

Y4.J89/2:C73/27/pt.13

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES  
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

---

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

---

PART 13

---

MARCH 29, APRIL 26, JUNE 1, AND JULY 27, 1961

---

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee	ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina	EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas	ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado	HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut	HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan	
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri	

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL  
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, *Vice Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina	ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas	EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
	HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

J. G. SOURWINE, *Counsel*

BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

II

RESOLUTION

*Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary*, That the following testimony taken in executive session be released from the injunction of secrecy, declassified where necessary, and with such expurgation as may be required for security or objectionable for other good cause be authorized to be printed and made public:

William A. Wieland, January 9, 1961; William A. Wieland, February 8, 1961; Samuel Shaffer, February 15, 1961; Col. Benoid E. Glawe, March 15, 1961; Andres Perez-Chaumont, March 29, 1961; Scott McLeod, April 4, 1961; Col. Oscar Doerflinger, April 26, 1961; Raymond Leddy, June 1, 1961; Jorge Garcia-Tunon, June 1, 1961; Ricardo Artigas-Ravelo, June 1, 1961; Whiting Willauer, July 27, 1961; Elmer R. Hipsley, November 16, 1961; Otto F. Otepka, November 16, 1961; Harris Huston, November 16, 1961; Salvatore A. Bontempo, January 9, 1962; William A. Wieland, February 2, 1962; Roger Jones, March 8, 1962; Abram Chayes, January 15, 1962; William O. Boswell, March 8, 1962; Frank Becerra, Jr., March 12, 1962; Elmer R. Hipsley, March 15, 1962; Capt. Charles R. Clark, Jr., April 12, 1962; Otto Otepka, April 12, 1962; Frances Knight, May 16, 1962; Robert D. Johnson, May 16, 1962; Abram Chayes, June 7, 1962; Roger W. Jones, June 7, 1962; John Leahy, June 12, 1962; Andreas Lowenfield, June 7, 1962; Andreas F. Lowenfield, June 12, 1962; Abram Chayes, June 19, 1962.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,  
*Chairman.*

THOMAS J. DODD,  
*Vice Chairman.*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON.  
JOHN L. McCLELLAN.  
SAM J. ERVIN, JR.  
ROMAN HRUSKA.  
EVERETT M. DIRKSEN.  
K. B. KEATING.  
HUGH SCOTT.

Dated October 4, 1962.

III

CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Artigas Ravelo, Ricardo.....	852
Doerflinger, Col. Oscar Maynard.....	839
Garcia-Tunon, Jorge.....	851
Leddy, Raymond.....	843
Perez-Chaumont, Andres.....	831
Willauer, Whiting.....	861

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES  
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 1961

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Roman L. Hruska.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will hold up your hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHAUMONT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ANDRES PEREZ-CHAUMONT

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you give the reporter your name, please, and your address?

Mr. CHAUMONT. My name is Andres Perez-Chaumont. My address—my home address—is 3744 Aberdeen Way, Houston, Tex.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your business or profession?

Mr. CHAUMONT. I am export manager for the American Glass Tinting Corp., and that is a Du Pont corporation which distributes throughout the world.

That is a glass tinting product, and I am in charge of the distributorship to all foreign countries.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are a Cuban national, are you, Mr. Chaumont?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, when did you leave Cuba?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Well, I left Cuba in 1957, at the beginning of 1957, when I was appointed military attaché to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, and to the Embassy in Central America. I only went back once, that was in November 1958, for 2 days, 3 days.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were then an Army man?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your rank?

Mr. CHAUMONT. A lieutenant colonel.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what branch of the service?



Mr. CHAUMONT. Well, I had started as infantry, but then I had a specializing command in general staff, and I had gone all the way to be subdirector of the school of commanding general staffing in Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you serve in intelligence work at all?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes; I was in charge of all the intelligence throughout Mexico and Central America.

Mr. SOURWINE. During what period were you in charge of this intelligence?

Mr. CHAUMONT. 1957 and 1958.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, or did you, know one William Arthur Wieland?

Mr. CHAUMONT. If I knew him personally, no. I have known him by references.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean, you have known him by references?

Mr. CHAUMONT. I believe he was a Cuban that had another name, Montenegro.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that Arturo Guillermo Montenegro?

Mr. CHAUMONT. I would not remember, sir. I have heard also that because I turned in very many beautiful reports on all Communist activities throughout the time I was there to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, and usually I did not see action concerning all the information I had given. And somehow or other I was told that there was a gentleman named Wieland that had been a Cuban named Montenegro, that was the one that sort of had been an obstacle for those reports to have been properly evaluated.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in 1957 and 1958?

Mr. CHAUMONT. 1958.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the American Ambassador?

Mr. CHAUMONT. In Mexico? Robert Hill.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Wieland in the Embassy?

Mr. CHAUMONT. I do not recall whether he belonged to the Embassy. There was a young—

Mr. SOURWINE. This is just hearsay, then, about Mr. Wieland?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you told this by personnel in the Embassy?

Mr. CHAUMONT. By personnel of the American Embassy there; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who told you this?

Mr. CHAUMONT. About Mr. Wieland's information?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CHAUMONT. Well, Ambassador Hill, yes, because I would complain to him; I would say that what would happen with those reports, that they were very definite, they were very precise, very concise, with facts all over, dates, names, and places, and nothing was done about it, ever.

Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Witness, what action was called for by your reports?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Well, I would, for instance, to make it very clear for the Government of the United States, the Communist connections of Fidel Castro and all his group of exiles and his party members and everything that were in Mexico at the time. They had close connections with the Communists, they were in close contact with

the Czech commercial attaché, with the Russians—they would receive these reports. I mean, those reports were very concise, I would give very definite action, and yet when I would inquire about the reaction they would say, well, nothing has been done about it, and I would see that they were still not considered as Communists somehow or other.

I even turned in records, I remember. For instance, once there were about 80 of them that went to make a demonstration in front of the British Embassy when they decided to sell arms to the Cuban Government, when the United States decided not to. Then about 80 or 90—89 exactly—

Mr. SOURWINE. Of whom?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Of the Cuban exiles in Mexico, made a demonstration in front of the British Embassy. I told them all about it, to prove that they were Communists. And they would start singing all the time the Communist international song.

Then the police came and put them in cars. They kept singing all the time, and when they got to the police station, all 89 of them kept singing. Even in the prison they had there they kept singing the Communist song and all that. They even made records of the song and everything, and the names of everyone was taken. I turned all that over to the Embassy so they could see that that was a definite Communist-oriented movement.

And, well, like that, hundreds of times I turned things like that in. Names exactly, the 89 names, what they sang—you could hear them singing the Communist international song and everything; their connections with the Czech commercial attaché, with the Russian Embassy—all that sort of thing.

Senator HRUSKA. Were some of those in that demonstration before the Embassy known to you as having been active in Communist work?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes. Some of them even belonged to the Communist Party. For instance, I have the Communist identification of Mrs. Guevara, who was later to become one of the most prominent people in Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. The wife of "Che" Guevara?

Mr. CHAUMONT. The wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was her maiden name?

Mr. CHAUMONT. I do not recall. But I have the copy, and I even sent a photostatic copy to the U.S. Embassy once. I sent everything to Colonel Doerflinger, who was the assistant military attaché there and who was the contact man with me, because I would make all my intelligence reports to Cuba and always I would give a copy to them.

Senator HRUSKA. To whom did Colonel Doerflinger report? To whom did he report within the Embassy?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Within the Embassy I do not know about the procedure. I know Ambassador Hill was very well informed because he would tell me whenever I met him there, he would say, "Your report on this and this was very good," and certainly this was approved, and he would comment with me. But I do not know the procedure inside the Embassy, who took it.

Senator HRUSKA. Were these reports that you gave the American Embassy furnished to the Embassy with the approval of your own Government?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. President Batista had ordered cooperation with the American Embassy?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

General Tabernilla was in charge of the command of all the armed forces—navy, air force, army, and everything.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. In your intelligence report, Mr. Chaumont, did you deal with any information on the question of whether Fidel Castro himself was a Communist?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what that information was, as best you remember it.

Mr. CHAUMONT. I had other reports of his actions since he first started in Bogotá, where he participated there in that sort of revolutionary action that was there once.

Well, the whole story of the comments, how he acted to people he met with there, how he developed things there and took refuge, and got on a plane and went over. And, of course, the basic thing for which I know definitely, when Fidel Castro decided to attack in Cuba for the first time in 1953, he went to Oriente Province, to Moncada where I was in command. I was the commanding officer there. That was his first action.

On the 26th of July, as a matter of fact, the day that gave name to his movement, he went there with 295 men and he attacked us at about 5 o'clock in the morning.

Of course, after the action there and the persecution and everything later on, they were completely defeated. They had about 190 dead and 70-something captured, and the rest got away.

Well, among the things we collected were some records which had a musical background of all these military marches and everything. They were going to be played in all the radio stations there as soon as the movement succeeded. In those records he spoke in his usual manner and his program was definitely outlined there. That was in 1953, the 26th of July. It was all about the agrarian reform, taking away all the land and distributing it and all that, distributing the stock of all industries to the people.

On those records he only said 50 percent of the stock, of course, but, later on, it turned out to be all of it. And taking away all the idle money that was in the banks.

Of course, there he said substituting it by bonds and things, but get it in circulation at once. And nationalizing, of course, all foreign enterprises there, all services, electric company, and all that sort of thing.

Well, all his program that he has taken, has carried on later on, was outlined on those records.

We took them and we sent them, I sent them, over to General Tabernilla for him to see. And I remember when I wrote sending it, I said, "Here you can see this is plainly a Communist movement; it would be very good for this to be made known, maybe not to the general public, but certainly to the American Embassy and to all owners of industries and land and sugar mills and everything," so they would know what they could expect from this movement.

I understood that Tabernilla, of course, took them immediately to Batista. And I understood also that they had been made known to the American Embassy at that time in Cuba.

Senator HRUSKA. Now, Mr. Chaumont, how many records were there?

Mr. CHAUMONT. There were four.

Senator HRUSKA. A series of four?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Four records, yes, because they were going to be played in four different stations.

Senator HRUSKA. But each of those records was the same?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, they were the same. They were going to be played in the different radio stations.

Senator HRUSKA. They were what we call platters?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

They were records; yes, platters.

Senator HRUSKA. And whose voice was on those records between the songs?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Fidel Castro's, personally.

Senator HRUSKA. Did you listen to those records?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Senator HRUSKA. And you recognized his voice?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Oh, yes.

Senator HRUSKA. And he identified himself on the records, that it was Fidel Castro?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where those records are?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No, I would not know. I know I sent them to General Tabernilla. And the instructions that were sent were to be sure and let them know—I remember I made the comment not to the general public, because there would be a lot of people that would sympathize with these things: "Oh, taking away from everybody and giving it to everybody; that is going to be wonderful," you know. But to all the people who were going to be affected, all industries, commerce, factories, international enterprises, U.S. Embassy, of course. That was the first one I mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any information, sir, respecting any connections between Cuban or Mexican or Iron Curtain country Communists and American Communists?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Not firsthand, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. There were a number of American Communists in Mexico around this time?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of any contacts between them and the Communists in your country?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge about any of the activities of Maurice Halperin?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the name "Martha Dodd" or "Martha Dodd Stern" mean anything to you?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Alfred K. Stern?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. William Berges?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No.

Those, of course, are the names of the American Communists that were there and all that, but I do not know of any connection with the Cuban people that were there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I am asking. But I have two more names I want to ask you about.

You obviously cannot answer until you hear them.

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Walter Illsley?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAUMONT. No, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. Before we get too far away from those records which you found, I just want to make our record here complete.

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir.

Senator HRUSKA. When was it that those records were seized by you?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Well, in the movement of the 26th of July when we were attacked, when they attacked us there.

Senator HRUSKA. What year?

Mr. CHAUMONT. 1953.

Senator HRUSKA. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any losses yourself in that struggle?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many were lost on your side?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Twenty-one men I lost there. My aide was one that was killed there a yard away from me, and my lieutenant was killed also. Twenty-one all together.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many did you have in your garrison, under your command?

Mr. CHAUMONT. When we were attacked we only had there at the moment about 49 or 50, at that very moment. It was sort of a holiday, a carnival there, and everybody was out and they were having a good time. And we had given permission to most of them. It was very well figured out by them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had 49 or 50 and Castro had 295—

Mr. CHAUMONT. Exactly, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). Of which he lost 190 to 195 that were killed?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And some 70 captured?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Seventy captured, more or less; yes. About 40 got away.

Mr. SOURWINE. About 30 or 40 got away?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Castro himself captured?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was subsequently released, was he not?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir; a year later he was released. He got an amnesty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Got an amnesty by Batista?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how that was arranged?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Politicians and the press and the priests and, I mean, the bishop and cardinals. Everyone would talk to him and they convinced him that it would be a good gesture and it would make him appear favorably in the eyes of the public, of the people, and it would be a good thing to release him, and release everybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Castro was then exiled, was he not?

Mr. CHAUMONT. He went after, yes. When he was released, he went into exile.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you spoke of Fidel Castro's connection with the uprising in Bogotá?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he had anything to do with the assassination of Gaitan?

Mr. CHAUMONT. According to the reports—I wasn't there at the time, but according to the reports, even the confidential reports said, and what the military attaché of Colombia at that time, in Mexico, gave me, he was definitely connected with it. I was president of the Association of Military Attachés in Mexico and was on very good terms with all of them, and they would interchange information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your own intelligence community regard Fidel Castro as a Communist at the time he was in the Sierra Maestra in 1957 and 1958?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir; definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew he was accompanied by "Che" Guevara?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes, sir; he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that Guevara was a Communist?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have information about Raul Castro?

Mr. CHAUMONT. About his connections with communism?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, if any.

Mr. CHAUMONT. Well, not directly with him. But I had heard—that was secondhand—I mean I had received information that he was a Communist and he participated in the Communist ideas, and that he was even much more extreme than his own brother.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have information about Vilma Espin?

Mr. CHAUMONT. That she was a Communist, too, and that she participated directly with the ideas of the Communist group, and that was the information. I did not know directly, I mean, but I would receive it in the reports and in information from people that were even with them in the Sierra Maestra, as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have information regarding Haydee Santamaria?

Mr. CHAUMONT. Yes. She participated in the attack at Moncada. There were 2 women among the 290-something and she was one. And at the time I did not know she was a Communist, of course. I knew she was an awful type of woman because she would talk and act even worse than the men. But I did not know her Communist connections at the time. Later on, of course, I was sent reports that she belonged to that group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions of this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Recess.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES  
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1961

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:25 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Present: Senators Dodd, Norris Cotton, and Kenneth B. Keating.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research directors; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator DODD. The committee is called to order.

Do you want to be sworn?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Yes.

Senator DODD. Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give to the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COL. OSCAR MAYNARD DOERFLINGER, CHIEF,  
OPERATIONS BRANCH, OACSI

Senator DODD. Give us your name, please.

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Oscar Maynard Doerflinger—that is M-a-y-n-a-r-d- D-o-e-r-f-l-i-n-g-e-r. My present home address is 2006 Columbia Pike, Arlington.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your present assignment, Colonel?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. My present assignment is Chief of the Operations Branch, OACSI, which is Army intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you been in intelligence?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Well, I have been in military intelligence off and on. I have been on this job since last August 1. Prior to that I spent 4 years in Mexico as assistant army attaché, which is, of course, an intelligence job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You had intelligence functions in Mexico?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Yes, overt. Some years previous, I served in a similar capacity in Chile.

Mr. SOURWINE. Colonel, the committee had testimony recently from a Mr. Chaumont, C-h-a-u-m-o-n-t, who was a former officer of

the Batista forces in Cuba. Colonel Chaumont told us that he had made various reports to you and given you various material. Do you remember Mr. Chaumont?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Oh, yes; very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the nature of the material he gave you?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Well, it was quite varied, in fact. Andre Perez-Chaumont was initially a major, promoted to lieutenant colonel while he was serving the Cuban Government in their Embassy in Mexico. I worked with him because we were naturally associated, both being members of the Attaché Corps accredited to Mexico at that time. I had frequent contact with him. We were both officers of the Attachés Association, which is a thing which commonly exists in various capitals of the world, where the host government desires that an organization be set up through which the service attachés—Army, Navy, and Air—of the various countries accredited maintain their relationships, introduce each other, and make themselves known to the government. They make trips together.

It is a convenient device through which the host government can, to some extent control the activities of the foreign service attachés.

Well, he was an officer of the association, and so was I. We worked together, arranging various meetings, and he was always very cooperative, extremely cooperative with the American Embassy.

During this period, Fidel Castro was in Mexico starting his operation which led into the landings in Cuba. Naturally, Perez-Chaumont was very concerned, because he knew perfectly well that this operation was directed against the government he represented, which was that of Fulgencio Batista. He received various reports about the operations and planning of the Castro crowd and passed some of this information to us.

Some of it he passed verbally. Sometimes he gave us newspaper clippings, sometimes he gave us written reports prepared in his own office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did these reports include evidence that Fidel Castro had Communist connections or associations?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Yes; this was commonly asserted. I recall in one instance that there was a demonstration, I believe opposite the British Embassy, at the time that British aircraft was delivered to Cuba.

I remember Chaumont stating at one time that the crowds were singing the Internationale in their demonstration. I do not know whether this was proved out or not.

I will tell you the way this was handled. I worked very closely with Ambassador Hill, and he runs a very strongly commanded Embassy. Everything I received, including the information I received from Chaumont, I passed on to Ambassador Hill or, when not to Hill personally, I passed it over to the designated representatives of his political section. These were Mr. Raymond Leddy, the political counsel, and Mr. Winston Scott.

Mr. SOURWINE. Winston Scott was what, security officer?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. No, sir; he was the so-called head of the political research section.

Mr. SOURWINE. You examined and noticed this material as it went through your hands?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As an intelligence agent, what was your evaluation of it? Was it convincing to you as to Castro's Communist connection?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I do not believe there is much question about Castro's Communist affiliation. It was generally accepted that he was supported by Lazaro Cardenas, the ex-President of Mexico, a man of strong leftist convictions, who protected Castro at every turn. I cannot testify to this personally. I do not know personally that Fidel Castro was supported by Lazaro Cardenas but this was commonly accepted in Mexico as a fact at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is very interesting, and I am sure you meant it to be responsive, but the particular question was your evaluation of the material given to you by Chaumont, the material that came to you from Cuban sources, as to your particular judgment whether this was convincing as to whether Castro was Communist connected.

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I was not in a position to evaluate the information given to me, because I had no way of checking it out. I was inclined to believe it, but I could not say that this is accurate.

For example, I know that the Ambassador directed the other elements of the Embassy to check this information out, because these other elements had personnel and facilities through which it could be checked out. I was merely the channel through which it was passed to the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to get at is whether you are in a position to tell us that information was or was not forwarded through your Embassy and through channels to Washington which would establish Castro's Communist connections or associations.

Colonel DOERFLINGER. This I could not say; I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were the 4 years you were at that Embassy?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I was there from, I believe, June of 1956 to July of 1960.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that Castro first invaded Cuba?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. Batista fell on the 1st of January 1959, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

Colonel DOERFLINGER. So he went in there around the middle or early, I believe, of the previous year.

Mr. SOURWINE. He went in in 1958, not 1957?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you were at the Embassy in Mexico for at least 2 years while Castro was operating in Mexico?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. During this time you received—was it a large number of reports from Chaumont?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. A fair amount.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw them, but you were unable to evaluate them as to whether they were convincing with respect to Castro?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I was unable to state positively whether they were true, because I had no opportunity to check them out.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand this, that knowing the source, you could—

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I have confidence in Perez-Chaumont.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I am trying to get at, your own judgment as an intelligence officer.

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I have great confidence in Perez-Chaumont. He is a fine man, a reliable man. In my opinion, his statements are worthy of credence.

Mr. SOURWINE. When this material was forwarded, was it forwarded with anything in the nature of an evaluation?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. This I did not know, because I did not forward it. I turned it over to the Ambassador, to Mr. Scott, or to Mr. Leddy, and the form in which they forwarded it was not known to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. One of the things Mr. Chaumont said he gave you was detailed information with respect to the wife of "Che" Guevara, positively identifying her as a Communist. Do you remember this?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I do not recall this.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, yourself, as a result growing out of your intelligence function in the Embassy, procure and deliver any information dealing with the Castro activities?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. No, because at that time, my function was that of an overt intelligence officer, in the military field. There were other people in the Embassy who were charged with the other field of endeavor. In my capacity as an Army attaché I would not normally have gotten into this type of thing.

Senator DODD. Off the record just a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Colonel, do you or did you know William Wieland?

Colonel DOERFLINGER. I have never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no connections with him?

[Colonel Doerflinger nods.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any questions, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have none.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any questions, Mr. Schroeder?

Mr. SCHROEDER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. We called the colonel mainly for the corroboration of prior testimony. We have covered that point.

Senator KEATING (presiding). Thank you, Colonel.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

## COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

THURSDAY, JUNE 1, 1961

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:10 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Present: Senators Dodd and Kenneth B. Keating.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Frank Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator DODD. Mr. Leddy, raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LEDDY. I swear.

### TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND LEDDY, COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN EMBASSY, MEXICO

Mr. SOURWINE. You are Raymond Leddy?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are in the Foreign Service of the U.S. State Department?

Mr. LEDDY. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your present position, sir?

Mr. LEDDY. I am counselor for political affairs, assigned to the American Embassy at Mexico City.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you been in that position?

Mr. LEDDY. One month short of 4 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you serve in that capacity under former Ambassador Hill?

Mr. LEDDY. I served with Ambassador Hill during the entire time of his tenure as Ambassador from July of 1957 through December of 1960.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Leddy, did intelligence go through the Embassy in Mexico to your knowledge dealing with the Communist affiliations and associations of Fidel Castro?

Mr. LEDDY. Prior to my arrival in Mexico, reports had been available at the Embassy concerning Castro's stay in Mexico.



Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know what was available at the Embassy prior to your arrival?

Mr. LEDDY. Because it was discussed in Embassy meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what you know about it while you were there.

Mr. LEDDY. From the time of my arrival in July of 1957 we received information from some local sources in Mexico and from the Embassy of course, in Havana, and the Department of State.

The information from Mexico showed Castro's Communist affiliations prior to his departure.

Mr. SOURWINE. From where?

Mr. LEDDY. The departure from Mexico to invade Cuba, and also showed the support of the Communists in Mexico for Castro when he already was in Cuba.

The information from our Embassy in Havana and from the State Department was of a wide nature and showed information, some of which was communistic affiliations and others which were not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a particular occasion when Mr. Milton Eisenhower visited Mexico and when he was briefed with regard to Castro during an airplane ride?

Mr. LEDDY. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us, first, were you on the airplane?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was on the plane?

Mr. LEDDY. The plane is the airplane of the air attaché who was then Col. Benoid E. Glawe. Colonel Glawe was aboard the plane—from Mexico to Mazatlan where Dr. Eisenhower was to spend a weekend during the course of his visit of approximately 1 week as the guest of President Lopez Mateos. Dr. Eisenhower and the Secretary, Mr. Keith Spaulding, were on the plane, and Ambassador Hill, myself from the Embassy. Our wives also accompanied us, Mrs. Hill and my wife, and Mr. William Wieland of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was all except for the pilot?

Mr. LEDDY. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, who gave Mr. Milton Eisenhower the briefing on Castro?

Mr. LEDDY. I was asked by the Ambassador to discuss the conclusions of the fifth meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago, Chile, that same weekend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do this?

Mr. LEDDY. In the course of this discussion we got into the entire Cuban situation since the meeting at Santiago had been called primarily to deal with the Cuban problem.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express your synthesis of the intelligence which had come to you with respect to Castro?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir; I reviewed a number of items which concerned the conclusions of the Foreign Ministers' meeting and their relation to the Cuban Government and then discussed the composition of the Cuban Government and its actions up to that time, which was the last week of August of 1959 when Castro was in power for about 8 months.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express a conclusion respecting Castro's communistic connections or his affiliations?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir; I pointed out that the information which we had available would indicate in my mind conclusively that Castro

was, himself, pro-Communist and that his government was falling under the control of Communists and that, as such, it constituted a danger to other countries and a matter of serious concern to our own Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you interrupted at all during this briefing?

Mr. LEDDY. Mr. Wieland expressed disagreement with me throughout the period of an hour and a half.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically, did he express disagreement with what you have just told us you said about Castro's communistic connections and affiliations?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir; he expressed disagreement with each of the points which I raised for discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he declare that Castro was not pro-Communist?

Mr. LEDDY. He said that Castro was not a Communist and that there was no conclusive evidence that any of the people in his government were Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone else enter into these discussions?

Mr. LEDDY. Ambassador Hill entered the discussion occasionally and, near the conclusion, Colonel Glawe entered the discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what way did each of those gentlemen enter?

Mr. LEDDY. On the part of Ambassador Hill, to explore further the reasons for the statements which I had made and to query Mr. Wieland for his reasons, and on the part of Colonel Glawe, to express very strong disagreement with the position which was taken by Mr. Wieland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the words in which Colonel Glawe expressed this disagreement?

Mr. LEDDY. I do very clearly because at the end of the discussion, Colonel Glawe turned to me and said, "I disagree with Mr. Wieland of the State Department. In my mind, he is either pro-Communist or a fool."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say this to you alone for your ears only?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He didn't say it loudly?

Mr. LEDDY. He spoke to me directly. Whether he spoke to any others I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know whether any others heard him?

Mr. LEDDY. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were all of the persons who were on the airplane in a position to hear this interchange; that is, your briefing on Ambassador Hill's part?

Mr. LEDDY. All the passengers were in position. The plane is a DC-3 type. The seats are bunched together in the forward section of the plane on the left-hand side and the right-hand side has a type of sofa or lounge and we were seated on the lounge; that is to say Dr. Eisenhower, myself, Mr. Wieland, and facing us was Ambassador Hill and the ladies were on the next seats facing us. Mr. Spaulding was just beyond the ladies in a small area, and I believe the conversation was clearly audible to all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even Mr. Spaulding could have heard the conversation?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he participate?

Mr. LEDDY. Not to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the ladies participate?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Am I correct in understanding that Ambassador Hill and Colonel Glawe both supported your position?

Mr. LEDDY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That Mr. Wieland was alone in defending Mr. Castro to Milton Eisenhower?

Mr. LEDDY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did this briefing terminate? Did you conclude with what you had to say or was it broken off in some other way?

Mr. LEDDY. I concluded the points which I had in mind as bearing on the Communist nature of the Castro government and at that point Ambassador Hill turned to Dr. Milton Eisenhower and asked whether he had any further questions. Dr. Eisenhower said that he had none and he stood up and went to the forward part of the plane. That terminated the briefing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was any documentary evidence offered in connection with this briefing or any papers proffered to Mr. Eisenhower?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir; only the newspaper versions of the final account of the fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, which was the starting point of the discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. Wieland?

Mr. LEDDY. My first acquaintance with Mr. Wieland was in 1954 in the Department of State. I was then in charge of Central American and Panamanian affairs, and Mr. Wieland was brought into the Department on temporary assignment during the difficulties with the Guatemalan Government of Arbenz in the spring of 1954. We worked together for a period of about 3 months.

Mr. SOURWINE. And thereafter, what was your dealing with him or your acquaintanceship with him?

Mr. LEDDY. My subsequent meeting was when Mr. Wieland made a visit to Mexico in the summer of 1958 in his capacity as officer in charge of what was then called middle American affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the occasion when Mr. Eisenhower came down there?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir; that was a year later in August of 1959.

Mr. SOURWINE. After that visit, did you see Mr. Wieland again before 1959?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the exact day of this airplane trip to Mazatlan?

Mr. LEDDY. If I recall rightly it was the 22d of August. It was, however, the Saturday of the week on which the meeting of foreign ministers was concluded and the date can be very easily fixed.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in 1959?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When Mr. Wieland was in Mexico in 1958, did you discuss with him, or did you hear him discuss, Castro or Cuban affairs?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir; we had a very brief meeting at that time. I accompanied Mr. Wieland in a call he made on the Foreign Minister,

and apart from that, my meetings with him the Embassy were purely casual. We had no briefings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, from your knowledge of the intelligence which you saw in your official capacity, were you able to form an opinion respecting the position Mr. Wieland took during the briefing of Mr. Eisenhower in the airplane in August of 1959?

Mr. LEDDY. Well, Mr. Sourwine, as far as opinion goes I had certainly an impression at that time based on the statements made by Mr. Wieland.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was this opinion?

Mr. LEDDY. In the first place, that he was not fully informed of all the facts bearing upon the Communist penetration of the Cuban Government, and secondly, that he was not willing to accept the interpretation of those facts which were offered in the course of the discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. What information did you have that was not available to him or would not have been available to him in his position?

Mr. LEDDY. I knew of no information which came to me in any special way. It was all official information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he was poorly informed. He had access to all the information you had access to and more; didn't he?

Mr. LEDDY. In the course of the conversation, he made a point of the fact that he saw all of the reports whereas we could only see part of them in Mexico.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this point seem valid to you?

Mr. LEDDY. I felt that the totality of reports would have in no way changed the facts which were pretty solid about the Communists in Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact it was well known in Mexico that Castro's group had been under Communist influence and in Communist association when they were organizing and training in Mexico; isn't that true?

Mr. LEDDY. The history there showed that the Government had taken action against Castro's group and that they had Communist affiliations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take issue with Mr. Wieland during this briefing when he interrupted you to challenge what you had said?

Mr. LEDDY. To take issue in the sense of expressing my disagreement with his viewpoints, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't enter into any argument with him that would involve personalities?

Mr. LEDDY. None whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply stuck to your points?

Mr. LEDDY. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything about this briefing that you have not been asked about that you think the committee should know?

Mr. LEDDY. My recollection of the incident is very clear, Mr. Sourwine, and I felt the concern which I think was common to the Ambassador and Colonel Glawe. We had been watching developments in Cuba from the Embassy in Mexico for many reasons, among the first of which was our responsibility for reporting on Communist developments in Mexico. The affiliations which Castro had in Mexico were known. When the Batista government fell, a great number of refugees from Cuba visited our Embassy and many of them were



known to officers in the Embassy who had served in Havana, and many of them made their way to the Embassy to inform us about developments in Cuba. We listened to and reported their information and it indicated to us a growing pattern of Communist takeover and we expected to see this reflected in the reports from the State Department. It was not, however, until midsummer of 1959 that in our reviews of incoming material we could discern an acceptance of the reality that Castro was communistic and that the people around him were Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you could discern an acceptance of this fact?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That Castro was a Communist and the people were Communist around him in midsummer of 1959 in the State Department summaries of reports?

Mr. LEDDY. In the State Department and intelligence community digests.

Mr. SOURWINE. Coming down from Washington?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was the Castro visit to the United States?

Mr. LEDDY. If I recall correctly it was approximately April 1959.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was after he had come to the United States and had gone?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that time you saw no evidence of State Department recognition of his Communist affiliations and connections?

Mr. LEDDY. That is correct. I recall particularly that there was a summary prepared as of the end of June under the auspices of the intelligence community. It summarized the characteristics of the Castro government and its tendencies after 6 months in power.

Consequently, when we had this discussion late in August we felt real concerned that the facts as they had now been developed and summarized and digested were still not fully accepted by the State Department officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say this estimate was prepared after 6 months?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the end of June?

Mr. LEDDY. It bore a date of June 30, 1959.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who prepared this estimate?

Mr. LEDDY. The intelligence community under the chairmanship of the CIA.

Mr. SOURWINE. And this was a final paper in the sense that it was disseminated to the full list that gets such estimates?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a top-level paper and purportedly definitive with regard to its subject as of its date?

Mr. LEDDY. It was a comprehensive report of the situation as of the first 6 months of Castro.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw this estimate?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes; we received it at the Embassy as we do all such.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did this estimate indicate that Castro was pro-Communist?

Mr. LEDDY. It did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it indicate that he was also a Communist himself?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it indicate that he was surrounded by Communists?

Mr. LEDDY. It characterized his immediate advisers as either Communist or pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it refer to Che Guevara as a Communist?

Mr. LEDDY. The exact words I don't recall but I do remember that it placed Che Guevara in the Communist camp without saying that he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it make reference to Gen. Alberto Bayo?

Mr. LEDDY. I don't remember the name of Gen. Alberto Bayo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this estimate reach conclusions with regard to the Communist or non-Communist nature of the Castro regime?

Mr. LEDDY. Its conclusions were in the sense that unless the trend were checked, the Communist plan to further infiltrate and control the Government would go on rapidly.

Mr. SOURWINE. The position which was taken by Mr. Wieland during the airplane ride to Mazatlan was contrary to this estimate; was it not?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir; Mr. Wieland said there was no conclusive evidence whatsoever that Fidel Castro or any of the people in the government were Communists.

Senator KEATING. Again, what was the date of that ride?

Mr. LEDDY. Late August of 1959.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Wieland had access to this national intelligence report?

Mr. LEDDY. I would feel certain that such an estimate circulated to the Embassy would be fully circulated to the responsible officers of the State Department inasmuch as they are primarily concerned, and the State Department is one of the agencies of the Government which participates in preparing the estimates.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, as a matter of fact you know that he not only had access to it, it was his duty to see it and read it and understand it; wasn't it?

Mr. LEDDY. I would think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in his special field. Was the existence of this estimate called to his attention in connection with the discussion in the airplane?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir; I cited it as one of the bases for the statements I had made concerning individuals in the Government and the plans of the Government. He said he had access to all of the material, but did not recall this particular report.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEATING. No questions.

Senator DODD. I don't have any.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are grateful to you for coming up here today, Mr. Leddy. We regret that we didn't get to hear you last week.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Leddy.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee recessed.)

## COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

THURSDAY, JUNE 1, 1961

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Kenneth B. Keating presiding.  
Present: Senator Keating.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Frank Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator KEATING. The subcommittee will come to order.

General Garcia, raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence which you give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General GARCIA. I do.

Senator KEATING. General, during the recess, certain questions have been put to you to which you have made certain answers. These have been transcribed in English and I have them in my hand. In order to save time, I will ask you, with the aid of your interpreter, to read these questions and answers; and if your answers have been correctly transcribed, we will then ask you to sign this with your name at the end of it. Then it will be made a part of the record.

Now, Mr. Ravelo, will you stand and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence which you give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RAVELO. I do.

Senator KEATING. Would the interpreter please stand and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly and correctly interpret in this proceeding?

Mr. ROMERO. I do.

My name is Mario S. Romero. I am an interpreter, in room 519, Mills Building, Washington, D.C.

Senator KEATING. Mr. Ravelo, you heard what I said to General Garcia-Tunon.

Mr. RAVELO. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING. And I will ask you to do the same as the general and to sign this at the end.

Mr. RAVELO. Yes, I will.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ask if he has any corrections he wants to make before he signs it.

Senator KEATING. I want to explain to both of you that you may make any change or correction before signing it.

Now, Counsel, do you have further questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just one or two, Mr. Chairman.

General Garcia, the statement here mentions a document, which is a copy of an original which you gave to Mr. William Wieland. You have just handed me a document which is a carbon copy of seven pages. This is the document you referred to?

# TESTIMONY OF JORGE GARCIA-TUNON AND RICARDO ARTIGAS-RAVELO AS GIVEN THROUGH MARIO S. ROMERO, THE INTERPRETER

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may this be ordered in the record at the appropriate place?

Senator KEATING. Yes, and that is the document in Spanish which he gave to Mr. Wieland?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, and if the Chair would wish to order that this be translated by the interpreter, and the English translation be printed in the record rather than the Spanish, that would be desirable.

Senator KEATING. So ordered.

(The document referred to reads as follows:)

[Translation from the Spanish language, January 1958]

## OBSERVATIONS REGARDING FIDEL CASTRO'S LETTER TO THE JUNTA FOR THE LIBERATION OF CUBA

(1) This document establishes a new correlation of forces, as the document itself affirms. It contains a true immediate program of the "fidelismo." It is directed mainly to public opinion. Jumping over all moral barriers and renouncing any possible help from the factions represented in the Junta of Liberation, Fidel Castro throws himself alone to the attainment of his revolutionary objectives. Observe—and it is probably not a mere coincidence—that the rest of the opposition is condemned in the document, while at no time is a pronouncement made against communism.

(2) The letter should not be interpreted as the simple act of breaking the unity of the opposition. What it does is to concentrate the entire opposition around the 26th of July movement. It sweeps away all the political hierarchies. "I am the opposition," it says, and because of the dramatic overtone and the circumstances in which the letter is produced, it is possible to assert that this stroke gives considerable advantage to the "fidelismo" and places it right at the top of the political situation. With just one bold gesture Fidel Castro has become the anti-Batista.

(3) In the face of Fulgencio Batista's absolutism, Fidel establishes his own absolutism and liquidates the very little prestige left to Carlos Prío Socarras. Now there is only one rebel chief and his name is Fidel Castro. It would not be farfetched to prognosticate that 80 percent of the Junta of Liberation will incorporate itself into the "fidelismo."

(4) Until now the opposition to Batista's regime, which opposition is headed by Prío and the "ortodoxos," was planning within the country to substitute Batista and his team. As a matter of fact, they were insurrectional plans of a political type, more or less gangster-like, but never with revolutionary objectives aimed at creating a real social agitation. This is substantiated by the scanty participation of the workers in the insurrectional movements. It was a dis-

possessed political minority, partially discredited, aspiring to regain control of the State.

(5) Fidel Castro has launched, for the first time, revolutionary aims directed toward wider sections of the population. Reassured by his heroic gesture, he tries to gather behind him the entire Cuban population. It should be noted that Fidel Castro, in this program, proclaims himself the source of law and promises:

(a) Designates the executive power.

(b) Abolishes the legislative power.

(c) Creates new workers leadership, sweeping out the present ones, which means, simply, that the new workers movement which he promises will have revolutionary overtones. In the next few days he will have to launch extremely radical objectives in order to mobilize the satisfied Cuban working class.

(d) Dismisses wholly the judicial power.

(e) Liquidates the armed forces of the Republic, traditionally bureaucratic and free from political partisanship, and promises to substitute them with elements of revolutionary extraction, which means simply that the armed forces he promises will consist of the armed peasants who second him in his struggle and who have already been equipped with a revolutionary conscience.

(f) Abolishes the system of political parties, the bulwark of any democratic government, since he stresses that the political parties will have no right to participate in the provisional government. Only the 26th of July Party, his own, will have access to the new structure of the revolutionary regime he proposes.

(g) It should be noted that all the aims which come forth from the revolutionary program of Fidel Castro are directed toward the creation of a totalitarian regime. Compare: "All the power to the Soviets," said Lenin in 1917. "All the power to the 26th of July," says Fidel Castro in 1958.

(h) Proclaims harsh penalties for all those committed to the Batista regime and hints at the possibility of extending those penalties to those committed to prior regimes, which makes obvious his intention of satiating the revolutionary appetite of the masses.

(6) In summary, if the program briefly disclosed by Fidel Castro in his letter to the Junta of Liberation is analyzed thoroughly, one arrives at the conclusion of it being an integral revolution made by workers, soldiers, and peasants, because it tends to mobilize all three components; the workers' revolutionary movement, in the hands of revolutionary leadership of the 26th of July; revolutionary soldiers, at the service of the 26th of July; peasants mobilization with agrarian reform and distribution of land, something which has often been proclaimed previously. At no time, either now or before, does Fidel make a clear anti-Communist declaration; however, he does not hesitate to condemn the traditional politics; his allies of yesterday and the most traditional institutions of the country. He takes a radical attitude against everybody, with the exception of communism. The revolution which he proclaims, and to which he is giving impetus with weapons in his hands, is mainly a social type revolution. Future development will bring him to coincide with the Communist tactics. What Fidel Castro promises at this time does not differ greatly from what was promised by Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz, in Guatemala, in their time. It also shows points of coincidence with the "peronista" teachings. It must be noted that this is the first time in the history of Cuba in which one man is successful in creating a disciplined army of peasants and students, and proclaims total conquest of power, displacing the existing regime and all the traditional political leaderships in the country. This is particularly grave taking into consideration that the romantic aura Fidel Castro possesses gathers behind him the great majorities.

## CONCLUSIONS

If within the next few days Batista's regime were to collapse, or Batista himself were slain in any of the assassination plots being planned against him, without the previous existence of a plan of military strengthening which would be useful in keeping order and channeling the political activities of the country, the revolutionary thesis of Fidel Castro is the one which would arouse the country from one end to the other. At the sudden collapse of Batista's dictatorship, nothing could prevent "fidelismo," with its radical objectives, from controlling all the power. The army, dismembered and leaderless, would not have the fortitude to stop the sweeping advance of the masses agitated by the

"fidelismo" and would end by joining the "fidelista" movement in order to survive. The case of Santiago de Cuba ought to be remembered, when, several months ago, an aroused and fervently "fidelista" population practically took over the city for several days. It should be noted that the fact of Batista remaining in power is no longer dangerous in itself, but only because of the possibility of provoking social chaos. Any delay in arriving at an adequate solution to the Cuban problem is extremely dangerous because it allows the revolutionary teachings of "fidelismo" to deepen into the innermost core of the people, and perhaps the time will come when it is no longer restrainable. The new correlation of forces brought about by this sudden breach in the opposition unity, compels an emergency treatment. The revolutionary "fidelismo" is of no importance militarily at this moment and it will be difficult for it to organize the takeover of power, but it is undermining the little institutionalism which is left in the country. It arouses the masses, infiltrates the unions, and lately is concentrating all its efforts toward the physical liquidation of the workers' leaders. A few days ago, in Oriente, the "fidelistas" assassinated a prominent workers' leader. It is known, also, that Mujal himself is seriously threatened. On the other hand, Fidel Castro's document admits that the labor section of the 26 of July is organizing the strike committees in every working place and sector of industry, together with the oppositionist elements of ALL MILITANCIES willing to join a work stoppage. Here is, clearly defined, the live and pulsing presence of the collaboration with the Communist agitators in the "fidelista" movement. Fidel Castro, so clear in his attitudes, so courageous in his declarations, does not exclude the support of the Communists, and he does it in a deliberate manner. Such support suits him well and he proclaims his willingness to accept it. This aim of a general strike makes evident the definite direction the "fidelismo" has taken in this phase of the struggle against Batista's regime, which is none other than the infiltration of the unions in order to accomplish its revolutionary objectives. In less than one year the "fidelismo" has made the insurrectional leadership of Carlos Prio critical and has put aside the two major political parties in Cuba; that is the "autenticos" and the "ortodoxos," which help to explain the swiftness of his action and the deliberateness of his plans. If he is allowed to advance further, if a plan is not executed rapidly in order to stop the "fidelista" agitation, he will succeed in bringing about a catastrophic social convulsion. The order to burn the sugar fields emanating from the Sierra Maestra, seems to be directed against Batista, and perhaps many have been fooled by this appearance, but the truth is that the intention is to hurt the United States, and it would not be difficult to uncover in this order some hidden Communist instigation.

Only the immediate liquidation of Batista's regime, and its substitution by a strong military power, unobjectionable to the country and to the political parties, could contribute to the equilibrium of the forces which make up the organization of the Cuban Nation. Only swift and effective action could deprive this rising revolution of the elements which form the basis of its sustenance. The "fidelismo" teachings, now openly revolutionary, radical and very agreeable to the oppressed Cuban people, feeds itself and grows by Batista's presence in power. Replace Batista's regime with a strong military power, closed to any revolutionary infiltration, and those teachings lose all their emotional value and are reduced to their just limits. The only remedy will be for the movement to incorporate itself into the civil struggle and to abandon the revolutionary tactics.

#### CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATOR

This is to certify that the foregoing document is a true and correct translation from the Spanish language to the best of my knowledge and ability.

MARIO S. ROMERO,

704 17th St. NW., Washington 6, D.C. Telephone DI-7-2090.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Sworn and subscribed before me a notary public in and for the District of Columbia on this 7th day of June of 1961.

[SEAL]

H. DOUGLAS FRISBIE,

Notary Public.

My commission expires June 14, 1962.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am addressing myself to General Garcia now. Do you have any knowledge of the number of Czechs, Chinese, and Russians in Cuba today?

The INTERPRETER. No; I don't have a correct number because at this time they are big. There are different sources of information, and it is hard to determine which of the sources is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same question of Mr. Artigas-Ravelo.

The INTERPRETER. The number is very, very hard to put, but to give you a general idea, I believe that they exceed 15,000 persons.

Senator KEATING. Where did you get that information?

The INTERPRETER. The agents that are in Cuba and they come from Cuba and that are organized with us. Also by the number of houses, apartment houses and residences which have been taken over where Czechs, Russians, and Chinese live in those apartments.

Senator KEATING. And they live mostly by themselves?

The INTERPRETER. They live with their families.

Senator KEATING. But I mean are they in a certain part of Havana by themselves or in certain parts of the country?

The INTERPRETER. They are contained in certain sections and in country clubs.

Senator KEATING. And they have taken over houses and apartments belonging to Cubans?

The INTERPRETER. The whole houses and apartments, not the whole building, but the apartments, that is correct. Just in the Russian personnel now, there are registered 275.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Artigas, in your questioning which is included in this statement that you are to read and sign, there was mention of communication by letter between you and Mr. William Wieland. Do you have a copy of the letter you wrote Mr. Wieland from Atlanta, Ga., in January 1958?

The INTERPRETER. No; it was in May of 1959, not January, from Atlanta.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that General Artigas-Ravelo stated that he wrote Mr. Wieland a letter from Atlanta, Ga., in January 1958.

The INTERPRETER. From Miami.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is 1958 telling him of the two top men in the Cuban Communist Party.

Do you have a copy of that letter?

The INTERPRETER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, while we were waiting for this hearing to begin you told us of knowledge you had respecting Communist support for Castro while his forces were assembling in Mexico. Would you tell us that briefly for the record, please, and so the Senator may hear it?

The INTERPRETER. Well, I did not say that. It was General Garcia.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was addressed to General Garcia. My apologies.

The INTERPRETER. The time that I was in Mexico, is that your question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You told us what the Cuban Ambassador told you.

The INTERPRETER. Dr. Oscar de la Torre, Ambassador of Cuba in Mexico, a friend of mine, when I visited him he told me that the Communists were backing the political activities of Castro inclusive in those days and they had attacked the Cuban Embassy in Mexico with Molotov cocktails. The Ambassador showed me the damage that was caused.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have knowledge that the Mexican police had taken action against the Castro group?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the police when they raided the headquarters of the Castro group had found Communist documents?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; they found Communist literature in the Castro headquarters.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was made public at the time, was it not?

The INTERPRETER. The arrests and the raid were public. But a friend that I know, a Cuban, showed me a copy of the police record and he promised to give me a copy of that police record but I have not received it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did that police record show, as you remember it?

The INTERPRETER. Well, other than the Communist literature, which was the matter of interest to us, I remember that he mentioned the name of the brother of Castro as a person who participated in almost every activity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that Raul?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything more about this police report?

The INTERPRETER. I remember, but the purpose of the arrest was not because of political activities but because of gangster activities.

Senator KEATING. Were these activities made known by you to Mr. Wieland?

The INTERPRETER. I don't remember, but if I did mention it to him, it was just orally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any information about the situation in Cuba, or Castro's intentions, which you want to give this committee for this record?

The INTERPRETER. Well, I have already given information at the end of 1959 that the Communist propaganda of Castro was going to be intensified among the colored people in the United States and now in this province, racial problems are coming up to surface which I believe are a consequence of the activity of the Castro agents in this territory.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Artigas, you told us of your belief that Castro intends to move against Santo Domingo.

The INTERPRETER. I am sure he will do it because that is his plan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any advice for the United States under these circumstances?

The INTERPRETER. I have been trying for the past 5 years to help, but all my help has been sterile.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was giving you an opportunity on this record to make any recommendations that you wanted to make.

The INTERPRETER. What we were talking about previously about Trujillo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The INTERPRETER. I believe sincerely that the actual situation is highly dangerous, without this meaning that we are going to the panic situation. But I believe at this time we are sitting on top of a

volcano and millions of TNT, just sitting on them. Under no circumstances do I believe the United States should allow in Santo Domingo the same situation which now is happening in my country. Castro's plan is not Castro's—Castro is really the instrument of the Soviets, and his plan is greater penetration into Latin American countries.

The principal objective at this moment in Castro's plan is to occupy Guatemala, and in effect, Mr. Arbenz is now in Cuba with this subject in mind; also in Bolivia and Colombia and the other places in America they have named. We know through sources which are to be believed that they have this plan now in Cuba, that there is now in Cuba one of the chiefs of the Spanish revolution—Lister—he was the one that directed the battle in Spain. Another object of the Castro government is, if the situation in Santo Domingo turns worse, they will try to turn that situation into a revolution and take it over. If that happens, then the situation will turn into the worst one of today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have information respecting the threat of Communist aggression in British Guiana?

The INTERPRETER. No; I have no knowledge about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, General Garcia?

The INTERPRETER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEATING. All right, thank you very much, gentlemen.

Now you look at that testimony and, with the help of the interpreter, make any changes or corrections you might want.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand that, do you? Read it through. Any changes that you want to make in your answers should be made.

Senator KEATING. And, when that is done, we will place it in the record.

(The prepared testimony of Gen. Jorge Garcia-Tunon and Mr. Ricardo Artigas-Ravelo, as signed by both, is as follows:)

#### GENERAL JORGE GARCIA-TUNON

Birth: July 22, 1913, France. Cuban citizen, Retired Army General (Inf.) 1952. Education: Military Academy, Havana, Cuba.

Residence: Miami since 1956. Pension stopped by Batista Government in 1957.

Question. When was the first time that you saw Mr. Wieland?

Answer. I was introduced to Mr. Wieland by Mr. Piad in June 1957. I saw Mr. Wieland after this approximately 15 times.

Question. When was the second time that you saw Mr. Wieland?

Answer. November 1957. But, the first time that I saw Mr. Wieland, we spoke about the Cuban problem, about doing something to get rid of Batista as the situation was very bad in Cuba with Batista and we wanted to do something about it. Also present at this meeting was Mr. Stewart, an assistant to Mr. Wieland, and Mr. Hardin. Mr. Stewart was not against Batista and favored leaving the situation as it was.

Question. At the time of your second meeting, November 1957, did you ask Mr. Wieland about the document?

Answer. I had not given the document to anyone at this time. I gave it to Mr. Wieland in January 1958. He said he would advise me, but I never heard from him about it.

Question. What did you discuss at the second meeting?

Answer. Mr. Wieland asked me for all information that I had about the Government, the military, and everything that I knew.

Question. When did you see Mr. Wieland again?

Answer. I went to see him around December 1957, but I saw Mr. Stewart instead. I went to discuss this same Cuban problem and to tell him of an organization, Junta de Liberacion, which had been created in Miami. Mr. Stewart was



annoyed with me because of the way that I insisted upon discussing this problem about Batista.

Question. When did you see Mr. Wieland again?

Answer. January 1958. At this time, I submitted the document to Mr. Wieland.

Question. Would you describe this document?

Answer. Well, Fidel Castro had written a letter from the mountains in the Sierra Maestra, which was public knowledge, in which he dissolved the Junta de Liberacion, which was an organization against Batista and which comprised all such organizations against Batista. In dissolving this organization, Fidel Castro took charge of the organized efforts against Batista.

This letter was addressed to all the heads of the different factions organized in Miami against Batista.

On the basis of this letter, we prepared a document which was an analysis of the contents of this letter and a comparison of its thoughts and ideas with the tenets of Marxism. We compared the 26th of July Movement with Lenin's slogan, "All Power to the Soviets."

While Castro does not mention Communism by name, all of his plans are the same, his methods are the same: he is going to dissolve the Army and arm the workers.

All this we advised Mr. Wieland. Mr. Wieland was alone, but I was accompanied by Mr. Artigas, in Washington.

Question. What did Mr. Wieland say?

A. Mr. Wieland said that he'd look it over and advise me. I never heard from him about it. We also suggested in that document that Batista should be substituted by a military junta. To this suggestion Mr. Wieland gave me the distinct impression without actually saying it, that this was very probable, that it could be done. We even discussed the names of military men who could form a military junta.

Question. Did he ask you to tell him who could do this?

Answer. Yes. I told him: General Cantillo, Colonel Barquin, who was in prison at the time, General Diaz Tamayo, General Sosa, and myself, General Garcia-Tunon.

Question. Were any of those mentioned as possibilities for the Junta takeover?

Answer. Yes, General Cantillos, we later learned, had been meeting secretly with Castro in the mountains.

Question. Did you ever ask him about the document?

Answer. Yes; but Mr. Wieland said that there was nothing that he could do but report this information to his superiors.

Question. When was the next time that you contacted Mr. Wieland?

Answer. I saw him several times after January 1958. I was residing in Washington then.

Question. Did you ever discuss this document again?

Answer. Yes. I insisted that there should be found a solution to the Cuban problem, and he told me that there was nothing we could do. All he could do was to gather information and report it to his superiors.

Question. Did Wieland ever mention Castro?

Answer. I saw Mr. Wieland several times and I do not recall exactly when he spoke about Castro, but generally speaking I told him that Castro seems to be working for the Communists. He told me that anyone who was against the Batista Government was always accused of being a Communist.

I want to make clear, that in those days, Castro was never the center of the conversation. It was Batista.

Question. Do you recall any of your visits after January 1958?

Answer. After January 1958, I spoke to him several times always about this same Cuban problem.

Question. Did he tell you that he had stopped shipment of arms to Batista?

Answer. On one occasion, we talked about that, but he did not tell me that he had stopped shipments of arms to Batista but that the Government did in order to avoid any more bloodshed in Cuba.

Question. Did you ever tell Mr. Wieland that, in your opinion, Castro was a Communist?

Answer. I do not recall exactly that, but I discussed this in the document and I told him about Castro Communists and their activities in Mexico.

Question. How did you know about this?

Answer. It was said that when Castro was detained by the Mexican Police in Mexico, they acquired quite a few books and documents of Castro's on Communism.

Question. When was the last time that you saw Mr. Wieland?

Answer. It was in 1959—twice, in May and July or August. When I left Cuba in April through the Ecuador Embassy, I went to live in Atlanta and then I wrote from there to him, telling him everything that had happened in Cuba, all that was happening at that moment, and everything that would happen.

Question. Did he reply?

Answer. No. I told him about the dangers to the United States of the Cuban situation and asked him if good offices of the United States could be used to solve this problem. He never replied.

Question. What happened when you came to Washington in May?

Answer. I saw him and told him that Castro was a Communist and that he should be stopped.

Question. What did he say?

Answer. He told me that Castro was not a Communist. We did not discuss the document.

RICARDO ARTIGAS RAVELO

Question. What was your rank in the army?

Answer. I held the rank of Commander in the Police Force; I was chief of investigations in Havana for 4 years. I am now retired.

Question. Did you serve under the Prio government?

Answer. Yes; I was director of the national lottery under Prio.

Question. When did you arrive in the U.S.?

Answer. I arrived here on March 13, 1952, in Miami.

Question. Would you describe yourself as being anti-Batista or anti-Castro?

Answer. I am both anti-Batista and anti-Castro.

Question. Did you ever meet with William Wieland?

Answer. Yes; I have met with him some 25 or 30 times.

Question. When did you first see him?

Answer. I first saw him in June 1957 in the company of General Garcia, at the State Department here in Washington.

Question. Was General Garcia with you on any subsequent visits to Mr. Wieland?

Answer. Yes; I believe he was with me on two other occasions.

Question. What was the purpose of your visits to Mr. Wieland?

Answer. I wanted to give him information on the very bad situation in Cuba and let him know the serious nature of Communist infiltration there.

Question. When did your second visit with Mr. Wieland take place?

Answer. I saw him again in August 1958. I might add that I was in constant touch with him by telephone.

Question. In your visits with Mr. Wieland, did he ever mention to you anything about the stopping of arms shipments to Batista?

Answer. Yes; Mr. Wieland told me that the State Department would no longer allow the shipment of arms to Cuba.

Question. Did you ever suggest a solution to Mr. Wieland regarding the problems existing in Cuba at that time?

Answer. Yes, prior to the fall of Batista and the takeover by Castro, I suggested to Mr. Wieland that a military junta be formed to prevent Castro from assuming power.

Question. Why did you feel a junta would be a good thing?

Answer. I knew of Castro's previous activities and of his Communist attitude. I cited several instances of this attitude such as the Bogotá uprising, etc.

Question. What did Mr. Wieland say when you told him of Castro being a Communist?

Answer. His answer was that Castro was not a Communist.

Question. Did you warn him of Castro being a Communist on any other occasion?

Answer. I constantly warned him about this and his answer was always the same, that Castro was not a Communist.

Question. Prior to the Castro takeover, did you ever tell Mr. Wieland of Communist Party members joining the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestras?

Answer. Yes.

Question. When was this?

Answer. I wrote Mr. Wieland a letter from Miami, Fla., in January 1958. I told him that the two top men in the Cuban Communist Party had gone to the Sierra Maestras to join Castro. They are Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Ladislao Gonzalez Carvajal. I even told Wieland the day on which they went.

Question. Did Mr. Wieland ever reply to your letter?

Answer. No, never.

Question. After you wrote this letter you saw Mr. Wieland again, did you not?

Answer. Yes, I saw him after that.

Question. Did you again mention to him the episode about the two Communist Party leaders joining Castro in the Sierra Maestras?

Answer. Yes, I asked him what the United States could do about the Cuban situation.

Question. Did you ask him why he did not reply to your letter in which you told him of the Communist leaders joining Castro?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What did he say?

Answer. He replied that the United States could do nothing about the Cuban situation.

Question. When did you last see Mr. Wieland?

Answer. I saw him for the last time in March 1959 at the State Department here in Washington.

Question. What was the purpose of your visit at that time?

Answer. I came to Washington with a Cuban Army colonel named Corzo. He went with me to see Wieland, and we submitted a military plan to overthrow Castro.

Question. To whom did you submit this plan?

Answer. We gave it to Mr. Wieland.

Question. What did Mr. Wieland have to say about the plan.

Answer. He again said that Castro was not a Communist and defended him as he had done on every occasion in the past when I had brought up Castro's name.

Question. Did you say you saw Wieland 25 or 30 times in all?

Answer. Between 1957 and 1959 I made about 17 trips to Washington to see him.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

## COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1962

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:25 p.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; Frank Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator DODD. On the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you wish to be sworn, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. WILLAUER. I would like to be sworn.

Senator DODD. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WILLAUER. I do.

### TESTIMONY OF WHITING WILLAUER

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you give the reporter your full name?

Mr. WILLAUER. Whiting Willauer.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your present address?

Mr. WILLAUER. My present address, which is a temporary address, summer address, is Westcliff, Nantucket, Mass.

My home is Antigua, Guatemala.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Government?

Mr. WILLAUER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been special assistant to the Secretary of State?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were educated at Exeter and Princeton, where you received your B.S., cum laude, in 1928?

Mr. WILLAUER. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You then attended Harvard Law School, from which you secured an L.L.B. in 1931?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Graduating in the top 10 percent of your class?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At Princeton you played varsity football and lacrosse, among various other extracurricular activities?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You hold a pilot's license for multiengine aircraft with more than 3,000 hours in the air?

Mr. WILLAUER. Foreign pilot's license, not from the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an expert scuba diver?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; I have done a great deal of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got a commendation for rescue work performed in 1957 while you were Ambassador to Honduras?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; here in the Senate and locally by the authorities.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recovered several bodies in a very difficult operation which involved the risk of your own life?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You speak Spanish, French, Chinese, and German, as well as English?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, I am on the professional level or very close to it in Spanish. I used to be pretty good in French, but that is gone. I used to have some Chinese; that is gone. And the others are childhood languages, I would only really claim Spanish today.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are very modest, Mr. Ambassador.

You are a practicing attorney and have had a substantial private practice?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. With general experience in labor, banking and insurance matters, and with admiralty law as a specialty?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were legal coordinator of Admiral Byrd's second Antarctic expedition?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been attorney for the Civil Aeronautics Board, and were coordinator of legal matters in connection with the construction of the Washington National Airport?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been a special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Handling first cases of judicial and political corruption, and you had all such cases under your charge for a time?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And later handling Communist and Nazi matters?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were special counsel for the Federal Power Commission?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were assistant to the President and executive secretary of China Defense Supplies, 1941-44?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what was China Defense Supplies.

Mr. WILLAUER. China Defense Supplies was an organization—in fact, it was a Delaware corporation—set up in this country, the medium through which the Chinese Government operated to obtain its lend-

lease supplies during World War II, and was the principal backstopping agency for General Chennault's Flying Tiger operation during the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were assigned to the Chinese Government first to assist in the formation of the Flying Tigers and later in all phases of the Chinese war effort?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist in pioneering the so-called hump air route from India to China?

Mr. WILLAUER. I had a great deal to do with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And with its operations after it got underway?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. About half your time between 1941 and 1944 was spent in China and India?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were commended by General Chennault, among others, for your work there.

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct. He wrote me a very nice letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944 and 1945 you were Director of the Foreign Economics Administration, Far Eastern and Special Territories Branch?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. This included operations in the fields of foreign aid and economic intelligence, procurement of strategic material, economic warfare, and postwar planning?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had responsibilities in all those areas?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. From August of 1945 until V-J Day you were special representative of the President of the United States in the Philippines?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your assignment there, sir?

Mr. WILLAUER. To try and reconstitute the civilian economy. Concurrently at that time I served also, or continued to serve as Director of the Far Eastern Branch of the FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. You also had an assignment to arrange with General MacArthur for transition from military to civilian control?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, that was the Philippine assignment to which we referred.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Now, in 1946 you established residence in China as foreign counsel for various organizations?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Including International Correspondence Schools, Time, and others?

Mr. WILLAUER. And others, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also form a partnership with General Chennault?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose?

Mr. WILLAUER. For the purpose of forming an airline. We particularly wanted to have an airline there to help in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of China.



Mr. SOURWINE. And did you form such an airline?

Mr. WILLAUER. We did.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the CAT Airline?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were its general manager and executive vice president, and later became president and vice chairman of the board?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you act as adviser to the director of operations of UNRRA?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did. Informally.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what area?

Mr. WILLAUER. In China, informally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the director of operations of UNRRA at that time?

Mr. WILLAUER. Ralph Olmstead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also act as adviser to the Premier of China on reconstruction problems?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; but informally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also serve in Shanghai as a member of the Committee on Western Jurisdiction?

Mr. WILLAUER. Jurisprudence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Western Jurisprudence?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the objective of this committee?

Mr. WILLAUER. We hoped, through influencing Western-trained Chinese lawyers, to get a ground swell in favor of a constitutional government in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were also adviser to various American concerns doing business in China?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in connection with the CAT airline, that was the air transport facility for both UNRRA and ECA, wasn't it?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct. That is the way it started.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the way U.S. aid got into China?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is how we redistributed it through China.

Mr. SOURWINE. At one time, specifically in 1948, CAT airline was the largest aircargo carrier in the world, wasn't it?

Mr. WILLAUER. According to the best statistics we could find.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had a very high rating by intelligence sources as a deterrent to early Red Chinese Communist victory.

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes. That was after the reconstruction phase. When the war, the hot war, broke out, after the failure of the Marshall mission, and we had really hot war between Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the Commie forces, we became more and more carriers of military supplies for the Chiang Kai-shek forces; we used to drop, air-drop, or land under fire all over China in beleaguered cities.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were the major medium for evacuation of anti-Communist refugees to Hong Kong and Formosa, were you not?

Mr. WILLAUER. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a very important transport facility for the U.N. Command during the Korean war.

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, indeed—two-thirds of our fleet was there. And we, I think, were rated rather highly by that command.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were also an important air transport facility during the struggle in northern Vietnam?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. CAT is still operating as an airline, is it not?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, and it is a fairly large one.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is operating pretty well all along the periphery of communism in the Orient?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is what we do. From Korea down to Bangkok.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the Chinese Communist victory on the mainland in 1949, other Chinese airlines defected to the Communists, did they not?

Mr. WILLAUER. They did; two of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. And so did the Chinese merchant marine.

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Most of the airline equipment was in Hong Kong at the time?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And CAT fought quite a legal battle to get its equipment out?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right. We won it after losing it about eight or nine times. We won it in privy council, which is the supreme court for colonial matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long did you remain in the Orient and connected with the CAT Airlines?

Mr. WILLAUER. Until 1953, the early summer of 1953, when one of my children was killed in an accident, and I returned home, in connection with that accident, and at the same time I was being approached by Gen. Bedell Smith, who was then the Under Secretary of State, as to whether I would take on the job of Ambassador to Honduras, which I later did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed to that position in 1954?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, were you at that time familiar with the situation in Guatemala?

Mr. WILLAUER. I had a very extensive briefing on that situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. By 1954, Guatemala had become controlled by international communism, had it not?

Mr. WILLAUER. There was no doubt about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was then in existence an anti-Communist revolutionary movement?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, and it was largely based in Honduras.

Mr. SOURWINE. And was it part of your job to assist that movement?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; it was. In fact, after the revolution was successful, I received a telegram from Allen Dulles in which he stated in effect that the revolution could not have succeeded but for what I did. I am very proud of that telegram.

I also received a telegram from Secretary Dulles, which was in more general language, complimenting me on my work.

Mr. SOURWINE. You served 4 years as Ambassador to Honduras?

Mr. WILLAUER. Approximately; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your judgment, sir—as the committee has been informed—that you were appointed Ambassador to Honduras mainly because of your 15 years of tactical experience in fighting international communism?

Mr. WILLAUER. This is what I was told.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you were employed?

Mr. WILLAUER. At the time I was appointed. Actually, the period is even longer than that.

I got my first indoctrination in communism way back in—from Mr. Mandel, actually, when he was on the Dies committee, and I was in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, during your 4 years as Ambassador to Honduras, there were a series of crises, were there not?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; they were terrific.

Mr. SOURWINE. Four different governments?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And to capsule this, this period ended with the first freely elected government in Honduran history in power?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And throughout all of these crises, you were active in combating communism, and trying to help establish a stable government in Guatemala?

Mr. WILLAUER. No, in Honduras. That was my major work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, after your 4 years as Ambassador to Honduras, were you then appointed Ambassador to Costa Rica?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how long did you serve there?

Mr. WILLAUER. I believe I actually took over the Embassy in May of 1958, and I was terminated as of April 30, 1961.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Ambassador, was there something of a team in working to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala, or were you alone in that operation?

Mr. WILLAUER. There was a team.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jack Puerifoy was down there?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, Jack was on the team over in Guatemala; that is the principal man, and we had Bob Hill, Ambassador Robert Hill, in Costa Rica, where there was certain side effects. And we had Ambassador Tom Whelan in Nicaragua, where a lot of the activities were going. And, of course, there were a number of CIA operatives in the picture.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was Mr. Dulles' involvement in that area?

Mr. WILLAUER. Mr. Allen Dulles?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, the CIA was helping to equip and train the anti-Communist revolutionary forces.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you were the man in charge in the field in this general area of all these operations?

Mr. WILLAUER. I certainly was called upon to perform very important duties, particularly to keep the Honduran Government—which was scared to death about the possibilities of themselves being overthrown—keep them in line so they would allow this revolutionary activity to continue, based in Honduras.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other instances of the successful overthrow of a Communist government in this hemisphere?

Mr. WILLAUER. No.

Senator DODD. Or any hemisphere?

Mr. WILLAUER. I have never heard of another one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Costa Rica is pretty generally rated as a very good example of effective democracy, perhaps the best example of such in Latin America, isn't that right?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; and I believe that rating is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been for a long time an important focal point of non-Communist liberal movements in the Caribbean area?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a result, close contact with liberal leaders in Costa Rica and a number of other Latin American countries was established?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes. It was one of my major duties to maintain such contact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it part of your job—did you consider it part of your job—to assist in awakening the leaders of the surrounding countries to the Communist nature of the Castro regime?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did—insofar as I could do it through my contacts as they came through Costa Rica, or through one of their more important leaders, ex-President Figueres.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ex-President of what country?

Mr. WILLAUER. Ex-President of Costa Rica.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first become convinced that the Castro regime was Communist?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was very suspicious of it fairly—well, I should say toward the last quarter of 1958, before they took power—when I heard that "Che" Guevara was in the act in a big way, and having met—crossed his trail, I should say, in the Guatemalan picture, where I became very much alarmed, and then when I began to hear, in the latter part of 1948, about—

Mr. SOURWINE. 1958.

Mr. WILLAUER. 1958—about agrarian reform, and a few things like this, began to remind me of China a great deal. And my nose began to twitch, in the last quarter of 1958.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare any communications for the State Department with regard to your aroused worries about the Communist nature of the Castro regime?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did, but not in 1958. On January 26, 1959—I will have to give you a little background to answer this question, I think, sir, if you will permit me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DODD. Of course, Mr. Ambassador, go right ahead.

Mr. WILLAUER. On January 26, 1959, my suspicions having been very, very strongly aroused, I had a conference with ex-President Figueres at lunch.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was 25 days or 26 days after Castro came into power?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct. And I said to Mr. Figueres "You and your liberal group of Betancourt, Munoz Marin, and others, of course, put this man into power, or at least supported him very strongly. And I feel, Mr. Figueres, that the chances are very strong that he will be dominated by communism, if he is not already a Communist. And how do you feel about it?"

He said, "Well, I am worried about this man, but I don't think he is going to go this way."

I then said, "Well, if it does go this way, if I prove to be right, you and the liberal movement will be forever discredited unless you do something about it, and do it quick."

And after some discussion along these lines, he said, "Well, you have got me really worried."

And I then said, "Well, what are you going to do about it?"

He said, "Well, in 2 weeks"—actually he said, "On February 13, President Betancourt is going to be inaugurated, and I and the rest of our liberal team are going to all be there, and we will discuss this matter."

As later proved—which I will go on and tell you about later—this was done, and it had certain results.

On the 27th of January, the day after this conversation, I reported it in full in a letter to Assistant Secretary Rubottom, with copies to the Secretary of State and other interested officers in the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask at this point—it may seem to be an extraneous question—is this common practice, to file a report and to send copies to others in the Department?

Mr. WILLAUER. I felt that it was perfectly proper practice. I don't know how common it is. But I have always felt this—that the distribution machinery in the Department is clumsy, and one copy of a dispatch is inclined to sit on a fellow's desk for a long time. And, therefore, when I had a matter as hot as this one seemed to me, it seemed best to send it to all concerned directly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you follow up after this communication with a series of recommendations to the Department?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. On overall U.S. policy in Latin America, and specifically on the Castro Communist dictatorship problem?

Mr. WILLAUER. I certainly did. There is a long series of letters, the dates of which I will furnish the committee. I may not include all of them, but if you would like the dates I will give them to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. WILLAUER. This letter which I mentioned already of January 27, 1959. February 3, 1959; March 10, 1959; March 13, 1959; April 16, 1959; April 30, 1959; January 29, 1960; March 8, 1960; March 22, 1960; March 30, 1960; July 18, 1960; and a dispatch, No. 14 of our Embassy, of July 11, 1960.

This was supplemented by a number of trips which I took myself, sometimes at my own expense, to try to explain my views.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom in the Department did you explain your views on those trips?

Mr. WILLAUER. On all occasions to Mr. Rubottom. On certain occasions to Secretary Herter. On one occasion to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy. On all occasions to Mr. Allan Stewart, who was the officer in charge of Central America.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was the desk officer?

Mr. WILLAUER. The desk officer for Central American countries and Panama.

There may have been others, but those were the most prominent.

And additionally, of course, I had a great deal of contact over in the CIA, principally with Col. J. C. King, who runs Latin American Affairs, with Richard Bissell, and others. And Allen Dulles himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, this was, of course, a developing situation. Some changes were rapid.

But is it fair to say that the general tenor of all of these communications was the same?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what way? Were you sounding an alarm against Castro communism in all instances?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was.

Might I give you a little background?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And tell us, if you will, in your own words, what you were urging the Department to do.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, first, by way of background, following up the meeting of Figueres and his liberal group on February 13, at the Betancourt inauguration, Figueres returned to—returned on March 13 or 14—no; it was a little before that. But I saw him after his return on March 13, 1959, and he had—he told me that his group had appointed him to go to Havana and to talk sense, or to try to talk sense, with Castro. That they were worried about it, and that Figueres was first to survey the situation, see if it was along the lines that I had claimed it was, and if he found that things were not all right he was to talk sense to him. He was using this—the occasion for this trip was an invitation which Castro had issued to Figueres, as a great revolutionary figure himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Figueres had assisted Castro with certain arms and ammunition?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right. And there was to be a labor rally, and Figueres was to come and make one of the principal speeches. And, incidentally, I assisted Figueres in some parts of his speech, by giving him some ideas. His speech, as it ultimately resulted, ran around this theme: That whatever you may feel about liberalism or communism, there is a cold war going on, and Latin America must be on the side of the United States and against Russia in a showdown between those two sides. Figueres told me in the process that he would have liked to have played up the Communist angle more. But he felt he could be more effective if he didn't emphasize that as much as the necessity of being on the side of the United States.

I think all of you know that he went to Havana, he was unable to consult with Castro. Castro refused to see him.

The only words he ever had with Castro were when he, Figueres, was mounting the rostrum to make his speech, and they were very short words.

Figueres started to make this speech. A labor leader named David Salvador grabbed the microphone away from him. Castro took over, and denounced Figueres in no uncertain terms as a reactionary and called him all sorts of nasty names. Figueres then returned from this trip with two or three of his top advisers.

I talked to all of them. And every one of them, from Figueres on down, said, "We have no doubt that this matter is a Communist matter, or if it is not already it is about to be."

The date of Figueres' return was about March 13, 1959.

In any event, that is when I had my talks with him and reported this to the Department in a letter once again distributed to Rubottom

Mr. WILLAUER. This is what I was told.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you were employed?

Mr. WILLAUER. At the time I was appointed. Actually, the period is even longer than that.

I got my first indoctrination in communism way back in—from Mr. Mandel, actually, when he was on the Dies committee, and I was in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, during your 4 years as Ambassador to Honduras, there were a series of crises, were there not?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; they were terrific.

Mr. SOURWINE. Four different governments?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And to capsule this, this period ended with the first freely elected government in Honduran history in power?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And throughout all of these crises, you were active in combating communism, and trying to help establish a stable government in Guatemala?

Mr. WILLAUER. No, in Honduras. That was my major work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, after your 4 years as Ambassador to Honduras, were you then appointed Ambassador to Costa Rica?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how long did you serve there?

Mr. WILLAUER. I believe I actually took over the Embassy in May of 1958, and I was terminated as of April 30, 1961.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Ambassador, was there something of a team in working to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala, or were you alone in that operation?

Mr. WILLAUER. There was a team.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jack Puerifoy was down there?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, Jack was on the team over in Guatemala; that is the principal man, and we had Bob Hill, Ambassador Robert Hill, in Costa Rica, where there was certain side effects. And we had Ambassador Tom Whelan in Nicaragua, where a lot of the activities were going. And, of course, there were a number of CIA operatives in the picture.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was Mr. Dulles' involvement in that area?

Mr. WILLAUER. Mr. Allen Dulles?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, the CIA was helping to equip and train the anti-Communist revolutionary forces.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you were the man in charge in the field in this general area of all these operations?

Mr. WILLAUER. I certainly was called upon to perform very important duties, particularly to keep the Honduran Government—which was scared to death about the possibilities of themselves being overthrown—keep them in line so they would allow this revolutionary activity to continue, based in Honduras.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other instances of the successful overthrow of a Communist government in this hemisphere?

Mr. WILLAUER. No.

Senator DODD. Or any hemisphere?

Mr. WILLAUER. I have never heard of another one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Costa Rica is pretty generally rated as a very good example of effective democracy, perhaps the best example of such in Latin America, isn't that right?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; and I believe that rating is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been for a long time an important focal point of non-Communist liberal movements in the Caribbean area?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a result, close contact with liberal leaders in Costa Rica and a number of other Latin American countries was established?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes. It was one of my major duties to maintain such contact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it part of your job—did you consider it part of your job—to assist in awakening the leaders of the surrounding countries to the Communist nature of the Castro regime?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did—insofar as I could do it through my contacts as they came through Costa Rica, or through one of their more important leaders, ex-President Figueres.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ex-President of what country?

Mr. WILLAUER. Ex-President of Costa Rica.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first become convinced that the Castro regime was Communist?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was very suspicious of it fairly—well, I should say toward the last quarter of 1958, before they took power—when I heard that “Che” Guevara was in the act in a big way, and having met—crossed his trail, I should say, in the Guatemalan picture, where I became very much alarmed, and then when I began to hear, in the latter part of 1948, about—

Mr. SOURWINE. 1958.

Mr. WILLAUER. 1958—about agrarian reform, and a few things like this, began to remind me of China a great deal. And my nose began to twitch, in the last quarter of 1958.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare any communications for the State Department with regard to your aroused worries about the Communist nature of the Castro regime?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did, but not in 1958. On January 26, 1959—I will have to give you a little background to answer this question, I think, sir, if you will permit me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DODD. Of course, Mr. Ambassador, go right ahead.

Mr. WILLAUER. On January 26, 1959, my suspicions having been very, very strongly aroused, I had a conference with ex-President Figueres at lunch.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was 25 days or 26 days after Castro came into power?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct. And I said to Mr. Figueres “You and your liberal group of Betancourt, Munoz Marin, and others, of course, put this man into power, or at least supported him very strongly. And I feel, Mr. Figueres, that the chances are very strong that he will be dominated by communism, if he is not already a Communist. And how do you feel about it?”

He said, “Well, I am worried about this man, but I don't think he is going to go this way.”

I then said, "Well, if it does go this way, if I prove to be right, you and the liberal movement will be forever discredited unless you do something about it, and do it quick."

And after some discussion along these lines, he said, "Well, you have got me really worried."

And I then said, "Well, what are you going to do about it?"

He said, "Well, in 2 weeks"—actually he said, "On February 13, President Betancourt is going to be inaugurated, and I and the rest of our liberal team are going to all be there, and we will discuss this matter."

As later proved—which I will go on and tell you about later—this was done, and it had certain results.

On the 27th of January, the day after this conversation, I reported it in full in a letter to Assistant Secretary Rubottom, with copies to the Secretary of State and other interested officers in the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask at this point—it may seem to be an extraneous question—is this common practice, to file a report and to send copies to others in the Department?

Mr. WILLAUER. I felt that it was perfectly proper practice. I don't know how common it is. But I have always felt this—that the distribution machinery in the Department is clumsy, and one copy of a dispatch is inclined to sit on a fellow's desk for a long time. And, therefore, when I had a matter as hot as this one seemed to me, it seemed best to send it to all concerned directly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you follow up after this communication with a series of recommendations to the Department?

Mr. WILLAUER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. On overall U.S. policy in Latin America, and specifically on the Castro Communist dictatorship problem?

Mr. WILLAUER. I certainly did. There is a long series of letters, the dates of which I will furnish the committee. I may not include all of them, but if you would like the dates I will give them to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. WILLAUER. This letter which I mentioned already of January 27, 1959. February 3, 1959; March 10, 1959; March 13, 1959; April 16, 1959; April 30, 1959; January 29, 1960; March 8, 1960; March 22, 1960; March 30, 1960; July 18, 1960; and a dispatch, No. 14 of our Embassy, of July 11, 1960.

This was supplemented by a number of trips which I took myself, sometimes at my own expense, to try to explain my views.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom in the Department did you explain your views on those trips?

Mr. WILLAUER. On all occasions to Mr. Rubottom. On certain occasions to Secretary Herter. On one occasion to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy. On all occasions to Mr. Allan Stewart, who was the officer in charge of Central America.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was the desk officer?

Mr. WILLAUER. The desk officer for Central American countries and Panama.

There may have been others, but those were the most prominent.

And additionally, of course, I had a great deal of contact over in the CIA, principally with Col. J. C. King, who runs Latin American Affairs, with Richard Bissell, and others. And Allen Dulles himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, this was, of course, a developing situation. Some changes were rapid.

But is it fair to say that the general tenor of all of these communications was the same?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what way? Were you sounding an alarm against Castro communism in all instances?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was.

Might I give you a little background?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And tell us, if you will, in your own words, what you were urging the Department to do.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, first, by way of background, following up the meeting of Figueres and his liberal group on February 13, at the Betancourt inauguration, Figueres returned to—returned on March 13 or 14—no; it was a little before that. But I saw him after his return on March 13, 1959, and he had—he told me that his group had appointed him to go to Havana and to talk sense, or to try to talk sense, with Castro. That they were worried about it, and that Figueres was first to survey the situation, see if it was along the lines that I had claimed it was, and if he found that things were not all right he was to talk sense to him. He was using this—the occasion for this trip was an invitation which Castro had issued to Figueres, as a great revolutionary figure himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Figueres had assisted Castro with certain arms and ammunition?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right. And there was to be a labor rally, and Figueres was to come and make one of the principal speeches. And, incidentally, I assisted Figueres in some parts of his speech, by giving him some ideas. His speech, as it ultimately resulted, ran around this theme: That whatever you may feel about liberalism or communism, there is a cold war going on, and Latin America must be on the side of the United States and against Russia in a showdown between those two sides. Figueres told me in the process that he would have liked to have played up the Communist angle more. But he felt he could be more effective if he didn't emphasize that as much as the necessity of being on the side of the United States.

I think all of you know that he went to Havana, he was unable to consult with Castro. Castro refused to see him.

The only words he ever had with Castro were when he, Figueres, was mounting the rostrum to make his speech, and they were very short words.

Figueres started to make this speech. A labor leader named David Salvador grabbed the microphone away from him. Castro took over, and denounced Figueres in no uncertain terms as a reactionary and called him all sorts of nasty names. Figueres then returned from this trip with two or three of his top advisers.

I talked to all of them. And every one of them, from Figueres on down, said, "We have no doubt that this matter is a Communist matter, or if it is not already it is about to be."

The date of Figueres' return was about March 13, 1959.

In any event, that is when I had my talks with him and reported this to the Department in a letter once again distributed to Rubottom



and the others. I thought that this was particularly significant because it illustrated that even the liberals who would be inclined to favor the man that they had put in a power were at that early date convinced that they backed the wrong horse, and that this thing was headed surely for communism.

Now, the second part of your question, if I remember it correctly, Mr. Sourwine, was what was the general nature of my recommendations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILLAUER. The general nature was that we should try to get, in the first instance, the Organization of American States more actively interested by feeding to them all of this type of information on a very concerted basis, because at this time the general feeling around the hemisphere was that this Castro thing was nothing more or less than an overdue social revolution. Simultaneously there was going on in liberal circles, Latin American liberal circles, a movement to have the OAS Charter changed so that dictators could not belong to the Organization.

And I suggested, by—by dictators they were talking about dictators of the right.

And I suggested that if this tendency grew into a real movement, that we ought to insist and arrange that the exclusion should include dictators of the left as well as of the right who, of course, are more dangerous, since they are backed by Russia.

In the early stages that was the tactic that I was recommending in general, and appears in these letters which you have been told about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make arrangements for the use of Costa Rica as the site for the OAS meetings of August 1960 on the Dominican and Cuban problems?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, at the request of the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you assisted the Costa Rican Government in the prevention of a major Communist effort to sabotage these meetings.

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, we had quite a setup there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about that Communist effort at sabotage.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, we had very reliable information that they had sent in almost unlimited funds to try to get riots going and the usual techniques, the Bogotá technique. And what happened was that I arranged, and with the assistance of my staff to alert the Costa Rican public and their officials to this information, and we helped them form voluntary citizens detective—voluntary citizens committee, voluntary detectives, and other countermeasures, in addition to the official measures, to put a stop to this thing.

And the result of that was that there was practically no trouble at all.

I must say I am not taking credit for what the Costa Rican people did. I just assisted them in some of the techniques.

Senator DODD. Well, I think you are very modest, if I may interrupt. I think you deserve great credit. I want that to appear on the record.

Mr. WILLAUER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sent all these communications to the Department. What reaction, if any, did you get from the Department, or officials of the Department?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, I think, if I might go back a bit, there is a very important first step in this thing, which was the El Salvador Conference, because this was the first real reaction.

In April, if my memory does not fail me—I made some notes of a lot of these things, because I thought it would be important—in April 9 through 11 we had a meeting—

Mr. SOURWINE. What year?

Mr. WILLAUER. Of 1959—we had a meeting in El Salvador of all the ambassadors, American ambassadors, whose countries touched upon the Caribbean Basin. I think there were 14 of us there. The meeting was headed up by Deputy Under Secretary Loy Henderson, and by Assistant Secretary Rubottom, and was attended by other officials, besides the ambassadors.

At that meeting, some very peculiar things happened, or at least they seemed peculiar to me.

Before the meeting was convened, I had a private conversation with Ambassador Bonsal. Ambassador John Cabot, our current Ambassador in Brazil, was with me at the time. I don't know whether I asked this question or Cabot asked the question, but one of us asked Bonsal what he thought of Castro. And much to my amazement, in view of what I have told you before, of what I had thought about him, and what Figueres thought about him, and the rest of the intelligence, he said that he wasn't a bad fellow, that he was, of course, eccentric, that he—let me just refer to a few notes here—he said he wasn't such a bad fellow, and he thought that he probably could be handled, and he, Bonsal, probably could handle him, if he was left alone.

He said he was in favor of a soft glove approach, of an approach of patience—and very serious consideration of a possibility of aiding Castro, if he got himself into an economic jam. He said that Castro was a terrific person, physically and mentally, he was far from crazy, that he was not living on pills, and that he was not a Communist.

Well, part of this occurred in this private conversation. The rest occurred in the open meeting which started thereafter. And I have difficulty in separating in my memory which is which.

But all of what I said came out in the open meeting.

At this point, Ambassador Hill and I, who felt very strongly that this was developing into a Communist situation, if it already was not one, and we argued as strongly as we could for a position of the Conference to the effect that this was a dangerous potentially Communist situation, and that our communique or report to the Secretary of State should include recommendations for a more extensive concentration on the problem, through the OAS, and any other media that we could ascertain.

And there was a very, very heated dispute in this Conference.

The only support Hill and I got at all, except from Rubottom on occasion—I must say that Rubottom seemed rather skeptical of Bonsal's view, but—he was chairing the meeting, it wasn't really his place, I suppose, to argue with him.

But he showed some skepticism.

The only support we got was from our Ambassador Whelan. He was, until recently, our Ambassador to Nicaragua.

Senator DODD. And a very good one, I might add.

Mr. WILLAUER. Now, not to give you all the details of this very involved meeting, an impasse arose about this communique, in which Ambassador Hill said that he could not sign a soft communique, and he would have to file a separate report to the Secretary, or protest this thing, unless it could be modified.

And I supported him in that position.

Finally, the impasse got so bad that Mr. Henderson and Mr. Rubottom took Mr. Hill into a private room, and asked me to come along. I was able to suggest certain language which, while it wasn't as strong as either Hill or I wanted, at least to those who knew the background, it would point up what we thought was required to be done.

But I must say on the whole, even, that compromise language was pretty weak, and, in my opinion, inadequate to the situation.

I don't know, at this point, whether I have fully answered your question.

I wonder—

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was "What reaction, if any, you got from the State Department or officials of the Department to this series of communications and recommendations that you had been sending up?"

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Well, that is why this meeting is really the first real reaction I got. I mean I got certain letters back. None of them that I received back accepted my point of view. Most of them argued against it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did you hear from Allan Stewart about this series of recommendations?

Mr. WILLAUER. I didn't hear anything directly, other than in conversations, excepting one very important thing which came to me indirectly.

On one occasion, my deputy chief of mission, the man who is the No. 2 in the Embassy, Mr. Roy I. Kimmel, a career Foreign Service officer, who was just retired, was in Washington on leave or consultation, and had a conversation with Mr. Stewart which Mr. Kimmel reported to me on his return. According to Mr. Kimmel, Mr. Stewart said the following: He said, "First, Willauer is going to get nowhere with these recommendations. They are not going to do any good. And, second, we are going to put a stop to his frequent visits to Washington, trying to sell these ideas."

Mr. SOURWINE. You were never told, by Mr. Stewart or anyone else, to desist from making such recommendations?

Mr. WILLAUER. Indeed not. And, in fact, from Secretary Herter himself I received several letters, commending me on the reporting and the ideas that I was advancing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know, then, that Secretary Herter got your letters and your recommendations?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The copies you sent to him were received by him?

Mr. WILLAUER. Certain of them were. I particularly remember that he commended me for my report on the Figueres situation, for one. As to the others, I cannot be sure, because I don't have the files; they are all secret, and I don't have access to them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you familiar with the material of an intelligence nature about Cuba and Castro which was coming out of the State Department during this period?

Mr. WILLAUER. No, not all of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw some of it?

Mr. WILLAUER. I saw some of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, what was the nature of that which you saw?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, I was far from impressed that the general tenor of what I saw—

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that general tenor?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, the general tenor is: We are not sure what this thing is, it may be just an agrarian social reform, the Commies are gaining in some fields, but, generally speaking, Castro is a strong and dedicated person. That is the general tenor of what I saw.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have a situation, do you not? You were sending intelligence in—

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). Which clearly portrayed the Castro regime as Communist or Communist controlled?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw other intelligence of this nature going to the Department?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not see any intelligence of this nature coming from the Department for dissemination to the field?

Mr. WILLAUER. Precious little in my area.

Mr. SOURWINE. The evaluated intelligence, which I think is the proper name for it, which you saw coming out of the Department, had a different tenor?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, such as I saw. But, remember, the way the thing is institutionalized, down in my area it was just the accident of my contacts with Figueres and the liberal movement and my general knowledge of communism that got me into the Cuban act at all. And, therefore, I was not on the receiving line of the direct intelligence, that is, the whole volume of the intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And you do not know what that was?

Mr. WILLAUER. And I do not know what that was. I mean we would get monthly summaries and things of that sort. But not the day-to-day flow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in October 1960 you were appointed delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, as a member of Secretary Herter's personal staff, were you not?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your job included liaison with all Latin American delegations?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were subsequently, in December 10, 1960, appointed Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. WILLAUER. Special Assistant to the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

And when did you leave that post?

Mr. WILLAUER. Officially as of April 30 of this year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you have functions as Special Assistant to Secretary Herter which involved dealing with the CIA and with the anti-Castro Cuban factions?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes, I did. But if I might—if you will permit me, there is some necessary background before I can get into that.

Senator DODD. Go right ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to open this up, not to steer it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILLAUER. I appreciate that.

On April 30, 1959, I wrote a letter, which is mentioned in this list of letters, to Mr. Rubottom, reviewing the situation again, since we had our conference in El Salvador, and concluded the letter by a strong recommendation saying that the intelligence community should be convened, and that they should be asked the specific question of whether Cuba and Castro, and Castro's government, was dominated by communism, was not dominated, or to what degree it was dominated.

What I was talking about, although I didn't use this phrase, is what we call a national intelligence estimate which, as you gentlemen know, is a very formal document, can only be gotten in the usual course by the request of the Secretary of State or some other high official, such as the President, or Secretary of Defense, under the orders of the Security Council, I believe the procedures are, and requires the intelligence community to sit down and fish, cut bait, or go ashore, on the question that they are asked.

What I wanted to do was to make sure that the President got himself such a document, because had it been prepared it would have been inevitable that he would see it. In other words, from my conversations and the reactions that I was getting, that there was at least enough confusion in the lower echelons of the State Department as to just what this was, that the alarm bells were not being rung high enough up in the chain of command. And I was sure that if I could get an NIE, national intelligence estimate, that the alarm bells would be rung. I was particularly sure because I later came up to Washington, in connection with this recommendation, and I talked to the CIA people, who would have been preparing this. They were very anxious to prepare such an estimate, and told me that they certainly would label this thing communism.

Now, the reason that is background is that it got me—my difficulties in getting this idea accepted, got me pretty much to the attention of a little higher echelon than Rubottom in the Department, on how I felt about this thing, and what I wanted to do about it, and I think in part led directly to this final assignment of mine.

I might say, parenthetically, that, in my opinion, if a national intelligence estimate had been prepared at that time, and it had come out the way the CIA told me that it would come out, this invasion effort would have been commenced at least 9 months earlier, and thereby would have had at least a 50-percent better chance of success than it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, returning to the question of your functions as special assistant to Secretary Herter, which involved dealing with the CIA and with the anti-Castro Cuban factions, what were your functions there?

Mr. WILLAUER. Mr. Herter called me into his office on December 10, 1960. He said, "President Eisenhower and I have a very special job which we have chosen you to do if you are prepared to accept it." He then said "what we want you to do is this: There has been going on since March 17, 1960, the preparations of an invasion, backed by the

CIA, but run by Cubans. There is quite a lot of doubts about whether this plan is correct, what the timing should be, various problems about pulling the thing together. I want you to be the senior partner of a partnership of two people. Your junior partner will be a top CIA man. And you will report to"—and he switched legal terminology here to "a board of directors"—of Under Secretary level, who were set up under the Eisenhower administration to deal with this type of situation. "You are to have access to every piece of information, you are not to do anything in writing that you can avoid putting down on paper. But get in there and take a good hard look at this thing. Give us your real opinion on it."

And so I went to work. I couldn't go to work that day, because I had a previous speaking engagement on the coast. But on the 15th of December I went to work on that and continued, and I had a number of suggestions to make and changes in the plan that I thought ought to be done, and one thing or another like this. I might say parenthetically that I felt one of the great weaknesses of the plan was the lack of provision of top air cover for the low-level strafing missions of B-26 bombers which were supposed to carry out the beach-head. And I felt that that top level cover should come from jets.

Now, I am not a military man, but I lived at the right hand of General Chennault from 1942 until 1953, and I had absorbed quite a little about air strategy, naturally, from him.

Well, there were certain problems about how those jets could be supplied, and one thing or another like that. There were also problems about the Joint Chiefs of Staff not having been cut in until I got them in. There was another very important thing which I would prefer not to go into, because we might have to use it, but a device which I think should have been added to this thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we go completely off the record?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Back on the record.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, continuing with my functions, both Tom Mann and I felt that, if we were to undertake this invasion effort—we were not convinced at this point whether it should be done or not—

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Tom Mann?

Mr. WILLAUER. He was then the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

He is now our Ambassador to Mexico. He and I were both convinced that this thing should not be done or undertaken unless there was practically no chance that it would fail, and that we should have to commit ourselves in advance to see that it was backed up, so that it could not fail.

Now, I continued working, drawing together these strings, formulating my ideas, talking, cross-examining people.

Incidentally, some of my old pilot friends were in on the training of the Cubans and I talked to them as to the abilities of the Cubans as pilots.

And various other things that one does as a coordinator in a thing like this.

Then the administration changed. And on Sunday, the 22d of January, there was a full dress meeting, chaired by Secretary of State



Rusk, attended by the Secretary of Defense, and many other high officials, including Allen Dulles and the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lemnitzer, myself, Mr. Mann, and others. Gordon Gray—no, Gordon Gray wasn't there.

Robert Rendy was there. I don't know whether one of the Bundys was there or not.

Paul Nitze was there.

This whole operation was reviewed.

I might say, parenthetically, Allen Dulles told me that, long before December 10 when I came on, he had been to Miami, I believe, or Palm Beach, and had somewhat filled in the incoming President on the operation.

On January 26 I received a telephone call from the Secretary of State, asking whether I would continue in the same functions as I had been performing, and I said I would be glad to, there was nothing in the world I would rather do, because I felt very strongly about this situation.

On February—let me just consult a note here, if I might, I want to be sure about my dates.

On February 8, at 11:30 a.m., I was called to a meeting in the Secretary's Office, attended by Mr. Berle, who had just come aboard as head of this special task force for Latin America, Mr. Bowles, Mr. Mann, Mr. Theodore Achilles, former Ambassador Achilles, who at that time was working with Mr. Berle, and myself. I don't believe there was anybody else at the meeting.

This meeting was called preparatory to a conference at which President Kennedy was to have that afternoon at 3 o'clock at the White House to review this situation. There was considerable discussion, but the discussion mostly revolved around the problems of the Organization of American States, and whether we could count on their support, and how we could get their support.

And I made a few remarks about the operation, but it wasn't really on the operation, but rather on the political aspects, the hemisphere political aspects, that they were emphasizing.

Near the end of the meeting, the Secretary announced that he had just gotten word from the White House that President Kennedy did not want too large a meeting, and, therefore, that the Secretary was going to take—was going himself, with Mr. Berle and Mr. Mann. So I didn't go.

I walked out of the office and went—I thought Mr. Berle motioned me to follow him. But as I came to his office door, he went in first, and Mr. Achilles and Mr. Mann went in, and I started to follow in, and Mr. Berle said, "You are not needed."

So I went away.

Then on February 16, at 12 o'clock, I had a meeting with Under Secretary Bowles, who I had never met before, and who, under the old system, would have been the man to whom I would directly report, unless I felt it necessary to ask for an audience with the President or the Secretary of State.

Mr. Bowles reviewed my record with me, and was rather laudatory about some of the things that he had heard about me, and that he knew I had done, and said that "although you are rated a Republican, you are the kind of a fellow I think that we ought to have around this

administration, and I would like to talk with you later, but I want to talk with Mr. Berle first," and one thing or another like this.

Mr. Berle was down south, down in South America, trying to work on this OAS problem in Brazil and various other places.

When he got back, and I finally ascertained that Mr. Bowles and Mr. Berle had met, I asked for an appointment with Mr. Bowles to see where I stood.

Well, one of the reasons I wanted this appointment was the following:

I had come to the conclusion that these ideas of mine had reached a point where they had to be put on paper, that I had to go firm on what I thought should be done. And I needed to talk to the CIA about certain aspects of the possibilities of setting up this jet cover. And so I had arranged an appointment with the appropriate officials in the CIA for a few days later, when they could see me.

Some of them were out of town. And either the day of the appointment or the day just before it—anyhow, just on the eve of the appointment, shall we call it—my opposite number, Mr. Tracy Barnes, my junior partner in this partnership, called me up and said, "We can't talk to you any more. We can only talk to other people."

And he mentioned Mr. Berle, and I believe Mr. Mann.

Now, this is the only official word that I ever had that I was cut out of the operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was when?

Mr. WILLAUER. This is on or about February 15. It could be as late as the 20th. I didn't keep a record of this kind of thing, by orders from Secretary Herter.

And I had nothing to do with the operation from there on in.

The surprising thing, however, to me was—and I have no reason to resent being cut out. I mean I am not running this administration. It is up to President Kennedy and the superiors to decide who they want to have do something. But you will recall that having been asked by the Secretary of State to do something, I rather thought at least I better tell somebody that I wasn't able to do something.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not feel you could be pulled off the job by a telephone conversation from your opposite number in CIA?

Mr. WILLAUER. That is right.

Now, the Secretary was out of town, I believe, at the SEATO Conference, and various other things. And since I knew that Mr. Bowles was supposed to be the man, at least under the old setup, I kept trying to get an appointment with him. I tried for 30 days straight. I called his secretary every day, or went up to see her. I saw him once in the hall. He said, "I am awfully busy, I will see you later."

And I finally gave up after 30 days and started working on certain other things that had come to my attention about Honduras and like that. And that is the end of that story.

I did see Mr. Berle a couple of times. I couldn't get anything from him about any suggestions that I would work on. I asked him what I was supposed to do. He said, "I don't know."

I just got a general runaround.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you eventually get any official expression to the effect that you were called off of this job?

Mr. WILLAUER. No, I never have to this day, excepting to be told that I was no longer to be continued as a special assistant.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you told that, and by whom?

Mr. WILLAUER. I was told that by a telephone conversation with Mr. Findley Burns.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. WILLAUER. He is an assistant to Mr. Jones, who is the head of—who is the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the State Department, who telephoned me on, I believe it was, Tuesday, April 11. Anyhow—no, it wasn't. It was the day before the invasion started, which I think would make it the 16th of April, while I was in San Jose.

Now, the thing which I told General Taylor, and which I felt amazed him, and certainly amazed me, is that I have no quarrel with having been pulled off the job. It is quite natural, I think, for a new administration to want to have their own people—although I am neither really a strong—I am a nonpolitical. I am ostensibly a Republican, but I have worked for the New Deal, and everything else. That is not the point. They are entitled to do anything they want to.

But the thing that amazed me most was that I was never, as they say, debriefed, and, therefore, never had an opportunity to express these ideas, which I think might have been of some value in the chances of success of the operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you were called on the phone by this gentleman you named, who was assistant to Mr. Jones?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And what did he tell you?

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, prior to leaving to say goodbye in San Jose—for it is the custom for an Ambassador to make an official goodbye—I knew the papers were being processed, to make me a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State under the new administration in a formal manner. That is on a payroll. When I was a special assistant before I had been paid as Ambassador, on consultation. And I was told by Mr. Jones himself that these papers were going to be decided upon by Mr. Bowles.

Before I left to go down to say goodbye in April of 1961, I wrote a memo with a copy to Mr. Bowles. I think it was addressed to Mr. Jones. Anyhow, he got a copy—saying that I would like very much to know as soon as possible, preferably while I was down there, what my future status was going to be, because it would make a difference what I would pack up and send where and all that sort of thing. And he called me. As he said, "I am doing this as a courtesy by telephone, rather than by telegram, because we don't necessarily want to spread this all over the Department while you are still down there."

Mr. SOURWINE. And what did he say?

Mr. WILLAUER. He said, "I regret to inform you that you will not be continued on, and that your services will be terminated as of April 30."

Mr. SOURWINE. When you ended as Ambassador?

Mr. WILLAUER. When I ended as Ambassador. And I was accorded, at my request, the courtesy of 30 days more occupancy of my office because this had come as a rather sudden thing, and I had to clean up my files and all that. So I actually left the Department, although I wasn't paid, as of the end of May.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never were called in for a debriefing or final consultation?

Mr. WILLAUER. No; excepting after General Taylor was called in to look into the failure—I spent approximately an hour telling him just what I have told you gentlemen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know who it was that terminated you, or by whose order?

Mr. WILLAUER. No; I haven't the vaguest idea. Nor have I made any attempt to find out. I have been told by the CIA, by high officials in the CIA, that they were extremely dissatisfied by the fact that they could not continue to work with me, because they had worked with me for years and years and years, and, they said, very successfully.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had the date for the invasion been set in February at the time they cut you out of the operation?

Mr. WILLAUER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that you did not know about this, and it actually came as much of a surprise to you as any person on the outside?

Mr. WILLAUER. In a sense; yes. Although I knew we were working against certain probable deadlines.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. William Wieland?

Mr. WILLAUER. I knew him, but not well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any information respecting Mr. Wieland's views at any particular period of time about Castro, and the Castro government in Cuba?

Mr. WILLAUER. The only conversation on this subject that I can recall with Mr. Wieland—and I think it probably was the only conversation—certainly the only one of any importance—was some time in the latter part of 1958, when I happened to drop in to see him, just as a matter of courtesy, while I was in Washington on a consultation trip. I said, "How about this Castro business?"

And he said, "Well, we are worried about Castro, and we are trying to get some sort of an arrangement between Castro and Batista, some sort of a coalition, to live and let live, or other kind of government. The church is trying to help us. But we are not getting very far with it, because Castro is very stubborn on it, and claims he wants the personal privilege of shooting Batista."

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this the first you had heard that the State Department was working for a coalition government in Cuba?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had had experience with the State Department seeking a coalition government in China, had you not?

Mr. WILLAUER. I sure did, under the Marshall mission. I was there and watched that one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any firm impression about the possibilities of the success of a coalition government that involves a Communist faction?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; it is going to be very successful for the Communists inevitably. It always has been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any information that has not been elicited from you with respect to either the position of the State Department or anyone in the State Department, or which otherwise would shed light on the question of why the United States took the action or course of inaction which it did with respect to Castro?

Mr. WILLAUER. Not that I can recall. If anything comes to mind, I will be glad to contact the committee and appear again, if you so desire.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the public testimony before this committee of former Ambassador Robert Hill?

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes; I read it last night.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any comments on his testimony that you think might be helpful to the committee?

Mr. WILLAUER. Insofar as the matters contained therein are of my personal knowledge, and a great deal of it is of my personal knowledge, it seems to me a hundred percent correct. Certain opinions that he may hold I don't necessarily fully share as strongly as he does—things like what Mr. Wieland said and did and all that. I don't know anything about it other than by hearsay. But the general tenor of his testimony—and certainly the part about what happened at Salvador, where I was a witness, is absolutely correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember Mr. Hill's recommendations about the necessity for changing both procedure and motivation in the State Department in order to put this country in a position to cope with the Castros and the other Communists?

Mr. WILLAUER. I certainly do. I helped him in the formulation of that part of his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would concur in this completely?

Mr. WILLAUER. I do. I am sort of coauthor of that end of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no other direct questions of this witness. I have covered the situation, as far as I know, where he has any information.

Senator DODD. Yes. Well, I must say it is a very interesting and helpful piece of testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have one piece to offer for the record. It does not concern this witness. I think this is a good place, however, to put it in. It is the earliest chance we have had.

This is a letter addressed to the chairman, dated July 26, and signed by Mr. Brooks Hays, Assistant Secretary of State, and it is in response to the chairman's request for certain correspondence between Ambassador Hill and Mr. Rubottom, which Mr. Hill told us about. The Chair might wish to order that this go in the record at this point.

Mr. WILLAUER. Might I ask for one more thing in the record?

I don't know whether it is in—that I am here in response to a subpoena which was served on me in Nantucket by a U.S. marshal last Tuesday.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. You are not a volunteer.

Senator DODD. Yes, of course, Mr. Ambassador, you were subpoenaed to appear here as a witness under subpoena, and the record will show this, as counsel has indicated, and as I have.

And the letter of July 26, addressed to the chairman of this subcommittee, signed by Brooks Hays, is included as requested by counsel, and made a part of the record.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, July 26, 1961.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Subcommittee on Internal Security, your chief counsel, Mr. Sourwine, has asked that we furnish certain correspondence between former Ambassador Robert C. Hill and Mr. Roy R. Rubottom,

former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, concerning the report of the chiefs of missions meeting at San Salvador, April 9 to 11, 1959.

As you know, reports such as the report of the chiefs of missions meeting at San Salvador and related correspondence are as a rule not made available outside of the executive branch. The free and frank exploration of policy by high level officers would be impeded if remarks made while the policy was in the process of development and formulation were to become available to outsiders. In order to assist the subcommittee in its inquiry in this case, however, I am very glad to summarize below the background and substance of the exchange of letters from Ambassador Hill to Mr. Rubottom dated June 1, 1959, and from Mr. Rubottom to Ambassador Hill dated July 2, 1959.

The Hill-Rubottom exchange concerned a report of the San Salvador Conference circulated by the Department to all the participants. In brief, Ambassador Hill wrote that the report as prepared in Washington did not coincide with his recollections of what had been said in some of the discussions in San Salvador, and in particular did not record in sufficient detail some of his own comments. He attached a memorandum of suggested corrections. Mr. Rubottom replied that in his view the report did portray "with a broad brush" what took place at the meeting.

Ambassador Hill's letter itself acknowledged receipt of the report, confirmed a telegraphic objection to the report on the grounds of inaccuracies and omissions, and stated that the attached memorandum of comments on the report was based "on my own recollection." The letter went on to express the belief that the suggested corrections could be made without great difficulty, and Ambassador Hill offered to help "in any way I can toward this end." Ambassador Hill stated that Mr. Rubottom's direction of the discussion was "unfailing fair and constructive," and that the good results achieved at the Conference were very largely due to his efforts.

Mr. Rubottom, in reply, stated his view that the report was substantially accurate, and expressed regrets that it did not satisfy Ambassador Hill. He said no tape recording or stenographic transcript of the proceedings had been made, but that the report had been prepared from notes kept at the meeting. Mr. Rubottom stated his conclusion that the best thing to do was to circulate the Conference report, leaving to each chief of mission the opportunity to write in such comments as he desired. Mr. Rubottom said he would file Ambassador Hill's comments with the record unless Ambassador Hill desired otherwise, and the comments were so filed.

I trust that this will be of assistance to you in completing your investigation. If we in the Department can be of further help, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

(S) BROOKS HAYS,  
Assistant Secretary  
(For the Secretary of State).

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILLAUER. Mr. Chairman, I have one more request, or suggestion.

Some time ago I prepared a paper called "The Crisis in United States Interests in the Caribbean," in which I go into this problem of the State Department and all of this same material as Ambassador Hill went into. I have prepared this in the summer of 1958, while on a short home leave.

And I did submit it to the State Department at a later date, in connection with a letter that I wrote to Secretary Herter. I think it might be of interest in connection with my testimony as to how I feel about Ambassador Hill's views, if you would be interested in receiving it.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be printed in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator DODD. Surely.

Mr. WILLAUER. I have a copy of this, which I would be glad to furnish.

(The paper referred to is as follows:)

#### THE CRISIS IN U.S. INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN

America's most important interests in the Caribbean are facing ultimate extinction at the hands of the international Communist conspiracy and its running mate, ignorant supernationalism.

The threat today is vastly more serious than in previous times when similar threats were faced; and in the current world political climate, the means of protection are infinitely harder to find and mobilize.

In the past, American interests in the Caribbean have been threatened by pirates, by hostile national actions from abroad, or by greedy dictators. Direct action to fight these menaces was acceptable and accepted due to the clearness of the immorality of the threat and public tolerance of the principle of self-help by force.

Several decades ago few were shocked when we sent marines into countries of the Caribbean to protect our interests from confiscation. The difference today is that international communism operates so subtly that only the initiated recognize the drift of events until it is too late. Even when communism is entrenched in command of a government—as was the case in Guatemala in 1954—many will be found to disbelieve this to be so. Furthermore, the horror of the use of force by the "colossus of the north" is so great that practically no offense of a Latin country is big enough to justify force in the eyes of many of our own citizens, and practically all Latin Americans abhor and condemn it. This in turn has caused the United States to tie its policy to the twin concepts of "nonintervention" and the Organization of American States.

The OAS is in substance a junior or regional United Nations without a "security council" and the veto power. It acts solely through a "general assembly" type of organ where every nation of the 21 in the hemisphere votes equally. Although the character of the OAS preserves the right of individual self-protection, in practice, in Latin American affairs, the United States has watered this down greatly in comparison with its attitude and actions in other parts of the world; and in practice since the charter of the OAS was adopted we have never acted unilaterally in Latin America.

In contrast elsewhere, with but slight hesitation, we come to the rescue of "dictator" Chiang at Quemoy, needing only the fact that we have a treaty to protect our morality. But it is argued that in the Orient the Communist nature of the aggression is open and clear, as if that should make a difference as to whether or not we live up to a treaty.

Or if the overtress of the Communist threat is still felt to make a controlling difference, what about our entrance into Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government? Here there was a threat of communism, but it was subtler and masked behind nationalism. Also there were indeed "legitimate revolutionary" forces at work in the area at the time—a factor which, in Latin America, we use to inhibit activation of our treaty obligations to protect all recognized governments in Latin America, even though their regimes are accused of being dictatorial.

Accordingly, when Somoza or Trujillo asks for aid, we scuttle to the OAS where we know that the aid will not be effectively given. This we do, in part, as an instinctive reaction because of our abhorrence of dictators, but we also are responding to our fear that, if we live up to our treaty obligations, we will be charged with protecting rightwing dictators, even though our treaty obligations require us to protect them as well as leftwing dictators.

Worse, still, we at least subconsciously recognize that we are ducking our obligations so we lull our consciences by playing up every shred of factual doubt as to whether there is a reason to act under treaty obligations. Thus we halfway welcome evidence that there is no outside intervention, that the matter is an internal one, and that we cannot prove international Communist control or participation.

Why such a fundamental difference in our firmness in acting? Is it because of real abhorrence of dictators? If so, how differentiate our policy toward China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and Korea, in all of which we are openly supporting dictatorial regimes. Do we feel differently then about dictators in the Western Hemisphere than in other parts of the world? Apparently so; but do we really?

The answer is difficult to find until we break down the problem into an analysis of whose feelings we are talking about when we say "our." There is pretty clear reason to believe that "our" means two things when we refer to Latin America: on the one hand, the American people as a whole; on the other hand, the officials of the Latin American Division of the Department of State as the spokesman and policymaker of the executive branch of the U.S. Government. The opinion of the American people, as a whole, is clearly against dictators everywhere, but, at the same time, it recognizes that the international Communist conspiracy is the most ruthless dictatorship of them all. So, when thinking as Americans, we have little trouble in choosing in favor of Chiang over Mao. Had our press and our Government properly informed our popular opinion as to the true nature of what is going on in Latin America, we would be in a much better position to decide where our best interests lie. Unfortunately, as to Latin America, both of these molders of opinion (the press and the Government) seem to be repeating for us their sorry performance of the previous decade which lead to the capture of China by international communism.

The Edgar Snows of Chinese communism are replaced today by the Herbert Matthews of Caribbean Communists. Neither the Snows nor the Matthews are Communists, and both can be fairly credited with abhorring it—if and when they recognize it. The trouble with this type of journalism is that it is carrying a banner for a cause, and, in its hate of the dictators, it is blind to the nature of the forces of communism which are infiltrating the legitimate revolutionary forces. Today, as yesterday, they fail to see through the agrarian reform; through the rent-control measures aimed against the wicked landlords. They do not recognize the familiar Communist plot to liquidate the middle class and other opposition elements. How is this possible with the history of Red China so clearly and recently written? Truly, it seems that even among our highly educated modern press there are many in high places of whom it must be said that "none are so blind as those who will not see."

But what of our Government? The Eisenhower supporters campaigned in 1952, in large part, on the disgrace of the loss of China. Treason in the State Department was alleged. Are we heading for a similar campaign issue in 1960? This time with the Democrats on the offensive and Latin America (or at least the Caribbean) substituted for China? How is it that our President is briefed by the State Department to say that communism in Cuba has not been proved, and to say it in a context that might easily be interpreted (and unhappily was by the New York Times and Walter Lippmann) as proving that the threat of Cuban communism is very minor?

Clearly, such briefing of the President could only come from one place—the Latin American division of the State Department. What indeed does this division think about the current Caribbean situation? What are the conditioning factors and what, if any, program does it really have?

The Latin American division of the State Department suffers from weaknesses which are awesomely similar to those which existed in the China division at the time of the loss of China. The keynote in both situations, personelwise, is mediocrity. Just as the problems of China, a few decades back, received a low priority of high-level attention, so, in recent history, have those of Latin America. It is a fact that with the notable exception of a brief flurry in the time of Cordell Hull, with Adolph Berle and Sumner Welles stimulating his interest, no Secretary of State, since the beginning of World War II, has paid real attention to policymaking in this hemisphere. This has naturally meant that the smarter officers of the Department were chosen for, or maneuvered themselves into, other branches of the service. This, added to the greater attractiveness of life in the continental capitals, largely left the field of Latin America free for the second run of our diplomats. There have been some notable exceptions, but these were largely accidental. Thus the three top career policymakers in the Department today, Henderson, Murphy, and Merchant, have had no Latin American experience. Anyone naming our 10 most prominent career diplomats would have a hard time finding more than 1 or 2 who could be, in any way, considered Latin American experts.

With this large field of approximately 25 percent of all foreign posts left open in Latin America, the second run of our diplomatic service has proceeded to entrench itself very much in the pattern of the old China service. They have cultivated a "mystique" about the area. The emphasis is on speaking Spanish or Portuguese, on being "simpatico," and all the other little skills that add up to a false substitute for deep thinking and sound policymaking.



Most convenient of all for the second-raters came the sacrosanct policy of nonintervention. When so desired, this is truly a sword and a buckler for those who want to continue to do nothing, because they are incapable of figuring out what to do. As a companion piece to that kind of nonintervention, the second-raters have forgotten the adage of our first and greatest diplomat, Benjamin Franklin, who felt that to represent your country well in another country you had to be a little unpopular there. The reason is obvious. You must represent your country's interest ahead of the interest of the country where you serve. This is, however, not the way to win a popularity contest, and to be rated as "simpatico."

The foregoing weaknesses did not become too damaging or too glaring so long as our diplomats in Latin America did not have to face up to very serious problems or meet foreign competition by experts in their own field. So without the exposure of our weakness, things drifted along the lush postwar years when the Latin American economies were thriving and Russia was working only covertly and so quietly that she did not attract much public attention. When finally faced with disagreeable proof of the steady growth of Communist influence south of the border, most of our diplomats were as inexperienced with the techniques of the international Communist conspiracy as their Latin American friends.

Practically none of our men had served face to face with the raw facts of Communist technique and so, despite "midcareer" and other formal departmental schooling, they secretly shared the Latin American view that the Communists were patriots first, or that being Catholics, local Communists were no more than members of another political party. Various devices and catch phrases were used to explain away or soft-pedal the menace of communism. A favorite one was to talk about pure Marxism, as if that somehow was innocuous.

Thus tragically today we find ourselves with the international Communist conspiracy firmly entrenched in Cuba and ready to spread throughout the Caribbean. Its strength in Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia and most of Central America is great. In all countries of the Latin American area it is a vital factor, and because of ignorance of the Latin American masses and the naivete among the educated, there is little chance that the seriousness of the menace will be recognized indigenously and the necessary local measures to check it taken spontaneously. Unfortunately, at the same time, much of our press and of our State Department cannot be counted on for effective help with the problem.

Before proceeding to discussion of courses of action it is necessary to clear away some areas of possible misunderstanding which may have arisen in some of the previous statements.

First, what about Latin American "dictatorships"? Despite what has been pointed out above concerning our treaty obligations to protect them, on balance "dictatorships", even though benevolent, are bad in the Latin American scene. That, however, does not mean that we can lightly embrace a policy of overthrowing them by force, or of turning our backs to revolutionary movements. It is a favorite thesis of ex-President of Costa Rica Figueres that dictators cause communism. Figueres does not mean exactly this but he does mean that because there are dictators and the Communists have hypocritically managed to convince a vast majority of those who oppose dictators that they (the Communists) are enemies of dictators, the existence of dictatorships encourages the acceptance of communism as a means to overthrow them.

Those who thus accept the Communists give little heed to the problem of the price which will be collected by the Communists when the dictator falls. Figueres fully recognizes this problem and says he prefers to oppose any Communist aid in antidictator movements. But Figueres really has no practical answer to the problem of how to prevent communism from filling the vacuum after a dictator is overthrown.

Next, what is the correct evaluation of the so-called non-Communist anti-dictator Latin American liberals: Figueres, Muñoz Marín, Betancourt, and so forth: Many feel they are Communists (or just as bad) and certainly Betancourt by his own admission was once a party member. Since no one has ever produced a shred of direct evidence that any of them are Communists now, or even fellow travelers, the case both for and against them must rest on circumstantial evidence with the footnote that the degree of knowledge of the Communist machine available to our intelligence services is sufficiently direct so that it is an odds on bet that if they were Communists we would know it. As for the circumstantial evidence, it is in favor of their being foes of communism. Their

public utterances and actions have done so much harm to the Communist cause that the only possible argument that they are Communists is that they are under the deepest of possible cover and are being reserved for some long-range use, the nature of which it is difficult to discern.

Finally, reference has been made to knowledge of languages and other trappings of the "mystique" of our "Latin American diplomats." This does not mean that knowledge of the language and of customs is to be looked down upon as a qualification for a diplomat anywhere. What we need is a set of priorities. Brains and ability first. To a man with these, the language and customs will come easily and rapidly as has often been proved. This is particularly true in Latin America because a working knowledge of Spanish or Portuguese is one of the easiest linguistic accomplishments to achieve rapidly.

Incidentally, for obvious reasons it has never seriously been suggested that all of our top diplomats everywhere should have a working knowledge of the language of the post in which they are about to serve before they are appointed. If anyone were so bold as to seriously advocate such a requirement I am sure that the Foreign Service career officers would be in the vanguard of the opposition to such a suggestion. Clearly, if knowledge of the language of the people were a requirement for top diplomatic appointments, this would limit such appointments in approximately one-third of our embassies to veterans of private enterprise in the countries where the basic language of the people is not one of the half dozen major languages of the world. Knowledge of the major languages of the Western World, such as English, French, Spanish, German, and so forth, will serve a diplomat well. However, it will only serve him well in his contacts with the educated upper crust of the ex-colonies. It is a provocative thought that a knowledge of English alone will assure the diplomat of contact with the upper crust.

I am a great believer in and personally practice the study of foreign languages with some measure of success. But I submit that given ordinary linguistic ability, our modern technique of language teaching, a working knowledge of any language sufficient to serve as a basis of contact with the people of any country can be achieved in 90 days. I also believe that a superficial knowledge of an "exotic" language may well tempt our diplomats into the trap of trying to do business in that language when he ought not to do so.

I attach for comment a partial list of countries where the language of the people is clearly outside the scope of what we should expect from our top diplomatic officers.\*

Much has been said of the Latin American Division as a whole, but what about the men who have headed it in recent years. As to those who have been other than out and out career men, there is a considerable body of opinion, especially in the U.S. Senate, that the policies they pursued and their tactics with the Latin leaders were better designed to further their future intended private careers than to face up to the hard and unpleasant decisions which would possibly have altered events but which undoubtedly would have harmed their personal popularity.

As for the career incumbents, they have been of the group which specialized in Latin American affairs and which have been thoroughly discussed above.

What is to be done at this late date to make a beginning at extricating ourselves from the mess in which we find ourselves? Among the steps which should be taken are at least the following:

1. An alliance of the forces vitally interested in finding a solution is an obvious first step. In some articulate form, and as unobtrusively as possible at first, liaison for exchange of ideas, for formulation of plans, and for taking action must be established. Until our Government policy radically improves, this mechanism must be created outside of Government. Indeed, one of its major objectives must be to radically reform our Government policy and mechanisms for the area.

While this alliance probably must start with U.S. private interests in the area, it should as rapidly as possible ally itself with like-minded Latin American interests. It is extraordinary how much can be accomplished by partnerships of this kind in handling international problems. It is equally extraordinary to those who have practical experience that so little has really been done along

\*Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Holland, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaya, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam.

these lines. Indeed, an observer who comes to the Latin American area from other areas of the world is struck by the lack of real policy thinking and implementation by large interests in the area. One explanation for this persistently suggests itself; in the formative era of the establishment and growth of these interests it was easy to capture the local forces that counted. All-powerful dictators could be had for a price. National awakening, social aspirations for a better life, and the urge to greater human dignity had not then been aroused in the area.

Wherever possible liaison with sympathetic elements in our own and foreign government should be created. Fruitful help in the United States can be hoped for from our Department of Defense, from the intelligence community and from the legislative branch. There are many officials in the State Department high command and some few even in the Latin American Division who, if made aware of the true nature of the problem, might be prepared for action. At the very least they can be softened up so as not to oppose a positive program.

2. Perhaps the most important is how and whom to enlist as allies from among the Latin Americans. A first obvious group in view of the immediate problem in the Caribbean is that of Figueres, Munoz Marin, Betancourt, etc. This, however, requires much more careful exploration and at the very least a great deal more mutual understanding on the part of the original backers of the suggested new movement on the one hand and the Figueres group on the other. Businessmen with good reason mistrust the high degree of socialism inherent in the Figueres thinking whereas Figueres and his friends are suspicious of the methods and objectives of private foreign and local interests.

3. The ideal solution is to form a partnership of local and foreign interests. At first this seems an objective unlikely of accomplishment. But is it so hard really? And in any event, by working toward it would not much be accomplished?

If the advisability of forming a partnership with local interests were suggested to a sound American enterprise doing a profitable business and with no nationalistic threat of a takeover, much persuasion would be needed. Resistance would be bolstered with the "swapping in midstream" argument.

But how about those who are today facing expropriation in Cuba? And those who are fearing similar action elsewhere? Clearly they must take some action. What action is better than to join in partnership with local interests, even if the latter have to be lent the money to acquire their share?

It may be that the partnership suggestion goes too far but, in exploring it, some variations acceptable all around may be hit upon.

One factor must always be borne in mind. It is basic in the legal philosophy of all nations that enterprises essential to the survival of a state have to be in some manner put under effective control of the state. The means of this control vary from state ownership to state regulation, down to majority (or substantial) ownership by citizens of the state. Thus in the United States we deem our airlines and ships essential to our survival because of their essentiality in the economy and the national defense. We, therefore, require them to be 75 percent owned by our citizens for domestic operation.

It must be recognized that wherever in Latin America we find a one or two commodity economy the essentiality of that commodity can be made by skillful politicians (and there are now such trained by Moscow all over the world) to appear to the citizens of that country as more important than all our own public utilities put together are to us. Therefore, even if there is no indigenous communism or socialism in the picture, we must expect that the local people will be made apprehensive whenever the commodity is under foreign control. Under such circumstances in the long run nothing short of at least some appearance of a partnership type of interests will satisfy local opinion; and business simply cannot be done without consciously assuming the cost and risk of paying that price. U.S. capital which does not have the nerves to stand the fluidity of such a relationship neither should stay in nor get into foreign business as it has now in reality become in the world. The sooner we get on with the mechanics of realistic steps to bring about the appropriate new relationships the happier the solution will be.

Indeed, as proven in Mexico and China, and now widely threatened elsewhere de facto expropriation under the guise of land reform or greatly increased taxation or labor costs is the alternative that all of our interests may shortly have to face. The longer we delay the greater the chance that the international Communist conspiracy will persuade local governments to make the necessary moves to wipe out U.S. interests. Although this will also do infinite harm to

local interests by drying up effective production, the local people will not understand this until the harm to them and to our source of supply has been accomplished. The only other recourse for us is to use force, which in today's world and our own internal climate we will not face.

4. There is, however, an intermediate kind of force, economic in nature, which involves the deliberate control of the access of the Latin raw materials to American markets. This, if skillfully manipulated, could be used to deter economic aggression against the American interests in the suggested new partnership relationships.

5. In the present state of Latin American managerial know-how a considerable foreign management is and will for some time be essential to assure production. Thus for anything in Latin America now owned by Americans where we considered that continued production is essential to our future national interest, a U.S. official policy must be contrived to preserve this production. Since the partnership by local interests is by far the best all-around solution, our Government should institute an addition to our foreign investment guarantee procedure to make easy the financing of these local partnerships and to obtain for them the adequate recognition and protection needed from local governments.

As to the vital problem of who shall be the major partnership and in control of management, this should be solved by an evaluation process. Obviously, here as in every other relationship the caliber of the management provided for oversea service will control the result. One of a number of possible techniques is to provide for U.S. managerial control until the debt for acquiring the partnership interest is paid down to the point where an arbitrator would state the remaining U.S. interest in the investment is safe, at which time the control would pass.

6. Many will criticize this approach to the fundamental problem of Latin American relations because its primary approach is economic and in the private enterprise sector. Nothing is further from the truth. Full recognition is given to the problems of cultural relations and to the desirability of person-to-person understanding brought about through face-to-face dealings. However, it is submitted that none of these other things can really thrive until the bread-and-butter part of the problem is brought into better condition, and that the business partnership in some variation of its possible forms is the most hopeful basis of a sound and lasting solution.

There are other political ideas which I do not wish to put in writing at the present.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing more, sir.

Senator DODD. All right. I want to thank you very much for your helpful testimony. We are trying to find out just what went on here, mostly so we can prevent a recurrence of it. It is shocking to me, I am frank to say, on the record, that a man of your background, who has been engaged in the preparations for this affair, was treated so shabbily.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, of course, I don't mind how I was treated, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DODD. I know. That is not the point.

Besides that, when I say treated so shabbily, I mean the welfare of the country was treated shabbily. It is just unthinkable to me that this sort of thing can happen. I don't care whether they liked you or not.

You understand my saying that. But obviously it seems to me you were a man who simply had to be consulted, and certainly should have been given an opportunity to wind up your affairs in an orderly fashion, at least.

Mr. WILLAUER. Well, that is the way I felt about it, if I might be permitted to make a remark. The only thing I think that was terribly, I might say, unorthodox, or bad for the country, was that my brains were not picked when they decided to shift the authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is one minor matter I might

bring up. It is a little bit of a loose end. You told us of several persons to whom you carried your story about the situation in Cuba. And one of them whom you mentioned was Mr. Murphy.

Mr. WILLAUER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you actually have an opportunity to complete your presentation to Mr. Murphy?

Mr. WILLAUER. No. This was on the attempt to get an NIE, national intelligence estimate. And he was called out of the room to see the Secretary, and he never really got the whole thing.

Incidentally, I forgot to tell you gentlemen that when I went into this job on December 10, I was put in touch with an office in the State Department which has control of all those NIE's, I found that the only NIE on this subject in existence was one which was still in the process of preparation on December 10, 1960.

Now, whether or not there has been other special reports to the President or not, I do not know.

But I was assured by the Chief of that office, Mr. Joseph Scott, that this NIE that I saw in December, in an uncompleted form, was the only one in this situation.

Senator DODD. I was going to ask a question that had to do with your description of the financial backing at the time of the meeting in Costa Rica, the OAS meeting.

You used the language, "almost unlimited funds."

Mr. WILLAUER. We had what we thought fairly solid intelligence that the Central Bank of Cuba, or whatever it is called, the one that "Che" Guevara is in charge of, had allocated \$500,000, which would be the equivalent of \$5 million in the United States or more, \$50 million, perhaps, to the sabotaging of this conference. This intelligence came to us through what we deemed to be pretty reliable sources out of El Salvador.

Senator DODD. Well, this matter of these moneys, these unlimited funds, I think, as you accurately describe them, has interested me for a long time. I think it is something that we really should take a look at.

(Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

## APPENDIX I

The following text of an address on the Cuban situation by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on January 25, 1962, was ordered printed as an appendix to this record:

[Department of State, press release January 25, 1962]

ADDRESS BY HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, AT THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN STATES, PUNTA DEL ESTE, URUGUAY, JANUARY 25, 1962

Mr. Chairman, fellow Foreign Ministers, it is a very great personal pleasure for me to be here for my first meeting with my colleagues of the Americas. The fact that I find among them a number of old friends enhances that pleasure.

I join my colleagues in expressing our deep appreciation to the Government of Uruguay for the warm hospitality which we are enjoying in this lovely place, and for all the arrangements which were made on relatively short notice to make this meeting possible. Secretary of State Stettinius once said that there might not have been a Charter of the United Nations had it not been for the weather and charm of San Francisco. I am confident that Punta del Este is making its own special contribution to the unity, strength, and progress of the inter-American system.

For the second time in 6 months, the nations of the Americas met here in pursuit of their common goal—social progress and economic growth within a community of free and independent nations. But this time we come to make measures to safeguard that freedom and independence—so that in the future we may devote all our efforts to social progress and economic growth.

We are assembled again on the eastern shore of a vast continent. Across this continent millions of our people are struggling to throw off the bonds of hunger, poverty, and ignorance—to affirm the hope of a better life for themselves and their children. Last August we joined in an historic document—the Charter of Punta del Este—setting forth the goals, the machinery, and the commitments necessary to transform that hope into reality. Last August we joined hands in a great alliance—the Alianza Para El Progreso.

Since that time, in every part of the hemisphere we have moved forward with fresh energy in fulfillment of the pledges we solemnly undertook to the peoples of the Americas. The task ahead is vast. Everyone in this hall knows the mighty effort which will be required to break the ancient cycle of stagnation and despair. But the need for action is urgent. Across the world the winds of change are blowing; awakening peoples are demanding to be admitted to the promise of the 20th century. For Americans, north and south, this is a historical challenge. As the 19th century saw the Western Hemisphere enter the epoch of political independence, so the 20th century—if those of us in this room, and the Governments we represent, have boldness and faith—will see this hemisphere enter the epoch of economic abundance.

The means by which we seek our ends are the intelligence, decision, and will of the governments and people of the hemisphere. We cannot hope to make progress unless the governments of our nations faithfully meet the needs of their peoples for education and opportunity—unless we press steadily forward with the measures of self-help and social reform which make development possible and spread its benefits among all the people. This work has already begun. Let me say that it is unfinished business in the United States itself. Many Latin American nations are engaged in national plans and programs, internal reforms and action to build houses, schools, and factories, roads and dams. My own country has already made large commitments for this fiscal year and will have no difficulty in meeting the more than \$1 billion pledged to the first year of the Alliance for Progress. We have together established international machinery to stimulate and review national plans.



This is a notable beginning. There is, of course, much more to be done. Our task is to be measured, not in the months of this year, but in the years of this decade. I wish there were some way in which we could transmit to you the depth of our affectionate interest in the economic and social prospects of this hemisphere. Perhaps you would forgive me for a personal recollection. Like millions of present-day North Americans, I spent my earliest years in what people would now call underdeveloped circumstances. We were prescientific and pretechnical; we were without public health or medical care; typhoid, pellagra, hookworm, and malaria were a part of the environment in which providence had placed us. Our schools were primitive. Our fathers and mothers earned a meager living with backbreaking toil.

But the great adventure through which many of us have lived has seen the transformation of our lives in a short period—a transformation brought about by the magical combination of education, health, and increasing productivity. On our farms we felt the impact of the indispensable partnership among education, scientific research, and the extension of knowledge to those who could put it to practical use. Neighbor helped neighbor to build a house, a barn, or to pass along news about new prospects and new methods. They joined together to build roads until public funds could take over the burden. They pooled their limited resources to hire a schoolteacher or a doctor. Bits of capital began to accumulate and this was reinvested in growth and development. More and more young people managed to get to the university and more and more of these brought their learning back to the benefit of their own people.

These changes did not take place without struggle. Years of thought and work and debate were required to prepare America for the necessary steps of self-help and social reform. I remember well the bitter resistance before Franklin Roosevelt was able to win support for the Tennessee Valley Authority, that immense network of dams and power stations and fertilizer factories and agricultural extension offices which has wrought such miraculous changes in our South. But a succession of progressive leaders, determined to bring about social change within a framework of political consent, carried through an alliance for progress within the United States.

Other parts of the hemisphere have experienced similar improvements. What has been done for some must now be done for all. It shall be our common purpose to labor without cease to advance the cause of economic progress and social justice within the hemisphere—to advance the autonomous and peaceful revolution of the Americans.

There are those in every land who resist change—who see the society they know as the climax of history, who identify their own status and privilege with the welfare of their people, and who oppose the vital land and tax reforms necessary for the completion of our work. But their resistance is doomed to failure. The 19th century is over; and, in the 20th, people across the earth are awakening from centuries of poverty and oppression to claim the right to live in the modern world. "The veil has been torn asunder," wrote Bolívar, "We have seen the light; and we will not be thrust back into the darkness." No one can hope to prolong the past in a revolutionary age. The only question is which road we mean to take into the future.

This is not a question alone for this hemisphere. It is a question faced everywhere in the world. On the one hand are those who believe in change through persuasion and consent—through means which respect the individual. On the other are those who advocate change through the subjugation of the individual and who see in the turbulence of change the opportunity for power.

I do not believe that I have to argue the moral superiority of free society anywhere in the Americas. I do not think, other things being equal, that any rational person would prefer tyranny to tolerance or dictatorship to democracy. But there are some who doubt the capacity of freedom to do the job. And turn in resentment and desperation to totalitarian solutions. They are wrong. History shows that freedom is the most reliable means to economic development and social justice, and that communism betrays in performance the ends which it proclaims in propaganda. The humane and pragmatic methods of freemen are not merely the right way, morally, to develop an underdeveloped country; they are technically the efficient way.

We meet here at Punta del Este to consider the tragedy of Cuba. There have been many elements in that tragedy. One was the failure of the dictatorship which preceded Castro to concern itself with the elementary needs of a people who had a right to be free. Another was the disillusionment of the hopes which rode with Castro at the beginning of his resistance movement. And

now we see the Cuban people subjected to a regime which has committed itself to Marxist-Leninist doctrines at the very time when this answer to economic and social problems has proved itself to be brutal, reactionary, and sterile. If there is one lesson which we in the Americas can learn from observing what is happening from East Germany to North Vietnam, it is that Castroism is not the answer to economic and social development. If there is tension in Berlin today, it is because of the failure of the regime in East Germany and the flight of tens of thousands of its people toward freedom and expanding opportunity. It is worth noting that vast areas of the world with remarkable natural resources have failed to provide even the elementary needs of food, contrasted with the surpluses which abound throughout much of the free world. The needs of the individual have been ruthlessly subjected to the requirements of the power-hungry apparatus of the state. What we know in the free world as the consumer is brushed aside and men are called upon to submit themselves to the requirements of ambition and appetite.

Wherever communism goes, hunger follows. Communist China today is in the grip of a vast and terrible famine, which, in turn, has led to stagnation and decline of industry. There is hunger in North Vietnam, whatever contribution communism has appeared to make to industrial development comes only because it does what Marx charged 19th century capitalism with doing: That is, it grinds down the faces of the poor and forces from their postponed consumption the capital necessary for arms and industry. Communism—once in power—has turned out to be the most effective and brutal means known to history for exploiting the working class.

Recognizing its failure in the underdeveloped world, recognizing that its greatest enemy is the process of peaceful and democratic development, communism in recent years has concentrated—in Asia, in Africa, in the Middle East, now in our own hemisphere—on using the troubles of transition to install Communist minorities in permanent power. The techniques by which communism seeks to subvert the development process are neither mysterious nor magical. Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung, and Che Guevara have outlined them in frankness and detail. They seek first to lay the political basis for the seizure of power by winning converts in sections of the populations whose hopes and ambitions are thwarted by the existing order. They then try to capture control of broadly based popular movements aimed ostensibly at redressing social and economic injustice. In some cases, they resort to guerrilla warfare, as a means of intimidating opposition and disrupting orderly social progress. At every point, the Communists are prepared to invoke all the resource of propaganda and subversion, of manipulation and violence, to maximize confusion, destroy faith in the democratic instrumentalities of change and open up the way for a Communist takeover.

As for its claim to social justice, Chairman Khrushchev himself has given the most eloquent testimony of the inevitability of monstrous injustice in a system of totalitarian dictatorship. The crimes of Stalin—crimes fully acknowledged by his successor—are the inescapable result of a political order founded on the supposed infallibility of a single creed, a single party and a single leader. Under the banner of the classless society, communism has become the means of establishing what the Yugoslavia Communist Milovan Djilas has termed the "new class"—an elite as ruthless in its determination to maintain its prerogatives as any oligarchy known to history.

Nothing shows more clearly the failure of communism to bring about economic development and social justice than the present condition of Europe. The bankruptcy of communism is etched in the contrast between the thriving economies of Western Europe and the drab stagnation of Eastern Europe—and it is symbolized in the wall of Berlin, erected to stop the mass flight of ordinary people from communism to freedom.

The proponents of free society need have no apologies. We have moved far beyond the rigid laissez-faire capitalism of the 19th century. The open society of the mid-20th century can offer the reality of what the Communists promise but do not and cannot produce—because the means they are using, the techniques of hatred and violence, can never produce anything but more violence and more hatred. Communism is not the wave of the future. Communists are only the exploiters of people's aspirations—and their despair. They are the scavengers of the transition from stagnation into the modern world. The wave of the future is the peaceful, democratic revolution symbolized for the Americas in the Alliance for Progress—the revolution which will bring change without chaos, development without dictatorship, and hope without hatred.



This is our faith, because we have pledged ourselves to this road into the future, we have no more urgent obligation than to guarantee and protect the independence of the democratic revolution. Because communism has its own ambitions, communism everywhere directs its most intense effort to making democratic change impossible. It is in this setting that I ask you to consider the question of the purposes and methods of communism in our hemisphere.

If the one striking development of the last years in our hemisphere has been the rise of the Alliance for Progress, the other striking development has been the defection of Cuba from the inter-American system.

Let us be clear about the character of the problem presented by Castro and his government.

We have no quarrel with the people of Cuba. As this week we have welcomed a free Dominican Republic back into the inter-American community, so we looked forward to the day when a free and progressive government will flourish in Havana, and the Cuban people can join with us in the common undertakings of the hemisphere.

Many of us in this hemisphere had no quarrel with the avowed purposes of the revolution of 1959. Many rejoiced in the aspirations of the Cuban people for political liberty and social progress. Nor would we have any quarrel with changes in the economic organization of Cuba instituted with the consent of the Cuban people. Our hemisphere has room for a diversity of economic systems. But we do condemn the internal excesses of the Castro regime—the violations of civil justice, the drumhead executions, the suppression of political, intellectual, and religious freedom. But even these things, repellent as they are, have been known to our continent. If kept within the confines of one unhappy country, they would not constitute a direct threat to the peace and the independence of other American states. What we cannot accept—and will never accept—is the use of Cuba as the means through which extracontinental powers seek to break up the inter-American system, to overthrow the governments of other countries and to destroy the autonomous democratic evolution of the hemisphere.

The Castro regime has extended the global battle to Latin America. It has supplied communism with a bridgehead in the Americas, and it has thereby brought the entire hemisphere into the front line of the struggle between communism and democracy. It has turned itself into an arsenal for arms and ammunition from the Communist world. With Communist help Dr. Castro has built up the largest military establishment in Latin America.

Within the United Nations, the Cuban delegation has abandoned its brethren of the hemisphere to play the smirking sycophant for the Communist bloc. Out of the 37 rollcall votes taken on the most important issues in the last session of the General Assembly, a majority of the members of the Organization of American States voted together 35 times. But, of these 37 votes, Cuba voted 33 times with the Soviet bloc—and only 5 times with the OAS majority. Cuba opposed the resolution appealing to the Soviet Union not to explode the 50-megaton bomb; it was the only delegation in the United Nations, besides the 10 avowed members of the Soviet bloc, to do so. In the same manner, Cuba alone joined the Communist bloc to oppose the resolution calling for a nuclear test ban treaty with international controls. On several occasions, Cuban representatives followed other members of the Communist bloc in walking out of the General Assembly when delegates of states not approved by the Soviet Union dared take the floor.

At the seventh meeting of Foreign Ministers at San Jose in August 1960, our governments together rejected any attempt on the part of the Communist powers to exploit the political, economic, or social troubles of any American state. Since San Jose, the Cuban Government has alined itself more flagrantly than ever with those dedicated to the overthrow of the inter-American system and the destruction of inter-American freedom. The Soviet-Cuban communique of September 20, 1961, and the Chinese-Cuban communique of October 2, 1961, both signed by President Dorticos, proclaim an identity of views on foreign policy between the Cuban and the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes. Only a few weeks ago, Dr. Roa, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, made clear once again that the primary allegiance of the Castro Government is not to its brethren in the Americas but to its comrades beyond the Iron Curtain. "The Socialist camp, led by the invincible Soviet Union, is with the Cuban revolution," Dr. Roa said. "We are neither alone nor helpless. The world is with the Cuban revolution, and the future belongs entirely to the universal Socialist society that is coming, and of which, forever, Cuba already forms part."

When Dr. Castro himself said on December 2, "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life," he could have surprised only those who have paid no attention to the evolution of the Castro regime. This public oath of fealty to Marxism-Leninism underlines Dr. Castro's commitment to the Leninist use of deception and violence, to the Leninist contempt for free institutions, and to the Leninist injunction that obedience to the international Communist movement is the highest duty.

Driven by this Marxist-Leninist faith, the Castro regime has dedicated itself, not to the struggle for democracy within the hemisphere or even within Cuba, but to the perversion and corruption of this struggle in the interests of world communism. Part III of the report of the Inter-American Peace Committee sets forth the ties of the Government of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc, its subversive activities within the hemisphere, its violations of human rights, and the incompatibility of its behavior with the Charter of the Organization of American States.

Fourteen years ago at Bogotá, the Ninth International Conference of American States in its Resolution XXXII on "The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America" declared that "By its antidemocratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom. This resolution condemned 'interference by any foreign power, or by any political organization serving the interests of a foreign power, in the public life of the nations of the American continent.' The American Republics solemnly resolved 'to adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities directed, assisted, or instigated by foreign governments, organizations, or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats, or by any other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations.'"

Three years ago at Santiago, the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics reaffirmed the Bogotá Resolution in the Declaration of Santiago, condemning "the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine."

No one can doubt, on the basis of hard evidence compiled by committees of the OAS and known to every observer in our hemisphere, that the Castro regime has placed itself in a position of systematic and contemptuous hostility to these principles of our inter-American system. Beyond the evidence, every delegate in this hall knows in his mind and heart that those behind Castro hope to overthrow his Government and every other Government in Latin America. The Castro regime, by repudiating the principles and philosophy of the inter-American system and making itself the American agent of world communism, has created a clear and present danger to the prospects of free and democratic change in every country in Latin America. The time has come for the American Republics to unite against Communist intervention in this hemisphere. We believe in the inter-American system. We stand on the principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States. We are faithful to the ancient hope of a hemisphere of free democracies, bound together in independence and common purpose. Else we would reject that hope, forsake our faith itself, exposed in its isolation to every gust of political or ideological fanaticism.

The Alliance for Progress is the best way of attacking the longrun sources of the Communist appeal—poverty, hunger, and ignorance. But the Alliance cannot by itself provide a means of warding off the shortrun Communist tactics of disruption and subversion. Vitamin tablets will not save a man set upon by hoodlums in an alley. If the Alliance is to succeed, we need to protect the Democratic processes of change—we need a shield behind which constructive measures can take effect in steady and secure progression. We have seen the effect of Communist disruptive tactics in other lands and other continents. Let us take action now to guard our own continent and our programs of Democratic reform against those who seek to replace democracy by dictatorship—those who would transform our fellowship of free states into a bondage of satellites.

I am confident that this meeting of foreign ministers will hearten the Democratic forces of this continent by making it clear that we will not stand still while the enemies of democracy conspire to make Democratic change impossible. Against Dr. Castro's Communist allies, let us reaffirm our faith in our own good

neighbors; let us commit our minds and our hearts to the success of our free Alliance for Progress.

What is our working task here at this meeting? I suggest we must move in four major directions:

First, we must recognize that the alinement of the Government of Cuba with the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and its commitment to extend Communist power in this hemisphere, are incompatible with the purposes and principles of the inter-American system and that its current activities are an ever-present and common danger to the peace and security of the continent.

Second, we must now make the policy decision to exclude the Castro regime from participation in the organs and bodies of the inter-American system; and to direct the Council of the Organization to determine how best to give rapid implementation to this decision. Within our own competence, since the Inter-American Defense Board was created by a meeting of consultation, we can and should now exclude the Government of Cuba from membership in the Inter-American Defense Board. This step would correct at once the most obvious incongruity arising from the participation of a regime aligned with the Sino-Soviet bloc in a body planning the defense of the hemisphere against the aggressive designs of international communism.

Third, we must interrupt the limited but significant flow of trade between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere, especially the traffic in arms.

Fourth, we must set in motion a series of individual and communal acts of defense against the various forms of political and indirect aggression mounted against the hemisphere. The acts of political aggression which the Castro regime is committing have an immediate and direct impact in the general Caribbean area near the focus of infection. Yet with one exception there is not a foreign minister present whose country has not felt the impact of the interventionist activities which constitute essential elements of the international Communist design. We must find adequate means to strengthen our capacity to anticipate and overcome this constant gnawing at the security of our peoples. In particular, we should direct the Inter-American Defense Board to establish a special security committee to recommend individual and collective measures to the Governments of the American States for their greater protection against any acts or threats of aggression, direct or indirect, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers or others associated with them.

As we confront these decisions let us face, as old friends and neighbors, a few basic facts in our situation. The weight of Communist aggressive techniques is felt unequally among us; the nature of the Communist threat is understood in different ways among our peoples; and the OAS itself is confronted, as a body, with a form of aggressive action relatively new in its history.

We have heard references to the intrusion of the cold war into this hemisphere. There may be some who wonder whether the Americas are being caught up, as innocent bystanders, in a struggle among the giants.

But let us think clearly about what the cold war is and what it is not. The Communist world has dedicated itself to the indefinite expansion of what it calls its historically inevitable world revolution. The cold war is simply the effort of communism to extend its power beyond the confines of the Communist bloc and the effort of free men to defend themselves against this systematic aggression. The cold war would have been unknown to us had the Soviet Union determined, at the end of World War II, to live in peace with other nations in accordance with its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations. The cold war would end tomorrow if those who control the Communist movement would cease their aggressive acts, in all their many forms. Nothing would be more gratifying to the citizens of my country than to have the Soviet Union bring about the revolution of peace by a simple decision to leave the rest of the world alone.

But the cold war is not a contest between the Soviet Union and the United States which the United States is pursuing for national ends. It is a struggle in the long story of freedom, between those who would destroy it and those who are determined to preserve it. If every nation were genuinely independent, and left alone to work out its relations with its neighbors by common agreement, the tensions between Washington and Moscow would vanish overnight.

Speaking last October, before the 22d Communist Party Congress, Mr. Khrushchev said:

"We firmly believe that the time will come when the children and grandchildren of those who do not understand and do not accept communism will live under communism."

This is his belief. Were it only his belief we need not care; but it is also the program of action of the Communist powers—and about that we care a very great deal.

We know that the Communist effort to impose their system on other nations and peoples will fail and that the next generation will dwell in a community of independent nations, each freely pursuing the welfare of its people. We know this is so because history confirms that freedom must win because it is rooted in the nature of man and in his relations with God.

Our problem today is to combine a sense of the necessities of the harsh realities with the dreams upon which civilized man has steadily built. A shining future is waiting for us in this hemisphere—a future in which every child will have a decent chance for life, for education, for medical care, for constructive labor, and creative contribution: in which every republic on this continent will cooperate to improve lagging standards, to elevate culture, and to raise man to his full dignity in freedom.

We have the talents, the resources, and the aspirations. We need not retreat into the murky shadows of a conspiratorial society developed on the steppes of central Asia because we can move ahead in the great tradition of a civilization which was born in the free discourse of the early Mediterranean world more than 2,000 years ago, was nourished in Western Europe, and came to this hemisphere to be extended by Bolivar and San Martin, by Marti, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

Our task today is not to let a petty tyrant who has appeared among us divert us from these great tasks but to put him in his place while we proceed with the great adventure upon which we are embarked together.

APPENDIX II

The following chronology of events in Cuba was prepared by the Department of State at the request of Senator Morse and was ordered printed as an appendix to these hearings:

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS, 1957-62

SUMMARY

The attached chronology for the period 1957-62 records, on the one hand, U.S. Government attempts to get along with the Castro regime in Cuba, and on the other, that regime's hostility toward the United States and betrayal of the Cuban revolution to international communism.

As early as 1957 the U.S. Government expressed its concern over political unrest in Cuba. In 1958 we suspended arms shipments to the Batista government which, in disregard of an agreement with the United States, had used them to combat the revolutionary movement headed by Fidel Castro. When the Castro regime came to power in 1959, the United States looked upon it with sympathy, recognized it almost immediately, and welcomed its promises of political freedom and social justice for the Cuban people. We made clear our willingness to discuss Cuba's economic needs. Despite our concern at the Cuban regime's mounting hostility toward the United States and its growing Communist tendencies, we attempted patiently and consistently from early 1959 until late 1960 to negotiate differences with the regime.

Elements in the Castro movement engaged in anti-American activities during the revolution against Batista. Soon after it came to power in 1959, the Castro government turned away from its previous promises, permitted Communist influence to grow, attacked and persecuted its own supporters in Cuba who expressed opposition to communism, arbitrarily seized U.S. properties, and made a series of baseless charges against the United States. It ignored, rejected, or imposed impossible conditions on repeated U.S. overtures to cooperate and negotiate. In 1960 Cuba established close political, economic, and military relationships with the Sino-Soviet bloc, while increasing the pace and vehemence of measures and attacks against the United States. We did not take defensive measures until the last half of 1960.

The United States terminated relations with the Cuban Government in January 1961 because of Cuban demands which placed crippling limitations on our ability to carry out diplomatic and consular functions in Cuba. The adoption by the present Cuban Government of a totalitarian Communist system and its alignment with the international Communist movement, which were already clear at that time, have become more complete since then. These developments culminated in December 1961, when Castro openly espoused Marxism-Leninism.

July 25, 1957: U.S. Ambassador Earl T. Smith, upon presentation of credentials, states that the American people are saddened and concerned over the political unrest which has led to bloodshed in Cuba.

March 14, 1958: U.S. suspends arms deliveries to Cuba.

June 22, 1958: Raul Castro, rebel commander in northern Oriente Province, issues a military order for the detention, effective June 27, of all U.S. male citizens for the purpose of "stopping U.S. military shipments to the Batista government." Pursuant to this order, starting June 26, Cuban rebels kidnap 43 U.S. citizens, including 30 sailors and marines, from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The last of those kidnaped are released July 18.

September-October 1958: Cuban rebels set up a system for levying taxes on both Cuban and U.S. enterprises operating in rebel-occupied territory in eastern Cuba, and harass several U.S. companies in an attempt to collect funds and acquire supplies and equipment.

October 20, 1958: Cuban rebels kidnap two Americans employed by the Texas Oil Co., and release them 3 days later.

COMMUNIST THREAT TO U.S. THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 897

January 1, 1959: President Batista flees Cuba.

January 2, 1959: Fidel Castro proclaims provisional government headed by Manuel Urrutia as President.

January 5, 1959: President Urrutia appoints Jose Miró Cardona as Prime Minister.

January 7, 1959: The United States recognizes the Cuban Government, noting with satisfaction the assurances given of the Cuban intention to comply with international obligations and agreements, and expresses the sincere good will of the Government and people of the United States toward the new Government and the people of Cuba.

January 7, 1959: The Communist Party daily, Hoy, appears in Havana for the first time since 1953.

January 9, 1959: Ernesto Guevara, commander of La Cabaña fortress in Havana, says that many members of the Communist Party lost their lives fighting Batista while the Batista government was receiving weapons from the U.S. Government, and that the Communists have earned the right to be just another party in Cuba.

January 13, 1959: By this date, almost 200 persons have been "tried" by revolutionary tribunals, found guilty, and summarily shot. By the end of 1959, the count is over 600.

January 27, 1959: Nine U.S. companies operating in Cuba have made advance payments of \$2,560,000 on taxes which are not due until March 30.

February 16, 1959: Fidel Castro succeeds Miro Cardona as Prime Minister.

March 2, 1959: U.S. Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal presents credentials. He brings cordial greetings and heartfelt good wishes from President Eisenhower for the happiness, prosperity, and progress of Cuba. He states to President Urrutia: "We wish you every success in your announced objective of raising the standard of living of your country. I shall devote particular attention to all opportunities of increased cooperation in the economic field which may present themselves."

March 4, 1959: The Cuban Government intervenes the Cuban Telephone Co., the first intervention of a U.S.-owned firm.

March 16, 1959: Cuban Ambassador Ernesto Dihigo presents credentials. President Eisenhower expresses hope and desire for ever closer relationship between Cuba and the United States.

March 22, 1959: Prime Minister Castro charges that U.S. authorities were lax in keeping track of arms purchases and other activities in the United States directed against Castro. United States denies charge on March 23.

April 13, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal tells Prime Minister Castro that the United States considers Castro's forthcoming visit to the United States very important, and offers to help in any way required.

April 16, 1969: During lunch given by Secretary of State Christian Herter for Prime Minister Castro in Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., in conversation with the president of the Cuban National Bank, Felipe Pazos, arranges further conversations for the following day with Cuban officials.

April 17, 1959: Assistant Secretary Rubottom gives Minister of Economy Regino Boti, Minister of Treasury Rufo Lopez Fresquet, and Pazos friendly welcome and invites them to indicate Cuba's needs. He says the U.S. Government desires to be helpful. The Cubans rebuff offer.

Later the same day Prime Minister Castro, in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, says he has not come to the United States to ask for money.

May 17, 1959: Cuban Government approves agrarian reform law, providing for taking of agricultural properties, payment to be in 20-year bonds at 4½ percent interest.

May 27, 1959: Assistant Secretary Rubottom tells Ambassador Dihigo that the United States understands that the Cuban revolution is deep and meaningful for the Cuban people, that its eventual course is matter for their decision, and that we understand the desire and need for land reform.

June 1, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal, in informal conversation with Minister of State Roberto Agramonte, states that the United States supports sound land reform, and recognizes Cuba's right to expropriate private property, provided just and prompt compensation is made. He states that it is in the interest of both Cuba and the United States to work together, to get along amicably, and to afford each other a full hearing before taking actions materially affecting the other.



June 11, 1959: Commenting on Cuban agrarian reform law, United States expresses sympathy for the objectives of agrarian reform; recognizes the right of a state to take property for public purposes, coupled with an obligation to pay prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; expresses concern as to the adequacy of the law's provisions for compensation to U.S. citizens whose property may be expropriated; and expresses hope for further exchanges of views.

June 12, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal urges on Prime Minister Castro the importance of close relations between Cuba and the United States because of the inter-related economies and the proximity of the two countries.

June 20, 1959: In Washington, Assistant Secretary Rubottom offers Cuban Minister of State Raul Roa full cooperation in returning problems of United States-Cuban relations to normal, nonpublic diplomatic channels, as advocated by Roa.

June 22, 1959: In Washington, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon tells Minister of State Roa of the sincere desire of the United States that Cuba grow and prosper, and expresses the hope that the mutually beneficial traditional relationship between the United States and Cuba continue.

June 25, 1959: Cuban Government seizes three of U.S.-owned cattle ranches in Camaguey Province, first such seizures subsequent to the agrarian reform law.

June 27, 1959: Cuban Government seizes U.S.-owned cattle ranch in Oriente Province.

July 1, 1959: Maj. Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz resigns as head of the Cuban Air Force, charging Communist infiltration of the armed forces and Government.

July 12, 1959: Prime Minister Castro describes reported appearance of Major Diaz Lanz before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in executive session as an unfriendly act and as U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Cuba.

July 13, 1959: President Urrutia, appearing on television, states that communism is not really concerned with the welfare of the people, and that it constitutes a danger for the Cuban revolution.

July 14, 1959: Major Diaz Lanz testifies publicly before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on communism in Cuba.

July 14, 1959: Acting Minister of State Armando Hart denounces Diaz Lanz's appearance before Senate Internal Security Subcommittee as blatant intervention in Cuban internal affairs.

July 17, 1959: In television appearance, Fidel Castro resigns as Prime Minister and accuses President Urrutia of treason because of July 13 speech. Urrutia resigns.

July 23, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal expresses to Minister of State Roa the general sympathy of the United States for the objectives of the Cuban revolution and our support for agrarian reform programs of a sound nature. States that in connection with the Diaz Lanz case, U.S. policy has been correct and faithful to our highest principles. Expresses concern over the deterioration in Cuba-United States relations as a result of anti-American statements of principal Cuban Government leaders. Expresses wish of U.S. Government to cooperate in any way in obtaining information on various incidents.

July 26, 1959: Fidel Castro announces that he will resume position of Prime Minister.

July 31, 1959: On at least six occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize or place cattle on land owned by U.S. citizens.

August 15, 1959: Prime Minister Castro charges complicity of U.S. officials in permitting planes participating in counterrevolutionary activities against Cuba to take off from the United States.

August 21, 1959: Assistant Secretary Rubottom emphasizes to Ambassador Dihigo that he believes that the United States and Cuba urgently need to sit down together and talk over various problems to arrive at an understanding.

August 31, 1959: On at least three occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize or harvest land owned by U.S. citizens.

September 2, 1959: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William P. Snow, in conversation with Ambassador Dihigo, expresses regret at the continuing attacks on the United States by Cuban Government officials, concern at the failure of the Cuban Government to hear the views of U.S. business interests before the passage of laws affecting them, and the hope that the Cuban Government might arrive at a better understanding of the U.S. position in defense of democracy against the world Communist conspiracy.

September 3, 1959: In first interview since June 12, Ambassador Bonsal expresses to Prime Minister Castro our general sympathy with the objectives of the revolution, concern at anti-American statements made by Cuban officials and

at insinuations by Cuban officials that our relations have not been straightforward and correct, at the treatment received by American interests in Cuba, and at the failure of the Cuban Government to see the implications of international communism.

September 10, 1959: Assistant Secretary Rubottom tells Cuban representative on Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Enrique Perez Cisneros, that the United States is still disposed to carry out a policy of friendship and fairness toward Cuba despite considerable provocation during the past 9 months.

September 21, 1959: Ambassador Dihigo informs Assistant Secretary Rubottom that President Osvaldo Dorticos and Minister of State Roa are completely receptive to the idea that Cuba and the United States begin immediately to discuss their problems and endeavor to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. He requests that the United States compile a list of the general and specific problems now troubling the United States in its relations with Cuba, and present the list to the Cuban Government. Rubottom indicates his pleasure at this request and says that we will immediately give consideration as how best to meet it.

September 30, 1959: On at least eight occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize water system, forest and other lands, and place cattle on land owned by U.S. citizens.

October 6, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal tells Minister of State Roa that the United States is generally in sympathy with the stated democratic social objectives of the Cuban revolution, but also is perplexed and in doubt about Cuban attitudes toward the United States and the free world.

October 12, 1959: United States presents note to Cuban Government reaffirming our understanding and sympathy for the goals which the Cuban Government has declared to be the purpose of its agrarian reform.

October 19, 1959: Maj. Hubert Matos, a rebel army leader during the revolution, resigns as military chief of Camaguey Province, charging Communist penetration of the Government. Matos is arrested and on December 15 is sentenced to 20 years in prison for conspiracy, sedition, and treason.

October 21, 1959: Maj. Diaz Lanz makes an illegal flight from the United States over Havana. Prime Minister Castro charges that the plane bombed and strafed Havana resulting in deaths and injuries.

October 26, 1959: Prime Minister Castro accuses the United States of tolerating air incursions against Cuba and of threatening Cuba with economic strangulation.

October 26, 1959: Cuban Government passes law imposing confiscatory taxes upon the Nicaraguan nickel facilities, owned by the U.S. Government, in violation of a binding international agreement. Subsequently the Cuban Government intermittently embargoes the export of the product and continually harasses the operation by delaying or failing to approve the exportation of the product and the importation of critically needed supplies and replacement parts.

October 27, 1959: Referring to October 21 incident, United States states that the plane distributed leaflets over Havana, that it was impossible for the plane to bomb or strafe, that the Cuban police reported no bombing or strafing, and that deaths and injuries from the incident must have resulted from Cuban anti-aircraft fire or bombs thrown by terrorists. Rejects implication that the United States approved the flight or was in any way responsible.

October 27, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal tells Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos and Minister of State Roa that the "United States awaits a resolution by the Cuban Government of the issues involved on a basis of friendship and observance of international law which have traditionally characterized negotiations between Cuba and the United States." Bonsal also expresses the hope that normal negotiations will not be distorted to obscure the deep sympathy with which the entire United States views the efforts of the Cuban people to achieve their social, economic, and political aspirations.

October 31, 1959: On at least 12 occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize lands, cattle, and equipment, order cattle moved, deny access to pastures, order cutting of timber, open fences and plow up land, and place cattle on land owned by U.S. citizens.

November 6, 1959: Cuban Ministry of State distributes brochure entitled "Cuba Denounces Before the World." Brochure repeats allegations about October 21 plane incident and charges that the United States is providing political asylum to Cuban fugitives from justice.

November 9, 1959: United States protests November 6 brochure as disregarding facts on plane incident. Also states that Cuban Government has never re-

quested extradition of alleged fugitives from justice under extradition treaty with United States.

November 24, 1959: Daniel M. Braddock, Minister-Counselor of American Embassy, Havana, states to Minister of Economy Boti that although various individual matters have been discussed between Cuba and the United States, little or no progress has been made on them. Braddock says that some American companies in Cuba fear that the ultimate intention of the Cuban Government is to take them over.

November 30, 1959: On at least nine occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize land, cattle, and equipment, and place cattle on land owned by U.S. citizens.

December 4, 1959: Ambassador Bonsal reviews for Minister of Economy Boti the principal events in United States-Cuban relations since October 12, noting the deterioration that has occurred in the meantime. He refers to the Cuban offer of November 13 to continue negotiations on pending questions, and asks if Boti is disposed to resume these discussions. Boti indicates assent.

December 31, 1959: Cuba and Communist China sign trade agreement under which Cuba is to sell Peiping 50,000 tons of sugar.

December 31, 1959: On at least seven occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize land, equipment, property, remove timber, borrow equipment (most of which is not returned), and use repair shops owned by U.S. citizens.

January 11, 1960: United States protests seizure of U.S. property in recent weeks by Cuban officials in violation of agrarian reform law. States that without court order or any written authorization, lands and buildings have been seized and occupied; equipment has been confiscated and removed; cattle have been taken; wood has been cut and sold; productive pastures have been plowed under without the consent of their owners; and fences and boundaries have been arbitrarily moved.

January 21, 1960: Prime Minister Castro says that notes from the U.S. State Department and statements by U.S. officials encourage counterrevolutionary activities against Cuba and indicate that a policy of hostility against Cuba is more evident every day. He implies that the United States exploited Cuba for 50 years.

January 26, 1960: President Eisenhower reaffirms the adherence of the United States to the policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, including Cuba; explicitly recognizes the right of the Cuban Government and people to undertake social, economic, and political reforms which, with due regard for their obligations under international law, they may think desirable; and expresses the sympathy of the American people for the aspirations of the Cuban people.

January 27, 1960: Answering President Eisenhower's statement of January 26, President Dorticos states that the Cuban Government is fully disposed to discuss differences between Cuba and the United States through diplomatic negotiations, and will hear and consider complaints and claims regarding individual cases raised by U.S. citizens, in accordance with Cuban and international law.

January 31, 1960: On at least 11 occasions during the month, Cuban Government officials seize a marine dredge, land, stores, cattle and horses, and brand cattle owned by U.S. citizens.

February 4, 1960: Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan arrives to open a Soviet exhibition.

February 4, 1960: Charge d'Affaires Braddock states to Minister of State Roa that the United States is disposed to take President Dorticos' statement at face value and is prepared to return to diplomatic norms. Braddock mentions the desirability of leading officials of both Cuba and the United States working within the traditional spirit of United States-Cuban friendship, maintaining an atmosphere free of public recriminations, and observing standards of international and domestic laws applicable to each other's nationals.

February 10, 1960: United States states that it considers the January 27 statement of President Dorticos consistent with a desire for a return to normal diplomatic channels and welcomes the readiness of the Cuban Government to negotiate pending problems.

February 13, 1960: Prime Minister Castro and Deputy Premier Mikoyan sign joint Soviet-Cuban communique describing their conversations as "carried out in an atmosphere of frank cordiality."

February 13, 1960: Cuba and Soviet Union sign trade and economic aid agreements. Soviet Union to buy 1 million tons of Cuban sugar in each of ensuing 5 years. Soviet Union extends \$100 million credit for purchase of equipment.

February 15, 1960: Replying to U.S. protest of January 11, Cuban Government states that no property has been confiscated under the agrarian reform law; that where agrarian reform officials have occupied properties, steps are being taken for their fair appraisal; and that if the United States considers that Cuban laws have been violated, U.S. nationals have the right to appeal through appropriate channels.

February 15, 1960: Commerce Minister Cepero Bonilla states that the United States pays a premium price for sugar in order to bolster "inefficient and expensive" domestic sugar producers who cannot compete with "efficient and cheap producers such as Cuba."

February 20, 1960: Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with East Germany.

February 22, 1960: Cuban Government announces that it has decided to name a commission to begin negotiations in Washington, under the condition that the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government will adopt no measure considered prejudicial to the Cuban economy and people while the negotiations are in progress.

February 24, 1960: Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro blames the United States for exploitation of Cuba since the beginning of the century.

February 29, 1960: United States tells Cuban Government that it wishes to seek a solution of outstanding problems through negotiations, but cannot accept the condition proposed by the Cuban Government that no measure of a unilateral character be adopted by the legislative or executive branch of the U.S. Government, and wishes to explore the subjects to be discussed before initiating negotiations.

March 2, 1960: National Bank President Ernesto Guevara states that the 3 million tons of sugar which Cuba sells annually to the United States "at supposedly preferential prices" have meant and mean slavery for the people of Cuba.

March 4, 1960: French munitions ship *La Coubre* explodes in Havana Harbor. On March 5 Prime Minister Castro identifies the United States as the responsible agent of the explosion.

March 7, 1960: The United States categorically and emphatically denies the charge by Prime Minister Castro implying involvement of the U.S. Government in the *La Coubre* disaster.

March 9, 1960: Secretary of State Herter states at press conference that "we have been hopeful throughout that the atmosphere of our relationship with Cuba would allow us to settle through diplomatic means such differences as we may have with Cuba."

March 15, 1960: United States expresses shock and dismay at Prime Minister Castro attributing responsibility for *La Coubre* disaster to United States; rejects Castro's suggestion that the United States wants to keep Cuba defenseless in order to oppress Cuba; states that it is prepared to discuss various other matters, on which Castro has been critical of the United States through normal channels of communication; and continues to hope that the United States and Cuba can settle their differences through diplomatic means.

March 20, 1960: National Bank President Guevara states, "Our war \* \* \* is against the great power of the north."

March 20, 1960: Plane from the United States leaves Fort Lauderdale, and is damaged by Cuban gunfire as it lands on a highway in Cuba the next day. U.S. grand jury later indicts William J. Shergalis, a U.S. citizen, and Hector Garcia Soto, both of whom arranged for the flight, for acting as agents of the Cuban Government without filing the registration statement required by law.

March 31, 1960: Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with Poland.

April 11, 1960: United States asks Cuban Government if the March 2 views of National Bank President Guevara on sugar represent the official Cuban position. No reply ever received from Cuban Government.

April 19, 1960: Prime Minister Castro states that the U.S. Government takes advantage of every opportunity to create confusion with respect to United States-Cuban relations. He states that the U.S. Government seems to have adopted the policy used in the past to encourage fascism.

April 19, 1960: The first shipment of Soviet crude oil arrives in Cuba on the Soviet tanker *Vishinsky*.



May 6, 1960: Cuban Coast Guard patrol vessel fires without warning upon U.S. submarine *Sea Poacher* on the high seas 11 miles from the Cuban coast.

May 16, 1960: Cuba and Czechoslovakia establish diplomatic relations.

May 13, 1960: Prime Minister Castro, referring to *Sea Poacher* incident of May 6, states that the Cuban Coast Guard cutter *Oriente* sighted a U.S. submarine 5 miles off the Cuban coast. In the same speech Castro states that 3 miles is the limit of Cuban territorial waters.

May 14, 1960: United States expresses astonishment and protest to Cuban Government over *Sea Poacher* incident and requests explanation. On June 11 Prime Minister Castro says that no explanation will be given.

May 16, 1960: Cuba and Czechoslovakia establish diplomatic relations.

May 17, 1960: National Bank of Cuba informs U.S. oil companies in Cuba that each of them will be required to purchase 300,000 tons of Russian petroleum during the balance of 1960.

May 17, 1960: Minister-Counselor Braddock reminds Cuban Under Secretary of State Fernandez Font that Minister of State Roa told Ambassador Bonsal that Roa would be soon getting in touch with Bonsal to resume discussions on the possibility of negotiations on pending problems.

June 4, 1960: United States reviews the record of the Cuban Government's campaign of slander against the United States, and the efforts of the United States to maintain its traditionally friendly relations with the people of Cuba. The record includes Cuban confiscation and expropriation of U.S. property, failure of the Cuban Government to compensate U.S. property owners, payments due to American exporters, Cuban attacks on U.S. sugar premium, air incursions, and the *La Coubre* and *Sea Poacher* incidents.

June 7, 1960: United States objects to "fallacious" and "offensive" Cuban Government pamphlet containing thinly veiled charges implying U.S. Government involvement in *La Coubre* disaster.

June 8, 1960: Antonio Nuñez Jimenez, Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute, says in Moscow that of all the Latin American countries, Cuba is "the Soviet Union's greatest and most loyal friend."

June 9, 1960: Prime Minister Castro, referring to the United States, says that powerful interests which wanted to destroy the revolution provoked the *La Coubre* incident. He calls this type of disaster "criminally conceived and executed."

June 10, 1960: Cuban Government seizes four U.S.-owned hotels in Havana.

June 10, 1960: Cuba signs a 5-year trade and payment agreements with Czechoslovakia.

June 10, 1960: Prime Minister Castro states that U.S. officials participated in a plot to mount an invasion attempt in Cuba against Nicaragua under the leadership of a Nicaraguan exile, for the purpose of embarrassing the Cuban Government. U.S. [asserts] allegations are false.

June 10, 1960: Cuban Minister of State Roa says in Montevideo that Cuba decided "to break the structure of its commercial relations with the United States."

June 15, 1960: Cuba and Poland establish diplomatic relations.

June 18, 1960: Joint Cuban-Soviet communique in Moscow notes the fruitful development of trade, economic, and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba.

June 18, 1960: Agrarian Reform Director Nuñez Jimenez states "The Communist Party of Cuba is \* \* \* the party whose members are receiving the benefits of the revolution."

June 27, 1960: United States explains the unusual precautions it has taken against illegal air incursions from U.S. territory affecting Cuba. States that the Cuban Government has shown no recognition of these efforts, has continued to picture the United States as permitting and encouraging these incursions, and has never provided the United States with data which would aid in investigating the incursions.

June 27, 1960: United States submits memorandum to the Inter-American Peace Committee on provocative actions of the Cuban Government. Memorandum mentions *La Coubre* incident, *Sea Poacher* incident, air incursions, and false Cuban allegations of U.S. complicity in plot to invade Nicaragua.

June 29, 1960: Cuban Government seizes Texaco and Esso refineries, on grounds that they had violated Cuban law in refusing to refine Soviet crude oil. As of this date, the oil companies had voluntarily financed over \$50 million worth of crude oil imports for which the Cuban Government had refused to release dollars.

July 3, 1960: Agrarian Reform Director Nuñez Jimenez states in East Berlin that Cuba desires relations not only with the Soviet Union but with all Socialist countries.

July 3, 1960: U.S. Congress gives President authority to reduced import quota on Cuban sugar.

July 3, 1960: Jose Miró Cardona, Ambassador-designate to the United States, resigns, stating that the "ideological differences between the plans of the Government \* \* \* and my conscience were impossible to resolve." He takes asylum in the Argentine Embassy.

July 5, 1960: United States protests seizure of U.S.-owned oil refineries as arbitrary, inequitable, and contrary to Cuban law, and expresses the hope that the Cuban Government will rescind these actions.

July 6, 1960: Cuban Government passes nationalization law, authorizing nationalization of U.S.-owned property through expropriation. Authorizes payments to be made from fund to be derived from receipts from annual purchases of Cuban sugar over 3 million tons, at price of at least 5.75 cents a pound. Payment to be in 30-year bonds at 2-percent interest.

July 6, 1960: President Eisenhower, "with the most genuine regret," orders a cut of 700,000 tons in Cuba's 1960 sugar quota, on grounds that Cuban commitments to pay for Soviet goods with Cuban sugar have raised serious doubts as to whether the United States can depend on Cuba as a source of sugar.

July 7, 1960: Prime Minister Castro says that the United States acted in a "frenzy of impotence and hatred \* \* \* in a fit of rage" in cutting the sugar quota, but defies the United States and says that his revolution will triumph.

July 9, 1960: Soviet Premier Khrushchev states that the U.S.S.R. is "raising its voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba \* \* \*. Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire."

July 9, 1960: President Eisenhower says that Khrushchev's statement underscores the close ties that have developed between the Soviet and Cuban Governments.

July 10, 1960: Prime Minister Castro devotes an entire speech to expressing satisfaction at the support offered Cuba by the Soviet Union and to attacking what he describes as the aggressive policies of the United States.

July 10, 1960: National Bank President Guevara states that Cuba is defended by the Soviet Union, "the greatest military power in history."

July 10, 1960: President Dorticos hails "the message of solidarity spoken by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and coming to us in our most difficult hour."

July 16, 1960: U.S. protests nationalization law of July 6 as discriminatory, arbitrary, and confiscatory.

July 21, 1960: Cuban press reports Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro stating in Moscow that Cuba "is grateful for political and moral support from the Soviet Union."

July 23, 1960: Cuba signs a 5-year trade and payment agreement with Communist China, calling for Chinese Communist purchase of 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar in each of the next 5 years.

July 30, 1960: National Bank President Guevara states that the U.S.S.R., Communist China and other Socialist countries are Cuba's friends.

August 1, 1960: United States submits document to the Inter-American Peace Committee entitled "Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere." Document deals principally with the relations between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the emergence of a dictatorial pattern of political control in Cuba. Document states that the Cuban Government has taken discriminatory actions against the property of U.S. citizens in Cuba valued at over \$850 million, and that no effort has been made by the Cuban Government to assure them anything approaching adequate compensation.

August 6, 1960: Under authority of the nationalization law, Cuba nationalizes through forced expropriation the properties of 26 companies wholly or partially owned by U.S. citizens. The United States protests this action on August 8.

August 6, 1960: Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro says Cuba is grateful for Soviet support, and that U.S. aid always has strings attached, while aid from the Soviet Union is disinterested.

August 7, 1960: Prime Minister Castro justifies the confiscation of the investments of U.S. citizens in Cuba by accusing the United States of "economic aggression" in reducing Cuba's sugar quota.

August 10, 1960: United States issues 23-page document containing evidence of the aggressive intent of the Cuban Government in its discriminatory trade and financial policies, and its confiscation of the property of U.S. citizens. Estimates the value of confiscated U.S. property at about \$1 billion. States that the backlog of payments due to U.S. exporters because of the failure of Cuban authorities to make the necessary foreign exchange available is over \$100 million. States that about one-half of U.S. investments had been seized before any change was made in the Cuban sugar quota.

Document states that property seized under nationalization law of July 6 covers only the most recent cases of the arbitrary taking of such property without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. In prior cases, starting in June 1959, the Cuban Government has shown little or no consideration for the rights guaranteed property owners under the laws of Cuba. It has seized and occupied lands and buildings of U.S. citizens, confiscated and removed equipment, confiscated and removed cattle from the pastures of owners, seized timberland resources, plowed under productive pastures without the consent of owners, and arbitrarily moved fences and boundaries. In many cases no inventory was taken at the time of seizure nor receipt provided, nor indication given that any payment would be made. The value of American owned property affected by such acts is estimated at \$350 million.

August 13, 1960: Commerce Minister Cepero Bonilla declares that for the coming year "it would be much more advantageous to Cuba if the United States did not buy a single grain of sugar."

August 16, 1960: Cuban press reports on message from Prime Minister Castro to Premier Khrushchev, expressing thanks "for the support of the Soviet people, which is irrefutable proof that the peoples fighting for their independence are not alone in their struggle."

August 24, 1960: Prime Minister Castro charges the United States with supporting counterrevolutionaries and states that Cuba will be friends with the Soviets and the Chinese People's Republic.

August 29, 1960: The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting at San Jose, Costa Rica, approve Declaration of San Jose, stating that the acceptance by an American state of extracontinental intervention endangers American solidarity and security. They also create an ad hoc good offices committee to help settle controversies between governments in the Americas.

August 29, 1960: Prime Minister Castro repeats charges of United States aggression against Cuba and says he will not renounce Soviet support.

September 2: In reply to the Declaration of San Jose, Prime Minister Castro presents "Declaration of Habana," which bitterly attacks the United States and the OAS, denounces United States intervention in Latin America, accepts offer of assistance from the Soviet Union, and denies that the Soviet Union or Communist China have interventionist intentions in the Western Hemisphere. States Cuba will establish relations with the Chinese People's Republic.

September 12, 1960: United States offers to present its charges for examination by the good offices committee created August 29, and express the hope that the Cuban Government will cooperate.

September 15, 1960: Cuba and Hungary sign trade and payments agreements.

September 17, 1960: Under authority of the nationalization law, Cuba nationalizes 3 U.S.-owned banks through forced expropriation. United States protests on September 29.

September 18, 1960: National Bank President Guevara accuses the United States of aggression and genocide. Says that Cuba has received arms from Czechoslovakia and is expecting many more from any power that will sell them.

September 23, 1960: Cuba and North Korea establish diplomatic relations.

September 26, 1960: Prime Minister Castro makes series of untrue and distorted allegations against the United States at the U.N. General Assembly.

September 30, 1960: Communist Prime Minister Chou En-lai states that "in the event of necessity the Chinese Government and people will give all possible support and aid to the Cuban people."

October 7, 1960: Cuba and Bulgaria sign trade and payments agreements.

October 12, 1960: United States submits document to the U.N. Secretary General entitled "Facts Concerning Relations Between Cuba and the United States," replying to Prime Minister Castro's allegations of September 26.

October 13, 1960: Unidentified men raid the Cuban consulate general in Miami. Cuban Government states that the attack was permitted with the "suspicious indifference" and the "manifest collusion of the American authorities" and that the identities of those responsible are known to the authorities.

October 19, 1960: United States prohibits exports to Cuba except for non-subsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies, to defend the legitimate economic interests of the people of the United States against the discriminatory, aggressive, and injurious economic policies of the Castro regime.

October 24, 1960: Under authority of the nationalization law, Cuba nationalizes through forced expropriation 166 properties wholly or partially owned by U.S. citizens. United States protests on November 19.

October 26, 1960: Cuba and Rumania establish diplomatic relations and sign trade and technical assistance agreements.

October 27, 1960: United States rejects "emphatically and categorically" the Cuban protest of October 13. States that the United States does not condone the violation of its laws by anyone, that it makes every effort to prevent such violations, that an investigation into the incident is continuing and that the United States has told the Miami police of the need for special police protection for the consulate general.

October 28, 1960: United States reiterates September 12 offer to cooperate with good offices committee and expresses hope that committee will carry out its mission promptly.

November 14, 1960: Cuban Government rejects the United States statements of October 27 as "mendacious and detrimental" and refers to an "alliance" between the executioners of the Cuban people and the United States Government.

November 18, 1960: United States states that at least 12 Soviet ships have delivered arms and ammunition to Cuba since July 1960 and that Soviet bloc arms provided to Cuba amount to at least 28,000 tons.

December 2, 1960: Cuba and North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations.

December 9, 1960: Cuba and Outer Mongolia establish diplomatic relations.

December 11, 1960: National Bank President Guevara expresses wholehearted support for the December 6 statement of the Congress of 81 Communist Parties which met in Moscow, and states that Cuba "should follow the example of peaceful development set by the Soviet Union."

December 15, 1960: Cuba and Albania establish diplomatic relations.

December 16, 1960: President Eisenhower fixes the Cuban sugar quota at zero for the first quarter of 1961.

December 17, 1960: Cuba and Hungary establish diplomatic relations.

December 19, 1960: Cuba and the Soviet Union sign joint communique through which Cuba openly aligns itself with the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and indicates its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

January 2, 1961: Cuba holds military parade. Many Soviet and bloc arms displayed, including tanks, assault guns, and field guns. Prime Minister Castro says this represents only a "small part" of the arms which Cuba has received from the bloc.

January 2, 1961: Prime Minister Castro demands that the U.S. Embassy in Havana be reduced to 11 officials within 48 hours.

January 3, 1961: United States terminates diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba in view of Castro's demand of January 2, which placed crippling limitations on the ability of the United States to carry out normal diplomatic and consular functions. Cuba turns over its diplomatic and consular affairs to the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington.

February 23, 1961: Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declares that the Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machineguns.

March 31, 1961: President Kennedy fixes the Cuban sugar quota at zero for 1961.

April 3, 1961: The United States issues "Cuba" pamphlet, expressing determination to support future democratic governments in Cuba to help the Cuban people achieve freedom, democracy, and social justice, and calling on the Castro regime to sever its links with the international Communist movement.

April 3, 1961: Department states in "Cuba" pamphlet that since mid-1960 more than 30,000 tons of arms, with an estimated value of \$50 million, have arrived in Cuba from beyond the Iron Curtain; that the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the Soviet bloc for the maintenance of their armed power: that Soviet and Czech military advisers and technicians have accompanied the flow of arms; that Cubans have gone to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union for training as jet pilots, ground maintenance crews, and artillerymen; and that Cuba has, except for the United States, the largest ground forces in the hemisphere, at least 10 times as large as those maintained by previous Cuban Governments, including that of Batista.

April 16, 1961: Prime Minister Castro describes his regime as Socialist.  
April 17-19, 1961: Cuban patriots fail in attempt to redeem the independence of their homeland.  
April 20, 1961: President Kennedy states that any unilateral American intervention would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations, but that we do not intend to abandon Cuba.  
April 21, 1961: Cuba votes with the Soviet bloc on almost every major international issue during the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, which ran from September 20 to December 20, 1960, and March 7 to April 21, 1961.  
April 30, 1961: Minister of Industries Ernesto Guevara declares that the Castro movement was "the first Socialist revolution in Latin America."  
May 1, 1961: Prime Minister Castro speaks of "our Socialist revolution" and says that a new "socialist constitution" will be prepared for Cuba.  
July 26, 1961: Prime Minister Castro announces formation of Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) as the precursor of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution to be the only party in Cuba.  
September 20, 1961: Soviet-Cuban communique proclaims "identity of positions of the Soviet Union and Cuba on all the international questions that were discussed."  
October 2, 1961: Chinese-Cuban communique proclaims complete agreement between the Cuban and Chinese Communist regimes on "the current international situation and the question of further developing friendship and cooperation."  
December 2, 1961: Prime Minister Castro states: "I believe absolutely in Marxism \* \* \* I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life." He admits that he hid his true political ideology during his revolutionary struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have strength, had been known as people of very radical ideas, unquestionably all the social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so from that time on."  
December 6, 1961: United States submits document to the Inter-American Peace Committee entitled "The Castro Regime in Cuba" containing information on Cuba's ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and her threat to independent governments in the Western Hemisphere.  
December 20, 1961: Cuba votes with Soviet bloc on 33 out of 37 major issues in 16th session of U.N. General Assembly.  
January 14, 1962: The Inter-American Peace Committee reports that Cuba's connections with the Sino-Soviet bloc are incompatible with inter-American treaties, principles, and standards.  
January 31, 1962: The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting at Punta del Este, declare that as a consequence of its public alinement with the international Communist movement, the present Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba is excluded from participation in the inter-American system.  
March 27, 1962: United States states that Sino-Soviet bloc has furnished about \$100 million worth of military equipment and technical services to Cuba and that several hundred Cuban military personnel have received training, including pilot training, in the bloc. Arms include 5 to 75 Mig jet fighters; 150 to 250 tanks; 50 to 100 assault guns; 500 to 1,000 field artillery; 500 to 1,000 antiaircraft artillery; 500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and torpedo boats. No evidence of missiles, missile bases, or bombers.

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A	Page
Achilles, Theodore	876
Agramonte, Roberto	897
Albania	905
Alliance for Progress (Alianza Para El Progreso)	889, 891-894
American Glass Tinting Corp.	831
Arbenz, Jacobo	846, 853, 857
Arbenz government	866
Arevalo	853
Association of Military Attachés	837
B	
Bangkok	865
Barquin, Colonel	858
Batista	834-836, 840, 852, 853, 857-859, 879, 897, 905
Bayo, Gen. Alberto	849
Berges, William	836
Berle, Adolph	876, 883
Berlin	891, 903
Betancourt	867-869, 884, 886
Bissell, Richard	868
Bogata	834, 837, 870, 893
Bolivia	857
Bonsal, Ambassador Philip W.	871, 897-900, 902
Boti, Regino	897, 900
Bowles, Chester	876, 878
Braddock, Daniel M.	900, 902
British Guiana	857
Bulgaria	904
Bundy	876
Burns, Findley	878
Byrd, Admiral	862
C	
Cabot, Ambassador John	871
Camaguey Province	898, 899
Cantillo, General	858
Cardenas, Lazaro	841
Castro, Fidel	832, 834-837, 840, 841, 843, 844, 846-849, 852-855, 858-860, 867, 869-874, 879, 880, 890, 892-894, 896-898, 900-906
Castro, Raul	837, 856, 896, 901, 903, 905
Castro Regime in Cuba, The (document)	906
CAT Airline	864, 865
Central Bank of Cuba	888
Central Intelligence Agency	848, 866, 868, 873-875, 877, 879
Cepero Bonilla	901, 904
Chaumont (see also Perez-Chaumont, Andre)	839, 840, 841
Chennault, General	863
Chiang Kai-shek	864, 882
Chile, Santiago	844
China	863, 864, 867, 879, 883, 886, 891, 900, 903
China Defense Supplies (Delaware corporation)	862

	Page
Chinese-Cuban communique	906
Chinese People's Republic	904
Chou En-lai	904
Civil Aeronautics Board	861, 862
Committee on Western Jurisdiction	864
Communist/s, American	835
Communist Party, Cuban	855
Colombia	837, 857
Costa Rica	861, 866, 867, 870, 884, 888
"Crisis in United States Interests in the Caribbean, The"	881-887
Cuba	831-906
Chronology of events in	896-906
Cuba Denounces Before the World (brochure)	899
Cuban Embassy	831
Cuban Telephone Co.	897
Czechoslovakia	902, 905

D

De la Torre, Dr. Oscar	855
Diaz Lanz, Maj. Pedro Luis	898, 899
Diaz Tamayo, General	858
Dies Committee	866
Dihigo, Ernesto	897, 898, 899
Djilas, Milovan	891
Dillon, C. Douglas	898
Dodd, Martha	835
Doerflinger, Col. Oscar Maynard	833, 839
Dominican Republic	870, 892
Dorticos, President Osvaldo	892, 899, 900, 903
Dulles, Allen	865, 866, 868, 876

E

Ecuador Embassy	859
Eisenhower, Milton	844, 845, 846, 847
Eisenhower, President	874, 883, 897, 900, 903, 905
El Salvador	871, 874, 888
El Salvador Conference	871
Espin, Vilma	837
Esso refinery	902

F

Facts Concerning Relations Between Cuba and the United States (document)	904
Federal Power Commission	861, 862
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt	836
Figueres, President	867, 869, 871-873, 884, 886
Flying Tigers	863
Font, Fernandez	902
Foreign Economics Administration	863
Formosa	864
Fort Lauderdale	901

G

Gaitan, Dr. George Eliecer	837
Garcia Soto, Hector	901
Garcia-Tunon, Gen. Jorge	851
Testimony of	857-859
Germany, East	901
Glawe, Col. Benoid E.	844-847
Gonzales Carvajal, Ladislao	860
Gray, Gordon	876
Guantanamo Bay	896
Guatemala	853, 865-867, 882
Guevara, "Che"	837, 842, 849, 867, 888, 891, 897, 901, 903-906
Guevara, Mrs.	833

H

Hardin, Mr.	857
Hart, Armando	898
Havana	869, 892, 899, 900, 901
Declaration of	904
Hays, Brooks	880
Letter to Senator Eastland	880, 881
Henderson, Loy	871, 872, 883
Herter, Secretary Christian	868, 872-874, 881, 897, 901
Hill, Ambassador Robert	832, 833, 840, 843-846, 866, 871, 872, 880, 881
Hill, Mrs.	844
Honduras	861, 862, 865, 866
Hong Kong	864, 865
Hoy (newspaper)	897
Hull, Cordell	883
Hungary	904, 905

I

Illsley, Walter	836
India	863
Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI)	906
Inter-American Defense Board	894
Inter-American Peace Committee	893, 902, 903, 906
Jones, Roger W.	878
Junta de Liberacion	857, 858
Justice Department	866

K

Kennedy, President John F.	876, 905, 906
Khrushchev	891, 894, 903, 904
Kimmel, Roy I.	872
King, Col. J. C.	868
Korea	865
Korea, North	904
Korean war	864

L

La Cabana fortress	897
La Coubre (French munitions ship)	901, 902
Lebanon	882
Leddy, Raymond	840, 842
Testimony of	843-849
Lemnitzer, General	876
Lippmann, Walter	883
Lopez Fresquet, Rufo	897

M

MacArthur, General	863
Mandel, Ben	866
Mann, Tom	875, 876
Mao Tse-tung	883, 891
Marshall mission	864, 879
Mateos, President Lopez	844
Matos, Maj. Hubert	899
Matthews, Herbert	883
Mazatlan	846, 849
Merchant, Mr.	883
Mexico	831-833, 837, 839-841, 843, 846, 847, 859, 875
Miami	904, 905
Mikoyan, Anastas I.	900
Miro Cardona, Jose	897, 903
Moncada	834, 837
Montenegro, Arturo Guillermo	832
Montevideo	902
Morse, Senator Wayne	896
Moscow (U.S.S.R.)	886, 902, 905
Munoz Marin	867, 884, 886
Murphy, Robert	868, 883, 888

INDEX

N

National Bank of Cuba	902
New York Times	883
Nicaragua	866, 871, 902
Nunez Jimenez, Antonio	902, 903

O

Observations Regarding Fidel Castro's Letter to the Junta for the Liberation of Cuba (document, January 1958)	852-854
Organization of American States (OAS)	870, 871, 876, 882, 892, 893, 894, 904
Oriente (Cuban Coast Guard cutter)	902
Oriente Province	834, 896, 898
Outer Mongolia	905

P

Panama	868
Pazos, Felipe	897
Perez-Chaumont, Andres (see also Chaumont, Colonel)	840, 841
Testimony of	831-837
Perez Cisneros, Enrique	890
Philippines	863
Piad, Mr.	857
Poland	901, 902
Prio Socarras, Carlos	852, 854, 859
Puerifoy, Jack	866
Punta del Este	890, 906
Charter of	889

Q

Quemoy	882
--------	-----

R

Ravelo, Ricardo Artigas	851
Testimony of	859-860
Rendy, Robert	876
Roa, Raul	892, 898, 900, 902
Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael	860
Romero, Mario S. (interpreter)	851-860
Roosevelt, Franklin	890
Rubottom, Roy R.	868, 869, 871, 872, 874, 880, 881, 897-899
Rumania	905
Rusk, Secretary Dean	876
Text of address re Cuba	889-895

S

San Jose	878, 892, 904
Declaration of	904
San Salvador	881
Santo Domingo	857
Santamaria, Haydee	837
Santiago	
Declaration of	893
Scott, Joseph	888
Scott, Winston	840, 842
Sea Poacher (U.S. submarine)	902
SEATO Conference	877
Shanghai	864
Shergalis, Wm. J.	901
Sierra Maestra	837
Sino-Soviet bloc	893, 894, 906
Smith, Gen. Bedell	865
Smith, Ambassador Earl E. T.	896
Snow, Edgar	883
Snow, Secretary William P.	898
Somoza	882
Sosa, General	858
Spaulding, Keith	844, 845
Stern, Alfred K.	835
Stern, Martha Dodd	835
Stewart, Allan	857, 868, 872

INDEX

V

T

Tabernilla, Gen. Francisco J.	834, 835
Taylor, General	878, 879
Texaco refinery	902
Texas Oil Co.	896
Trujillo	856, 882
26th of July movement	852, 853, 858

U

United Nations	889, 892, 894, 906
UNRRA	864
Urrutia, President	897, 898
Uruguay	889

V

Vietnam	864, 865
North	905
Vishinsky (Soviet tanker)	901

W

Welles, Sumner	883
Whelan, Ambassador Tom	866, 871
Wieland, William Arthur	832, 842, 844, 845, 847, 849, 852, 855-860, 879, 880
Willauer, Whiting, testimony of	861-881

O