Rebels in Brazil, Shifting Attacks to Cities, Denounce Costa on Seized Radio

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RIO DE JANEIRO, Aug. 15-Twelve men armed with submachine guns took over a radio station today in São Paulo, Brazil's largest city, and broad-cast an attack on the military Government of President Arthur da Costa e Silva.

Twelve minutes later, by the time the recorded manifesto was over, the group had left the remote suburban transmitter site in two cars. There were no reports of injuries.

The swift attack was typical of a new kind of tactic for armed revolution that has been developed along similar lines by small groups of Marxist-Leninists operating in the cities of Brazil and her tiny neighbor,

Bank robberies, which used to be rare, have become frequent in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro since late 1967.

During another typical operation in São Paulo last month, five men with submachine guns held afternoon traffic along a heavily traveled avenue at bay. Seven armed men strode past them into a bank. The holdup, witnesses recalled later, was conducted in silence and was dver in less than 10 minutes.

The authorities say that the broadcast the

broadcast, the paramilitary holdup and other similar attacks were carried out by a shadowy group of long-time Communists and young radical recruits led by Carlos Marighella, a 58-year-old Congressman who bolted from the peaceful Brazilian Communist narty in late 1967 party in late 1967.

As Governor Rockefeller of New York arrived in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on June 21, it was estimated that the General Motors subsidiary in Montevideo, the capital, lost \$1-million through arson in the administration building

tration building.

The fire was one night's work for a small six-year-old group of urban guerrillas who call themselves Tupamaros and acknowledge Raul Sendic, ence

a Socialist labor organizer, as their founder. He is probably their present leader.

The urban tactics are part of a shift in guerrilla emphasis disclosed in a survey made by correspondents of The New York Times in Brazil and Uru-

Since late 1967, when Ernesto Che Guevara died in an attempt to establish a guerrilla campaign in rural eastern Bolivia, his ideological heirs here and in Uruguay, apparently independently of each other and of orders from outside their countries have made the their countries, have made the gangling, disorganized cities their terrain.

In São Paulo, the industrial capital of Latin America's largest nation, in Rio de Janeiro and in Montevideo, they have planted the principles of guerrilla warfare in an urban environment apparently badly prepared to defend itself.

They Move Singly

According to what security officials know about them, the officials know about them, the new guerrillas are not bearded jungle fighters in motley fatigues moving through the mountains, but urban combatants moving singly from "safe" houses in apartment buildings to suburban hideouts or rural training grounds. They are said to gather only long enough to carry out an operation. Their preferred objectives appear to be banks, stores of military or civilian arms and dynamite warehouses. warehouses.

It is estimated that since 1967 in São Paulo, a city of six million people, urban guerrillas have made off with approximately 2.5 million new cruzeiros, the equivalent of \$500,000, in 60 holdups. They have stolen arms and uniforms from a state militia barracks and a state militia barracks and an army hospital and dynamite from several quarries and con-struction companies.

In January a 31-year-old Brazilian Army captain, Carlos Lamarca, a career officer known as a crack shot, disappeared

from his infantry regiment near São Paulo with a sergeant and two enlisted men and 63 light, modern automatic rifles, 10 submachine guns and ammuni-tion. Carlos Lamarca has been identified by the São Paulo police as a leading figure in a group known as the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard.

200 Prisoners Taken

In recent months the Brazilian armed forces and police have broken up two clandestine guerrilla organizations and taken more than 200 prisoners. Carlos Marighella and Carlos Lamarca are still at large.

"There are at least 10 groups operating in the country," a Brazilian Army colonel said in a recent interview. "Marighella's troop is the best organized.

la's troop is the best organized, the most active and the most aggressive."

A professor of philosophy at the University of São Paulo whose field is the theory of anarchism said: "Ours is a very strange terrorism. The terrorists have seemed, at least recently, to avoid property damage and killing. They seem to have learned the lesson of the failure of terror in Venezuela in 1963 as well as of Guevara's

In 1963 Venezuelan polling places sporadically became battlefields for soldiers and Communist terrorists. The nation elected Raul Leoni President on a reform platform that con-demned armed revolution.

The Brazilian colonel who had been delegated by the War Ministry to answer questions about guerrilla tactics said:
"They do not want to go into a classic terrorist operation here because they'll lose the support of the people."

The evidence available in public and from clandestine.

public and from clandestine manifestos suggests that the urban guerrillas in Brazil and Uruguay have developed their tactics on their own, adapting to their surroundings the theories of revolutionary war that have grown out of Fidel Castro's guthives in Cuba to past

efforts in Peru and Venezuela, as well as in Bolivia, the tendency has been to try to transplant unquestioningly the Cu-ban pattern of rural guerrilla bands that attract political support and percome a victorious regular army.

Trained Overseas

A high São Paulo police officer said, in written answers on questions submitted in writing:

"There is evidence of influence from foreign countries.
Various leftist elements have taken political and guerrilla courses in China, Cuba and Russia."

However, he said that it was impossible to assert categorically that the movements were directed from abroad because the countries providing the courses limited themselves to psychological indoctrination.

Although their tactics may

differ, the long-range aim of the urban guerrillas matches the Guevara goals; they believe in violent revolution as the only road to a socialist so-

ciety.

In an interview published in July, 1968, by the Chilean magazine Punto Final, an unidentified member of Tupamaro said, "Our strategy falls within the over-all strategy of creating many Vietnams and giving the interventionists a lot of work on many fronts."

In a study of guerrillas in Brazil published in Havana a month later, Carlos Marighella asserted that the political aim of guerrilla warfare was "the expulsion of United States imperialism and the total destruction of dictatorship and its military forces in order, in consequence, to establish the consequence, to establish the power of the people."

Reason for Choice Given

"One should not, however, undertake guerrilla efforts without a strategic plan and over-all tactics based on objective reality," he added.

The Tupamaro member interviewed by Punto Final of-fered this analysis of Uruguay-

an "objective reality": "We do not have unassailable strong-holds in our country where a lasting guerrilla nucleus could be installed, although we have places in the countryside that are difficult to get at. On the other hand, we have a large city with buildings covering more than 300 square kilometers and that allows the development of an urban struggle."

Although 'Carlos Marighella's stated long-range goal is to establish roving guerrilla bands in rural areas throughout Brazil, Brazilians who read a

recent clandestine manifesto signed by the underground leader say that he has settled on the cities of Brazil as the country's weak point and that he looks forward to two years of urban operations before security measures are tightened enough to stop him. The same document stated that the main purpose of book subbasis was purpose of bank robberies was to fill a revolutionary war

"The over-all impression left by the manifesto," a Brazilian said, "was one of long-term planning and much, much patience."

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