

## U.S. MANIPULATIONS LEADING TO CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS EXPOSED

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1. Concoction of the Caribbean Crisis by the U.S. Government

Hardly anyone doubts today what postwar international crisis was most acute and most dangerous for world peace. It was undoubtedly the Caribbean crisis of 1962 or, as it is called in the West, especially in the United States, the "Cuban," or "missile" crisis. This brief international crisis would have been colossally dangerous in the event it got out of control; it has had no equal in the past 25 years.

Little has been said and written so far concerning the events that led up to and occurred during it. American bourgeois diplomats, politicians, scholars, and journalists interpret the diplomatic struggle of those days in a unique and most one-sided way. One can cite THIRTEEN DAYS by Senator R. Kennedy (R. F. Kennedy. THIRTEEN DAYS, A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN CRISIS, N.Y., 1966), the memoirs of J. Kennedy's assistants A. Schlesinger (A. M. Schlesinger. 1000 DAYS, JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE. Boston, 1965), and Th. Sorensen (Th. Sorensen. KENNEDY. N.Y., 1965), for an Americanized, rather tendentious, discussion of the history of the Caribbean crisis. The American periodic press is still debating the question of what America "gained or lost" as a result of this crisis. It is also frequently used as proof that "the Russians cannot be trusted." A graphic example in this regard was the propaganda campaign of American "mistrust" of the Soviet Union inspired by official Washington in October 1970. American scholars of international affairs frequently cite the Caribbean crisis when analyzing theories relating to international relations and international conflicts and crises. At the same time they make use of an exaggerated version of the story of the Caribbean crisis. A characteristic feature of this version is an effort to represent the actions of J. Kennedy's government during that period as being "forced." Furthermore, there continues to be increasing distortion of the compromise factor involved in settling the crisis, with the "victor's" crown being placed on the brow of American foreign policy and diplomacy. All these assertions are quite remote from reality, a fact that becomes increasingly clear from a thorough and objective analysis of the events of the autumn of 1962.

How spontaneous was the Caribbean crisis, was it actually unexpected for the U.S. Government? How did it come about? What was its cause? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to give a brief description of the international situation during the summer and fall of 1962. It was most unstable. The United States was expanding its intervention in South Vietnam. Nuclear weapons were being tested in the atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean. Because of the refusal of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to acknowledge the status quo in Europe, the situation here was also very tense. At the same time, there were talks on disarmament and exchanges of opinion on European problems between the USSR and the United States. There was even contemplated a certain rapprochement in their positions in regard to the problem of eliminating the consequences of the Second World War. But isolated positive tendencies in American foreign policy nonetheless did not give grounds for hoping that realism in European affairs would triumph in Washington over the policy of aggression.

*Tote es el hijo de  
Gromyko a quien preparan  
para reemplazar a Khrushchev  
en Washington. Ya tiene el  
rango de ministro-con-  
sejero*

American actions in the area of the Caribbean Sea looked particularly dangerous. The course of American foreign policy in regard to Cuba was aimed at a secret preparation of a new aggression against the country. American reactionaries were trying to forget the lessons from the defeat in the Bay of Pigs. The U.S. Congress had passed a resolution wherein the American Government assumed the obligation to fight against the Cuban people "by any means that might be needed, up to the use of arms." (VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SSSR [USSR Foreign Policy], M. 1968, p 230.) Senator Keating headed an unbridled campaign to force the U.S. Government to start its aggression against Cuba (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 800). In southern United States, in Florida, the Central Intelligence Agency was feeding and financing Cuban counterrevolutionaries. The American Government was inspiring an anti-Cuban campaign throughout the country; with the help of the press, it was inflating the myth of the "Soviet threat" in Europe and beyond its confines and deliberately intensifying thereby international tension.

At the same time Kennedy's government was trying to cast doubt on the legality of defensive measures being carried out by the government of populist Cuba. On 4 September 1962, the President in a special message proposed rigid conditions which, in the opinion of the U.S. Government, the Cuban government could and could not take to strengthen its defensive capability. This message, which violated various norms of international law, contained threats to Cuba in case it failed to carry out the American demands (Statement by President Kennedy, September 4, 1962 [DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 24, 1962, p 450]). Thus, U.S. foreign policy was taking a course to force "a struggle against communism" in the Western Hemisphere in general and in regard to populist Cuba in particular. Preparations were escalating in the country for an aggression against Cuba; an unbridled anti-Cuban campaign was in progress. One hundred fifty thousand reservists were mobilized. Washington was also attempting to organize an economic blockade of the island. The American plan to suppress the Cuban revolution was showing its contours increasingly clearly.

On 11 September 1962, the Soviet Union called on the U.S. Government "to show good sense, not lose its self-control, and soberly consider what its actions might lead to if it were to unleash a war." The Soviet statement showed a real course for the normalization of the situation in the Caribbean Sea area. "Instead of heating the atmosphere by such actions," it was said in a TASS statement, "as mobilizing reserves, which is the equivalent of a threat of war, would it not be more sensible for the U.S. Government to show its wisdom by making a kind gesture by establishing diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba, the desirability of which was recently shown by the Cuban Government." (VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA I MEZHDUNAROD NYYE OTNOSHENIYA [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations]. Collection of Documents, 1962. M., 1963, p 362). President Kennedy in his statement of 13 September 1962 did not reply to the proposal of the Soviet Union on ways for normalizing American-Cuban relations. At the same time he announced that the government of Fidel Castro "was in danger," enumerating the actions taken against Cuba by the Organization of American States (OAS) under strong pressure by the United States. Kennedy then went on to outright threats: "Should the United States at any time deem it necessary to take military action against Communism in Cuba, all the deliveries by weapons by Communists and Soviet technicians would be unable to alter the consequence of significantly postpone the time for achieving such a result." (Statement by the President, September 13, 1962 [DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN], September 24, 1962, p 450). This statement of the President was also supplied with a number of "pacifying," but ambiguous phrases. Thus, Kennedy said: "We shall never start a war in this hemisphere nor permit one." (IBID., p 482).

In regard to the conditions for "preservation of peace" in the Caribbean Sea area proposed by President Kennedy, the aims of the U.S. Government took on an openly aggressive character. Another matter of concern was the fact that the U.S. Government continued to carry on anti-Cuban activities among the OAS and other regional Latin-American organizations. In this connection, there should be mentioned a communique adopted at the 2 and 3 October meeting of foreign ministers and special representatives of American states. It was stated in it that Cuba was being transformed "into an armed base for Communist penetration in America..." (Communique of the Informal Meeting of American Foreign Ministers and Special Representatives, Washington, October 2-3, 1962 [DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, October 22, 1962, p 598]). The participants at the meeting referred to the threat offered by Cuba to "the unity of the Americas and of its democratic institutions" and to the need "to take special measures against it both individually and collectively." (IBID.) Thus, under the mask of fighting "Communist intervention" in Latin America, Washington was preparing for imperialist intervention in the matter of Cuba. On 3 October 1962, the U.S. Congress adopted a resolution calling the U.S. Government to take measures against Cuba "which was threatening the security of the United States." (Joint Resolution of the U.S. Congress: Public Law 87-733, approved October 3, 1962).

With worsening of the conflict in the Caribbean Sea area stemming from the plans and actions of U.S. political circles in regard to Cuba, the Soviet and Cuban Governments, in full accord with the norms of international law, had reached an agreement during the summer of 1962 for strengthening the defensive capability of Cuba. Medium-range missiles were delivered to the island for defensive purposes. This action was aimed at exerting a deterrent influence on the supporters of military ventures in Washington and at suppressing any new American aggression against the Cuban people. On 8 October 1962, the President of Cuba, O. Dorticos, appeared at the General Assembly of U.N. and announced: if the United States were to give effective guarantees that it would not intervene militarily in Cuba and would not help other countries to try to invade the island, Cuba would not engage in any military measures. The United States, however, did not react to this announcement (U Thant to Premier Fidel Castro, October 26, 1962 [DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1962, Edited by R. Stebbins, N.Y., 1963, p 404]) and continued to strengthen its military bases in the Caribbean Sea area. The CIA increased weaving its net of agreements and diversions around Cuba.

It is well known that an integral part of the U.S. aggressive global strategy after the Second World War was its policy of encirclement of the USSR and other socialist countries with a thick net of offensive military bases. Many of them were set in direct proximity of the borders of the Soviet Union. They also included long-range aviation and subsequently missiles. It is also well known that the Soviet Government on a number of occasions asked the United States to eliminate its foreign military bases located on alien territories. During the time of the Caribbean crisis the U.S. Government had no justification to demand that the USSR not take legal measures for strengthening the defensive capability of Cuba nor to accuse the Soviet Government that it was responsible for the Caribbean crisis by its "unilateral actions." The roots of the crisis should not be sought here. They are concealed not only in the "crisis diplomacy" policy of 1962 but also in the very nature of U.S. postwar foreign political strategy, in Washington's policy of aggressive machinations in the international arena and in their destruction of the security of other peoples. Even American bourgeois literature contains from time to time articles that throw light on the real reasons for the crisis. Thus, Prof. F. Green acknowledges that "the political roots of the missile crisis are to be explained by the decision of Castro's government to have Cuba take the path of a profound social and economic revolution..." (FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SIXTIES. THE ISSUES AND THE INSTRUMENTS. Ed. by R. Hilsman and R. Good, Baltimore, 1965, p 128).

The situation in the Caribbean Sea area became increasingly tense. American U-2 reconnaissance planes appeared over Cuba, thereby crudely violating the norms of international law. The flights of these planes showed once more that the CIA and the Pentagon was gathering information for a possible intervention against the Cuban people. President Kennedy not only knew about these flights but personally sanctioned them. On 14 October 1962, a U-2 flight violated Cuba's sovereignty. (Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 672). It took an aerial photo survey of Cuban territory. After the plane had returned to its base, the material was processed and studied for information which showed, as has been pointed out, of the further strengthening of Cuba's military potential, including missiles. This data was passed to the heads of CIA and the Pentagon. The President's special assistant, M. Bundy, was then notified. Characteristically, the latter did not immediately bother Kennedy. Early the morning of 16 October, Bundy and representatives of American intelligence had a special talk. (IBID., 673). Acknowledgment of the decisive role of the CIA in inflaming the Caribbean crisis is contained in F. Green's book VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA 60-KH GODOV, PROBLEMY I INSTRUMENTY [Foreign Policy in the Sixties, the Issues and the Instruments]. It says that "... reconnaissance played a basic role in determining policy before and after detection of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. (FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SIXTIES. THE ISSUES AND THE INSTRUMENTS, p 128). Only after a careful briefing by CIA personnel did Bundy rush to the President. Kennedy was still in his private quarters looking over the morning papers. Bundy hurriedly informed the President of the CIA version. Kennedy did not find anything extraordinary in this communication. In reply to the President's question: "What does this all really mean?" -- Bundy started to prove that the detected missiles could be used for "aggressive purposes" against the United States. (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 80).

Kennedy, of course, understood, as T. Sorensen wrote subsequently, that the appearance of medium-range missiles in Cuba could not affect the balance of power between the USSR and the United States which was principally based on intercontinental strategic missiles. In his book THIRTEEN DAYS, R. Kennedy, in reminiscing of the frame of mind of the U.S. political summit at the time, acknowledged that the opinion held by members of the President's entourage was that Soviet missiles in Cuba "did not affect the balance of power." (R. F. Kennedy, OP. CIT., p 31). The former Deputy Assistant Secretary reached about the same conclusion in his book CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY. He wrote that the U.S. Government during the period of the Caribbean crisis was guided more by political than by military considerations. (M. H. Halperin, CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY. L., 1968, pp 41-42).

During the second half of October, prior to the development of the crisis in the Caribbean Sea Area, the Pentagon planned certain military "exercises." They were to camouflage the concentration of a large number of troops in Florida and at other American military bases in the proximity of Cuba. (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 803). Forty thousand Marines participated in the "maneuvers". Five thousand of them were moved directly to Cuba, to the base of Guantanamo. The 82nd and 101st Division were in combat readiness. An American army of 100,000 troops was concentrated in Florida ready to invade Cuba at any minute. Fourteen thousand reservists were mobilized to service transport aircraft. In September and October the U.S. Congress was preparing a special act that was approved 22 October 1962. (The Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Fiscal Year 1963: Public Law 87-872, approved October 23, 1962 [DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1962. Edited by R. Stebbins, pp 373-374]). It specified that the United States would cease giving "aid" to countries selling to Cuba arms and goods "of strategic value or transporting

such goods to Cuba." In this way the American Government tried to weaken the defense capability of Cuba and prevent her from obtaining arms even of the conventional type,

Kennedy's administration held a number of conferences to develop operation plans in relation to Cuba: The first was created by Kennedy in the White House on 16 October at 11:45. (Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 674). In a special directive, Kennedy demanded secrecy in regard to the plans under consideration. The meeting at the White House was followed by a conference at the State Department. At 6:30 p.m. summoned another conference, this time once more at the White House. A small group of trusted persons on whom the President depended in developing his political line in those days consisted of Vice President L. Johnson, Secretary of State D. Rusk, Secretary of Defense R. Macnamara, Secretary of Justice R. Kennedy, General Taylor, and other assistants and advisers: McCown, Dillon, Stevenson, Bundy, Sorensen, Ball, Gilpatrick, Thompson, A. Johnson, Acheson, and Lovett. (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 802). The American military suggested to Kennedy an air attack on Cuba to destroy military objectives, stores, and airfields. Demands were heard to finish off Cuba by way of an American invasion from the sea. Some of the "hawks" believed it necessary to carry out a series of mass flights involving 500 planes. (Concerning this question, see Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 675; A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 804). Such were the truly piratic plans of the aggressors. The following acknowledgment by R. Kennedy is extremely interesting in a psychological sense. Listening to these bellicose proposals, he handed the following note to the President during a conference: "I now know what Tojo felt when he planned Pearl Harbor." (R. F. Kennedy, OP. CIT., p 31). Among J. Kennedy's advisers were also to be found more balanced people. They rejected the point of view of those favoring direct aggression, believing that such an approach was too dangerous for the United States. "Immediate invasion of Cuba could bring on war (between the USSR and the United States -- Anat. G.) which a nuclear restraining agency was called upon to prevent," wrote subsequently the well-known American specialist on international affairs, J. Stoessinger. (J. G. Stoessinger. THE MIGHT OF NATIONS, WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME. N.Y., 1969, p 166.) A rather circumspect position was taken by the former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Thompson. The President's brother, R. Kennedy, was also a backer of the circumspect course. (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 803). However, the Pentagon and the CIA succeeded nevertheless at this stage of escalating aggression to get the President to agree to strengthen the American base at Guantanamo.

In regard to the attitude of the United States to its NATO allies during the White House's preparation of the crisis situation, it can be said that they were simply ignored even at the highest level. The decision favoring such a position was made by the President during the first secret meetings. It demonstrated to the heads of West-European governments that the United States in acutely critical situations works out its own course of action without their approval or even knowledge. The reference to the "necessity" for secrecy in regard to its aggressive plans and their implementation without the knowledge of their main allies could not help but create a feeling of uncertainty in regard to U.S. actions after the Caribbean crisis even among many pro-American West Europeans. Naturally, during the crisis, the bourgeois governments of Western Europe sided with Kennedy's government in official statements. But this was the official position behind which was concealed a deep uneasiness concerning Washington's policy, which was reflected in intensified polycentrism at NATO.

Thus, an international crisis was being fabricated in the U.S. capital. The hawks were in a state of ecstasy. R. Kennedy subsequently recalled that a number of the President's advisers "seemingly lost their objectivity and ability to make a sober evaluation

of the situation. (R. F. Kennedy, OP. CIT., p 31). Finally, President Kennedy came to the conclusion that the large-scale aggression of the American navy, army, and air force against a defensively strengthened Cuba was too much of a risk for the United States. (Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 683). The American military, however, insistently demanded direct aggression against the island. The principal political advisers finally agreed in favor of a naval blockade. Kennedy supported this plan which was a rude violation of the norms of international law and the U.N. constitution. On 18 October, the President created two secret groups (subcommittees) from among those who had participated in developing the crisis strategy. Both groups were directed to present to the White House a detailed plan for executing both an air attack on Cuba and a naval blockade. (IBID., p 688). Kennedy thereby took the dangerous course of confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba.

On 18 October a meeting was held between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and President Kennedy. It was widely discussed in the American press during the Caribbean crisis and, after Kennedy's assassination in 1963, in all kinds of memoir literature, including R. Kennedy's work. The basic purpose of all these commentaries was to mask the true character of the conversation and fabricate yet another excuse to justify the actions of the United States in the fall of 1962 in regard to Cuba and the Soviet Union and in violation of the norms of international law. Incidentally, it is known that during the period of exacerbation of the international situation in the Caribbean Sea area when possibilities existed for diplomatic settlement of the crisis situation, Kennedy's government refused to use them for a long time. This pertains to the basically early, "latent" period of Washington's fabrication of the Caribbean crisis. At that time, the U.S. Government deliberately rejected various diplomatic ways for preventing a conflict. During the first half of October 1962, President Kennedy and his chief diplomatic advisers did not think of resorting to serious diplomacy to solve the problems that had been bothering them because of the strengthened defensive capability of Cuba. Thus, the major part of President Kennedy's talk with A. A. Gromyko on 18 October 1962 dealt with the "Cuban problem" and with other important questions, principally the German peace treaty and normalization of the position of West Berlin on its foundation. The Cuban question was raised during this conversation by the Soviet side. The President's attention was drawn to the following considerations: an active anti-Cuban campaign had been in progress in the United States for an extended period of time. Obviously, it represented a specific policy of the American Government. Such a course could lead to dangerous consequences for all mankind, which, was believed in the USSR, was desired by no people, including the American. The President's attention was also drawn to the fact that there were demands in the United States for aggression against Cuba and that responsible people were trying to justify the aggressive acts and dangerous adventures. (AVP [Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki -- Foreign Policy Archives], f. 59, op. 46, p. 56, d. 277, ll. 206-207)

During the talk, President Kennedy was told that the solution to an overwhelming majority of international problems was the result of statements and negotiations between states in which governments disclosed their position in regard to various problems. (IBID., ll. 207-208). The American President was made to clearly understand that if the U.S. had any "pretensions" to Cuba or the Soviet Union, they would have to be resolved by peaceful means. This statement of the Soviet representative also did not seem to get President Kennedy's attention, although his interest in the "problem" of Cuba's strengthened defense capability could be considered within the frame work of negotiations. He continued to hold to the same tactics even after the reasons were explained to him by which the USSR was extending assistance to Cuba to

strengthen her defense capability. The President was told that the Soviet Union would not play the role of a casual bystander under conditions where an active anti-Cuban campaign was being fanned in the United States and unfriendly acts were being conducted against Cuba and against states that were maintaining friendly relations with her, respected her independence, and were rendering assistance at a difficult time for her. (IBID., 1. 208). President Kennedy was also told that the sixties of the 19th century were not the middle of the 19th century, were not a time for dividing colonies, and were not a time when victims of aggression could make their selves heard only after weeks or even months after they had been attacked. The decision of the U.S. Government to call to the army another 150,000 reservists was characterized as an extremely dangerous act meant to exacerbate international tension. (IBID., 1. 209). Thus, the American President was served notice directly that the Governments of the USSR and Cuba feared an armed invasion of Cuba and that under such conditions the Soviet Union could not remain idle. It was explained to Kennedy that the Soviet Union's assistance to Cuba consisted only in contributing to its defense capability and strengthening its economy. Instruction of Cubans by Soviet specialists in the use of defense weapons for the country served as a threat to no one. (IBID., 1. 210)

During the course of the conversation, the President admitted that during the summer of 1962 the Cuban question "had become a really serious one." He spoke of being disturbed by the fact that the USSR was delivering weapons to Cuba at such a rapid rate. (IBID., 11. 211-212). Later Kennedy stated that his government had no plans to invade Cuba. However, he said: "As President, I am restraining those Americans who favor invasion of Cuba." (IBID., 1. 212). In this way Kennedy admitted that plans existed in the United States for aggression against Cuba. "I don't know where all this will lead us to," he remarked in regard to the situation in the Caribbean Sea area. This statement of Kennedy without doubt did not correspond to reality, since it forced out the consequence of exacerbation of the international situation as its cause in a matter for which the United States was responsible. The American President thought well of the future course of events. He was deliberately leading at that time toward a military confrontation between the United States and the USSR, despite the fact that all actions of the Soviet Union in regard to Cuba were in full accord with international law and the sovereign rights of the USSR and Cuba.

Kennedy did not bring up the question of Soviet missiles in Cuba, restricting himself only to general statements about the fact that the situation in the Caribbean Sea area had "unexpectedly deteriorated" because of the actions of the Soviet Government. In this connection, the President had in mind strengthening of the defense capability in its broadest aspects. Then President Kennedy's attention was directed to the fact that the question boiled down to the Cuban Government being ready or not ready to repulse attempts at a new invasion of Cuba and taking steps to protect the country against aggression. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet Government had responded to Cuba's appeal for help only because this appeal pursued the objective of eliminating the threat hanging over Cuba. (IBID., 11. 213-214). It was pointed out to President Kennedy that if the Soviet Union was indeed helping the Cuban request for arms for defensive purposes, this state of affairs in no way constituted a threat to the United States. In reply, Kennedy repeated that the United States had no plans for invasion of Cuba and that he was trying to prevent any actions that could lead to war, if only such actions were not caused by the other side. Later Kennedy read his statement of 4 September 1962 on the Cuban question containing the American interpretation of the situation in Cuba.

From the above it can be seen that in his conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the USSR on 18 October 1962 President Kennedy did not once raise the question directly of the presence of Soviet medium-range missiles on Cuba. Consequently he could not have been given an answer whether such arms were or were not in Cuba. (In R. Kennedy's book THIRTEEN DAYS, there is an extremely tendentious discussion of this conversation of the President of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Soviet Union. As T. Sorensen subsequently noted "Robert Kennedy personally dictated this manuscript in the fall of 1967 on the basis of personal diaries and memoirs..." (from a brief introduction by Sorensen to R. Kennedy's manuscript published in the November 1967 issue of McCALL'S -- Anat. G.). R. Kennedy's recollections of this conversation are vague and inaccurate. He states, for example, that "at the beginning of the conversation Gromyko stated that the United States must stop threatening Cuba" (R. P. Kennedy, OP. CIT., p 40). Actually the talk began with a discussion of European problems. This, actually, is admitted by Schlesinger and Sorensen in their memoirs. Further on R. Kennedy wrote that during the course of the conversation after the President had read his statement of September 1962 pointing out "the serious consequences that might ensue if the Soviet Union were to put on Cuba missiles or other offensive weapons...", Gromyko assured him that this would never occur and that the United States should not be concerned" (IBID., p 41). Such a description of the conversation by R. Kennedy absolutely does not correspond to reality. The President actually did read at the end of the conversation his statement of 4 September. But after the talk, he himself said to Sorensen that A. A. Gromyko "did not react to the statement I read to him" (see Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 691). Consequently, R. Kennedy's version, which left its imprint on the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign carried on in the United States during and after the Caribbean crisis, cannot withstand criticism.) Moreover, it may be assumed that President Kennedy deliberately deceived the Soviets by hiding the true intentions of the U.S. Government in regard to Cuba and by emphasizing the U.S. Government's refusal of an invasion of Cuba while a group of persons close to him was studying in utmost secrecy ways of having American armed forces invade the island. The actions of the President were based on the traditional bases of imperialistic diplomacy: to create a cover of the strictest secrecy during the course of development of acute international problems; to act only on the basis of selfish interests through the use of the strategic military situation and methods of political blackmail to exert pressure on its opponent. All these elements of "crisis diplomacy" were employed by the Kennedy government during the course of the Caribbean crisis. It is enough to ask the question: why should diplomatic representatives of the USSR be obliged to inform the U.S. Government in advance of any of its defense measures taken to protect a friendly state while the United States failed to give to the Soviet Union any information concerning arms deliveries to its allies? The fact of the matter is that the military actions of the United States in setting up missile bases on foreign territories introduced a truly aggressive character to the plan of its overall military and political strategy, while all the steps the USSR had taken in strengthening the security of Cuba were of a defense character.

On 18 October 1962 A. A. Gromyko also had a talk with D. Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State. During the course of this conversation, the American diplomat stated that the United States had no intention of an armed invasion of Cuba and that the island had become a military staging area for an "attack against the United States and Latin America." (AVP, f. 59, op. 46, p. 56, d. 277, ll. 268-269). Cuba's internal regime was characterized by Rusk as not corresponding to the interests of the security of the Western Hemisphere. Further on Rusk spoke at length concerning the "community" of interests of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Without directly mentioning



the Monroe Doctrine, he in essence attempted to defend it, emphasizing the "solidarity" of all the countries of the Western Hemisphere and the "community" of interests in regard to their security. Rusk was particularly displeased with the fact that Soviet weapons had appeared on Cuba. He, like President Kennedy, did not ask the Soviet representative of the presence of missiles on Cuba. Rusk received a full answer concerning all the "apprehensions" he had mentioned. A. A. Gromyko stated that Cuba was obliged to make the necessary conclusions because of the island having been invaded by counterrevolutionaries trained by Americans and armed at their expense. Rusk was also told that if Washington had any pretensions to Cuba, such as material ones, the United States would be justified in contacting the Cubans and settling them. (IBID., 1. 272). Rusk did not reply to this remark.

Then there took place a most significant discussion between the Soviet and the American representative concerning American military bases outside the limits of the United States in the immediate proximity of the boundaries of the USSR. Rusk was told that he obviously would not deny the existence of American military bases and numerous military advisers in Turkey and Japan, without going on to speak of England, Italy, and certain other countries in Western Europe, as well as in Asia and Africa. Does it mean that the United States can have military bases in these countries and conclude with their governments military pacts while the USSR has no right to assist Cuba in developing its economy and in strengthening its defense capability? (IBID., 1. 273). Rusk said that the Soviet Union was "exaggerating" the role of American military bases outside its frontiers. During the continued course of the conversation, the American representative in essence declined to discuss the subject of what countries had American missiles and nuclear weapons. In his words, aside from the actual territory of the United States, they were to be found in only three countries. In reply to A. A. Gromyko's remark that England was one of these countries, Rusk answered affirmatively since this fact was widely known, and London itself did not deny it. But the Secretary of State would say no more in regard to the other two countries referred to. The Soviet representative directed the attention of the American diplomat that the United States has military pacts with a number of countries and that these countries are obliged to permit various forms of U.S. weapons on their territories at any time. Rusk likewise made no comment to this remark. Obviously, when it came to U.S. military strategy and tactics, he preferred to maintain in deepest secrecy those questions pertaining to American bases around the USSR. Consequently, he had no basis for expecting that the other side would suddenly begin discussing with U.S. representatives measures it had taken to strengthen the defense of a friendly country.

The fact that by the fall of 1962 not a single important international problem of the time had been as yet resolved by diplomatic means (if one does not consider the agreement on Laos) put on the agenda for the day the question of the use of all possible means for peaceful settlement of international disagreements including meetings at the highest level between the Head of the Soviet Government and the President of the United States. The Soviet Government, adhering to the traditional principles of Leninist peace-loving policy, communicated to J. Kennedy through the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Soviet Union on 18 October 1962 the proposal for such a meeting to settle international problems under dispute and a consideration of problems due to disagreement between the USSR and the United States. (IBID., 1. 224). The President positively reacted to this proposal of the Soviet Union. He only remarked that he would like to consider at such a meeting problems in an informal manner and without isolating concrete problems subject to consideration. Kennedy also stated that during the past few months the U.S. Government had been trying to

improve relations with the USSR. The Laos question, he pointed out, had achieved a certain degree of success. Whether the President himself had been agreeable to such a summit meeting and he had been persuaded against it or his remarks about discussing "agenda for the day" at a summit meeting had been only diplomatic camouflage to mask the planned intensification of a course of aggression against the USSR and Cuba, is hard to say.

The very same day Thompson at a dinner held by Rusk told the USSR Ambassador to the United States A. F. Dobrynin that the White House would like to postpone the summit meeting. In the opinion of the American side, a meeting in November 1962 would have an unprepared character and could hardly lead to any positive achievements. The President, Thompson said, believes that such meetings are of extremely great importance and failure would be intolerable. J. Kennedy wanted his second meeting with representatives of the Soviet Government to "produce concrete results." (IBID., 1, 283). Without completely rejecting the possibility of a meeting at the highest level with representatives of the USSR, the President of the United States in essence dismissed the idea of a meeting in the near future as "not being useful." This episode particularly showed the absence in the American leadership and in Kennedy personally any desire to discuss the situation and solve the problem by means of peaceful diplomatic means. Kennedy manifestly preferred "crisis diplomacy."

The development of a line by the U.S. Government in the planned crisis situation continued in Washington even after President Kennedy left the American capital on 19 October to go to the Western States for a day and a half to take part in the election campaign. More likely this was a diversionary maneuver not so much to help candidates of the Democratic Party in elections to the U.S. Congress and as State governors as to cast doubt on an information leak on the crisis under preparation should it become the subject of analysis by the governments of other states. At the same time representatives from the CIA and the Pentagon again started to insist on bombing Cuba. They stated that all other measures had been so far "manifestly unsatisfactory." "Now or never!" (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 806;) demanded the hot-war partisans. However, an increasing number of the President's advisers was coming to the conclusion of the catastrophic consequences of such a step for the United States. This was openly stated by R. Kennedy and T. Sorensen at one of the secret meetings. (IBID.) U.S. Secretary of State D. Rusk preferred to remain silent for the most part. Robert Kennedy later even said: the former had announced with concern that the American military, regardless of what conclusions they might reach "in the final analysis would defend a sudden attack by a very large country on a very small country." (R. F. Kennedy, OP. CIT., p 38). It would appear from all this that Rusk did not feel that the moral bases for the American position were "decent."

In this way, the President's advisers formed two groups, each of which defended its point of view according to which way the military forces would be used in the fabricated crisis, in what size and in what sequence. Some favored a naval blockade, others outright invasion with the assistance of air, naval, and land forces. (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 807) Demands for a massed air attack was again proposed by the group of hawks when the President returned to the White House from his "election trip." Members of the committee of the chiefs of staff insisted on direct aggression. Chief of Staff, Air Force, General C. LeMay "resolutely argued with the President, stating that a military invasion was essential." (R. F. Kennedy, OP. CIT., p 36). The former Secretary of State D. Acheson favored an air invasion of Cuba. (IBID., p 38) One of the members of the committee of the chiefs of staff called for use of atomic weapons. (IBID., p 48). President Kennedy finally agreed to the proposal of a naval

blockade. He even replaced the word "blockade" by what seemed to be in his opinion a more peaceful word "quarantine" in the texts of documents as if to justify the aggressive action that was being prepared. (Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 695.) The U.S. Government in this way assumed the course of open violation of the norms of international law.

On the day of 22 October J. Kennedy informed former Presidents Hoover, Truman, and Eisenhower of the actions he had planned. He also organized an emergency meeting with 20 of the most influence members of the U.S. Congress. (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 812; Th. Sorensen, OP. CIT., p 702). At this meeting Senator Russell demanded that Cuba be subjected to an outright invasion. Russell was supported by Senator W. Fulbright (A. M. Schlesinger, OP. CIT., p 812). On the evening of 22 October, one hour before President Kennedy was to speak to the American people, Secretary of State Rusk invited A. F. Dobrynin to visit him. Rusk immediately informed the Soviet ambassador that he had been instructed not to answer any questions in regard to the text of both documents nor to comment on them. Then Rusk gave to Dobrynin a personal message from President Kennedy to the Head of the Soviet Government dated 22 October and also the text of the President's address to the American people (R. Kennedy's book describes selectively in a number of places the correspondence between the U.S. President and the Head of the Soviet Government that took place between 22 and 26 October (R. F. Kennedy, OP. CIT., pp 79-81). Following examination of these documents, the American Secretary of State was informed that the U.S. Government was creating a dangerous crisis. (AVP, f. 59, op. 46, p. 20, d. 94, l. 390). The attention of the American diplomat was directed to the fact that the United States in essence was rejecting negotiations concerning all questions raised by the President during the Soviet-American bilateral meetings. Rusk made no reply to this remark. In this case it was not a matter of instructions, it was simply that he had nothing to say.... Only a few days previously he himself had started to develop in a talk with the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs the subject of American military missile bases near the borders of the Soviet Union but had not raised any question concerning "Soviet bases" in Cuba. At 7:00 p.m., Washington time, President Kennedy read his statement over television and tried to justify the irresponsible actions of the U.S. Government. (DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1962. Edited by R. Stebbins, pp 374-380). The Caribbean crisis had begun.

(To be concluded.)

## THE AMERICAS

## USSR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END CARIBBEAN CRISIS REVEALED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No. 8 Aug 71 pp 121-129 J

[Concluding part of Anat. A. Gromyko article; for part 1 see the 12 August DAILY REPORT pp, III, G 5-15]

[Text] 2. Diplomatic Efforts of the USSR to Liquidate the Crisis

By 22 October 1962, the U.S. Government had concentrated in the Caribbean Sea area large naval forces (183 units), air forces, parachutists, and Marines. American troops in Western Europe were put on combat readiness. Strategic air bombers were put in the air (50 percent of their total strength).<sup>1</sup> Nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles assumed operative positions, threatening the socialist countries.<sup>2</sup> The world was on the verge of thermonuclear war. R. Kennedy acknowledged several years later that he went to bed on 22 October full of worry and terror.<sup>3</sup>

In order to "legalize" in some way its actions in regard to Cuba and the USSR which contravened international law, the U.S. State Department called an emergency meeting in Washington on 23 October of the OAS Council which passed a resolution justifying the actions of the U.S. Government. The resolution called upon the Latin American countries "to use military force" against Cuba.<sup>4</sup> On 23 October at 7:06 p.m. (Greenwich time), President Kennedy signed "Proclamation 3504," announcing that a "quarantine" of Cuba would go into effect at 7:00 p.m. on 24 October 1962. The Proclamation included under "offensive weapons" not only ground-to-ground missiles but bombers as well. The Department of Defense was instructed to put into effect the President's directive.<sup>5</sup>

On 23 October, the Soviet Embassy was visited by R. Kennedy, the President's brother. He stated that his visit was due to personal reasons and that he had no instructions from the President.<sup>6</sup> He then went on to expound the American version of the fact that President Kennedy personally felt that he had been deceived. To the question of the Soviet Ambassador why the American Government had not turned to the Soviet Government for explanation of the situation before embarking on a policy fraught with the danger of an armed conflict between the USSR and the United States, R. Kennedy had no clear answer. The Soviet side voiced the hope that the U.S. Government would soberly evaluate the situation and not take any action that could lead to a catastrophe. Attention is directed to the following fact. Even after the U.S. Government had unleashed the Caribbean crisis, R. Kennedy, while one of the most influential members of the American Cabinet, was unable to discuss concrete ways for settling the conflict in his conversation during his visit to the Soviet Embassy. However, one had the feeling that he was manifestly concerned about the existent situation. Leaving the Embassy, R. Kennedy again confirmed the plan for a naval blockade of Cuba. The Soviet Ambassador stated in this connection that the measures taken by the United States in the open sea violated international norms for freedom of navigation and were illegal.<sup>7</sup>

On 23 October, the Soviet Government issued a Declaration in which the establishment of a naval blockade of Cuba by the United States was called an "unprecedented act of aggression." The attention of the Governments of other countries was directed to the fact that U.S. imperialists were ready "to throw the world into the abyss of military catastrophe." "The peoples of all countries," it was stated in the Declaration, "should understand that the United States of America, in undertaking such a venture, have taken a step on the road to unleashing a thermonuclear world war." The Declaration also emphasized that "should the aggressors unleash a war, the Soviet Union would reply with a mighty blow." It proposed that the United States immediately accept the Soviet proposals for eliminating military bases on foreign territories in various parts of the world. The Soviet Union requested that the UN call an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider the problem of "violation of the UN Charter and Threat to Peace by the United States of America."<sup>8</sup>

During the period of the Caribbean crisis, a rather intensive correspondence was carried on through diplomatic channels between the Head of the Soviet Government and the President of the United States. The Soviet side sought for a way for a peaceful settlement of the Latin American crisis fomented by the United States which presented a threat to world peace. In a letter addressed to the President dated 23 October 1962, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR pointed out that the weapons in Cuba, regardless of what class they might belong to, were only intended for purposes of defense.

President Kennedy's statement of 22 October was described as open interference in the internal affairs of Cuba, the USSR, and many other countries. The hope was expressed that the American Government would show good sense and cease from carrying out its thoughtless actions, which could lead to the most catastrophic consequences to peace for the entire world.<sup>9</sup> On 24 October the U.S. Embassy communicated President Kennedy's reply to the letter of the Head of the Soviet Government. It again attempted to place the blame on the Soviet Union for causing the Caribbean crisis. Kennedy also spoke of his concern regarding the possible future development of the events. He expressed the hope that the United States and the USSR would be realistic and not take any steps that would further endanger the possibility of retaining control over events. Kennedy also communicated in his letter that the quarantine established by the United States would go into effect at 2:00 p.m. Greenwich time on 24 October.<sup>10</sup> In a letter of reply dated 24 October, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR pointed out that the actions of the U.S. Government had the quality of an ultimatum intended to frighten the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup> The American President was asked to consider the situation with composure without giving way to emotion.<sup>12</sup> In less than 24 hours, Kennedy replied to this letter of the Head of the Soviet Government in such a way as to interpret the sequence of events during the summer and fall of 1962 in a manner intended to justify his actions in regard to Cuba. The measures taken to strengthen the defense capability of Cuba Kennedy said "called for responsive actions which I have announced." Kennedy also expressed his disappointment in regard to the worsening of relations between the USSR and the United States. However, he still promoted the far-fetched version that only unilateral actions by the Soviet Government could restore the situation to what it had been earlier.<sup>13</sup>

During the period of the Caribbean crisis, American diplomacy was very active in the U.N., the basic purpose of which was to justify U.S. aggressive actions against the USSR and Cuba. On 23 October, a meeting of the Security Council was convened under the chairmanship of V. A. Zorin, the Representative of the USSR. The agenda for the meeting included consideration of the question brought up by the Soviet Union

concerning violation of the U.N. Charter and threat to peace by the United States, the inquiry of the Cuban Government in regard to U.S. aggressive actions against Cuba, and also the letter of the United States. The hall where the Security Council meeting took place was filled to capacity with diplomats and the public. The first to speak at this meeting was the American delegate A. Stevenson, who had with foresight listed his name among the speakers on 22 October at the time of Kennedy's appearance on radio and television. His entire speech attempted to justify the establishment of the naval blockade of Cuba by the U.S. Government. Stevenson then presented to the Security Council an American resolution calling for removal from Cuba of Soviet missiles and sending of U.N. observers to Cuba "to see to it that the present resolution was carried out." Only with fulfillment of these demands, would the United States agree not to carry out quarantine measures.<sup>14</sup> The draft of the American resolution contained a clause for the USSR and the United States to consider at the first opportunity the question of measures for eliminating the existent threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and to world peace and to present a report on this matter to the Security Council. Thus the draft of the resolution, albeit in a veiled and demagogic form, indicated a departure from the former extremely bellicose position of the United States in regard to the question of what ways to take to resolve the Caribbean crisis. Although American diplomacy assumed on the whole an aggressive position at the U.N., Kennedy's Government nevertheless did not exclude the possibility of conducting talks in the very near future with the USSR.

On 24 October a special meeting of the Security Council took place at which spirited discussions ensued concerning the situation in the Caribbean Sea area. They included the participation of delegations from Venezuela, England, Romania, Ireland, France, Chile, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, and also U Thant in the role of General Secretary. The Romanian Representative fully supported the position of the Soviet Union and Cuba, namely that the United States was presenting a threat to peace.<sup>15</sup> The Representatives of the UAR and Ghana during the course of the discussion supported the right of Cuba to independently select its political regime and take the necessary steps of defense of its freedom and territorial integrity. They emphasized that the actions of the United States in establishing a blockade of Cuba violated the principle of freedom of the seas and threatened peace and general security. Ghana and the UAR presented their draft of a resolution calling for the United States, Cuba, and the USSR to resolve the conflict through peaceful discussions.<sup>16</sup> A completely different position was presented by the states who were members of NATO. They manifested military bloc interests and the pressure exerted on them by the U.S. Government. The English Representative, A. Dean, not the least bit phased by the fact that his country had become a missile base for the United States, supported the aggressive actions of the American Government against Cuba and the USSR. Evidently understanding the great danger to which England subjected itself through the maintenance of missiles on its territory aimed at the USSR, A. Dean spoke in favor of talks between the interested parties. The French Representative, R. Sedou, spoke in favor of the talks. Since the OAS under pressure from the United States had taken an anti-Cuban position, the Representatives of Venezuela and Chile supported Stevenson's proposal at the Security Council. Ireland's Representative, Aiken, called for a peaceful settlement of the crisis through discussions. U Thant in participating at the Security Council meeting read the text of his message to the Soviet Government and the U.S. Government containing the wish that all parties involved in the conflict get together and talk over the situation.<sup>17</sup> He also stated that he was ready to render any necessary service and that he was at the disposal of both sides. Upon termination of the meeting, 45 Afro-Asiatic countries expressed their support of U Thant's proposal. However, Stevenson affirmed his dissatisfaction with the proposal which

he communicated to the Acting General Secretary, saying that J. Kennedy has as yet made no decision concerning a reply to the appeal.<sup>18</sup>

The Soviet Government, in reply to U Thant's appeal "to refrain from any actions that could aggravate the situation and bring on the risk of war," announced that it accepted his proposal.<sup>19</sup> Inasmuch as the international situation continued to be aggravated because of the U.S. Government's delay in replying with respect to U Thant's first message, the latter sent new messages on 25 October to the USSR and the United States in which he again raised the question of developing grounds for an agreement for settling the problem peacefully in accordance with the U.N. Charter.<sup>20</sup> In a telegram addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR, U Thant asked that instructions be given to Soviet vessels "on their way to Cuba to stay away from the region of seizure" so as to avoid any collision with ships of the United States during the course of consideration of various options for a possible agreement.<sup>21</sup> U Thant also asked President Kennedy to instruct pertinent American organizations to avoid direct collision with Soviet ships. The United States did not leave unanswered U Thant's second message. It agreed to take measures that would prevent a collision between American and Soviet vessels. Kennedy did this against the will of the military, who demanded of him that the actions of American naval vessels extend beyond the limits of the quarantine zone into the open ocean. The purpose of these demands was one -- to provoke a collision between American and Soviet vessels. As T. Sorensen subsequently noted, there took place "a sharp disagreement with representatives of the naval forces."<sup>22</sup> The tone of J. Kennedy's reply differed quite considerably from his speech on television, when the President had threatened Cuba and the USSR with a naval quarantine. "I have received your message of today," he wrote to U Thant. "I understand and welcome as before your efforts to reach a satisfactory solution. I understand and sympathize with your solicitude in regard to the necessity for showing great caution from now on to the start of discussion."<sup>23</sup> Kennedy promised U Thant that American naval vessels in the Caribbean Sea would do everything possible to avoid a direct collision with Soviet vessels. In his letter to U Thant, Kennedy again stated that the "offensive weapons" of the USSR on Cuba threatened peace.<sup>24</sup> The American President again misconstrued here the reason for the conflict, which lay in the aggressiveness and recklessness of American foreign policy.

On 25 October another meeting of the Security Council took place. Here Stevenson read J. Kennedy's reply to U Thant's second appeal. The Soviet Representative in his turn read the answering letter of the Soviet Government.<sup>25</sup> At this session, the American Representative again tried to justify the activities in the Caribbean Sea area which were a violation of the U.N. Charter. Stevenson attempted to interpret the aggressive actions of the United States, which had been taken while circumventing the U.N., as joint actions of the Organization of American States. V. A. Zorin, the Soviet Representative, unmasked the inconsistency of such statements, pointing out that the aggressive actions initiated by the United States were opposed by the peoples and the majority of governments who were U.N. members.<sup>26</sup> Representatives of the UAR and Ghana suggested that the meeting of the Security Council be interrupted to permit the interested parties initiate the necessary talks with the cooperation of U Thant. This proposal was passed by the Security Council.

The tactics of the U.S. Government during the Caribbean crisis, the techniques and methods resorted to by the White House in order to attain certain goals point to the fact that the U.S. Government in its actions in October 1962 was resorting to a considerable extent to political blackmail. The tendency of American foreign policy and diplomacy to the rather extensive and frequent use of political blackmail in its

postwar strategy and tactics was closely connected to the fact that the scope for the use of real military force by American imperialism had narrowed with the strengthening of the defense potential of the socialist countries and primarily the USSR. This did not mean that the United States was not going to use military force involving the employment of "classic" forms of armament. It is enough to recall the events in Korea, Laos, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba to realize this. However, the United States has tried to avoid a direct military confrontation with the USSR, although the Pentagon and the CIA have frequently voiced their disagreement in regard to such a course. American Presidents have taken cognizance of this, but nonetheless have refused to decide in favor of a direct military confrontation. However, they have made full use of methods of political blackmail, feeling obliged to convince the opposing side that Washington, on the inception of one or another "undesirable" situation, would immediately resort either to conventional or to nuclear power.

American research institutes concerned with international problems are attentively studying techniques and methods of political blackmail. In the opinion of American theoreticians and politicians, in order to make such tactics work, they require the assistance of mass information and disinformation media. They resort to them usually at a time when the secret stage of an operation is coming to an end in regard to preparation of an episode in "the war of nerves" with the Soviet Union. This is what happened during the Caribbean crisis. After the shroud of secrecy enveloping the preparation of Kennedy's Government of the Caribbean crisis had come off, strong psychological pressure in a direction favorable to the U.S. Government was applied with the help of the mass media on American public opinion on U.S. military-bloc allies, on developing countries, and, of course, not last, on the Soviet Union. In special instructions to representatives of the press, R. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, even stated that the United States would not hesitate to sink Soviet vessels delivering "offensive type" weapons to Cuba.<sup>27</sup> Such statements quickly found their way into print and over radio and television, actively stirring up the troubled atmosphere by predicting an early "test of strength." Of course, the tactics of political blackmail did not exhaust the essentials of the moment. R. Kennedy admitted later that "President Kennedy plotted a course for events, set them in motion, but was unable to control them."<sup>28</sup> The decisive role of getting the events back under control was played by the Soviet Government. President Kennedy's contribution was to finally hold out against the pressure from the right which demanded war with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

On 25 and 26 October the situation became more heated. On 26 October the Head of the Soviet Government sent a reply to the President of the United States to his letter of 25 October. It emphasized that the peoples of the socialist countries as well as all progressive mankind want peace and consider war as a calamity rather than a game and means for the attainment of political or other goals or even less as an end in itself.<sup>29</sup> It explained to the American President that his arguments relative to "offensive weapons" on Cuba had no foundation and that the decision of the United States to quarantine Cuba could be considered fairly as a piratic measure.<sup>30</sup> The letter also contained concrete proposals which were used subsequently to a significant degree as the foundation for settling the Caribbean crisis. "Let us normalize the situation," it was proposed to the American President. If the President and the U.S. Government were to give assurances that the United States would not attack Cuba and restrain other countries from taking such action, the international situation would quickly change for the better.<sup>31</sup> In addition, the American President was firmly told that, if he were to establish a quarantine as a first step to unleashing war, the USSR would have no alternative than to accept the challenge.<sup>32</sup> It is characteristic



that R. Kennedy in his book 13 Days gives a number of excerpts (in outright or indirect form) from the message of 26 October sent by the Soviet Side.<sup>35</sup> However, he does not state that the Soviet Union would have been forced to accept the U.S. military challenge had the American side become so bound to it. The position of the Soviet message of 26 October bears evidence of the toughness of the Soviet Union in the face of U.S. aggressive actions. At the same time this toughness, as can be seen from the letter, was combined with flexibility. Not without reason did R. Kennedy subsequently acknowledge that the Soviet epistle contained "the rudiments of a compromise of some sort of agreement," and this inspired him with a feeling of optimism.<sup>34</sup>

The Cuban Government, as is known, also took steps to seek peaceful ways to settle the Caribbean crisis. It reacted positively to the actions of the U.N.'s Acting General Secretary. On 26 October U Thant sent a message to Fidel Castro in which he asked Cuba to make its contribution to the maintenance of peace "under today's critical conditions."<sup>35</sup> On 27 October Cuba's Prime Minister presented a reply saying that Cuba was ready to consider everything necessary relative to its differences with the United States and to do everything that it could in cooperation with the U.N. to settle the existing crisis. In addition, the message continued a just remark that Cuba rejected decisively any actions that would violate its sovereignty, such as the naval blockade, which was an act of coercion and of war. The Government of Cuba stated that it was ready to accept U Thant's conditions "provided that at the same time the Government of the United States restrains itself during the period of negotiations from threats and aggressive acts against Cuba, including the naval blockade of our country." This was a fair and proper position. F. Castro expressed his readiness to study any new proposal by U Thant and invited him to visit Cuba for the purpose of discussing on the spot questions pertaining to the Caribbean crisis.<sup>36</sup> U Thant greatly appreciated the peaceful policy of the Cuban Government and in his reply to Fidel Castro agreed to visit the island in order "to continue our mutual efforts to settle the problem peacefully."<sup>37</sup>

In the late evening of 27 October, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States invited R. Kennedy to visit him. The talk with the Soviet Ambassador was held in private. R. Kennedy said: "The Cuban crisis" is rapidly becoming aggravated. Later on he said that the Pentagon was exerting strong pressure on his brother in connection with the reconnaissance plane shot down over Cuba. Then he expressed the concern that, should war break out, millions of Americans would die. The U.S. government, he said, was trying to avoid this. Later he gave his opinion that he was sure that the Soviet Union adhered to the same view. Any delay in finding ways out of the crisis was fraught with great danger and risk. R. Kennedy noted that in the United States among the highly placed generals there were many stupid heads who were always eager for a fight. He did not exclude the possibility that the situation could get out of control and lead to irreparable consequences. R. Kennedy also said that, in the opinion of the President, a suitable basis for settling the Caribbean crisis could be the Soviet proposals of 26 October and the American letter of reply. The U.S. Government was ready to give assurances that there would be no intervention in regard to Cuba and that all countries of the Western Hemisphere -- he was sure of this -- were ready to give similar assurances.<sup>38</sup> The Soviet Ambassador raised the question of the need to liquidate American missile bases in Turkey. R. Kennedy did not reject such a possibility. He remarked that such a decision could be made by NATO and later said: "President Kennedy has been trying for a long time to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy. Some time ago, he arranged to have these missiles removed, and we think that these missiles will be taken away shortly after the termination of the present

crisis."<sup>39</sup> This was already a specific promise in addition to the basic agreement of the U.S. Government to give guarantees that it would not intervene in Cuba. During the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy persistently returned to the same theme: time would not wait, we must not let it get away. With these words, he took leave of the Soviet Ambassador, leaving with him the number of a direct telephone line to the White House and remarking that he was spending almost all his time with the President. In this way, J. Kennedy and his close followers, on learning of the hard but flexible position of the Soviet Government, rejected the ultimatum demands set forth by the President of the United States on 22 October and took a course which sought to find a basis of compromise for liquidation of the Caribbean crisis. The Soviet Ambassador in the United States was authorized to communicate to the American side that the considerations communicated on request of President Kennedy had met with a positive response in Moscow.<sup>40</sup>

In an official message dated 27 October, the Soviet Government presented compromise proposals which served as the basis for settlement of the crisis. The USSR agreed to remove those missiles from Cuba which the United States considered "offensive," but with the obligatory condition that the American Government agree to respect the inviolability of Cuba's boundaries and bind itself not to engage in any aggression in regard to it.<sup>41</sup> In Washington the reaction to the Soviet message was mixed. The opponents to settlement of the crisis insisted that the United States must not agree to the demand of the USSR for removal of American rockets from Turkey.<sup>42</sup> A reflection of that kind of aggressive frame of mind was the White House's declaration of 27 October 1962 which attempted to prove that the security problems of Europe were not inter-related and that the Caribbean crisis had to be settled before one could go on to consider the solution of other problems.<sup>43</sup> In this way, the American Government did not want publicly to consider the problem of liquidating U.S. missile bases in Turkey. At the same time, as pointed out by R. Kennedy, this question was considered confidentially, and President Kennedy made the important decision of removing American missiles from Turkey.

The Soviet proposals of 27 October were fair to the highest degree. Many prominent American investigators of the Caribbean crisis were forced to acknowledge this. Thus, J. Stoessinger in his work The Might of Nations wrote that the Soviet proposals "seemed reasonable -- they reflected the widespread opinion of neutrals that both sides had to compromise and sacrifice something. Such a position was widely held in the U.N., and a number of Western commentators, such as Lippman, favored it."<sup>44</sup>

By 27 October, the President's main advisers were well acquainted with J. Kennedy's frame of mind. As a result, by the evening of that day, a reply message to the Soviet Government had been prepared. In it the American President gave assurances of renouncing invasion of Cuba and promised to quickly abrogate the quarantine.<sup>45</sup> But even then there were certain representatives from the Pentagon who tried to make President Kennedy believe that he should not compromise. R. Kennedy cited, for example, the following fact: "On that memorable Sunday morning, when the Russians had communicated that they were pulling out their missiles, one highly placed military adviser recommended that the United States undertake in any case offensive actions on Monday." And later on: "President Kennedy was greatly disturbed by the inability of the military to see beyond the limited military field."<sup>46</sup>

On 28 October, the Soviet Government sent a new message to the U.S. Government in which it confirmed its readiness to fulfill the obligations it had assumed in regard to the Caribbean crisis and also announced that the USSR would continue to

assist Cuba in its fight against aggression.<sup>47</sup> On 28 October, President Kennedy made a declaration in which he promised that the United States, upon the complete elimination of the Caribbean crisis, would give a great deal of attention to "the problem of averting the arms race and easing international tension." Subsequently J. Kennedy came out in favor of reaching an agreement restricting the spread of nuclear weapons and forbidding nuclear tests. He proposed that talks be started immediately to deal with these problems in a "constructive spirit."<sup>48</sup>

On 1 November 1962, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR A. I. Mikoyan flew to Havana for an exchange of opinions with the Government of Cuba on the problem of the Caribbean crisis. On his way to Cuba, he stopped off at New York where he had a talk with U Thant and also with A. Stevenson on ways to weaken international tension. In Cuba, during the course of exchange of opinions between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, an agreement was reached in their points of view concerning a peaceful settlement of the Caribbean conflict. During the first half of November, there was a flow of exchange of opinions through diplomatic channels and through the U.N. in regard to the elimination of the residues of the Caribbean crisis fomented by the United States. The negotiations took place, first, through exchange of oral statements between the Soviet and American sides and, second, during the course of talks between the American representative, D. MacLay, and the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR V. V. Kuznetsov.

During the course of Soviet-American contacts related to settling the Caribbean crisis, President Kennedy and other American officials frequently showed inconsistencies in resolving problems connected with the critical situation that had arisen because of their fault. For example, going beyond the agreement reached earlier, they tried to interpret arbitrarily interpret the term "offensive weapon"; they complicated in all manner of ways the agreement by which the United States obligated itself not to commit any aggression against Cuba. All this served as a reflection of the acute struggle going on in U.S. political circles, where the extremists, unhappy over the compromise, tried, if not to break it, at least to create a situation of manifest advantage to the United States. Despite all this, President Kennedy basically tried to adhere to the agreement. On 16 November, he made the statement that he was in favor of an official formulation of American assurances. The United States was to put down in fixed form its obligation not to attack Cuba, restrain other countries of the Western Hemisphere from doing the same thing, and stop the blockade of Cuba. As a result of the complicated diplomatic struggle, during the course of which the Soviet Government took the initiative and adhered to a flexible position, the fundamental problems of the Caribbean crisis were resolved. On 20 November, President Kennedy announced at a press conference removal of the quarantine. On 21 November, the Soviet Government instructed the intercontinental to shift from full combat readiness to normal military training and activities. The state of combat readiness was also countermanded for strategic aircraft.<sup>50</sup>

As for adoption of concordant announcements by the USSR and the United States at the U.N., summing up, as it were, fulfillment of mutual obligations by the parties (proposed in messages by the heads of the USSR and U.S. governments), the American side delayed in every possible way drawing the matter to a conclusion. To justify such a position, arguments were cited that the USSR seemingly "defaulted" in regard to a number of its obligations, for example in the matter of verification. Together with this, J. Kennedy spoke in principle of continuing work on the texts of the declarations and proposed speeding up presentation of the American side of the Soviet texts.<sup>51</sup> It was thus possible to reach agreement that settlement of the Caribbean

crisis should be embodied in declarations of the three sides -- the USSR, Cuba, and the United States -- which were to be presented to the Security Council for approval.

The texts of the declarations now had to be reconciled.<sup>52</sup> The American representatives, however, began to insist that the declarations did not need to be approved by the Security Council, but should be simply "recorded" at the U.N. Soon it became clear that the U.S. Government had decided to hold up and then break up the negotiations for working up the declarations. In justification of such a course of events before world and American public opinion, a number of inspired articles by journalists close to the White House appeared in the press with the knowledge of the President. They presented once more in distorted form the events that preceded the Caribbean crisis. In particular, an article entitled "The White House During the Cuban Crisis" was published in the Saturday Evening Post. It presented in every possible way the work of President Kennedy during the Caribbean crisis and sharply criticized A. Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. The latter, it was stated, had been in favor of negotiations with the USSR even at the beginning of the crisis rather than of the course taken by the American Government and involving the danger of military collision. Attempts were again made to blame the USSR for having its representatives "deceive the American President." These steps were taken with manifest purpose of complicating the negotiations in New York concerning the obligation of the United States not to intervene in Cuba.

On 7 January 1963, V. V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet representative to the negotiations for settling the Caribbean crisis, and A. Stevenson, the American representative to the U.N., addressed a joint letter to U Thant, the General Secretary. They noted that, while both Governments "had not succeeded in resolving all the problems" related to the Caribbean crisis, they felt that "the degree of agreement reached between them for settling the crisis" made it unnecessary to leave the problem on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council. The letter also said: "The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken in connection with the crisis to eliminate the threat of war should lead to the solution of other differences of opinion between them and to a general lessening of tension that could serve as a cause for preserving the threat of war."<sup>53</sup> However, even in the beginning of 1963 there still were numerous attempts on the part of the "rabid" to push the U.S. Government into new venturesome acts against Cuba and the USSR. At his press conference held on 7 February 1963, President Kennedy admitted that the U.S. Government "was receiving hundreds of communications each month" concerning the presence of Soviet "offensive weapons" in Cuba. He confirmed that even a number of members from the U.S. Congress were providing such "information" while refusing to name their sources. "We cannot base the solution of problems of war and peace on such rumors or communications, which do not touch the essence of the problem ..." -- observed the President.<sup>54</sup> Subsequently J. Kennedy told outright the critics of the work of his Government that he did not believe that the Soviet Union wanted "a major war."<sup>55</sup> These official statements of the American President on nonintervention in Cuba made during the Caribbean crisis, as well as after it, showed that the United States was obliged in its foreign policy to take into account the agreement reached by the Governments of the USSR and the United States in November 1962.

## FOOTNOTE APPENDIX

1. Vneshnyaya Politika SSSR [USSR Foreign Policy], M., 1968, p 232.
2. J. G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time, N. Y., 1969, p 166.
3. R. F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, a Memoir of the Cuban Crisis, N. Y., 1969, pp 55-56.
4. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962. Edited by R. Stebbins, N. Y., 1963, pp 380-383.
5. Ibid., pp 383-384.
6. This statement by R. Kennedy did not correspond to the facts. He went to the Soviet Embassy on the direct request of President Kennedy to make contact with the Soviet side and try once more to explain the actions of the U.S. Government. This is only described by R. Kennedy in his book Thirteen Days (p 63).
7. AVP [Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki SSSR -- Archives of USSR Foreign Policy], f 59, op 46, p 20, d 95, ll 6-7.
8. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya. Sbornik Dokumentov, 1962 god [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collection of Documents, 1962], M., 1963, pp 399-405.
9. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 89, d 437, l 14.
10. Ibid., l 27.
11. Ibid., l 30.
12. Ibid., l 31.
13. Ibid., p 20 d 95, ll 20-21.
14. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, p 385.
15. U.N. Document S/5,187, October 23, 1962 (ed. cit.).
16. U.N. Document S/5,190, October 24, 1962 (ed. cit.).
17. U.N. Document S/PV, 1,024, October 24, 1962 (ed. cit.).
18. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 56, d 277, l 339.
19. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a..., op. cit., pp 410-411.
20. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, op. cit., pp 389-391.
21. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a..., op. cit., p 412.

22. T. Sorensen, Kennedy, N.Y., 1965, p 710.
23. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, p 391.
24. Ibid.
25. See Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz, pp 410-413.
26. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 56, d 277, l 353.
27. Ibid., p 20, d 94, l 401.
28. R. F. Kennedy, op. cit., p 71.
29. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 89, d 437, l 25.
30. Ibid., l 46.
31. Ibid., ll 49-50.
32. Ibid., l 51.
33. R. F. Kennedy, op. cit., pp 86-91.
34. Ibid., p 90.
35. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, op. cit., p 404.
36. Ibid., p 405.
37. Ibid., pp 405-406.
38. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 20, d 95, ll 48-51.
39. R. F. Kennedy, op. cit., pp 108-109.
40. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 19, d 88, l 10.
41. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz ..., op. cit., 416.
42. R. F. Kennedy, op. cit., pp 101-102.
43. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, p 396.
44. J. G. Stoessinger, op. cit., pp 167-168.
45. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuz..., op. cit., p 418.
46. R. F. Kennedy, op. cit., p 119.
47. Pravda, 29 October 1962.
48. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962, op. cit., p 402.

49. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 20, d 95, l 236.
50. Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuza..., op. cit., p 427.
51. AVP, f 59, op 46, p 20, d 95, l 326.
52. Ibid., ll 337-338.
53. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963, p 369.
54. Ibid., p 370.
55. Ibid., p 373.

MUSKIE: NIXON'S POLICIES IGNORE NEEDS OF AVERAGE FAMILY

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0656 GMT 7 Sep 71 L

[Text] New York September 7 TASS--Senator E. Muskie, speaking at a meeting in Los Angeles yesterday, said that the economic policy of the Nixon administration meets only the interests of a handful of prospering citizens of the United States while ignoring the needs of the average American family.

Criticising the present government wage and price freeze programme and the officially declared postponement of an earlier promised reform of the social insurance system, the senator called for greater federal appropriations for the needs of American cities, now in the grip of a financial crisis, and for increasing scanty unemployment benefits.