




GRENADA DOCUMENTS: AN OVERVIEW AND SELECTION



Internat


A continuación le traslado algunas informaciones y apreciaciones sobre la reunión del Comité de la Internacional Socialista para la Defensa de la Revolución en Nicaragua, efectuada el 25 del presente mes de junio en Managua.

Esta reunión es la segunda que celebra el Comité. La primera se efectuó en Washington el 6 de diciembre de 1980.

El Comité fue creado oficialmente por iniciativa de Willy Brandt, en el XV Congreso de la Internacional Socialista celebrado en Madrid en noviembre pasado; quedó integrado por los siguientes miembros: Willy Brandt, Bernt Carlsson, Bettino Craxi, Michael Foot, Felipe González, Michael Harrington, Anker Joergensen, Bruno Kreisky, Michael Manley, Francois Mitterrand, Olof Palme, José Francisco Peña Gómez, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Michel Rocard, Pierre Schori, Mario Soares, Kalevi Sorsa, Joop den Uyl y Hans-Juergen Wischnewski.

Esta reunión es la segunda que efectúa el Comité; la primera se celebró en Washington el 6 de diciembre de 1980.

Entre las personalidades que asistieron a esta reunión en Managua, se encontraban Bernt Carlsson, Secretario General de la I.S.; Felipe González, presidente del Comité; Carlos Andrés Pérez de A. Democrática,



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Pierre Schori, del Partido Socialdemócrata Sueco y Michael Harrington del DROC de E.U., todos miembros del Comité.

Resultó muy significativa la ausencia de los germanoccidentales en la reunión, hecho que sin dudas revela la intención del SPD de moderar su actuación frente a la situación centroamericana e imprimirle a su gestión latinoamericana dentro la I.S. un perfil bajo y de menor compromiso con los procesos que en esa zona se desarrollan. Se adjunta carta enviada por el Secretario Internacional del SPD al Secretario Internacional de Partido Socialdemócrata Austriaco presente en el evento, - en ocasión de esta reunión.

Las presiones norteamericanas y la difícil situación interna por la que atraviesa el SPD, explican en buena medida la cautela germanoccidental frente a la Revolución Nicaragüense.

A partir de los contactos bilaterales que se desarrollaron con los participantes, el documento que se aprobó y el propio desarrollo de la reunión, consideramos:

- 1) Se observaron en general, dos tendencias entre los participantes. - Una, encabezada por Felipe González y Carlos Andrés, con abiertos -- objetivos neutralizadores, asumiendo posiciones de relativa presión interesados en dejar claramente expresado los límites de la "solidaridad de la I.S." con Nicaragua, y subrayando que el apoyo de la "I.S. es al "proyecto político democrático y pluralista". Este sector reflejó temores por el curso que a su juicio estaba tomando el proceso, y en especial por el asunto de lo que llamaron el suministro

tro de armas de Cuba y la URSS; en síntesis, preocupados por la --
"cubanización" y "sovietización" del proceso.

Esta tendencia, en términos cuantitativos era minoritaria, pero --
cualitativamente es la de mayor peso.

El otro sector, no hizo de estas consideraciones el centro de su --
atención, y en general mostraron comprensión e interés por conocer
objetivamente las dificultades del proceso, coincidiendo en censu--
rar a E.E.U.U. como el máximo responsable de la situación por la que
atraviesa Nicaragua y denunciado los peligros que acechan el pro--
ceso.

En esta línea se ubicaba Pierre Schori, Jim Fulton, del Nuevo Par--
tido Democrático de Canadá, Antoine Blanca, del Partido Socialista
Francés, entre otros.

- 2) Desde el punto de vista de los objetivos que el FSLN se propuso con
la reunión, a nuestro juicio se obtuvieron; se reconoció en la De--
claración aprobada por el Comité, los peligros y amenazas sobre el
proceso y se ratificó el apoyo de la I.S. al proyecto "políticos --
democrático y pluralista que tiene lugar en Nicaragua". Por otra --
parte, las declaraciones públicas formuladas por la mayoría de los
participantes, fueron en general positivas en la actual coyuntura--
para el proceso, pero muestran en alguna medida, las aprehensiones--
de algunos sectores con el actual rumbo del proceso.
- 3) Se evidenciaron las contradicciones y tendencias en el seno de la --
I.S. en cuanto a cómo encarar la política frente a Nicaragua y en --

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general la actitud a asumir frente a la problemática latinoamericana. Las presiones de los EE.UU. sobre la I.S. y los partidos que la integran, la difícil y compleja situación internacional y el curso que van tomando los procesos en la región, determinan que los sectores más derechistas en el seno de la I.S., adopten una posición de cierto repliegue y moderación, y se propongan evitar que la I.S. continúe comprometiéndose como hasta el momento, sin que ello signifique renunciar a los objetivos estratégicos de incidir en el rumbo de los procesos centroamericanos y en particular Nicaragua, con claros propósitos neutralizadores.

- 4)* Con esta reunión, la I.S., ha dejado expreso los límites de la "solidaridad" con Nicaragua, y de hecho sus sectores de derecha se propusieron ejercer presión e incidir directamente en el curso de la Revolución. No se trata de que la I.S. varíe estratégicamente su política frente a Nicaragua, pero sí mostrará en lo adelante mayor cautela y discreción, y estará muy atenta a los próximos pasos de la Revolución.

Finalmente, le adjuntamos una versión de la entrevista que sostuvo Bayardo Arce con Felipe González y Carlos Andrés, antes de iniciarse la reunión, y que refleja nítidamente la óptica de las posiciones de derecha en la I.S.

Con saludos revolucionarios,

Manuel Piñeiro Losada

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SECRET

tanques.

Pidieron a Bayardo que ellos quisieran tener una reunión con toda la Dirección Nacional, para abordar todos estos temas y otros que no se pueden tratar en el marco de la reunión de la I.S.

Bayardo resumió las dificultades y problemas que confrontaban, subrayando que ellos (los sandinistas) no eran los que cerraban las puertas, y que si todos los caminos se les cerraban a la Revolución, ellos tenían que acudir donde se les brindara la ayuda; que la revolución tiene que garantizar su derecho a subsistir y defenderse.

Respecto a los tanques y el armamento, Bayardo revirtió el problema, cuestionando por qué se hacía tanto ruido con ese problema, y nadie hablaba de los tanques ingleses que están entrando en Honduras. En síntesis no negó categóricamente el asunto, pero tampoco lo afirmó.

Refiriéndose a la aludida presencia cubana, Bayardo se preguntó de qué presencia cubana se trataba, agregando que acababa de venir de la Habana donde fue a convencer a Fidel para que se reponga en un plazo breve el contingente de maestros que saldrá próximamente, porque 60,000 niños se quedarían sin maestros, y ellos necesitaban 2,000, y hasta ahora nadie, ningún país se había ofrecido a enviárselos excepto Cuba. En esta línea, Bayardo argumentó todo el plan de colaboración de Cuba con Nicaragua.

Dijo además, que los sandinistas entendían perfectamente la situación que confrontaba la socialdemocracia y que incluso comprenderían que en un momento determinado, los socialdemócratas dejaran de apoyar la revo-

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lución; pero también pedía se asimilara cuales eran las alternativas que el proceso tenía ante sí.

En cuanto a la reunión que solicitaron con la Dirección Nacional en pleno, Bayardo evadió el asunto, argumentando razones de carga de trabajo, aunque, en una de las sesiones de la reunión, los participantes tuvieron la posibilidad de sostener un intercambio directo con los miembros de la Comisión Política (Bayardo, Humberto Ortega y Weelock).



CARTA ENVIADA POR HANS EBERHARD, SECRETARIO INTERNACIONAL DEL PARTIDO SOCIALDEMOCRATA AUSTRIACO A SU HOMOLOGO WALTER HACKER, DEL PARTIDO SOCIALDEMOCRATA DE AUSTRIA Y REPRESENTANTE DE BRUNO TERESKY EN LA REUNION DEL COMITE.

Bonn, 19 de junio de 1981

Profesor Walter Hacker
Secretario Internacional del
Partido Socialdemócrata Aus-
triaco.

Estimado Walter :

Con respecto a Nicaragua tengo que informarle que ni Willy Brandt ni Hans Juergen Wischnowski podrán asistir a la reunión del comité de la IS para la defensa de la revolución de Nicaragua que se celebrará en Managua el 25 de junio. Desafortunadamente tampoco podremos asistir Klaus Lindenberg y yo. Explicaremos esto directamente a los amigos nicaraguenses. De todos modos, hemos pedido a nuestro colega Lutterbach que actúe como observador en las discusiones y reuniones.

Willy Brandt le escribió a Felipe González y le expresó sus opiniones y las nuestras con respecto a ciertos acontecimientos que han tenido lugar en Nicaragua. Usted también debía leer esta carta.

Espero que usted esté de acuerdo conmigo en que nuestra solidaridad con la revolución no puede ser interpretada por algunos colegas sandinistas como un tipo de carta blanca para cualquier acción que lleven a cabo. Por muchas razones nuestra asistencia tanto en lo político como en lo moral no puede ser interpretada como si fuera en una sola dirección.

Supongo que conoce de la última lucha interna en el movimiento sandinista, con los hermanos Ortega enfrascados en una batalla desesperada contra los que practican la política de "mano dura" que muchos consideran que respaldados por Arce, Wheelock y Borge.

Con más interés que el de costumbre, deseo leer su informe, deseo saber si no debo ir a Estocolmo o debo encontrarme con usted a mitad del camino después de su regreso de Managua.

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8 JUL 1981

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Con relación al viaje de nuestro amigo Marten Van Traa y otros a -- Uruguay y Argentina considero que todo marcha bien.

Le escribí a Marten y le pedí que fuera precavido y prudente porque la situación real de Argentina está llena de complejidades; algunos círculos del gobierno seguramente agradecerían que se llevara a cabo cierto diálogo con nuestras fuerzas políticas en Europa siempre que no turben su orgullo nacional.

Con respecto a la reunión del Comité de la IS sobre América Latina y el Caribe que se celebrará el 25 de julio en Granada dudamos, por razones obvias, la razón y decisión de celebrar esta reunión en esa isla, podría ser interpretada por algunos como una provocación. Espero que nuestros amigos salvadoreños no serán los que más sufrirán por esto.

Saludos,

Hans Oberhard.

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4306 Bonn 19/6 1110 km.

EXE

professor walter hacker
internationaler sekretar der spoe
wien

lieber walter,

nachstehend beermittle ich dir, was ich an pierre shori und
marter van traas zu nikaragua, argentinier und ge grenada
geschrieben habe. elena flores hat auch kennnis davor:

"1. with regard to nicaragua i have to inform you that neither
willy brandt nor hans-juergen vischnevski will be able to
attend the meeting of the si committee for the defence of the
revolution in nicaragua at managua on june 25th. unfortunately
klaus lindenberg as well as myself are unable to come either.
we shall explain this directly to the nicaraguan friends. anyhow
we have asked our colleague lutterbach to act as an observer
to the discussions und gatherings.

willy brandt has written to felipe gonzales and expressed some of
his or our feelings concerning certain developments in nicaragua.
you should read that letter too.

i hope y you will agree with me that our solidarity with the
revolution cannot be interpreted by some of the sandinista

... many reasons... stance politically...
 ... cannot be understood... a one-way road.
 ... know of the... inflicting... the sandinista
 ... with the ortega brothers being in a desperate battle
 ... against the "yardliners" whom they think to be backed by arce,
 ... and borge.

With more than the usual interest I am looking forward to read
 your report, I am wondering if I should not come over to Stockholm
 or meet you halfway after your return from Managua.

As regards the trip of our friend Marten van Traa and
 others to Uruguay and Argentina I do hope that everything goes
 well.

I have written to Marten and asked him to use his caution and
 prudence the actual situation in Argentina is full of
 complexities, some circles within the government would certainly
 appreciate a certain dialogue with our political forces in
 Europe provided we do not stumble over their national pride.

With regard to the meeting of the SI Committee on Latin
 America and the Caribbean on July 25th at Grenada we doubt,
 for obvious reasons, the reason and the wisdom of that decision.
 I have ~~not~~ the meeting on that island. Some might regard it
 as a provocation. I do hope that our Salvadorian friends will
 not be those who will suffer most from that."

Miles gute und viel glueck fuer die reise
 erzuechtst

ein

ans--eberhard

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I TRANSFER TO YOU BELOW SOME INFORMATION AND APPRECIATIONS ABOUT THE MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE ~~REVOLUTION~~ REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA, HELD ON JUNE 25 IN MANAGUA.

THIS IS THE SECOND MEETING THE COMMITTEE CELEBRATES. THE FIRST ONE TOOK PLACE IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 6, 1980.

THE COMMITTEE WAS OFFICIALLY CREATED BY INITIATIVE OF WILLY BRANDT, IN THE XV CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL HELD IN MADRID LAST NOVEMBER; IT WAS INTEGRATED BY THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS: WILLY BRANDT, BERNT CARLSSON, BETTINO CRAXI, MICHAEL FOOT, FELIPE GONZÁLEZ, MICHAEL HARRINGTON, JAKER JOERGENSEN, BRUNO KETISKY, MICHAEL MANLEY, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND, OLOF PALME, JOSÉ FRANCISCO GÓMEZ, CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ, MICHEL ROCARD, PIERRE SCHORI, MARIO SOARES, KALEVI SORSA, LOOP EN UYL AND HANS-JUERGEN WISCHNEWSKI.

THIS MEETING IS THE SECOND ONE ~~ARRANGE~~ HELD BY THE COMMITTEE, THE FIRST ONE TOOK PLACE IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 6, 1980.

AMONG THE PERSONALITIES WHO ATTENDED HIS MEETING IN MANAGUA WERE BERNT CARLSSON, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE S.I.; FELIPE GONZÁLEZ, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE; CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ FROM DEMOCRATIC GERMANY; PIERRE SCHORI, OF THE SWEDISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT PARTY AND MICHAEL HARRINGTON FROM THE DSOC OF THE U.S, ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

IT WAS VERY SIGNIFICANT THE ABSENCE OF WESTERN GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE MEETING, WHAT UNDOUBTEDLY REVEALS THE INTENTION OF THE PD TO MODERATE ITS ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AND GIVE ITS LATIN AME

2ican negotiation within the S.I. A LOW OUT-
LINE LESS COMMITTED TO THE PROCESSES TAKIN
PLACE IN THAT ZONE. WE ENCLOSE LETTER SENT BY
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE SPD TO THE
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE AUSTRIAN SOCIAL-
DEMOCRAT PARTY PRESENT IN THE EVENT, ON THE
OCCASION OF THIS MEETING.

THE NORTH AMERICAN PRESSURES AND THE DIFFI-
CULT INTERNAL SITUATION THE SPD GOES THROUGH,
EXPLAINS TO A GOOD EXTENT THE WESTERN GERMAN
CAUTION TOWARDS THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

STARTING FROM THE ~~VARIOUS~~ BILATERAL CONTACTS
DEVELOPED AMONG PARTICIPATORS, THE DOCUMENT
APPROVED AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEETING
ITSELF, WE CONSIDER.

- 1) IT WAS NOTICED, IN GENERAL, TWO TENDENCIES
AMONG THE PARTICIPATORS. - ONE HEADED BY
FELIPE GONZÁLEZ AND CARLOS ANDRÉS, WITH
OPEN NEUTRALIZING OBJECTIVES, ASSUMING
POSITIONS OF RELATIVE PRESSURE INTERESTED
IN EXPRESSING CLEARLY THE LIMITS OF THE
"S.I. SOLIDARITY" WITH NICARAGUA, AND UNDER-
LINING THAT THE SUPPORT OF THE S.I IS FOR
"DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALIST POLITICAL PROJECT".

THIS SECTOR SEEMED TO BE AFRAID OF THE
COURSE THAT, TO THEIR OPINION, THE PROCESS
WAS TAKING, AND SPECIALLY OF THE MATTER
THEY CALLED THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS OF CUBA
AND THE USSR; SUMMARIZING, THEY WERE
WORRIED ABOUT THE "CUBANIZATION" AND
"SOVIETIZATION" OF THE PROCESS.

THIS TENDENCY, WAS INFERIOR IN TERMS OF
QUANTITY BUT QUALITATIVELY IT HAS MORE WEIGHT.
THE OTHER SECTOR, DID NOT BECOME THESE
CONSIDERATIONS, THE CENTRE OF ITS ATTENTION,

AND IN GENERAL DEMONSTRATED COMPREHENSION AND INTEREST TO KNOW, OBJECTIVELY, THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROCESS, COINCIDING IN CENSURING THE US AS MAXIMUM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SITUATION NICARAGUA GOES THROUGH AND DENOUNCING THE DANGER THAT THREATEN THE PROCESS.

IN THIS LINE WERE UBICATED PIERRE SCHORI, JIM FULTON, FROM THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADA, ANTOINE BLANCA OF THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, AMONG OTHERS.

- 2) FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ~~THE~~ OBJECTIVES PROPOSED BY THE FSLN, WE CONSIDER THEY WERE ATTAINED, IT WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE DECLARATION APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE, THE DANGERS AND THREATS ON THE PROCESS AND IT WAS RATIFIED THE SUPPORT OF THE S.I. TO "POLITICAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALIST PROJECT OF NICARAGUA". ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PUBLIC DECLARATIONS FORMULATED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTICIPATORS, WERE, IN GENERAL, POSITIVE FOR THE PROCESS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT SHOW TO A GIVEN EXTENT, THE APPREHENSIONS OF SOME SECTORS IN RESPECT TO THE PRESENT COURSE OF THE PROCESS.
- 3) IT WAS EVIDENCED THE CONTRADICTIONS AND TENDENCIES WITHIN THE S.I. IN CONNECTION WITH HOW TO FACE POLITICS TOWARDS NICARAGUA AND IN GENERAL, THE ATTITUDE TO BE ASSUMED BEFORE THE LATIN AMERICAN PROBLEM. THE PRESSURES OF THE U.S. ON THE S.I. AND THE PARTIES THAT COMPOSE IT, THE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE COURSE PROCESSES IN THE REGION

ARE TAKING, DETERMINE THAT THE MOST RIGHTIST SECTORS WITHIN THE ~~S.I.~~ S.I., ADOPT A POSITION OF CERTAIN CONVOLUTION AND MODERATION, AND PROPOSE THEMSELVES TO AVOID THAT THE S.I. CONTINUE TO COMMIT ITSELF AS IT HAS DONE SO FAR, WITHOUT IMPLYING THE RENOUNCIATION TO THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF IMPINGING ON THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PROCESSES, AND IN PARTICULAR ON NICARAGUA, WITH CLEAR NEUTRALIZING OBJECTIVES.

- 4) WITH THIS MEETING, THE S.I. EXPRESSED THE LIMITS OF THE "SOLIDARITY" WITH NICARAGUA, AND IN FACT ITS RIGHTIST SECTORS HAVE SET FORWARD TO EXERT PRESSURE AND IMPINGE DIRECTLY ON THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION. IT IS NOT THAT THE S.I. STRATEGICALLY CHANGES ITS POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA, BUT IT WILL DEMONSTRATE FROM NOW ON MORE CAUTION AND DISCRETION, AND WILL BE MORE ATTENTIVE TO THE NEXT STEPS OF THE REVOLUTION.

FINALLY WE ENCLOSE A VERSION OF THE INTERVIEW MAINTAINED BY BAYARDO ARCE WITH FELIPE GONZALEZ AND CARLOS ANDRÉS, BEFORE STARTING THE MEETING AND THAT CLEARLY REFLECTS VIEW OF THE POSITION OF RIGHT ~~E~~ IN THE S.I.

WITH REVOLUTIONARY GREETINGS

MANUEL PINFIRE LOSADA

BAYARDO PRCE TALKS WITH CARLOS ANDRES AND FELIPE GONZALEZ.

CARLOS ANDRES AND FELIPE, INDICATED THAT THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED OF THE DANGERS, THREATS AND PRESSURE BEING EXERCISED ON NICARAGUA, MAINLY BY THE U.S., AND THE DIFFICULT SITUATION THE PROCESS UNDERGOES. THAT PRECISELY WHAT THE U.S. WANT IS TO HARASS NICARAGUA, PUSH IT TO A RADICALIZATION OF THE PROCESS, AS TO HAVE PRETEXT AND EVIDENCES TO IMPLEMENT THE MILITARY AGGRESSION.

BOTH SHOWED THEIR CONCERN THAT THE SANDINIST DIRECTION MIGHT FALL INTO A SNARE AND SUIT THE U.S., AND ~~WHAT~~ TO THEIR OPINION, THEY WERE FALLING IN THE SNARE, THEREFORE IT IS NECESSARY THAT SANDINISTS TAKE THAT REALITY INTO ACCOUNT AND NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE PROVOCATED. SO IT IS QUITE INDISPENSABLE THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY PROJECT IS MAINTAINED WITHIN THE ~~FRAMEWORK~~ DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALIST FRAMEWORK AND THAT THIS WAS A CONDITION TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE S.I. THEY POINTED OUT THAT THEY (THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS) WERE IN A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, RECEIVING STRONG AND CONTINUOUS ~~AND~~ ROUGH ATTACKS AND PRESSURES FROM THE U.S.; THEY ADDED THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE GERMAN TO THE MEETING WAS A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THAT DIFFICULT SITUATION.

THEY EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS AN URGENT NEED TO DELIMIT A MINIMUM PLATFORM THAT SAFEGUARDS RELATIONS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY WITH THE NICARAGUAN PROCESS AND TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT IN CASE ~~THEY~~ ^{THEY} CONTINUE ~~BY~~ THE TENDENCY OF APPROXIMATION TO THE SOVIET BLOCK, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO BEAR THE

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PRESENT POSITION OF SOLIDARITY.

IN REFERENCE TO SOME MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY THE SANDINISTS, CARLOS ANDRÉS SUGGESTED TO DIMINISH THE CUBAN PRESENCE. BOTH MENTIONED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET PRESENCE PARTICULARLY THE TANKS.

THEY ASKED BAYARDO THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A MEETING WITH THE ENTIRE NATIONAL DIRECTION, TO APPROACH ALL THESE TOPICS AND OTHERS WE CANNOT DEAL WITH IN THE MEETINGS OF THE S.I.

BAYARDO SUMARIZED THE DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS BEING FACED, UNDERLINED THAT THEY (THE SANDINIST) ARE NOT THE ONES WHO CLOSE THE DOORS, AND THAT IF ALL THE PATHS ARE CLOSED TO THE REVOLUTION, THEY WOULD HAVE TO GO TO WHERE AID IS GIVEN. THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS TO GUARANTEE ~~ITS~~^{ITS} RIGHT TO SURVIVE AND DEFEND ITSELF.

IN RESPECT TO THE TANKS AND ARMAMENT, BAYARDO REVERTED THE PROBLEM, QUESTIONING WHY SO MUCH NOISE WAS MADE AROUND THIS PROBLEM, AND NOBODY SPEAKS OF THE ENGLISH TANKS THAT ARE ENTERING HONDURAS. IN SYNTHESIS, HE DID NOT DENY THE MATTER CATEGORICALLY, BUT HE DID NOT AFFIRM IT NEITHER.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLODGED CUBAN PRESENCE, BAYARDO ASKED HIMSELF WHAT CUBAN PRESENCE WAS THAT, ADDING THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM HAVANA WHERE HE TRIED TO CONVINCE FIDEL ABOUT REPLACING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE CONTINGENT OF TEACHERS THAT WILL DEPART IN SHORT, BECAUSE 60,000 CHILDREN WOULD BE LEFT WITHOUT TEACHERS, AND THEY NEEDED 2,000 AND SO FAR NOBODY, NO COUNTRY HAD OFFER THEM BUT CUBA.

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IN THIS POINT, BAYARDO ARGUED ALL THE COLLABORATION PLAN CUBA-NICARAGUA.

IN ADDITION HE SAID, THAT THE SANDINISTS UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY WELL THE SITUATION SOCIAL DEMOCRACY FACES AND THEY WOULD EVEN UNDERSTAND THAT IN A DETERMINED MOMENT, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ~~WOULD~~ WILL STOP SUPPORTING THE REVOLUTION, BUT HE ALSO ASKED TO ASSIMILATE WERE THE ALTERNATIVE ■ THE PROCESS HAS BEFORE ITSELF.

IN RESPECT TO THE MEETINGS THEY REQUESTED WITH THE WHOLE NATIONAL DIRECTION, BAYARDO GUARDED THE POINT, ARGUING REASONS OF EXCESSIVE WORK, ALTHOUGH, IN A SESSION OF THE MEETING, PARTICIPATORS HAD THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING A DIRECT EXCHANGE WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSION (BAYARDO, HUMBERTO CRISTO AND WEE LOCK)

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SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA

LETTER SENT BY HANS EBERHARD, INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY TO HIS COLLEAGUE WALTER HACKER, OF THE AUSTRIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY AND REPRESENTATIVE OF BRUNO KRISKY IN THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE

Bonn, June 19, 1981

PROFESSOR WALTER HACKER
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE
~~GERMAN~~ AUSTRIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT
PARTY.

ESTEEMED WALTER:

In connection with Nicaragua I have to inform you that neither Willy Brandt nor Hans Jürgen Wischnewski will be able to attend the meeting of the S.I. committee for the defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution to be held in Managua on June 25. Unfortunately neither Klaus Lindenberg nor me can attend. We'll explain this directly to our Nicaraguan friends. Anyway, we have asked our colleague Lutterbach to act as observer in the discussions and meetings.

Willy Brandt wrote to Felipe González and expressed his opinions and ours in respect to certain events that have taken place in Nicaragua. You should also read that letter.

I hope you agree with me in that our solidarity with the Revolution can not be interpreted by some Sandinist colleagues as a kind of white card for any action they carry out. On the many reasons our assistance both in politics and

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MORALITY CAN NOT BE INTERPRETED AS IF IT WERE
IN ONLY ONE DIRECTION:

I SUPPOSE THAT ^{YOU KNOW ABOUT} THE LAST INTERNAL STRUGGLE
IN THE SANDINIST MOVEMENT, WITH THE BROTHERS
ORTEGA DEVOTED TO A DESPERATE STRUGGLE AGAINST
THOSE WHO PRACTICE THE POLICY OF "HARD HAND"
THAT MANY CONSIDER IS INDORSED BY ARCE, WHELLOCK
AND BERBE.

WITH MORE INTEREST THAN USUALLY, I WANT TO
READ YOUR REPORT, I WANT TO KNOW IF I SHOULD
NOT GO TO STOCKHOLM OR I MUST MEET YOU
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WAY IN YOUR RETURN FROM
MANAGUA.

IN RELATION TO THE TRIP OF OUR FRIEND MARTIN
VAN TRAP AND OTHERS TO URUGUA AND ARGENTINE,
I CONSIDER EVERY THING IS GOING OK.

I WROTE MARTIN AND ASKED HIM TO BE CAREFUL
AND PRUDENT BECAUSE THE REAL SITUATION OF AR-
GENTINE IS FULL OF COMPLEXITIES, SOME RULING
CIRCLES ~~W~~ WOULD SURELY THANK TO HAVE A
DIALOGUE WITH OUR POLITICAL FORCES IN EUROPE
PROVIDED WE DON'T AFFECT THEIR NATIONAL PRUD

IN RESPECT TO THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE
THE SI ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
TO BE HELD IN JULY 29 IN GRENADA, WE DOUBT,
DUE TO OBVIOUS REASONS, THE REASON AND DECISION TO
HELD THIS MEETING IN THAT ISLE, COULD BE INTER-
PRETED BY SOMEONE AS A PROVOCATION. I HOPE OUR
SALVADORIAN FRIENDS ARE NOT THE ONES WHO SUFFER
THE MOST AS A RESULT.

GREETINGS,

HANS EBERHARD

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SORRY NOT TO HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO TYPE
IT. TIME PRESSURED
ME. James

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Translation of Document #33

The following is a transcription of some notes on the meeting of the Socialist International Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in Nicaragua, held the 25th of this month of June in Managua. This meeting is the second held by the Committee. The first took place on December 6, 1980 in Washington.

The Committee was officially created on the initiative of Willy Brandt, at the XV Congress of the Socialist International held in Madrid last November; it consisted of the following members: Willy Brandt, Bernt Carlsson, Bottino Craxi, Michael Foot, Felipe Gonzalez, Michael Harrington, Anker Joergensen, Bruno Kreisky, Michael Manley, Francois Mitterrand, Olof Palme, Jose Francisco, Pena Gomez, Carlos Andres Perez, Michel Rocard, Pierre Schori, Mario Soares, Malevi Sorsa, Joop den Uyll, and Hans-Juergen Wischnewski.

Attendees at this meeting in Managua included Bernt Carlsson, Secretary General of the Socialist International; Felipe Gonzalez, chairman of the Committee; Carlos Andres Perez of Accion Democratics; Pierre Schori of the Swedish Social Democratic Party; and Michael Harrington of the DSCC of the United States, all members of the Committee. The absence of one of the West Germans proved to be very significant, since it undoubtedly reveals the intention of the SPD to moderate its actions vis a vis the Central American situation and to give its Latin American administration within S.I. a low and less conspicuous profile with developments in that region. Attached is a letter sent by the International Secretary of the SPD to International Secretary of the Austrian Social Democratic Party on the occasion of this meeting.

U.S. pressures and the difficult domestic situation experienced by the SPD explains in good part the West German caution toward the Nicaraguan Revolution. From the bilateral contacts developed with the participants, the document which was approved, and the development itself of the meeting, we considered:

1) In general, two tendencies were observed among the participants. One, led by Felipe Gonzalez and Carlos Andres, with open, neutralizing objectives, assuming positions of relative pressure interested in clearly expressing the limits of "S.I.'s solidarity" with Nicaragua, and stressing that the support of S.I. is to the democratic and pluralist political project. This faction reflected fears of the course which, in their judgment, the process was taking, and especially of what they called the supply of Cuban and Soviet arms; in short, concern over the "Cubanization" and "Sovietization" of the process. This tendency, quantitatively, was in the minority, but, qualitatively, carries the most weight. The other faction did not give much attention to these considerations

and in general showed understanding and interest in getting to know objectively the difficulties of the process, joining in censuring the U.S. as the most responsible for the situation in Nicaragua and denouncing the lurking dangers in the process. On this side could be found Pierre Schori, Jim Fulton, of the New Democratic Party of Canada, Antonie Blanca, of the French Socialist Party, among others.

2) From the point of view of the objectives that the FSDN proposed for the meeting, in our opinion, they were accomplished. The dangers and risks of the process were recognized in the Declaration approved by the Committee and S.I. support was voted for the "Nicaraguan democratic and pluralist policy" project. On the other hand, the public declarations formulated by the majority of the participants were generally positive, but showed to some degree the apprehensions of some factions with the current direction of the process.

3) The contradictions and tendencies within S.I. were highlighted insofar as how to deal with the policy toward Nicaragua and, in general, the attitude to assume toward the Latin American situation. U.S. pressures on the S.I. and its parties, the difficult and complex international situation and the course being followed by the processes in the region, determine that the most right-wing factions in the heart of the S.I. adopt a position of conciliation and moderation, and propose to avoid that the S.I. continue to behave as it has been up until now, without renouncing the strategic objectives of influencing the direction of the Central American and, in particular, the Nicaraguan processes with clear neutralizing proposals.

4) With this meeting the S.I. has made clear the limits of its "solidarity" with Nicaragua, and in fact its right-wing factions proposed to exert pressure and direct influence on the course of the Revolution. This is not a case of the S.I. strategically varying from its policy toward Nicaragua, but rather demonstrates, to the highest degree possible, caution and discretion, and it will watch very closely the next steps in the Revolution. Finally, we attach a copy of the interview that Bayardo Arce had with Felipe Gonzalez and Carlos Andres, before the meeting started, which clearly reflects the viewpoint of the right-wing positions in the S.I.

With revolutionary best wishes
[signed]
Manuel Pineiro Losada

Conversation Between Bayardo and Carlos Andres and Felipe Gonzalez

Carlos Andres and Felipe indicated that they were absolutely convinced of the dangers, threats, and pressures which were being exerted on Nicaragua, principally by the U.S., and the difficult situation which the process is experiencing. That precisely what the U.S. wants to do is harass Nicaragua, pushing it into a radicalization of the process, and thus giving itself a pretext and evidence for implementing military aggression.

Both were worried that the Sandinista junta would fall into this trap and play into the hands of the U.S. and that, in their judgment, it was already doing so; therefore, the Sandinistas must take into account that reality and not let themselves be provoked. So it becomes absolutely indispensable that the revolutionary project be kept within the democratic and pluralistic guidelines, and that this was the condition for maintaining the support of S.I. They indicated that they (the social democrats) were in a very difficult situation, undergoing strong and continuous attacks and pressures from the U.S.; they added that the absence of the Germans at the meeting was a clear example of that difficult situation.

They stressed that it was urgent that a minimal platform be drawn up which protects the relationship of social democracy with the Nicaraguan process and that they come to some understanding. That to continue the trend toward closeness with the Soviet bloc, it would be very difficult to sustain the present position of solidarity.

Referring to steps which could be taken by the Sandinistas, Carlos Andres suggested a decrease in the Cuban presence. Both mentioned the concern over the Soviet presence and in particular the tanks. They requested that Bayardo set up a meeting for them with the whole National Junta to bring up all of these questions and as well as others outside the framework of the meeting of the S.I.

Bayardo summarized the difficulties and problems which they faced, emphasizing that they (the Sandinistas) were not the ones who had closed doors, and that if all the roads were closed to the Revolution, they would have to go where they could get help; that the revolution has to guarantee its right to continue to exist and defend itself.

Regarding the tanks and weapons, Bayardo went over the problem, questioning why so much was being made of that problem when nobody was saying anything about the English tanks which were entering Honduras. In sum, he did not categorically deny the matter, but neither did he confirm it.

Referring to the previously alluded to Cuban presence, Bayardo wondered what Cuban presence was being talked about, adding that he had just returned from Havana where he went to convince Fidel to quickly replace the contingent of teachers which will soon leave since 60,000 children will be left teacherless, and 2,000 are needed, although up until now no one, no country has offered to send any except Cuba. Bayardo argues the plan of Cuban operation with Nicaragua along these same lines.

He also said that the Sandinistas understood perfectly the situation faced by social democracy and even understood that at a given point in time the social democrats would cease to support the revolution; but he also asked that the alternatives be considered.

Insofar as the meeting that was requested with the full National Junta, Bayardo evaded the issue, citing reasons of workload, although, in one of the meeting's sessions, participants had the opportunity to engage in a direct interchange with the members of the Policy/Political (?) Commission (Bayardo, Humberto Ortega, and Wheelock).

Letter Sent By Hans Eberhard, International Secretary of the German Social Democrat Party, to his Counterpart Walter Hacker, of the Austrian Social Democrat Party and Representatives of Bruno Kreisky in the Committee Meeting

Bonn, June 19, 1981
Professor Walter Hacker
International Secretary of the Austrian Social Democrat Party

Dear Walter:

Regarding Nicaragua, I have to inform you that neither Willy Brandt nor Hans-Juergen Wischnewski will be able to attend the meeting of the S.I. committee for the defense of the Nicaraguan revolution to be held in Managua on June 25. Neither, unfortunately, will Klaus Lindenberg nor I. We will explain this directly to our Nicaraguan friends. At any rate, we have asked our colleague Butterbach to act as an observer in the discussions and meetings.

Willy Brandt wrote Felipe Gonzalez and gave him his and our opinions on certain things which have taken place in Nicaragua. You should also read this letter.

I hope that you agree with me that our solidarity with the revolution cannot be interpreted by some Sandinista colleagues as carte blanche for whatever they do. For many reasons our assistance not only politically but also morally cannot be interpreted as if it were in only one direction.


I suppose you know of the last internal struggle in the Sandinista movement, with the Ortega brothers enmeshed in a desperate battle against those who advocate the hard-line policy considered by many to be supported by Arce, Wheelock and Borge.

With more than normal interest, I would like to read your report and to know if I should go to Stockholm or meet you halfway on your return from Managua.

With respect to the trip of our friend Marten Van Traa and others to Uruguay and Argentina, I expect that everything is going well. I wrote to Marten and asked him to be careful and prudent because the real Argentinian situation is full of complications; some government circles will certainly be thankful that a dialogue has been started with our political forces in Europe as long as we do not upset their national pride.

Regarding the meeting of the S.I. Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean to be held July 25 in Grenada, we question, for obvious reasons, the rationale and decision to hold this meeting on that island; it could be interpreted by some as a provocation. I hope that our Salvadoran friends are not the ones to suffer most because of this.

Best Wishes
Hans Eberhard



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**REPORT ON THE GENERAL CONGRESS OF THE WORLD CENTER FOR THE
RESISTANCE OF IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM, RACISM AND REACTION.**

FROM: The N.J.M. Delegate
TO: The Central Committee of the N.J.M.
DATE: June 26th, 1982.

Comrades, I left Grenada on June 11th to attend what I was informed to be a Conference in Solidarity with El Salvador. It was only on my arrival in Cuba, together with delegates from other Caribbean Revolutionary and Democratic Parties and Organisations that I learnt the true Character of the Conference in Libya.

On Saturday June 12th the Caribbean Delegates met with Cde Phinera, a member of the Central Committee of the P.C.C. in charge of American Affairs. He explained to us the nature of the Conference and put forward key guidelines for our approach to the major issues of the meeting.

ie(1) That we should avoid giving support for the idea of Libya being the center of the World anti-imperialist struggle and its military implications of a rapid Deployment force against imperialism.

(2) That we should only give solidarity expressions for the proposed World Center.

(3) That the Secretariat of the World Center should include Latin American and Caribbean Revolutionary Forces, he also said that Cuba will be participating as Ospal in the Congress and that they would be leaving that very night for Libya.

After the meeting with Cde Phinera the Caribbean Delegates continued to meet to analyse the new information and to take some common positions. The full implications of Cuba's participation in the Congress as Ospal and not as the PCC suddenly dawned on us and was a source of great concern but this did not prevent us from taking common decisions ie:

(1) That the English speaking Caribbean take a multi-lateral approach to Material assistance from the Libyans for the different Organisations and Parties, as compared to the Bi-lateral approach which can give range for organisations requesting arms, and its possible repercussions in terms of imperialist reaction.

(2) The tentative decision that N.J.M. should speak on behalf of the Caribbean, because there were other Caribbean Delegates who took another route to Libya, because they also received invitations from the Libyan Embassy in Guyana, and therefore would have to be consulted with, on the decisions.

N.J.M. agreed to speak on behalf of the Caribbean but pointed out its concern over the level of Cuba's participation in the conference, The fact that they were not attending as the PCC indicates the low profile being taken by the Cubans and that it is of concern to us since Cuba is the leader of the Revolutionary Movement in this part of the world. We should therefore express our concern about this to Cde Otto Marreza.

W.P.J. response was that it seems that N.J.M. is implying, taking a low profile if Cuba is doing the same and since they are the two parties with State Power, therefore in that case the other Organisations should not speak and infact we should go underground.

The Libyans met with us on Monday June 14th and apologised for not getting in contact with us earlier. We left Cuba that day and arrived in Libya on Tuesday 15th June. We were driven to the Congress from the Airport. There were Delegates from over 80 States and 240 Organisations at the Congress.

The opening session of the General Congress included a welcoming address by the Congress Chairman, The feature address by the Libyan Leader and Solidarity statements. The Leader's address was adopted as a Working Paper of the Congress Papers.

The second day of the General Congress included a Morning session of Solidarity Statements. During the latter part of the morning session, The second item of the Congress was introduced. The draft Charter of the World Center or the World Sanctuary was presented verbally to the Congress, None of the Delegates had a written Copy of the draft, But sometime later Copies of the draft Charter was brought to the Congress Center while it was still being read.

After all delegates received copies of the draft, it was suggested that since the document was not studied before, the Congress should break for lunch so that delegates could study it. On resumption the draft was discussed and amendments were called for in the documents. A redrafting Committee was set up, and delegations submitted their admendments in writing to the Committed The third Day of the General Congress was Characterized by Solidarity State-ments.

The closing session of the General Congress focused on three Major items i.e. (1) The ratification of the Charter. (2) The ratification of the Tri-poli Declaration. (3) The setting up of the organs of the Sanctuary Comp-rising The General Secretariat of the Congress and the selection of the Sec-retary General.

The New Draft was ratified after much comments and criticism about it. At one time it appeared as if the Congress would break up in confusion and disarry. Criticism flew across the hall at the Latin American Delegates from Arab and African Delegates generally. The Latin Americans called for amend-ments to the Charter and a break in the Meeting so that they can meet among themselves first, and with the Libyans and the redrafting Committee after. The Chairman called for all amendments to be in writing. It was clear that the Arab Belegations and African Delegations like, Benin, Ghana, Senegal and Uganda comprised the Core of the fprces which wanted the Charter ratified as presented by the redrafting Committee.

There were expressions from several delegations of the fact that they were invited to Libya to attend a Conference in Solidarity with El Salvador and now being confronted with the real nature of the Conference, they cannot concretely commit themselves to the center because they have no mandate from their organisations to do so. They suggested bringing back the documents home so that their organisations can study them.

The question of the membership of the Soviet Union in the Center was raised. It was pointed out that the Center is for the small Countries of the world, The Third World Countries, not for the big Countries. One or Two delegations also pointed out that the Latin Americans were trying to prevent the ratification of the Charter because the Soviet Union was excluded from membership. This charge was denied by the Latins saying, that all they wanted were some amendments to the New draft Charter.

The Congress adjourned for 30 minutes at the request of the Latins. On Resumption the Latins put forward their proposed amendments i.e. :

- (1) That all reference to the United Nations be removed from the draft.
- (2) That the Word 'Unifed' be removed from objective Two of the Charter.
- (3) That the word 'Weapon' be deleted from the Charter.

The Congress accepted the amendments and the Charter was ratified.

The second item the Tripoli Declaration was discussed. Suggestions were made on adding some details to the declaration and it was also ratified. The Chairman of the Congress presented the third item of the closing session. The item included the setting up of the General Secretariat and the Secretary General. The Congress agreed that the Secretariat be composed of the representatives of 18 Countries and Organisations. There were proposals for membership of the Secretariat of a number of Countries.

PROPOSALS FOR MEMBERSHIP

- 1. Iran 2. P.L.O. 3. Lebanon 4. Libya 5. Ghana 6. SWAPO
- 7. Senegal 8. Cyprus 9. Greece 10. El Salvador 11. Nicaragua
- 12. Cuba 13. Syria 14. Egypt 15. Polisario 16. Benin 17. Seychelles
- 18. Chile 19. Grenada.

Grenada was proposed for membership by W.P.J. Zimbabwe and Vietnam were also proposed for membership. El Salvador and Nicaragua withdrew from proposed membership in the Secretariat and suggested Guatemala.

Grenada was proposed for membership again by Seychelles. Other Countries proposed themselves for membership.

Bolivia took the floor and told the congress Chairman that Grenada has been proposed again and again and that he was not responding to the proposal, therefore she would like to propose Grenada for membership again.

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The entire Congress showed its approval by exploding into loud applause. The Chairman said that we had agreed on 18 members which we now have, but it seems that you want it to be 19, - more loud applause, Grenada was accepted as a member of the Secretariat. The Secretary General of the General Secretariat was bestowed on Libya.

The Secretariat met at 12 noon on Saturday June 19th. Cuba was not informed in time of the meeting, so that the Leader of the P.C.C. delegation Cde. Fundora and other top members had already left Libya. Only Cde. Luis was in Libya and he represented Cuba at the meeting only as an observer.

I and the rest of the Caribbean delegation left the Hotel at 11 a.m. to attend a meeting at the International Green Book Center, up to that time I was not informed of the Secretariat Meeting, but I met with the Cuban Delegate Cde Luis who brought me up to date on the meeting. He said that the meeting of the Secretariat was a complicated one. Some Countries did not understand changes in the names of members of the Secretariat. Nicaragua El Salvador membership was a major issue. The Arabs suggested translations problems as reason for the issue. The Libyans want a meeting with Nicaragua and El Salvador to find out why they do not want to be members of Secretariat.

Some members of the Secretariat were concerned about the Latin Americans behaviour. The Libyans suggested outside pressure from the Soviet Union through Cuba on the other Latin Countries.

The question of Grenada membership was not challenged.

Cuba was proposed a member of the Executive Committee in the meeting along with Benin, Iran, Syria, and Libya.

Secretariat to meet in six (6) months again.

Based on this report and the attached documents, and detailed analysis of the global situation, our party will have to decide whether Grenada should participate in the World Center for resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism and Reaction.

Gordon...H...


THE CARIBBEAN DELEGATION

The Caribbean Delegation Comprised the following Representatives.

ANTIGUA - TIM HECTOR -A.C.L.M.
 BAHAMAS - LIONEL CAREE - VANGUARD
 BARBADOS - FRANCIS BELLE - MONALI
 DOMINICA - BILL RIVIERE - D.L.M.
 - PIERRE CHARLES - D.L.M.
 GRENADA - GODWIN HORSFORD - N.J.M.
 GUYANA - MICHAEL CHAN - P.P.P.
 - ROHIT WILLIAMS - P.P.P.
 JAMAICA - ELEAN THOMAS - W.P.J.
 - MAXINE HENRY - P.N.P.
 ST. LUCIA - GEORGE ODLUM - P.L.P.
 - MIKE PILGRIM - P.L.P.
 - EARL BOSQUET - W.R.M.
 ST. VINCENT SIMEON GREENE - U.P.M.
 TRINIDAD/TOBAGO
 MICHAEL ABEUDEEN- P.P.M.

There were sharp differences in views among delegates from the Caribbean on issues regarding a Common approach to material assistance from the Libyans and also who should speak on behalf of the Caribbean. N.J.M., W.P.J., W.R.M. and P.P.P. generally carried a common position on these two issues and generally had a common outlook on most issues.

There was a line that Cuba was using Grenada to influence the other Caribbean parties and organisations. The reason I believed that this line developed was the fact that Cuba was always keeping in touch with Grenada. Cuba always contacted Grenada to invite the Caribbean to the Latin American and Caribbean meeting, and generally made Grenada aware of the behind the scenes issues involved in the Congress and what is their position and general guidelines for us to follow.



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- A) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
- B) LIST OF ANNEXES
- C) TEXT OF THE REPORT

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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

1. The 15th Congress of the S.I. held in Madrid and conceived as the programmatic grounds for the projection of the so-called democratic socialism in the 80's, could not implement the political basis for the offensive initially conceived by that international organization.
2. Various concurring factors in the field of international relations, the election of Ronald Reagan, the world's economy and East-West relations contained in the text of this report affected this.
3. The Congress could rather be defined as the expression of a policy of expectation and of partial tactical retreat of the S.I.
4. Despite the aforementioned, it should be stressed that the S.I. maintained, in essence, its basic global positions set forth at the Geneva and Vancouver Congresses which opened a new stage in the international organization's political life.
5. It can be stated that the policy toward Latin America became the central issue and the probatory touchstone of the S.I.'s opening to the Third World and of its will to confront the new Republican Administration.

Undoubtedly, the contradictory nature of the actions of international Social Democracy lies in its very roots. In its Latin American projection, obviously without losing its feature of being a permanent adversary of the left and of the revolutionary forces it becomes a tactical ally of the latter; an important ally in the peoples' democratic and anti-imperialist struggle.

The effective use of the tactical space offered by the forces of social reformism in this juncture, will depend greatly on the left's ability and capability to project it to serve its own objectives in the struggle; a clear proof of which has precisely been the scenario of the Congress.

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the Social Democrat's reformist project --in the face of the harsh socioeconomic reality of our continent, characterized by a deepening of the system's structural crisis and a growing polarization of the class struggle --has, objectively, no cristalization prospects whatsoever in most of our countries.

6. In spite of these restrictive circumstances, the Congress fully ratified Western Europe's will to practice an independent policy with respect to the United States in all vital matters of international life.

This is evidenced in the:

- Petition of the ratification of SALT-II
- Adherence to the convening of the Pan European Conference on Disarmament.
- Support to the proposed moratorium or to the non-stationing of new intermediate range missiles in the area.

7. In the Congress, judgements were passed on the problems of Afghanistan, Cambodia and Poland, as well as on the arms race with expressions which, although of anti-Soviet content, differed in emphasis.
8. In the item or chapter devoted to African problems, an underlying political reference is made of our country concerning that region, although in a general context it implies other nations.

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
9. The existence of multiple trends and nuances within the attending Social Democratic parties and personalities became manifest in the Congress, which reiterates our criteria on the heterogeneity of the reformist movement in our times.
10. The S.I.'s social reformist theoretical basis became manifest in issues such as the economic crisis, North-South Dialogue, problems of employment, etc., although the progressive nature of some of its central approaches on these matters should be acknowledged.
11. In our view, the Congress as a whole ratified the convenience of maintaining a line of access to the S.I.'s political information sources and of frequent relations with its activities, specially under the circumstances of the Republican Party's rise to power in the presidency of the United States..

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REPORT ON THE 15TH CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL - MADRID,
NOVEMBER 13-16, 1980.

The purpose of this report is to make a global political assessment of the results of the S.I.'s Congress and of the agreements contained in its General Resolution, the only document adopted at the meeting. References on the most significant activities that took place within the framework of the Congress that permitted, through different channels, the knowledge of important political situations in the Social Democracy's leadership and in many of its component factors are also included. This report excludes the minutes of the working sessions, the analysis of the delegations' speeches, press conferences and other activities which, due to their lengthy nature, would require a different treatment.



The preparatory work for this Congress and the direction given to it at various previous meetings of the Bureau of the International, as well as the documents and reference available to us, clearly indicate that the objective of the S.I. leadership was to turn the Madrid Congress into a new important offensive in the worldwide political strategy of Social Democracy, stressing that this Congress was to substantiate and make a breakdown of the so-called "projection of the S.I. in the 80's".

In other words, the attempt was to strengthen S.I.'s activities and to arrive at political statements that would mean an important step forward in the implementation of the three main objectives set forth at the 1976 Geneva Congress and ratified at Vancouver in 1978. As is known, they are: to expand East-West cooperation; a plan of measures for the solution of the North-South conflict and to promote

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human rights. Coinciding with said goals, the Third World phase or phase of rupture with Eurocentrism that continued developing in subsequent years, was opened. As foreseen, the new political objectives of the International were to be contained in a new programmatic platform whose drafting project was entrusted to a working group presided over by Felipe González and made up by Vice Presidents Reulf Steen and Karel van Miert of Norway and the Flemish Socialist Party (Belgium) respectively. The idea was to elaborate a set of doctrines of the S.I. or declaration of principles, structurally similar to the one adopted at Frankfurt in 1951 but that would basically underline the political tasks that constitute the S.I.'s present profile and to express its main present political goals in a more invigorated way.

As is known, the preparatory work of S.I.'s Congress covers a lengthy period to plan their activities, in which the Bureau of the international body establishes various tasks related to the preparation of the reports and proposals that will be debated within the framework of the Congress. In order to have more information available concerning the preparatory stages of the Madrid Congress and of the aims we have referred to, at the end of this report there is a list of the main documents to be consulted as references.

Unquestionably, the international junctures which occurred during the last months of the preparatory stage of the Congress, critically affected the plans of the International to turn the Congress into a new basis for the projection of its worldwide political activity. In our view, among the most relevant facts in this regard, the following can be mentioned: Ronald Reagan's election as President of the United States; the suspension of the Conference on European Cooperation and Security in Madrid; the events in Poland; the Iraq-Iran

war and its repercussions in the region; the sharpening of the international economic crisis and particularly its effects on the industrialized countries of the West.

We believe that the impact of these situations can be clearly observed, with respect to the Congress, by examining two of its documents:

1. Opening speech of the Congress, delivered by the President of the S.I., Willy Brandt.
2. The introductory speech on the Declaration of Principles by Felipe González, where reference is made to the inconvenience of presenting at the Madrid Congress a new programmatic basis, postponing its elaboration for the next Congress, using various pretexts.

If to all the aforementioned elements we add the information about the strong pressures exerted on the S.I.'s leadership and on Brandt himself by the US State Department of which we learned through Latin American delegations' sources, one understands even more clearly the political context within which the S.I. leadership had to work in its Congress. The main US pressures that we learned of were:

1. A personal letter of Secretary of State Edmund Muskie addressed to Willy Brandt, about which he reported of the Bureau to stress the pressures being exerted on him.
2. Various documents of the State Department itself where concrete demands are made on the treatment of the situation in El Salvador and Central America. (see annexed list).

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Due to the aforementioned, one can understand that the frustration of the S.I.'s initial plans and the difficult political circumstances in which the Congress was held, made Brandt himself ask publicly the following in his opening speech. "I don't know what will be the fate of mankind in the 80's: How would I know will be that of the S.I.?"

The verification of the aforementioned political circumstances led us to state, in different messages sent during the initial days of the Congress, that attitudes of retreat were being observed in the S.I. in the face of the new situations. We believe that the final results introduced some alternative elements, specially concerning Latin America which we shall later on discuss, that would indicate that the strategy adopted before the existing difficulties by the leadership of the S.I. could be defined more accurately as a "waiting stage" or as a policy of expectation and restraint awaiting for the development of international events.

We shall now break down the main formulations of the text of the Final Resolution adopted, using as reference the draft prepared by the already mentioned working group (Circular 89/80) and the different versions containing the modifications resulting from the political debate during the Congress. In our comments, we shall refer to the confidential information and political circumstances that allow us to make assessments of some of the problems put forth.

The aforementioned draft presented as a basis for discussion and forwarded to the members of the Bureau on September 17, 1980 was elaborated by the Resolutions Committee that met in Bad Neuenahr, FRG, on September 14. The Committee was presided over by Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, Vice Chairman of the SPD and the following affiliated parties:

- British Labour Party
- New Democratic Party of Canada
- Radical Party of Chile
- French Socialist Party
- Social Democratic Party of Germany
- Labour Party of Israel
- Social Democratic Party of Italy
- Social Party of Japan
- Socialist Party of Senegal
- Workers' Socialist Party of Spain (WSPS)
- Social Democratic Party of Sweden
- UISY

In our opinion, the text is deliberately moderate and extremely cautious in its political statements. It could be said that, by omission, it was poor and weak. The reasons for this were, undoubtedly, the heterogeneity of the Drafting Committee on the one hand, and the purpose

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for the document to serve exclusively as basis for the debate in the Congress on the other.

It should be pointed out that Latin America was dealt with in an obscure and indiscriminate fashion, and that the global approach on Latin America proved hollow, politically weak and negligent.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the draft contained two issues of major importance to measure the S.I.'S political position:

- Support to the French-Polish idea favoring a European Conference on Disarmament, which undoubtedly was a bridge with the socialist countries.

- Petition of the immediate ratification of SALT-II, which naturally clashed with the election of the Republican candidate in the United States.

Since the first working day of the Congress (November 13), the efforts of the rightist and conservative sectors of the International aimed at depriving the text of the previously mentioned positive features and at introducing wordings denoting anti-Sovietism and enhancing the ideological values of Social Democratic reformism became manifest. Through various friendly sources worth mentioning -- some Latin-American delegations, Pierre Schori and members of the WSPS participating in the organizational work -- we learned of the passionate debate on this issue in the Bureau meeting.

On the 14th, a second draft General Resolution -- which we obtained through the same sources -- also circulated confidentially among the members of the Bureau. As can be seen in this text, the debate within the Bureau resulted in the inclusion of various issues: the Afghan problem;

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events in Poland; charge on the USSR's alleged arms-race policy; and to restrain the formulation of economic problems only to monetary and commercial matters. As to Latin American matters, the text reflected, however, some of the main problems of the region, although still in a weak and insufficient manner.

Saturday evening (November 14 to 15) a very lengthy session of the Bureau was held -- also reported to us by the same sources -- which resulted in the formulation of a third draft General Resolution. In general, this was the text finally adopted by the plenary on Sunday 16th with the addition of three topics proposed by the delegations of the countries concerned: Cyprus, Malta and Grenada, aimed at highlighting, of course, the political objectives of their respective S.I. member parties (EDEK, consultative party; Labor Party of Malta, full member; and New Jewel, admitted as full member during this Congress).

In its introduction, the document describes the present international situation by the aggravation of the economic crisis, the speeding up of the arms race, the deepening of the North-South gap, and the increasing violation of human rights. As can be noted, all these assertions oppose the S.I. programmatic objectives. It goes on affirming that "peace is threatened more seriously than at any other moment in the past ten years and relations among the great powers have worsened considerably". We believe that the S.I. deliberately starts with such a statement to conceal the sharp differences in the political atmosphere of the Madrid Congress and the previous Geneva and Vancouver Congresses, where the atmosphere was of relative success.

Additionally, -- and this can be considered undoubtedly as a victory of the progressive positions and of the will to oppose the future Republican Administration -- the International calls for the ratification of SALT-II.

although in a subtle manner backs the beginning of the SALT-III negotiations soon. In this chapter of the text, a formulation remained -- which, in our opinion, is the most important concession of the Congress to US interests -- stating that should negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons be suspended, this "could lead to the USSR's greater accumulation of new missiles" It should be understood that in spite of the negative content of this formulation, it does not fail to reveal also a pressing intention on the United States.

Another element contained in the introduction is the Iran-Iraq conflict. After referring to its dangerous nature, the document cautiously speaks of the actions Olof Palme had just initiated, by making his success lie on "the commitment of non-interference by the great powers and the nations of the region". According to our knowledge, it seems that Palme's actions were preceded by a commitment expressed in the form of a declaration of intentions by the factors potentially involved in the conflict favoring the actions and refraining from any material implications in the confrontation between the two countries.

Following the introduction, the Polish issue is dealt with also in cautious terms although reiterating the reformist S.I.'s traditional stand on the organized labor movement to be found also in Brandt's opening speech.

Another significant element is the insistence on the need to safeguard the continuation of the Madrid Conference on European Security and cooperation. It should be stressed that this formulation becomes particularly important if we take into consideration that the atmosphere in Madrid and the general political assessments concerning the Conference seemed to indicate that a general blocking of its possibilities to go beyond the formal opening on November 11. Without doubt, the strong support given by the S.I. to the Conference was aimed at highlighting a constructive position as opposed to the situation prevailing then.

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It is also particularly important that, although limitedly, the introduction contains support to the holding of a European Conference on Disarmament. We believe it reveals the interest of the International to please the positions of the French, the SDP and of a group of major European social democratic parties, and also constitutes a political gesture towards the socialist countries, particularly the USSR.

Immediately, the Resolution approaches a chapter on the economic crisis, stressing its aggravation and stating that it is "the proof of the existing economic order's inability to achieve a more just distribution of wealth". Analyzing this paragraph within S.I.'s characteristic approach, we believe that it presents more advanced theoretical formulations than those agreed upon in the Geneva and Vancouver Congresses, since, although the International naturally stresses its false distribution solution as a remedy for economic exploitation and insists on the formula of productivity and purchasing power increases as miraculous panaceas, it is also true that the need for reform in the international economic order is clearly established and opposition to the thesis on the solutions through free market economies is formulated, which undoubtedly constitutes a direct attack against the US Republican Party's policy.

Then comes an extremely brief chapter on Europe that reflects caution and care in its formulation. It contains, however, two very significant aspects:

- a) Reiteration of S.I. support to all measures contributing to the withdrawal or non-stationing of new intermediate-range missiles in Central Europe, which is an endorsement of the idea of a moratorium promoted by the FRG.

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b) Reiteration of the need for Western Europe to express and publicize its own interests and responsibilities concerning the problems of world peace, even by opposing them to the United States.

Both issues without doubt reveal two basic aspects of S.I.'s political objectives in Europe and, in its broader sense, in East-West relations, and clearly emphasize the will of not yielding before the new US Administration. In a conversation with Francois Mitterand at a reception given at the Ayuntamiento de Madrid, he said that the inclusion of these two issues in the Resolution meant a face-to-face confrontation with the United States and embodied the will of the S.I. to persevere in its objectives.

Concerning the Middle East, the most relevant element was the decisive and full support given to the efforts of the Labor Party of Israel to return to the government of that country. It is noteworthy to stress that the leadership of the S.I. undoubtedly took two bold measures that reveal its degree of commitment in this connection. On the one hand, Brandt, Kreisky and Felipe González, among others, signed a joint document together with the Egyptian Foreign minister Boutros Ghali and Shimon Peres himself -- which was afterwards mentioned in the Resolution only in terms of "noting", thus revealing the degree of internal debate aroused. In this connection, we were able to learn that in the Bureau meeting where this topic was dealt with, a sharp confrontation aroused in which the position that intended to make the Congress adopt a more direct support to the content of the Declaration in its Resolution was defeated by 14 votes against 5.

Moreover, the Congress decided to acknowledge consultative status to the MAPAM Party of Israel, inviting it to make up a joint representation with the existing member party.

The position adopted on the Middle East became one of the most vulnerable points and a critical factor for Brandt himself, who was blamed on several

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occassions during the press conference held at the closing of the meeting,
as can be seen in the Memoires published.

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Moreover, as can be seen in the Resolution, the formulation on the Palestinian problem actually does not go beyond the Camp David Agreements established by the governments of Israel and the United States.

We believe that a relevant element in the chapter devoted to the Middle East is the recognition of Malta's new policy of Neutrality; this position of the S.I. should lead us to a closer examination of the present actions of the government of Malta -- which has recently adopted firm stands on issues as important as Italian-Maltese and Libyan-Maltese relations -- and Malta's position at the Belgrade Conference on the European Security and Cooperation Conference, which was further stressed in the present round of negotiations in Madrid. This topic is interesting when determining the degree of Yugoslav influence in Malta's policy.

In the chapter devoted to Asia two central elements should be pointed out:

1. The position on China
2. The treatment of the Cambodia and Afghanistan problems.

As for China, the strategy adopted by the S.I. clearly favors the position of the US, enhancing the new Chinese policy of broader "international dialogue". It is significant that the Resolution also denotes interest in the development of events in China.

It should be pointed out that in spite of our inquiries in this respect, we could not learn of the presence on any Chinese officials in the Congress with any capacity.

Concerning the Cambodian and Afghan problems, the Resolution calls for a "reconciliation of the Cambodian people to guarantee its neutrality".

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And although no reference is made on Vietnam or on any specific claims -- which are expressed in connection with the situation in Eastern Timor and the presence of Indonesian troops there -- undoubtedly, the nature of the demand is negative.

In the case of Afghanistan, it should be pointed out that the S.I. adopted an overtly aggressive style in stating "that it is terrified and deceived" because the USSR has not yet withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan, and concludes saying that it "supports the resistance of the Afghan people to the occupation of the country". In a conversation held with many journalists attending the Congress and in the speeches delivered by most speakers at the Congress, an extraordinary insistence on the Afghan problem as an element of denunciation of the USSR became manifest. These circumstances should be taken into consideration when evaluating this part of the text.

Lastly, in connection with Asia, India's position as a decisive force in the Non-Aligned Movement is stressed, but no further mention of the Movement itself or its policies is made.

As for the chapter devoted to Africa it is also extremely brief, and is dealt with very conventionally, as usual in S.I.'s congresses and conferences. Its main considerations refer to the denunciation of the South African regime and the struggle against apartheid. The S.I. seems to consider that the phenomena of class exploitation, neocolonialism and military dictatorships in the region do not exist.

We wish to stress that this Congress Resolution contained an entirely new formulation which constitutes an implicit attack against ~~the African Horn~~ the African Horn demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the African Horn conflict "and others".

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The only positive element to be stressed in this chapter is the actual recognition of the POLISARIO Front within the context of the reaffirmation of the right of the Saharan people to self-determination.

The analytical section of the Resolution that refers to Latin America and the Caribbean is specially significant both for its content and for its length, when compared with the rest of the Resolution. An assessment of the document reveals a sharp contrast between the chapter devoted to Latin American problems and the treatment of other topics such as détente, disarmament, the Middle East, Africa, and others. The chapter devoted to Latin America is undoubtedly the most positive and advanced in the document.

The most important issues in the analysis of the Latin American situation were:

- Central America, particularly El Salvador
- Latin America policy of the new US Republican Administration
- Nicaragua

It is enlightening to note the positions contained in the Resolution that show the positive trend we have already referred to:

- a) "The Socialist International challenges the US government to put an end to its political and military support to the present Salvadorian Junta and to admit its inability to prevent more bloodshed. We reject the thesis of the Salvadorian problem is that of a Junta fighting against an extreme right or an extreme left. It is rather that of a despotic regime whose actions have led to a state of civil war".

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- b) "We believe that the victory and achievements of the Nicaraguan revolution reflect the expectations for social change in the entire region. We reiterate our support for the Sandinista National Liberation Front".
- c) "The Socialist International voices its solidarity with the people of Grenada and our new affiliated party, the New JEWEL Movement. The International will never admit foreign interference in the economic or military affairs of Grenada".
- d) "The Socialist International seriously warns against any attempt from foreign powers at interfering in the internal affairs of Latin American and Caribbean countries".
- e) "We are concerned about some remark of the then Republican candidate to the presidency of the United States on Latin America, particularly his expressions of support to the dictatorial regimes of El Salvador and Guatemala, and his attacks against Grenada and Nicaragua.. We hope that our fears be groundless. We will await for the political statements of the new Administration before passing judgement. But we see the attitude of the new Administration towards Latin America and the Caribbean as a sample of its stand towards the whole world".

To sum up, the position of the S.I in the Final Resolution on El Salvador represented a defeat for the United States and Latin American center right sectors, who could not impose their thesis.

From the point of view of the progressive and left forces, the analytical chapter on Latin America is in essence -- given the present international juncture-- undoubtedly positive and to a great extent meets the objectives pursued in this context.

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Suffice it to reiterate that the first draft Resolution represented a set back not only when compared with the results of the Santo Domingo Conference but also with what was stated at the previous Vancouver Congress; it was simply hollow, full of rethorics, and avoided any definition on the most burning and relevant problems of the continent.

In this positive evolution of the Resolution concerning Latin American issues, the action of the delegates from MNR and FDR of El Salvador and the Nicaraguan delegation headed by Commander Bayardo Arce was most influential.

The behavior of the three key elements in the analysis of the Latin American situation -- the Europeans, the Latin American group and the actions of the US State Department -- gives an approximate picture of the contradictions and trends dealing with the treatment of the Latin American issue in the Congress.

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a) The Europeans

In general, the position of European parties on the Latin America reality was good; this was reflected both in public addresses in the plenary and in the Bureau meetings and bilateral conversations and contacts. The Spanish, Swedes, English Laborites, Dutch, Finns, Belgians, French, Canadians, among others, were part of this trend.

To give an example: the drafting of the paragraph where the S.I. challenges the United States to put an end to its political and military support to the present Junta in El Salvador, was proposed by Jenny Little from the British Labour Party, when Willy Brandt was presiding over one of the Bureau sessions. It was also she, who, together with the PKP delegation from Jamaica, defeated a motion presented by Fanny Simon from the US Social Democratic Party against Cuba, which received only one vote in favor, from said party.

The German Social Democratic Party which was divided into two main trends on the Latin American problem deserves special mention: one trend was led by SPD Vice Chairman, Hans Jürgen Wischniewski with more conservative positions and more susceptible to US influences, and the other led Willy Brandt with a realistic and receptive attitude towards the positions of the most progressive and radical sectors of the Latin American group.

It must be taken into account that Wischniewski has been leading the conversations of the SPD with the State Department on S.I.'s positions on Latin America.

In his opening and closing speeches, Brandt ratified S.I.'s line of solidarity with the Nicaraguan Revolution and of support for the struggle

in El Salvador, which means to reject U.S. strong pressures to change the situation. It was precisely at the second Bureau meeting where the wording of the Latin American chapter was discussed, that Brandt sarcastically revealed that he had received a letter from Secretary of State, Muskie, stating that the positions of the S.I. Congress on El Salvador should be strictly moderate.

b) The Latin American group

In the Latin American group, differences were more clearly defined:

- The center right sector, led by Carlos Andrés Pérez, Daniel Oduber and the Panamanian representation led by Blandón. The main objective of this sector was to make the S.I. change positions on Central American realities, particularly on El Salvador, attempting to receive support for an alleged immediate political or negotiated solution of the Salvadorian conflict and for this to be included in the Congress Resolution on those terms. They cited the military weakness of the revolutionary forces in El Salvador and their incapability to defeat the army, stating that negotiations were the sole solution — which would in essence entail the capitulation of the revolutionary forces and the implementation of a formula acceptable by the United States. Basically, this position agrees with the alternatives the State Department is planning for El Salvador.

- The center left sector, made up by Peña Gómez, Anselmo Sule and Jorge Arturo Reyna, did not speak in favor of the positions of the center right sector but maintained an eclectic attitude and showed little activity, reflected ups and downs and attempted to conciliate the formulations of the most progressive and left sectors.

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- The sector of progressive and revolutionary forces, made up by the Salvadorian representatives (DEU, FDR and MNR), Commander Bayardo Arce of the FSLN, Jamaica's PNP, the New JEWEL of Grenada, and others. The positive role played by Manuel Ungo and Hector Oqueli of the MNR should be stressed, as well as the work done by Commander Bayardo Arce. The main objective of these forces was to thwart the maneuvers of the center right, strongly stimulated by the Panamanians, and avoid a set back of S.I. positions on Latin America and the Caribbean.

To this end, a plan of action was scheduled to held meetings and contacts with the main European and Latin America^d leaders, the results of which were positive.

c) Actions of the US State Department

After the Santo Domingo Conference, the State Department intensified its efforts and activities to change the policy the S.I. was following toward Latin America and the Caribbean which, as is known, shows important signs of friction with the Latin American projection of Carter's Administration.

Contacts and meeting^s took place before the holding of the Congress among State Department officials and Social Democracy leaders. The main interest for the US government remained unchanged: to avoid the S.I.'s condemnation of the Junta in El Salvador and actually to promote its support, and to prevent criticisms on the policy of the United States toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

As stated before in this report, during the Congress we learned of four documents that had been distributed by the State Department and the US Embassy in Madrid, in which the basic issue demanded was for the "Socialist International to condemn the use of violence whatever its

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origin, making an appeal to all those involved in the conflict of El Salvador to stop the violence and accept the mediating offers of the bishops".

It was also learned, on the other hand, that the State Department sent a large group of officials for lobbying, including Roy Prosterman, who is well known for his participation in setting up the "strategic villages" in Vietnam and for his being at present an adviser in the implementation of the agrarian reform intended for El Salvador. Also present, and on the same job, was Rey Prendes, the Major of San Salvador, who was sent by the Americans.

The continued presence of the US Ambassador to Madrid, Terence Todman in the Congress halls was also common.

In making a comparative analysis of this Congress' section on Latin America and the Caribbean with the previous Congress, one clearly observes important progress. The formulations adopted relate to the most important issues of the region's political life at present and to a large extent meet the objectives that the progressive and revolutionary forces aspired to have reflected in the document, although when compared with the Santo Domingo Conference, there are important elements that are not contained in the Resolution of the Congress:

- Support to the struggle of the people of Puerto Rico for their independence, an itchy issue for the United States, that brought about strong reactions on the part of the State Department.
- The recognition of the "legitimacy of the use of violence when other paths to attain the peoples' objectives of liberty and social justice are closed".

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In this regard, it is significant that no reference was made about the Santo Domingo Declaration, while only satisfaction was expressed on the September 13, 1980 Declaration of the Latin American Parties meeting in Caracas. This was, undoubtedly, a concession to the United States.

On the other hand, one should not forget that due to this forum's hierarchy, the weight and significance of the statements on Latin America contained in the Resolution of the Congress relevantly go beyond the scope of the Declaration of Santo Domingo, which was a regional meeting.

In our view, the reasons that explain the positive projection of the position on Latin America adopted by the 15th Congress of the S.I. are the following:

1. Since the early part of this decade, the S.I. started to make a turn in its relations with the so-called Third World and specially with our region. This change takes place within a period of deepening of the structural crisis of State monopoly capitalism, which imposes new demands on the main European countries. The collapse of the system of colonial domination, the blows dealt to the traditional structure of neo-colonial domination beginning with the change in the international correlation of forces and the economic attraction the countries of the region offer, are basic elements behind the actions of the Socialist International.
2. Undoubtedly, Latin America is a touchstone of the political opening of the S.I. to the so-called Third World. There are factors of greater socio-economic development and of the region's socio-classist structure among others, that offer Social Democrats better possibilities of influence when compared to other areas of the underdeveloped world.

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3. On the other hand, we cannot lose sight of the existence of interimperialist contradictions, mainly between the FRG and the United States. West Germans are aware of the changes occurring in the continent and of the transformations that will undoubtedly take place in the future; they also know that this reality is affecting and will affect US hegemony to a great extent. Their aspiration, in the face of this displacement, is to guarantee space and influence that, to be efficient, must count on the credibility and acceptance of the democratic, progressive and even left forces of the area.
4. The way the Congress dealt with Nicaragua is truly illustrative. The Nicaraguan Revolution is, without doubt, a trial test for the S.I. policy toward Latin America. The establishment of an International Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution and the support of the S.I. to the Sandinista Front, is an unmistakable proof of its interest to continue making efforts to influence this process, which is decisive for their influence work in the area and specially in Central America.
5. In the Congress, therefore, a set back in the positive formulations the S.I. had maintained on Latin America and the Caribbean until then, would have meant the failure and collapse of a policy that represents the main achievement Social Democracy can show in its Third World projection; and an open defeat of its efforts to neutralize revolutionary processes in the continent.
6. The prospect for the new Republican Administration's Latin American policy has aroused fear and almost the conviction of important sectors of the European Social Democracy that Reagan will militarily attack Latin America. In our view, that assumption favored the

receptive attitude of most European Social Democratic Parties in the Congress before the positions adopted on the area. From their point of view, it is a matter of warning the new Administration to act persuasively in the future policy to be implemented by the US Government.

The last part of the General Resolution contains, in various sections, the main problems for the 80's from the S.I. point of view. Undoubtedly, what was most significant was the statement contained in the second paragraph of this chapter in the sense that "The political pendulum has moved to the right in certain parts of the world".

The treatment given to the remaining items, through having once again a bearing on the Social Democrats' theoretical ground, shows some formulations that are more positive than others in past Congresses and Conferences. This is particularly significant concerning the:

- Treatment of the role of transnationals, while underlining the need of their subordination to the "peoples' interests".
- Deep reforms, not only in the international monetary system, but also in its institutions.
- Formulation of a thesis on the overcoming of the economic crisis in the developed world that rejects the unilateral interpretation of its inflationary origin and proposes a world-wide social solution in the search for employment sources.
- Adoption of the postulates of the Report of the Brandt Commission, which basically implies the ratification of its most positive considerations.

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Presentation: Social Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean (until 197

In this presentation we intend to examine how Social Democracy has become ever more active in Latin America and the Caribbean in the past few years, which are the objectives and characteristics that make up its projection in the area, which are the elements that have conditioned it and the true possibilities Social Democrats count on to develop their strategy in the continent.

In the past five years, the international Social Democracy has intensified its activities in the so-called Third World, specially in Latin America and the Caribbean, showing particular interest in expanding its political space and influence in this region.

It is timely to recall, --in order to evaluate the true dimensions of this offensive -- that Social Democracy as a political trend had, until then, expressed itself basically as a European phenomenon. This does not mean, nevertheless, that our sub-continent was marginated within the framework of the strategic interests of certain European Social Democratic parties such as the German Social Democratic Party that -- as an expression of West German monopoly interests and through the "renowned" Friedrich Ebert Foundation -- created the basis for its work of systematic and long-term penetration in the area. The establishment of the Latin American Institute for Social Research (ILDIS) in Chile (1966) and of the Center for Democratic Studies on Latin America (CEDAL) (1968) proves this.

Although it is true that since the 70's the SI maintained relations with some Latin American parties such as the Socialist Party of Uruguay, the MNR of Bolivia, APRA in Peru, amongst others, these relations were very weak and lacked true prospects.

On the other hand, Latin America's political history does not record the existence of a significant movement which could be defined as Social

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Democrat -- in view of its goals, programs and structures, if we use as point of reference the European Social Democratic pattern, -- except in the English-Speaking region of the Caribbean, where they emerged under the protection and incentive of the colonial bonds with the British Labour Party.

In our Opinion, many elements condition and explain to a great extent the deployment of the SD's efforts to plant itself in the so-called Third World countries, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.

1.- One of the basic reasons are the new demands and pressures on the main European countries originated by the deep structural crisis of State monopoly capital -- in the form it had in the 40's and the 50's. The collapse of the system of colonial domination, the blows dealt against the traditional structure of neo-colonial domination that started with the changes that occurred in the world's correlation of forces, greatly affecting the so-called Third World, demand actions from State monopoly capital to overcome the crisis.

2.- For European Social Democracy --especially for parties in power -- the economic attraction of the so-called Third World countries becomes greatly important: market possibilities for their products; the transfer of processing industries; cheaper labor and, above all, the revaluation of raw materials as a relevant element in the productive process.

The following data concerning the FRG-Latin American relations are illustrative in this respect.

According to official 1978 reports, Latin America is the most important recipient country of the FRG's goods and capital when compared with Asia and Africa. The FRG is the main commercial partner of Latin America of the capitalist European countries.

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In the field of capital investments, an accelerated increase of West German presence is observed; in the past 10 years, investments have multiplied by five. In 1978, West German investments in Latin America represented 63,3% of their total investments in the so-called Third World and 13.5 % of the total direct investments of the FRG abroad.

3.- On the other hand, the estimates of the Social Democracy concerning Latin America take into account the existence of historical and cultural bonds and similarities of the latter with the Old Continent and the most favorable conditions offered by the area's dependent capitalist development (when compared with Africa and Asia) in terms of class structure and of more appropriate socio-economic conditions when compared with the rest of the underdeveloped world to implement the Social Democratic project .

Seen from a different prospect, this SD offensive is launched in a period of development of military dictatorships and of the establishment of fascist regimes in the continent as a result of the deep crisis in the representative democratic-bourgeois system and of the development of the revolutionary and democratic forces; in this manner, Social Democracy presents itself as an "alternative to save the system" by offering an alleged path that would exclude both fascism and socialist revolutions.

The following statements by some of the most outstanding European Social Democratic leaders, contained in an exchange of letters between Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme and Bruno Kreich from 1972 to 1975 are truly eloquent.

In one of these letters, Olaf Palme states: "The talks I have had during the past few years with representatives from Third World countries have indicated that those countries are searching for their own path in a world like today's, subject to a clear polarization of forces...Most Third World countries reject both Soviet communism and US capitalism and do not accept

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any of those systems as valid development models. The strength and value of Social Democracy lies in the fact that it does not constitute a political threat for these countries at all".

Palme goes on saying: "What we do want is to have close and open contacts with these countries and discuss with them the problems that the world's progressive forces are faced with. Our International cannot become an exclusively European organization. We must find responsible and non-bureaucratic formulas to make of the International a forum open for debates and the cooperation of representatives from all over the world. To do this, the basic thing is not that we all fully agree on all ideological matters".

On his part, Willy Brandt stated: "We should not end this exchange of views without clarifying our criteria on which is the best way to improve cooperation among Social Democrats and other forces of similar ideology throughout the world. In order to efficiently carry out this task, our International is quite limited. We must attain a flexible and non-schematic cooperation with political forces from other parts of the world that somehow coincide with our parties although with different starting points ."

Brandt goes on saying: "Let us take Central America as an example. There are various parties there that come very close to what we understand as democratic socialism, but these parties do not fit within a framework as rigid and conditioned by traditions as the Socialist International. Therefore, some form of exchange of views among our parties and theirs would have to be found...We should speak of fundamental theoretical matters, but also of basically practical topics. We should be flexible enough to establish contacts with these forces and find common fields of action in spite of possible differences. This is an important goal for all European Social Democrats".

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The 13th Congress of the SI, held in Geneva in 1976, considered the new changes that were taking place in the projection and relations of Social Democracy with the so-called Third World, specially Latin America and the Caribbean; it planned the SI's interest to overcome its Eurocentrism and expand its political space; a special resolution on Latin America was adopted for the first time, denouncing the military dictatorships and existing repression in various countries of the continent; the Dominican Revolutionary Party and Costa Rica's PLN were added to the list of SI's member parties and Accion Democratica and Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, both from Venezuela, and Paraguay's Partido Revolucionario Febrerista were given consultative status, thus making up a total of 5 new full member parties and 3 with consultative status. Daniel Oduber of the PLN of Costa Rica and Anselmo Sule of the Partido Radical de Chile were elected vice-chairmen of the organization, which is significant if we take into account that Latin Americans had access to those positions for the first time.

It should be stressed that the documents adopted did not contain the traditional formulations of obstinate anti-communism of the times of the "cold war" that had characterized SI's stand, which, naturally, does not mean it has abandoned the anti-communist objectives that inspire the organization, nor the negative references to socialist countries.

Besides, the so-called "democratic socialism", expression of the doctrines of contemporary bourgeoisie reformism, was not stressed as an "alternative project" between capitalism and communism; a certain flexibility of the stubborn stand concerning relations with other communist parties and progressive forces took place.

Since the 13th Congress of the SI was held up to now, the activities and actions of the SI concerning Latin America have multiplied: holding of international meetings, visits of delegations of the organization and of

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its main leaders to various countries of the continent have taken place, such as those of Willy Brandt, Mario Soares, Al Herand and Felipe Gonzalez; added to this is the fact that at all ordinary meetings of the SI Bureau, the Latin American issue has been relevant.

These actions of the SI have included denunciations of the military and fascist dictatorships of the area in such terms, the ceasing of repression, the need to make democratic changes and the promotion of the so-called "democratic socialism" as a feasible alternative for the countries of the continent in the face of decaying capitalism and "totalitarian socialism".

To this one must add the meetings and reunions that have been held on various occasions and that had not been officially convened by the SI, that is, not organically committed to it and that counted with a large participation of Latin American parties, including some of the left. This type of informal meetings are part of the SI's policy of dialogue and rapprochement with the progressive and left forces of the area, outside of its organizational framework using for this purpose somewhat powerful parties such as Mexico's PRI, Venezuela's AN and Portugal's PS, amongst others.

In general, the agreements and resolutions of this type of meeting have had a marked progressive content, even to the point of denouncing the US for its policy on the area.

The international Social Democratic organization showed particular activity concerning the struggle of the Nicaraguan people against Somoza, waging an international solidarity campaign with their struggle and speaking in favor of the armed line as an exception in the case of Nicaragua, as stated by Willy Brandt at the 15th Vancouver Congress held in November last year.

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Representatives of over twenty parties and political organizations of Latin America attended this meeting and two resolutions signed by them were adopted, a general one on Latin America and another one supporting the independence of Puerto Rico, which were basically more progressive than the one officially passed by the Congress on the area. Besides, four Latin Americans were elected as Vice-chairmen of the SI, two other parties of the area joined the organization and the establishment of a Committee of the SI on Latin America was proposed.

Let us now briefly examine, strictly from the Latin American perspective, the real forces Social Democracy counts with in the region.

At present, there are 10 Latin American parties organizationally linked to the SI. As full members we have: Partido Socialista de Argentina, Barbados Labour Party, Partido Radical de Chile, Partido Liberacion Nacional de Costa Rica, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, El Salvador's Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, Jamaica's Peoples National Party and with consultative status: Partido Revolucionario Febrerista de Paraguay, Acción Democrática and Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, both of Venezuela.

Undoubtedly, in spite of its heterogeneity in classist terms, these ten parties are a political expression of the interests of sectors of the bourgeoisie in their respective countries; this general classist framework does not, of course, exclude the difference in the class compositions of the parties, a circumstance that, among others, gives each party a more or less liberal or progressive, or more or less conservative orientation.

On the other hand, we should add that some of these parties, like the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Jamaica's PNP and Costa Rica's PLN to a lesser degree, represent important forces of the small and middle bourgeoisie and, above all, the former one, whose influence reaches somewhat large sectors of the people, counting with leaders of the charisma of Francisco Peña Gómez, Secretary General of the PRD.

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Besides, it should be stated that out of these parties, there are four with a specifically important influence in the political life of their respective countries:

- in Santo Domingo, the PRD won the past elections and is, without doubt, the main political force of the nation,
- the PNP of Jamaica was elected to government by a majority support.
- Venezuela's AD and Costa Rica's PLN continue being, in spite of having lost the majority in the past elections, the most important political forces in their respective countries.

There is another group of organizations and parties in the sub-continent which, although presently lacking organizational bonds with the SI, have relations and contacts of relative importance with said organization, or move within the sphere of influence of the "Social Democratic trend", or if anything, flirt with it.

Among the main forces of this category, we have the following organizations:

- Partido Revolucionario Hondureño
- Frente Unido de la Revolución de Guatemala (FUR)
- Partido Socialista Democrático de Guatemala
- Partido Revolucionario Institucional de México (PRI)
- Partido Liberal de Colombia
- Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda de Bolivia (MNR-I)
- Izquierda Democrática de Ecuador
- Unión Cívica Radical de Argentina
- Partido Revolucionario Democrático de Panamá
- Partido Intransigente de Argentina
- Partido Socialista Unificado de Argentina
- APRA de Peru
- Partido Trabalhista Brasileño

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- Partido Democrático de Curazao
- Partido Independentista de Puerto Rico

These organizations have attended the activities, seminars and meetings sponsored by the S.I. or the West German SDP, and most of them have declared their ideological adherence to the Social Democratic trend.

The differences in the programmatic formulations, national projections, composition and actual political force in their respective countries among the parties listed above are unquestionable. However all these parties establish their political projects and actions within the framework of the capitalist system and in line with representative democracy.

There is another group of parties and movements, a minority indeed, which has maintained irregular and peripheral contacts with the S.I. or some major European social democratic parties. We are referring to the Montoneros, the Partido Socialista Uruguayo, the Partido Socialista Revolucionario del Peru, sectors within the Partido Socialista of Chile and the PSLN, among others.

These revolutionary and left forces affirm that they have nothing to do with social democracy ideologically -- in some cases we have no doubts --, and that they simply use these contacts circumstantially to promote their objectives in the struggle, in terms of requesting solidarity for their causes, denouncing fascist regimes, and so on.

The parties organically linked to the S.I. -- which we have mentioned -- declare with varied approaches, their basic programmatic goal to be the so -- called democratic socialism based on the theoretical and ideological bequest of Bernstein's revisionism of the Second International which Lenin brilliantly defined and rejected in his struggle against this trend.

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To this we must add that these parties vindicate, to a greater or lesser degree, the alleged solutions offered by European Social Democracy to the serious problems the countries of the area face. In the socio-economic field they favor a just redistribution of income, the creation of stable sources of employment for all, demand fair treatment in international economic relations, more advantageous prices on raw materials, and so on; in the political sphere they demand a democratic opening, the elimination of military and fascist regimes, respect for individual freedom, and others.

In analyzing the past six years of European Social Democracy's activity it is imperative to record an objective fact: in 1973 European Social Democrats had more or less stable links with 8 or 10 related organizations in the area, while at present more than 24 parties are linked with Social Democracy.

Let us now review how do other mechanisms of the European Social Democracy — specifically West German as predominant force in the S.I.— operate in the continent, to do its penetration work in the area in order to promote its strategic objectives.

We are referring to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a tool of the German Social Democratic Party and, to be exact, of West German monopoly capital.

The essential objectives of this institution in the area can be briefly described as follows:

- to create favorable conditions for West German capital penetration and the promotion of its economic interests in the region,

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- to curb and/or neutralize the revolutionary movement by encouraging the development of the political forces related to Social Democracy,
- to subtly nurture anti-communism and hostile activities against the socialist camp.

These aims, of course, are not manifest nor evident in the activities carried out by the foundation. An outstanding feature of its work is its subtle and refined methods and practices.

For this purpose, it relies on training and research institutions covering almost all countries of the area, such as the Costa Rica-based Center for Democratic Studies on Latin America, and the Latin America Institute for Social Research with branches in Caracas and Quito. It also has experts and advisors on different matters in charge of representation offices in various countries of the continent.

Through all these means it organizes numerous international seminars and training courses for trade union, peasant, business, youth, political party leaders and others.

Moreover, it provides material and financial support to political parties and movements that favor the Social Democratic trend.

CEDAL alone organizes some 65 to 70 varied annual seminars in which approximately 2000 persons participate every year. It is estimated that CEDAL operates on a 2-2.5 million dollar annual budget.

It is appropriate to recall, as an example, the holding of an International Seminar in Solidarity with Nicaragua convened last April

by CEDAL to assess the situation in Nicaragua and agree upon concrete solidarity actions with the FSLN, the Patriotic Front and the Group of Twelve, as was publicly announced.

Apart from the representatives of the main Nicaraguan groupings that fought against Somoza, this meeting was attended by 19 parties and organizations from 13 countries linked with the Social Democracy.

The following significant formulations in the resolutions of this event are worth mentioning:

- the denunciation of US policy of intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean, specially Carter Administration's abetment of Somoza's regime. Imperialism was condemned and denounced by name;
- recognition of the need for unity of the left in every country and in Central America; therefore, a proposal was advanced for launching a campaign to resolutely struggle against anti-communist and anti-socialist mentality;
- the Central American projection of the struggle that was then being waged against Somoza was stressed, and it was literally stated that: "Nicaragua's liberation transcends to the freedom of other Latin American peoples such as Guatemala and El Salvador, and that the will to support Nicaragua's liberation, will mean the promotion of freedom for the Guatemalan and Salvadorian peoples."

An overall assessment of the results of the event we have referred to should inevitably include the following:

- First, it was an international meeting of Social Democracy-related parties but not binding on the S.I. organically since it was held outside of its structure.

- Second, the positive formulations and decisions made passed the filter of coined phrases — also included in the document — such as "changes only in democracy and freedom", "social justice in freedom" and others obviously intended to differentiate them from the achievements of real socialism.

- Third, in the case of Nicaragua, European Social Democracy knew well that the struggle waged against Somoza was irreversible. On the one hand, they tried to prevent that process from becoming a true revolution of socialist nature while searching for a possibility to obtain political and economic benefits in a Somoza-free Nicaragua. In this respect, FRG's intention to compete with the US is evidenced in its clear purposes of appearing as "alternative partner", taking advantage of the anti-US sentiments and positions of a majority of the Nicaraguan opposition forces.

- Lastly, we must not lose sight of the positive role played in the Seminar by Jamaica's PNP, Guatemala's FUR and PSD, El Salvador's MNR and by most representatives of the Group of Twelve, the Patriotic Front and the FSLN.

To sum up we would like to conclude with the following considerations on the abovementioned items:

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1. We see a dual nature in the projection of Social Democracy in Latin American and the Caribbean. On the one hand, it does represent a permanent enemy of the essential objectives of the communist and left movements in that this trend intends to prevent the triumph of socialist revolutions and the materialization of the communist ideal. On the other, it is obvious that certain political positions of the Social Democracy can be used by the revolutionary and progressive forces of the continent at given junctures of the struggle against the repressive and fascist military regimes and of the confrontation with US imperialism.
2. Hence, in our view, while ideological struggle against this trend is necessary, we should implement ways and methods of case-by-case treatment of the parties related to Social Democracy whose positions coincide with certain tactical objectives of the Latin American revolutionary movement.
3. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that, although in the main contradiction of our times between capitalism and socialism, led by US imperialism and the USSR respectively, Social Democrats as a whole are on the imperialist side up to now, is not always from a position of mere satellites, since inter-imperialist contradictions also affect social democracy. This is the case of West German Social Democracy— representative, in essence, of German financial capital — which is at present one of the leading contenders of US imperialism, although remaining as its partner in the struggle against socialism, the USSR and the socialist camp with compromising and often contradictory policies.
4. In this sense, the demagogic policy of "human rights" and of encouragement of "democratic openings" in the countries ruled by

repressive military regimes, insistently promoted by Carter's Administration in its early years in power, favored the deployment of Social Democratic policies in the region. To this we must add that it is extremely difficult to conceive of the development of this overall Social Democratic offensive without the consent and encouragement, or at least the implicit tolerance of US imperialism, including a certain degree of political agreement on basic aspects.

Nevertheless, recently, and beginning with the reactivation of Christian Democracy in the area with the victory of COPEI in Venezuela and the defeat of the PLN in Costa Rica by a coalition in which Christian Democracy holds a prominent place, there are signs that the US is favoring the projects of Christian Democracy more than those of Social Democracy, considering, among other things, that the first is a more moderate force and less dangerous to its interest than Social Democracy.

5. As for the strategy of the international Social Democracy on Latin America and the Caribbean, in our opinion, it points to the following directions:

- to oppose the "model of democratic socialism" to scientific socialism in an attempt to recover the essential values of the bourgeois representative democracy system
- to deviate and neutralize the revolutionary and progressive movement, that is to prevent the victory of new socialist revolutions
- to undermine the influence and progress of the socialist camp, particularly of Cuba and the URSS.

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To this end:

- it tries to secure its presence in countries ruled by military dictatorships or fascist regimes in case of an eventual "opening". This has been the case in Santo Domingo, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and lately in El Salvador.
 - it strengthens its bonds with those countries related member parties and implements a recruitment policy -- including revolutionary movements -- with those organizations capable of becoming suitable counterparts for its policy in the area.
6. Finally, we would like to stress that, -- irrespective of the repercussion and propagandizing impact of the activation of Social Democracy in the area in recent years -- the real effects of this policy so far show that, in spite of the circumstantial or eventual successes Social Democracy may have achieved in given countries by contributing to implement oportunistic openings its medium - and long-term historic prospects are doomed to failure.

The continent's harsh socio-economic reality and the degree of polarization of the class struggle make the "solutions" being fostered by Social Democracy actually precarious.

To: Cde. Unison Whiteman, Foreign Minister
 From: Cde. Fennis Augustini, High Commissioner

Report on Meeting of the Praesidium of Socialist International held in Bonn,
 West Germany on 1-2 April 1982

I arrived at the Tulpenfeld Hotel, Bonn where most of the delegates were staying at about 4.00 p.m. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain accommodation at that hotel. Arrangements were subsequently made for me at Astoria Hotel, a reasonable distance away from Tulpenfeld.

After settling in, I returned to Tulpenfeld. There was a meeting with the Cuban delegation, the Nicaraguan delegation, the British delegation which was headed by Michael Foot, leader of the Labour Party, the Guatemalan delegation, the Venezuelan delegation headed by Carlos Cuidros Perez, a member of the Swedish delegation and Guillermo Lingo of the El Salvador delegation.

Before these meetings I spoke to representatives and later on Bernt Carlsson Secretary General of the Socialist International seeking observer status for Grenada at the meeting. The decision was firm that only members of the Praesidium and specially invited guest could attend. (The composition of the Praesidium is; President, General Secretary, six Honorary Presidents, and twenty-one Vice Presidents).

ISSUES:

The special meeting of the Praesidium was called because of the confusion existing in S.I. over a number of issues, one delegate said to me that if nothing is done about the present situation S.I. would lose credibility.

- (a) The most immediate was the cancellation of the Bureau meeting which was to take place in Venezuela, when the party Democratic Action bowed to American pressure and refused to invite Nicaragua. It was cancelled on the personal intervention of Bernt Carlsson and Willy Brandt.
- (b) The declaration by Nicaragua of a state of emergency, seen in the context of the debate taking place within S.I. as to the principles involved in Social Democracy i.e. elections, two party system, human rights questions, freedom of religion, freedom of speech (free press).
- (c) Disarmament - The recent visit of the S.I. disarmament committee to the Soviet Union within the context of world disarmament.
- (d) The East - West conflict as it is seen being aggravated by Poland, Afghanistan and the debate about the relationship with Cuoa.

The meeting started at 09.45 on the 1st April, although a number of delegations had not yet arrived. Some of the late arrivals were, French delegation, Israeli delegation, Austrian delegation, Jamaican delegation (only Michael Manley attended Cde. Paul Miller did not attend), Danish delegation and the Netherland delegation and the Chilean delegation Radical Party (Cde. Anselmo Sulle was the only delegate attending)

Central America and the Caribbean was down for discussion in the afternoon session (see agenda attached) it generated the most interest.

My information is that the discussion on Central America and the Caribbean went very well, this is substantiated by the fact that:-

- (a) There appear to be some dissatisfaction with Felipe Gonzales's report on Nicaragua - one delegate referred to the report as somewhat vague.
- (b) A committee was appointed to draft resolution on the area (resolution attached) the composition of the committee was Ed Broadbent, Canada; Carlos Perez, Venezuelan; Michael Manley, Jamaica; and later on Gonselmo Sule was coopted.
- (c) A decision was taken that Willy Brandt should appoint a committee to visit the area and report back (I asked Brent Carlsson that Grenada be included in the itinerary of the committee).
- (d) It was decided that the S.I. Secretariat will continue to invite Nicaragua to attend its meeting, implication being disapproval with Democratic Action of Venezuela over its decision to exclude Nicaragua from the Bureau meeting in November.

I had a short discussion with Michael Manley - his stay was extremely short - he advised that, based on the letter he received from Maurice, Grenada's case was put firmly by him. My understanding is that this was so, although there appear to be some confusion on the invitation. In a follow up discussion, Brent Carlsson informed me that N.J.M. will have to send our individual invitations to Sister Parties.

On the East/West question - it appears that the meeting supported West Germany's position on Ostpolitik and to press for constructive dialogue on disarmament.

Comments

Most sister parties seemed well disposed towards Grenada, although some have reservations on what they see as the Marxist thrust of the N.J.M. I believe that close relationship with Cuba will continue. Nicaragua's position is a little more difficult, although there was a great degree of understanding and sympathy for them by the time the meeting was finished.

N.B. Carlos Perez informed me that he may be visiting Grenada in May next year.

Had meetings with Chile Radical Party, Anselmo Sule and the delegation from Panama who was lobbying for admittance to S.I.

Fennis Augustine

1) To fully and objectively evaluate the results of the Bonn meeting, the following background must be kept in mind:

-Calling off the meeting in Caracas was undoubtedly the first significant setback for the SI on the Latin American scene. It revealed more clearly than ever the existing internal contradictions in the organization, the pressures being exerted in this regard and the aims of the conservative sector to negatively modify SI's Latin American policy and to recall its support for the Nicaraguan Revolution.

-The decision by Brandt and by the vast majority of the social-democratic parties of Europe, to refuse to bow to the demands of the right-wing forces, reaffirmed the interests of the most pragmatic and realistic circles of the SI, oriented towards continuing their neutralization strategy based on penetration of and influence on the political processes in the area. In this situation the rivalry between Western Europe and the US also comes to the fore, as well as the aim of European monopoly capitalist circles to dispute actively but without confrontation terrain which falls in the area of the US. Brandt's decision to cancel the Caracas meeting reveals his conviction and that of the interests he represents to refuse to sacrifice strategic objectives for momentary situations which may present themselves.

-The consultations carried out by Felipe González in the region last December, which ended in January with the meeting he held with Haig in Washington, had negative results for the SI, in that, as seen by various European and Latin American parties, mainly the SPD of West Germany, Felipe didn't handle adequately the various situations he found himself in; he tried to monopolize the handling of the SI's policy towards Central America; and he contributed to stirring up the crisis he confronted in the SI by stimulating anti-Sandinista attitudes and positions and helping to spread opinions and confusion about the direction of the Nicaraguan process.

-Brandt's designation of Jospin to accompany Felipe on the consultations in the region after the Caracas cancellation showed his air of compensating for the wavering and negative positions of Felipe with a more realistic point of view, such as that of PSF. Felipe is playing his own game, aspiring to the presidency of Spain, for which he needs the nod from the US and from the Spanish right-wing policy-makers and military.

-Carlos Andrés Pérez--for various reasons, from the internal pressures in his own party, to pressures brought to bear by the US, and to the inconsistencies in his own demagogic positions--became the main spokesman for the anti-Sandinista attitudes.

-With the virtual failure of the overtures made by Felipe González and the cancellation of the Caracas meeting, the SI lost ground in the region, which was largely gained by the Mexican initiative, strongly reenforced by López Portillo's visit to Managua, his proposals for a solution in Central America and the efforts being made to implement them. The COPAL meeting held in Managua February 19-20 was an important step forward for FRI in terms of its intent to play a primary role in regional developments.

2) Regarding both its organizational structure and its content, the Bonn meeting was prepared by its hosts so that its results would confirm the continuity of the positions which the SI has been adopting towards Latin America and the Caribbean, foreseeing and controlling all those elements or factors that were potentially risky, and which could have blocked this objective. The

right-wing positions were isolated or neutralized. No one questioned the SI's continued support for the Nicaraguan Revolution, and what's more, no one objected to Brandt's proposal that the FSLN be invited to the Bureau's next meeting in Helsinki. The subject of Nicaragua--the most conflictive problem debated-- and the situation in El Salvador, were treated positively. 291

3) As far as the SI's stand on Latin American issues is concerned, the results of the meeting were generally positive. In addition to the resolution on Central America and the Caribbean, a commission was approved including Wischewsky (vice-president of the SPD), Ed Broadbent (vice-president of the SI and president of the NPD of Canada) and Carlos Andrés Pérez (from Acción Democrática) which would travel to the region, including to Cuba and the United States, with the mandate to hold conversations to promote a political solution to the tensions in Central America and the Caribbean. This commission will present a report on the results of its work to the SI Bureau meeting next May in Helsinki.

4) The tone of the document approved on Central America is moderate, cautious, without adjectives, but expresses clear positions on basic problems of the area:

-Notes that the so-called elections in El Salvador are no solution at all, and opts for a global negotiated settlement that would include all political sectors, specifying the inclusion of the FDR-FMLN.

-Says that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua should receive support for its commitment to pluralism, social justice, democracy and non-alignment; and condemns all attempts at destabilization and interference against its sovereignty.

-Emphasizes the importance of a total regional negotiation process that would include the countries of the region, and in particular the United States and Cuba. This is an essential aspect, in that it constitutes pressure on the US for negotiations.

-Adopts the proposals formulated by López Portillo and other regional leaders as the basis for achieving a solution for regional security, peace and cooperation.

5) Nevertheless, proceeding from the social-democratic viewpoint of not provoking the United States and of facilitating a channel of communication to the Administration, the resolution makes no reference to the US responsibility for the situation the region finds itself in, nor to the dangers of its interventionist actions. The resolution limits itself to underlining the importance of the suspension of any intervention by one state in the affairs of another.

6) Negative aspects of the document are: its unilateral and self-seeking mention of the subject of elections in Grenada; and on the other hand, the formulation on Guatemala, that while general and vague, contributed to creating favorable expectations of the military coup recently carried off there.

7) In summary, the net results of the meeting were positive; it represented a blow against the policies of the present US Administration towards the region and a setback for its aims of changing the Latin American policy of the SI. The US Government's reaction against the results of the meeting was immediate, reflected in a State Department communiqué dated April 6, which strongly attacks the SI for its positions regarding Nicaragua and El Salvador.

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
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8) Internally, the SI managed to control and neutralize the actions of the conservative and right-wing sectors. Felipe González was excluded from the commission to be sent to the region; Carlos Andrés Pérez outdid himself to demonstrate that his position had not changed, and that he continued to support Nicaragua; Mario Soares did not participate in the debate, and publicly stated that he fully subscribed to the resolution adopted; the PLM sent no representative to the meeting, so as not to commit itself, aware beforehand of the correlation of forces. 212

9) Together with the objective factors that shaped the results of the meeting, the actions and speeches of Michael Manley, Ed Broadbent, Claf Palme, Anselmo Sule and Riulf Steen played a very important role.

10) It can be stated that the positive positions of the SI towards the area, which correspond to its strategic interests, were strengthened. In the context of the present world situation, faced with the aggressive policies of US imperialism and the polarization of political forces especially within the region, social democracy sees its possibilities strengthened to act as an intermediate alternative and to increase its role as a neutralizer against the radicalization of, the revolutionary processes in the region. And they also include Cuba in this perspective, thinking to compromise in a negotiation process with the US our incidence in regional developments, or as they see it, "tying our hands and limiting our influence."

11) On the other hand, it can't be forgotten that posed against the US, the influence and terrain gained by social democracy in Latin America are resources and possibilities it has for negotiating global problems with the United States, with which, apart from strategic questions uniting the two, the SI maintains tactical differences of importance in the present situation.



SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL - AN ASSESSMENT FROM GRENADA'S PERSPECTIVE

BACKGROUND

1. Many claim for the Socialist International a history dating back to more than a century. It would appear that initially the name was the First International.
2. This International was born out of the rise of Socialist thought in Europe, the workers struggle in that continent and the internationalization of Capital and social and economic problems which many socialists felt demanded an internationally organised response.
3. Born in Europe at the historical epoch when vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America were yet colonised by Europe the Socialist International was a European organisation. However, since the second world war and the subsequent decolonisation process which saw the emergence of numerous nation-states, and since the heightened class struggle and formation of progressive nationalist and socialist parties in the newly independent nations, the horizon of Socialist International has widened considerably, stretching beyond Europe.
4. Thus, today only 20 of the 48 full member parties of the Socialist International are European. From Latin America and the Caribbean there are eleven (11) parties enjoying full membership.
5. Because of this widening of the Socialist International (SI) the concerns of the organization have advanced beyond mere European ones and today reflect to a certain extent, truly international concerns which progressive, democratic forces must confront.

PRINCIPLES AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

6. The SI has sought to commit itself to the principles of "Peace, Freedom and Solidarity". This is its broad banner.
7. More specific principles are reportedly contained in two documents: The Frankfurt and Oslo declarations of principles. The Frankfurt declaration was forged in 1951 and the Oslo declaration in 1962.

8. It is said that the Frankfurt 1951 document presented the Socialist doctrine mainly 326
" as a permanent human liberation movement, aiming at a fully democratic organisation of society, spreading from the political to the Economic, social, Cultural and International Fields."
9. Democracy was seen "as the Synthesis of Freedom and equality whereby economic and social exploitation as well as political and Cultural enslavement of men by men and people by people is rendered impossible."
10. Recently the SI set up a Working Group on a New Declaration of Principles. To the Norwegian Labour Party was assigned the task of analysing the current situation from the point of view of Democratic Socialism exposed by the SI.
11. One of the findings of the Norwegian Labour Party was that:
"Democratic Socialists disagree, on the one hand with the point of view that Social evolution should ideally be coordinated by an invisible hand as is justified by the liberal theory of the market; on the other hand, we do not agree that power should be concentrated in one hand as justified in leninist theories of absolutism. One solution divests the people of power; the other establishes power over the people."
12. The Norwegian conclusion continues:
"According to one theory, power is decentralised and left at the doors of the market; according to the other it is completely concentrated in the Central Committee. In one the perfect society is identified with the perfect market; in the other, with the perfect leaders. In the one, the freely competitive market, no one holds power; in the other the dictatorship of the proletariat degenerates into a dictatorship over the proletariat. In the one, people are made impotent by the economy; in the other, by the police. Democratic Socialists reject both."

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13. **Advocating these principles and coming from such a philosophical orientation, the SI can be viewed as wanting to form a sort of third bloc or third force between the two main opposing poles of politics: Capitalism and Socialism. Thus, in Foreign Policy SI would repudiate both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and would blame both for international tensions and the cold war. For some of the Europeans the principles and ideological orientation of the SI is a means of escaping US hegemony over Europe while not attaching Europe to the U.S.S.R. Thus, Europe would, in this way, be back on the road to global supremacy.** 327
14. **However, the establishment of a New declaration of principles can prove a very torturous undertaking particularly as the SI is no longer monopolised by Europe but is now a fairly heterogeneous body. And as President Welly Brandt put it "the European Concept of democracy cannot be exported to other regions on the earth."**
15. **Thus, as the "other regions" assert their sovereignty and their definitions of democracy and socialism the SI can become even more diverse. This has been recognised by Felipe Gonzalez of the Socialist Workers Party of Spain which hosted the last SI Congress. Gonzalez pointed out that "the risk of a new declaration of principles which is a letter of introduction of our identity, in which present and future members of the SI must be able to recognise themselves, is great".**
16. **Developing the point Gonzalez continued:**
"We could fall into the temptation of preserving the principles of identity of European Socialism, excluding the others, thereby not giving an answer to the new problems..... Alternatively, we could be guilty of the fault of making a declaration so vague that, while including everybody, would satisfy no-one, even minimally, and which in consequence would not differentiate us from liberal or Christian democrats,....."

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17. This then in the dilemma confronting the SI as it attempts to forge a new declaration of principles. A possible way out as one perceives it will be to agree on certain basic and broad ideological foundations and to create a body of ideas which condenses the SI position on Fundamental World problems and issues.

18. In this manner some real harmony can be established between the parties; between a party like the Izquierda Democratica (Democratic Left) of Ecuador which rejects the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat because, it says, the concept produces a new elite which usurps the power of the proletariat, a party which rejects a single class party and wants a mass party; and between movements like the PSIN of Nicaragua, the National Revolutionary Movement of El Salvador and the N.J.M. of Grenada which believe that the party is one in which only the most serious and conscious elements can join. This divergence in views shows up the underlying fundamental contradiction between revolutionary socialists and democratic socialists.

19. However, in the SI a working relationship can be established between the democratic socialists who assume a middle ground position between socialism and capitalism and the revolutionary socialists who are committed to the application of marxists-Leninist principles in the construction of scientific socialism. One thinks the strategy is to agree on very broad principles and take a SI position on world issues on which there exists a consensus.

POSITION ON MAJOR ISSUES

20. The SI on most of the major problems and issues today assumes/liberal progressive position, on others it takes /a a position equidistant from both the USA and the USSR.

21. Evidence of the SI, position of equidistance is its categorisation of the USA and the USSR as superpowers both seeking global dominance.

22. On the questions of the arms race, disarmament and international tension the SI attributes blame to both the USA and the USSR. Thus on disarmament the SI makes representation to both nations on an identical basis.

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In May 1979 the SI sent its Study Group on Disarmament ³²⁹ to discuss with Carter, Mondale and U.S. Government experts. In November 1979 the same Group went to the Soviet Union and talked with Brezhnev, the Soviet Government, the CPSU and other institutions.

23. The SI blames both the USA and the USSR for international tension and the set back to detente. SI cites: (i) the Cuban brigade crisis of late August 1979; (ii) U.S. reluctance to ratify SALT II; (iii) NATO decision on eurostrategic missiles as the main causes and is convinced that the situation was exacerbated by (i) the Soviet decision to deploy the SS-20; (ii) the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
24. In Poland the SI Congress Resolution coming out of the last Congress held in Spain on November 13-16, 1980 states:
- "As the democratic socialists committed to the right of workers to organise free and independent trade unions, we welcome the recognition of these rights in Poland. We regard this as an importance advance for economic and civil rights. We salute the courage shown by the leadership of solidarity. We welcome the pragmatic and realistic approach taken by the Government so far.
- Our solidarity with the struggle for trade unions rights is clear. We recognise these advances as achievements of the Polish Workers and believe that any further progress will be made only by them."
25. SI takes no side in the Iran/Iraq war but views it as "a serious blow to stability in the Middle East and to Security internationally." SI appeal to both to cease hostilities and to take part in mediation efforts.
26. On the Kampuchean question SI Congress Resolution takes a broad position. It says: "We express our great concern and deep sorrow at the tragedy of the people of Cambodia. The SI reminds all Government's of their responsibility to help heal the effects of this terrible genocide.

The unity and integrity of Colombia must be respected. We support any initiatives towards a solution which will secure a reconciliation of the Cambodian people and its neutrality status."

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27. The SI position on Southern Africa is Firm. It states in part: "We condemn the continued aggression by South Africa against independent Angola."
28. It also undertakes the commitment to continue working "with all elements of the South African resistance, especially the ANC and SWAPO." and demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and Herman Toiva Ja Toivo.
29. On the Palestinian question the SI is somewhat split. Some parties are supportive of the Camp while others see the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and think that the PLO must be included in the negotiation of any solution.
30. The SI is soft on Morocco, though not supportive of it, on the Western Sahara issue. The SI; however, recognise the Polisario Front and thinks that the Polisario Front and thinks that the Polisaris Front/Mauritania peace accord can be a model by which the problem of the Western Sahara can be resolved.

POSITION ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

31. The SI has been following developments in Latin America, particularly in the Central America and the Caribbean sub-region, very keenly. The progressive struggles unfolding in this troubled region, long dominated by European colonialism and, later, U.S. imperialism, have earned the support of the SI.
32. Thus, in the Congress Resolution the SI extended support for the Panama Canal treaties, for the valiant struggle by Michael Manley and the PNP in the face of numerous adverse odds. for the Nicaraguan revolution and the FSLN, for the Grenadian revolution and the NEW JEWEL Movement and for the exemplary struggle of the people of El Salvador led by the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR). The SI rejected the imperialist line that the Junta is a "moderate" one "fighting the extreme right or left." The SI declares:

"It is rather a despotic regime whose activities have led to a state of Civil War."

33. The SI supports independence for Belize "secure within its present borders."
34. The SI has repudiated the so-called "referendum" conducted by Pinochet in Chile and also the so-called "new constitution and "Join(s) with the people of Chile in their ongoing resistance to the military Junta.
35. A similar stand is taken on Bolivia which is ruled "by a vicious military dictatorship."

Full support from the SI goes to the people and the National Unity Government led by Hernan Siles Zuazo and Jaime Paz Zamora.
36. The Fronte Democratics Contra ta Represion (Democratic Front Against Repression) (FDCR), the body which united all the progressive and democratic Forces in Guatemala opposing the bloody dictatorship led by Romeo Lucas Garcia, enjoy the full solidarity of the SI.
37. The SI has frequently resolutely condemned the dictatorships in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.
38. In sum then the SI policy in Latin America indicates firm support for the struggles unfolding in that region.

N.J.M. AND THE SI.

39. The NEW JEWEL Movement became a full member party of the SI at the last Congress of the SI in Madrid, Spain. Previously, for a brief period, the N.J.M. had observer status.
40. The question of whether the N.J.M. - Grenada ought to be a member of SI has arisen. It is opportune that it has arisen at a time when the Ministry of External Affairs has decided to assess Grenada's membership in all international bodies.
41. Now it has been established beyond dispute that the Grenada Revolution of March 13th. faces grave threats from imperialism, mercenaries and external reaction.

Given this, one of the ongoing objectives of Grenada's Foreign Policy has to be: to harness moral, political, economic and other support from the international community so as to stave off and combat external aggression and subversion.

42. One of the means of achieving this objective is through forging broad alliances internationally; through becoming a part of the international organisations which condemn firmly, militantly, imperialism and its aggressive manoeuvres and henchmen. The SI is such an organisation; thus, Grenada N.J.M., is correctly a member.
43. As Grenada seeks this international support, and as one fundamental aspect of the N.J.M.'s ideological orientation is internationalism, another objective of the foreign policy is: to support the struggles of oppressed people.
44. Through membership in the SI Grenada can express organised support for the progressive struggles; in Southern Africa, the Western Sahara, Palestine, El Salvador, Nicaragua and other parts of Latin America etc. Thus, the objective is realised; thus, N.J.M. is correctly a member of SI.
45. Some would argue yes, these are your objectives, yes, they are realised through membership in SI. But what about principles? The ideology of the SI is Democratic Socialism. The Grenadian revolution aspires to advance beyond democratic socialism. Thus, there are differences between the N.J.M. (Grenada) and the SI.
46. Of course there are differences. There exist fundamental contradictions between revolutionary socialists and democratic socialists. But this does not mean that the two cannot strike a working relationship under certain conditions when the objectives are sufficiently broad.
47. There is a world of difference between the mildly reformist Social Democratic Parties in Europe, the Accion Democratica (AD) of Venezuela and the Ceylon Labour Party, on the one hand, and the N.J.M. of Grenada on the other. However, on certain broad issues a progressive consensus can be effected. Thus, N.J.M. in the SI is not a contradiction of its stated objectives and philosophical orientation.

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48. In paragraphs 20-30 of this paper the SI Position on Major Issues was outlined 'A Comparison with Grenada's position reveal that there exist a tangible coincidence of views on many issues. The SI fully supports the struggle in Southern Africa, condemns strongly apartheid and racism, is in firm solidarity with the FDR IN El Salvador, the FDGR in Guatemala, the PSIN in Nicaragua and generally takes a very progressive position on Latin American issues. Those views and positions are identical to Grenada's. Thus, a working relationship, membership, is quite in order.
49. On issues where there exist a difference of views - Afghanistan, the two Superpowers, two imperialisms thesis, Kampuchea, the structure of the SI is sufficiently flexible to permit dissension. Thus, Grenada's sovereignty and principles are not compromised by being in the SI.
50. One can also point out to critics that if states like vietnam, Oman, Zambia, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Libya, Iran, whose economic, political and social philosophy is so enormously divergent, if these states can cooperate and agree in the Non Aligned Movement on very sensitive issues, then there is no reason why Grenada cannot effect some relationship with the Democratic Socialism of the SI. The fact is that the international situation demands that bodies with divergent views cooperate, discuss and agree on some broad and sensitive issues.
51. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. represent two fundamentally opposing poles of world politics, let they sit together, take Joint decisions, agree on a number of issues at the United Nations, its Security Council and other bodies. Grenada and the Social Democratic parties can do the same in the SI.
52. In sum then Grenada's membership in the SI is quite consistent with its principles and objectives. Differences exist but they do not compromise the Revolution, its goals and tenets. As a matter of fact given Grenada's near isolation in the Caribbean sub-region. Its best defence might be a broad stretch of Foreign relations. The SI can be a useful element in that stretch.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

53. Already Grenada has achieved statements of support from the SI. This must be consolidated.
54. The SI has mobilised economic support for Nicaragua. Grenada can approach the SI with a request for obtaining economic assistance. Grenada should point out to the SI (i) Grenada's particular economic constraints as a small island; (ii) the attitude of the British and the Americans over the question of aid through WINBAN for banana rehabilitation must be revealed to the SI with a view to showing the urgent need for assistance and to obtain an SI condemnation of this economic aggression on the part of Britain and the U.S.A.
55. Now that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of West Germany is in office, Grenada should initiate some dialogue with West Germany with a view to obtaining economic assistance. The possibility of trade should also be raised particularly as our traditional markets are in the hostile U.S.A. and Great Britain. In the event of an economic blockade by these two the West German Market might be an alternative. The SPD is a leading member of SI with Willy Brandt being the President. Its Government in Bonn might be more cordial to Grenada than the conservative Christian Democrats. Also, now that West Germany has an Ambassador accredited to Grenada it will be easier to communicate with Bonn.
56. Finally, membership in the SI should be retained. It has proved useful and if Grenada's foreign policy initiatives are strengthened it can prove even more useful in the future.

**REPORT ON MEETING OF SECRET REGIONAL CAUCUS OF
HELD IN MANAGUA FROM 6TH-7TH JANUARY, 1983**

The following Organizations were represented:-

F.S.L.N.	- Nicaragua	- Antonio Marguin
M.N.R.	- El Salvador	- Hector Oqueli
R.F.	- Chile	- Freda
P.N.P.	- Jamaica	- Paul Miller
P.C.C.	- Cuba	- Silva
N.J.M.	- Grenada	- Chris DeRiggs

The following items constituted the agenda:

- (1) An analysis of the balance of forces within the Socialist International -
 - the Regional situation.
 - the International situation.
- (2) Initiatives to be taken to strengthen the position of progressive forces of Latin America and the Caribbean within the organization.
- (3) Initiatives to neutralize forces within S.I. that are against us.
- (4) Upcoming activities of S.I. - Regionally and Internationally.
- (5) Activities of Copaal - combining S.I. work with Copaal work.
- (6) Conference on non-intervention and peace in Central America.
- (7) Political character of projected growth of S.I.
 - Conference of African S.I.
- (8) Structure of S.I.
 - Chairmanship of Regional Committee.
 - Proposed Regional Executive Secretary.

- (9) Proposed Institute of Economic and Political studies.
- (IO) ALDHO. - Latin American Human Rights Organization.
- (II) Work of Social Democracy in the Region.

The meeting was organized for the purpose of deepening the process of co-ordination among the most progressive S.I. forces of Latin America and the Caribbean with a view towards expanding the influence of the Region as a whole in the Organization and outlining a number of concrete initiatives related to the upcoming Congress of S.I. in Sydney, Australia.

The meeting was chaired by Antonio Harguin of the International Relations department of the F.S.L.N.

I. ANALYSIS

1) Regional Situation - the progressive forces are in control.

a) There are fourteen members of the S.I. Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Of these fourteen, there are seven parties that are generally progressive and some within a Marxist-Lennist trend.

There are three (3) new parties that have recently gained consultative observer status in S.I. They are:

- (i) Puerto Rico.
- (ii) W.P.A. - Guyana
- (iii) P.L.P. - St. Lucia

The presence of these parties will help to strengthen the influence of the progressive forces within the Regional Committee. These parties can, in effect, function like full members of the organization. We must always consult with them and keep them informed.

2. EUROPE IN RELATION TO LATIN AMERICA

a) There are sharp divisions among the European parties in their outlook on Latin America.

- b) Our friends in this area are prepared to accept the Latin American Revolutionary process as being palatable if restricted to the Latin American context.
- c) There is a great amount of misunderstanding about Latin America both among our friends and our enemies - some amount of fear and uncertainty.
- d) Many of the European S.I. parties expect us to understand the concept of "the Soviet Menace".
- e) Some European parties are concerned that, by the Latin American presence in S.I., they have let in a
- f) Many European Parties are willing to hold discussions with us at levels which indicate the contradictions among themselves -
- the difference between Kryski of Austria and Braudl of Germany on the P.L.O. question.
- g) Our strongest allies in Europe are the Nordic S.I. parties and that of Holland. There is also good potential with the U.D.P. of Canada.
- h) Our principal enemies are to be found among the parties of Soares and Horgo in Portugal and Italy respectively - the Social Democrats of the U.S.A. are also our sworn enemies.
- i) The reason why the European parties did not allow W.P.A. and P.L.P. to get beyond the consultative membership status is because of their fear of the growth of membership with parties that they do not control.
- j) A Mission to Europe comprising of our most trusted forces in Latin America and the Caribbean can be strategically valuable before the Sydney Congress. It can help to assure our friends and confuse our enemies.

DECISIONS

- 1) The next meeting of the Broad Latin America Region S.I. Committee will be in any one of the following places:-

Las Paz - Bolivia
Mexico
Caracas
Canada

Michael Manley of P.N.P. and Ausolmo Sule of P.R. will co-ordinate with B. Carlson of the S.I. Secretariat on this matter. Member parties will be informed accordingly.

2. A broad resolution on the Latin American and Caribbean situation will be passed at the meeting of the Regional Committee.

Agenda for this meeting will include:

- a) Analysis of current political situation.
- b) Attitudes to S.I. in Latin America.
- c) Issues for Sydney:
 - i) New situation
 - ii) Expansion of S.I.
- d) S.I. Latin America Committee:
 - i) Structure
 - ii) Staff
 - iii) Officers
- e) Christian Democracy in Latin America.
- f) Actions to strengthen ALDHU.
- g) Sydney Resolutions.

3. Hector Oquel of M.N.R. of El Salvador will draft a Resolution on Latin America and the Caribbean by 31st January, 1983. This Resolution will be specifically for the Sydney Congress and will address only the most major issues.

The following guidelines will be the basis for the Resolution:-

- (a) The Basle Resolution - including such themes like Peace and Non-Intervention, Anti-Militarisation in the Region, Anti-dictatorship, the settlement of disputes, etc.
- (b) Solidarity with Nicaragua, Grenada and the F.D.R., P.M.L.F. and M.N.R. of El Salvador.
- (c) A limited number of other key issues in the Region.

- (d) The creation of a platform and frame of reference in S.I. for the approach on the Latin America and Caribbean Region until the next Congress in Belgium (in the subsequent 2 years).
4. Subject to the approval of N.J.M., the next meeting of the Secret Regional Caucus of progressive S.I. parties will be in Grenada around the 13th and 14th March. This meeting will have strategic value in that it will provide the opportunity to:
- i) Assess the results of the tour of Europe by the selected parties, and
 - ii) Conduct a final assessment on issues related to the Sydney Congress - questions of tactics and levels of co-ordination can also be discussed.
6. Grenada should consider inviting a few key S.I. personalities to March 13th celebrations.
7. Bilaterals will be held with new Regional S.I. forces before Congress - Grenada will speak with W.P.A. and P.L.P.
8. In the meeting in Grenada, we are going to consider what initiatives can be taken to support Surinam. If the Surinam Government wishes, an unofficial familiarization visit can be organized subsequent to proposed Grenada meeting. This, it is felt, may have value in preparing members of the Regional Caucus to be able to speak with authority if the question of Surinam is raised in Sydney. If a decision is made to go ahead with this, the team can comprise:
- Radical Party of Chile
 - F.S.L.N.
 - P.N.P.
 - N.D.P.

N.J.M. will establish contact with Surinam and guide the Regional Secret Caucus accordingly.

At the meeting of the S.I. Resolution Committee and Finance Committee in Madrid and Italy respectively during the middle of February, Regional parties should try to have the possible presence.

Subsequent to the Madrid and Italy meetings, a tour of Europe should be organized to hold Bilaterals with all European parties who belong to S.I.

The participants of this mission should include:

- Ungo of M.N.R.
- Oquel of M.N.R.
- Sule of P.R.
- Manloy of P.N.P.
- Miller of P.N.P.
- A senior representative of N.J.M.

This mission will seek to counter the forces of Portugal, Italy and the U.S..

Seek to speak discussion within hostile European parties.

Work of the expulsion of the (C.I.A.) U.S.A. Social Democratic Party.

9. Progressive S.I. forces in the Region should seek to attend COPAL meeting scheduled for Brazil in March and secure reinforcement of Sydney S.I.L.A. Resolution.
10. To push ahead and implement the proposal for the establishment of a Regional Institute for Political and Economic Research.
 - Paul Miller of Jamaica as Director
 - Open bank account in the Bahamas with signatures of Miller and Hector Oquel.

Maintain the Secret Regional Caucus with periodic and special meetings.

Review membership in the future.

Submitted by.
CDE. CHRIS DE RIGGS.

①

REPORT ON SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL BUREAU MEETING
3-4TH NOVEMBER, 1982
IN BASLE, SWITZERLAND

- A. Agenda, list of Participants and important resolutions are submitted as Appendix I, II and III respectively.
- B. The N.J.H. Delegation consisted solely of myself. I arrived in Basle on the evening of Wednesday 3rd November. I missed the first day of the Conference. This was largely due to late Booking and difficult flight connections.

On arrival at the meeting I immediately established contact with the delegation of P.N.P. of Jamaica which consisted of Michael Manley and Paul Miller. The following morning I held a Bilateral with Paul Miller (Michael Manley had left after the first day) who gave me a summary of the first day's Agenda.

He indicated that Manley had presented to the S.I. Bureau Meeting a report on the Caribbean and Latin America. Paul Miller indicated that Michael Manley had, in his report, outlined the case for Grenada along the following lines:-

- i) that the Country, under the P.R.G., had made important strides forward in the development of its Economy;
- ii) that a number of forums of peoples' participation had been developed;
- iii) that the basis was being laid for the formation of a New Constitution and the organisation of elections in the future;
- iv) that there were certain objective difficulties which affects the rate at which the Country can proceed in developing the objectives stated in No. ii.

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On the 2nd day of the Meeting, attention was focused on:-

- (1) Resolutions to be sent to the Congress of S.I. scheduled for Sydney, Australia in April 1983,
- (2) Invitations to the S.I. Congress, and
- (3) other matters related to the up-coming Congress.

RESOLUTIONS I

As a consequence of discussions held between representatives of Socialist Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean, a joint resolution was submitted to the Bureau Meeting. This resolution was presented by Anselmo Sule of the Partido Radical of Chile who is presently living in exile.

The resolution did the following:-

- i) It called for unconditional support for the National Revolutionary Movement of El Salvador (NRR),
- ii) it condemned plans for military aggression against Nicaragua,
- iii) it welcomed the decision of the Frente Patriotico de la Revolucion de Nicaragua to request to the Junta Government the elaboration of an electoral law, a law for political parties, a law for foreign Investment's, of a law regulating the means of communication and the reform of the law of the state of emergency that will allow political parties to function,

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- iv) it called on the S.I. to accept the invitation forwarded by Nicaragua to send a fact-finding Mission into Nicaragua. The following members of S.I. have been designated:

Ed Broadbent, Carlos Andres Perez, Michael Manley, David Oduber, Mario Soares, Auselmo Sule,

Other representatives, including General Secretary Bernt Carlsson,

- v) S.I. was asked (in this resolution) to condemn and denounce the policy of genocide by the Military Regime of Guatemala against the Indian population,
- vi) the resolution proposed a Conference aimed at Non-intervention, stability and peace in Central America,
- vii) the resolution also expressed support for the process of strengthening democracy in Colombia and Brazil - at the same time, it pointed out the need to expose the discovery of clandestine cemeteries in Argentina, the misery and hunger in Chile which result from the failure of the Economic Model in that country and also expressed support for the people of Paraguay in their struggle against dictatorship.

ON THE CARIBBEAN

- (1) The Resolution called on the Socialist International to deplore and condemn the attempts to isolate and destabilize Grenada and to publicise its satisfaction for the process of democratization on the island.
- (2) S.I. was asked to denounce the increase of crimes by the Regime of Haiti and to express its solidarity with the opposition forces in that country.

- (3) S.I. was requested to support the Partido Independista de Puerto Rico in its fight for Independence.

Finally, the resolution called on S.I. to publicise its support for the Latin American Association of Human Rights (ALDHU) and to request governments, parties and friendly organizations to collaborate with the Association.

A number of minor amendments were made to the Resolution, but there was substantial opposition to the section which expressed solidarity with Grenada and Nicaragua. Mario Soares of the Socialist Party of Portugal led off the opposition followed by Brettino Craxi of the Italian Socialist Party, Rita Freedman of the Social Democrats of the U.S.A. also spoke against solidarity with Grenada. Their major line of attack was that Grenada was a one-party state and, therefore, could not be considered a democracy.

Both myself and Paul Miller of P.N.P. responded on the behalf of Grenada. My response took the following form:

- (a) A brief analysis of the History of Grenada through Slavery and Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism.
- (b) An explanation of the historical basis for the existence of one party in Grenada.
- (c) The major Economic and Social gains of the Revolution.
- (d) Special emphasis was given to the process of building and strengthening the forums of Peoples' participation which is the basis for a new constitution and an approach to the question of Elections.
- (e) I made reference to our Adherence to the principles of accountability, peoples participation, responsibility and the rule of law.

(f) I ended by expressing amazement that ignorance of the existing reality within Grenada had been expressed from certain quarters of the meeting and reminded them that Grenada has always been willing to receive fact-finding Missions because our record simply cannot be challenged.

The amended Resolution went through.

RESOLUTION 2

The other resolution of major importance was the resolution on the Beirut Massacre - a draft resolution was presented to the meeting denouncing the massacre, calling on S.I. to mount its own investigation and calling for S.I. to formally recognize the P.L.O.

There was widespread division on this resolution with considerable hedging on the part of the more conservative parties within S.I. Eventually, the dissention was so great that there was no agreement on the draft.

INVITATIONS TO CONGRESS

A number of parties and individuals were identified for invitation to the Sydney Congress. They include;

- 1) Afghanistan - Social Democratic Party (Resistance Movement).
- 2) Angola - U.P.L.A.
- 3) Botswana - Democratic Party
- 4) Czechoslovakia - Charter 77 - (dissident groups)
- 5) Eritrea
- 6) Ethiopia
- 7) Ghana
- 8) Greece

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- 8) Guatemala - National Revolutionary Movement
- 9) Guyana - W.F.A. - Now having consultative member status
- 10) St. Lucia - P.L.P. - now having consultative member status
- 11) Iran - National Council of Resistance
- 12) Korea - unification group
- 13) Mozambique - Brelimo
- 14) Nicaragua
- 15) Panama
- 16) Peru
- 17) Somalia - Revolutionary Socialist Party
- 18) Tanzania
- 19) Tunisia
- 20) Uruguay
- 21) U.S.A.
- 22) Yugoslavia - Y.C.L.
- 23) Zimbabwe - Z.A.N.U.
- 24) Suriname - (to be verified)

Individuals include:

- i) Lech Walesa
- ii) Nelson and Winnie Mandela
- iii) Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia
- iv) Rudolph Botleck (in prison in Czechoslovakia)

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A definite decision was made not to invite the P.L.O. This decision was primarily to the benefit of the Israel Labour Party and the Australian Labour Party - In the case of the Australian Labour Party, the argument was that it would embarrass the Government of Malcolm Fraser.

SOME OBSERVATIONS

- (i) The heated debate on issues like Grenada, Nicaragua and the P.L.O. could be an indication of sharpening contradictions between left and right forces in W.I.
This question was discussed in caucus with Hector Aqueli, Paul Miller and others. They generally agree that the right wing forces in S.I. are becoming more aggressive.
- (ii) Latin America and the Caribbean need to formalize and maintain the Regional caucus. It is clear that the right forces are going to attack again in the Sydney Congress. The proposal, therefore, is that a number of Regional Countries be organized between the present period and the Sydney Congress. One such caucus can be held if enough parties are present at the inauguration of Miguel de la Madrid in Mexico. In this context, co-ordination with P.H.P. is important.
- (iii) There is the suspicion that contradictions between right forces of S.I. are growing - for example:
 - (a) between the French and the Germans for Leadership,
 - (b) between the Nordic and German Socialists.
- (iv) I have picked up that there is a move spear-headed by Willy Brandt to isolate and remove Aernst Carlson - This, it is alleged, is part of the struggle by the German Socialists to tighten their control of the organization.

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- (v) It was also reported at caucus level that there is a growing momentum for the secretariat to be moved from London to a European Capital - Vienna has been one name mentioned.
- (vi) It is felt that Regional Parties of S.I. need to put a lot more diplomatic footwork into the organization - the example is quoted of Ungo of El Salvador who has spent a lot of time lobbying the European Socialists. It is felt that similar efforts from other S.I. Members in the Region can help to exploit contradictions existing even within the Membership of S.I. Parties like the Socialist Party of Portugal.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommended that a full consultation be held between N.J.M., P.N.F., W.P.A. and P.L.P. on the current situation in S.I. with a view towards working out a co-ordinated approach for the wider Regional caucus leading up to the Sydney Congress.

In closing, I wish to indicate that a decision was made based on a recommendation by the Finance and Administration Committee, that N.J.M. subscription to S.I. be upped to £160 per year.

A copy of the new publication "Making the Peoples' Budget" was given to each delegation present.

Submitted by,

Cde. Chris DeRiggs,
International Relations Sec.

Monday 8th November, 1982.

TO: N.J.M. Leadership SUBJECT: Emergency S.I. Meeting in Panama
 FROM: Comrade Whiteman DATE: March 3, 1981

The emergency S.I. meeting of Latin America and the Caribbean took place in Panama on Saturday, 28th February and Sunday, 1st March. Basically, it was a one item agenda; the situation in El Salvador.

There were representatives of the following countries:

Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Grenada, Honduras, Panama itself, Peru, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Uruguay and Nicaragua. P.N.P. was absent. From Europe came Spain, West Germany, France, Portugal and Sweden arrived. Brent Carlsson, Secretary General attended. Media coverage was wide.

The Conference was designed to counter these two carefully worked out tactics by the United States:

- (1) To project the struggle of the people of El Salvador as a direct East West ("Communist - Capitalist") confrontation as a means of completely wiping out from the consciousness of the world the domestic causes, the oligarchy, the semi-feudal system, the incredible poverty of the masses.
- (2) To show that the freedom fighters ("Marxist hardliners") do not want a negotiated settlement, that they prefer the bloodshed.

Because of airline difficulties, I missed the first day of the Conference. Although S.I. has a clear consensus on El Salvador, somehow Carlos Andre Perez insisted on adding the names of Cuba and the Soviet Union to the resolution demanding an end to the supply of arms to El Salvador!

(He claims that he is not anti-Cuba or anti-Communist but that S.I. must appear to be objective and even handed. He also claims that he whole heartedly supports the El Salvador liberation struggle. This is strange because there was a quiet meeting where the military commanders in the field explained their need for support in this ~~existing~~ critical situation and Carlos agreed with them).

For hours he persisted. Sweden and Grenada spoke out forcefully on the issue. Grenada pointed out that the U.S. supply of arms to the junta ^{is a} notorious fact, that the U.S. officially and publicly stated this; that S.I. should not speculate on where the freedom fighters are getting arms from; that, in any event, we should not equate arms for the oppressors with weapons to defend the people in their just struggle.

Finally, the El Salvador Comrades said they were prepared to accept a compromise formula that names no country but makes it clear that it is the U.S. that is being condemned. The house accepted this approach.

It should be noted that Vernon Walters, the ex-deputy C.I.A. Director insisted on presenting to the meeting (he is on a tour of the region to draw up support for a U.S. invasion of El Salvador and ^{he happened to be} in Panama by "coincidence") proof of Cuban and Soviet arms supplies. This offer was not accepted.

As a means of defeating the second U.S. tactics ("hardliners, not wanting to negotiate"), the Conference offered the services of S.I. Chairman, Will Brandt as mediator in the conflict.

This initiative ensures that the U.S. cannot propose someone favourable to their own interest. Brandt is sympathetic for the freedom fighters but the U.S. will have difficulty rejecting him for he is a Nobel Peace Prize Winner with stature world wide.

This counter tactic would therefore give the comrades time to carry on the military and the political struggle together.

Another resolution expressed support for the Nicaraguan and Grenada revolutionary processes and solidarity with the Government and people of Panama who were undergoing pressures from the U.S. There was also support for Michael Manley and for the independence of Puerto Rico.

A Working Group for Latin America and the Caribbean was chosen. The members are Jose Pena Gomez, Carlos Andres Perez, Hector Oqueli, Bernt Carlsson, N.J.M. and P.N.P. This group will propose to S.I. structures and a work programme for the region.

For a number of reasons, I proposed a regional conference in Grenada in May. The conference enthusiastically accepted. Delegates from all over have expressed interest in coming to Grenada to the meeting and this will be extremely useful to us also. If the N.J.M. Bureau ratifies this, plans for the conference will have to begin soon after the Festival.

The General Secretary, Bernt Carlsson, will be visiting us for a few days on April 18, and Pierre Schori sometime in May. These are also two important visits for us since they are stalwart supporters of the revolution in S.I. and internationally.

Anselmo Sule will ~~xxxxx~~ speak with Carvajal about arranging the meeting in Mexico? (Neutral ground if the Tom Adams matter is on) towards the end of this month with Pena Gomez and Maurice to work out a concrete programme of S.I. activity on behalf of Grenada. This is a follow-up to Maurice's proposal in Havana. If we wish this same committee to mediate on the Tom Adams affair, then Tom can be invited for a part of the proceedings. We will have to keep in touch with Sule.

Many of the leading comrades will be at the Aruba meeting. They look forward to seeing Comrade Maurice.

The next two major S.I. (International) events are the Party Leaders' Conference - Amsterdam - April 29, and the Bureau meeting - Tel Aviv on June 11, and 12. I strongly recommend that Comrade Maurice attend one of these.

P.S. On my way back from the Conference I noted the following from press reports:

- (1) That the mission of Vernon Walters to the region has been considered a failure. Of course, he claims that his objective was not to gain support for a U.S. invasion of El Salvador but merely to explain and give evidence of Cuban and Soviet military involvement.
- (2) That the big four Latin American powers: Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico have issued a statement in Buenos Aires rejecting any U.S. intervention in El Salvador.
- (3) That Duarte has agreed to participate in the mediation talks as proposed by Socialist International.
- (4) That Bernt Carlsson is on his way to Washington to discuss the mediation offer with the State Department.
- (5) That the U.S. has ~~just~~^{just} announced a massive step up of military aid to El Salvador. (Many U.S. Senators, even Senator John Glenn who once supported such a policy are now opposed to this).
- (6) It seems that both sides are applying the tactic of talk ~~more~~^{more}, appear the one more willing to talk, but fight harder.



ROUTING SLIP

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TO: Cdo. Prime Minister.

FOR ACTION		
FOR APPROVAL		
FOR SIGNATURE		
PREPARE DRAFT		
FOR COMMENTS	X	
MAY WE DISCUSS?		
YOUR ATTENTION		
AS DISCUSSED		
AS REQUESTED		
NOTE AND FILE		
NOTE AND RETURN		
FOR INFORMATION		

Draft letter to Socialist Affairs on article carried claiming that you promised in October elections in 1982.

Date:

February 3, 1982

FROM:

Permanent Secretary, P.M.O.

February 2, 1982.

Socialist Affairs,
8 Flowers Mews,
Archway close,
London N19 3TB
United Kingdom.

Dear Cde. Carlsson,

I address myself to you in your capacity as editor of the magazine Socialist Affairs, the mouthpiece of our organisation, the Socialist International.

In issue No. 6/81 of the magazine an article on Grenada appeared on page 239 of the English edition. In that article entitled "Bishop pledge to hold elections" it was reported that Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, leader of the People's Revolutionary Government and the New Jewel Movement, "pledged in early October that general elections would be held in the island some time in 1982, after Public approval of a new constitution currently being formulated."

Please be advised that the above statement, quoted from the article referred to above, is fundamentally incorrect. Prime Minister Maurice Bishop has at no time placed any particular time frame on the holding of elections and certainly on no occasion has he uttered any pledge to hold elections in 1982.

The People's Revolutionary Government led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop is committed to the formulation of a new constitution. Currently the necessary legal experts to do the drafting and models of other constitutions are being sought. When those are obtained the concrete formulation will commence with the draft concluded being submitted to the entire populace - mass organisations, workers, women, youth, farmers.

The comments, criticisms and ideas arising out of that process of discussion and debate will be submitted to the experts for study and incorporation and then they will present a second draft which will again be studied and adopted with amendments by the entire populace.

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February 2, 1982

Only out of this process will elections emerge and since there are several phases involved it is impossible and even foolhardy to put any definitive time frame on the holding of elections. This has been the consistent policy and pronouncement of the PRG and its leader Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.

I therefore, request that in your next issue you publish the text of this letter so that the position of the People's Revolutionary Government on the question of elections can be clarified and made known to your readership.

Yours Fraternally,

Benny Languine
Ag. Permanent Secretary
Prime Minister's Office.

GRENADA

Bishop pledge to hold elections

The prime minister of Grenada's two-and-a-half-year-old revolutionary government, Maurice Bishop, pledged in early October that general elections would be held in the island some time in 1982, after public approval of a new constitution currently being formulated. Bishop's New Jewel Movement (which is a member party of the International) seized power in March 1979 and has since been engaged in the long process of social and economic reconstruction in difficult circumstances.

Earlier in the year a major cabinet reshuffle was announced by Bishop on 29 July intended to put the small Caribbean island on a 'war footing' to face the 'tremendous challenge' posed by US hostility to the New Jewel

regime. The changes included the creation of a new ministry of national mobilisation and the appointment of the first woman member of the revolutionary government, the full composition of which became as follows: Maurice Bishop (prime minister, information, health, defence and interior); Bernard Coard (deputy prime minister, finance, trade, industry and planning); Kenrick Radix (attorney-general, legal affairs, agro-industries); Unison Whiteman (foreign affairs and tourism); Hudson Austin (communications, works and labour); George Louison (agriculture, lands and fisheries, cooperatives and rural development); Jacqueline Crest (education, youth and social affairs); Selwyn Strachan (national mobilisation) and

Norris Ban (housing)

In carrying out the reshuffle Bishop stressed the need to increase efficiency and output in the face of economic aggression and propaganda destabilisation by US imperialism.

The following month the Grenada prime minister issued a statement detailing US moves against his regime, claiming in particular that recent American military exercises off Puerto Rico were a rehearsal for a planned invasion of Grenada. Bishop added that the government's conclusion concerning the real purpose of these exercises 'is shared by many in the region and elsewhere who are fully aware of the Reagan administration's hawklike attitude towards our resolution and the steps it has already taken to destabilise our development process', and listed the following as

examples of the US approach:

- attempts to block funding for the construction of an international airport on

Grenada;

- attempts to gain the support of other governments in the region for the blocking of Caribbean Development Bank credits;
- allowing mercenaries to train openly in Miami in preparation for future invasions of Nicaragua or Grenada;
- drawing up plans for a blockade of Grenada;
- pre-election threats by Reagan and George Bush to teach Grenada a lesson;
- daily illegal spy flights over Grenada in violation of international airspace.

The Grenada prime minister concluded: 'We firmly believe that the Caribbean will not be able to achieve true social justice and equality for its people in an atmosphere of tension and insecurity. It is surely the right of the people of Grenada, as it is the right of all peoples, to develop their own processes in their own way free from all forms of external dictation, intimidation and pressure.'

AUSTRIA

Award of Kreisky and Czernetz prizes

This year's Bruno Kreisky Foundation prizes for services to human rights have been awarded to ten individuals and two organisations, ranging from the imprisoned South African nationalist leader, Nelson Mandela, to the Israeli Histadrut trade-union federa-

tion. Worth between 100,000 and 400,000 Austrian schillings, the prizes were awarded by a jury chaired by Karl Blecha (deputy chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party) and including SI President Willy Brandt and Chancellor Kreisky himself.

Among the individuals awarded prizes were Simcha Flapan, for his contribution to Arab-Jewish dialogue, and Raimonda Tawil, for her work in the field of Arab women's emancipation. The Histadrut was honoured for its efforts to integrate Arab workers in Israel, while Nelson Mandela, currently serving a life sentence in South Africa, was commended for his commitment to the struggle for black equality.

Also awarded prizes were two South Korean opposition

activists, Kim Dae Jung and the poet Kim Chu Ha; Domitilia Barrios de Chungara, a Bolivian miner's wife who has championed the rights of workers and women in her country; the late Enrique Alvarez Cordoba of El Salvador, who was murdered in November 1980 after playing a leading role in the opposition to the military junta; the Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda, for his relentless opposition to fascist forces; Rosa Jochmann and Felix

Enrique Alvarez Cordoba



Ermacora, both of Austria. I their tireless efforts in various human-rights campaigns: a the Foundation for the Support of European Intellectuals. I its work in assisting European scientists and intellectuals.

The Kreisky Foundation was founded on the occasion of Chancellor Kreisky's 65 birthday. Banks, insurance companies and other bodies have contributed 9 million schillings to finance the prizes which are awarded every 10 years to individuals and organisations for outstanding service in the cause of human rights.

Earlier in the year, the 1981 Karl Czernetz prize (which honours the memory of the former international secretary of the Austrian Socialist Party) was awarded in four sections to local party organisations (including two young socialist groups) for outstanding achievements in the educational, cultural and information field

Domitilia Barrios de Chungara



AIC

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**SUMMARY REPORT ON THE REGULAR MEETING OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

SANTO DOMINGO, D.R. February 24-25th 1983

SUBMITTED BY: BESSIE WILLIAMS, NJM'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MEETING

This report does not claim to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Further follow up with cde. Victor Oqueli will be necessary. Please also see the short papers prepared for the press on the Conference. (Press Communique)

Basically, the public Conference report reiterated previous positions taken by some Latin American Governments on the region. This report attempts to report on some internal issues.

OUTCOME OF THE AGENDA ITEMS :

Item 1: Political situation in Latin America. Oqueli proposed a paper which was quite satisfactory as a start. (appendix 2). Off the record Andres Perez said it was too "anti-American" and introduced a completely new draft. (appendix 3) Several amendments were submitted. Grenada's written amendment is contained in appendix 4. Although a committee of four was set up, no conclusion was reached and all draft amendments etc. are being sent to the drafting committee for the SI Congress which will be in Lisbon, Portugal, April 1983. (although there is still talk from Bernt Carlson about Sydney, Australia)

Item 11: Other Matters/ Special Developments.

1. The SI Congress will be in Lisbon Portugal. Bernt Carlson is not happy with that but this seems more or less final.

2. Andres Perez (as per usual) was extremely aggressive, almost hegemonistic on (a) the content of the assessment on Latin America, which he wanted to be very soft, almost no reference whatsoever to the US.

(b) On the first day, apparently he advanced a thesis on what should be the character of SI. He apparently wants it to be significantly identifiable from the christians and the communists. Ungo repeated this..o them

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- (c) He wanted clear and firm statements against Suriname.
- (d) He lost a definitive, but not-made-public bid for the Presidency to replace Pena Gomez. It appeared he was not popularly favoured by forces such as Oqueli.
3. The Guatemalan Carlos Gallardo of the Social Democrats informed the meeting that some elements of the party had been engaged in diverse action. They called a special and contestable 'Congress'. Also some progressive forces feared these same elements are co-operating with the Rios Lott government. The other side presented their case. In summary, it appears that: (a) there is an ideological and/or tactical difference between those who want to build relations with the freedom fighters (Gallardo's position, more or less) and those who want to concentrate now on rushing to take advantage of Rios Lott March 23rd "Política Abierta" (opening). And (b) there appears to be a struggle for leadership by a younger wing of the party. The SI Presidium advised them to settle the matter internally and they later announced the establishment of an internal Commission which will report on progress/or lack of it at the Lisbon Congress.
4. The Nicaraguans who are only observers, attended very few sessions and delivered less than a one-minute greeting. They were very active bilaterally and in the other structured activities. e.g. tours.

Item 111. What should be the SI Strategy in Latin America?

Several proposals were put forward.

- (i) Andres Perez proposed a committee to look into the situation in Suriname (the Dutch Labour Party Representative gave a very poor report on the human rights situation there)
- (ii) A proposal for a fact-finding mission to the Eastern Caribbean
- (iii) an SI meeting should be held soon in Brazil to get a better understanding of the situation and work with all socialist parties there, similar discussions around Argentina as well.

Item iv. Internal organisation of the committee: First Pena Gomez was emphatically urged to remain as President, by Reuben Berrios, (PIP), Carlos Morales (PRC Chile) from the floor. Pena Gomez said the serious domestic crisis in the D.R. had more or less eased and he was now once again in a position to accept the presidency as offered to him.

Secondly, a paper on "Terms of Reference" was adopted and it is attached as appendix 5. (it does not include all the amendments)

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Item 5. On Christian Democracy in Latin America was not discussed.

This is more or less in summary what occurred. I arrived at the meeting one day late, and in any case the meeting was not very disciplined so items became merged.

MY OVERALL ASSESSMENT

First on the meeting itself. There are a number of storms inside SI at this time. Among them are: Elections for President and Secretary General; left-right splits over issues such as Nicaragua. It is rumoured that Suarez of Portugal wants the Congress in Lisbon. So he can invite and parade Eden Pastora (Commandante Zero) and thus embarrass the Sandinistas. The Central American situation continues to be an issue of major controversy, to the extent that even Latin Americans are, or seem divided on SI strategy for the region. e.g. Andres Perez vs Hector Oqueli) There is also the charge that the Israelis have and continue to maneuver via certain Scandinavian parties to get an indication for Israel's position. Thus the Lisbon Congress could be very important in deciding whether Socialist International takes a more anti-imperialist, anti-zionist position, or whether the right will be victorious.

Second, what is the political situation as seen by Latin American social democrats.. Unfortunately, I was not able to get a clear reading on this. I sensed that there is a certain amount of turmoil and most people are waiting to sort things out at the Congress. This appears to be Oqueli's position.

Third, was NJL's presence useful? Jamaica's Paul Miller did not come, neither was Barbaños present. So even though we arrived at the end of the second day, an English-speaking party's presence was very useful. Furthermore NJL is well respected and its leaders well-known and equally respected. It was therefore very useful to continue to be working and to be seen among such regio parties and figures. Pena Gomez, Sule (Chile), Oqueli, Reuben Berrios (PR), even Andres Perez took time out to listen and to come out and greet me, but particularly to send greetings to cde. Laurice Bishop. Our input in the meeting may not have been all that critical (with the exception of appendix 4) But as the 1981 hosts, as a member, as English-speaking Caribbean, and as a party well-loved, the answer is yes, the presence was very useful.

The delegate was given about one week's notice and quite unfortunately, no brief whatsoever. This was due to communications/transportation problems encountered by the International Relations Committee.

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Added to this, the meeting was moved up one day earlier and the delegate missed a full two-thirds of the first day.

On the morning of the second day, Grenada was given the floor without soliciting it. I made a very short statement, the text of which is attached as appendix 4.

The third and final interview was towards the closing of the meeting to thank and congratulate the host/president Mr. Pena Gomez, attached as an appendix 5.

BILATERALS (these were mostly very brief meetings and with no real agenda. I really want to report comprehensively on the meeting)

(a) Carlos Gallard (SDP - Guatemala) He briefed me on the internal conflicts in his party. Regarding the March 23rd Political opening offered by Gen. Rios Montt, he was of the opinion that it could be used but with great caution and without compromise. He thought it would be difficult because the dictatorship has moved large sections of the people into virtually concentration camps, and this makes it even more difficult to do political work, given the repression etc. I told him that our Party/cde. Bishop would welcome him to Grenada anytime. He sends cde. Bishop very warm greetings.

(b) Hector Oqueli (for El Salvador) We did not really speak on the El Salvador situation but on SI, its work and problems. He advised me that there was a personality struggle between Willy Brandt and Bernt Carlson. The popular feeling inside SI is that Carlson should resign. (He has already been offered a post as ambassador-at-large Swedish foreign ministry). Oqueli reminded NLM and cde. Kogo about the proposed meeting for Grenada, on/around March 13th 1955. I urge someone to contact him. Oqueli's name has been proposed for Secretary General of SI. He was generally cool and helpful.

(c) Zaarndem from Aruba's LEF and Carlos Marquez were very friendly and advised me that Betico was at this moment in Holland on the independence talks. He said that Holland continues to be adamantly opposed to Aruba's independence outside of the bloc of six islands.

(d) Rodrigo Borja (Democratic Left - Ecuador) discussed the very poor economic situation in Ecuador. He said public opinion polls inside Ecuador showed that his party, the democratic left will win the next elections in January 1964. Some at this meeting (e.g Sule) told me this man Borja will be the next president of Ecuador.

(e) Guillermo Ungo (FOR - El Salvador) sends greetings to cde. Bishop. He seems in very high spirits. His circles were Andres Perez and Ans Sule.

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(f) Oscar Brites (RFP- Paraguay) remembers visiting Grenada as part of a Latin American Socialist Youth Conference.

(g) Andres Perez (AD-Venezuela) He sends greetings to cde. Bishop I asked him when he is coming to Grenada and he said "Sometime hopefully this year" then he moved quickly again.

(h) Reuben Berrios (PIP - Puerto Rico) We travelled to PR together and he selected a hotel for me to stay. He showed me old San Juan, next morning, his party paid for my hotel room and political Affairs chief Hiram Melendez took me to the Party Office before going to the airport. The PP also gave NJM a small tape Recorder. Bro. Reuben told me that some of the US troops used in the recent provocative military exercises in Honduras to intimidate Nicaragua came from the US troop supplies in Puerto Rico. I also learnt that Cyrus/ or someone fitting his description has addressed a CLAT trade union meeting some two months ago, in which he denounced the FRG.
(ref. Hiram Melendez)

ON P.D.R. AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Pena Gomez seems to be in control, politically speaking. Someone also observed that the military was well under control as well. I did not meet with him though he was very warm, but understandably busy. The party machinery seemed to function well for the meeting (the Party) also paid for room and meals for all 2-3 days. The trade union, youth and women's movement, all are attached as appendices.

The delegations were taken on a tour of the city and shown the main political economic centre piece of the Blanco Administration. Housing projects. Some 512 house units are being constructed to satisfy a housing crisis (10,000 units must be built in 4 yrs: a political promise) Meanwhile one party member told me re unemployment was about 50%

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. an immediate consultation with Hector Ogueli: The proposal meeting of select regional parties (circa 1983) would be excellent followup especially since no one from St. George's attended this meeting. This is of highest importance.

2. We must begin to prepare immediately for the Lisbon Congress, April 7-10 or 4-7 1983. Two of the important issues NJM must raise (which are also likely to win broad support from Latin America) are: 'the Caribbean as a zone of Peace, independence and Development and the need for special consideration of small island states in the context, of the severe financial and economic crisis.

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Given the ,any struggles inside SI at this time, we must start early to catch people's attention before they are carried away by internal politicking.

3. NJM could assist the committee with its fact-finding mission to the eastern caribbean. Oqueli could best suggest how.

4. NJM must strengthen its relations with Pena Gomez.

5. Respond to the invitation for the Socialist Youth Conference March 23-25
Appendix 10

Expenses

1. Airline ticket	\$832.00
2. Tel. Calls and meals	95.55
3. Lodging paid by PDR	0 0
4. Overnight in B/Dos	<u>58.60</u>
Total	986.15

Please ^{refund} ~~regard~~ soonest to Washington Mission.

List of appendices.

2. Resolution on Latin America and the Caribbean - Hector Oqueli draft
3. " " " " - Andres Perez "

Grenada's proposais to the text
Terms of reference for the latin American /caribbean committee
list of participants, agenda and daily schedule.

REPORT OF S.I. COMMITTEE FOR LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN

This S.I. Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean was held between 19th and 21st of August, 1983. However because of late organisation of our part I was only able to attend the second half of the second day and the final day. The agenda for that period and the entire conference is enclosed. Enclosed also are a list of participants, the (only) Portuguese version of the Rio declaration and all other documents I received from the Conference.

First of all let me raise what seemed to me, the "unexplainable" presence of a number of European Parties. My understanding was that the meeting was a Latin American caucus and as such some fourteen Latin American countries were to be present. This concern of the presence of the European parties stemmed from the fact that most of the representatives of these parties held backward and in some cases reactionary positions during the day and a half. Two examples in particular could be cited.

One: The position of the Holland delegate on the Social and Economic Crisis was that the crux of the problem with the Third World was and is the question of the internal distribution of wealth. The debt problem and all other external economic and social problems affecting the third world stem from the internal distribution system in operation. True enough. But the position went further to say that the Third world's problems have nothing to do with their external economic relations. In other words we are laying blame on the developed capitalist economics for their problems. This position, however, was successfully defeated by the Brazilian delegation.

Two: In the case of Portugal their position on a solution to the problem was for Portugal and its former colonies (i.e. Brazil, Angola, Mozambique etc.) should bond themselves together in a sort of union to work collectively by themselves to solve the Third world problem.

These, among others, were prominent points coming from these parties. The European parties came from Holland, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal and even Israel.

On the issue of the Social and Economic problems within the context of a world in crisis most presentations were purely descriptive and less analytical. The Brazilians dominated the floor. As such nothing beyond the general call for a restructuring of the international financial and trading system was called for. There were some feeling (I think it was from the Venezuelans) that Third World countries should unilaterally refuse to pay their debts. There was all tacit support for the creation of a Third World currency. In the context of that entire discussion, I made the call for an inclusion in the final declaration, the meeting support for the struggle for the N.I.E.O. The call was made in my presentation which lasted for about twelve to fifteen minutes. Details follow.

Having arrived late and learning that a number of parties have made contribution on the situation in their respective countries I decided to ask for the floor on the final day. The presentation made can be divided into five parts viz.

1. Attacks made on the Grenada Revolution, centering on a. The International Airport (carrying a similar line as was carried by the Comrade Leader, Hunter College Address) and b. the allegation of human rights abuse in Grenada, constitutionality and elections. Again the Hunter College line was given.
2. The threat of imperialism to the Revolution focussing on a. negative propaganda around our carnival festivities; the aim of which was to scare our people and detract tourism. b. the presence of Gairy in Barbados at a time of U.S. Military Nonouveres in the Region. Gairy himself, comfortable in Barbados and using the media there. c. attempts made to isolate Grenada again at the Caricom Heads of Government Conference in Port-of-Spain and the struggle

that had to be waded by our delegation.

3. The performance of our economy and the negative implications of the world capitalist crisis.
4. The present political situation in Central America and expressing firm support for the Contadora Initiative; also, expressing condemnation of all acts of military (and otherwise) aggression against the Nicaraguan Revolution. Support for the peoples of El Salvador and Guatemala was also expressed as well as support for a negotiated political settlement to the problems in Central America.
5. The final part called on the meeting to express in its final declaration concern and support for the following:
 - a. The preservation of World Peace
 - b. The struggle for a N.I.E.O.
 - c. That the Caribbean be declared a zone of peace, Independence and Development and implemented in practice.
 - d. The Contadora Initiative

In terms of criticism of the presentation two specific ones could be made. In the first instance the correctness of naming Barbados as the country from which Gairy was operating is questionable. In the context of the type of gathering it seemed later to me that implying Barbados without naming it could have been more appropriate. Secondly, the final part of the presentation did not call on the meeting to express concern and condemnation of U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Grenada. However, implicit in the presentation was the cry for such, but specific reference to it would have gone a longer way. A mild concern for the Grenada situation was in the final declaration.

By way of general criticism of the entire planning and arrangements for Grenada to attend the meeting let me make a few remarks. In the first instance late preparation (or even no preparations) were made. As a result I was able to attend only half of the meeting. Besides that the lateness meant the following:

1. Lost of time and money. I had to fly north and then south and vice versa on my return. It was possible to fly south only.
2. Absolutely no briefing with respect to the content of the meeting (before leaving) and what we as a party wanted from the meeting.
3. No contacts on information as to the venue of the meeting. I only knew it was in Rio. I was therefore stranded in Rio for over five hours.
4. There was also a security problem related to point three in that I had to unavoidably release information of myself and my mission in Rio before I could have established contact with St. George's. This is in the context of Bernt Carlsson, a V.P. of S.I. been arrested at the airport and detained for couple hours and a murder at the airport only fifteen minutes after I left it. Anything could have happened.

Finally, I want to make a few recommendations on our approach to future missions.

1. The I.R.C. have someone specialised in S.I. matters (and other organs of equal or greater importance). My experience was that continuity and personal contact, relations and familiarity are necessary at these fora.
2. All travel requirements should be found out at least three days before someone goes on a mission. (Visa, routing etc.). This will save time, money and minimise security risks.

3. Thorough briefing of comrades going to these sessions with particular emphasis on objectives.
4. At least two party comrades should be singled out for full time work in I;R.C. with specific responsibility of carrying our line to these sessions.

Walter SANDIFORD.