



John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library

Columbia Point Boston, Massachusetts 02125

June 3, 1991

Antonio E. De La Cova
Bon Vista Apts. F-3
Morgantown, West Virginia 26505

Dear Mr. De La Cova:

This is in reply to your letter of May 30.

Enclosed please find the photocopies of the Khrushchev-Kennedy letters from October 30, 1962 thru December 14, 1962 you requested.

Thank you for your interest.

Sincerely,

June Payne
Research Assistant



John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library

Columbia Point Boston, Massachusetts 02125

June 25, 1991

Antonio de la Cova
Bon Vista Apts.
Morgantown, WV 26505

Dear Mr. de la Cova:

This is in reply to your letter of June 19.

Enclosed please find the photocopies that you requested of the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence from October 1962.

Thank you for your interest and good luck with your book.

Sincerely,

June Payne
Archives Technician



John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library

Columbia Point Boston, Massachusetts 02125

Telephone: (617) 929-4582
929-4500

Mandatory Review Case: NLK-92-23

APR 16 1993

Tony Delacova
84-B Jefferson Street
Westover, WV 26505

Dear Mr. Delacova:

Mandatory review of the following document(s) has been completed.

Document(s) 1 have been declassified in full. They are available for research use in the Library's Research Room.

Copies of the declassified document(s) are enclosed.

Copy(ies) of the document(s) may be ordered at a cost of \$.25 per page. Please use the enclosed order form.

If you have any questions concerning this case or the mandatory review process, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Suzanne K. Forbes
Archivist, Foreign Policy Materials

Enclosure(s)

Receipt

Date 6/25 1991

No. **238301**

FROM ANTONIO de LA COVA

\$ 60.75

SIXTY

75
100

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FOR PHOTOCOPYING

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BOSTON, MA 02125

DC 1152

<u>ITEM #</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>PAGES</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN</u>
1	11/5/62	RFK memo to JFK	2	TS	DECLASSIFIED

NOTES FOR THE ARCHIVIST:

Item 1 is located in NSF:CO:USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, 11/3/62-11/6/62, Box 184.



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

November 5, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Am

Dobrynin asked earlier this morning if I could see him and I made arrangements to have him come to the office at 12 o'clock Noon.

He delivered another letter from Mr. Khrushchev. I read it and found that it concerned our list of offensive weapons that Stevenson had submitted.

I explained to Dobrynin that from the first it had been made clear by the Soviet Union that they would get rid of any weapons which we considered offensive and certainly it was very clear that the bombers, the IL 28's, had to go. Dobrynin replied that he was not familiar with that position and also did not know what was on the list that Khrushchev mentioned in his letter. I told him I would get a copy of it; that it was ^{basically} the same list of weapons that had been listed in the President's Quarantine Proclamation. He replied he would obtain a copy from Kusnetsov.

During the middle of the conversation the President called

DECLASSIFIED
EO. 12363, Sec. 3.4
NIK-92-23
By SF NARA, Date 4/14/93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum for
The President

November 5, 1962

and said that he had just received some preliminary information which indicated that several of our planes over Cuba had been fired upon. In ending my conversation with Dobrynin, therefore, I stressed the fact that any arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba.

RFK:amn
cc/Secretary Rusk
McGeorge Bundy

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release
01/06/92

January 6, 1992

STATEMENT BY MARGARET TUTWILER/SPOKESMAN

Release and Joint U.S.-Russian Publication of
the Kennedy-Khrushchev Correspondence Related to the
Cuban Missile Crisis

- The Department is today declassifying and releasing the remaining pieces of correspondence between President Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Russian Government is taking the same action and a similar announcement is being made in Moscow.
- The United States and Russia have also agreed to publish jointly all Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence related to the Cuban Missile Crisis. We are discussing details of the joint publication, which we expect to be accomplished this year. For the United States, the correspondence will be published by the United States Information Agency as a special issue of its publication Problems of Communism. This will include both English and Russian texts, plus scholarly commentary.
- Release by the United States and the Russian Federation of these letters comes at a time of dramatic change, when fundamentally new relations are developing between the United States and Russia. These documents, which involve critical high-level exchanges at the height of the Cold War which is now behind us, will be of interest to historians and scholars, as well as to the general public. The Department is pleased to be able to work with the Russian Federation to make the complete historical record of this correspondence available publicly.
- The correspondence declassified and released today is:
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated October 30, 1962 (unofficial translation);

- Letter from President Kennedy to General Secretary Khrushchev dated November 3, 1962 (U.S. original text);
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 4, 1962 (unofficial translation).
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 12, 1962 (unofficial translation);
 - Oral message from President Kennedy to General Secretary Khrushchev dated November 12, 1962 (unofficial English translation provided by the Russians);
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 14, 1962 (unofficial translation);
 - Letter from President Kennedy to General Secretary Khrushchev dated November 15, 1962 (U.S. original text);
 - Oral message from President Kennedy to General Secretary Khrushchev dated November 20, 1962 (unofficial English translation provided by the Russians);
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 20, 1962 (unofficial translation);
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 22, 1962 (unofficial translation);
 - Letter from General Secretary Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated December 10, 1962 (unofficial translation); and
 - Letter from President Kennedy to General Secretary Khrushchev dated December 14, 1962 (U.S. original text).
- Packages with the texts of the newly released correspondence, along with copies of previously released material, will be available in the Press Office. A list of all correspondence between President Kennedy and General Secretary Khrushchev on the Cuban missile crisis is attached.

Kennedy - Khrushchev Correspondence
Cuban Missile Crisis, October-December 1962

<u>Doc. #</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Sender/Recipient</u>	<u>Summary</u>	<u>Citation of Previous Publication</u>
1.	10/22/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Kennedy expresses U.S. reaction to Cuban developments.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 635; <u>Claflin, JFK</u> , pp. 205-206.
2.	10/23/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Khrushchev accuses U.S. of intervening in Cuba; reaction to Kennedy's speech of 10/22.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 636.
3.	10/23/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Kennedy acknowledges Khrushchev's 10/23 letter and blames Soviets for Cuban crisis.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 636.
4.	10/24/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Answers Kennedy's letter of 10/23 and accuses Kennedy of offering the Soviets an ultimatum, not a "quarantine."	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 637.
5.	10/25/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Replies to Khrushchev's letter of 10/24/ and reiterates U.S. belief that Soviets initiated the first challenge in the crisis.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 639.
6.	10/26/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Acknowledges Kennedy's letter of 10/25 and protests U.S. definition of offensive weapons.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 640.
7.	10/27/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Acknowledges Khrushchev's letter of 10/26 and agrees to work out permanent solution to the Cuban problem.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 649; <u>Claflin, JFK</u> , pp. 209-210; <u>Docs. on Disarm.</u> , p. 990.; <u>Public Papers of JFK</u> , p. 813.
8.	10/27/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Has studied Kennedy's reply to U Thant; proposes points of agreement for avoiding armed conflict.	<u>Bulletin</u> , Nov. 19, 1973, p. 646; <u>Docs. on Disarm.</u> , p. 991.

9.	10/28/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Replies to Kennedy's letter of 10/27 and assures him that order has been issued to dismantle offensive weapons.	<u>Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1973, p. 650;</u> <u>Docs. on Disarm., p. 995.</u>
10.	10/28/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Answers Khrushchev's message of 10/28, saying it is an important contribution to peace.	<u>Bulletin, Nov. 19, 1973, p. 654;</u> <u>Public Papers of JFK, p. 814;</u> <u>Claflin, JFK, pp. 211-212; Docs.</u> <u>on Disarm., p. 1000.</u>
*1.	10/30/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Discusses Cuba, disarmament, Germany and Berlin.	
*2.	11/03/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Kennedy replies to Khrushchev's message of 10/30.	
*2a.	11/04/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	[Received on 11/05/62] Khrushchev discusses a list of offensive weapons.	
3.	11/06/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Message concerning removal of IL-28 bombers from Cuba.	Claflin, <u>JFK</u> , pp. 217-221.
*4.	11/12/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Message confirms withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.	
*5.	11/13/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Oral message on IL-28 bombers.	
*6.	11/14/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Message agrees to withdraw IL-28 bombers from Cuba.	
*7.	11/15/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Acknowledges Soviet agreement to remove IL-28 bombers.	
*8.	11/20/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Confirms Cuban agreement in reply to Kennedy's 11/15 message.	

*9.	11/20/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Oral message lowering the state of alert on Cuba.	
10.	11/21/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Replies to Khrushchev's message of 11/20.	Published in Claflin, <u>JFK</u> , p. 222; Beschloss, <u>Crisis Years</u> , 561.
*11.	11/22/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Answers Kennedy's 11/21 message.	
*12.	12/10/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Discusses Cuba and Berlin.	
*13.	12/14/62	Kennedy to Khrushchev	Kennedy considers Cuban crisis over.	Published in part in Claflin, <u>JFK</u> , pp. 227-229; Beschloss, <u>Crisis Years</u> , 571.
14.	12/19/62	Khrushchev to Kennedy	Khrushchev considers Cuban crisis closed; discusses nuclear test ban and inspections,	<u>Docs. on Disarm.</u> , p. 1239. <u>Amer. For. Pol.: Current Docs.</u> (1962), p. 1306.

*(NEWLY DECLASSIFIED LETTERS Jan. 6, 1992)



LETTERS EXCHANGED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962

- 1. 10/22/62 President Kennedy letter
- 2. 10/23/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 3. 10/23/62 President Kennedy letter
- 4. 10/24/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 5. 10/25/62 President Kennedy letter
- 6. 10/27/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 7. 10/26/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 8. 10/27/62 President Kennedy letter
- 9. 10/28/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 10. 10/28/62 President Kennedy letter
- 11. 10/30/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 12. 11/03/62 President Kennedy letter
- 13. 11/05/62 (received) Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 14. 11/06/62 President Kennedy letter
- 15. 11/12/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 16. 11/14/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
- 17. 11/15/62 President Kennedy letter
- 18. 11/20/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter

19. 11/21/62 President Kennedy letter
20. 11/23/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
21. 12/11/62 Chairman Khrushchev letter
22. 12/14/62 President Kennedy letter

Letters 1-10 were opened in 1973 by the Department of State and published in: The Department of State Bulletin, Volume LXIX No. 1795, 11/19/73.

Letter 14 was declassified in 1974 as the result of a mandatory review request.

Letter 19 was declassified in 1979 as the result of a mandatory review request.

Letter 22 was released in sanitized form in 1980 as the result of a mandatory review request.

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

Box 184

COUNTRIES

USSR

Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-A, 10/22/62-10/27/62 FOLDER

~~.../.../... U 1p~~
~~Index to contents of volume I~~

TAB 1

- ~~Declassified 10/20/62 ... U TS(...) 3pp~~
8/29/74 ~~Draft Kennedy letter to Khrushchev re JFK speech on Cuban missile crisis, with handwritten changes~~
- ~~Declassified 10/21/62 ... U TS(...) 2pp~~
8/29/74 ~~Memo from unidentified source: "Subject: Proposed changes in President's message [above] to Khrushchev" with handwritten changes~~
- ~~Declassified 10/21/62 State UC(...) 3pp Deptel 961 (Moscow) [3pp]~~
8/29/74 ~~Relays text of Kennedy message for delivery to Khrushchev~~
- ~~10/22/62 WH U 2pp~~
~~Original of Kennedy letter to Khrushchev which was not sent because salutation was changed~~
- ~~10/22/62 WH U 1p~~
~~Note from Bromley Smith to W.H. Brubeck re the attached~~
- ~~10/22/62 WH U 2p~~
~~Retyped final letter (carbon) from Kennedy to Khrushchev with salutation altered~~
- ~~EXEMPTED 10/22/62 State C(...) 2pp Deptel 970 (Moscow)~~
6/1/76
NAK 73-30 ~~Reports Secretary's conversation with Soviet ambassador~~

TAB 2

- ~~Declassified 10/23/62 State US(...) 2pp Embtel 1042 (Moscow) [2pp]~~
8/29/74 ~~Relays Embassy translation of Khrushchev letter of 10/23 to Kennedy~~
- ~~11/1/62 State U 1p [1p]~~
~~W.H. Brubeck memo for McG. Bundy re: "Letter to the President, dated October 23, from Chairman Khrushchev"~~
- ~~Declassified .../.../... State US(...) 2pp L.S. # 45989~~
8/29/74 ~~Translation of Khrushchev letter of 10/23 to Kennedy~~

TAB 3

- ~~10/23/62 State U 1p~~
~~Covering memo from W.H. Brubeck re attached~~
- ~~Declassified 10/23/62 State UC(...) 1p~~
8/29/74 ~~Working copy of a draft message from Kennedy to Khrushchev replying to Khrushchev letter of 10/23 with handwritten McG. Bundy changes~~

~~10/23/62 State UC(....) 2pp Deptel 985(Moscow)~~
8/29/74 Relays Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter of 10/23
for delivery to Khrushchev
{~~10/24/62 State C(....) 1p Embtel 1053(Moscow)~~
Reports delivery of Kennedy message to Khrushchev

TAB 4

~~10/24/62 FBIS U 2pp #122 [& 4 copies]~~
Text of Khrushchev letter to Bertrand Russell

TAB 5

~~10/24/62 State US(....) 4pp Embtel 1070(Moscow) [4pp] [4pp]~~
8/29/74 Relays Embassy translation of Khrushchev letter replying
to Kennedy letter of 10/23

~~11/ 6/62 State US(....) 1p~~
8/29/74 W.H.Brubeck memo for McG. Bundy: "Letter to the
President from Chairman Khrushchev dated October 24,
1962"

~~State US(....) 4pp L.S. #46234~~
8/29/74 Translation of covering letter from Smirnovsk
to Foy Kohler and of Khrushchev letter to
Kennedy of 10/24/62

TAB 6

~~10/25/62 WH U 1p [1p] [1p] [1p]~~
Kennedy letter to Khrushchev in reply to Khrushchev
letter of 10/24

~~10/25/62 State UC(....) 2pp Deptel 997(Moscow) [2pp]~~
8/29/74 Relays text of Kennedy message to Khrushchev for
delivery, in reply to letter of 10/24

TAB 7

~~10/27/62 State U 1p Embtel 1107(Moscow)~~
Reports delivery of Khrushchev letter of 10/27 to
Embassy for Kennedy

~~10/27/62 FBIS U 3pp #49~~
Text of Khrushchev letter of 10/27 to Kennedy

~~State U 5pp L.S. # 46236~~
Translation of Khrushchev letter of 10/27 to Kennedy

~~11/ 8/62 State U 1p~~
W.H.Brubeck memo for McG. Bundy re attached

~~State U 5pp L.S. # 46236~~
Translation of Khrushchev letter of 10/27
to Kennedy [same as above]

COUNTRIES

USSR

Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62

~~.../.../... U 1p
Index to the contents of this volume~~

TAB 1

EXEMPT NLK-79-59 AND UNDER NLK-79-59 APPEAL + UNDER NLK-86-48, 6/88

- 1 11/20/62 USSR ... 13pp
Khrushchev letter to Kennedy in reply to Kennedy letter of 11/15 NLK 79-59
- 1a .../.../... USSR ... 1p
Statement for Kennedy on Castro and making recommendations for future public statements
- 2 .../.../... WH U 1p
Covering tally sheet listing numbered copies of attached
- 2a 11/21/62 WH ... 1p
Different covering memo listing distribution of copies of attached
- 2b 11/20/62 USSR ... 13pp-
Khrushchev letter to Kennedy in reply to Kennedy letter of 11/15
- 2c .../.../... USSR ... 1p
Statement for Kennedy on Castro and on recommendations for future public statements

TAB 2

- 3 11/21/62 ... 1p
"Draft reply" of Kennedy response to Khrushchev letter of 11/20 with McG. Bundy handwritten changes
- 3a 11/21/62 ... 1p
"Draft reply" of Kennedy response to Khrushchev letter of 11/20 without any changes
- 4 ~~11/21/62 ... 6(...) 1p [& 5 copies]~~
~~Kennedy "Message for Chairman Khrushchev" replying to 11/20 letter, incorporating changes made in above draft NLK 79-59~~

DECLASSIFIED
6/1/79

TAB 3

- 5 EXEMPTED 11/22/62 USSR TS(...) [US designation] 5pp [5pp]
NLK-76-78 [or 11/23/62] Khrushchev letter to Kennedy in response to Kennedy letter of 11/21/62 NLK 79-59, NLK-86-48, 6/88

TAB 4

- 6 12/11/62 USSR ... 9pp [9pp] NLK-86-48, 6/88
Khrushchev letter to Kennedy re negotiations - NLK 79-59

— available for research use 3/2/76

TAB 5

7 12/13/62 State TS(...) 4pp
L. Thompson draft of Kennedy reply to Khrushchev
letter of 12/11/62 with copious handwritten changes
by McG. Bundy

8
EXEMPTED
6/1/76
NLK-73-30
9 NLK-86-48, 6/88
12/13/62 WH TS(...) 5pp
Labelled "Bundy 3rd draft" of Kennedy reply. Incorporates
Bundy changes made above

12/14/62 WH ... 1p [& 5 copies]
Final Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter of 12/11 NLK-79-56
SANITIZED UNDER
NLK-79-59 APPEAL 11/14/80

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

Box 184

COUNTRIES

USSR

Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/6/62

TAB 13

1 5/73 11/ 3/62 WH S(...) 2pp
 EXEMPTED 6/1/76 Kennedy letter to Khrushchev in reply to Khrushchev
 NLK 73-30 letter of 10/30/62
 1 UPHOLD UNDER NLK-86-47, 5/87.
TAB 14

2 5/73 11/ 5/62 Justice TS(...) 2pp
 EXEMPTED 6/1/76 Memo for the President from the Attorney General re
 NLK 73-30 RFK's conversation with Dobrynin
 2a " "/..../.. USSR ... 3pp
 Khrushchev letter to Kennedy received on
 11/5/62 re Kusnetsov negotiations

TAB 15

DECLASSIFIED NLK-87-128, 7/88

3 5/73 11/ 5/62 ~~State TS(...) 1p~~
 EXEMPTED 6/1/76 ~~Covering note for McG. Bundy from Llewellyn Thompson~~
 NLK 73-30 ~~re attached drafts~~
 3a 5/73 11/ 5/62 State 6. 3pp [3pp]
 EXEMPTED Draft Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letter
 NLK-73-30, 6/1/76 re missile crisis negotiations with hand-
 NLK-87-129, 7/88 written Bundy changes
 3b EXEMPTED 5/73 11/ 5/62 State TS(...) 2pp [2pp]
 NLK-73-30, 6/1/76 Draft telegram for Stevenson and McCloy } 15d
 NLK-87-128, 7/88 re missile crisis negotiations
 4 11/ 6/62 ... U 3pp
 Different [probably later version] draft Kennedy
 reply to Khrushchev letter re missile crisis negotiatio
 5 11/ 6/62 ... U 10pp
 Later version of above draft, expanded with handwritte
 Bundy changes and inserts
 6 Declassified 11/ 6/62 ... U 7pp
 9/9/74 Later version of above draft incorporating handwritten
 changes and typed inserts added above
 7 11/ 6/62 ... U 7pp
 Same version of draft as above with further handwritten
 changes

- opened for research 9/9/74

- 8 ~~11/ 6/62~~ ~~WH U 5pp~~
~~Completely different draft letter with handwritten (maybe Bundy) changes, notation "dictated by Captain Shepard"~~
- 9 ~~11/ 6/62~~ ~~WH U 6pp~~
~~Kennedy letter to Khrushchev [a modification of the draft two items above and previous to that] in reply to Khrushchev letter of 11/5~~
- 10 ~~11/ 7/62~~ ~~WH U 1p~~
~~Covering memo from Bromley Smith to W.H. Brubeck 11/ 6/62 WH U 6pp~~
~~Kennedy letter to Khrushchev in reply to Khrushchev letter of 11/5~~

TAB 16

- 11/... .. 7pp
 Khrushchev letter to Kennedy received 11/12/62 on recent exchange of letters
- EXEMPTED
 NLK-86-47, 5/87
 12/... .. 8pp [9pp]
 Khrushchev letter to Kennedy received 11/12/62, different typed version than above

EXEMPTED
 NLK-86-47, 5/87
 13 TAB 17

- 11/14/62 ... S 5pp
 Khrushchev letter agreeing with JFK proposals

TAB 18

- 14 11/15/62 ... 5pp
 Draft Kennedy reply to Khrushchev letters re withdrawal
- 15 11/15/62 ... TS(...) 5pp
 Copy of document above classified Top Secret
- 16/... .. 3pp
 Pages 4-6 of a "3rd draft" of the Kennedy reply; agrees with text of above document but a different typing
- 17/... .. 1p
 Pages 2 of the following draft before changes were made
- 18 11/15/62 ... 3pp
 Draft Kennedy reply with handwritten changes
- 19 11/15/62 WH ... 6pp
 Double spaced version of Kennedy reply to Khrushchev worded as sent
- EXEMPTED
 NLK-86-47, 5/87
 20 11/15/62 WH S 4pp [4pp]
 Single spaced version of Kennedy reply as sent

1. 10/22/62 Ltr to Khrushchev re President's speech :
2. 10/23/62 Ltr from Khrushchev re President's speech
3. 10/23/62 Ltr to Khrushchev .
4. 10/24/62 Khrushchev ltr to Bertrand Russell
5. 10/24/62 Ltr fm Khrushchev =
6. 10/25/62 Ltr to Khrushchev =
7. 10/27/62 Ltr fm Khrushchev (public) .
8. 10/26/62 Ltr fm Khrushchev (Moscow 1101) t
9. 10/27/62 Ltr to Khrushchev -
10. 10/28/62 Ltr fm Khrushchev (Tass) :
11. 10/28/62 Ltr to Khrushchev =
12. 10/30/62 Ltr frm Khrushchev .
13. 11/3/62 Ltr to Khrushchev -
rec'd
14. 11/5/62 Ltr frm Khrushchev :
15. 11/6/62 Ltr to Khrushchev re his 11/5 ltr .
16. 11/12/62 Ltr fm Khrushchev re IL-28s -
17. 11/14/62 Ltr fm Khrushchev re IL-28s
18. 11/15/62 Ltr to Khrushchev re IL-28s .

INDICATE: CORRECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

M

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy, MOSCOW 944

NIACT

SS
Info

ELITE EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

The following message from the President should be delivered to the Foreign Office for transmission to Khrushchev one hour before the delivery of the President's speech, now scheduled for Monday, October twenty-second at 7:00 p. m. Washington time.

QUOTE -- Sir:

There is attached a copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereon. A copy of this statement has already been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I

Drafted by: S/ZAL
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: The Secretary

Circulation: Cleared with the [unclear]

S/S-Mr. Furlas

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

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FORM 5-61 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By [unclear] NARS, Date 5/29/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

you that the United States is determined to remove this threat to the security of this hemisphere. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgement on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation. UNQUOTE

You will be notified should there be any change in this schedule or text of President's statement. Text statement in septel. If text not received in time, deliver letter and advise Foreign Office it will follow.

All messages concerning this subject must ~~have~~ bear the caption "ELITE" immediately before any other pertinent caption.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1962



S/S - 18540

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

I enclose two memoranda prepared by Assistant Secretary Tyler on the matter of the October 26 Khrushchev letter and the Rowland Evans story.

The Secretary would appreciate your bringing the memoranda to the attention of the President.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- 1. Memorandum for the Files, November 6.
- 2. Memorandum for the Record, November 2.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

State letter 11/11/74
By [signature] NARS, Date 12/9/74

SECRET

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

3649

INDICATE: COLLECT CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

RETAIN OR DESTROY
Oct 28 - 5 03 PM '62
Cry to bus

54

Origin
SS

ACTION: AMEmbassy MOSCOW 1020 NIACT

Info:

Rpt Info: AMEmbassy PARIS 2387 PRIORITY
AMEmbassy LONDON 2353 Priority
USUN NEW YORK 1129 PRIORITY

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

JUS

TRSY

RMR

SMITH

BUNDY

BELK

BURRIS

DAVIS

DUNGAN

FELDMAN

FORRESTAL

HIRSCI

JOHNSON

KAYSEN

KILDUFF

KLEIN

KOMER

LEGERT

PARROTT

PETERSEN

SAUNDERS

SCHLESINGER

Following is text President's reply to Khrushchev letter of October 28 for delivery to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed to Soviet Embassy and released by White House at 4:35 PM.

Begin text

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight even though the official text has not yet reached me because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General

U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter

S/AL-L. Thompson

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

George W. Ball

White House - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Davis

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

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UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

End Text

Rusk

RUSK

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

By 3 dispatches 10/23/62

Re used text of message to K.

DRAFT

2

October 20, 1962

TOP SECRET

By 3 dispatches 10/23/62

Sir:

There is attached a copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto. A copy of this statement has already been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility of a ^{misjudgment} ~~misapprehension~~ on the part of your Government of the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives

TOP SECRET

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State Dept Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *Dancy* NARS, Date *8/29/74*

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any ^{miscalculation} ~~miscalculation~~ on your part with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that in this case your Government has miscalculated and that the United States is determined to remove this threat to the security of this hemisphere. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any further miscalculation on your part.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

~~Should you carry out your plan to come to New York, I shall be glad to see you at anytime.~~

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(U) or (E)
By D. [unclear] NARS, Date 8/29/74

Subject: Proposed changes in President's message to Khrushchev

The following amendments to the President's message to Khrushchev (October 20 draft) are proposed.

Change 1. Page 1, para 1, second sentence, change as follows:

"A copy of this statement is enclosed."

Reason: To provide for transmittal of message itself to Soviet Ambassador in Washington, in order to allow more advance notice to Khrushchev than if message delivered through our Ambassador in Moscow.

Change 2. Page 2, para 2, third sentence. Change "long-range" to "offensive."

Reason: To avoid Soviet quibbling over definition of "long-range".

Change 3. Page 2, para 2, after third sentence, ending "has proceeded", insert following:

"For your information, let me add that we have complete knowledge of these developments. Such actions on the part of the Soviet Union are particularly grave in light of the demonstrated irresponsibility and emotional instability of Premier Castro."

Reason: To emphasize completeness of our knowledge, in order to undercut any Soviet disposition to argue for defensive nature of their action. *Also, by reference to Castro, to emphasize disparity between Cuban case and our own overseas deployment.*

Change 4. Page 2, para 2, begin new paragraph, with a change as follows,

in the sentence beginning "I must tell you":

"I must tell you that in this case your government has miscalculated and that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere be removed."

Reason: To use language leaving open an option to Soviets to remove offensive weapons, rather than implying that only way of removal would be by U. S. unilateral action.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Change 5. Page 2, at end of the new paragraph, after "on your part", add:

"I should inform you further that I have already ordered that the following precautionary measures be taken:

- a. Increase the alert status of the U. S. Strategic Air Command.
- b. Establish a naval and air patrol of the Cuban coast.
- c. Reinforce the garrison at the U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.
- d. Initiate evacuation of U. S. dependents from the U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

Reason: To strengthen point concerning seriousness with which we view situation, and at same time to minimize possibility that Soviets would misinterpret the implementation of these measures as going beyond a minimum response to the Cuban buildup.

Change 6. Page 3, at end of paragraph, add following:

"I would also hope to receive from you prior to the time of my speech a communication which would indicate your willingness to arrange for immediate removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, in order that I can publicly state to the people of the United States and the world that a satisfactory resolution of this crisis is in prospect."

Reason: To strengthen President's position of having exhausted all reasonable avenues of approach to the problem, and to provide an opportunity to Khrushchev - in the event he has seriously underestimated U. S. reaction - to initiate withdrawal before public announcement has made any drawing back altogether unfeasible.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11762

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Collection
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
BY [Signature] NARS, Date 8/28/74

M

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy, MOSCOW 961

OCT 21 7 41 PM '62

SS
Info:

NIACT

ELITE EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

007

The following message from the President should be delivered to the Foreign Office for transmission to Khrushchev one hour before the delivery of the President's speech, now scheduled for Monday, October twenty-second at 7:00 p. m. Washington time.

QUOTE -- Sir:

There is attached a copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto. A copy of this statement has already been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

S/AL - LEThompson:mac 10/21/62

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

Cleared with the White House - Mr. Bundy.

S/S-Mr. Furnas

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL

since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that

CONFIDENTIAL~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET/NOFORN CONFIDENTIAL~~

you that the United States is determined to remove this threat to the security of this hemisphere. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgement on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation. UNQUOTE

You will be notified should there be any change in this schedule or text of President's statement. Text statement in septel. If text not received in time, deliver letter and advise Foreign Office it will follow.

All messages concerning this subject must ~~precede~~ bear the caption "ELITE" immediately before any other pertinent caption.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~TOP SECRET/NOFORN CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1962

Sir:

A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

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
It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgement on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
MOSCOW



E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1962

To: William H. Brubeck

From: Bromley Smith

For your information and files. This is the retype, changing the salutation. The original was handed to Secretary Rusk by the President.

file

October 22, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman

A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I

Original handed to A. J. F. by P. J. 10/22/61


publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

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I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Nikita S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.



12/23

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

EYES ONLY

32

~~SECRET~~

Control: 17195
Rec'd: OCTOBER 23, 1962
11:56 AM

Action

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1042, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM

*Cy 10-16 destroyed
10/24*

NIACT

ELITE

POLICY

EYES ONLY

EMBTEL 1041

EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 23 TO PRESIDENT. KUZNETSOV INFORMED ME LETTER WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED "FOR TIME BEING."

BEGIN TEXT. MR. PRESIDENT.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR LETTER, AND HAVE ALSO ACQUAINTED MYSELF WITH TEXT OF YOUR SPEECH OF OCTOBER 22 REGARDING CUBA.

I SHOULD SAY FRANKLY THAT MEASURES OUTLINED IN YOUR STATEMENT REPRESENT SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLES. UNITED STATES HAS OPENLY TAKEN PATH OF GROSS VIOLATION OF CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS, PATH OF VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON HIGH SEAS, PATH OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BOTH AGAINST CUBA AND AGAINST SOVIET UNION.

STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES AMERICA CANNOT BE EVALUATED IN ANY OTHER WAY THAN AS NAKED INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF CUBAN REPUBLIC, SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER STATES. CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS DO NOT GIVE RIGHT TO

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(3) or (4)
By NARS, Date 8/29/74

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1042, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM FROM MOSCOW

ANY STATE WHATSOEVER TO ESTABLISH IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS CONTROL OF VESSELS BOUND FOR SHORES OF CUBAN REPUBLIC.

IT IS SELF-UNDERSTOOD THAT WE ALSO CANNOT RECOGNIZE RIGHT OF UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER ARMAMENTS ESSENTIAL TO REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR STRENGTHENING OF ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY.

WE CONFIRM THAT ARMAMENTS NOW ON CUBA, REGARDLESS OF CLASSIFICATION TO WHICH THEY BELONG, ARE DESTINED EXCLUSIVELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, IN ORDER TO SECURE CUBAN REPUBLIC FROM ATTACK OF AGGRESSOR.

I HOPE THAT GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES WILL SHOW PRUDENCE AND RENOUNCE ACTIONS PURSUED BY YOU, WHICH COULD LEAD TO CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE THROUGHOUT WORLD.

VIEWPOINT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO YOUR STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 22 IS SET FORTH IN STATEMENT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS BEING CONVEYED TO YOU THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW.

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV. END TEXT.

ORIGINAL OF LETTER BEING AIRPOUCHED TODAY.

KOHLER

DT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10/23/62 11:05 AM WVC

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Brandy

32

~~SECRET~~

Replaces earlier copy

Action

Control: 17195

Rec'd: OCTOBER 23, 1962

11:56 AM

SS

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1042, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM

NIACT

ELITE

POLICY

EYES ONLY

EMBTEL 1041

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I SHOULD SAY FRANKLY THAT MEASURES OUTLINED IN YOUR STATEMENT REPRESENT SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLES. UNITED STATES HAS OPENLY TAKEN PATH OF GROSS VIOLATION OF CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS, PATH OF VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON HIGH SEAS, PATH OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BOTH AGAINST CUBA AND AGAINST SOVIET UNION.

STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES AMERICA CANNOT BE EVALUATED IN ANY OTHER WAY THAN AS NAKED INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF CUBAN REPUBLIC, SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER STATES. CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS DO NOT GIVE RIGHT TO

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ICRC Dec 10/73

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By NARS. Date 8/22/74

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

-2- 1042, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM FROM MOSCOW

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/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV. END TEXT.

ORIGINAL OF LETTER BEING AIRPOUCHED TODAY.

KOHLER

DT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10/23/62 11:05 AM WVC

SECRET



S/S-17999

~~SECRET~~ Enclosures

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

641
File

November 1, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President, dated
October 23, from Chairman
Khrushchev

There is enclosed for the White House files
the original with official translation of Chair-
man Khrushchev's letter of October 23, 1962
addressed to President Kennedy. An informal
translation of the letter was contained in
Moscow's telegram No. 1042.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

SECRET Enclosures

SECRET Enclosures

NOV 1 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President, dated
October 23, from Chairman
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addressed to President Kennedy. An informal
translation of the letter was contained in
Moscow's telegram No. 1042.

J. T. ROGERS FOR
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

SECRET Enclosures

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) of (E)
By *...* NARS, Date *8/27/74*

~~SECRET~~

45989

T-85/T-94

Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

Moscow, October 23, 1962

Mr. President:

I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with the text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.

I must say frankly that the measures indicated in your statement constitute a serious threat to peace and to the security of nations. The United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas, the path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against the Soviet Union.

The statement by the Government of the United States of America can only be regarded as undisguised interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Union and other states. The United Nations Charter and international norms give no right to any state to institute in international waters the inspection of vessels bound for the shores of the Republic of Cuba.

And naturally, neither can we recognize the right of the United States to establish control over armaments which are necessary for the Republic of Cuba to strengthen its defense capability.

We reaffirm that the armaments which are in Cuba, regardless of the classification to which they may belong, are intended solely for defensive purposes in order to secure the Republic of Cuba against the attack of an aggressor.


I hope that the United States Government will display wisdom and renounce the actions pursued by you, which may lead to catastrophic consequences for world peace.

The viewpoint of the Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in a Statement of the Soviet Government, which is being transmitted to you through your Ambassador at Moscow.

[s] N. Khrushchev

N. Khrushchev
Premier of the U.S.S.R.

William H. French
Executive Secretary



EYES ONLY

File 6203
3

URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRET

cleared by phone
to Mr Ball's office
5:45 PM 10/23
M2

118
7-48

October 23, 1962

Under Secretary of State George Ball
requests your clearance be phoned to his office
before 6:00 p.m. this evening on the attached
cable:

William M. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amembassy MOSCOW

ALACT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

Following message from President to Chairman Khrushchev should be held/delivered only upon receipt further instructions from Washington.

Begin text.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third. I think you will recognize that the step which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing ^{offensive weapons} long-range missiles to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is. ~~With this in mind,~~ I hope you will issue instructions to your ships bound for Cuba not to challenge the quarantine legally established by the Organization of American States this afternoon. ~~We have no desire to sign a file upon your vessels.~~

End Text.

Under
The/Secretary

U:GWBall:fj 10/23/62

~~White House~~

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Bulletin

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By *...* NARS, Date *8/31/14*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

12572

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

OCT 23 6 51 PM '62

M Origin **ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW 985 NIACT**

SS Info **EYES ONLY**

You should deliver following letter addressed by the President to Chairman Khrushchev immediately. This replaces message contained Deptel 982.

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third. I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

I hope

Drafted by:

U:GWBall:hc 10/23/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

George W. Ball

Clearance:

White House - Mr. Bundy
S/S - Mr. Brubeck

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FORM DS-322 5-61

ICRC Letter 10/14/73
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *D. J. ...* NARS, Date 8/29/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
NOVA IS DECLASSIFIED
DATE 02/01/2008 BY 60322 UCBAW/SBW

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely,

JFK

UNQUOTE

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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K' Cuss

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action.

Control: 17487

SS

Rec'd: October 24, 1962
12:52 a.m.

Info

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1053, October 24, 7 a.m.

NIACT

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Department telegram 985.

Letter delivered 7 a.m. Moscow time.

KOHLER

CJ/2

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
ICRC Date 10/4/73

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By *Dunagan* NARS, Date 9/9/74

EYES ONLY

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FBI 122 (OUT OF SEQUENCE)

Copy to Sorenson

FBI 122 (OUT OF TURN)

KHRUSHCHEV TEXT (SEE 116)

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1900 24 OCT 62 L

(TEXT OF REPLY BY PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO BERTRAND RUSSELL)

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. RUSSELL: I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR CABLE AND I EXPRESS MY SINCERE THANKS FOR THE ANXIETY YOU SHOW IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH PLACE THE WORLD ON THE VERGE OF A WAR. ONE CAN WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR WORRY AND ANXIETY. I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL NOT MAKE ANY RASH DECISIONS; WILL NOT LET ITSELF BE PROVOKED BY THE UNJUSTIFIED ACTION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES; AND WILL DO NOTHING IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE SITUATION, FRAUGHT WITH IRREPARABLE CONSEQUENCES, WHICH HAS ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT THE LAUNCHING OF A WAR. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT SHOULD SUCH A WAR BE LAUNCHED, IT WILL BE FROM ITS FIRST HOUR A THERMONUCLEAR WORLD WAR. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO US. BUT APPARENTLY IT IS NOT CLEAR TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WHICH HAS CAUSED THE CRISIS. THEY SAY THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS CHOSEN THIS RASH PATH NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS HATRED OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT. BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND IN THE HEAT OF THE INTERPARTY ELECTORAL (AGITATION).

BUT THIS IS MADNESS WHICH MAY LEAD THE WORLD TO A CATASTROPHE OF A THERMONUCLEAR WAR. THE PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OUGHT TO THINK OF THE CONSEQUENCES THEIR RASH ACTIONS LEAD TO, SHOULD A THERMONUCLEAR WAR BE UNLEASHED.

FBIS 123 (OUT OF SEQUENCE)

FBIS 123 ONLY, ADD 122 OUT OF TURN (KHRUSHCHEV TEXT)

X X X MILLIONS OF PEOPLE.

(CONCLUDING TEXT) I BEG YOU, MR. RUSSELL, TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION AND OUR ACTIONS. WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE ENTIRE COMPLICATION OF THE SITUATION CAUSED BY THE PIRATE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WE CANNOT ACCEPT IT IN ANY FORM. SHOULD WE ENCOURAGE PIRACY AND BANDITISM IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES, IT WILL NOT HELP TO STRENGTHEN THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND CONSEQUENTLY OF LAW AND ORDER UPON WHICH NORMAL RELATIONS ARE BUILT, BOTH AMONG STATES AND AMONG PEOPLES. THEREFORE, SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT GROSSLY DISREGARD AND VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS; SHOULD IT NOT FOLLOW THE APPEALS OF COMMONSENSE IN ITS ACTIONS, THEN THE SITUATION MAY BECOME EXTREMELY ACUTE AND GET OUT OF CONTROL. AND THIS MAY GROW INTO A WORLD WAR WITH ALL THE SAD CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES.

THAT IS WHY EFFORT IS NOW REQUIRED NOT ONLY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND CUBA, WHICH HAS BECOME THE MAIN FOCUS ON WHICH THE WORLD CRISIS IS CONCENTRATED. EFFORT IS ALSO ESSENTIAL ON THE PART OF ALL THE STATES, ALL PEOPLES AND ALL CLASSES, IN ORDER TO AVERT THE WAR CATASTROPHE.

FOR SHOULD THIS CATASTROPHE OCCUR, IT WILL BRING EXTREMELY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES TO MANKIND; IT WILL NOT SPARE EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT; IT WILL NOT SPARE EITHER THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE OR THOSE WHO WISH TO REMAIN ALCOF.

I WISH TO SAY ONCE AGAIN: WE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT SUCH A CATASTROPHE. BUT ONE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT OUR EFFORTS MAY NOT PROVE SUFFICIENT. FOR OUR EFFORTS AND OUR POSSIBILITIES ARE THE EFFORTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF ONE SIDE ONLY. SHOULD THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM OF PIRATE ACTION PLANNED BY IT, THEN IN DEFENSE OF OUR RIGHTS AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS WHICH ARE RECORDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXPRESSED IN THE U.N. CHARTER, WE SHALL OF COURSE BE OBLIGED TO MAKE USE OF THE MEANS OF DEFENSE AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR. WE HAVE NO OTHER WAY OUT.

IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT SHOULD ONE TRY TO APPEASE A BANDIT BY FIRST GIVING HIM ONE'S PURSE, THEN ONE'S COAT, AND SO FORTH, HE WILL NOT BECOME ANY KINDER, AND WILL NOT GIVE UP ROBBERY. ON THE CONTRARY, HE WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY BOLDER. THAT IS WHY ONE MUST STOP THE BANDIT, SO AS TO PREVENT THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE FROM BECOMING A LAW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILIZED PEOPLE AND STATES.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST SHOW RESTRAINT AND HALT THE REALIZATION OF ITS PIRATE THREATS, FRAUGHT WITH THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THE QUESTION OF WAR AND PEACE IS SO VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE WOULD DEEM IT EXPEDIENT TO HAVE A MEETING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, TO DISCUSS ALL THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE ARISEN, TO DO EVERYTHING IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF A THERMONUCLEAR WAR. UNTIL THE ROCKET AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE BEEN USED THERE IS STILL AN OPPORTUNITY TO

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

✓ Bush

~~SECRET~~

Control: 17952
Rec'd: OCTOBER 24, 1962
9:24 PM

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Action

SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

EYES ONLY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM

NI ACT

POLICY

EYES ONLY

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT RECEIVED BY MESSENGER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AT 11:30 PM MOSCOW TIME.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 23, FAMILIARIZED MYSELF WITH IT AND AM ANSWERING YOU.

IMAGINE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD POSED TO YOU THOSE ULTIMATIVE CONDITIONS WHICH YOU HAVE POSED TO US BY YOUR ACTION. HOW WOULD YOU HAVE REACTED TO THIS? I THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN INDIGNANT AT SUCH A STEP ON OUR PART. AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIBLE TO US.

HAVING POSED THESE CONDITIONS TO US, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, HAVE CHALLENGED US. WHO ASKED YOU TO DO THIS? BY WHAT RIGHT HAVE YOU DONE THIS? OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, LIKE OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SORT OF STATE IT MAY BE, CONCERN ONLY THE TWO COUNTRIES BETWEEN WHICH THOSE RELATIONS EXIST. AND IF ONE IS REALLY GOING TO TALK ABOUT

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TCRC 10/4/73
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
BY: [Signature] DATE: 2/31/74

~~SECRET~~

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EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

A QUARANTINE, REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTER, IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED, ACCORDING TO ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE, ONLY BY THE AGREEMENT OF STATES BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND NOT BY ANY SORT OF THIRD PARTY, THERE EXIST, FOR EXAMPLE, QUARANTINES ON AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND PRODUCTS. BUT IN THE CASE AT HAND, THE QUESTION IS IN NO WAY ONE OF QUARANTINE, BUT RATHER OF FAR MORE SERIOUS THINGS, AND YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND THIS.

YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ARE NOT DECLARING QUARANTINES, BUT ADVANCING AN ULTIMATUM AND THREATENING THAT UNLESS WE SUBORDINATE OURSELVES TO YOUR DEMANDS, YOU WILL USE FORCE. CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE SAYING! AND YOU WISH TO CONVINC ME TO AGREE TO THIS! WHAT DOES AGREEMENT WITH SUCH DEMANDS MEAN? THIS WOULD MEAN TO GUIDE ONESELF IN ONE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES NOT BY REASON BUT TO INDULGE ARBITRARINESS. YOU ARE NO LONGER APPEALING TO REASON, BUT WISH TO INTIMIDATE US.

AND, MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS AND THINK THAT IN YOUR HEART YOU RECOGNIZE THAT I AM CORRECT. I AM CONVINCED THAT IN MY PLACE YOU WOULD ACT THE SAME WAY.

REFERENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CANNOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE THE DEMANDS NOW ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AUTHORITY OR BASIS TO MAKE DECISIONS LIKE THAT OF WHICH YOU SPEAK IN YOUR LETTER.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THESE DECISIONS. INTERNATIONAL LAW EXISTS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CONDUCT EXIST. WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRICTLY OBSERVE THE NORMS REGULATING NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE OBSERVE THESE NORMS AND ENJOY THE RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY ALL STATES.

YOU WISH TO COMPEL US TO RENOUNCE THE RIGHTS THAT EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE ENJOYS, YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO LEGISLATE IN QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, YOU ARE TRAMPLING UPON THE

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF THIS LAW. AND ALL THIS NOT ONLY OUT OF HATRED FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE USA. WHAT MORALITY, WHAT LAW CAN JUSTIFY SUCH AN APPROACH BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? YOU CANNOT FIND SUCH A MORALITY AND SUCH A LAW, BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE USA WITH REGARD TO CUBA ARE OUTHRIGHT BANDITRY, OR, IF YOU LIKE, THE FOLLY OF DEGENERATE IMPERIALISM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, AND AT LEAST OF ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, CAN SUFFER GRAVELY FROM SUCH FOLLY, SINCE THE USA HAS FULLY LOST ITS FORMER INACCESSABILITY WITH THE ADVENT OF CONTEMPORARY TYPES OF ARMAMENT.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU COOLY WEIGH THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED, NOT GIVING WAY TO PASSIONS, THEN YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO REJECT THE ARBITRARY DEMANDS OF THE USA. WHEN YOU CONFRONT US WITH SUCH CONDITIONS, TRY TO PUT YOURSELF IN OUR SITUATION AND THINK HOW THE USA WOULD REACT TO THESE CONDITIONS. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT IF SOMEONE HAD ATTEMPTED TO DICTATE CONDITIONS OF THIS SORT TO YOU, THE USA, YOU WOULD HAVE REJECTED SUCH AN ATTEMPT. AND WE ALSO SAY -- NO.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION, PUSHING MANKIND TOWARDS THE ABYSS OF A WORLD MISSILE-NUCLEAR WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPTAINS OF SOVIET VESSELS BOUND FOR CUBA TO OBSERVE THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES BLOCKADING THAT ISLAND. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET MARINERS ARE STRICTLY TO OBSERVE THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND NOT TO RETREAT FROM THEM BY EVEN ONE STEP. AND IF THE AMERICAN SIDE VIOLATES THESE RULES, IT MUST REALIZE WHAT SORT OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL REST ON IT IN THAT CASE. OF COURSE, WE SHALL NOT BE SIMPLY OBSERVERS OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

AMERICAN SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE WILL THEN BE FORCED FOR OUR PART TO TAKE THE MEASURES WHICH WE DEEM NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS. FOR THIS WE HAVE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED TO CIA, WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TREASURY AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 10/24/62 PER SS.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPIES TO SS 10/24/62 CWO-M.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

WH
1 Copy given
Benn

~~SECRET~~

M
Action

Control: 17952
Rec'd: OCTOBER 24, 1962
9:24 PM

SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

EYES ONLY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM

NI-ACT

POLICY

EYES ONLY

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT RECEIVED BY MESSENGER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AT 11:30 PM MOSCOW TIME.

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IMAGINE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD POSED TO YOU THOSE ULTIMATIVE CONDITIONS WHICH YOU HAVE POSED TO US BY YOUR ACTION. HOW WOULD YOU HAVE REACTED TO THIS? I THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN INDIGNANT AT SUCH A STEP ON OUR PART. AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIBLE TO US.

HAVING POSED THESE CONDITIONS TO US, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, HAVE CHALLENGED US. WHO ASKED YOU TO DO THIS? BY WHAT RIGHT HAVE YOU DONE THIS? OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, LIKE OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SORT OF STATE IT MAY BE, CONCERN ONLY THE TWO COUNTRIES BETWEEN WHICH THOSE RELATIONS EXIST. AND IF ONE IS REALLY GOING TO TALK ABOUT

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JCRC Cite... 10/4/73
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By [Signature] NARS, Date 8/23/74

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EYES ONLY

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-2- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

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YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ARE NOT DECLARING QUARANTINES, BUT ADVANCING AN ULTIMATUM AND THREATENING THAT UNLESS WE SUBORDINATE OURSELVES TO YOUR DEMANDS, YOU WILL USE FORCE. CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE SAYING! AND YOU WISH TO CONVINC ME TO AGREE TO THIS! WHAT DOES AGREEMENT WITH SUCH DEMANDS MEAN? THIS WOULD MEAN TO GUIDE ONESELF IN ONE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES NOT BY REASON BUT TO INDULGE ARBITRARINESS. YOU ARE NO LONGER APPEALING TO REASON, BUT WISH TO INTIMIDATE US.

AND, MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS AND THINK THAT IN YOUR HEART YOU RECOGNIZE THAT I AM CORRECT. I AM CONVINCED THAT IN MY PLACE YOU WOULD ACT THE SAME WAY.

REFERENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CANNOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE THE DEMANDS NOW ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AUTHORITY OR BASIS TO MAKE DECISIONS LIKE THAT OF WHICH YOU SPEAK IN YOUR LETTER.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THESE DECISIONS. INTERNATIONAL LAW EXISTS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CONDUCT EXIST. WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRICTLY OBSERVE THE NORMS REGULATING NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE OBSERVE THESE NORMS AND ENJOY THE RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY ALL STATES.

YOU WISH TO COMPEL US TO RENOUNCE THE RIGHTS THAT EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE ENJOYS, YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO LEGISLATE IN QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, YOU ARE TRAMPLING UPON THE

SECRET

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-3- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF THIS LAW. AND ALL THIS NOT ONLY OUT OF HATRED FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE USA. WHAT MORALITY, WHAT LAW CAN JUSTIFY SUCH AN APPROACH BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? YOU CANNOT FIND SUCH A MORALITY AND SUCH A LAW, BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE USA WITH REGARD TO CUBA ARE OUTRIGHT BANDITRY, OR, IF YOU LIKE, THE FOLLY OF DEGENERATE IMPERIALISM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, AND AT LEAST OF ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, CAN SUFFER GRAVELY FROM SUCH FOLLY, SINCE THE USA HAS FULLY LOST ITS FORMER INACCESSIBILITY WITH THE ADVENT OF CONTEMPORARY TYPES OF ARMAMENT.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU COOLY WEIGH THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED, NOT GIVING WAY TO PASSIONS, THEN YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO REJECT THE ARBITRARY DEMANDS OF THE USA. WHEN YOU CONFRONT US WITH SUCH CONDITIONS, TRY TO PUT YOURSELF IN OUR SITUATION AND THINK HOW THE USA WOULD REACT TO THESE CONDITIONS. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT IF SOMEONE HAD ATTEMPTED TO DICTATE CONDITIONS OF THIS SORT TO YOU, THE USA, YOU WOULD HAVE REJECTED SUCH AN ATTEMPT. AND WE ALSO SAY -- NO.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION, PUSHING MANKIND TOWARDS THE ABYSS OF A WORLD MISSILE-NUCLEAR WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPTAINS OF SOVIET VESSELS BOUND FOR CUBA TO OBSERVE THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES 'BLOCKADING' THAT ISLAND. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET MARINERS ARE STRICTLY TO OBSERVE THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND NOT TO RETREAT FROM THEM BY EVEN ONE STEP. AND IF THE AMERICAN SIDE VIOLATES THESE RULES, IT MUST REALIZE WHAT SORT OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL REST ON IT IN THAT CASE. OF COURSE, WE SHALL NOT BE SIMPLY OBSERVERS OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF

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-4- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

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RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

KOHLER

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NOTE: RELAYED TO CIA, WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TREASURY AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 10/24/62 PER SS.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPIES TO SS 10/24/62 CWO-M.

~~SECRET~~

Copy to Klein

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RUEHCR 17952
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SECSTATE WASHDC
WHITE HOUSE
ATE GRNC

DECLASSIFIED
ICRC 10/4/74
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
BY [Signature] NARS, Date 8/29/74

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

TO. MR. BUNDY WHITE HOUSE

70 OCT 25, 2 AM FROM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW SIGNED KOHLER

ES ONLY

LICY

LOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV
PRESIDENT RECEIVED BY MESSENGER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AT
30 P. M. MOSCOW TIME.

IN TEXT

MR MR PRESIDENT:

AVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 23, FAMILIARIZED MYSELF

ME, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD POSED TO YOU THOSE ULTIMATIVE
CONDITIONS WHICH YOU HAVE POSED TO US BY YOUR ACTION. HOW
WOULD YOU HAVE REACTED TO THIS? I THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE
BEEN INDIGNANT AT SUCH A STEP ON OUR PART. AND THAT WOULD HAVE
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HAVING POSED THESE CONDITIONS TO US, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, HAVE
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IT MAY BE, CONCERN ONLY THE TWO COUNTRIES BETWEEN WHICH THOSE
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A QUARANTINE, REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTER, IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED,
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AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND PRODUCTS. BUT IN THE CASE AT HAND, THE
QUESTION IS IN NO WAY ONE OF QUARANTINE, BUT RATHER OF FAR MORE
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YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ARE NOT DECLARING QUARANTINES, BUT ADVANCING
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TO GUIDE ONESELF IN ONE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
NOT BY REASON BUT TO INDULGE ARBITRARINESS. YOU ARE NO LONGER
APPEALING TO REASON, BUT WISH TO INTIMIDATE US.

SO, MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS AND THINK THAT IN
OUR HEART YOU RECOGNIZE THAT I AM CORRECT. I AM CONVINCED

RENCE TO THE DECISIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
CANNOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE THE DEMANDS NOW ADVANCED BY THE
UNITED STATES. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AUTHORITY OR BASIS TO

TAKE DECISIONS LIKE THAT OF WHICH YOU SPEAK IN YOUR LETTER.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THESE DECISIONS. INTERNATIONAL
LAW EXISTS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CONDUCT EXIST.

WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRICTLY
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YOU WISH TO COMPEL US TO RENOUNCE THE RIGHTS THAT EVERY
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OUT OF HATRED FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO
AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE
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BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? YOU
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CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU COOLY WEIGH THE SITUATION
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WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO REJECT

SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF
THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE
IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION, PUSHING MANKIND TOWARDS THE ABYSS
OF A WORLD MISSILE-NUCLEAR WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET
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SIDE VIOLATES THESE RULES, IT MUST REALIZE WHAT SORT OF
RESPONSIBILITY WILL REST ON IT IN THAT CASE. OF COURSE,
WE SHALL NOT BE SIMPLY OBSERVERS OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF
AMERICAN SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE WILL THEN BE FORCED
FOR OUR PART TO TAKE THE MEASURES WHICH WE DEEM NECESSARY
AND ADEQUATE IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS. FOR THIS WE
HAVE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS.

S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

JSK

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5/0350Z

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *D. Meyer* NARS, Date 8/29/74

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

ATTN. MR. BUNDY WHITE HOUSE

1070 OCT 29, 2 AM FROM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW SIGNED KOHLER

EYES ONLY

POLICY

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV
TO PRESIDENT RECEIVED BY MESSENGER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AT
11:30 P. M. MOSCOW TIME.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

IMAGINE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD POSED TO YOU THE ULTIMATIVE CONDITIONS WHICH YOU HAVE POSED TO US BY YOUR ACTION. HOW WOULD YOU HAVE REACTED TO THIS? I THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN INDIGNANT AT SUCH A STEP ON OUR PART. AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIBLE TO US.

HAVING POSED THESE CONDITIONS TO US, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, HAVE CHALLENGED US. WHO ASKED YOU TO DO THIS? BY WHAT RIGHT HAVE YOU DONE THIS? OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, LIKE OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SORT OF STATE IT MAY BE, CONCERN ONLY THE TWO COUNTRIES BETWEEN WHICH THOSE RELATIONS EXIST. AND IF ONE IS REALLY GOING TO TALK ABOUT A QUARANTINE, REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTER, IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED, ACCORDING TO ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE, ONLY BY THE AGREEMENT OF STATES BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND NOT BY ANY SORT OF THIRD PARTY. THERE EXIST, FOR EXAMPLE, QUARANTINES ON AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND PRODUCTS. BUT IN THE CASE AT HAND, THE QUESTION IS IN NO WAY ONE OF QUARANTINE, BUT RATHER OF FAR MORE SERIOUS THINGS, AND YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND THIS.

YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ARE NOT DECLARING QUARANTINES, BUT ADVANCING AN ULTIMATUM AND THREATENING THAT UNLESS WE SUBORDINATE OURSELVES TO YOUR DEMANDS, YOU WILL USE FORCE. CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE SAYING! AND YOU WISH TO CONVINC ME TO AGREE TO THIS! WHAT DOES AGREEMENT WITH SUCH DEMANDS MEAN? THIS WOULD MEAN TO GUIDE ONESELF IN ONE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES NOT BY REASON BUT TO INDULGE ARBITRARINESS. YOU ARE NO LONGER APPEALING TO REASON, BUT WISH TO INTIMIDATE US.

NO, MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS AND THINK THAT IN

REFERENCE TO THE DECISIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CANNOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE THE DEMANDS NOW ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AUTHORITY OR BASIS TO TAKE DECISIONS LIKE THAT OF WHICH YOU SPEAK IN YOUR LETTER. CONSEQUENTLY, WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THESE DECISIONS. INTERNATIONAL LAW EXISTS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CONDUCT EXIST. WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRICTLY OBSERVE THE NORMS REGULATING NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE OBSERVE THESE NORMS AND ENJOY THE RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY ALL STATES.

YOU WISH TO COMPEL US TO RENOUNCE THE RIGHTS THAT EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE ENJOYS, YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO LEGISLATE IN QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, YOU ARE TRAMPLING UPON THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF THIS LAW. AND ALL THIS NOT ONLY OUT OF HATRED FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE USA. WHAT MORALITY, WHAT LAW CAN JUSTIFY SUCH AN APPROACH BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? YOU CANNOT FIND SUCH A MORALITY AND SUCH A LAW, BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE USA WITH REGARD TO CUBA ARE OUTRIGHT BANDITRY, OR, IF YOU LIKE, THE FOLLY OF DEGENERATE IMPERIALISM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, AND NOT LEAST OF ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ITSELF, CAN SUFFER GRAVELY FROM SUCH FOLLY, SINCE THE USA HAS FULLY LOST ITS FORMER INVULNERABILITY WITH THE ADVENT OF CONTEMPORARY TYPES OF ARMAMENT.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU COOLY WEIGH THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED, NOT GIVING WAY TO PASSIONS, THEN YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO REJECT

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION, PUSHING MANKIND TOWARDS THE ABYSS OF A WORLD MISSILE-NUCLEAR WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPTAINS OF SOVIET VESSELS BOUND FOR CUBA TO OBSERVE THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES, BLOCKADING THAT ISLAND. OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET MARINERS ARE STRICTLY TO OBSERVE THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND NOT TO RETREAT FROM THEM BY EVEN ONE STEP. AND IF THE AMERICAN SIDE VIOLATES THESE RULES, IT MUST REALIZE WHAT SORT OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL REST ON IT IN THAT CASE. OF COURSE, WE SHALL NOT BE SIMPLY OBSERVERS OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF AMERICAN SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE WILL THEN BE FORCED FOR OUR PART TO TAKE THE MEASURES WHICH WE DEEM NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS. FOR THIS WE HAVE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS.

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

RUSK

BT

25/0350Z

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



SECRET - EYES ONLY

November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President
from Chairman Khrushchev,
dated October 24, 1962

I am enclosing herewith the signed original and an official translation of Chairman Khrushchev's letter to the President dated October 24. A translation prepared by the Embassy in Moscow was forwarded via Moscow's telegram No. 1070.

J. T. ROGERS
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- 1. Signed original of letter to the President from Khrushchev, dated October 24.
- 2. Official translation.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *D. Douglas* NARS, Date *2/29/74*

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 4
page No. 3 of 4 copies,
Series A.

46234
T-94/T-24
Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Moscow, October 24, 1962

Mr. Ambassador:

Enclosed herewith is a letter from N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America,

It is requested that this letter be transmitted to the President without delay.

Sincerely yours

[s] Smirnovski

Officer in Charge of USA Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR

Enclosure: Letter from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the President of the United States.

Mr. Foy D. Kohler,

Ambassador of the United States of America,

Moscow.

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 23, have studied it, and am answering you.

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you--the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no.

The Soviet government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression

bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

[s] N. Khrushchev

N. Khrushchev

Moscow


October 24, 1962

Ministry of Defense
 General Staff
 Main Directorate of Communications

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October 25, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied -- namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, USSR

October 25, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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John F. Kennedy

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Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
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Moscow, USSR

October 25, 1962

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Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, USSR

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

12901

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INDICATE COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Anembassy MOSCOW

NIACT

EYES ONLY

Oct 25 1 59 AM '62

Ref: Embtel 1070

Com. Gen. Rm.

EYES ONLY

006

Signed original following message from President to Khrushchev delivered to ~~EMB~~ Soviet Embassy 1:45 a.m. October 25 Washington time. Please deliver to highest ranking ~~EMB~~ Soviet official immediately available.

October 25, 1962

QUOTE Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive ~~EM~~ weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your

Drafted by:

White House

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Johnson

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept Bulletin
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *Damesy* NARS, Date *8/27/74*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM DS-322 5-61

EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will ^{see} review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will ~~see~~ how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these ~~xxx~~ solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied -- namely, that all these public ~~xxxxxx~~ assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of ~~xxxx~~ missile ~~xx~~ bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these ~~xxxxxx~~ events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

UNQUOTE

Please report time delivery.

Note: Relayed: Sec. McNamara-Defense, Chairman JCS, CIA,
Treasury and Justice Depts. 10/25/62 per SS

CONFIDENTIAL**RUSK**

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

12901

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

Bury

OCT 25 1 59 AM '62

41

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

NIACT 997

Ref: Embtel 1070

EYES ONLY

005

Signed original following message from President to
Khrushchev delivered to ~~EMX~~ Soviet Embassy 1:45 a.m.
October 25
Washington time/. Please deliver to highest ranking ~~EMX~~ Soviet
official immediately available.

October 25, 1962

QUOTE Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret
very much that you still do not appear to understand what it
is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were
reports of important shipments of military equipment and
technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early
September I indicated very plainly that the United States
would regard any shipment of offensive ~~EMX~~ weapons as pre-
sented the gravest issues. After that time, this
Government received the most explicit assurances from your

Drafted by:

White House

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Johnson

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept Bulletin

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

BY *D. May* NARS, Date *8/29/74*

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FORM DS-322
5-61

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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I repeat my regret that these ~~xxxxx~~ events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY UNQUOTE

Please report time delivery.

Note: Relayed: Sec. McNamara-Defense, Chairman JCS, CIA, Treasury and Justice Depts. 10/25/62 per SS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUSK

7

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

55 L

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Action

Control: 19281

Rec'd: October 27, 1962

3:34 p.m.

EUR

FROM: Moscow

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 1107, October 27

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USIA

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1107, INFORMATION USUN 22.

INR

RMR

Original of Khrushchev's October 27 letter to President delivered to Embassy by Foreign Ministry messenger precisely at 5:00 PM Moscow time. E.E...simultaneously with beginning Moscow radios broadcasting of text. Embassy assumes Department has text. Will not translate unless requested. And will air pouch original October 30.

KOHLER

TRT

Relayed White House.

Note:Mr Brubeck (SS) notified 3:45 pm;advance copy EUR 10/27 EKN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President
from Chairman Khrushchev,
dated October 27, 1962.

Forwarded herewith is the original text and official translation of the letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy of October 27. The text of this letter was broadcast by Moscow Radio simultaneously with the receipt of the original by the Embassy in Moscow.

The official translation has been compared with the broadcast version and no differences in substance were noted.

J. T. ROGERS
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- 1. Letter to the President from Chairman Khrushchev, dated October 27.
- 2. Official translation.

Judge McLean
11/14/62

FBIS 49

TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1430 27 OCT 62 L

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE ACQUAINTED MYSELF WITH MUCH SATISFACTION WITH YOUR REPLY TO U THANT TO THE EFFECT THAT STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO EXCLUDE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS AND THUS AVOID IRREMEDIABLE FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES. THIS REASONABLE STEP ON YOUR PART STRENGTHENS MY (BELIEF) THAT YOU ARE SHOWING CONCERN TO SAFEGUARD PEACE, AND I NOTE THIS WITH SATISFACTION.

I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT OUR PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AND I PERSONALLY, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARE CONCERNED SOLELY THAT OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP AND OCCUPY A WORTHY PLACE AMONG PEOPLE OF THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC COMPETITION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE AND ARTS, AND THE RAISING OF THE WELL-BEING OF PEOPLE; THIS IS THE MOST NOBLE AND NECESSARY FIELD FOR COMPETITION, AND VICTORS AND VANQUISHED WILL ONLY (WORD INDISTINCT) FROM IT, BECAUSE THIS MEANS PEACE AND INCREASED COMMODITIES FOR THE LIFE AND ENJOYMENT OF MAN.

IN YOUR STATEMENT, YOU SUPPORTED THE OPINION THAT THE MAIN AIM WAS NOT ONLY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AND TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS--AND THEREFORE THE DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS WHICH MAY AS A RESULT OF SUCH A CONTACT STRIKE THE FIRE OF A MILITARY CONFLICT AFTER WHICH ALL TALKS WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS, BECAUSE OTHER FORCES AND LAWS WOULD COME INTO FORCE--THE LAWS OF WAR. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. THE MAIN THING THAT MUST BE DONE IS TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE THE STATE OF PEACE AMONG STATES AND PEOPLE.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATE, MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST DUTY OF A PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE SAME QUESTIONS, AND I BEAR THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

YOU HAVE BEEN WORRIED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HELPED CUBA WITH WEAPONS WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY--YES, PRECISELY ITS "DEFENSIVE CAPACITY"--BECAUSE NO MATTER WHAT WEAPONS IT POSSESSES, CUBA CANNOT EQUAL YOU. THESE ARE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES, ALL THE MORE SO IF ONE TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE MODERN MEANS OF EXTERMINATION.

OUR AIM HAS BEEN AND STILL IS TO HELP CUBA. AND NO ONE CAN DENY THE HUMANESS OF OUR MOTIVES, WHICH ARE TO ENABLE CUBA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND DEVELOP IN THE WAY ITS PEOPLE DESIRE.

(MORE)

27 OCT 1103A MLH/HM

FBIS 51

FIRST ADD 49 (TEXT KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY)

X X X ITS PEOPLE DESIRE

(CONTINUING TEXT) YOU WANT TO MAKE YOUR COUNTRY SAFE, THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT CUBA, TOO, WANTS THE SAME THING. ALL COUNTRIES WANT TO MAKE THEMSELVES SAFE.

BUT HOW ARE WE, THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR GOVERNMENT, TO ASSESS YOUR ACTIONS WHICH ARE EXPRESSED IN THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE SURROUNDED THE SOVIET UNION WITH MILITARY BASES, SURROUNDED OUR ALLIES WITH MILITARY BASES, LITERALLY DISPOSED MILITARY BASES AROUND OUR COUNTRY, AND STATIONED YOUR ROCKET ARMAMENTS THERE? THIS IS NOT A SECRET. AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE DEMONSTRATIVELY SAYING THIS. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN BRITAIN AND ITALY AND AIMED AGAINST US. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN TURKEY.

YOU ARE WORRIED BY CUBA. YOU SAY THAT IT WORRIES YOU BECAUSE IT IS A DISTANCE OF 90 MILES BY SEA FROM THE AMERICAN COAST. HOWEVER, TURKEY IS NEXT TO US. YOUR SENTRIES WALK UP AND DOWN AND LOOK AT EACH OTHER. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER THEN--THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND SECURITY FOR YOUR OWN COUNTRY AND THE REMOVAL OF THOSE WEAPONS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE AND DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE SAME RIGHT FOR US?

YOU HAVE PLACED DESTRUCTIVE ROCKET WEAPONS, WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, IN TURKEY, LITERALLY AT OUR ELBOW. HOW THEN DOES ADMISSION OF OUR EQUAL MILITARY CAPACITIES TALLY WITH SUCH UNEQUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR GREAT STATES? THIS CANNOT BE MADE TO AGREE IN ANY WAY.

IT IS WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU HAVE AGREED TO OUR REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AND BEGINNING TALKS, APPARENTLY THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF U.N. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT. HENCE HE, TO SOME DEGREE, ASSUMES THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR, AND WE CONSIDER THAT HE IS ABLE TO COPE WITH THIS RESPONSIBLE MISSION IF, OF COURSE, EACH SIDE WHICH IS DRAWN INTO THIS CONFLICT SHOWS GOOD WILL. I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END THE CONFLICT QUICKLY AND NORMALIZE THE SITUATION, AND THEN PEOPLE WOULD BREATHE MORE EASILY, CONSIDERING THAT THE STATESMEN WHO ARE VESTED WITH RESPONSIBILITY, HAVE GOOD SENSE, AN AWARENESS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE ABILITY TO SOLVE COMPLEX QUESTIONS AND NOT BRING THINGS TO THE CATASTROPHE OF WAR.

I THEREFORE MAKE THIS PROPOSAL. WE AGREE TO REMOVE FROM CUBA THOSE MEANS WHICH YOU REGARD AS OFFENSIVE MEANS. WE AGREE TO CARRY THIS OUT AND DECLARE THIS PLEDGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. YOUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL MAKE A DECLARATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE

TURKEY IS NEXT TO US. YOUR POSITION AT EACH OTHER. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER THEN--THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND SECURITY FOR YOUR OWN COUNTRY AND THE REMOVAL OF THOSE WEAPONS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE AND DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE SAME RIGHT FOR US?

YOU HAVE PLACED DESTRUCTIVE ROCKET WEAPONS, WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, IN TURKEY, LITERALLY AT OUR ELBOW. HOW THEN DOES THE ADMISSION OF OUR EQUAL MILITARY CAPACITIES TALLY WITH SUCH UNEQUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR GREAT STATES? THIS CANNOT BE MADE TO AGREE IN ANY WAY.

IT IS WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU HAVE AGREED TO OUR REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AND BEGINNING TALKS, APPARENTLY THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF U.N. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT. HENCE HE, TO SOME DEGREE, ASSUMES THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR, AND WE CONSIDER THAT HE IS ABLE TO COPE WITH THIS RESPONSIBLE MISSION IF, OF COURSE, EACH SIDE WHICH IS DRAWN INTO THIS CONFLICT SHOWS GOOD WILL. I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END THE CONFLICT QUICKLY AND NORMALIZE THE SITUATION, AND THEN PEOPLE WOULD BREATHE MORE EASILY, CONSIDERING THAT THE STATESMEN WHO ARE VESTED WITH RESPONSIBILITY, HAVE GOOD SENSE, AN AWARENESS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE ABILITY TO SOLVE COMPLEX QUESTIONS AND NOT BRING THINGS TO THE CATASTROPHE OF WAR.

I THEREFORE MAKE THIS PROPOSAL. WE AGREE TO REMOVE FROM CUBA THOSE MEANS WHICH YOU REGARD AS OFFENSIVE MEANS. WE AGREE TO CARRY THIS OUT AND DECLARE THIS PLEDGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. YOUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL MAKE A DECLARATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES ON ITS PART, CONSIDERING THE UNEASINESS AND ANXIETY OF THE SOVIET STATE, WILL REMOVE ITS ANALOGOUS MEANS FROM TURKEY.

LET US REACH AGREEMENT AS TO THE SPAN OF TIME NEEDED FOR YOU AND US TO ACHIEVE THIS. AFTER THIS, PERSONS ENJOYING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT CHECK ON-THE-SPOT FULFILLMENT OF THE PLEDGES ASSUMED. OF COURSE, THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND TURKEY ARE NECESSARY FOR ENTRY INTO THOSE COUNTRIES OF THESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES AND FOR INSPECTOR OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PLEDGE ASSUMED BY EITHER SIDE.

IT WOULD EVIDENTLY BE BETTER IF THESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES WOULD HAVE THE TRUST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND YOUR TRUST AND MINE--OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION--AS WELL AS OF TURKEY AND CUBA. I THINK IT WILL NOT BE DIFFICULT TO PICK SUCH PEOPLE WHO WOULD ENJOY THE TRUST AND RESPECT OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(MORE)

TOP AND LAST AD 19 (TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY)

X X X ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(CONCLUDING TEXT) HAVING TAKEN UPON OURSELVES A PLEDGE TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLES OF CUBA AND TURKEY AND STRENGTHEN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SECURITY, WE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAKES A SOLEMN PROMISE TO RESPECT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS AND SOVEREIGNTY OF TURKEY, NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE TURKEY, NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVA ON, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRES ON AG. INST TURKEY BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBOR STATES OF TURKEY.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A SIMILAR STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RESPECT TO CUBA. IT WILL DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPECT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS OF CUBA AND ITS SOVEREIGNTY, UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE, AND NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVASION OF CUBA, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO MIGHT CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBORING STATES OF CUBA.

OF COURSE, FOR THIS WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO SOME KIND OF TIME LIMIT. LET US AGREE TO SOME PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT TO DELAY--TWO OR THREE WEEKS; NOT MORE THAN A MONTH.

THE MEANS SITUATED IN CUBA WHICH YOU HAVE STATED ARE PERTURBING YOU ARE IN THE HANDS OF SOVIET OFFICERS. THEREFORE, ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF THEM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS EXCLUDED. THESE MEANS ARE SITUATED IN CUBA AT THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND ARE ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. THEREFORE IF THERE IS NO INVASION OF CUBA OR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER OF OUR ALLIES, THEN OF COURSE THESE MEANS ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE A THREAT TO ANYONE, FOR THEY ARE NOT THERE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ATTACK.

IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MY PROPOSAL, THEN WE WOULD SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW YORK, TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD GIVE THEM EXHAUSTIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY. IF YOU ALSO CHOOSE YOUR MEN AND GIVE THEM THE CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS, THEN THIS QUESTION CAN BE SOLVED QUICKLY.

WHY SHOULD I WANT THIS? BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW PERTURBED AND EXPECTS SENSIBLE ACTION FROM US.

THE GREATEST JOY FOR ALL PEOPLES WOULD BE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE RADICAL LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT THAT HAS ARISEN. I ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AGREEMENT INsofar AS IT COULD SERVE AS A GOOD BEGINNING AND WOULD, IN PARTICULAR, MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON BANNING OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SKETCH AND LAST AD 49 (TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY)

X X X ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(CONCLUDING TEXT) HAVING TAKEN UPON OURSELVES A PLEDGE TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLES OF CUBA AND TURKEY AND STRENGTHEN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SECURITY, WE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAKES A SOLEMN PROMISE TO RESPECT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS AND SOVEREIGNTY OF TURKEY, NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE TURKEY, NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVA- ON, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRES- ON AG- INST TURKEY BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBOR STATES OF TURKEY.

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OF COURSE, FOR THIS WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO SOME KIND OF TIME LIMIT. LET US AGREE TO SOME PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT TO DELAY--TWO OR THREE WEEKS; NOT MORE THAN A MONTH.

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IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MY PROPOSAL, THEN WE WOULD SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW YORK, TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD GIVE THEM EXHAUSTIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY. IF YOU ALSO CHOOSE YOUR MEN AND GIVE THEM THE CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS, THEN THIS QUESTION CAN BE SOLVED QUICKLY.

WHY SHOULD I WANT THIS? BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW PERTURBED AND EXPECTS SENSIBLE ACTION FROM US.

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WHY SHOULD I WANT THIS? BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW PERTURBED AND EXPECTS SENSIBLE ACTION FROM US.

THE GREATEST JOY FOR ALL PEOPLES WOULD BE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE RADICAL LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT THAT HAS ARISEN. I ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AGREEMENT INsofar AS IT COULD SERVE AS A GOOD BEGINNING AND WOULD, IN PARTICULAR, MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON BANNING OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE QUESTION OF TESTS COULD BE SOLVED IN PARALLEL, WITHOUT CONNECT ON ONE WITH THE OTHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENT ISSUES.

HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON BOTH THESE ISSUES TO PRESENT THE PEOPLE A GOOD GIFT, TO PLEASE THEM ALSO WITH THE NEWS THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE DISCONTINUATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ATMOSPHERE WILL NO LONGER BE POLLUTED. OUR AND YOUR POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE VERY CLOSE.

ALL THIS COULD POSSIBLY SERVE AS A GOOD IMPETUS TOWARD SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ALSO ON OTHER CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ON WHICH WE ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS. THESE ISSUES HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN SOLVED, BUT THEY ARE AWAITING URGENT SOLUTION WHICH WOULD CLARIFY THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

THESE, THEN, ARE MY PROPOSALS, MR. PRESIDENT.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS, KHRUSHCHEV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 46236
T-94/T-24
Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

J. Kennedy, President of the United States

Copy to U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the U.N.

Dear Mr. President,

I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal

Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect

territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay--say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now

peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also ^{to} gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These issues have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

[s] N. Khrushchev

N. Khrushchev

October 27, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 46236
T-94/T-24
Russian

[Embossed Seal of the USSR]

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These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

[s] N. Khrushchev

N. Khrushchev

October 27, 1962

INDEX

1. 11/20/62 Ltr from Khrushchev
2. 11/21/62 Ltr to Khrushchev
3. 11/23/62 Ltr from Khrushchev
4. 12/11/62 Ltr frm Khrushchev
5. 12/14/62 Ltr to Khrushchev

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 21, 1962

MESSAGE FOR CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have been glad to get your letter of November 20, which arrived in good time yesterday. As you will have seen, I was able to announce the lifting of our quarantine promptly at my press conference, on the basis of your welcome assurance that the IL-28 bombers will be removed within a month.

I am now instructing our negotiators in New York to move ahead promptly with proposals for a solution of the remaining elements in the Cuban problem. I do not wish to confuse the discussion by trying to state our present position in detail in this message, but I do want you to know that I continue to believe that it is important to settle this matter promptly and on reasonable terms, so that we may move on to other issues. I regret that you have been unable to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, and that in consequence we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday, there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W. J. Gormanist (NLK-79-59)
BY MPM NARS, DATE 6/1/79

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1962

NK 79-51 # 5

ENC 2

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was glad to have your message of December 11th and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuban affair between us, the settlement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.

I have followed with close attention the negotiations on the final settlement of the Cuban question between your representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, in New York. In these negotiations we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kuznetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement on how finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by now has certainly reached you. I wish to assure you that it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.

You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not re-introduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you could accept our position -- but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I

SANITIZED

U.S. ARCHIVIST (NK-79-59 APPEAL)
BY Ym4 NARS, DATE 11/14/80

~~SECRET~~

quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest without further acrimony.

With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us, I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously misleading information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or misunderstanding one of your diplomats appears to have used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unwise in our country, where the members of the press often insist on printing at some later time what they may learn privately.

Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is fierce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magazines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newspapermen, but no spokesmen.

But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential channels. I entirely share your view that some trust is necessary for leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to hold and to express my convictions about the relative merits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.

I appreciate your writing me so frankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in my last press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realize, of course, we could not agree.

We also are hopeful that once the Cuban crisis is behind us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.

I look forward to receiving your confidential letter and proposals on the test ban question, and I think there is every reason to keep working on this problem. I hope that in your message on this subject you will tell me what you think about the position of the people in Peking on this question. It seems to me very important for both of us that in our efforts to secure an end to nuclear testing we should not overlook this area of the world.

~~SECRET~~

5

Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family,
and let me in turn send you and your wife and family our personal
good wishes for the coming year.

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Mac:

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I enclose the draft letter and a draft telegram to Stevenson and McCloy.

As I stated, the Secretary has not as yet seen either of these.

Sincerely,

Tommy
Llewellyn E. Thompson

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosures (2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4	
By <i>mjg</i>	NARA Date <i>7/88</i>

Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. I cannot believe that there could have been any doubt in your mind that IL-28's, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were included.

A >

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the

definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion.

^{to} I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side, we are insisting only on the bare minimum of what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. ^{But} In order to make our position clear, I think I should ^{go on to} give you ^a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States. ~~I am sure I need not~~ ^{There} tell you that recent events have ^{given} provided a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said ^{the other day} yesterday to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. But I cannot accept this view; I think you would not either, if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends. ^{And} But however one may judge that ^{argument} agreement, the fact of the matter is not only that we were not informed of what your Government was doing secretly in Cuba, but that active steps were taken to mislead us about what was being done.

11/07/04

I do not refer here to the TASS article of September, but rather to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba_x which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even in Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time -- while public and private reassurances were being given -- there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us.

11/6/62

ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but ~~I must emphasize that~~ the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is entirely essential for the United States, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October, ~~after very clear assurances had been given.~~

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance, which has the full support of the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, I would like to say a word about my expression of confidence that when we are able "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. We will indeed be ready to use our influence in this direction if the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are carried out, but I should tell you in all frankness that these are

sovereign countries and that their willingness to give such assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will

cease to be a threat to their security. The same ^{question consideration} consideration will

~~be given by the people of this country as we consider what our ^{face the American people as they do consider as they} ~~attitudes toward~~ ^{relationships with Cuba may be after this immediate crisis is} ~~relationships with Cuba may be after this immediate crisis is~~ ^{from this}~~

^{I think we must both recognize that it} surmounted. It will be very difficult for any of us in this Hemisphere

to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues ~~in any way~~ to be a significant military outpost of the

Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to

consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remain in Cuba large numbers of Soviet

military technicians, ^{and systems} major weapons and communications complexes under Soviet control, ^{all with} and the recurrent possibility that offensive

weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. In this connection in particular, I hope you understand that we would be bound to regard any

^{more to establish a} ~~support for Soviet submarines~~ ^{base in} Cuba just as seriously as we regarded the installation of missile bases and bombers. ^{In summary, I believe} Cuba can ^{that}

never have normal relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by a foreign

power from outside the Hemisphere and who adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider

considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope

that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, ^{and} with a proper system for continued reassurance in the future that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis, and unless we take it promptly, I do not see how renewed action on our side can be avoided.

...the... supporting...
Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not

In a larger sense, Mr. Chairman, the real risk in this
complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that
confirmand has been that our efforts to understand each other
this matter of IL28's, or any other possible future matter of
...together... submarines, is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of
course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons,
but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States
and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own
military men would inform you that the continued existence of such
bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military
defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic
these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in
it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear
weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any
more than rockets, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba.
Thus their continued presence would have the same effect in creating
grave tension that the missiles would have, and their removal, in
my view, is quite as necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

Your letter speaks as if our list was long and complicated, and
I agree that lawyers drafting proclamations often include more words
than you and I would. But our side will not make complications over the
details of such language as ~~mechanical or electronic equipment to~~

Sketch A

~~support the above items.~~ It is simply the missiles and bombers
and their necessary supporting equipment which are essential to me.

In a larger sense, Mr. Chairman, the real risk in this confrontation has been that our efforts to understand each other and to work together might be permanently broken down by a move on your part which could not be accepted here and against which very clear assurances had been given. There is really no safety for either of us in any attempt on your side to establish a permanent Soviet military base in Cuba, and therefore I am glad of your repeated assurances that this is really not your intention. The most significant contribution which your side could make, over time, would be the full withdrawal of all Soviet military personnel. I think your mind may be moving in the same direction, from some of the comments in your important letter of October 26. But our side has not made any such withdrawal a formal condition of settlement, nor do I do so now. All that I am doing in this letter is to explain as clearly as I can that the IL28 bombers are indeed offensive weapons, as we understand them, and that in our judgment they are fully covered by our exchange of letters of October 27 and October 28. It seems to us much better that they should be removed on this basis than that we should have to consider some further action to fulfill our commitments within this Hemisphere.

11/6 11/6/60

We have just as much interest as you in avoiding any new aggravation of the situation.


In giving your representative in New York a list of the steps we consider desirable, was any desire on our part to...

...as established by my letter... of October twenty-first... in my letter... of November...

...and it... described by...

...of the... and...

...with... and...



November 6, 1962

Copy to (1) Mrs. [unclear]
(2) Mr. [unclear]
(3) The Attorney General
Copy to [unclear]
[unclear]

Dear Mr. Chairman: The United States and other Western Hemisphere countries, and I am sure your own military

(4) State for
[unclear]
By [unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation. Our intention was just the opposite: to stick to a well-known list, and not to introduce any new factors. But there is really only one major item on the list, beyond the missiles and their equipment, and that is the light bombers with their equipment. This item is indeed of great importance to us.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second, in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba, and so it seems clear to me that our exchange of letters covers the IL-28s, since your undertaking was to remove the weapons we described as offensive.

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s is not a minor matter for us.

at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than missiles, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus in the present context their continued presence would sustain the grave tension that has been created, and their removal, in my view, is necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side we are insisting only on what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr.

Kusnetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. I cannot accept this view; not only did this action threaten the whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument, what actually happened in this case was not simply that the action of your side was secret. Your Government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate.

I do not refer here only to the TASS article of September, but also to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary in regard to these assurances is, as we agreed, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is an essential safeguard for the United States and the other countries of this hemisphere, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, as we much prefer, a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere

with this surveillance which is so important to us all in obtaining reliable information on which improvements in the situation can be based. It was of great importance, for example, for me last week to be able to announce with confidence that dismantling of missiles had begun.

Finally, I would like to say a word about longer range matters. I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remains in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. That is why I think there is much wisdom in the conclusion expressed in your letter of October 26th, that when our undertakings against invasion are effective the need for your military specialists in Cuba will disappear. That is the real path to progress in the Cuban problem. And in this connection in particular, I hope you will understand that we must attach the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.

I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this hemisphere unless it ceases to appear to be a foreign military base and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their

supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued safeguards in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and give attention to other problems which ought to be resolved in the interest of peace.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

DRAFT

November 6, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. I cannot believe that there could have been any doubt in your mind that B-28's, capable of carrying nuclear weapons were included.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion.

In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, although I doubt that there could be any, I wish to comment upon a further point in your letter. You state that I gave assurances "that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the United States but by other countries of the Western Hemisphere either." The position is, of course, as stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh, that under the conditions stated we would agree "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise." There is, of course, a clear implication that the United States would use its influence with the other countries of this Hemisphere and this is indeed so. If the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are fully

carried out I continue to believe that the other countries of the Western Hemisphere will support the position I took. I must tell you, in all frankness, however, that these are sovereign countries and that their willingness to give assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will in fact cease to be a threat to their security. I suggest that you take this into account in deciding upon your relationship with the Cuban Government in the military field. In this connection, I assume that your Government takes its assurances on submarine bases as seriously as we do. Our agreement related to assurances against invasion. But you must be aware that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by an extra-hemispheric foreign power and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. Although these considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, I hope that you will give them due consideration.

DRAFT
11/6/62
(dictated by Captain Shepard)

Dear Mr. Chairman

I received your recent letter and I wish to give you as fully as possible the strong feelings we have about the matter here.

In the first place, I need not tell you of the profound shock which recent events have provided to relations between our two countries.

You may state, as Mr. Kuznetsov stated yesterday to Mr. McCloy,

that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any

activities it was carrying on in a third country. I ^{cannot} ~~do not~~ accept

this view, nor would you if the activities being carried on in a third

country were intended to alter the balance of power in the world

upon which our present uneasy peace so much depends. The fact

of the matter, however, is not only were we not informed of events

in a third country, but active steps were taken to misinform us about

what was being done.

I am not now referring to the TASS article of September but to the communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential communications from the highest levels of your government. Through these channels ^{we} were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba, which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. Believing that those ^{assumptions} represented a commitment which would be met, I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were warning us of the trend of events in Cuba.

Then the undeniable evidence that offensive weapons were

[The fact that my government misjudged the course of events in Cuba being installed was a deep and dangerous shock first has given a most profound shock to my country.]

to our government and then to our whole people.
~~Let~~ Let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if there had been set up in Finland, a government of increasing hostility to you, and then during ^{if} ^{as} the comparatively brief period, ^{as} ^{even in Sweden} while public ^{and private} reassurances were being given ^{as} there had been

-3- ^{an action from our side. But that}
is how ~~the~~ action of your side in
Cuba appears to us.

^{Finland}
clandestinely sent to ~~Cuba~~ a whole variety of dangerous means

^{destruction}
of ~~construction~~ which had been belatedly discovered, ^{you know how the} you can have
~~Government +~~
^{Soviet people would have reacted to such}
~~some idea of the feeling in this country.~~ Now why then am I so

persistent in wanting this matter settled quickly and completely?

First, because ~~in some measure~~ I believe it vital that we reestablish

^{some}
~~a~~ measure of confidence and communication between you and me. If
^{leaders of the}
the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with ^{some accuracy} precision the intentions
^{each} of the other, ^{we shall face} ~~this will mean~~ an increasingly dangerous period for the
~~two of us.~~

^{you}
Secondly, in return for ~~the~~ commitments ~~of yours~~ I gave certain
^{in particular a commitment that}
commitments on behalf of the United States, ~~among them that~~ we
^{which has already}
would not invade Cuba. This commitment, ~~has~~ been under attack,
^{an} ~~and~~ will become increasingly ^{by a} the object of criticism ~~by~~ great many
of my countrymen. If after all we have gone through there ~~remains~~

~~It can only be kept if the~~ It

remains *a Soviet* *including Soviet-manned*
~~or leaves~~ in Cuba [^] military bases which could quickly become offensive [^]

SAM sites, ~~heavy aircraft~~, large numbers of technicians, jet

bombers, ^{and} with a possibility that mobile missiles bases could quickly

be introduced. Combined with these facts is Castro's opposition to

UN on-the-ground-inspection and announced opposition to air

reconnaissance which at present gives us some degree of security.

Under these conditions, even though the missiles might be withdrawn

if the SAM sites remain, if the bombers remain, if a fishing harbor

is constructed which could ^{submarines, if Russian}

technicians remain, if the Cubans object to air surveillance, use

SAM missiles against it and refuse to agree to on-the-ground inspection

then the whole threat could rise again in the period of a comparatively

few days and we would once again be faced with dangerous events.

Already we have reports of missiles being hidden in caves, although

I accept your word that they are not; of carriers and other

missile-supporting devices being also hidden; of a refusal to withdraw bombers, many of which are flown by Soviet pilots. All this while Castro remains guaranteed against invasion.

The best way, in my opinion, to draw the poison from this situation to provide genuine security for the Cubans would be to withdraw the missiles and the supporting equipment with adequate inspection, withdraw the bombers and the Soviet military personnel and to arrange with us for some international or national system of periodic air surveillance to give us the reassurance we need against a repetition of the events of the past days. This is the way to peace in the Caribbean. This is the way to provide security in Cuba. This is the way for us to move on to agreement in other vital areas.

DRAFT
11/6/62

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. I cannot believe that there could have been any doubt in your mind that IL-28s, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were included.

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s,

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Copies to O. M. ...
(2) M. ...*

November 7, 1962

To: William H. Brubeck (Executive Secretary, State Dept.)
From: Bromley Smith (NSC Secretary)

Will you please see that Ambassador Thompson is provided with a copy of the attached. Any additional distribution within the Department should be in accordance with Ambassador Thompson's instruction. He also has a copy of the Khrushchev letter of November 5.

Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. I cannot accept this view; not only did this action threaten the whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument, what actually happened in this case was not simply that the action of your side was secret. Your Government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate.

I do not refer here only to the TASS article of September, but also to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary in regard to these assurances is, as we agreed, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is an essential safeguard for the United States and the other countries of this hemisphere, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, as we much prefer, a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere

with this surveillance which is so important to us all in obtaining reliable information on which improvements in the situation can be based. It was of great importance, for example, for me last week to be able to announce with confidence that dismantling of missiles had begun.

Finally, I would like to say a word about longer range matters. I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remains in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. That is why I think there is much wisdom in the conclusion expressed in your letter of October 26th, that when our undertakings against invasion are effective the need for your military specialists in Cuba will disappear. That is the real path to progress in the Cuban problem. And in this connection in particular, I hope you will understand that we must attach the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.

I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this hemisphere unless it ceases to appear to be a foreign military base and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their

supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued safeguards in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and give attention to other problems which ought to be resolved in the interest of peace.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow