

U.S. "ISOLATION" OF CUBA RUNNING INTO TROUBLE

A keystone of U.S. foreign policy in recent years—the isolation of Cuba—is showing signs of quickening erosion.

Fidel Castro's trade with the rest of the world, including many nations that are friends and allies of the U.S., is marked by steady gains.

Diplomatic isolation of Cuba, too, is melting. There are 68 governments that now recognize the Castro regime. On the international scene, Cuba is a member of the United Nations and at least two dozen other multinational groups.

In Latin America, despite U.S. pressure, sentiment is rising to take Castro back into the fold. Argentina, in May, became the eighth Western Hemisphere nation to extend recognition to Cuba.

Summing up that trend, a diplomat who is concerned with Cuba noted: "The United States finds itself increasing-

an economic and political lifeline to Havana and, from the beginning, Canada, England, France, Spain and others traded with Cuba.

Cuba's two-way trade with the free world isn't great, but this is the way it has progressed:

1966	\$303,000,000
1967	341,000,000
1968	389,000,000
1969	545,000,000
1970	675,000,000
1971	700,000,000
1972	730,000,000

A major factor in this steady climb, officials point out, is that Cuba now is getting more credit from Western European countries in a sort of revolving-fund arrangement.

Britain is still the leading exporter to Cuba among non-Communist countries,

to the Soviet Union to be diverted to Cuba.

The diplomatic front. A sign of Castro's standing among Western nations was given late in May when French President Georges Pompidou welcomed a new Cuban Ambassador with the hope that there would be expanded economic relations between the two countries.

President Pompidou said that ties between France and Cuba had shown improvement after a visit to Havana last autumn of a French parliamentary mission. He also spoke of recommendations by another mission in March for an increase in economic exchanges.

U.S. officials list these governments that now recognize Cuba diplomatically:

Western Europe (19). Included are 12 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Britain. Others: Austria, Finland, Malta, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the Vatican.

Eastern Europe (9). Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

Far East (12). Ceylon, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Also the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Cambodian Government-in-exile.

Africa, Middle East (20). Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Syria, Tanzania, NATO ally Turkey, Egypt, Yemen (Aden), Sierra Leone, Zambia, Somali Republic and Mauritania.

The Americas (8). Chile, Jamaica, Argentina, Guyana, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico and Peru.

Action by OAS. In 1964, at the urging of the U.S., the Organization of American States voted by a two thirds majority to ban ties between its members and Communist Cuba.

Mexico did not follow the OAS ban. Of the seven other Latin-American nations that have relations with Cuba, only Guyana is not an OAS member.

Other Latin-American countries that are showing signs of granting recognition
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—Vigorski-Photoreporters

Fidel Castro in Hungary, one of 68 Governments which recognize Cuba. Increasingly, his nation has been attracting more friends, more trade despite U.S. policy.

ly alone on the Cuban issue in the Western Hemisphere.

Washington's aim. Ever since Castro established his Communist regime, it has been the American goal to push for his downfall by cutting Cuba off from the rest of Latin America, and by at least partially isolating Havana from her world capitals.

This "blockade" succeeded in hurting Cuba economically, but it never produced total isolation. Russia established

selling 64 million dollars' worth of goods in 1971.

But Japan, which was a latecomer in the sales competition, ranked second with 54 million.

Other big traders:

Italy, 50 million dollars; France, 41 million; Spain, 29 million, and West Germany, 19 million.

Canadian sales to Cuba totaled 24 million dollars in 1971—not counting a large amount of wheat that Canada sold

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tion—Panama, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela.

Does all this mean that a "bandwagon" escalation is under way? In Washington, officials insist not. Says one:

"This doesn't change much in the situation that has been developing over the last two years or so in the Hemisphere—where a lot of people now think the isolation of Cuba is anachronistic."

Recognition by U.S.? The subject of Cuba came up at almost every news conference held by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers during his May tour of Latin America. His answer:

The U.S. is ready to deal with any country that shows it wants relations and is willing to respect America and its sys-

tem in the way that Washington is willing to respect theirs.

Mr. Rogers cited Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary as examples of such countries, previously at odds with the U.S., with whom the U.S. has increasingly close relations.

Waiting for Castro. American officials point out that Castro has given no signal that he wants friendship with the U.S. Should the U.S., then, take the lead? One official points out these risks—

- Washington would lose friends in Brazil—"very important to us."

- The Soviets would be eased of the economic drain they have experienced in keeping Cuba alive.

- The U.S. might get dragged into a massive aid program in Cuba.

- The Cuban sugar quota would possibly have to be restored by the U.S.—at the expense of "friends and allies"

among whom it has been divided since 1961.

"Feeling their oats." What it all adds up to, according to some diplomatic observers, is this—

Over the past few years, Latin Americans "have been feeling their oats," demonstrating their independence.

Latin-American leftists have been saying: If the U.S. can make deals with Russia and Red China, why can't we recognize anybody we want to—such as Castro?

It is clear that nationalism is on the rise in Latin America and that there are elements in almost every country that favor the re-establishment of relations with Cuba. The U.S., continuing its policy of trying to isolate Castro, is likely to find itself more and more at odds with neighbors to the south on the Cuban issue.

HOW KREMLIN GRIP ON CUBA TIGHTENS

LONDON

A new study, just published here, spells out the increasing control that the Soviet Union has over Cuba.

Says a report of the British-based Institute for the Study of Conflict:

- There now are Soviet officers in all units down to the battalion level in the 90,000-man Cuban Army with more than 50 Russian advisers attached to the general staff alone.

- Soviet nominees, appointed by dictator Fidel Castro's brother, Raúl, act for Moscow at top levels of the most important ministries of the Cuban Government.

- The Cuban economy is "irrevocably mortgaged" to the Soviets until at least the end of this century. Cuban debts to Moscow, excluding arms, top 3 billion dollars. Russian economic aid currently is put at 1.5 million dollars daily.

Benefits to Kremlin. For the Soviet Union, says the report, control of Cuba has brought three specific benefits:

1. Establishment of a conveniently located and increasingly useful showcase base from which trade, educational propaganda and revolutionary movements can be promoted throughout South and Central America and the Caribbean.

2. Construction of a nuclear-submarine base at Cienfuegos, "the use of which greatly increases the effective capacity of the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic." (U.S. officials maintain that, when the Soviets tried to



—Sovfoto

Havana harbor expansion was achieved with Soviet help. Through economic pressures, the Russians have forced Premier Castro into obedience.

equip the Cienfuegos project in 1970, they were challenged by the U.S. and work on base facilities was halted. However, it is noted that any base far from home where sailors can go ashore for recreation is of some advantage—even though the Soviet submarines cannot be serviced there.)

3. Inclusion of a Latin-American country in the Soviet-dominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). As a result, Cuba's "previous economic dependence upon the U.S.A. was essentially replaced by a new dependence upon the Soviet Union and its satellites."

Expansion of influence. The Institute study—based largely on revelations of Cuban intelligence defectors—dates growing Russian influence in Cuba from early 1968, when bilateral relations "touched their nadir."

At that time, says the report, Kremlin officials decided to apply tough economic pressures against Havana in order to pull Fidel Castro into line. This move was said to have followed a succession of abortive Soviet attempts in the mid-'60s to remove the Cuban leader.

As part of the crackdown, vital

oil supplies were slowed to a minimum, all shipments of industrial materials were halted and many Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the island.

Within months Castro came to heel, to the extent of supporting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. Then, according to the study, a new economic agreement was negotiated which involved sending some 5,000 Russian personnel to Cuba.

In 1969, the Soviets began to re-equip the Cuban armed forces with advanced weapons, including surface-to-air guided missiles, in return for securing the rights to construct the vitally important naval base at Cienfuegos.

Ever since, the report contends, it has been a story of increasing Soviet control over the most important aspects of Cuban policy, to the point where Cuba at this time is in a state of "amiable clienthood" to the men in the Kremlin.

Concludes the British study:

"For all his natural independence, Fidel Castro has allowed his country to become a Soviet dependency."