

COUNTRIES

USSR

Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-B, 10/26/62-10/30/62

TAB 8 [tabs 7 and 8 are out of sequence as filed in the White House]

DECLASS. 10/26/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 13pp Embtel 1101(Moscow) [13pp] [13pp]
 8/29/74 Relays Embassy translation of Khrushchev letter of 10/26 to Kennedy in answer to Kennedy letter of 10/25

~~.../.../... U 1p~~
 List of "Recipients of Moscow's 1101(Khrushchev letter to the President of October 26, 1962)"

~~10/27/62 State U 1p Embtel 1109(Moscow)~~
 Correction on Embtel 1101

DECLASS. 10/27/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 1p
 8/29/74 W.H. Brubeck memo for McG. Bundy re "Corrections in Moscow's 1101"

EXEMPTED 10/28/62 State S(...) 1p Deptel 2345(London)
 6/1/76 NLK 73-30 Instructs Embassy on delivery of Khrushchev letter

DECLASS. 10/28/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 1p Deptel 2346(London)
 1/29/74 Relays text of Khrushchev letter of 10/26

DECLASS. 11/ 3/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 1p
 8/29/74 W.H. Brubeck memo for McG. Bundy re "Chairman Khrushchev's letter to the President, dated October 26, 1962"

DECLASS. ~~.../.../... State US(...)~~ 9pp L.S. # 46118
 8/29/74 Translation of Gromyko covering letter to Foy Kohler and of Khrushchev letter of 10/26 to Kennedy

DECLASSIFIED 11/ 8/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 1p
 11/11/74 W.H. Brubeck memo for McG. Bundy re attached

DECLASSIFIED 11/ 6/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 1p
 11/11/74 William Tyler memo for the files re conversation with Ambassador Alphand

DECLASSIFIED 11/ 2/62 State ~~US(...)~~ 1p
 11/11/74 William Tyler memo for the record re leak of Khrushchev letter of 10/26

TAB 9

~~.../.../... U 3pp~~
 Draft Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter of 10/26 with handwritten changes

~~.../.../... U 1p~~
 Addition to draft above [not clear how it was to be added]

~~.../.../... U 1p~~
 Different draft Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter of 10/26

opened for research use 9/6/74

~~10/27/62 WH U 1p [1p] [1p]
Press Release: "Text of a letter by the President
addressed to the Chairman of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet, Nikita Khrushchev"
10/27/62 State U 3pp Deptel 1015(Moscow)
Relays text of Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter of
10/26 for delivery
10/27/62 State U 1p Deptel 1123(USUN, New York)
Relays text of Kennedy letter of 10/27 to Khrushchev
10/28/62 State U 1p Embtel 1113(Moscow)
Reports delivery of Kennedy letter~~

TAB 10

~~EXEMPTED 10/28/62 State C(...) 1p Embtel 1115(Moscow)
6/1/76 NLK 78-30
Reports expected delivery of Khrushchev reply to
Kennedy
10/28/62 FBIS U 4pp #53
Text of Khrushchev letter to Kennedy replying to
Kennedy letter of 10/27
10/28/62 FBIS U 2pp #133
Reports "Initial Communist Propaganda Treatment of
the 28 October Khrushchev Kennedy Exchange"
10/29/62 State U 1p Embtel 1121(Moscow)
Reports delivery of Khrushchev message
10/29/62 State U 1p Deptel 1022(Moscow)
Reports Tass translation of Khrushchev letter in part
10/30/62 State U 1p
Telegram from Secretary of State to McG. Bundy re
partial transliteration of paragraph of Khrushchev
letter
/ / WH U 1p
Covering memo from "RCM" re attached
/ / U 5pp
"Official English text of Khrushchev message"
as taken from Tass
10/31/62 FBIS U 28pp
Daily Report Supplement; World Reaction Series; No. 11-
4962; Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to Khrushchev's
28 October Letter on Dismantling Cuban Missile Bases
11/ 1/62 State U 1p A 328(from The Hague)
"Local Soviet Information Bulletin Apparently Makes
Distinction Between Khrushchev's messages to the
President of Oct. 27 and 28"
DECLASS. / / US() 4pp
8/29/74 Memo on offensive weapons for the NSC Executive
Committee meeting, 11/3/62
11/ 8/62 State U 1p
Covering memo from W.H. Brubeck to McG. Bundy re
"Letter to the President from Chairman Khrushchev,
dated October 28, 1962" [letter to the President original
not attached as indicated]~~

~~.../.../... State U 7pp LS No. 46235~~
~~Translation of covering letter and Khrushchev~~
~~letter of 10/28/62~~

TAB 11

~~10/28/62 ... U 8pp~~
~~Draft Kennedy reply to Khrushchev message of 10/28~~
~~with handwritten editorial changes and alternate~~
~~paragraphs~~

~~10/28/62 ... U 2pp~~
~~Draft Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter of 10/28~~
~~incorporating the changes made in the above with~~
~~additional handwritten changes~~

~~10/28/62 State U 3pp Deptel 1020(Moscow)~~
~~Relays text of Kennedy reply to Khrushchev for~~
~~delivery~~

CLASS. ~~.../.../... US() 3pp [3pp]~~
29/74 ~~Paper on "Texts of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Understanding~~
~~of October 26, 27 and 28, 1962"~~

TAB 12

10/30/62 USSR ... 16pp [16pp]
Text, in English, of Khrushchev letter replying to
Kennedy letter of 10/28/62

EXEMPTED

NW 57-126

7/88



2

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 18890

SS

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
6 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

020

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS OF LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT DELIVERED TO EMBASSY BY MESSENGER 4:43 P.M. MOSCOW TIME OCTOBER 26, UNDER COVER OF LETTER FROM GROMYKO TO ME.

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 25. FROM YOUR LETTER, I GOT THE FEELING THAT YOU HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AND (SOME) SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. I VALUE THIS.

NOW WE HAVE ALREADY PUBLICLY EXCHANGED OUR EVALUATIONS OF THE EVENTS AROUND CUBA AND EACH OF US HAS SET FORTH HIS EXPLANATION AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THESE EVENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, I WOULD JUDGE THAT, APPARENTLY, A CONTINUATION OF AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS AT SUCH A DISTANCE, EVEN IN THE FORM OF SECRET LETTERS, WILL HARDLY ADD ANYTHING TO THAT WHICH ONE SIDE HAS ALREADY SAID TO THE OTHER.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

BY *[Signature]* NARS, Date 5/29/74

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

I THINK YOU WILL UNDERSTAND ME CORRECTLY IF YOU ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE WORLD. EVERYONE NEEDS PEACE: BOTH CAPITALISTS, IF THEY HAVE NOT LOST THEIR REASON, AND, STILL MORE, COMMUNISTS, PEOPLE WHO KNOW HOW TO VALUE NOT ONLY THEIR OWN LIVES BUT, MORE THAN ANYTHING, THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLES. WE, COMMUNISTS, ARE AGAINST ALL WARS BETWEEN STATES IN GENERAL AND HAVE BEEN DEFENDING THE CAUSE OF PEACE SINCE WE CAME INTO THE WORLD. WE HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED WAR AS A CALAMITY, AND NOT AS A GAME NOR AS A MEANS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF DEFINITE GOALS, NOR, ALL THE MORE, AS A GOAL IN ITSELF. OUR GOALS ARE CLEAR, AND THE MEANS TO ATTAIN THEM IS LABOR. WAR IS OUR ENEMY AND A CALAMITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLES.

IT IS THUS THAT WE, SOVIET PEOPLE, AND, TOGETHER WITH US, OTHER PEOPLES AS WELL, UNDERSTAND THE QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE. I CAN, IN ANY CASE, FIRMLY SAY THIS FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS FOR ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE WHO WANT PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG PEOPLES.

I SEE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU TOO ARE NOT DEVOID OF A SENSE OF ANXIETY FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD, ~~BECAUSE OF~~ ^{OF} UNDERSTANDING, AND OF WHAT WAR ENTAILS. WHAT WOULD A WAR GIVE YOU? YOU ARE THREATENING US WITH WAR. BUT YOU WILL KNOW THAT THE VERY LEAST WHICH YOU WOULD RECEIVE IN REPLY WOULD BE THAT YOU WOULD EXPERIENCE THE SAME CONSEQUENCES AS THOSE WHICH YOU SENT US. AND THAT MUST BE CLEAR TO US, PEOPLE INVESTED WITH AUTHORITY, TRUST, AND RESPONSIBILITY. WE MUST NOT SUCCUMB TO INTOXICATION AND PETTY PASSIONS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ELECTIONS ARE IMPENDING IN THIS OR THAT COUNTRY, OR NOT IMPENDING. THESE ARE ALL TRANSIENT THINGS, BUT IF INDEED WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR POWER TO STOP IT, FOR SUCH IS THE LOGIC OF WAR. I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN TWO WARS AND KNOW THAT WAR ENDS WHEN IT HAS ROLLED THROUGH CITIES AND VILLAGES, EVERYWHERE SOWING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE, I ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ON CUBA ARE GROUNDLESS. IT IS APPARENT FROM WHAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN ME THAT OUR CONCEPTIONS ARE DIFFERENT ON THIS SCORE, OR RATHER, WE HAVE DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF THESE OR THOSE MILITARY MEANS. INDEED, IN REALITY, THE SAME FORMS OF WEAPONS CAN HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS.

YOU ARE A MILITARY MAN AND, I HOPE, WILL UNDERSTAND ME. LET US TAKE FOR EXAMPLE A SIMPLE CANNON. WHAT SORT OF MEANS IS THIS: OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE? A CANNON IS A DEFENSIVE MEANS IF IT IS SET UP TO DEFEND BOUNDARIES OR A FORTIFIED AREA. BUT IF ONE CONCENTRATES ARTILLERY, AND ADDS TO IT THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF TROOPS, THEN THE SAME CANNONS DO BECOME AN OFFENSIVE MEANS, BECAUSE THEY PREPARE AND CLEAR THE WAY FOR INFANTRY TO ATTACK. THE SAME HAPPENS WITH MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL, WITH ANY TYPE OF THIS WEAPON.

YOU ARE MISTAKEN IF YOU THINK THAT ANY OF OUR MEANS ON CUBA ARE OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, LET US NOT QUARREL NOW. IT IS APPARENT THAT I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONVINCING YOU OF THIS. BUT I SAY TO YOU: YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE A MILITARY MAN AND SHOULD UNDERSTAND: CAN ONE ATTACK, IF ONE HAS ON ONE'S TERRITORY EVEN AN ENORMOUS QUANTITY OF MISSILES OF VARIOUS EFFECTIVE RADIUSES AND VARIOUS POWER, BUT USING ONLY THESE MEANS. THESE MISSILES ARE A MEANS OF EXTERMINATION AND DESTRUCTION. BUT ONE CANNOT ATTACK WITH THESE MISSILES, EVEN NUCLEAR MISSILES OF A POWER OF 100 MEGATONS BECAUSE ONLY PEOPLE, TROOPS, CAN ATTACK. WITHOUT PEOPLE, ANY MEANS HOWEVER POWERFUL CANNOT BE OFFENSIVE.

HOW CAN ONE, CONSEQUENTLY, GIVE SUCH A COMPLETELY INCORRECT INTERPRETATION AS YOU ARE NOW GIVING, TO THE EFFECT THAT SOME SORT OF MEANS ON CUBA ARE OFFENSIVE. ALL THE MEANS LOCATED THERE,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

AND I ASSURE YOU OF THIS, HAVE A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER, ARE ON CUBA SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEFENSE, AND WE HAVE SENT THEM TO CUBA AT THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. YOU, HOWEVER, SAY THAT THESE ARE OFFENSIVE MEANS.

KOHLER

GDW

* AS RECEIVED.

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 6:30 PM RLL.

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62 - 7:50 pm. JAW

~~SECRET~~

ING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

Action
SS

Control: 18954
Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
8:27 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

BUT, MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU REALLY SERIOUSLY THINK THAT CUBA CAN ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND THAT EVEN WE TOGETHER WITH CUBA CAN ATTACK YOU FROM THE TERRITORY OF CUBA? CAN YOU REALLY THINK THAT WAY? HOW IS IT POSSIBLE? WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. HAS SOMETHING SO NEW APPEARED IN MILITARY STRATEGY THAT ONE CAN THINK THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ATTACK THUS. I SAY PRECISELY ATTACK, AND NOT DESTROY, SINCE BARBARIANS, PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST THEIR SENSE, DESTROY.

I BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE NO BASIS TO THINK THIS WAY. YOU CAN REGARD US WITH DISTRUST, BUT, IN ANY CASE, YOU CAN BE CALM IN THIS REGARD, THAT WE ARE OF SOUND MIND AND UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY WELL THAT IF WE ATTACK YOU, YOU WILL RESPOND THE SAME WAY. BUT YOU TOO WILL RECEIVE THE SAME THAT YOU HURL AGAINST US. AND I THINK THAT YOU ALSO UNDERSTAND THIS. MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU IN VIENNA GIVES ME THE RIGHT TO TALK TO YOU THIS WAY.

THIS INDICATES THAT WE ARE NORMAL PEOPLE, THAT WE CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND AND CORRECTLY EVALUATE THE SITUATION. CONSEQUENTLY, HOW CAN WE PERMIT THE INCORRECT ACTIONS WHICH YOU ASCRIBE TO US? ONLY LUNATICS OR SUICIDES, WHO THEMSELVES WANT TO PERISH AND TO DESTROY THE WHOLE WORLD BEFORE THEY DIE, COULD DO THIS.

~~SECRET~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

WE, HOWEVER, WANT TO LIVE AND DO NOT AT ALL WANT TO DESTROY YOUR COUNTRY. WE WANT SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT: TO COMPETE WITH YOUR COUNTRY ON A PEACEFUL BASIS. WE QUARREL WITH YOU, WE HAVE DIFFERENCES ON IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS, BUT OUR VIEW OF THE WORLD CONSISTS IN THIS, THAT IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS, AS WELL AS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SHOULD BE SOLVED NOT BY MILITARY MEANS, THEY MUST BE SOLVED ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL COMPETITION, I.E., AS THIS IS UNDERSTOOD IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY, ON THE BASIS OF COMPETITION. WE HAVE PROCEEDED AND ARE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF THE TWO DIFFERENT SOCIAL-POLITICAL SYSTEMS, NOW EXISTING IN THE WORLD, IS NECESSARY, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSURE A STABLE PEACE. THAT IS THE SORT OF PRINCIPLE WE HOLD.

YOU HAVE NOW PROCLAIMED PIRATICAL MEASURES, WHICH WERE EMPLOYED IN THE MIDDLE AGES, WHEN SHIPS PROCEEDING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WERE ATTACKED, AND YOU HAVE CALLED THIS "A QUARANTINE" AROUND CUBA. OUR VESSELS, APPARENTLY, WILL SOON ENTER THE ZONE WHICH YOUR NAVY IS PATROLLING. I ASSURE YOU THAT THESE VESSELS, NOW BOUND FOR CUBA, ARE CARRYING THE MOST INNOCENT PEACEFUL CARGOES. DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT WE ONLY OCCUPY OURSELVES WITH THE CARRIAGE OF SO-CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS? ALTHOUGH PERHAPS YOUR MILITARY PEOPLE IMAGINE THAT THESE (CARGOES) ARE SOME SORT OF SPECIAL TYPE OF WEAPON, I ASSURE YOU THAT THEY ARE THE MOST ORDINARY PEACEFUL PRODUCTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, LET US SHOW GOOD SENSE. I ASSURE YOU THAT ON THOSE SHIPS, WHICH ARE BOUND FOR CUBA, THERE ARE NO WEAPONS AT ALL. THE WEAPONS WHICH WERE NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSE OF CUBA ARE ALREADY THERE. I DO NOT WANT TO SAY THAT THERE WERE NOT ANY SHIPMENTS OF WEAPONS AT ALL. NO, THERE WERE SUCH SHIPMENTS. BUT NOW CUBA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED THE NECESSARY MEANS OF DEFENSE.

I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN UNDERSTAND ME AND BELIEVE ME. BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU BELIEVE IN YOURSELF AND TO AGREE THAT ONE CANNOT GIVE WAY TO PASSIONS; IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTROL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

THEM. AND IN WHAT DIRECTION ARE EVENTS NOW DEVELOPING? IF YOU STOP THE VESSELS, THEN, AS YOU YOURSELF KNOW, THAT WOULD BE PIRACY. IF WE STARTED TO DO THAT WITH REGARD TO YOUR SHIPS, THEN YOU WOULD ALSO BE AS INDIGNANT AS WE AND THE WHOLE WORLD NOW ARE. ONE CANNOT GIVE ANOTHER INTERPRETATION TO SUCH ACTIONS, BECAUSE ONE CANNOT LEGALIZE LAWLESSNESS. IF THIS WERE PERMITTED, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO PEACE, THERE WOULD ALSO BE NO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. WE SHOULD THEN BE FORCED TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF-A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. WHY SHOULD THIS BE DONE? TO WHAT WOULD ALL THIS LEAD?

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 8:45 PM RLL

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62. CWO/JRL

~~SECRET~~

ACTING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 18896

SS

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962

Info

6:23 PM

MS

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

LET US NORMALIZE RELATIONS. WE HAVE RECEIVED AN APPEAL FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, U THANT, WITH HIS PROPOSALS. I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED HIM. HIS PROPOSALS COME TO THIS, THAT OUR SIDE SHOULD NOT TRANSPORT ARMAMENTS-OF ANY KIND TO CUBA DURING A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED--AND WE ARE READY TO ENTER SUCH NEGOTIATIONS-- AND THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY SORT OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS AGAINST VESSELS ENGAGED IN NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS. I CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS REASONABLE. THIS WOULD BE A WAY OUT OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE PEOPLES THE POSSIBILITY OF BREATHING CALMLY. YOU HAVE ASKED WHAT HAPPENED, WHAT EVOKED THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO CUBA? YOU HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THIS TO OUR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I WILL TELL YOU FRANKLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT EVOKED IT.

WE WERE VERY GRIEVED BY THE FACT -- I SPOKE ABOUT IT IN VIENNA -- THAT A LANDING TOOK PLACE, THAT AN ATTACK ON CUBA WAS COMMITTED, AS A RESULT OF WHICH MANY CUBANS PERISHED. YOU YOURSELF TOLD ME THEN THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. I RESPECTED THAT EXPLANATION. YOU REPEATED IT TO ME SEVERAL TIMES, POINTING OUT THAT NOT EVERYBODY OCCUPYING A HIGH POSITION WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE HIS

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

MISTAKES AS YOU HAD DONE. I VALUE SUCH FRANKNESS. FOR MY PART, I TOLD YOU THAT WE TOO POSSESS NO LESS COURAGE; WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THOSE MISTAKES WHICH HAD BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE HISTORY OF OUR STATE, AND NOT ONLY ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT SHARPLY CONDEMNED THEM.

IF YOU ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEACE AND WELFARE OF YOUR PEOPLE, AND THIS IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS PRESIDENT, THEN I, AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AM CONCERNED FOR MY PEOPLE. MOREOVER, THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE SHOULD BE OUR JOINT CONCERN, SINCE IF, UNDER CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS, WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT, IT WOULD BE A WAR NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE RECIPROCAL CLAIMS, BUT A WORLD WIDE CRUEL AND DESTRUCTIVE WAR.

WHY HAVE WE PROCEEDED TO ASSIST CUBA WITH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID? THE ANSWER IS: WE HAVE PROCEEDED TO DO SO ONLY FOR REASONS OF HUMANITARIANISM. AT ONE TIME, OUR PEOPLE ITSELF HAD A REVOLUTION, WHEN RUSSIA WAS STILL A BACKWARD COUNTRY. WE WERE ATTACKED THEN. WE WERE THE TARGET OF ATTACK BY MANY COUNTRIES. THE USA PARTICIPATED IN THAT ADVENTURE. THIS HAS BEEN RECORDED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY. A WHOLE BOOK HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THIS BY GENERAL GRAVES, WHO, AT THAT TIME, COMMANDED THE US EXPEDITIONARY CORPS. GRAVES CALLED IT "THE AMERICAN ADVENTURE IN SIBERIA."

WE KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO ACCOMPLISH A REVOLUTION AND HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO RECONSTRUCT A COUNTRY ON NEW FOUNDATIONS. WE SINCERELY SYMPATHIZE WITH CUBA AND THE CUBAN PEOPLE, BUT WE ARE NOT INTERFERING IN QUESTIONS OF DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, WE ARE NOT INTERFERING IN THEIR AFFAIRS. THE SOVIET UNION DESIRES TO HELP THE CUBANS BUILD THEIR LIFE AS THEY THEMSELVES WISH AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD NOT HINDER THEM.

YOU ONCE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PREPARING AN INVASION. BUT YOU ALSO DECLARED THAT YOU SYMPATHIZED WITH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

THE CUBAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY EMIGRANTS, THAT YOU SUPPORT THEM AND WOULD HELP THEM TO REALIZE THEIR PLANS AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA. IT IS ALSO NOT A SECRET TO ANYONE THAT THE THREAT OF ARMED ATTACK, AGGRESSION, HAS CONSTANTLY HUNG, AND CONTINUES TO HANG OVER CUBA. IT WAS ONLY THIS WHICH IMPELLED US TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH IT AID FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE DEFENSIVE CAPACITY OF THIS COUNTRY.

IF ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE USA ITSELF WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN AN ATTACK ON CUBA AND WOULD RESTRAIN OTHERS FROM ACTIONS OF THIS SORT, IF YOU WOULD RECALL YOUR FLEET, THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY CHANGE EVERYTHING. I AM NOT SPEAKING FOR FIDEL CASTRO, BUT I THINK THAT HE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA, EVIDENTLY, WOULD DECLARE DEMOBILIZATION AND WOULD APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE TO GET DOWN TO PEACEFUL LABOR. THEN, TOO, THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR, SINCE, IF THERE IS NO THREAT, THEN ARMAMENTS ARE A BURDEN FOR EVERY PEOPLE. THEN, TOO, THE QUESTION OF THE DESTRUCTION, NOT ONLY OF THE ARMAMENTS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, BUT OF ALL OTHER ARMAMENTS AS WELL, WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT.

I SPOKE IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL FOR THE DISBANDMENT OF ALL ARMIES AND FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL ARMAMENTS. HOW THEN CAN I NOW COUNT ON THOSE ARMAMENTS?

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 6:45 PM RLL

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62-7:50 pm JAW

~~SECRET~~

51

~~SECRET~~

Action
SS

Control: 18970
Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
9 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

018

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

ARMAMENTS BRING ONLY DISASTERS. WHEN ONE ACCUMULATES THEM, THIS DAMAGES THE ECONOMY, AND IF ONE PUTS THEM TO USE, THEN THEY DESTROY PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES. CONSEQUENTLY, ONLY A MADMAN CAN BELIEVE THAT ARMAMENTS ARE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS IN THE LIFE OF SOCIETY. NO, THEY ARE AN ENFORCED LOSS OF HUMAN ENERGY, AND WHAT IS MORE ARE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF MAN HIMSELF. IF PEOPLE DO NOT SHOW WISDOM, THEN IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THEY WILL COME TO A CLASH, LIKE BLIND MOLES, AND THEN RECIPROCAL EXTERMINATION WILL BEGIN.

LET US THEREFORE SHOW STATESMANLIKE WISDOM. I PROPOSE: WE, FOR OUR PART, WILL DECLARE THAT OUR SHIPS, BOUND FOR CUBA, WILL NOT CARRY ANY KIND OF ARMAMENTS. YOU WOULD DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INVADE CUBA WITH ITS FORCES AND WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY SORT OF FORCES WHICH MIGHT INTEND TO CARRY OUT AN INVASION OF CUBA. THEN THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENCE OF OUR MILITARY SPECIALISTS IN CUBA WOULD DISAPPEAR.

MR. PRESIDENT, I APPEAL TO YOU TO WEIGH WELL WHAT THE AGGRESSIVE, PIRATICAL ACTIONS, WHICH YOU HAVE DECLARED THE USA INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, WOULD LEAD TO. YOU YOURSELF

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

KNOW THAT ANY SENSIBLE MAN SIMPLY CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS, CANNOT RECOGNIZE YOUR RIGHT TO SUCH ACTIONS.

IF YOU DID THIS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE UNLEASHING OF WAR, WELL THEN, IT IS EVIDENT THAT NOTHING ELSE IS LEFT TO US BUT TO ACCEPT THIS CHALLENGE OF YOURS. IF, HOWEVER, YOU HAVE NOT LOST YOUR SELF-CONTROL AND SENSIBLY CONCEIVE WHAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO, THEN, MR. PRESIDENT, WE AND YOU AUGHT NOT NOW TO PULL ON THE ENDS OF THE ROPE IN WHICH YOU HAVE TIED THE KNOT OF WAR, BECAUSE THE MORE THE TWO OF US PULL, THE TIGHTER THAT KNOT WILL BE TIED. AND A MOMENT MAY COME WHEN THAT KNOT WILL BE TIED SO TIGHT THAT EVEN HE WHO TIED IT WILL NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH TO UNTIE IT, AND THEN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CUT THAT KNOT, AND WHAT THAT WOULD MEAN IS NOT FOR ME TO EXPLAIN TO YOU, BECAUSE YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY OF WHAT TERRIBLE FORCES OUR COUNTRIES DISPOSE.

CONSEQUENTLY, IF THERE IS NO INTENTION TO TIGHTEN THAT KNOT AND THEREBY TO DOOM THE WORLD TO THE CATASTROPHE OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR, THEN LET US NOT ONLY RELAX THE FORCES PULLING ON THE ENDS OF THE ROPE, LET US TAKE MEASURES TO UNTIE THAT KNOT. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

WE WELCOME ALL FORCES WHICH STAND ON POSITIONS OF PEACE. CONSEQUENTLY, I EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL, TOO, WHO MANIFESTS ALARM AND CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD, AND I READILY RESPONDED TO THE APPEAL OF THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, U THANT.

THERE, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE MY THOUGHTS, WHICH, IF YOU AGREED WITH THEM, COULD PUT AN END TO THAT TENSE SITUATION WHICH IS DISTURBING ALL PEOPLES.

THESE THOUGHTS ARE DICTATED BY A SINCERE DESIRE TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION, TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF WAR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

OCTOBER 26, 1962. END TEXT

ORIGINAL OF LETTER BEING AIR POUCHED TODAY UNDER TRANSMITTAL
SLIP TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 9:15 PM RLL

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 18954

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962

SS

8:27 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

BUT, MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU REALLY SERIOUSLY THINK THAT CUBA CAN ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND THAT EVEN WE TOGETHER WITH CUBA CAN ATTACK YOU FROM THE TERRITORY OF CUBA? CAN YOU REALLY THINK THAT WAY? HOW IS IT POSSIBLE? WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. HAS SOMETHING SO NEW APPEARED IN MILITARY STRATEGY THAT ONE CAN THINK THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ATTACK THUS. I SAY PRECISELY ATTACK, AND NOT DESTROY, SINCE BARBARIANS, PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST THEIR SENSE, DESTROY.

I BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE NO BASIS TO THINK THIS WAY. YOU CAN REGARD US WITH DISTRUST, BUT, IN ANY CASE, YOU CAN BE CALM IN THIS REGARD, THAT WE ARE OF SOUND MIND AND UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY WELL THAT IF WE ATTACK YOU, YOU WILL RESPOND THE SAME WAY. BUT YOU TOO WILL RECEIVE THE SAME THAT YOU HURL AGAINST US. AND I THINK THAT YOU ALSO UNDERSTAND THIS. MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU IN VIENNA GIVES ME THE RIGHT TO TALK TO YOU THIS WAY.

THIS INDICATES THAT WE ARE NORMAL PEOPLE, THAT WE CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND AND CORRECTLY EVALUATE THE SITUATION. CONSEQUENTLY, HOW CAN WE PERMIT THE INCORRECT ACTIONS WHICH YOU ASCRIBE TO US? ONLY LUNATICS OR SUICIDES, WHO THEMSELVES WANT TO PERISH AND TO DESTROY THE WHOLE WORLD BEFORE THEY DIE, COULD DO THIS.

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

WE, HOWEVER, WANT TO LIVE AND DO NOT AT ALL WANT TO DESTROY YOUR COUNTRY. WE WANT SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT: TO COMPETE WITH YOUR COUNTRY ON A PEACEFUL BASIS. WE QUARREL WITH YOU, WE HAVE DIFFERENCES ON IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. BUT OUR VIEW OF THE WORLD CONSISTS IN THIS, THAT IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS, AS WELL AS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SHOULD BE SOLVED NOT BY MILITARY MEANS, THEY MUST BE SOLVED ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL COMPETITION, I.E., AS THIS IS UNDERSTOOD IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY, ON THE BASIS OF COMPETITION. WE HAVE PROCEEDED AND ARE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF THE TWO DIFFERENT SOCIAL-POLITICAL SYSTEMS, NOW EXISTING IN THE WORLD, IS NECESSARY, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSURE A STABLE PEACE. THAT IS THE SORT OF PRINCIPLE WE HOLD.

YOU HAVE NOW PROCLAIMED PIRATICAL MEASURES, WHICH WERE EMPLOYED IN THE MIDDLE AGES, WHEN SHIPS PROCEEDING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WERE ATTACKED, AND YOU HAVE CALLED THIS "A QUARANTINE" AROUND CUBA. OUR VESSELS, APPARENTLY, WILL SOON ENTER THE ZONE WHICH YOUR NAVY IS PATROLLING. I ASSURE YOU THAT THESE VESSELS, NOW BOUND FOR CUBA, ARE CARRYING THE MOST INNOCENT PEACEFUL CARGOES. DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT WE ONLY OCCUPY OURSELVES WITH THE CARRIAGE OF SO-CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS? ALTHOUGH PERHAPS YOUR MILITARY PEOPLE IMAGINE THAT THESE (CARGOES) ARE SOME SORT OF SPECIAL TYPE OF WEAPON, I ASSURE YOU THAT THEY ARE THE MOST ORDINARY PEACEFUL PRODUCTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, LET US SHOW GOOD SENSE. I ASSURE YOU THAT ON THOSE SHIPS, WHICH ARE BOUND FOR CUBA, THERE ARE NO WEAPONS AT ALL. THE WEAPONS WHICH WERE NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSE OF CUBA ARE ALREADY THERE. I DO NOT WANT TO SAY THAT THERE WERE NOT ANY SHIPMENTS OF WEAPONS AT ALL. NO, THERE WERE SUCH SHIPMENTS. BUT NOW CUBA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED THE NECESSARY MEANS OF DEFENSE.

I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN UNDERSTAND ME AND BELIEVE ME. BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU BELIEVE IN YOURSELF AND TO AGREE THAT ONE CANNOT GIVE WAY TO PASSIONS; IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTROL

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

THEM. AND IN WHAT DIRECTION ARE EVENTS NOW DEVELOPING? IF YOU STOP THE VESSELS, THEN, AS YOU YOURSELF KNOW, THAT WOULD BE PIRACY. IF WE STARTED TO DO THAT WITH REGARD TO YOUR SHIPS, THEN YOU WOULD ALSO BE AS INDIGNANT AS WE AND THE WHOLE WORLD NOW ARE. ONE CANNOT GIVE ANOTHER INTERPRETATION TO SUCH ACTIONS, BECAUSE ONE CANNOT LEGALIZE LAWLESSNESS. IF THIS WERE PERMITTED, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO PEACE, THERE WOULD ALSO BE NO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. WE SHOULD THEN BE FORCED TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. WHY SHOULD THIS BE DONE? TO WHAT WOULD ALL THIS LEAD?

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 8:45 PM RLL

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62. CWO/JRL

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

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Action

Control: 18896

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962

SS

6:23 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

LET US NORMALIZE RELATIONS. WE HAVE RECEIVED AN APPEAL FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, U THANT, WITH HIS PROPOSALS. I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED HIM. HIS PROPOSALS COME TO THIS, THAT OUR SIDE SHOULD NOT TRANSPORT ARMAMENTS OF ANY KIND TO CUBA DURING A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED--AND WE ARE READY TO ENTER SUCH NEGOTIATIONS-- AND THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY SORT OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS AGAINST VESSELS ENGAGED IN NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS. I CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS REASONABLE. THIS WOULD BE A WAY OUT OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE PEOPLES THE POSSIBILITY OF BREATHING CALMLY. YOU HAVE ASKED WHAT HAPPENED, WHAT EVOKED THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO CUBA? YOU HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THIS TO OUR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I WILL TELL YOU FRANKLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT EVOKED IT.

WE WERE VERY GRIEVED BY THE FACT -- I SPOKE ABOUT IT IN VIENNA -- THAT A LANDING TOOK PLACE, THAT AN ATTACK ON CUBA WAS COMMITTED, AS A RESULT OF WHICH MANY CUBANS PERISHED. YOU YOURSELF TOLD ME THEN THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. I RESPECTED THAT EXPLANATION. YOU REPEATED IT TO ME SEVERAL TIMES, POINTING OUT THAT NOT EVERYBODY OCCUPYING A HIGH POSITION WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE HIS

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SECRET

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

MISTAKES AS YOU HAD DONE. I VALUE SUCH FRANKNESS. FOR MY PART, I TOLD YOU THAT WE TOO POSSESS NO LESS COURAGE; WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THOSE MISTAKES WHICH HAD BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE HISTORY OF OUR STATE, AND NOT ONLY ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT SHARPLY CONDEMNED THEM.

IF YOU ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEACE AND WELFARE OF YOUR PEOPLE, AND THIS IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS PRESIDENT, THEN I, AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AM CONCERNED FOR MY PEOPLE. MOREOVER, THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE SHOULD BE OUR JOINT CONCERN, SINCE IF, UNDER CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS, WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT, IT WOULD BE A WAR NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE RECIPROCAL CLAIMS, BUT A WORLD WIDE CRUEL AND DESTRUCTIVE WAR.

WHY HAVE WE PROCEEDED TO ASSIST CUBA WITH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID? THE ANSWER IS: WE HAVE PROCEEDED TO DO SO ONLY FOR REASONS OF HUMANITARIANISM. AT ONE TIME, OUR PEOPLE ITSELF HAD A REVOLUTION, WHEN RUSSIA WAS STILL A BACKWARD COUNTRY. WE WERE ATTACKED THEN. WE WERE THE TARGET OF ATTACK BY MANY COUNTRIES. THE USA PARTICIPATED IN THAT ADVENTURE. THIS HAS BEEN RECORDED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY. A WHOLE BOOK HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THIS BY GENERAL GRAVES, WHO, AT THAT TIME, COMMANDED THE US EXPEDITIONARY CORPS. GRAVES CALLED IT "THE AMERICAN ADVENTURE IN SIBERIA."

WE KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO ACCOMPLISH A REVOLUTION AND HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO RECONSTRUCT A COUNTRY ON NEW FOUNDATIONS. WE SINCERELY SYMPATHIZE WITH CUBA AND THE CUBAN PEOPLE, BUT WE ARE NOT INTERFERING IN QUESTIONS OF DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, WE ARE NOT INTERFERING IN THEIR AFFAIRS. THE SOVIET UNION DESIRES TO HELP THE CUBANS BUILD THEIR LIFE AS THEY THEMSELVES WISH AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD NOT HINDER THEM.

YOU ONCE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PREPARING AN INVASION. BUT YOU ALSO DECLARED THAT YOU SYMPATHIZED WITH

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-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

THE CUBAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY EMIGRANTS, THAT YOU SUPPORT THEM AND WOULD HELP THEM TO REALIZE THEIR PLANS AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA. IT IS ALSO NOT A SECRET TO ANYONE THAT THE THREAT OF ARMED ATTACK, AGGRESSION, HAS CONSTANTLY HUNG, AND CONTINUES TO HANG OVER CUBA. IT WAS ONLY THIS WHICH IMPELLED US TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH IT AID FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE DEFENSIVE CAPACITY OF THIS COUNTRY.

① IF ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE USA ITSELF WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN AN ATTACK ON CUBA AND WOULD RESTRAIN OTHERS FROM ACTIONS OF THIS SORT, IF YOU WOULD RECALL YOUR FLEET, THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY CHANGE EVERYTHING. I AM NOT SPEAKING FOR FIDEL CASTRO, BUT I THINK THAT HE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA, EVIDENTLY, WOULD DECLARE DEMOBILIZATION AND WOULD APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE TO GET DOWN TO PEACEFUL LABOR. THEN, TOO, THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR, SINCE, IF THERE IS NO THREAT, THEN ARMAMENTS ARE A BURDEN FOR EVERY PEOPLE. THEN, TOO, THE QUESTION OF THE DESTRUCTION, NOT ONLY OF THE ARMAMENTS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, BUT OF ALL OTHER ARMAMENTS AS WELL, WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT.

I SPOKE IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL FOR THE DISBANDMENT OF ALL ARMIES AND FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL ARMAMENTS. HOW THEN CAN I NOW COUNT ON THOSE ARMAMENTS?

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 6:45 PM RLL

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62-7:50 pm JAW

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

51

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Action
SS

Control: 18970
Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
9 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

007

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

ARMAMENTS BRING ONLY DISASTERS. WHEN ONE ACCUMULATES THEM, THIS DAMAGES THE ECONOMY, AND IF ONE PUTS THEM TO USE, THEN THEY DESTROY PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES. CONSEQUENTLY, ONLY A MADMAN CAN BELIEVE THAT ARMAMENTS ARE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS IN THE LIFE OF SOCIETY. NO, THEY ARE AN ENFORCED LOSS OF HUMAN ENERGY, AND WHAT IS MORE ARE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF MAN HIMSELF. IF PEOPLE DO NOT SHOW WISDOM, THEN IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THEY WILL COME TO A CLASH, LIKE BLIND MOLES, AND THEN RECIPROCAL EXTERMINATION WILL BEGIN.

② LET US THEREFORE SHOW STATESMANLIKE WISDOM. I PROPOSE: WE, FOR OUR PART, WILL DECLARE THAT OUR SHIPS, BOUND FOR CUBA, WILL NOT CARRY ANY KIND OF ARMAMENTS. YOU WOULD DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INVADE CUBA WITH ITS FORCES AND WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY SORT OF FORCES WHICH MIGHT INTEND TO CARRY OUT AN INVASION OF CUBA. THEN THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENCE OF OUR MILITARY SPECIALISTS IN CUBA WOULD DISAPPEAR.

MR. PRESIDENT, I APPEAL TO YOU TO WEIGH WELL WHAT THE AGGRESSIVE, PIRATICAL ACTIONS, WHICH YOU HAVE DECLARED THE USA INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, WOULD LEAD TO. YOU YOURSELF

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-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

KNOW THAT ANY SENSIBLE MAN SIMPLY CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS, CANNOT RECOGNIZE YOUR RIGHT TO SUCH ACTIONS.

IF YOU DID THIS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE UNLEASHING OF WAR, WELL THEN, IT IS EVIDENT THAT NOTHING ELSE IS LEFT TO US BUT TO ACCEPT THIS CHALLENGE OF YOURS. IF, HOWEVER, YOU HAVE NOT LOST YOUR SELF-CONTROL AND SENSIBLY CONCEIVE WHAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO, THEN, MR. PRESIDENT, WE AND YOU AUGHT NOT NOW TO PULL ON THE ENDS OF THE ROPE IN WHICH YOU HAVE TIED THE KNOT OF WAR, BECAUSE THE MORE THE TWO OF US PULL, THE TIGHTER THAT KNOT WILL BE TIED. AND A MOMENT MAY COME WHEN THAT KNOT WILL BE TIED SO TIGHT THAT EVEN HE WHO TIED IT WILL NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH TO UNTIE IT, AND THEN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CUT THAT KNOT, AND WHAT THAT WOULD MEAN IS NOT FOR ME TO EXPLAIN TO YOU, BECAUSE YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY OF WHAT TERRIBLE FORCES OUR COUNTRIES DISPOSE.

CONSEQUENTLY, IF THERE IS NO INTENTION TO TIGHTEN THAT KNOT AND THEREBY TO DOOM THE WORLD TO THE CATASTROPHE OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR, THEN LET US NOT ONLY RELAX THE FORCES PULLING ON THE ENDS OF THE ROPE, LET US TAKE MEASURES TO UNTIE THAT KNOT. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

WE WELCOME ALL FORCES WHICH STAND ON POSITIONS OF PEACE. CONSEQUENTLY, I EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL, TOO, WHO MANIFESTS ALARM AND CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD, AND I READILY RESPONDED TO THE APPEAL OF THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, U THANT.

THERE, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE MY THOUGHTS, WHICH, IF YOU AGREED WITH THEM, COULD PUT AN END TO THAT TENSE SITUATION WHICH IS DISTURBING ALL PEOPLES.

THESE THOUGHTS ARE DICTATED BY A SINCERE DESIRE TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION, TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF WAR.

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-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

OCTOBER 26, 1962. END TEXT

ORIGINAL OF LETTER BEING AIR POUCHED TODAY UNDER TRANSMITTAL
SLIP TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.


KOHLER

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NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 9:15 PM RLL

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 18890

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
6 PM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

009

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS OF LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT DELIVERED TO EMBASSY BY MESSENGER 4:43 P.M. MOSCOW TIME OCTOBER 26, UNDER COVER OF LETTER FROM GROMYKO TO ME.

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 25. FROM YOUR LETTER, I GOT THE FEELING THAT YOU HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AND (SOME) SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. I VALUE THIS.

NOW WE HAVE ALREADY PUBLICLY EXCHANGED OUR EVALUATIONS OF THE EVENTS AROUND CUBA AND EACH OF US HAS SET FORTH HIS EXPLANATION AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THESE EVENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, I WOULD JUDGE THAT, APPARENTLY, A CONTINUATION OF AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS AT SUCH A DISTANCE, EVEN IN THE FORM OF SECRET LETTERS, WILL HARDLY ADD ANYTHING TO THAT WHICH ONE SIDE HAS ALREADY SAID TO THE OTHER.

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State Dept Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
BY *D. Quary* NAKS. Date *8/29/74*

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-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

I THINK YOU WILL UNDERSTAND ME CORRECTLY IF YOU ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE WORLD. EVERYONE NEEDS PEACE: BOTH CAPITALISTS, IF THEY HAVE NOT LOST THEIR REASON, AND, STILL MORE, COMMUNISTS, PEOPLE WHO KNOW HOW TO VALUE NOT ONLY THEIR OWN LIVES BUT, MORE THAN ANYTHING, THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLES. WE, COMMUNISTS, ARE AGAINST ALL WARS BETWEEN STATES IN GENERAL AND HAVE BEEN DEFENDING THE CAUSE OF PEACE SINCE WE CAME INTO THE WORLD. WE HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED WAR AS A CALAMITY, AND NOT AS A GAME NOR AS A MEANS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF DEFINITE GOALS, NOR, ALL THE MORE, AS A GOAL IN ITSELF. OUR GOALS ARE CLEAR, AND THE MEANS TO ATTAIN THEM IS LABOR. WAR IS OUR ENEMY AND A CALAMITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLES.

IT IS THUS THAT WE, SOVIET PEOPLE, AND, TOGETHER WITH US, OTHER PEOPLES AS WELL, UNDERSTAND THE QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE. I CAN, IN ANY CASE, FIRMLY SAY THIS FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS FOR ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE WHO WANT PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG PEOPLES.

I SEE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU TOO ARE NOT DEVOID OF A SENSE OF ANXIETY FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD UEGN *UNDERSTANDING, AND OF WHAT WAR ENTAILS. WHAT WOULD A WAR GIVE YOU? YOU ARE THREATENING US WITH WAR. BUT YOU WELL KNOW THAT THE VERY LEAST WHICH YOU WOULD RECEIVE IN REPLY WOULD BE THAT YOU WOULD EXPERIENCE THE SAME CONSEQUENCES AS THOSE WHICH YOU SENT US. AND THAT MUST BE CLEAR TO US, PEOPLE INVESTED WITH AUTHORITY, TRUST, AND RESPONSIBILITY. WE MUST NOT SUCCUMB TO INTOXICATION AND PETTY PASSIONS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ELECTIONS ARE IMPENDING IN THIS OR THAT COUNTRY, OR NOT IMPENDING. THESE ARE ALL TRANSIENT THINGS, BUT IF INDEED WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR POWER TO STOP IT, FOR SUCH IS THE LOGIC OF WAR. I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN TWO WARS AND KNOW THAT WAR ENDS WHEN IT HAS ROLLED THROUGH CITIES AND VILLAGES, EVERYWHERE SOWING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

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-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE, I ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ON CUBA ARE GROUNDLESS. IT IS APPARENT FROM WHAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN ME THAT OUR CONCEPTIONS ARE DIFFERENT ON THIS SCORE, OR RATHER, WE HAVE DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF THESE OR THOSE MILITARY MEANS. INDEED, IN REALITY, THE SAME FORMS OF WEAPONS CAN HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS.

YOU ARE A MILITARY MAN AND, I HOPE, WILL UNDERSTAND ME. LET US TAKE FOR EXAMPLE A SIMPLE CANNON. WHAT SORT OF MEANS IS THIS: OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE? A CANNON IS A DEFENSIVE MEANS IF IT IS SET UP TO DEFEND BOUNDARIES OR A FORTIFIED AREA. BUT IF ONE CONCENTRATES ARTILLERY, AND ADDS TO IT THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF TROOPS, THEN THE SAME CANNONS DO BECOME AN OFFENSIVE MEANS, BECAUSE THEY PREPARE AND CLEAR THE WAY FOR INFANTRY TO ATTACK. THE SAME HAPPENS WITH MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL, WITH ANY TYPE OF THIS WEAPON.

YOU ARE MISTAKEN IF YOU THINK THAT ANY OF OUR MEANS ON CUBA ARE OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, LET US NOT QUARREL NOW. IT IS APPARENT THAT I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONVINCING YOU OF THIS. BUT I SAY TO YOU: YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE A MILITARY MAN AND SHOULD UNDERSTAND: CAN ONE ATTACK, IF ONE HAS ON ONE'S TERRITORY EVEN AN ENORMOUS QUANTITY OF MISSILES OF VARIOUS EFFECTIVE RADIUS AND VARIOUS POWER, BUT USING ONLY THESE MEANS. THESE MISSILES ARE A MEANS OF EXTERMINATION AND DESTRUCTION. BUT ONE CANNOT ATTACK WITH THESE MISSILES, EVEN NUCLEAR MISSILES OF A POWER OF 100 MEGATONS BECAUSE ONLY PEOPLE, TROOPS, CAN ATTACK. WITHOUT PEOPLE, ANY MEANS HOWEVER POWERFUL CANNOT BE OFFENSIVE.

HOW CAN ONE, CONSEQUENTLY, GIVE SUCH A COMPLETELY INCORRECT INTERPRETATION AS YOU ARE NOW GIVING, TO THE EFFECT THAT SOME SORT OF MEANS ON CUBA ARE OFFENSIVE. ALL THE MEANS LOCATED THERE,

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COMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 18954
Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
8:27 PM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

BUT, MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU REALLY SERIOUSLY THINK THAT CUBA CAN ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND THAT EVEN WE TOGETHER WITH CUBA CAN ATTACK YOU FROM THE TERRITORY OF CUBA? CAN YOU REALLY THINK THAT WAY? HOW IS IT POSSIBLE? WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. HAS SOMETHING SO NEW APPEARED IN MILITARY STRATEGY THAT ONE CAN THINK THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ATTACK THUS. I SAY PRECISELY ATTACK, AND NOT DESTROY, SINCE BARBARIANS, PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST THEIR SENSE, DESTROY.

I BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE NO BASIS TO THINK THIS WAY. YOU CAN REGARD US WITH DISTRUST, BUT, IN ANY CASE, YOU CAN BE CALM IN THIS REGARD, THAT WE ARE OF SOUND MIND AND UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY WELL THAT IF WE ATTACK YOU, YOU WILL RESPOND THE SAME WAY. BUT YOU TOO WILL RECEIVE THE SAME THAT YOU HURL AGAINST US. AND I THINK THAT YOU ALSO UNDERSTAND THIS. MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU IN VIENNA GIVES ME THE RIGHT TO TALK TO YOU THIS WAY.

THIS INDICATES THAT WE ARE NORMAL PEOPLE, THAT WE CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND AND CORRECTLY EVALUATE THE SITUATION. CONSEQUENTLY, HOW CAN WE PERMIT THE INCORRECT ACTIONS WHICH YOU ASCRIBE TO US? ONLY LUNATICS OR SUICIDES, WHO THEMSELVES WANT TO PERISH AND TO DESTROY THE WHOLE WORLD BEFORE THEY DIE, COULD DO THIS.

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

WE, HOWEVER, WANT TO LIVE AND DO NOT AT ALL WANT TO DESTROY YOUR COUNTRY. WE WANT SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT: TO COMPETE WITH YOUR COUNTRY ON A PEACEFUL BASIS. WE QUARREL WITH YOU, WE HAVE DIFFERENCES ON IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. BUT OUR VIEW OF THE WORLD CONSISTS IN THIS, THAT IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS, AS WELL AS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SHOULD BE SOLVED NOT BY MILITARY MEANS, THEY MUST BE SOLVED ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL COMPETITION, I.E., AS THIS IS UNDERSTOOD IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY, ON THE BASIS OF COMPETITION. WE HAVE PROCEEDED AND ARE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT THE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE OF THE TWO DIFFERENT SOCIAL-POLITICAL SYSTEMS, NOW EXISTING IN THE WORLD, IS NECESSARY, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSURE A STABLE PEACE. THAT IS THE SORT OF PRINCIPLE WE HOLD.

YOU HAVE NOW PROCLAIMED PIRATICAL MEASURES, WHICH WERE EMPLOYED IN THE MIDDLE AGES, WHEN SHIPS PROCEEDING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WERE ATTACKED, AND YOU HAVE CALLED THIS "A QUARANTINE" AROUND CUBA. OUR VESSELS, APPARENTLY, WILL SOON ENTER THE ZONE WHICH YOUR NAVY IS PATROLLING. I ASSURE YOU THAT THESE VESSELS, NOW BOUND FOR CUBA, ARE CARRYING THE MOST INNOCENT PEACEFUL CARGOES. DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT WE ONLY OCCUPY OURSELVES WITH THE CARRIAGE OF SO-CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS? ALTHOUGH PERHAPS YOUR MILITARY PEOPLE IMAGINE THAT THESE (CARGOES) ARE SOME SORT OF SPECIAL TYPE OF WEAPON, I ASSURE YOU THAT THEY ARE THE MOST ORDINARY PEACEFUL PRODUCTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, LET US SHOW GOOD SENSE. I ASSURE YOU THAT ON THOSE SHIPS, WHICH ARE BOUND FOR CUBA, THERE ARE NO WEAPONS AT ALL. THE WEAPONS WHICH WERE NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSE OF CUBA ARE ALREADY THERE. I DO NOT WANT TO SAY THAT THERE WERE NOT ANY SHIPMENTS OF WEAPONS AT ALL. NO, THERE WERE SUCH SHIPMENTS. BUT NOW CUBA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED THE NECESSARY MEANS OF DEFENSE.

I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN UNDERSTAND ME AND BELIEVE ME. BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU BELIEVE IN YOURSELF AND TO AGREE THAT ONE CANNOT GIVE WAY TO PASSIONS; IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTROL

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

THEM. AND IN WHAT DIRECTION ARE EVENTS NOW DEVELOPING? IF YOU STOP THE VESSELS, THEN, AS YOU YOURSELF KNOW, THAT WOULD BE PIRACY. IF WE STARTED TO DO THAT WITH REGARD TO YOUR SHIPS, THEN YOU WOULD ALSO BE AS INDIGNANT AS WE AND THE WHOLE WORLD NOW ARE. ONE CANNOT GIVE ANOTHER INTERPRETATION TO SUCH ACTIONS, BECAUSE ONE CANNOT LEGALIZE LAWLESSNESS. IF THIS WERE PERMITTED, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO PEACE, THERE WOULD ALSO BE NO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. WE SHOULD THEN BE FORCED TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. WHY SHOULD THIS BE DONE? TO WHAT WOULD ALL THIS LEAD?

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 8:45 PM RLL

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62. CWO/JRL

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52

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Action

Control: 18896
 Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
 6:23 PM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

LET US NORMALIZE RELATIONS. WE HAVE RECEIVED AN APPEAL FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, U THANT, WITH HIS PROPOSALS. I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED HIM. HIS PROPOSALS COME TO THIS, THAT OUR SIDE SHOULD NOT TRANSPORT ARMAMENTS OF ANY KIND TO CUBA DURING A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED--AND WE ARE READY TO ENTER SUCH NEGOTIATIONS-- AND THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY SORT OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS AGAINST VESSELS ENGAGED IN NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS. I CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS REASONABLE. THIS WOULD BE A WAY OUT OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE PEOPLES THE POSSIBILITY OF BREATHING CALMLY. YOU HAVE ASKED WHAT HAPPENED, WHAT EVOKED THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO CUBA? YOU HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THIS TO OUR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I WILL TELL YOU FRANKLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT EVOKED IT.

WE WERE VERY GRIEVED BY THE FACT -- I SPOKE ABOUT IT IN VIENNA -- THAT A LANDING TOOK PLACE, THAT AN ATTACK ON CUBA WAS COMMITTED, AS A RESULT OF WHICH MANY CUBANS PERISHED. YOU YOURSELF TOLD ME THEN THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. I RESPECTED THAT EXPLANATION. YOU REPEATED IT TO ME SEVERAL TIMES, POINTING OUT THAT NOT EVERYBODY OCCUPYING A HIGH POSITION WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE HIS

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

MISTAKES AS YOU HAD DONE. I VALUE SUCH FRANKNESS. FOR MY PART, I TOLD YOU THAT WE TOO POSSESS NO LESS COURAGE; WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THOSE MISTAKES WHICH HAD BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE HISTORY OF OUR STATE, AND NOT ONLY ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT SHARPLY CONDEMNED THEM.

IF YOU ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEACE AND WELFARE OF YOUR PEOPLE, AND THIS IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS PRESIDENT, THEN I, AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AM CONCERNED FOR MY PEOPLE. MOREOVER, THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE SHOULD BE OUR JOINT CONCERN, SINCE IF, UNDER CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS, WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT, IT WOULD BE A WAR NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE RECIPROCAL CLAIMS, BUT A WORLD WIDE CRUEL AND DESTRUCTIVE WAR.

WHY HAVE WE PROCEEDED TO ASSIST CUBA WITH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID? THE ANSWER IS: WE HAVE PROCEEDED TO DO SO ONLY FOR REASONS OF HUMANITARIANISM. AT ONE TIME, OUR PEOPLE ITSELF HAD A REVOLUTION, WHEN RUSSIA WAS STILL A BACKWARD COUNTRY. WE WERE ATTACKED THEN. WE WERE THE TARGET OF ATTACK BY MANY COUNTRIES. THE USA PARTICIPATED IN THAT ADVENTURE. THIS HAS BEEN RECORDED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY. A WHOLE BOOK HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THIS BY GENERAL GRAVES, WHO, AT THAT TIME, COMMANDED THE US EXPEDITIONARY CORPS. GRAVES CALLED IT "THE AMERICAN ADVENTURE IN SIBERIA."

WE KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO ACCOMPLISH A REVOLUTION AND HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO RECONSTRUCT A COUNTRY ON NEW FOUNDATIONS. WE SINCERELY SYMPATHIZE WITH CUBA AND THE CUBAN PEOPLE, BUT WE ARE NOT INTERFERING IN QUESTIONS OF DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, WE ARE NOT INTERFERING IN THEIR AFFAIRS. THE SOVIET UNION DESIRES TO HELP THE CUBANS BUILD THEIR LIFE AS THEY THEMSELVES WISH AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD NOT HINDER THEM.

YOU ONCE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PREPARING AN INVASION. BUT YOU ALSO DECLARED THAT YOU SYMPATHIZED WITH

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-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

THE CUBAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY EMIGRANTS, THAT YOU SUPPORT THEM AND WOULD HELP THEM TO REALIZE THEIR PLANS AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA. IT IS ALSO NOT A SECRET TO ANYONE THAT THE THREAT OF ARMED ATTACK, AGGRESSION, HAS CONSTANTLY HUNG, AND CONTINUES TO HANG OVER CUBA. IT WAS ONLY THIS WHICH IMPELLED US TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH IT AID FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE DEFENSIVE CAPACITY OF THIS COUNTRY.

IF ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE USA ITSELF WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN AN ATTACK ON CUBA AND WOULD RESTRAIN OTHERS FROM ACTIONS OF THIS SORT, IF YOU WOULD RECALL YOUR FLEET, THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY CHANGE EVERYTHING. I AM NOT SPEAKING FOR FIDEL CASTRO, BUT I THINK THAT HE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA, EVIDENTLY, WOULD DECLARE DEMOBILIZATION AND WOULD APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE TO GET DOWN TO PEACEFUL LABOR. THEN, TOO, THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR, SINCE, IF THERE IS NO THREAT, THEN ARMAMENTS ARE A BURDEN FOR EVERY PEOPLE. THEN, TOO, THE QUESTION OF THE DESTRUCTION, NOT ONLY OF THE ARMAMENTS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, BUT OF ALL OTHER ARMAMENTS AS WELL, WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT.

I SPOKE IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL FOR THE DISBANDMENT OF ALL ARMIES AND FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL ARMAMENTS. HOW THEN CAN I NOW COUNT ON THOSE ARMAMENTS?

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 6:45 PM RLL

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62-7:50 pm JAW

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51

~~SECRET~~

Action
SS

Control: 18970
Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
9 PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

009

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

ARMAMENTS BRING ONLY DISASTERS. WHEN ONE ACCUMULATES THEM, THIS DAMAGES THE ECONOMY, AND IF ONE PUTS THEM TO USE, THEN THEY DESTROY PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES. CONSEQUENTLY, ONLY A MADMAN CAN BELIEVE THAT ARMAMENTS ARE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS IN THE LIFE OF SOCIETY. NO, THEY ARE AN ENFORCED LOSS OF HUMAN ENERGY, AND WHAT IS MORE ARE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF MAN HIMSELF. IF PEOPLE DO NOT SHOW WISDOM, THEN IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THEY WILL COME TO A CLASH, LIKE BLIND MOLES, AND THEN RECIPROCAL EXTERMINATION WILL BEGIN.

LET US THEREFORE SHOW STATESMANLIKE WISDOM. I PROPOSE: WE, FOR OUR PART, WILL DECLARE THAT OUR SHIPS, BOUND FOR CUBA, WILL NOT CARRY ANY KIND OF ARMAMENTS. YOU WOULD DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INVADE CUBA WITH ITS FORCES AND WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY SORT OF FORCES WHICH MIGHT INTEND TO CARRY OUT AN INVASION OF CUBA. THEN THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENCE OF OUR MILITARY SPECIALISTS IN CUBA WOULD DISAPPEAR.

MR. PRESIDENT, I APPEAL TO YOU TO WEIGH WELL WHAT THE AGGRESSIVE, PIRATICAL ACTIONS, WHICH YOU HAVE DECLARED THE USA INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, WOULD LEAD TO. YOU YOURSELF

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

KNOW THAT ANY SENSIBLE MAN SIMPLY CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS, CANNOT RECOGNIZE YOUR RIGHT TO SUCH ACTIONS.

IF YOU DID THIS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE UNLEASHING OF WAR, WELL THEN, IT IS EVIDENT THAT NOTHING ELSE IS LEFT TO US BUT TO ACCEPT THIS CHALLENGE OF YOURS. IF, HOWEVER, YOU HAVE NOT LOST YOUR SELF-CONTROL AND SENSIBLY CONCEIVE WHAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO, THEN, MR. PRESIDENT, WE AND YOU AUGHT NOT NOW TO PULL ON THE ENDS OF THE ROPE IN WHICH YOU HAVE TIED THE KNOT OF WAR, BECAUSE THE MORE THE TWO OF US PULL, THE TIGHTER THAT KNOT WILL BE TIED. AND A MOMENT MAY COME WHEN THAT KNOT WILL BE TIED SO TIGHT THAT EVEN HE WHO TIED IT WILL NOT HAVE THE STRENGTH TO UNTIE IT, AND THEN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CUT THAT KNOT, AND WHAT THAT WOULD MEAN IS NOT FOR ME TO EXPLAIN TO YOU, BECAUSE YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY OF WHAT TERRIBLE FORCES OUR COUNTRIES DISPOSE.

CONSEQUENTLY, IF THERE IS NO INTENTION TO TIGHTEN THAT KNOT AND THEREBY TO DOOM THE WORLD TO THE CATASTROPHE OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR, THEN LET US NOT ONLY RELAX THE FORCES PULLING ON THE ENDS OF THE ROPE, LET US TAKE MEASURES TO UNTIE THAT KNOT. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

WE WELCOME ALL FORCES WHICH STAND ON POSITIONS OF PEACE. CONSEQUENTLY, I EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL, TOO, WHO MANIFESTS ALARM AND CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD, AND I READILY RESPONDED TO THE APPEAL OF THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, U THANT.

THERE, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE MY THOUGHTS, WHICH, IF YOU AGREED WITH THEM, COULD PUT AN END TO THAT TENSE SITUATION WHICH IS DISTURBING ALL PEOPLES.

THESE THOUGHTS ARE DICTATED BY A SINCERE DESIRE TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION, TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF WAR.

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

OCTOBER 26, 1962. END TEXT

ORIGINAL OF LETTER BEING AIR POUCHED TODAY UNDER TRANSMITTAL
SLIP TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 9:15 PM RLL

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 46118
T-85/T-94
Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, October 26, 1962

Mr. Ambassador:

I transmit herewith a letter from N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to J. F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America.

Respectfully,

[s] A. Gromyko

A. Gromyko

Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR

Enclosure: Letter for transmittal to J. F. Kennedy, President of the United States

His Excellency

Foy D. Kohler,

Ambassador of the United States of America,

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 46118
T-85/T-94
Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and a sense of responsibility. I appreciate this.

By now we have already publicly exchanged our assessments of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his interpretation of these events. Therefore, I would think that, evidently, continuing to exchange opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, would probably not add anything to what one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned for the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and all the more, communists--people who know how to value not only their own lives but, above all else, the life of nations. We communists are against any wars between states at all, and have been defending the cause of peace ever since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, not as a game or a means for achieving particular purposes, much less as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means of achieving them is work. War is our enemy and a calamity for all nations.

This is how we Soviet people, and together with us, other peoples as well, interpret questions of war and peace. I can say this with assurance at least for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among nations.

I can see, Mr. President, that you also are not without a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, not without an understanding and correct assessment of the nature of modern warfare and what war entails. What good would a war do you? You threaten us with war. But you well know that the very least you would get in response would be what you had given us; you would suffer the same consequences. And that must be clear to us-- people invested with authority, trust and responsibility. We must not succumb to light-headedness and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are forthcoming in one country or another. These are all transitory things, but should war indeed break out, it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have taken part in two wars, and I know that war ends only when it has rolled through cities and villages, sowing death and destruction everywhere.

I assure you on behalf of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people that your arguments regarding offensive weapons in Cuba are utterly unfounded. From what you have written me it is obvious that our interpretations on this point are different, or rather that we have different definitions for one type of military means or another. And indeed, the same types of armaments may in actuality have different interpretations.

You are a military man, and I hope you will understand me. Let us take a simple cannon for instance. What kind of a weapon is it--offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive weapon if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But when artillery is concentrated and supplemented by an appropriate number of troops, then the same cannon will have become an offensive weapon, since they prepare and clear the way for infantry to advance. The same is true for nuclear missile weapons, for any type of these weapons.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our armaments in Cuba are offensive. However, let us not argue at this point.

even if you have an enormous number of missiles of various ranges and power on your territory, using these weapons alone? These missiles are a means of annihilation and destruction. But it is impossible to launch an offensive by means of these missiles, even nuclear missiles of 100 megaton yield, because it is only people--troops--who can advance. Without people any weapons, whatever their power, cannot be offensive.

How can you, therefore, give this completely wrong interpretation, which you are now giving, that some weapons in Cuba are offensive, as you say? All weapons there--and I assure you of this--are of a defensive nature; they are in Cuba solely for purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. And you say that they are offensive weapons.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba could launch an offensive upon the United States and that even we, together with Cuba, could advance against you from Cuban territory? Do you really think so? How can that be? We do not understand. Surely, there has not been any such new development in military strategy that would lead one to believe that it is possible to advance that way. And I mean advance, not destroy; for those who destroy are barbarians, people who have lost their sanity.

I hold that you have no grounds to think so. You may regard us with distrust, but you can at any rate rest assured that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we launch an offensive against you, you will respond in kind. But you too will get in response whatever you throw at us. And I think you understand that too. It is our discussion in Vienna that gives me the right to speak this way.

This indicates that we are sane people, that we understand and assess the situation correctly. How could we, then, allow [ourselves] the wrong actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and before they die destroy the

endeavor. We argue with you; we have differences on ideological questions. But our concept of the world is that questions of ideology, as well as economic problems, should be settled by other than military means; they must be solved in peaceful contest, or as this is interpreted in capitalist society--by competition. Our premise has been and remains that peaceful coexistence of two different sociopolitical systems--a reality of our world--is essential, and that it is essential to ensure lasting peace. These are the principles to which we adhere.

You have now declared piratical measures, the kind that were practiced in the Middle Ages when ships passing through international waters were attacked, and you have called this a "quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels will probably soon enter the zone patrolled by your Navy. I assure you that the vessels which are now headed for Cuba are carrying the most innocuous peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that all we spend our time on is transporting so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Even though your military people may possibly imagine that these are some special kind of weapons, I assure you that they are the most ordinary kind of peaceful goods.

Therefore, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that the ships bound for Cuba are carrying no armaments at all. The armaments needed for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not mean to say that there have been no shipments of armaments at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already obtained the necessary weapons for defense.

I do not know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I wish you would believe yourself and agree that one should not give way to one's passions; that one should be master of them. And what direction are events taking now? If you begin stopping vessels it would be piracy, as you yourself know. If we should start doing this to your ships you would be just as indignant as we and the whole world are now indignant. Such

would there be peaceful coexistence. Then we would be forced to take the necessary measures of a defensive nature which would protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why do this? What would it all lead to?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the U.N., containing his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals are to the effect that our side not ship any armaments to Cuba for a certain period of time while negotiations are being conducted--and we are prepared to enter into such negotiations--^{undertake} and the other side not ^{undertake} any piratical action against vessels navigating on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has evolved that would give nations a chance to breathe easily.

You asked what happened, what prompted weapons to be supplied to Cuba? You spoke of this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what prompted it.

We were very grieved by the fact--I spoke of this in Vienna--that a landing was effected and an attack made on Cuba, as a result of which many Cubans were killed. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I regarded that explanation with respect. You repeated it to me several times, hinting that not everyone occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you did. I appreciate such frankness. For my part I told you that we too possess no less courage; we have also acknowledged the mistakes which have been made in the history of our state, and have not only acknowledged them but have sharply condemned them.

While you really are concerned for peace and for the welfare of your people--and this is your duty as President--I, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Furthermore, the preservation of universal peace should be our joint concern, since if war broke out under

Why have we undertaken to render such military and economic aid to Cuba? The answer is: we have done so only out of humanitarian considerations. At one time our people accomplished its own revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. Then we were attacked. We were the target of attack by many countries. The United States took part in that affair. This has been documented by the participants in aggression against our country. An entire book has been written on this by General Graves, who commanded the American Expeditionary Force at that time. Graves entitled it American Adventure in Siberia.

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to rebuild a country on new principles. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people. But we do not interfere in questions of internal organization; we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union wants to help the Cubans build their life, as they themselves desire, so that others would leave them alone.

You said once that the United States is not preparing an invasion. But you have also declared that you sympathize with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, support them, and will help them in carrying out their plans against the present government of Cuba. Nor is it any secret to anyone that the constant threat of armed attack and aggression has hung and continues to hang over Cuba. It is only this that has prompted us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to extend it our aid in strengthening the defense capability of that country.

If the President and Government of the United States would give their assurances that the United States would itself not take part in an attack upon Cuba and would restrain others from such action; if you recall your Navy--this would immediately change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba would, probably, announce a demobilization and would call upon the people to commence peace-

would also change the approach to the question of destroying not only the armaments which you call offensive, but of every other kind of armament.

I have spoken on behalf of the Soviet Government at the United Nations and introduced a proposal to disband all armies and to destroy all weapons. How then can I stake my claims on these weapons now?

Armaments bring only disasters. Accumulating them damages the economy, and putting them to use would destroy people on both sides. Therefore, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are a forced waste of human energy, spent, moreover, on the destruction of man himself. If people do not display wisdom, they will eventually reach the point where they will clash, like blind moles, and then mutual annihilation will commence.

Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh carefully what the aggressive, piratical actions which you have announced the United States intends to carry out in international waters would lead to. You yourself know that a sensible person simply cannot agree to this, cannot recognize your right to such action.

If you have done this as the first step towards unleashing war--well then--evidently nothing remains for us to do but to accept this challenge of yours. If you have not lost command of yourself and realize clearly what this could lead to, then, Mr. President, you and I should not now pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I pull the tighter this knot will become. And a time may come when this

need not explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.

Therefore, if there is no intention of tightening this knot, thereby dooming the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, let us not only relax the forces straining on the ends of the rope, let us take measures for untying this knot. We are agreeable to this.

We welcome all forces which take the position of peace. Therefore, I both expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, who shows alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant.

These, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you should agree with them, could put an end to the tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are governed by a sincere desire to alleviate the situation and remove the threat of war.

Respectfully,

[s] N. Khrushchev

N. Khrushchev

October 26, 1962

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

*WH
Bundy - P*

52

SECRET

Action

Control: 18890

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26, 1962
6 PM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

007

NO: 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

NIACT

EYES ONLY

POLICY

VERBATIM TEXT

EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS OF LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT DELIVERED TO EMBASSY BY MESSENGER 4:43 P.M. MOSCOW TIME OCTOBER 26, UNDER COVER OF LETTER FROM GROMYKO TO ME.

BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 25. FROM YOUR LETTER, I GOT THE FEELING THAT YOU HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AND (SOME) SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. I VALUE THIS.

NOW WE HAVE ALREADY PUBLICLY EXCHANGED OUR EVALUATIONS OF THE EVENTS AROUND CUBA AND EACH OF US HAS SET FORTH HIS EXPLANATION AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THESE EVENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, I WOULD JUDGE THAT, APPARENTLY, A CONTINUATION OF AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS AT SUCH A DISTANCE, EVEN IN THE FORM OF SECRET LETTERS, WILL HARDLY ADD ANYTHING TO THAT WHICH ONE SIDE HAS ALREADY SAID TO THE OTHER.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *R. Bundy* NARS, Date *5/29/74*

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

I THINK YOU WILL UNDERSTAND ME CORRECTLY IF YOU ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE WORLD. EVERYONE NEEDS PEACE: BOTH CAPITALISTS, IF THEY HAVE NOT LOST THEIR REASON, AND, STILL MORE, COMMUNISTS, PEOPLE WHO KNOW HOW TO VALUE NOT ONLY THEIR OWN LIVES BUT, MORE THAN ANYTHING, THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLES. WE, COMMUNISTS, ARE AGAINST ALL WARS BETWEEN STATES IN GENERAL AND HAVE BEEN DEFENDING THE CAUSE OF PEACE SINCE WE CAME INTO THE WORLD. WE HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED WAR AS A CALAMITY, AND NOT AS A GAME NOR AS A MEANS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF DEFINITE GOALS, NOR, ALL THE MORE, AS A GOAL IN ITSELF. OUR GOALS ARE CLEAR, AND THE MEANS TO ATTAIN THEM IS LABOR. WAR IS OUR ENEMY AND A CALAMITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLES.

IT IS THUS THAT WE, SOVIET PEOPLE, AND, TOGETHER WITH US, OTHER PEOPLES AS WELL, UNDERSTAND THE QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE. I CAN, IN ANY CASE, FIRMLY SAY THIS FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS FOR ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE WHO WANT PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG PEOPLES.

I SEE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU TOO ARE NOT DEVOID OF A SENSE OF ANXIETY FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD, ~~BECAUSE~~ *UNDERSTANDING, AND OF WHAT WAR ENTAILS. WHAT WOULD A WAR GIVE YOU? YOU ARE THREATENING US WITH WAR. BUT YOU WELL KNOW THAT THE VERY LEAST WHICH YOU WOULD RECEIVE IN REPLY WOULD BE THAT YOU WOULD EXPERIENCE THE SAME CONSEQUENCES AS THOSE WHICH YOU SENT US. AND THAT MUST BE CLEAR TO US, PEOPLE INVESTED WITH AUTHORITY, TRUST, AND RESPONSIBILITY. WE MUST NOT SUCCUMB TO INTOXICATION AND PETTY PASSIONS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ELECTIONS ARE IMPENDING IN THIS OR THAT COUNTRY, OR NOT IMPENDING. THESE ARE ALL TRANSIENT THINGS, BUT IF INDEED WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR POWER TO STOP IT, FOR SUCH IS THE LOGIC OF WAR. I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN TWO WARS AND KNOW THAT WAR ENDS WHEN IT HAS ROLLED THROUGH CITIES AND VILLAGES, EVERYWHERE SOWING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

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-3- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE, I ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ON CUBA ARE GROUNDLESS. IT IS APPARENT FROM WHAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN ME THAT OUR CONCEPTIONS ARE DIFFERENT ON THIS SCORE, OR RATHER, WE HAVE DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF THESE OR THOSE MILITARY MEANS. INDEED, IN REALITY, THE SAME FORMS OF WEAPONS CAN HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS.

YOU ARE A MILITARY MAN AND, I HOPE, WILL UNDERSTAND ME. LET US TAKE FOR EXAMPLE A SIMPLE CANNON. WHAT SORT OF MEANS IS THIS: OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE? A CANNON IS A DEFENSIVE MEANS IF IT IS SET UP TO DEFEND BOUNDARIES OR A FORTIFIED AREA. BUT IF ONE CONCENTRATES ARTILLERY, AND ADDS TO IT THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF TROOPS, THEN THE SAME CANNONS DO BECOME AN OFFENSIVE MEANS, BECAUSE THEY PREPARE AND CLEAR THE WAY FOR INFANTRY TO ATTACK. THE SAME HAPPENS WITH MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL, WITH ANY TYPE OF THIS WEAPON.

YOU ARE MISTAKEN IF YOU THINK THAT ANY OF OUR MEANS ON CUBA ARE OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, LET US NOT QUARREL NOW. IT IS APPARENT THAT I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONVINCING YOU OF THIS. BUT I SAY TO YOU: YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE A MILITARY MAN AND SHOULD UNDERSTAND: CAN ONE ATTACK, IF ONE HAS ON ONE'S TERRITORY EVEN AN ENORMOUS QUANTITY OF MISSILES OF VARIOUS EFFECTIVE RADIUS AND VARIOUS POWER, BUT USING ONLY THESE MEANS. THESE MISSILES ARE A MEANS OF EXTERMINATION AND DESTRUCTION. BUT ONE CANNOT ATTACK WITH THESE MISSILES, EVEN NUCLEAR MISSILES OF A POWER OF 100 MEGATONS BECAUSE ONLY PEOPLE, TROOPS, CAN ATTACK. WITHOUT PEOPLE, ANY MEANS HOWEVER POWERFUL CANNOT BE OFFENSIVE.

HOW CAN ONE, CONSEQUENTLY, GIVE SUCH A COMPLETELY INCORRECT INTERPRETATION AS YOU ARE NOW GIVING, TO THE EFFECT THAT SOME SORT OF MEANS ON CUBA ARE OFFENSIVE. ALL THE MEANS LOCATED THERE,

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-4- 1101, OCTOBER 26, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF FOUR) FROM MOSCOW

AND I ASSURE YOU OF THIS, HAVE A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER, ARE ON CUBA SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEFENSE, AND WE HAVE SENT THEM TO CUBA AT THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. YOU, HOWEVER, SAY THAT THESE ARE OFFENSIVE MEANS.

KOHLER

GDW

* AS RECEIVED.

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/26/62 6:30 PM RLL.

Note: Advance copies to SS 10/26/62 - 7:50 pm. JAW

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

13568

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OCT 27 7 36 PM '62

55

Origin

ACTION: USUN New York 1123 ENIACT

SS

Info:

VERBATIM TEXT

G

SP

L

SAL

FOR AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

ARA

Following ~~message~~ message from President to

EUR

Khrushchev should be delivered to U Thant as soon as

IO

P

possible:

USIA

(Code Room: Insert text of letter contained in Deptel 1015 to Moscow).

INR

RMR

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

S/C - Mr. Bruback

S/C - Mr. Bruback

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File

Recipients of Moscos's 1101 (Khrushchev letter to the President of October 26, 1962):

State Department

- The Secretary
- Under Secretary Ball
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Cleveland
- Mr. Hilsman
- Mr. Rostow
- Mr. Tyler
- S/S and file record

NSC Executive Committee

- The Vice President
- The Secretary of Defense
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- General Taylor
- The Attorney General
- The Secretary of the Treasury

Other

- Ambassador Stevenson
- The White House
- Ambassador Bohlen for General de Gaulle
- Ambassador Bruce for Prime Minister Macmillan
- Ambassador Finletter
- Handed to Ambassador Alphand on Secretary of State's direction
- Secretary of State has approved, but we have not yet transmitted to Ambassador Dowling for, Chancellor Adenauer.

Cancelled (

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT MESSAGE TO

55-1

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Oct 27 8 05 PM '72

Original SS

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW 10:5 NIACT

Info

- C
- SP
- L
- SAL
- ARA
- EUR
- IO
- P
- USIA
- INR
- RMR

Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in Washington and has been released to press.

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile ~~bases~~ ^{bases} in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week and -- in cooperation with the

Acting Secretary

Drafted by:

S/S - Mr. Beck

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Beck

Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

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UNCLASSIFIED

Acting Secretary General and your representative -- an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals -- which seem generally acceptable as I understand them -- are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not ~~be~~ be able to complete

these

UNCLASSIFIED

these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective inter-national guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

/S/ John F. Kennedy

END

UNCLASSIFIED

RHSK

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and find in it the indications of a willingness on your part to seek a prompt and peaceful solution to the present crisis.

I would suggest, in the light of your letter, that the elements which might be included in such a solution are the following:

1. You would undertake immediately to cease work on the offensive missile bases in Cuba and would promptly render inoperable all weapons systems in Cuba capable of being used against ^{territory of any nation of the western hemisphere.} ~~the soil of the United States or any Latin American country.~~

2. You would agree to remove such weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation, and supervision.

3. You would

3. You would undertake, with suitable safeguards, that you would not in the future introduce such weapons systems into Cuba.

4. Upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out of these commitments, we, on our part, ^(a) would undertake promptly to remove the quarantine measures now in effect.

5. ^(b) We would undertake to give ~~binding~~ assurances to respect the territorial integrity and ~~political~~ political independence of Cuba, and I am confident that other members of the Organization of American States would be prepared to do likewise, if Cuba, in turn, were to give ~~binding~~ assurances that it would not seek, through military aggression or subversion, to interfere in the affairs of other American states.

I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them today to work out an arrangement along these lines with the Acting Secretary General and your representatives. If you will give your representatives similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world no later than tomorrow. ~~I look forward to your prompt reply.~~

Once this has been accomplished I would be prepared promptly to meet with you to discuss ways in which we might concretely resolve other issues.

As I was preparing this letter I learned of your public message attempting to connect NATO bases and Cuba.

I must tell you frankly that this is not a way to get forward with a settlement of the immediate crisis. The immediate crisis is in Cuba, and it is there that very prompt action is necessary.

When we get agreement there, I shall be very ready to discuss wider issues.

Mr. Chairman:

I have received reports of the conversations now going on in New York as well as your letter of October 26th. From this and other information reaching me it offered that a solution of the Cuban crisis was in sight. I have now received reports of a broadcast of a message from you, which I have not yet received officially, which brings European bases into discussion. In the meantime work on your missile bases is feverishly going forward. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether your purpose in secretly putting these missiles in Cuba was to fire them when they were in place, to use them as a basis for making impossible political demands on the United States, or for some other purpose. I also do not know whether the discussions with U Thant were merely to gain time to complete these bases or were a genuine effort to find a peaceful solution of the Cuban crisis. Mr. Chairman, I am responsible for the security of the United States and have responsibilities to the other nations of this hemisphere. Time is running out, Mr. Chairman, and I must inform you that work on these bases must be stopped at once and arrangements completed within a matter of days to dismantle them or I shall be obliged to undertake further steps to protect our security. I am prepared to discuss problems on a broad or a narrow basis but this threat which has been created in Cuba must be dealt with at once.

October 27, 1962

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSETEXT OF A LETTER BY THE PRESIDENT
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME
SOVIET, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

October 27, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend -- in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative -- an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals -- which seem generally acceptable as I understand them -- are as follows:

- 1) You would agree to remove those weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
- 2) We, on our part, would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared

October 27, 1962

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

s/s 17726

October 27, 1962

SECRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Corrections in Moscow's 1101

We consider Moscow's 1101 an accurate translation of the Khrushchev letter with the following exceptions:

1. The first sentence of the fifth paragraph should read as follows: "I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding and a proper evaluation of the character of contemporary war and of what war entails."
2. On the first page of section 3 of Moscow's 1101, the sentence "You have asked what had happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba" should begin a new paragraph.
3. In the first full paragraph on page two of section three the second sentence should read as follows: "Moreover the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the Soviet Union and the USA, between whom, strictly speaking, are no reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war."

W. H. Brubeck
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

BR... NARS. Date *8/20/74*

SECRET EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 46235
T-94/T-24, R-V
Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America in the USSR and has the honor to transmit herewith a letter from N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to J. F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America.

Moscow, October 28, 1962.

Embassy of the United States of America

Moscow

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction and appreciation for the sense of proportion you have displayed, and for your understanding of the responsibility you now bear for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

I regard with great understanding your apprehension and the apprehension of the people of the United States of America over the fact that the weapons which you describe as offensive are indeed terrible weapons.

Both you and we understand what kind of weapons they are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible a conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give confidence to all peoples longing for peace, and to reassure the people of America, who, I am sure, want peace as much as the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to previously issued instructions for the cessation of further work at the weapons construction sites, has issued a new order to dismantle the weapons, which you describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I would like to repeat, as I have already stated in my previous letters, that the Soviet Government has extended economic aid as well as arms to the Government of Cuba, since Cuba and the Cuban people have constantly been under the continual threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratical vessel has shelled Havana. It is said that irresponsible Cuban emigrés did the shooting. This is possibly the case. But the question arises: from where did they shoot? After all, these Cubans have no territory; they are fugitives from their homeland; they have no funds for conducting military actions.

This means that someone put into their hands the weapons for shelling Havana and for piratical acts in the Caribbean, in Cuban territorial waters. It is unthinkable in our time that a pirate ship could pass unnoticed,

particularly considering the saturation of the Caribbean with American ships from which literally all of this is seen and observed. And in such circumstances pirate ships freely roam about Cuba, shell Cuba, and carry out piratical attacks upon peaceful cargo ships. It is, after all, known that they even shelled a British freighter.

In short, Cuba has been under a continual threat from aggressive forces that have not concealed their intention to invade Cuba's territory.

The Cuban people wish to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The threat of a Cuban invasion and all the other designs aimed at surrounding Cuba with tension are designed to engender uncertainty in the Cuban people, to intimidate them, and to hinder them in freely building their new life.

Mr. President, I want to say clearly once again that we could not be indifferent to this, and so the Soviet Government decided to help Cuba with means of defense against aggression--means only for purposes of defense. We placed means of defense there, means which you call offensive. We placed them there in order that no attack might be made against Cuba and that no rash acts might be permitted.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that no attack would be made on Cuba and that no invasion would take place--not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other countries of the Western Hemisphere, as your same message pointed out. In view of this, the motives which prompted us to give aid of this nature to Cuba no longer prevail. Hence, we have instructed our officers (these means, as I have already reported to you, are in the hands of Soviet officers) to take the necessary measures to stop the construction of the facilities indicated, and to dismantle and return them

In this way, on the basis of the assurances you have made and of our orders to dismantle, there appear to exist all the necessary conditions for the elimination of the conflict which has arisen.

I note with satisfaction that you have echoed my desire that this dangerous situation be eliminated and also that conditions be created for a more thorough appraisal of the international situation, which is fraught with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocket technology, space ships, global rockets, and other lethal weapons. All mankind is interested in ensuring peace.

Therefore, we who bear great trust and responsibility must not permit the situation to become aggravated but must eliminate breeding grounds where dangerous situations are created, fraught with serious consequences for the cause of peace. And if we, together with you and other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense situation, we must also concern ourselves with seeing that other dangerous conflicts do not arise which might lead to a world thermonuclear catastrophe.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about the improvement of relations between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, which you mention. We spoke of this a long time ago, and are ready to continue exchanging opinions with you on this question and to find a reasonable solution. We also wish to continue to exchange opinions on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, on general disarmament, and on other questions relating to relaxation of international tensions.

Mr. President, I place belief in your statement. On the other hand there are irresponsible people who would like to carry out an invasion of Cuba at this time and thereby unleash a war. If we take practical steps and announce the dismantling and evacuation of the above-mentioned means from Cuba, in doing so we at the same time want the Cuban people to be sure that we are with them and are not relieving ourselves of the responsibility

We are convinced that the peoples of all countries will, like yourself, Mr. President, understand me correctly. We do not threaten. We desire only peace. Our country is now on the upswing. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and have created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are making use of these values and want to develop their achievements further and by their steadfast labor to ensure even greater growth along the path of peace and social progress.

I should like, Mr. President, to remind you that military aircraft of a reconnaissance nature have violated the frontiers of the Soviet Union-- over which matter we had a controversy with you, and an exchange of notes took place. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 aircraft, whose reconnaissance flight over the U.S.S.R. led to the disruption of the summit meeting in Paris. You took a correct position at the time in condemning that criminal action on the part of the previous Administration of the United States.

But during your term of office as President, a second case of violation of our frontier by an American U-2 aircraft has taken place in the Sakhalin area. We informed you of this violation on August 30. You then replied that this violation had occurred as a result of bad weather and gave assurances that it would not be repeated. We accepted your assurances because there was, indeed, bad weather in that area at the time.

However, if your aircraft had not been given a mission to fly near our territory, then even bad weather could not have led an American aircraft into our air space. The conclusion follows that this is done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the frontiers of other states.

An even more dangerous case occurred on October 28, when your reconnaissance aircraft invaded the northern area of the Soviet Union, in the area of the

violates our frontier, and this happens at a time as troubled as the one through which we are now passing, when everything has been put in battle readiness. For an intruding U.S. aircraft can easily be taken for a bomber with nuclear weapons, and that can push us toward a fatal step. All the more so, because the U.S. Government and the Pentagon have long been saying that you continually maintain bombers with atomic bombs in the air. Therefore, you can imagine what kind of responsibility you assume, especially during such an anxious time as the present.

I should like to ask you to assess this correctly and to take steps accordingly, to prevent it from serving as a provocation to touch off a war.

I should also like to express to you the following wish. Of course, this is the Cuban people's affair--you do not at present maintain diplomatic relations, but through my officers in Cuba I have reports that American planes are conducting flights over Cuba. We are interested in not having any war at all in the world and in the Cuban people's being able to live in peace. But, in addition to this, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. By agreement with the Cuban Government, we have there officers and instructors who are training the Cubans; they are mainly ordinary people, including specialists, agronomists, animal husbandry technicians, irrigation and reclamation experts, common laborers, tractor drivers, and others. We have concern for them.

I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to bear in mind that a violation of Cuban air space by American aircraft may also have dangerous consequences. And if you do not want that, no cause should be given for the creation of a dangerous situation.

We must now be very cautious and refrain from any acts that would not help in the defense of the states involved in the controversy, but which could arouse only irritation, and even prove to be a provocation for a fatal step. We must therefore display sense and wisdom and refrain from

We value peace, perhaps even more than other peoples, because we experienced a terrible war against Hitler. But our people will not flinch in the face of any ordeal; our people trust their own government, and we assure our own people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not escape the responsibility and the grave consequences that war will bring to them. We are confident, however, that reason will prevail, that war will not be unleashed, and that the peace and security of peoples will be ensured.

In regard to the current negotiations of Acting Secretary General U Thant, with representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent to New York V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., with a view to assisting Mr. Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

[s] N. Khrushchev

N. Khrushchev

October 28, 1962.

FBIS 53

TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1405 28 OCT 62 L

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27, 1962. I EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION AND GRATITUDE FOR THE SENSE OF PROPORTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY BORNE BY YOU AT PRESENT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WHICH YOU HAVE SHOWN. I VERY WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR ANX ETY AND THE ANXIETY OF THE UNITED STATES PEOPLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FACT THAT THE WEAPONS WHICH YOU DESCRIBE AS "OFFENSIVE" ARE, N FACT, GRIM WEAPONS. BOTH YOU AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT KIND OF WEAPON THEY ARE.

IN ORDER TO COMPLETE WITH GREATER SPEED THE LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT DANGEROUS TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE, TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO ALL PEOPLE LONGING FOR PEACE, AND TO CALM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO, I AM CERTAIN, WANT PEACE AS MUCH AS THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUSLY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CESSATION OF FURTHER WORK AT BUILD NG SITES FOR THE WEAPONS, HAS ISSUED A NEW ORDER ON THE DISMANTLING OF THE WEAPONS WHICH YOU DESCRIBE AS "OFFENSIVE," AND THEIR CRATING AND RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT ONCE MORE WHAT I HAD ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU IN MY PRECEDING LETTERS--THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AID, AS WELL AS ARMS, INASMUCH AS CUBA AND THE CUBAN PEOPLE HAVE CONSTANTLY BEEN UNDER THE CONTINUOUS DANGER OF AN INVASION.

THE SHELLING OF HAVANA TOOK PLACE FROM A PIRATIC SHIP. IT S SAID THAT IRRESPONSIBLE CUBAN EMIGRES DID THE SHOOTING. THIS IS POSSIBLY THE CASE. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION ARISES: FROM WHERE DID THEY FIRE? AFTER ALL, THEY, THESE CUBANS, HAVE NO TERRITORY, THEY HAVE NO PRIVATE MEANS, AND THEY HAVE NO MEANS TO WAGE MILITARY ACTION. THUS SOMEBODY PUT THE ARMS NEEDED TO SHELL HAVANA AND CARRY OUT THEIR PIRATIC ACTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN--IN CUBAN TERRITORIAL WATERS--IN THEIR HANDS!

IT IS UNTHINKABLE IN OUR TIME NOT TO NOTICE A PIRATE SHIP, PARTICULARLY IF ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SUCH A SATURATION OF AMERICAN SHIPS IN THE CARIBBEAN FROM WHICH ACTUALLY ALL THIS IS WATCHED AND OBSERVED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, PIRATIC SHIPS ARE FREELY MOVING AROUND CUBA, SHELLING CUBA, AND CARRYING OUT PIRATIC ATTACKS UPON PEACEFUL TRANSPORT VESSELS! IT IS, AFTER ALL, KNOWN THAT THEY EVEN SHELLED A BRITISH FREIGHTER!

IN SHORT, CUBA HAS BEEN UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT OF AGGRESSIVE FORCES WHICH DID NOT CONCEAL THEIR INTENTIONS TO INVADE CUBAN TERRITORY.

THE CUBAN PEOPLE WANT TO BUILD THEIR LIFE IN THEIR OWN INTERE T

FIRST ADD 53 (KHRUSHCHEV TEXT)

X X X PURPOSES OF DEFENSE

(CONTINUING TEXT) WE STATIONED DEFENSE MEANS THERE WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE. WE STATIONED THEM THERE IN ORDER THAT NO ATTACK SHOULD BE MADE AGAINST CUBA AND THAT NO RASH ACTION SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO TAKE PLACE.

I REGARD WITH RESPECT AND TRUST YOUR STATEMENT IN YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27, 1962 THAT NO ATTACK WILL BE MADE ON CUBA--THAT NO INVASION WILL TAKE PLACE--NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES, BUT ALSO BY OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, AS YOUR MESSAGE POINTED OUT. THEN THE MOTIVES WHICH PROMOTED US TO GIVE AID OF THIS NATURE TO CUBA CEASE. THEY ARE NO LONGER APPLICABLE. HENCE WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR OFFICERS--AND THESE MEANS, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, ARE IN THE HANDS OF SOVIET OFFICERS--TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR STOPPING THE BUILDING OF THE SAID PROJECTS AND THEIR DISMANTLING AND RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

AS I ALREADY TOLD YOU IN MY LETTER OF OCTOBER 27, WE BOTH AGREE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT THAT UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES COULD VERIFY THE DISMANTLING OF THESE MEANS.

IN THIS WAY, IF ONE IS TO RELY ON YOUR ASSURANCES WHICH YOU HAVE MADE AND ON OUR ORDERS TO DISMANTLE, THEN ALL NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT WHICH HAS ARISEN APPEAR TO EXIST.

I NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT YOU HAVE RESPONDED TO MY WISH THAT THE SAID DANGEROUS SITUATION SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED AND ALSO THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD BE CREATED FOR A MORE THOUGHTFUL APPRAISAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WHICH IS FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGERS IN OUR AGE OF THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS, ROCKET TECHNOLOGY, SPACESHIPS, GLOBAL ROCKETS, AND OTHER LETHAL WEAPONS. ALL PEOPLE ARE INTERESTED IN INSURING PEACE. THEREFORE, WE WHO ARE INVESTED WITH TRUST AND GREAT RESPONSIBILITY MUST NOT PERMIT AN EXACERBATION OF THE SITUATION AND MUST LIQUIDATE THE BREEDING GROUNDS WHERE A DANGEROUS SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE. IF WE SUCCEED ALONG WITH YOU AND WITH THE AID OF OTHER PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL IN LIQUIDATING THIS TENSE SITUATION, WE MUST ALSO CONCERN OURSELVES TO SEE THAT OTHER DANGEROUS CONFLICTS DO NOT ARISE WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A WORLD THERMONUCLEAR CATASTROPHE.

IN CONCLUSION, I WISH TO SPEAK OF THE REGULATION OF RELATION BETWEEN NATO AND STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY, WHICH YOU MENTION. WE HAVE LONG AGO SPOKEN OF THIS AND ARE READY TO CONTINUE AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WITH YOU ON THIS QUESTION AND FIND A REASONABLE SOLUTION. I ALSO WISH TO CONTINUE AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC AND THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS, GENERAL DISARMAMENT, AND OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LESSENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

MR. PRESIDENT, I TRUST YOUR STATEMENT. HOWEVER, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE WHO WOULD LIKE TO CARRY OUT AN INVASION OF CUBA AT THIS TIME, AND IN SUCH A WAY TO SPARK OFF A WAR. IF WE TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS AND ANNOUNCE THE DISMANTLING AND EVACUATION OF THE APPROPRIATE MEANS FROM CUBA, THEN, DOING SO WILL ESTABLISH AT THE SAME TIME THE CONFIDENCE OF THE

FBIS 55

SECOND AND LAST ADD 53 (KHRUSHCHEV TEXT)

X X X ITS STEADFAST LABOR

(CONCLUDING TEXT) I SHOULD LIKE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO REMIND YOU THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF A RECONNAISSANCE CHARACTER HAVE VIOLATED THE FRONTIER OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH WE HAD CONFLICTS WITH YOU. AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES TOOK PLACE.

IN 1960, WE SHOT DOWN YOUR U-2 AIRCRAFT, THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OF WHICH OVER THE USSR LED TO THE WRECKING OF THE MEETING OF THE POWERS IN PARIS. YOU THEN TOOK A CORRECT POSITION IN CONDEMNING THAT CRIMINAL ACTION BY THE FORMER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, DURING THE PERIOD OF YOUR TENURE OF OFFICE AS PRESIDENT, A SECOND INSTANCE OF THE VIOLATION OF OUR FRONTIER BY AN AMERICAN U-2 AIRCRAFT TOOK PLACE IN THE SAKHALIN AREA. WE WROTE YOU ABOUT THIS VIOLATION ON AUGUST 30. YOU REPLIED THAT THIS VIOLATION HAD TAKEN PLACE AS THE RESULT OF BAD WEATHER AND GAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. WE GAVE CREDENCE TO YOUR ASSURANCE BECAUSE THERE WAS INDEED BAD WEATHER IN THAT AREA AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, IF YOUR AIRCRAFT DID NOT HAVE THE TASK OF FLYING NEAR OUR TERRITORY, THEN EVEN BAD WEATHER COULD NOT CAUSE AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT TO ENTER OUR AIRSPACE.

THE CONCLUSION FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT IT IS DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENTAGON, WHICH TRAMPLES ON INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES AND VIOLATES THE FRONTIERS OF OTHER STATES.

AN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS CASE OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 23 WHEN YOUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NORTH, IN THE AREA OF THE CHUKOTKA PENINSULA, AND FLEW OVER OUR TERRITORY.

ONE ASKS, MR. PRESIDENT, HOW SHOULD WE REGARD THIS? WHAT IS IT? A PROVOCATION? YOUR AIRCRAFT VIOLATES OUR FRONTIER AND AT TIMES AS ANXIOUS AS THOSE WHICH WE ARE NOW EXPERIENCING WHEN EVERYTHING HAS BEEN PLACED IN A STATE OF COMBAT READINESS. FOR AN INTRUDING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CAN EASILY BE TAKEN FOR A BOMBER WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THIS COULD PUSH US TOWARD A FATAL STEP--ALL THE MORE SO BECAUSE BOTH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND PENTAGON HAVE LONG BEEN SAYING THAT BOMBERS WITH ATOMIC BOMBS ARE CONSTANTLY ON DUTY IN YOUR COUNTRY.

THEREFORE, YOU CAN IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF RESPONSIBILITY YOU ASSUME, ESPECIALLY NOW DURING THE ANXIOUS TIMES WE ARE NOW EXPERIENCING.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO ASSESS THIS CORRECTLY AND TAKE STEPS ACCORDINGLY IN ORDER THAT IT WOULD NOT SERVE AS A PROVOCATION FOR UNLEASHING WAR.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS THE FOLLOWING WISH. OF COURSE, IT IS A MATTER FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE. YOU DO NOT AT PRESENT MAINTAIN ANY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT THROUGH MY OFFICERS ON CUBA I HAVE REPORTS THAT FLIGHTS OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OVER CUBA ARE BEING CARRIED OUT. WE ARE INTERESTED THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY WAR AT ALL IN THE WORLD, AND THAT THE CUBAN PEOPLE SHOULD LIVE QUIETLY. HOWEVER, MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS NO SECRET THAT WE HAVE OUR PEOPLE ON CUBA. ACCORDING TO THE TREATY WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, WE HAVE OFFICERS AND INSTRUCTORS THERE WHO ARE TRAINING THE CUBANS. THEY ARE MAINLY ORDINARY PEOPLE--EXPERTS, AGRONOMISTS, ZOOTECHNICIANS, IRRIGATION AND SOIL IMPROVEMENT EXPERTS, ORDINARY WORKERS, TRACTOR DRIVERS, AND OTHERS. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEM.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO BEAR IN MIND THAT A VIOLATION OF CUBAN AIRSPACE BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO HAVE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. IF YOU DO NOT WANT THIS, THEN NO PRETEXT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR THE CREATION OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

WE MUST BE NOW VERY CAUTIOUS AND NOT TAKE SUCH STEPS WHICH WILL BE OF NO USE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, BUT WHICH ARE LIKELY TO AROUSE ONLY IRRITATION AND EVEN PROVE A PROVOCATION LEADING TO THE BANEFUL STEP. WE MUST, THEREFORE, DISPLAY SOBRIETY AND WISDOM AND REFRAIN FROM STEPS OF THIS SORT.

WE VALUE PEACE, PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN OTHER PEOPLE, BECAUSE WE EXPERIENCED THE TERRIBLE WAR AGAINST HITLER. HOWEVER, OUR PEOPLE WILL NOT FLINCH IN THE FACE OF ANY ORDEAL. OUR PEOPLE TRUST THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND WE ASSURE OUR PEOPLE AND THE WORLD PUBLIC THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO BE PROVOKED.

SHOULD THE PROVOCATEURS UNLEASH A WAR, THEY WOULD NOT ESCAPE THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A WAR. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT REASON WILL TRIUMPH. WAR WILL NOT BE UNLEASHED AND THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLE WILL BE INSURED!

IN CONNECTION WITH NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS BETWEEN U.N. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE CUBAN REPUBLIC, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS SENT TO NEW YORK USSR FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS KUZNETSOV WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING U THANT IN HIS NOBLE EFFORTS AIMED AT LIQUIDATION OF THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION.

WITH RESPECT FOR YOU, KHRUSHCHEV. OCTOBER 28, 1962.

(ENDALL)

28 OCT 1962 HML/ZHM

OFFICIAL ENGLISH TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE

MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH TO EUROPE 11 28 OCT 62

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of October 27. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

① In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons constructions sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union. . . .

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor.

The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression -- only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba -- to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

2 It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,* we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, space-ships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assistance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution.

We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge.

Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration.

But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurance, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this. What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol.

Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.

I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Signed: Respectfully yours, N. Khrushchev

October 28, 1962

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INITIAL COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF THE 28 OCTOBER KHRUSHCHEV
AKENNEDY EXCHANGE X

MOSCOW

SHORTLY AFTER THE RELEASE OF THE 28 OCTOBER LETTER ANNOUNCING THAT THE CUBAN BASES WOULD BE DISMANTLED, TASS ISSUED BRIEF NEWS RELEASES ON THE INTERRUPTION OF U.S. RADIO AND TV PROGRAMS TO FLASH THE NEWS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE, AND REPORTING THAT KHRUSHCHEV'S "PEACELOVING MESSAGE" GOT FLASH TREATMENT IN WEST GERMAN NEWS MEDIA. AT 1835 GMT, TASS CARRIED THE FULL TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE IS BEING GIVEN PRIORITY TREATMENT IN RADIO MOSCOW'S BROADCASTS TO FOREIGN AUDIENCES. FOLLOWING THE BROADCASTING OF THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE THIS AFTERNOON BY THE MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE AND TASS, THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE SERVICES BEGAN IMMEDIATELY TO CARRY THREE TO FOUR-MINUTE SUMMARIES OF THE MESSAGE. THESE SUMMARIES HAVE NOW BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE. THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT SATURATION COVERAGE IS PLANNED. SO FAR THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN BROADCAST IN THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGES: GERMAN, ITALIAN, BULGARIAN, POLISH, MACEDONIAN, SERBO-CROATIAN, SPANISH, ARABIC, GREEK, AND IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND SOMALI TO AFRICA.

MOSCOW IS GIVING HEAVY PLAY TO FAVORABLE WORLD REACTION TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION. THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET-ORIGINATED COMMENT SO FAR.

MOSCOW LED OFF ITS MAIN DOMESTIC SERVICE NEWS BULLETIN AT 1900 GMT WITH THE TEXTS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE AND THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WELCOMING IT.

THIS WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A ROUNDUP OF FOREIGN REACTION, "THE WORLD LISTENED WITH ATTENTION TO THE MESSAGE FROM NIKITA SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY," THE BROADCAST SAID. "AS SOON AS MOSCOW RADIO BEGAN TO BROADCAST THE MESSAGE FROM NIKITA SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY, ALL THE WORLD'S LEADING NEWS AGENCIES, BREAKING OFF THEIR REGULAR TRANSMISSIONS, QUICKLY BEGAN TO GIVE SUMMARIES OF IT. UPI, A.P., AFP, AND REUTERS PICKED OUT KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS THAT HE REGARDED WITH RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT NO ATTACK WOULD BE MADE ON CUBA BY EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

IN NEW YORK, MOSCOW CONTINUED, U.S. RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS INTERRUPTED THEIR USUAL PROGRAMS TO INFORM LISTENERS ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE. THE NEWSCASTER REPORTED THAT SOFIA RADIO INTERRUPTED ITS PROGRAMS TO GIVE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE: "THE WORKING PEOPLE OF BULGARIA HAVE NOTED KHRUSHCHEV'S NOBLE AND HUMANE STAND." AFP WAS QUOTED AS REPORTING FRENCH REACTION, AND THE WEST GERMAN NEWS AGENCY DPA WAS QUOTED ON KHRUSHCHEV'S ".9\$34-53" TONE.

CASTRO WAS REPORTED AS SAYING IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE TUNISIAN WEEKLY JEUNE AFRIQUE THAT CUBA WAS READY TO DO EVERYTHING TO HELP IN SOLVING THE PRESENT CRISIS. MOSCOW DID NOT MENTION CASTRO'S STATEMENT REQUIRING WITHDRAWAL OF THE GUANTANAMO BASE.

THE MOSCOW RADIO BULLETIN DID NOT EXCEED ITS USUAL LENGTH OF 30 MINUTES.

OTHER COMMUNIST RADIOS

OTHER BLOC COMMENT CASTS KHRUSHCHEV IN THE ROLE OF A WORLD PEACEMAKER, AS THE MAN WHO DREW THE WORLD BACK FROM THE BRINK OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. THE EAST GERMAN AND NEWS AGENCY, IN REPORTING FAVORABLE WORLD REACTION TO KHRUSHCHEV'S MOVE, NOTES: "AFTER DAYS OF GREAT TENSION, DURING WHICH THE WORLD WAS PUSHED TO THE BRINK OF A NUCLEAR WAR BY THE AGGRESSIVE MEASURE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GREAT SIGH OF RELIEF IS BEING BREATHED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD."

THE ZAGREB DOMESTIC SERVICE SAID KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE REPRESENTS "PERHAPS DECISIVE PROOF OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE WORLD FROM THE DANGEROUS BRINK WHERE IT FOUND ITSELF NEARLY A WEEK AGO." BUDAPEST RADIO STATES THAT HISTORY WILL SHOW KHRUSHCHEV TO BE THE FIRST AMONG THOSE WHO DID EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO AVERT A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN OCTOBER 1962.

A SECONDARY THEME IN BLOC COMMENT IS THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MATCH THE SOVIET UNION'S PEACEFUL GESTURE WITH CONCRETE DEEDS. BUDAPEST RADIO NOTES THAT "PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PROMISE HAS SO FAR NOT BEEN PROVED BY DEEDS," AND THAT THE "SOVIET PREMIER ALLOWED NO DELAY ON HIS PART IN TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS". ZAGREB RADIO SAYS IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYBODY "THAT IT IS NOW THE TURN OF THE UNITED STATES," THAT IT MUST "REFRAIN FROM MILITARY MEASURES AGAINST CUBA AND CEASE ITS BLOCKADE."

28 OCT 622P CN/HML/WP

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

47
Action

Control: 19418
Rec'd: October 28, 1962
6:41 a.m.

SS
Info

FROM: Moscow

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TO: Secretary of State

SP

NO: 1113, October 28.

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Reference: Department's telegram 1015.

USIA

INR

Text delivered Foreign Ministry 1030 hours Moscow time
October 28.

RMR

KOHLER

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Note: SS/DO notified 6:50 a.m. 10-28-62.

UNCLASSIFIED

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

3608 file

INDICATE: COLLECT

CHARGE TO

SECRET

EYES ONLY

OCT 20 12 47 AM '62

41

Origin

ACTION:

AMEmbassy LONDON NIACT 2346

SS

AMEmbassy PARIS NIACT 2384

Info:

USRO Paris TOPOL NIACT 580

006

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

By 7 destroyed

Following is text Oct 26 Khrushchev letter to

10/31

President.

RUSK

(Code room please repeat Moscow 1101, Oct. 26, in four sections - control numbers 18890, 18954, 18896, 18970)

Drafted by:

U:GSSpringsteen:lr

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

George W. Ball

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Tyler

S/S - Mr. Kent

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept Bulletin

SECRET

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

BY *[Signature]* NARS, Date *8/22/74*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

CORRECTION

10/28/62/, 7 a.m.

47
Action

Control: 19086
Rec'd: October 27, 1962
7:54 a.m.

SCA
Info FROM: Moscow

SS TO: Secretary of State

G NO: 1109, October 27, noon

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The serial number of this message, received as 1101,
should be corrected to read 1109.

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CORRECTION

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotka Peninsula. ^{I have learned that} This plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him ~~XXXX~~ over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on ~~his own~~ ^{open} radio for ~~XXXX~~ ^{al} navigation assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and ~~agree with you that every possible measure~~ ^{will stipulate every maximum precautions} ~~should be~~ ^{is} taken to prevent recurrence.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American U-2 aircraft in the area of the Chukotka Peninsula. I ordered an immediate investigation of this incident and can inform you as follows:

This plane was engaged on an air-sampling mission in connection with the nuclear tests being carried out in your country. Its course was to the North Pole and it had been ordered not to come within one hundred miles of Soviet territory. The pilot reported that his navigation instruments, of which he had only one set because of the weight problem in this type of plane, had failed and that he was completely lost. I regret this incident and recognize that a frontier violation, particularly in time of high tension, could be misinterpreted. I have therefore given orders that even greater precautions be taken to avoid the possibility of such an incident and am pursuing further the investigation of which the foregoing is a preliminary report.

no
photographs
equipment

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American U-2 aircraft in the area of the Chukotka Peninsula. I ordered an immediate investigation of this incident and can inform you as follows:

This plane was engaged on an air-sampling mission in connection with the nuclear tests being carried out in your country. Its ^{plan} course was to the North Pole and it had been ordered not to come within one hundred miles of Soviet territory. The pilot reported that his navigation instruments, of which he had only one set because of the weight problem in this type of plane, had failed and that he was completely lost. I regret this incident and recognize that a frontier violation, particularly in time of high tension, could be misinterpreted. I have therefore given orders that even greater precautions be taken to avoid the possibility of such an incident and am pursuing further the investigation of which the foregoing is a preliminary report.

I agree that we must devote urgent attention to the problems of general disarmament, as it relates to all States including those of the NATO and Warsaw Pact. Priority should be given to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth or in outer space, support for constructive proposals for denuclearization arrangements worked out by states in areas where such weapons do not exist; to determining whether progress may not be made, at long last, on a nuclear test ban, and to other measures to reduce international tension. Also, we should determine what wide measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently in a constructive spirit at Geneva or elsewhere.

I agree with you that we should continue urgently our efforts to deal with other questions causing international tension and hope that we can progress in the fields of nuclear testing, general disarmament, and the problems related to relations between NATO and the States of the Warsaw Treaty.

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Air Force base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning back the pilot had a serious navigational error and was unable to find his way home. I am sure that the pilot was a highly skilled and experienced navigator and was guided back to the base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and agree that it is a serious matter. It is a matter which should be investigated and the results reported to the appropriate authorities.

DRAFT

October 28, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eighth even though the official text has not yet reached me because of the great importance I attach to our moving forward promptly to carry forward the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have ~~taken control and the situation had become unmanageable, because of the vicious cycle that was building up.~~

~~I am sure that you will agree that the noble efforts~~ ^{distinguished} of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider that my letter to you of October ^{seventh} ~~twenty-sixth~~ and your reply of today as ^{firm undertakings} ~~solemn commitments~~ on the part of both our governments which should be ~~implemented~~ promptly ^{carried out,} ~~as there are many other problems affecting peace which require attention. I am desirous of removing as quickly as possible the quarantine measures which are now in effect and~~ ^{hope} ~~I am hopeful that the United Nations can immediately take the necessary steps to eliminate any need for surveillance on our part of Cuban territory.~~ ^{establish the effective} ~~removal of quarantine measures now in effect.~~ ^{us, in order to remove the}

*He'll not take ground well
He shall do discussing these
matters with
the*

You have undertaken to remove what I have called offensive weapons from Cuba and I have assured you that no attack will be made on Cuba. I trust that the discussions under the auspices of U Thant and the arrangements for the United Nations to carry out its role can be quickly concluded. The other Latin American nations that are deeply involved in this problem will, I hope, also proceed urgently to consider the further actions that need to be taken and I am sure that a Cuba clearly committed to a peaceful course need have no fear from them.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

USA } I have already made arrangements to report on these matters to the Organization of American States whose members share a deep genuine interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

✓

October 28, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight even though the official text has not yet reached me because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, to permit the United States to remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

as your
message
says, so
that

in turn will
be able
to

N. S. Khrushchev,
Chairman,

The Council of Ministers,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotka Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

47-48

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control: 19551

Rec'd: October 29, 1962
12:19 a.m.

SS

FROM: Moscow

Info

G

TO: Secretary of State

SP

L

NO: 1121, October 29

SAL

ARA

EUR

IO

NIACT

P

USIA

INR

Department telegram 1020

RMR

Text delivered to Ministry 0608 hours Moscow time October 29.

KOHLER

LM

Note: Passed White House, 10/29/62

Advance copies to S/S and S/SO.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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13848

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50

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW 1022 NIACT

OCT 29 7 50 PM '62

EUR

Info

SS

RMR

In fourteenth paragraph Khrushchev's message October 28 as transmitted in English by Tass, the second sentence reads: "As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable representatives of the United Nations to verify the dismantling of these means".

Transmit NIACT transliteration Russian language text this sentence.

END

RUSK

Bundy has text of Khrush message

Drafted by:

EUR:REDavis:AMR 10/29/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Richard H. Davis

Clearances:

S/S = Mr. Wainner

S/S

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RE YOUR REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV
28 OCT. MESSAGE, THE DEPARTMENT SAYS KOHLER
NEVER TRANSMITTED IT ELECTRICALLY. HE DID
HOWEVER POUCH IT 30 OCT. BUT AS YET THE
SOVIET DESK HAS NOT RECEIVED IT. STATE HAS
BEEN USING THE TEXT AS DELIVERED BY TASS IN
ENGLISH.

RGM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

RUEPWW

RUEHCR 20047

O 300643Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE

STATE GRNC

BT

RECEIVED
NSA
6816
OCT 30 06 47

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L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

RECEIVED BY: _____

Date & Time Received _____

ATTN MR. BUNDY

ACTION STATE 1133 FROM MOSCOW OCTOBER 30, 7 AM

(ATTN OPERATOR FOLLOWING TRANSLITERATION RUSSIAN LANGUAGE)

DEPTEL 1022.

BEGIN TEXT. KAK YA VAM UZHE SOOBSHCHAL V PIS'ME DCADTSAT'
SED'MOGO OKTYABRYA, MY SOGLASNY S VAMI DOGOVORIT'SYA O TOM,
CHTOBY PREDSTAVITELI OON MOGLI UDOSTOVERIT'SYA V DEMONTAZHE
ETIKH SREDSTV. END TEXT

CFN 1022 REPEATING FOR CONFIRMATION

BEGIN TEXT. KAK YA VAM UZHE SOOBSHCHAL V PIS'ME DVADTSAT'
SED'MOGO OKTYABRYA, MY SOGLASNY S VAMI DOGOVORIT'SYA O TOM,
CHTOBY PREDSTAVITELI OON MOGLI UDOSTOVERIT'SYA V DEMONTAZHE
ETIKH SREDSTV. END TEXT. SIGNED KOHLER

RUSK

BT

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SD004 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OO RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 20047

O 300643Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE

STATE GRNC

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6816 1952 OCT 30 06 47

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RECEIVED BY _____
Date & Time Received _____

ATTN MR. BUNDY

ACTION STATE 1133 FROM MOSCOW OCTOBER 30, 7 AM

(ATTN OPERATOR FOLLOWING TRANSLITERATION RUSSIAN LANGUAGE)

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CHTOBY PREDSTAVITELI OON MOGLI UDOSTOVERIT'SYA V DEMONTAZHE
ETIKH SREDSTV. END TEXT. SIGNED KOHLER

RUSK

BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE I

DAILY REPORT

WEDNESDAY
31 OCTOBER 1962

SUPPLEMENT

World Reaction Series

NO. 11 -- 1962

FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S 28 OCTOBER LETTER
ON DISMANTLING CUBAN MISSILE BASES

WARNING

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FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S 28 OCTOBER LETTER
ON DISMANTLING CUBAN MISSILE BASES

31 OCTOBER 1962

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Press comment derives mainly from radio sources. In the interest of brevity, newspapers are sometimes cited directly.

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

S U M M A R Y

Radio Moscow has publicized Khrushchev's 28 October letter in full or in substantial summary form some 195 times in broadcasts beamed worldwide, and has heavily played the President's statement and letter of reply. Unable to keep up with the fast-moving developments, Moscow was still broadcasting foreign-language texts of Khrushchev's 27 October message an hour after the letter of the 28th was released. With none of the customary support propaganda prepared, broadcasters focused for several hours on reportage of worldwide relief and Soviet and worldwide acclaim for a Soviet "initiative" that "saved the world from the abyss of thermonuclear war."

There has been considerable Soviet stress on new prospects for peaceful settlement of "many" complex international questions by negotiation, though without singling out the areas for negotiation specified in Khrushchev's 26 October letter. There is brief but warm praise for the U.N. role. There has been some revival of the notion that removal of Soviet bases in Cuba might be matched by elimination of U.S. bases in Turkey, although the theme has not been strenuously pressed so far. A sign that Moscow propaganda may return to other elements of Khrushchev's 27 October letter is contained in a TASS report that many U.N. delegates are citing the passage in the 27 October letter which said an agreement on Cuba might facilitate a nuclear test ban.

Moscow has displayed some sensitivity to observations by "Western commentators" that the USSR was the one to retreat. Nothing, Moscow tells foreign audiences, could be further from the truth. Broadcasts tailored for Cuban listeners state that a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba "is precisely what the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government have tried to achieve all the time," and that the "Soviet rockets" in Cuba can now be safely dismantled because President Kennedy has been "made" to disclaim any intention of invading Cuba. Soviet media have reported Castro's statement of 26 October in full, but have said very little about his five-point demands. There are, however, some comments now to the effect that the tension is reduced but not ended, and some references to "certain leading Americans" who still call for an invasion.

East European satellite reaction combines expressions of relief at the lessening of tension with approbation for Khrushchev's "victory for peace." The comment is generally moderate in tone and optimistic with respect to future East-West relations--although Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have carried references to "hotheads" and "rash views," by implication in the bloc, which disapproved of Soviet moderation during the crisis. A Budapest broadcast, praising Khrushchev, U Thant, and Bertrand Russell for having "done the most to preserve peace," adds that "it is not impossible that President Kennedy's name will be mentioned in history."

The dissident Tirana radio, which noted that the Western press viewed the Soviet move as "a victory for U.S. diplomacy," delivers a blistering editorial attack on President Kennedy for "pushing humanity to the brink of the abyss." Only Albania has publicized Castro's statement that the U.S. "guarantees" are unsatisfactory. Khrushchev's role is ignored.

Peking propaganda plays down the Soviet decision to withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba, while putting continuing stress on Cuban defense preparations and casting doubt on the sincerity of the President's "so-called" assurances that Cuba will not be invaded. CPR media assert that the Cubans--like the Chinese--can survive "on their own resources" and have full confidence in "their own might." Not mentioning Soviet support for the Cubans, Peking depicts massive worldwide support and publicizes rallies in the CPR and pledges of backing from Chinese organizations and workers. The central press, according to NCNA press reviews, has given prominence to Castro's 28 October statement, but the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of that day--full texts of which are belatedly published--is treated only in passing in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 31 October, the first authoritative CPR comment on the recent events.

Castro's 28 October statement, released three hours after Moscow made Khrushchev's letter public, has been given saturation coverage in Havana media. Khrushchev's letter is published on page 2 of Monday's REVOLUCION, but has never been broadcast in full. Raul Castro's 29 October speech set the tone for heavy radio and TV comment playing up Castro's five-point demand, with special attention to the call for return of Guantanamo, and commentators insist that U Thant has come to Cuba "to negotiate, not to inspect." Referring somewhat more freely to Khrushchev's letter since 30 October, Havana commentators present his decision to dismantle the bases as a wise move aimed at making the Castro regime secure and "forcing Kennedy to negotiate." Wide publicity continues to be given claims of popular support for Cuba in Latin America and throughout the world. Cuba itself is pictured as a nation of arms, ready and able to defend itself against aggression. And additional emphasis has been placed on military preparedness since U Thant's arrival and first talks with Castro.

Yugoslav comment is optimistic, several commentators expressing hope that the accord apparently reached on Cuba can be extended to other East-West issues. Also prevalent is the view that the nonaligned nations played a particularly significant role in bringing about negotiations between the two sides. In lauding both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev for their responsible attitudes during the crisis, Belgrade says that "especially great credit" is due Mr. Khrushchev.

Latin American radio and press sources reflect the general feeling of relief that the crisis has been overcome. While it is generally agreed that the Soviet Union and Castroism have suffered a major rebuff with Moscow's decision to remove the offending bases, with a corresponding increase in American prestige and in President Kennedy's stature as a world leader, there is considerable ambivalence in defining the ultimate meaning of the apparent resolution of the crisis: a pervasive theme is the conviction that Castro has been revealed as a mere puppet manipulated at will by his Soviet masters and completely ignored when vital decisions had to be made; at the same time there is emphasis on the continuing threat which he presents and speculation that he may even be emboldened in his efforts to subvert the hemisphere by the mutual guarantees given as part of the agreement which dissipated the crisis.

West European comment, which during the height of the crisis reflected a wide range of opinion both approving and somewhat skeptical of the American initiative, is virtually unanimous in hailing the Soviet back-down as a victory for the President's firmness, and as a testimony to the correctness of the course the President chose. British comment, which had been somewhat critical, in the end hails the President's "cool head and steady nerves" and the statesmanship he demonstrated in his readiness for conciliation. While it is widely noted that many problems lie ahead, and that some Soviet counteraction can yet be expected in an effort to offset this setback, the resolution of the crisis is seen as a "step toward peace," as an eye-opener to the Russians concerning American willingness to fight to protect its vital interests, and as a possible forerunner to further dialogues between the two sides "dominated by commonsense and justice." There is no feeling that the Cuban threat has been eliminated by these developments, and the Swiss TRIBUNE DE GENEVE echoes a repetitive theme in declaring that the U.S. pledge of nonintervention may permit Castro to continue the subversion of Latin America. Some sources think Moscow's submission to U.S. pressure in this instance may make it more difficult in the future for the West to remain adamant when pressure is applied from the other side.

In the Far East, Japanese comment is mixed. Expressions of relief that the crisis has been overcome without war are mingled with comment critical of both sides. Praise of the President, and labeling of Moscow's decision as a "considerable defeat" accompany frequent references to the statesmanship demonstrated by both sides and laudatory references to Premier Khrushchev as a peacemaker who drew the world back from the brink of war. The Nationalist Chinese are gratified that the West so successfully stood up to the communists, but at the same time express concern at future concessions which may be demanded as a quid pro quo. Both South Korea and South Vietnam express relief and gratification while noting that caution is necessary to deal with future Soviet trickery. Australian commentators emphasize that the President's actions have been "entirely vindicated" by the outcome, while noting that elation must be tempered with caution.

In the Middle East, Israeli sources view the end of the crisis as a victory for American resolution which has strengthened the U.S. position as the leader of the Western world. The prospects for peace are said to have been improved by the equilibrium achieved between the two blocs. The UAR radio says the solution should hasten a search for a more permanent detente through a U.N. "peace conference" with disarmament talks to be held under the aegis of the nonaligned nations. The Syrian radio is effusive in its praise of Khrushchev's "brave and noble stand," which allegedly saved humanity from destruction. Iraqi comment is meager but critical of U.S. actions. Iranian, Greek, and Turkish sources followed the news closely and express great satisfaction with the easing of the crisis, and the President's "brilliant victory," as the Iranian radio put it. The independent African states generally express satisfaction with the outcome, with most noting the contribution that the nonbloc states made to an easing of the crisis. Both sides are congratulated for their restraint and statesmanlike acceptance of their responsibility for world peace.

While the Cuban people and their "revolution" have drawn extensive praise in propaganda, there have been relatively few references to Castro personally. Moscow has prominently publicized the exchange of messages between U Thant and Castro which led to the U.N. supervisory role in Cuba; and TASS, after some delay, carried in full Castro's 28 October statement spelling out his five demands including the "restoration" of Guantanamo naval base to Cuba. But Moscow commentators have virtually ignored the five demands. There was no comment until the 31st, when Shragin provides a mild endorsement in a broadcast to Cuba: Shragin notes simply that Castro's conditions "answer the interests of normalizing the situation in the Caribbean and of assuring the independence and integrity of the Cuban republic." The application of these measures, he says, "would benefit all peoples."

Increasing stress has been placed on the theme that the USSR saved world peace by exacting U.S. disclaimers of military action against Cuba. A PRAVDA article asserts that it is now "impossible to implement the initial Pentagon plans for a military invasion of the island of freedom, and . . . the Pentagon had to beat a retreat." A Soviet regional broadcast states that "the retreat of the United States in the Caribbean conflict was the result of the firm policy of the Soviet Union and the peoples' struggle for restraining the aggressors."

At the same time, Moscow displays sensitivity to observations by some "Western commentators" that the Soviet Union was the one to retreat. A broadcast in French assails those who "talk about a military setback for the Soviet Union by making out that the USSR had to yield to force" and who state that for the first time Khrushchev had to accept "conditions imposed by the United States." Nothing, the commentator says, is further from the truth: The Soviet Union sought only to bring about a detente in the Cuban area, and its success in this is a "major victory for Soviet policy." A TASS commentator reiterates that "it would be a big mistake" to speak of a "retreat" by the Soviet Union. Millions of people, it adds, not only have faith in the "immutable" peace policy of the Soviet Union, but also "believe in the defensive might of the Soviet Union and see in it a reliable bulwark preventing imperialism from starting another war."

In a commentary tailored for Cuban listeners, Moscow implies that the Cuban Government shares--or should share--in this appraisal of victory. It asserts that a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba "is precisely what the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government have tried to achieve all the time." A commentary broadcast three times exclusively to Cuba--making the first unequivocal admission in Moscow propaganda that "Soviet rockets" have been installed in Cuba--explains that "the Soviet rockets on your island" were "destined to serve as a guarantee" against aggression and can now be removed because President Kennedy has been "made" to disclaim any intentions of invading Cuba. Commentaries broadcast repeatedly to Cuba cite passages in Khrushchev's 28 October letter in which he pledges continuing support for Cuba. In sharp contrast with

these reassurances to the Cuban people is an English-language broadcast to North America which asserts that because President Kennedy "now says that the United States will not invade Cuba, the USSR has no need to give defense aid to the island republic."

While in the wake of the weekend exchange of notes Moscow had cut back and somewhat softened its attacks on U.S. "aggression" against Cuba, by the 31st such attacks were being renewed. An English-language broadcast to Europe typifies this comment: "The tension, though considerably reduced, has not disappeared altogether Efforts are being made to increase it again." Moscow voices open alarm over statements in U.S. papers and by "certain leading Americans" who "still call for an invasion." A Shragin commentary on the 31st assails Senators Capehart and Goldwater for demanding "harsher action toward Cuba." TASS quotes a PRAVDA commentary as warning that "the strict fulfillment of the pledges assumed by the United States to respect the integrity of Cuban territory is acquiring special importance" in view of continuing anti-Castro activities in the United States. There are only sporadic references, however, to U.S. air incursions over Cuban and Soviet territory.

Recent Moscow propaganda contains a moderate revival of the notion that removal of Soviet bases in Cuba might be matched by elimination of U.S. bases in Turkey, but the theme is not strenuously pressed. There are also signs that the propaganda may hark back to other elements of Khrushchev's 27 October letter: Thus a 31 October TASS report on U.N. deliberations says "representatives of many countries" are citing the passage from Khrushchev's 27 October message to the President in which he said that an agreement on the Cuban problem "might be a good beginning and, specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement."

B. East European Satellites

Satellite propaganda reaction to Khrushchev's letter of 28 October and the President's response combines expressions of relief at the lessening of tension with approbation for Khrushchev's "victory for peace," as a result of which the U.S. has "been compelled" to give up the quarantine and renounce invasion of Cuba. With the exception of East Germany, the comment is generally moderate in tone and optimistic with respect to future East-West relations. Warsaw takes the lead in pointing out the increased possibilities for solution of other issues through negotiation. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have carried comments referring to "hotheads" and "rash views"--by implication, in the bloc--critical of Soviet moderation. Only Albania reports on Castro's statement that the U.S. "guarantees" are unsatisfactory.

The Bulgarian news agency BTA reports, in a 28 October English-language broadcast, that domestic radio programs were interrupted several times for bulletins on the Khrushchev letter and the President's statement, and that the populace greeted the news "with interest, satisfaction, and relief." RABOTNICHESKO DELO's editorial on 29 October stresses the importance of the President's "guarantees" against invasion of Cuba, hinting at the existence of some disapprobation of the Soviet action: "If there are still some hotheads," it says, "they must understand that the Soviet Union is taking these measures because the immunity of Cuba is guaranteed." (A Prague domestic service commentary on 26 October, discussing the blockade of Cuba, had also indicated that discordant views had manifested themselves over the proper Soviet response: Noting that a tendency not to aggravate the situation "is becoming more and more apparent," the commentator said that "earlier there appeared many rash views that the Soviet ships, regardless of the situation and its development, ought to sail through at any price and at once. I repeat: at any price and at once.")

An editorial in the Sofia paper ZEMEDELJSKO ZNAME on 30 October notes approvingly that the Soviet Union "did not give in" but "gave a quiet response to the insolent challenge." Sofia further underscores its endorsement of Khrushchev's action--though indirectly--by belatedly broadcasting, on the evening of 30 October, an 8 October interview with Party First Secretary Zhivkov in which he stresses "wholehearted" Bulgarian support for Soviet proposals in the current session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The Czechoslovak press agency CTK reports that the 30 October RUDE PRAVO pays tribute to "the tremendous peace endeavors of the Soviet Union." CTK quotes PRACE, the trade union paper, to the effect that the United States has at last "been compelled" to renounce armed attack against Cuba.

East German reaction is slower in coming and harsher in tone than the Bulgarian and Czech, though stopping short of suggesting a direct linkage between the Cuban and Berlin situations. Late on 29 October, East German broadcasts spoke gloatingly of "adventurers" who through their own fault "lose their nerve completely," and the 30 October NEUES DEUTSCHLAND asserts that the U.S. "has been unmasked as the worst enemy of freedom and self-determination of nations." Like PRAVDA of the same date, the editorial stresses that the danger of invasion is not yet past, adding that "extremists" in the United States and "their cronies in Bonn" have not yet resigned themselves on this score.

Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian comment is smaller in volume but similar in tone to Bulgarian and Czech reaction. Budapest radio reports press comment of 29 October emphasizing relief at the satisfactory outcome of the crisis. MAGYAR NEMZET is reported as saying that the U.S. blockade necessitated "precautionary measures" by the Warsaw Pact states,

but that "this does not mean that we have abandoned our principles" -- seeming to imply some Warsaw Pact participation in the Soviet decisions. A later Budapest broadcast says that Khrushchev, U Thant, and Bertrand Russell have done the most to preserve peace, but adds that "it is not impossible that in assessing the efforts aimed at averting war, President Kennedy's name will also be mentioned in history." The 30 October TRYBUNA LUDU is reported by Warsaw PAP, in an English transmission, as welcoming the increased possibility of solving other East-West differences through negotiation. The paper's reference to U.S. bases in Turkey and the "problem" of West Germany as an "outpost of aggression" is one of the few instances in satellite comment of an effort to draw a connection between the Cuban crisis and the Berlin question. Bucharest radio on 28 October broadcast the text of Khrushchev's 28 October message and the President's rejection of Khrushchev's 27 October proposal. It followed, on 29 October, with comment praising the latest Soviet message.

Tirana radio on 29 October carried only brief TASS reports on the 28 October exchange of messages, after noting tersely on 28 October that the Western press "considers this move a victory for U.S. diplomacy." On 30 October, Tirana broadcast the text of a ZERI I POPULLIT editorial which--ignoring Khrushchev--delivers a blistering attack on President Kennedy for "pushing humanity to the brink of the abyss." The editorial also asserts that the President said that, to save West Berlin, he "would not hesitate to use the atomic bomb, if necessary, in the Caribbean, in Berlin, or anywhere else." While Khrushchev's 27 October Cuba-Turkey bases trade letter was promptly broadcast textually by Tirana the same day, it was not until 30 October, according to the Tirana press review, that the press published texts of the President's 27 October message and both 28 October messages, as well as Fidel Castro's statement that he finds the "guarantees" inadequate. This is the only East European reference to this statement in available propaganda. Tirana newscasts of 30 October also reported a TA KUNG PAO editorial describing a Peking rally for solidarity with Cuba.

C. Communist China

Peking propaganda since 28 October has conspicuously played down the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw offensive missiles from the island, stressed the popular support for the Cuban cause throughout the world--particularly in the CPR itself--and noted the Cuban people's readiness to repulse "with their own might" a new invasion from the United States.

These themes are prominent in the first authoritative reaction to the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of 28 October: A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 31 October, as reviewed by NCNA, declares that the people of the world must maintain "maximum vigilance" since under no circumstances can the "empty promises" of the U.S. "aggressors" be trusted. The editorial observes that after Khrushchev announced his decision to withdraw "so-called 'offensive weapons'" from Cuba, the President--instead of removing the naval blockade--intensified military preparations for an invasion. The paper lauds the Cuban people for demonstrating their revolutionary spirit of "never submitting or surrendering to the aggressor and strong pressure," thus defending "the honor of being a socialist country." PEOPLE'S DAILY asserts that

the revolutionary experience of the Cuban people "proves that the awakening and unity of the oppressed people is the greatest and most reliable strength. The fate of history is decided by the masses of people who are awakened and armed, who dare to fight and dare to win, not by the arms which the imperialists and the reactionaries deem all-powerful." It pledges the support of the Chinese people for the Cuban cause, saying that the two peoples are comrades-in-arms who will withstand "any serious test."

Although Khrushchev's 27 October letter to the President proposing a Turkish-for-Cuban bases trade received fairly extensive treatment, Peking has so far given his 28 October letter little publicity. A brief report of Khrushchev's decision to withdraw missiles appeared in PEOPLE'S DAILY of 29 October under the texts of the 27 October Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange, and NCNA and the Peking domestic service carried short summaries of the decision on the same day. But it was not until 30 October that the text was printed in PEOPLE'S DAILY, along with the President's reply, at the bottom of page three. The NCNA press review--which reported at the end of its section on Cuba that the paper had published Khrushchev's 28 October letter--stated that the Peking press of that day "gave prominence" to Castro's "important" statement of 28 October, which had been broadcast textually by Radio Peking the day after it was issued.

Peking has continued to reaffirm CPR support for the Cuban cause, declaring, in the words of a 29 October TA KUNG PAO editorial, that the Chinese people regard it as their "sacred international obligation" to give all possible aid to the Cuban revolution and that they "will remain steadfast to the Cuban people, whatever storms the U.S. imperialists raise." The paper also stresses that the Chinese people "are convinced that the Cuban people, who have won their revolution by relying on their own resources, will certainly be able to safeguard their revolutionary gains by relying on themselves." In this connection, the paper commends the Chinese example to the Cubans, pointing out that the CPR itself has successfully withstood a U.S. blockade. This point, reminiscent of earlier Peking assertions that the "Cuban revolution" can "survive on its own resources," is picked up in a 30 October WORKERS DAILY editorial stating that the Cuban people are fully confident of their revolutionary cause and of "their own might." And PEOPLE'S DAILY's 28 October editorial says that the "Cuban people will surely be able to defeat" any new U.S. aggression.

Peking has pointedly failed to speak of Soviet support for Cuba in picturing massive worldwide backing of the Cuban people. PEOPLE'S DAILY of 30 October rounds up worldwide protests against U.S. war provocations, while other papers note support for the Cubans in Algeria, East Germany, Cambodia, Mongolia, Uruguay, and Brazil. Broadcasts to the Arab world on 29 and 30 October report widespread support in North Africa and cite an Algerian paper as cautioning that "surrender in the present circumstances will encourage imperialism . . . and will mean retreat until the end." In publicizing the support of other Latin American nations, Peking has attempted to draw a distinction between the "peoples" of these nations and the "ruling circles." Thus a 30 October NCNA dispatch says that in some countries the fight against U.S. aggression has been closely linked with the struggle against the rule of pro-American reactionary forces, and adds that 30,000 people demonstrated in Montevideo "against the U.S. blockade . . . and the Uruguayan Government . . . decision to support the anti-Cuban policy" of the United States.

The adverse OAS vote against Cuba has been portrayed in Peking media as the result of U.S. "blackmail." And NCNA, pointing to reservations against U.S. "armed intervention" in Cuba voiced by such governments as Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Uruguay, states that "threats and bribery" are factors which must be taken into consideration when assessing the attitude of Latin American nations toward Washington. It cites Argentine papers to the effect that as a result of Argentina's vote in support of the Cuban blockade, the United States has agreed to a postponement of the repayment of Argentina's debts. Similarly, Brazil is said by NCNA to have been threatened with a reduction in its coffee export quota unless its policy of nonintervention in Cuba is altered.

While Peking has carried Khrushchev's reply to Bertrand Russell, which raises the possibility that the Cuban crisis could lead to thermonuclear war, CPR comment--including the government statement of 25 October--has in general referred to the U.S. action as "war provocation" and a "threat to world peace." In one of the infrequent CPR references specifically to thermonuclear war in this context, the 31 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial says that "no matter how ferociously U.S. imperialism rattles its saber and event. threatens to launch a nuclear war," the "heroic Cuban people" cannot be shaken.

Throughout the crisis, Peking has maintained that Cuba faces an imminent invasion from the United States, and recent comment continues in this vein. Numerous Peking broadcasts on 29 October depicted feverish Cuban anti-invasion preparations, and overseas NCNA transmissions the same day carried the 28 October statements by Fidel and Raul Castro casting doubt on President Kennedy's assurance that the United States will not invade Cuba. Supporting the implication that the Cuban crisis has not been ended by the latest Soviet moves, NCNA on 29 October pointedly asserted that the "U.S. bourgeois press and politicians have clamored that in spite of the Soviet agreement to dismantle 'offensive' weapons . . . the Cuban crisis is not over." A 29 October Peking domestic service broadcast alluded to President Kennedy's "so-called" assurance that Cuba would not be invaded. Broadcasts and NCNA dispatches the following day included frequent references to Cuban defense preparations and to U.S. aggressive plans: NCNA reported that the President had ordered the blockade fleet to remain in position "while the United States was taking aggressive steps over the Cuban question, and was still planning armed invasion." The agency cited as evidence Kennedy's continuing meetings with the National Security Council and other advisers, the Florida military buildup, Secretary Rusk's "allegations" that the Cuban Government was connected with dynamiting of a power station in Venezuela, and stepped-up activities of Cuban exiles.

D. Far Eastern Satellites

A Hanoi NHAN DAN editorial on 31 October, transmitted by the VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY, declares that the solidarity of the people of Cuba, the socialist camp, Latin America, Asia, and Africa has "forced the U.S. imperialists to make an initial concession" to give up the blockade and renounce invasion. A Hanoi domestic broadcast early on 30 October contained the first monitored reference from Hanoi to Khrushchev's 28 October message. Prior to this, Hanoi had referred only to the initial Soviet Government statement of 23 October. The 30 October broadcast quoted Secretary of Defense McNamara to the effect that "the United States will continue to engage in military spying activities over Cuba."

Pyongyang radio through early on 31 October has still failed to mention the Soviet or U.S. messages or any easing of the crisis, but reports protest meetings in support of Cuba, including belligerent anti-U.S. speeches by the Cuban ambassador to North Korea, Lazaro Vigoa.

Ulan Bator radio on 30 October reported publication of the full text of Khrushchev's 27 October message in the 29 October UNEN. Under the heading "A Realistic Proposal Which Meets the Interest of Peace," the paper provided the text of Khrushchev's message proposing liquidation of both Cuban and Turkish bases, accompanied by a roundup of Mongolian and "world protest" against U.S. "aggressive activities" with regard to Cuba.

The Pathet Lao radio on 31 October briefly notes a TASS dispatch reporting that Khrushchev had sent a message to President Kennedy announcing the Soviet decision to dismantle the bases in Cuba.

II. CUBA

Castro's 28 October statement, enumerating five conditions to be met by the United States if the guarantee against invasion of Cuba is to "exist," was broadcast by Havana about three hours after Moscow released Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle and remove missile bases. Havana media had been silent until then on Khrushchev's letter. The opening paragraph of Castro's brief statement referred to the "decision announced" by Khrushchev "withdrawing the installations of arms of strategic defense" from Cuba. Castro's statement was given saturation coverage, being broadcast as many as 30 times in one radio service. It was not until 11 hours after Moscow released the Khrushchev letter that the Havana radio gave its listeners an extensive summary of the Soviet decision. The text of Khrushchev's letter never has been broadcast by Havana, though it is said to have been carried on page three of REVOLUCION for 29 October.

Concentrating on President Kennedy's offer to guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba provided the missile bases are removed, the Castro statement said that for such a guarantee to be effective the resultant change in U.S. policy must involve suspension of the economic blockade and of "worldwide economic pressure" exerted on Cuba; cessation of attacks on Cuba from U.S. ports by refugees, and of all attempts by refugees to promote revolt against the Castro regime; and the return to Cuba of the Guantanamo naval base.

The statement was silent on the issue of inspection or U.N. supervision of the removal of missiles and bases. In his radio interview of 24 October Castro had bitterly denounced the idea of U.N. supervision and declared that anyone coming to Cuba with the idea of inspection should be prepared for gunfire. Although Khrushchev's letter agreed to adequate supervision or verification by the United Nations, Havana failed to mention this issue from the time of Castro's enunciation of his five points until the afternoon of 29 October, when a PRENSA LATINA dispatch to two Chilean papers quoted from Castro's 24 October interview to illustrate his attitude on the question of U.N. inspection. Reports of U Thant's arrival in Havana on 30 October stated pointedly that U Thant had come "to negotiate, not to inspect."

Castro's original letter to U Thant inviting him to visit Havana, sent prior to the Khrushchev agreement, was publicized by the Havana press and radio. After the release of Khrushchev's letter, and after U Thant had accepted Castro's invitation, Havana media said little about the coming visit, although it was mentioned in a few broadcasts and U Thant's actual arrival in Havana on 30 October was reported promptly. Havana broadcast President Kennedy's rejection of U Thant's original offer, as well as Khrushchev's acceptance, and stressed the "peaceful" efforts of Khrushchev along with Castro's invitation to U Thant. Up to that time Havana had persisted in its claim that the Soviet weapons in Cuba were only "defensive," and had frequently repeated the claim that the photographs presented by Ambassador Stevenson in the U.N. Security Council were faked.

Broadcasts on 31 October, reporting U Thant's first meeting with Castro, say that "the Cuban side fixed clearly its position and points of view without any agreement being reached." These broadcasts also denounce "distorted reports" of U Thant's visit reported by the U.S. press, which "stress that Thant was going to Cuba to resolve the problem of dismantling of the guided missile bases." Actually, according to the Havana radio, it was pointed out in the correspondence between U Thant and Castro that the idea was to discuss "all the important aspects of the problem."

Despite the heavy publicity for Castro's five points, there was very little Havana comment until late on 29 October, more than 24 hours after the statement was released. Raul Castro in a 29 October speech in Oriente Province quoted the statement in full, but commented only on the

demand that the Guantanamo base be relinquished. He described the five points as the "minimum demand," a term used frequently by Cuban propagandists since then. He said that in giving up the base the United States would make use of the "best opportunity for the President of the United States to show that his words are sincere."

Guantanamo is not the only U.S. base on foreign soil, Raul Castro pointed out, but it differs from the others in that the United States has the "legalistic argument that the bases are authorized by the puppet governments" in other instances. In Cuba, he asserted, both the people and the government want the United States to get out. Later propaganda references to Guantanamo generally follow Raul Castro's line. Although several radio and television commentators on 30 October discussed the five points outlined by Fidel Castro, and implied that they must form the basis for discussion with U Thant, the Guantanamo issue rather than the economic blockade or the problem of subversion and counterrevolution was stressed.

The 30 October PRENSA LATINA dispatch to Chilean papers introduced a new element of propaganda concerning Guantanamo: PRENSA LATINA complained that the base had become a center for "reporter information pools" to promote the "criminal irresponsibility" of the U.S. press. These "pools" had "falsified" Raul Castro's speech and had inaccurately ascribed some statements to Fidel Castro that had led to confusion in Bolivia. This charge has not been pursued in subsequent Cuban propaganda.

The bulk of Cuban broadcasts in the period following release of Khrushchev's letter, as during the entire period of the Cuban crisis, has been devoted to projecting an image of a threatened and courageous Cuba supported enthusiastically by popular opinion, especially in Latin America. A hated and aggressive U.S. imperialism was pictured as bitterly opposed by the vast majority of the world's common people. A large proportion of Havana broadcasts has focused on reports of support from hundreds of organizations and groups outside Cuba, pro-Castro statements from leftwing Latin American papers, and anti-American demonstrations. The sabotage in Venezuelan oil installations was given considerable play by Cuban propagandists, but strong exception was taken to U.S. news agency reports that Cubans had directed the sabotage. These reports were called "infamous and absurd," distributed for "perverse and malevolent purposes."

The fact that the OAS voted unanimously to back the U.S. measures against Cuba and that half of its members volunteered to furnish material aid to the blockade is still suppressed, although these are occasional hints that certain Latin American governments--without popular support--have sold out to the imperialists. Raul Castro in his Oriente speech used this line in remarking that "the puppet governments" are one thing and "the peoples they hypocritically claim to represent are another." A special program to the Dominican Republic on 30 October, ostensibly directed by the "Dominican Liberation Front," castigated the Dominican Government for offering its port to the United States during the naval blockade.

Cuban defense efforts continue to be emphasized. Broadcasts picture an enthusiastic military and civil populace working hard to meet the onslaught of a brutal aggressor and confident of victory. Several broadcasts have called for blood donors. The defense effort is said to include production, which has not been allowed to lag because of the military mobilization. One broadcast, in discussing the defense effort, warned that food should not be stored, as this would create "artificial scarcities," and a broadcast late on 30 October appealed to housewives to refrain from purchasing in the morning enough bread to last through the day.

Following U Thant's arrival in Havana, the Havana radio and television network gave added attention to Cuban military strength. The radio on 30 October announced both artillery practices and naval maneuvers, while a television program in the afternoon showed inspection visits to various military posts by Fidel Castro and President Dorticos. The picture showed Cuban troops wearing Russian helmets, long-range artillery pieces, antitank guns, and antiaircraft artillery.

Considerable emphasis is now put on the point first elaborated by Raul Castro that the Cubans want some important move by the United States, such as the return of Guantanamo, because they cannot accept President Kennedy's promises at face value. Two regular Cuban commentators, Kuchilan and Luis Gomez Wanguemert, use this argument in their latest broadcasts. Kuchilan declares: "We are maintaining our state of alert and war footing because the enemy is crafty and armed, and Mr. Kennedy is a solemn liar." Wanguemert asserts: "Our people are well acquainted with the habits and evil cunning of the powerful neighbor to the north." For this reason, he adds, "the Cuban people remain on a war footing, their arms in their hands and ready to repel any aggression."

In referring to Khrushchev's letter, commentators play down the promise to dismantle the missile sites, stressing the "firmness" on the part of Cuba and the USSR, Khrushchev's determination to preserve peace, and worldwide popular support for Cuba. President Kennedy had been "impelled" to give up his plans for aggression and was "forced to negotiate." Khrushchev's decision to remove the missiles, when discussed, is called a wise decision taken for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the Castro regime freedom to carry out its program.

PRENSA LATINA, transmitting to Chilean papers, declares that "socialism has arrived in America and will never depart." President Kennedy also seems to be convinced of this, PRENSA LATINA asserts, because he has "signed a truce which momentarily paralyzes plans for invasion of Cuba." A Havana broadcast in English complains that U.S. news media, the distorting the truth, are ignoring the fact that part of the agreement is a promise that there will be no invasion of Cuba and that the "illegal quarantine" will be lifted. The newspaper REVOLUCION for Tuesday is quoted by PRENSA LATINA as declaring that "the heroism of the Cuban people has again moved the world." For seven days, the paper is quoted as saying,

President Kennedy "prepared against our country all the aggressive forces of the monopolists and the Pentagon." Now "our people and Fidel" again look serenely to the future. Reported in the same dispatch is NOTICIAS DE HOY's statement that if the United States is sincere, it must begin by "dismantling the gigantic criminal machinery . . . set up to attack our people."

Havana did not report that the naval blockade had been lifted for 48 hours until U Thant arrived in Cuba. Prior to that, the radio had apparently sought to convey the idea that the blockade was ineffective by presenting speakers from "the first Cuban ship to break the imperialist blockade." A television commentator remarked that despite the blockade, "the Soviet merchantmen have kept coming to our country. Oil and other shipments are still coming from that distant friendly country."

An announcement on the afternoon of 30 October says that Fidel Castro will "speak to the world" over radio and television on Thursday. So far there has been little further advance publicity for this speech.

III. YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade radio's reportage and comment on Khrushchev's 28 October message dominate broadcast materials on the 28th and 29th, reaching a total of approximately 75 percent of broadcast time 29 October. Belgrade maintains a relatively objective stance, carrying reports from its correspondents in New York and Moscow of American, Soviet, United Nations, and world reaction stressing the theme that the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of messages represents a definite advance toward a solution of world problems such as disarmament and that, while great credit must go to the two leaders, especially Khrushchev, the nonaligned nations may also claim some credit for the part they played. Belgrade's dominant theme of optimism for the future culminates in a Ranko Lozo report from New York forecasting an imminent summit meeting and a possible Soviet-American agreement on the peaceful use of space.

Belgrade's first report of the Khrushchev message strikes the mild note characteristic of its entire treatment of the subject, noting that first reactions at the United Nations were that the crisis had finally been overcome and there was no longer any basis for military steps threatening peace. A Moscow report by Kicevic describes Moscow sources as believing the Khrushchev message to be a decisive step toward peaceful solution of the problem. The same newscast carries a New York report stating that American radio and television termed the Khrushchev message "a great and perhaps decisive contribution to the solution of the crisis." Mounting Belgrade attention to the Cuban events is typified by the radio's 0300 GMT newscast 29 October, almost entirely devoted to the subject. The radio reports President Kennedy's message to Khrushchev as expressing American hopes that a serious step can be made on the disarmament question and American readiness to discuss such problems urgently and in a constructive spirit in Geneva and elsewhere. U Thant's acceptance of Castro's

invitation to visit Cuba is reported, as are the Zoryn talks with U Thant and expressions of pleasure over the outcome of the issue voiced by the Norwegian premier, an Italian foreign office spokesman, and the Swedish and Danish foreign ministers.

The radio notes a BORBA commentary stressing that commonsense and peace have prevailed in the crisis and carries a Dimitrijevic commentary asserting that the basic tenor of Western press reaction to the 28 October message exchange is that "the worst has passed." Another commentary, by Dragoljub Katic, asserts that while credit must go to the leaders, Khrushchev foremost, of the two major powers involved in the dispute, the nonaligned countries must not be too modest in claiming some credit for the role they played in bringing about a resolution of the crisis. A Moscow report by Kicevic broadcast the evening of 29 October says that Moscow sources believe if the Cuban situation is solved in an appropriate manner, the way may be opened to "a period of pacification" and the solution of other problems, such as that of a test ban.

Belgrade continues extensive reportage of Cuban developments throughout 29 and 30 October, carrying factual reports of U Thant's impending visit to Cuba and his talks with Kuznetsov, Kennedy's appointment of a special committee to deal with the solution of the Cuban problem, a United States Defense Department spokesman's statement that the quarantine will remain in effect until the United Nations introduces inspection, the White House announcement that the United States will suspend the quarantine during U Thant's visit to Cuba at his request, Raul Castro's statement, a TASS commentary asserting that the United States must prove by deeds its statement that it will not attack Cuba, and messages by Nkrumah and Nehru regarding the Cuban situation sent to Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Castro.

Highlighting Belgrade's 29 October newscasts are the texts of messages exchanged between President Tito and Brazil's President Goulart. In his message Tito emphasizes the need to abolish the quarantine and to stop shipment of offensive arms to Cuba and indicates that the United Nations is the instrument which "can and should act more effectively to bring an end to the crisis." Tito adds that it would be useful for the leaders of the nonaligned and independent countries "to become personally involved" by sending messages to the chairmen of the Security Council and the General Assembly--a move which he says he intends to make "in the nearest future." A BORBA commentary reviewed by Belgrade radio early 30 October maintains that "more attention should be devoted to the countries of the Latin American region and that broader solutions should be sought to stabilize peace in this sphere."

IV. NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

A. Latin America

Venezuela: Caracas and San Cristobal radios, while noting that Khrushchev's decision to remove the rocket bases from Cuba has confirmed Castro's role as a mere puppet of an outside power, warn that Castroism remains a threat to democracies in the Americas. Radio Continente of Caracas says Khrushchev's action reveals a "great truth" about Castro-- that he was not only willing to provide Cuban soil for nuclear bases, but that he was willing to provide "a foothold for an awesome attack against continental democracy and our nation's sovereignty." The radio observes that Castro has "emerged as a fraud" and a "pathetic puppet who meekly submits to the whims of extracontinental bosses."

The Caracas independent daily LA ESFERA calls for the overthrow of the communist regime in Cuba, while the progovernment daily LA REPUBLICA, also of Caracas, says Castro must stop creating disturbances in other Latin American countries before his government can be respected. LA REPUBLICA says Khrushchev's action is a retreat but that he is trying to cover it up by the allegation that Washington will now respect the Cuban regime. The paper adds: "Something must be done" to make Castro promise "seriously and formally not to meddle in the internal affairs of other nations of the Americas."

San Cristobal's radio Ecos del Torbes quotes R. Ramon Escovar Salom, head of the Progressive Republican Movement, as declaring that dismantling of the bases is "not enough" and that "Sino-Soviet penetration of the Americas via Havana is intolerable." The head of the Democratic Action Party, Dr. Raul Leoni, is quoted by Caracas radio as asserting that the dismantling of the bases shows that Castro's country has been "turned into a beachhead for extracontinental military penetration." Venezuelan radios continue to report special vigilance by public security forces, and a government warning that anyone disseminating reports that cause panic, discouragement, or disorder will be tried for treason. Caracas reports a message from the Venezuelan chamber of deputies to U.N. Secretary U Thant supporting his efforts to maintain peace.

Colombia: Bogota's Radio Cadena Nacional carries numerous news reports on the developing situation, including the observation that "international political observers concede a Kennedy victory." Bogota AFP reports that Colombians felt a sense of relief on learning that the "imminence of world war" had dissipated. The entire press of 29 October praised

President Kennedy, AFP adds. Other reports note that Castro has been silent following the Khrushchev move, that the United States is continuing its precautions in the event negotiations do not succeed, and that Khrushchev may have lost prestige in his own government.

RCN reports that Colombian armed forces reduced the special measures that were taken when the crisis was at its peak. The Bogota RCN also reports that the Liberal Revolutionary Movement has stated that whereas the party formerly was in agreement with Castro on social issues, it can no longer maintain this position in view of the fact that "Khrushchev is managing the Caribbean from Moscow and is using the premier as a puppet." EL TIEMPO of Bogota comments that the Russian move to remove the bases is worthy of praise and believes it has opened the door to an understanding on many of the issues that caused the United States to take a determined stand. Bogota's Radio Santa Fe says the United States has bolstered its international credit and that the Russians have taken Castro's armaments and left him with "nothing to do but continue firing his high-caliber rantings over radio and television."

Bolivia: Radio La Cruz del Sur, of La Paz, comments that Khrushchev has made Fidel Castro appear as a "mere deputy." The radio says Cubans only recently became aware of the fact that Cuba possessed missiles, and that the "real boss was Nikita--not Fidel." Another commentator of the same station notes that Khrushchev sent arms to Cuba secretly for a long time but now has admitted it in his message to President Kennedy. The La Paz radio also reports, however, that the leftist national mine-workers conference adopted a resolution supporting Cuba.

Panama: Panama City's Circuito RPC says Khrushchev's action has removed any doubts that Castro has made a total sell-out to the Soviet Union. The station says the fact that Khrushchev did not consult Castro on the missile withdrawal "could not have been more humiliating for the Cuban puppet." Radio Mia, also of Panama City, says Khrushchev has "clearly demonstrated" that he gives the orders in Cuba, and that he ignores Castro's opinions, but warns that the Cuban threat must be eliminated once and for all. The radio declares that the "time has come to extirpate the cancer that has pierced the head of the Americas." The OAS, it is suggested, "has the obligation to adopt all appropriate measures to dissolve this absurd, bloody, and totalitarian regime." Another Panama City commentator terms the Khrushchev order dismantling the bases a "black day for the Reds." Panama City's Radio Nacional and Radio Miramar relay direct Voice of American broadcasts on the developing situation following the Khrushchev note, and Panamanian television

stations carry extensive films on the situation. A Televisora Nacional commentator notes the Brazilian proposal for the "denuclearization" of Africa and Latin America and says the Brazilian initiative deserves "great consideration."

Brazil: In addition to widespread expressions of hope that present developments will lead, through the United Nations, to agreement on disarmament, Brazilian sources devote considerable attention to the Brazilian proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The Brazilian press, according to AFP, regards the latest developments in the Cuban crisis as a "beautiful victory" for Brazil's policy. Although President Kennedy also receives some praise, the press continues to insist on "self-determination" for Cuba. SAPORITI news agency reports rumors that the stability of the Goulart Government is threatened by leftist parties still angry over Brazil's OAS vote for the U.S. quarantine.

Costa Rica: San Jose's Radio Reloj sees four results of the "dramatic events" culminating in the Khrushchev decision: 1) the beginning of the end of Castro as a heroic symbol; 2) more respect for the United States; 3) firmer solidarity between the United States and NATO; and 4) renewed unity in the American Continent against the threat posed by the communist world. The radio says some leaders of the Soviet Union might feel resentment over the situation and a new schism in the communist world could develop. Castro, despite his proclamations of adherence to Marxism-Leninism, was not consulted and appeared alarmed and furious over the Khrushchev move, the radio declares. Another Radio Reloj commentary refers to "Russia's surrender" and the "victory of U.S. policy."

Radio Monumental of San Jose carries a resolution of the Union of Workers of the Municipal Council of Cartago which says the Cuban revolution "is dead" and that Fidel Castro has emerged as a symbol of "tyranny, treachery, and dishonor." The resolution praises the "great unity between the North American and Costa Rican people." In an interview with Radio Monumental, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Daniel Oduber Quiros says Cuba's regime has become a Russian satellite government, and that Russia considers Castro a mere card in the world political game rather than a responsible ally.

Honduras: Tegucigalpa's Radio Centro carries a statement of the Government Public Relations Office which denounces the "call to subversion" made by Radio Havana and asserts the Honduran Government's "determination to act in the strongest way whenever any event arises in Honduras that is aimed at fulfilling orders emanating from Havana."

Peru: A Lima Radio America commentator says the victory of the United States "has been overwhelming from every standpoint, considering the proportions of the crisis threatening peace and security in the continent." The commentator says Khrushchev had to "capitulate" in the face of President Kennedy's "firm, resolute action," and that Castro has been left with nothing to show but the absurdity of his role as a "servant and slave of the Russians." The Russian move, it is said, should serve to lessen world tension. Lima's domestic service notes that President Kennedy sent a message of thanks to President Perez Godoy for his support.

Paraguay: Radio Encarnacion says Castro now has no alternative but to allow the inspection of the guided missile bases installed by the Soviets on his island in view of the pressing demands of the United Nations. The Paraguayan transmitter says this can be considered a setback to Soviet policy--a setback Khrushchev will have to explain to other Red leaders. Another Radio Encarnacion commentary says Khrushchev "had to retreat."

Argentina: The news agency SAPORITI says a television program in Buenos Aires on 29 October included the observation of Dr. Julio Amoeda, last Argentine Ambassador to Havana, that the blockade of Cuba did not violate the principles of self-determination, and that there is now ample proof of Soviet intervention in Cuba. It was declared that Castro's regime was acting in the service of international communism.

Mexico: A commentary by Barrios Gomez, broadcast by the Mexico City radio, says that fortunately Khrushchev was not as senseless as Hitler when he failed to withdraw his troops from Warsaw. Noting that Castro has now been isolated, Barrios Gomez says President Kennedy now knows where the shoe pinches that Khrushchev used to pound his United Nations desk.

Other Countries: Radios monitored from Uruguay, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador carried numerous reports on the situation but no comment was heard. Guatemalan radios, however, were heard to relay Voice of America broadcasts.

B. West Europe

West Germany: West German press and radio comment on the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange is heavy. Although the sentiment prevails that Kennedy's prestige is now greater than ever, and that the Soviets have suffered a clearcut defeat, commentators warn of possible strong Soviet retaliatory action elsewhere.. Radio and press emphasize that President Kennedy's firmness, rather than Khrushchev's love of peace, is responsible for the sudden Soviet decision.

DIE WELT, Hamburg independent, points out that the Cuban crisis has made one thing clear: that world peace was preserved only through

Kennedy's firmness. DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Cologne progovernment paper, asserts that Khrushchev finally recognized this American determination.

Most papers and radio commentators are quick to point out, however, that Khrushchev does not intend to accept defeat without seeking compensation in other areas, with RHEINISCHE POST, Duesseldorf progovernment, adding that the swiftness with which Khrushchev abandoned his Cuban position is a definite indication of this possibility. Typical of other comment along this line is that of GENERAL-ANZEIGER, Bonn progovernment, which predicts that Khrushchev will exploit his gesture as a savior of peace by wresting U.S. concessions on Berlin, and that of FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, pro-opposition, which asserts that Khrushchev will make up for his withdrawal by a diplomatic advance elsewhere. Olaf von Wrangel, in commenting over Radios Hamburg and Cologne, believes that the Soviets will attempt to establish a bridgehead elsewhere in order to negotiate the elimination of some NATO base or even Berlin.

In a more positive vein, several papers express hope for direct negotiations between Washington and Moscow as a result of the agreement reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev on the Cuban missile sites, but Wolf Rochlage, speaking over Radio Mainz, fears that these negotiations might possibly violate the interests of smaller nations.

Official Bonn reaction, while coinciding with that expressed in the press and radio, is accompanied by a note of concern. Press services of the leading parties caution against premature exultation and excessive optimism. Several papers report and agree with the statement by CDU/CSU floorleader Von Brentano that in return for the Cuban concession Moscow will demand the elimination of NATO bases and revive the demilitarized zones project.

The only negative reaction is that of the Hamburg newsmagazine DER SPIEGEL which criticizes Kennedy for having acted without proper justification and with brute force, and for his failure to consult his allies. According to DER SPIEGEL, Kennedy, "ruling the Western world in cowboy style," has shown how the next war may break out: the world will slip into the third world war because of inadequately assessed risks and a tension-relieving now-or-never attitude.

Great Britain: Extensive British press comment, as reviewed by London's general overseas service, ranges from expressions of "relief" and "great satisfaction" to statements reflecting great doubt that the crisis has, in fact, been resolved. These doubts are contained in such statements as: "Khrushchev has climbed down so quickly, so meekly, that the picture just does not fit"; "it is always a perilous procedure to take Khrushchev at face value"; and "Is it possible that Soviet acceptance of the principle of verification may lead to a breakthrough in the deadlock over disarmament and nuclear testing?"

The prevailing feeling that President Kennedy handled the situation admirably is reflected in the London DAILY MAIL's observation that the crisis was handled "subtly" by one with a "cool head and steady nerves." The GUARDIAN comments that Kennedy is to be commended for his decisive action, and, then, his readiness to be conciliatory. For the first time in 16 years, the GUARDIAN adds, the Russians were forced into retreat, by the "resourceful and courageous" Mr. Kennedy.

France: Although Khrushchev's agreement to withdraw his missile bases from Cuba is widely reported, French comment is concerned primarily with the results of the De Gaulle referendum. Paris radio commentator Maurice Ferro expresses surprise that this issue was settled directly between the two great powers, and that there was no role for European mediators. This, Ferro says, can only lead the European observer to ask himself: Why is Europe not building itself into a political and economic unit? He concludes: "Europe should not delay in uniting with Great Britain to form a power with greater economic power than either of the two big thermonuclear powers--a power, thanks to Britain and France, which will also possess an atomic deterrent."

Italy: The Italian press, reviewed by Rome radio, tends to view the outcome as a "step toward peace" rather than a victory for either side. "If the positive development of the Cuban crisis results in negotiations dominated by commonsense and justice," LA STAMPA writes, "the anxiety of these last few days will have served a great purpose." IL MESSAGGERO hopes that with Khrushchev apparently having become a realist regarding Cuba, he will apply the same attitude to other international issues so that "peace and security will no longer be just a theoretical image."

Switzerland: The Swiss press, reviewed by DPA, stresses President Kennedy's victory over Khrushchev, but not without giving the Soviet Premier some credit. The NATIONAL ZEITUNG of Basle writes that while Khrushchev has been taught a lesson, he has been able "to retreat without losing face." LA SUISSE notes the possibility that Khrushchev's latest declaration may be a maneuver "designed to incline world public opinion toward unilateral action in other parts of the world." TRIBUNE DE GENEVE writes that the U.S. pledge of nonintervention in Cuba will permit the Castro regime to continue its bloc-inspired subversion of Latin America.

Austria: The exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev draws extensive comment in the Austrian radio and press. Austrian radio commentator Ostry believes that it was the fine balance of nuclear power which saved the world from war, and expresses hope that the Cuban crisis may mark a turning point in world history since it has demonstrated that war has outlived its role as a means of politics. He pleads for a reform of international law, adjusting it to the changed conditions with the ultimate goal of replacing the balance of terror with a "balance of justice."

Press comment, very pro-American in tenor, generally depicts the outcome as an American success and unanimously lauds the show of American firmness. Opinions as to how the Russians fared show up in the headlines which speak, on the one hand, of the "greatest Western victory since 1945," and, on the other, of a "perfectly logical action by the Kremlin." The editorial attitude toward Khrushchev is frequently one of grudging respect, even in some pronouncedly anticommunist editorials. Several writers say he showed "great statesmanship," while another sees him as a master gambler who made the best of a lost game. Some editorials, such as that of the semiofficial WIENER ZEITUNG, see need for caution, events having demonstrated that "firmness applied in proper doses can be effective." The independent KURIER charges Khrushchev with having gone back on his own professed principles of coexistence by trying to alter the status quo, and says he had to withdraw quickly "to avoid being rapped hard on the knuckles" by the United States. The Catholic KLEINE ZEITUNG compares Khrushchev to a robber who is now patted on the back because he put his gun back into his pocket after a better armed policeman appeared on the scene.

Some papers express concern over possible Soviet retaliation, conceivably in Berlin, and some feel uneasy about the possibility of Khrushchev's being overthrown by a belligerent Kremlin faction. In this connection, ARBEITER-ZEITUNG recalls the disillusionment caused by earlier sudden aboutfaces in Soviet policy such as the Hungarian revolution and the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. DIE PREESE asserts that Kennedy's initiative may have averted another Berlin crisis since the test of strength in the Caribbean Sea has considerably narrowed Moscow's freedom of action and has accentuated the risks.

C. Asia and the Far East

Japan: Premier Khrushchev's letter is unanimously hailed as a favorable turn of events by the Japanese press and radio-TV, which describe it with such expressions of relief as "an unexpected concession," "a drastic compromise," and "a considerable defeat." Comments generally stress that a way has been found to solve the Cuban crisis, thereby removing the threat of thermonuclear war.

All leading newspapers carry Khrushchev's message to President Kennedy as their lead story in text form or full summary under banner headlines such as "Sudden Turn of Events Toward U.S.-Soviet Settlement Over Cuba," "Offensive Weapons To Be Withdrawn," "Cuban Crisis Avoided," and "Soviet Union Withdraws From Cuba." At the same time President Kennedy's statement welcoming Khrushchev's decision is given prominence by the press in bold print: "Welcomes Move As Statesmanlike Step Toward Peace" and "Hails Action As Important Contribution To Peace."

Describing Khrushchev as a peace-maker who stopped the world "on the brink of nuclear war," YOMIURI asserts: "On the surface it may seem as if the Soviet Union has bowed to America's power diplomacy, but Moscow has gained an advantageous position in giving the world the impression that it is a guardian deity of peace." The paper warns that it would be dangerous to believe that Moscow will withdraw from areas of vital interest to the Soviets if the West resorts to a show of force.

SANKEI also expresses a similar view. After editorially praising Khrushchev's "unexpectedly flexible attitude," it says that Khrushchev may have established "an advantageous foothold" in future negotiations with the United States on other international problems, and predicts that the Soviet Union will start a new diplomatic offensive for the withdrawal of American bases abroad for its dismantling of missile bases in Cuba. MAINICHI editorially praises Khrushchev for his "astuteness as a practical statesman," adding that his image as "a man of peace" has been strengthened. It says: "It is often the Soviet strategy to show a strongly menacing attitude at first, then concede later. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Premier Khrushchev's concession has given the world a favorable impression." The economic journal, NIHON KEIZAI, calls Khrushchev's concession not a matter of victory or defeat in the war of diplomacy but a "victory for man's rationality."

JOAK commentator Goro Fujise observes: "The fact that the United States must allow the continuation of the communist regime in Cuba will become an important matter to the United States from now on and also international criticism of U.S. military bases abroad will become stronger." Stressing that the stern military action taken by the United States against Cuba has fully reflected the fear of the American people for newly installed missiles in Cuba, TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting System) commentator Kichizo Karashima expresses the view that the Cuban crisis has made the world realize the necessity of settling the question of military bases.

A panel discussion of top ASAHI, MAINICHI, and YOMIURI commentators aired by TBS agrees that "Japan will find itself in a tight spot if the United States establishes new bases in the future."

Communist AKAHATA comment on Khrushchev's letter stresses the withdrawal of "aggressive weapons" from Cuba on condition that the United States will not invade Cuba, noting that "the brutality of U.S. imperialism has been exposed, amidst the patient and cool action of the Soviet Government."

Nationalist China: The Taipei radio and press are cautious in their appraisal of Khrushchev's decision to dismantle its bases in Cuba. The HSIN SHENG PAO, in an editorial carried by Radio Taipei on 29 October, says experience shows that Khrushchev will ask the United States to pay a high price for dismantling the Soviet bases in Cuba and says that even if these are withdrawn Khrushchev can build more bases in other Latin American countries and other parts of the world. The paper stresses that the only way to solve the Cuban question is to overthrow the Castro regime, a position also maintained by the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS. That paper's editorial warns the United States not to fall into the trap of false negotiations from which Khrushchev will likely seek assurance from the Government not to invade Cuba as part of a bargain.

South Korea: The Seoul radio makes copious use of Western press agency reports for news roundups on the Cuban situation. In a report on 29 October the radio notes Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the bases in Cuba and says that by consenting to inspection in Cuba the Soviet premier may now face another demand that he accept inspection in other areas of disarmament. In another broadcast on the same day, the radio says that although Khrushchev has decided to dismantle the Soviet bases in Cuba, the United States does not think it easy to surmount the various obstacles which may arise in solving the Cuban question.

South Vietnam: Saigon-Cholon editorialists repeatedly refer to the need for caution lest Khrushchev's move be the source of new trickery. VAN KUO JIH PAO warns of possible Soviet moves in other areas, while THANH CONG JIH PAO expresses fear of a plot to gain time and enable the USSR to complete the missile sites. Area editorialists also stress that the move allows the USSR to maintain its influence in Cuba. One paper states that as long as this influence exists, Khrushchev can use the island as a base for gradually communizing Latin America. Only occasionally mentioned is that Khrushchev's concession is a victory for Kennedy and that more firmness of this kind should be used in dealing with communism. One paper disapproves Kennedy's decision to lift the blockade during U Thant's visit to Cuba.

Australia: The Melbourne AGE is quoted by the Australian overseas service as saying that Kennedy's actions throughout the crisis were "entirely vindicated" by the outcome, but that any elation must be tempered with caution. Although the suddenness with which Khrushchev backed down is surprising, the paper says, it is apparent that Khrushchev was not prepared to risk war over Cuba. That the world was again carried to the brink of war testifies ever more clearly to the need for a "new approach" to East-West relationships and specifically Soviet-American relations, the paper concludes.

Indonesia: Quoting news agency dispatches on developments in Cuba, the Djakarta radio reports Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the Soviet bases in Cuba and Kennedy's statement praising him for the decision, describing it as an important contribution to peace. However, there has been no monitored official, press, or radio comment. In this connection the Djakarta radio reports without details on 30 October that the Cuban charge d'affaires called on Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo and that the Soviet military attache was received by Gen. Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces, to discuss the Cuban issue. The Indonesian Information Service quotes statements issued by the Murba Party, the Indonesian Peace Committee, and the Indonesian-Cuban Friendship Association protesting the U.S. blockade and "aggression" against Cuba, none of which make any reference to the Soviet decision to dismantle its bases.

India: The New Delhi radio reports briefly that Premier Nehru sent a message to Kennedy and Khrushchev "expressing relief over the happy turn of events and his real appreciation of their statesmanship, which has helped to remove the immediate danger." In other reports on the Cuban situation, the radio confines itself to brief reports from news agency dispatches.

Other Countries: The Karachi radio reports briefly without comment Khrushchev's announcement to dismantle the bases and Kennedy's statement welcoming this Soviet decision. Monitored Bangkok and Rangoon broadcasts devote little or no attention to Cuban developments. There has been no monitored comment from Laotian or Cambodian stations.

D. Middle East and Africa

Israel: Within a few hours of the Khrushchev message, HAARETZ political commentator Katz tells the Israeli radio audience that "Khrushchev's latest proposal is a retreat, which he is trying to cover up and present before the world as a gesture of peace." In general, the Israeli press interprets Khrushchev's decision as necessitated by America's firmness. According to HAARETZ, the United States has "reconsolidated its position as leader of the Western world, just as President Kennedy has strengthened his position as leader of the American people." The paper adds that the prospects for peace have improved now that the "equilibrium between

the two blocs is today better balanced." HATZOFÉ says that the threat of an American invasion of Cuba had "a very sobering and deterrent effect in Moscow," since thousands of Soviet officers and technicians would have been casualties. AL-HAMISEMAR praises Khrushchev's "wisdom" and calls for concessions from the United States which could lead to lessening tension, while SHEARIM says the free world has now proved it is strong enough to check Soviet intrigues.

UAR: In noting President Kennedy's remarks about ending the arms race and easing tension, AL-JUMHURIYAH recalls President Nasir's 1960 United Nations speech referring to the elimination of military bases and disarmament. In calling for a general peace conference under the United Nations, the paper says that "now that Kennedy and Khrushchev have admitted that the arms race has caused a severe waste," the best guarantee for the success of disarmament talks is to make "the nonaligned powers the judges." In another article, AL-JUMHURIYAH points out that world peace is indivisible and that it is of no use to speak of peace in the Cuban and Berlin crises and to disregard it elsewhere. According to a Cairo radio commentator, the public must not be deceived into believing the crisis is all over, because the solution does not lie in abolishing bases by one side only.

Syria: The Damascus radio broadcasts a telegram 28 October, from Premier Khalid al-Azm to his "great friend" Khrushchev, in which he expresses admiration for Khrushchev's "brave and noble stand" which has "saved humanity from definite and complete destruction and which is shining proof of self-restraint." The Damascus paper AN-NASR also praises the Soviets' "heroic, noble, wise, and farsighted" stand which "sidestepped a collision," but asks how the positions-of-strength policy can be restrained in the future now that it has had a "successful round" in Cuba and who can guarantee that the United States "will not adopt a similar attitude toward other countries." The paper adds that the United Nations must make clear to the United States that its "law of the jungle" can only lead to a nuclear war of which the "Americans will be the first victims." A Damascus commentator says that the "essence" of the Cuban crisis will continue to exist because Soviet and American military bases are a "danger to the whole world."

Iraq: The Iraqi press and radio commentaries make only oblique references to the Cuban crisis. For example, AL-BILAD praises Premier Qasim's part in "foiling the aggressive plots against the struggling Cuban people" by his statement of 25 October scoring the American blockade, and AL-JUMHUR

stresses the role of world opinion in solving the Cuban crisis. A Baghdad radio commentator stresses Iraq's role as a nonaligned state in settling the crisis and affirms that the people's support of peace is the real curb to the warmongers.

Saudi Arabia: The only Mecca radio commentary says that Nasir has received a "stunning blow at the defeat of his friend and colleague in communism, Castro," adding that the era of dictatorships is over and the era of "genuine popular democracy" has begun.

Iran: Several PARS "Topic of the Day" news commentaries review favorable world reaction to the lowering of tension following the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange. Teheran foresees that one result of the Soviet dismantling of the Cuban bases will be a Khrushchev visit to America within 3 months. The radio concludes that the President's "brilliant Cuban victory" has assured a Democratic Party victory in the congressional elections. According to Ankara radio, the Shah told reporters in Istanbul that he hopes the "encouraging" Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange will lead to a solution of world problems and lessened tension.

Greece: An Athens commentator says that on behalf of the free world, President Kennedy has shown the "greatest possible good faith" since the Khrushchev announcement on the Cuban bases, "thus contributing to an easing of world tension." The commentator asserts that as soon as the United States "neutralized the great danger which directly threatened humanity" it opened negotiations with noteworthy speed.

Turkey: Although Turkey gives adequate news coverage to the Cuban situation, news commentators do not discuss the Cuban crisis. The Ankara radio quotes Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin as terming the Soviet decision "excellent news if true."

Ghana: Comment from Ghana, reported by Radio Accra, praises the efforts of world leaders, and especially Khrushchev, to solve the Cuban crisis and welcomes President Kennedy's reassurances that the United States will not invade Cuba. Other comment reported by Accra credits Nkrumah in part for the "lull" in the Cuban crisis, applauds the mediation efforts of the Ghanaian and UAR delegates to the United Nations, and speaks of Ghana's role in "extracting an assurance from the United States that it would not invade Cuba." The Accra international service reports that Nkrumah sent a letter to Khrushchev congratulating him on the "bold decision" to dismantle missile bases in Cuba, a letter to President Kennedy welcoming his "timely and important reassurances that the United States will not invade Cuba," and a letter to Castro congratulating him on his "readiness to agree to halt the construction of missile bases."

A GHANAIAN TIMES editorial says that by agreeing to dismantle the missile bases Khrushchev has "made the biggest concession to mankind," and adds that though the presence of missiles in Cuba would undoubtedly have created another area of tension, the United States had no justification for the blockade of shipments to Cuba. An Accra radio commentary says Khrushchev's action was the more significant in that it was taken without "any known reciprocal gesture by President Kennedy." Though President Kennedy's reassurance that the United States will not invade Cuba is "most welcome," the commentary adds, it is to be hoped that in giving the reassurance "direct invasion was not the only method Mr. Kennedy had in mind." Other comment reviewed by the Accra radio calls for steps to eliminate all ground-to-ground missile sites established outside the territories of powers providing and controlling such weapons.

Nigeria: Nigerian press comment, according to the Lagos radio, praises the Soviet Union's role during the current Cuban crisis and calls on the United States to "demonstrate in no uncertain terms that it is not, after all, the warmongering party." The Lagos DAILY EXPRESS describes Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missile sites as both "statesmanlike and courageous." The DAILY TELEGRAPH says the Soviet Premier decided to "give back peace to the world at a time when the hopes of peace were several degrees below zero." The TELEGRAPH adds that Khrushchev chose the road of peace not because the Soviet Union could not strike, but in the interests of world peace, and calls on the United States to follow suit by dismantling its bases around the Soviet Union "because it must not be expected that only Mr. Khrushchev should demonstrate statesmanship." The progovernment MORNING POST says the U.S. blockade of Cuba and the Soviet Union's handling of the situation proved to the world that "the Soviets are better diplomats than the Americans," adding that "for a long time to come" the Americans will "have to convince the world that they are not the ones who cause trouble and threaten the happy existence of man." Americans should not think that what they did over Cuba helped in any way to secure world peace, the paper concludes.

Other Countries: Ghanaian President Nkrumah's messages to Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Castro are also reported by other West African transmitters. A Moscow PRAVDA commentary praising Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle Cuban missile bases is reported by Senegal and Dahomey radios.

AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State

INFO : MOSCOW

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Opin.

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
SEARCH

NOV - 1 1962

FROM : Amembassy THE HAGUE

DATE: November 1, 1962

SUBJECT : Local Soviet Information Bulletin Apparently Makes Distinction Between Khrushchev's messages to the President of Oct. 27 and 28.

REF :

The Soviet Embassy in the Netherlands puts out a periodic Information Bulletin in the Dutch language. The Embassy has noted, as of possible interest to the Department, that the October 29 edition of this Information Bulletin carries the texts of Khrushchev's letters of October 27 and 28 to the President about the Cuban situation. Khrushchev's letter of October 27 is presented under the simple title of "To the President of the United States, J. Kennedy." The letter of October 28, which follows the previous presentation, is presented under the title "Message from the Chairman of the Ministers' Council of the USSR to the President of the U.S.A., J. Kennedy." The thought occurs to the reporting officer that this distinction in title may well be a conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Embassy to identify the letter of October 27 as an unofficial or personal message from Khrushchev, whereas the letter of October 28 has the endorsement of the Supreme Council. Furthermore, the Information Bulletin states that a copy of the letter of October 27 was provided to the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, but does not state this in connection with its presentation of the letter of October 28.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Samuel De Palma

Samuel De Palma
Counselor of Embassy for
Political Affairs

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- ~~PARROTT~~
- ~~PETERSEN~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:JMKavanaugh:mjk Oct. 31, 1962

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

air

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY~~SECRET~~

November 2, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The President called me this evening to ask if I had talked to Ambassador Alphand about the Khrushchev letter of October 26. I said I had but Alphand had been perfectly pleasant about it and had returned the copy to me which I had sent him. I also told the President that Alphand asked whether my request implied that we were suggesting that the leak had come from his Embassy. I told the President that I had said to Alphand that this was not the case. The President then told me that as a matter of fact we were imputing this to someone connected with the French Embassy.

He said that there had been a dinner at Stew Alsop's house at which Rowland Evans and another newspaper man had been present together with a member of the staff of the French Embassy, and that Evans had written his story on the basis of the account the Frenchman had given of the Khrushchev letter. The President asked me if I knew "Sigi" (A. de Segonzac). I said I knew him well. The President then asked me to call de Segonzac and ask him whether he could tell me the name of the Frenchman involved. He added that if de Segonzac was unwilling to do so, I should go and see Alphand confidentially and tell him what I knew. The President repeated that we were letting it be known responsibility for the leak rests with a member of the French Embassy staff.

WRT
William R. Tyler

EUR:WRTyler:mt

SECRET

EYES ONLY

OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

extra

4

Chairman Khrushchev states, in his letter of October 28:

"...the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuance of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union."

What are the arms which President Kennedy had, prior to Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 28, "described as offensive"?

The answer to this question is to be found primarily in four documents.

Press Conference of September 13

The first document is the transcript of the President's press conference of September 13, 1962, in which he made clear that the United States could not accept a Communist buildup in Cuba that might "endanger or interfere with our security in any way" nor could we accept to have Cuba "become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union". Later in the press conference the President refined this concept further by making it clear that the United States would act "if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive action against the United States." This concept that offensive arms are those that provide a capacity to

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *...* NARS, Date 12/1/24

EYES ONLY

deliver

SECRET

deliver weapons against the soil of this country or of the soil of other American states is the implicit theme in all of the President's subsequent references to the subject.

Address of October 22

The second relevant document is President Kennedy's address of October 22, 1962, a copy of which was formally delivered to the Soviet Government. In his address, President Kennedy spoke of the discovery of "offensive missile sites" in Cuba, stating that the "purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere." After discussing these missile sites, the President states:

"In addition, jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being extracted and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared".

The President further said:

"This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base--by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction, constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, ..."

Proclamation of October 23

The concept of offensive weapons as including both missiles and jet bomber systems was given more precise

definition

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EYES ONLY

-3-

definition in the Proclamation issued by President Kennedy on October 23, entitled: "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba." The proclamation was directed at preventing "the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba." It specified as "prohibited materiel":

Surface-to surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

Letter of October 27

In addition to these three documents, the President's letter of October 27 to Chairman Khrushchev should also be regarded as illuminating the term "offensive weapons." In that letter, the President stated:

"The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements."

The

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EYES ONLY

-4-

The letter further provides:

"You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision"

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

November 3, 1962

SECRET - EYES ONLY

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE**

[The Great Seal of the United States]

Subject: Chairman Khrushchev's letter to the President, dated October 26, 1962.

I am enclosing herewith the signed original and an official translation of Chairman Khrushchev's letter to the President dated October 26. A translation prepared by the Embassy in Moscow was forwarded via Moscow's telegram 1101.

**William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary**

[s] A. George

A. George

Attachments:

Director of Foreign Affairs

1. Letter to the President from Chairman Khrushchev, dated October 26.
2. Official translation.
3. Moscow's 1101.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Records

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By *Da...* NARS, Date *8/22/74*

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

For the President

AR

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Pursuant to the President's instructions (see my Memorandum for the Files of November 2, 1962), I took Ambassador Alphanth aside at a dinner on November 5 and told him about the report of the dinner at Stew Alsop's. Ambassador Alphanth told me the following:

- (1) He had not been present at the dinner.
- (2) He had only shown the copy of Khrushchev's letter of October 26 to one other person in his Embassy.
- (3) He wished to point out that the Rowland Evans story provided no evidence that Evans had actually seen a copy of the letter.

This afternoon the Counselor of the French Embassy, Mr. Winckler, came to see me and said he had been distressed to hear what I had told the Ambassador yesterday evening. He told me that he was the member of the French Embassy who had been at the Alsop dinner, which Bill Bundy and Al Friendly also attended. He said that Rowland Evans had started right away talking about the Khrushchev letter in terms suggesting that he had heard from someone that its tone was peculiar and denoted great excitement and nervousness. Mr. Winckler said that Rowland Evans obviously felt he already had a story and was casting about for additional details. Mr. Winckler said that he made no comment on the letter, and that when Rowland Evans pressed the matter with him after dinner, he confined himself to saying that the letter was confidential and that he did not feel he could discuss it. Mr. Winckler said that while the story which Evans finally wrote was longer and more circumstantial than what he said that evening, it was clear that Evans felt he was on the track of a good story and was building it up as he talked about it.

WRT
William R. Tyler

EUR:WRTyler:mt

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
State Letter 11/1/74
By *Denney* NARS, Date 12/3/74



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

115 NO. 1 1962
115-21/1-21, 1-4
Russian

November 8, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President
from Chairman Khrushchev,
dated October 28, 1962.

Forwarded herewith is the original text and official translation of the letter from Chairman Khrushchev to Soviet Socialist President Kennedy of October 28. The text of this letter was broadcast by Moscow Radio simultaneously with the receipt of the original by the Embassy in Moscow.

The official translation has been compared with the broadcast version and no differences in substance were noted.

J. T. ROGERS
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Letter to the President from Chairman Khrushchev, dated October 28.
2. Official translation.

W. Brubeck 11/14/62

SECRET

Texts of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Understanding
of October 26, 27 and 28, 1962

(Ret'd from
Miss. Lincoln
11/13)

1. From Khrushchev's secret letter of October 26.

*Mc Murray. Cy 3
Bundy - Cy 23
S.S. - Cy 1
Cy 4-22
Adm. 11/27*

"If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different...."

"Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: We, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear."

2. President's open letter of October 27.

"As I read your letter [of October 26th], the key elements of your proposals -- which seem generally acceptable as I understand them -- are as follows:

"1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

"2) We, on our part, would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3. Khrushchev's open answer of October 28.

"In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union. . . .

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, * we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict. "

*In Khrushchev's open letter of October 27 (the Cuba-Turkey proposal) he had said:

"I therefore make this proposal. We agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means. We agree to carry this out and declare this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey.

"Let us reach agreement as to the span of time needed for you and us to achieve this. After this, persons enjoying the confidence of the U. N. Security Council might check on-the-spot fulfillment

of the pledges assumed. Of course, the authorization of the governments of Cuba and Turkey are necessary for entry into those countries of these plenipotentiaries and for inspection of fulfillment of the pledge assumed by either side.

"It would evidently be better if these plenipotentiaries would have the trust of the Security Council and your trust and mine -- of the United States and the Soviet Union -- as well as of Turkey and Cuba. I think it will not be difficult to pick such people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned."

4. President's open answer of October 28.

"I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, as your message says, so that the United States in turn will be able to remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area."

~~SECRET~~

Texts of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Understanding
of October 26, 27 and 28, 1962

1. From Khrushchev's secret letter of October 26.

"If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different. . . .

"Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom, I propose: We, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear. "

2. President's open letter of October 27.

"As I read your letter / of October 26th / , the key elements of your proposals -- which seem generally acceptable as I understand them -- are as follows:

"1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

"2) We, on our part, would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. "

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3. Khrushchev's open answer of October 28.

"In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union....

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,* we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict. "

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