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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

-v.-

JUAN MANUEL CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA,
et al.,
Defendants.

Cr. No. 78-367

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A
CHANGE OF VENUE

A defendant in a criminal proceeding is constitutionally entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury which has not been exposed to improper, inadmissible or inflammatory materials. United States Constitution, Amendment 6; see also Rule 21, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In the present proceeding, the focal point of the charges - the bombing death of a diplomat and a young woman on Washington's "Embassy Row" - is uniquely susceptible to local prejudice. The local press has exploited that fact, and has disseminated improper and prejudicial information about this case to the point where the defendants can no longer receive the fair trial to which they are entitled if the case is tried in this district. Consequently, the defendants request that their case be transferred to another, less inflamed jurisdiction.

THE PREJUDICE

The full implications of the prejudices attending this proceeding can only be determined from the Court's own knowledge of the extensive coverage which has accompanied every stage of the investigation since the death of Letelier several years ago. The

articles accompanying this application* are typical of the reporting which has taken place in the newspapers, on the television and in the periodicals. The excerpts cited below demonstrate the various forms of prejudice emanating from this coverage.

A. The sensationalism of the media coverage.

The media has reported in a particularly lurid fashion on the events underlying the charges in this case. For example, the Washington Post did not hesitate to take over the jury's function, insuring its readers that whoever planted the explosive which killed Letelier had the requisite intent to commit homicide:

the bomb had been strapped with precision above the I-beam of the Chevelle's frame so the driver would be hit with the full force of the blast. The high power of the expertly constructed explosive was clearly intended to kill.**

As for the explosion itself, various writers seemed to be in competition as to who could write the most nauseating portrayal. Thus, Paul Anderson described the victims as "blown to oblivion."*** The Washington Post went further, describing the bomb as

an explosive whose blast left its intended victim so mangled that hardened investigators became sick at the scene of the crime.****

In another article, Post writers began:

One of the first police officers to arrive at the scene of the explosion watched the debris still floating through the damp air to the ground like ash from a campfire . . .

and described how Ronni Moffit "died quickly of a severed artery."***** Similarly, the New York Times Sunday Magazine, widely read by District of Columbia residents, devoted a full story to the death, describing the victims thus:

* For purposes of clarity, the newspaper articles attached to the motion for a change of venue have been reorganized and attached hereto as an appendix to this memorandum. References are to the numbered pages of the appendix.

** Washington Post article: The Letelier Case: Murder and Diplomacy; set forth in the appendix to this memorandum at 018.

*** Jack Anderson, "Slain Chilean tied to Havana," appendix at 008.

**** Washington Post, "The Witness," appendix at 039.

***** Washington Post, "The Letelier Case: Murder and Diplomacy" appendix at 018.

Letelier's legs lay in the street nearby, his torso pinned in the wreckage. He died shortly after reaching the hospital. Ronni Moffitt, while not mutilated like Letelier, died a few minutes later, drowned in her own blood.*

B. Assuming the guilt of the defendants.

Upon learning that the defendants were suspects in this case, the media reporters immediately assumed their guilt. Frequently, these reporters sought to bolster this assumption by drawing strained analogies between the facts in this case and sensationalized accounts of the defendants' backgrounds. The Washington Post's article, "The Cubans - Men of Long-Held Political Passions" is demonstrative of this approach:

They are ~~veterans~~ of a long, lost war, the five Cubans indicted yesterday in connection with the slaying of a former Chilean ambassador. Though some of them led outwardly calm, industrious lives, they were also familiar with the ~~darkest~~ sides of life in the Cuban communities of New Jersey and Miami.

Among the most radical, right-wing elements of those communities, conspiracy often blends with intense political hatreds, the intense desire to return to a Cuba purged of Castro's revolution, and passions burn like fuses.

It is also a world of secrecy from which there erupts occasional, sometimes spectacular, outbursts of violence.

Some of the first names to come to light in the investigation of Orlando Letelier's murder were those of the Novos - Ignacio Novo Sampol an unemployed shoe and auto salesman, and his younger brother Guillermo Novo Sampol. They were implicated by another Cuban exile leader who was being held in Venezuela at the time in connection with the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner in which 73 persons died.

The Novos were leaders of the militant Cuban Nationalist Movement based in Union City, N.J., and their names had long been familiar to the federal agents who keep an eye on the exiles' ~~counter-revolutionary~~ underworld.

It was the Novo brothers who were charged in 1964 with firing a bazooka at the United Nations building while Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara was speaking there, though the charges later were dropped.

Ten years later, Guillermo Novo was convicted of plotting to blow up a Cuban ship anchored in Montreal.

By April of last year, another member of the Cuban Nationalist Movement was drawn into

* New York Times Sunday Magazine, "The Letelier Investigation," appendix at 025 et seq.

the investigation. But, even though he was offered immunity for his testimony, 38-year-old salesman Jose Dionisio Suarez, Esquivel, of Elizabeth, N.J., refused to talk, and spent 11 months in jail.

Both the Novos and Suarez testified under oath that they knew nothing of Letelier's murder.

According to yesterday's indictment, however, Guillermo Novo, Suarez, and their compatriots, Virgilio Paz Romero and Alvin Ross Diaz met with DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley on Sept. 13, 1976, to plot the murder of Orlando Letelier.

By Sept. 18 the same four members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement had helped Townley construct a bomb, according to the indictment.

On Sept. 21, Letelier died when a bomb blast destroyed his car.*

Similarly, the New York Times Magazine article on the assassination included an inset, entitled "Legacy of Terror" which was headed with a photograph of defendant Ignacio Novo and others over the caption "Old boys in the Latin American terrorist network." The inset itself contained much of the same information set forth in the Washington Post article just described. The clear thrust of the article - that the defendants were in fact guilty of the killing of Letelier - is exemplified by the last two paragraphs:

At Ignacio Novo's first congress of the Bay of Pigs Veterans' Association - attended by a complement of United States Congressmen and candidates - delegates voted to endorse the brigade's membership in CORU, Orlando Bosch's new terrorist consortium.

Letelier was killed less than a month later.**

As in the above-quoted articles, much of the news coverage claims an ongoing relationship between Cuban exiles and Chilean Secret Police, and then deduces from that premise that the Cubans charged in this proceeding must have been involved in the killing of Letelier, a former Chilean ambassador who was critical of the present regime in that country. See e.g., The Washington

* Appendix at 038.

** Appendix at 028.

Post, "Eight Indicted in Letelier Slaying;"* New York Times Sunday Magazine, "The Letelier Investigation."**

Reporters also sought to add the appearance of authority to their belief by citing to the opinions of "experts." Thus, for example, Paul Anderson reported that "Investigators are now convinced that DINA [the Chilean secret police] hired Cuban killers to murder Letelier."*** In a subsequent article, Anderson further asserted that "Investigators tell us . . . two [DINA] brigade leaders contacted among other a Cuban demolition expert, Guillermo Novo, in New Jersey."**** Similarly, the New York Times magazine article reported that "some experts" believe that Cuban exiles were responsible for "terrorist acts like the murder of Orlando Letelier. . . ."*****

C. Inadmissible evidence.

Most of the articles on this case contain information which would clearly be inadmissible at the trial below. Thus, for example, the Washington Post reported in one article that

The investigation [into the Letelier killing] quickly focused on the Cuban exile connection after ~~Venezuelan authorities~~ informed the United States that Cuban exile leader Orlando Bosch - who was being held in that country for the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner in which 73 person died - ~~had~~ implicated "the Novo brothers" in the Letelier case.*****

Unless Mr. Bosch is called as a witness at trial, this information constitutes inadmissible, and highly prejudicial, double hearsay.

Similarly, the articles have dwelt at length on allegations of prior criminal activity by the defendants, regardless of whether those allegations ever led to conviction, or even to formal charges. Thus, the Washington Post has reported:

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- * Appendix at 036.
 - ** Appendix at 025.
 - *** Paul Anderson, "Foreign spies get CIA cooperation," appendix at 013.
 - **** Paul Anderson, "On the Trail of a Murderer," appendix at 014.
 - ***** Appendix at 025.
 - ***** Washington Post, "The Letelier Case: Murder and Diplomacy," appendix at 018.

* Actually was newspaper *El Nacional*

In 1964, /The Novo brothers/ fired a bazooka from across the East River toward the United Nations while Che Guevara was speaking there. They were arrested, but charges against them were dropped because they had not been properly informed of their rights.

Ignacio Novo also had been charged in the early 1970s in New Jersey with an explosives-related case, according to court records. And Guillermo Novo was on probation for a 1974 conviction in New Jersey in connection with a plot to blow up a Cuban ship and other property in Montreal.

The Cuban exile movement headed by the Novos, who had been living in this country for nearly two decades, was ~~considered extreme even by some other militant anti-Castro Cubans~~. They eventually were "adopted" in a sense by the rightists in the Pinochet government in Chile, ~~according to some sources~~, at a time when anti-Castro forces here felt betrayed by the U.S. government's effort at rapprochement with the Fidel Castro government.

The government's Cuban exile informants were reluctant to appear before grand juries as witnesses. Police officers and FBI agents who had used them for years were reluctant to disclose even to other central investigators the names of person providing them with information in the Letelier case.

At the same time, in early 1977, U.S. investigators began checking the foreign travels of some of the persons whom they believed, based on information from the Cuban exile informants, to be centrally involved in the murder conspiracy. They also were planning ways to put pressure on some of those persons so they might be forced to cooperate.

In early March 1977, while most law enforcement people here were occupied with 12 Hanafi Muslims barricaded in three Washington buildings, Propper, Cornic, and Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr. were in Venezuela meeting with that country's secret police.

There they learned that Guillermo Novo had traveled to Chile and Venezuela in late 1974, in apparent violation of his probation in the United States. ~~They determined to use that information to try to put pressure on Guillermo Novo.~~

Then, in April 1977, they decided to grant immunity from prosecution to two Cuban exiles, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel and Alvin Ross Diaz, if they would cooperate with investigators. Suarez refused to testify to the grand jury, and was sentenced to jail for an 11-month contempt of court sentence with the vow that he would never talk. At a press conference at the time, Ignacio Novo and Ross accused the government of harassing Cuban exiles.

In June 1977, prosecutors made their attempt to have Guillermo Novo's probation revoked. However, Novo failed to show up for that Trenton, N.J., hearing and became a fugitive for the next 11 months.

Then prosecutors learned in the late fall of 1977 that two persons whom they believed could have been DINA agents had come into the United States on official Chilean passports and met with Cuban exiles shortly before Letelier's murder.*

These charges have been repeated so frequently that it is unlikely that any of the potential jurors in this district remain unexposed to them. See e.g., Washington Post, "Eight Indicted in Letelier Slaying"**; Washington Post, "The Cubans"***; Paul Anderson, "On the Trail of a Murderer".****

D. Washington prejudice.

Finally, it is clear that the events underlying the charges in this case are particularly distressing to residents of this district. The Washington Post has referred to the killing of Letelier as the "first diplomatic assassination here."¹ Almost every article makes reference to the fact that the bombing occurred "in the heart of Washington,"² on "tranquil,"³ "tree-lined,"⁴ "placid,"⁵ "stately"⁶ Sheridan Square the "Embassy Row"⁷ of the nation's capitol. Moreover, the actions of the executive branch in recalling its ambassador to Chile as an expression of displeasure at the lack of cooperation by Chile in this investigation,⁸ and the House of Representatives in voting at one point

* Id., appendix at 018.

** Appendix at 036.

*** Appendix at 038.

**** Appendix at 014.

1. Washington Post, "Eight Indicted in Letelier Slaying," appendix at 035.

2. Washington Star, "Paraguayan Links Chile's DINA to Letelier Slaying," appendix at 023.

3. Jack Anderson, "Slain Chilean tied to Havana," appendix at 007.

4. Id.

5. Washington Post, "Eight Indicted in Letelier Slaying," appendix at 035.

6. Washington Post, "The Letelier Case: Murder and Diplomacy," appendix at 018.

7. Washington Post, "Envoy to Chile recalled over Letelier Probe," appendix at 061.

8. Id.

to impose an arms embargo on Chile until the three Chileans named in the indictment were extradited to stand trial in this country⁹ both indicate of the importance given to this case in Washington.

The extent of coverage given to this case in the local press is both a cause and a product of the fact that Washingtonians feel particularly threatened by the Letelier killing. On the day of the indictment, the ~~Washington~~ Post alone ran four different articles on the case, including a front page headline and lead article.¹⁰ This "saturation" coverage is certain to intensify immediately prior to and during the trial itself.

THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS

It is a fundamental precept of our legal system that the jury be impartial - "free of prejudice passion, excitement, and tyrannical power." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940). Of equal importance, their verdict must be "induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).

Defendants herein submit that the nature of the charges in this case and the publicity to date create the clear likelihood that they will be deprived of these basic rights if their trial is held in this district. In this regard, it is important to note that the defendants are not obliged to prove actual bias in order to be entitled to the relief they seek. Rather, given the elusive nature of proof of bias, constitutional due process requires such relief whenever the case involves even "a probability that prejudice will result." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966).

9. Washington Post, "Halt in Arms for Chile is Passed and Reversed," appendix at 059.

10. Appendix at 035-039.

American Bar Association standards are in accord:

because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. This determination may be based on such evidence as qualified public opinion surveys or opinion testimony offered by individuals, or on the court's own evaluation of the nature, frequency, and timing of the material involved. A showing of actual prejudice shall not be required.

ABA, Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice, Sec. 3.2, p. 8.

These standards have been quoted as embodying a correct expression of applicable law. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1968).

This rule is consistent with the principle that due process is violated whenever there is "the probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Moreover, the probability standard has been specifically applied to motions for transfer under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As the Court said in United States v. Marcello, 280 F.Supp. 510, 513-14 (E.D.La., 1968):

Succinctly, then, it is the well-grounded fear that the defendant will not receive a fair and impartial trial which warrants the application of the rule. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed. 2d 630 (1965). As the Supreme Court recently stated in Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, venue should be changed 'where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial.' (emphasis added) 384 U.S. at 363, 85 S.Ct. at 1522. The many cases which we have examined indicate that this is the federal practice. (Emphasis in the original).

See also: Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); and Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961), (where, based on the facts set forth at 281 F.2d 156, the Solicitor General confessed error).

In determining whether a change of venue should be granted, this Court is obliged to consider a number of different factors:

A study of the cases dealing with the problem of pre-trial publicity indicates that four main factors should be considered in deciding if relief of some kind should be granted at this stage of the proceedings. First, it is necessary that the publicity be recent, wide-spread and highly damaging to the defendants. Second, it is an ~~important consideration whether the government was responsible~~ ~~for the publication of the objectionable material~~, or if it emanated from independent sources. This factor is especially significant in regard to the third factor, the inconvenience to the government and the administration of justice of a change of venue or continuance. The government can hardly be heard to complain of inconvenience if it was responsible for the dissemination of damaging material. In fact, governmental complicity was almost singularly dispositive in the leading case in which a trial judge's discretion was reversed, see *Delaney v. United States*, 1 Cir. 1952, 199 F.2d 107, though the publicity in that case was particularly virulent and was concentrated on the eve of trial. Last, it must be considered whether a substantially better panel can be sworn at another time or place.

United States v. Bonanno, 177 F.Supp. 106, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) cited with approval by the Supreme Court in *Irvin v. Dowd*, *supra*, 366 U.S. at 727; *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, *supra*, 384 U.S. at 354.

Application of these criteria to the present case clearly establishes the defendants' entitlement to relief.

First, it is beyond serious dispute that the defendants herein have been subjected to "recent, widespread and highly damaging publicity." As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, the ~~news coverage has largely assumed the defendants' guilt~~ of the crimes charged, and has ~~saturated the public~~ with highly ~~prejudicial information~~ which would not be admissible in a court proceeding. In this regard, the Report of the American Bar Association's Committee on Minimum Standards relating to Fair Trial and Free Press is instructive:

If public statements and reporting with respect to these matters assume the truth of what may be only a belief or a suspicion, they may destroy the reputation of one who is innocent and may seriously endanger the right to a fair trial in the event that formal charges are filed.

* * *

~~/D/uring the period prior to trial, public statements originating from officials, at-~~

torneys, or the news media that assume the guilt of the person charged, that include inaccurate or inadmissible information, or that serve to inflame the community, may undermine the judicial process by making unobtainable a jury satisfying the requisite standard of impartiality.

Id. at 16-17.

Similarly, the language of the court in setting aside a conviction for prejudicial publicity in Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) is equally applicable here:

Some of the damaging evidence would not be admissible, since it related to conduct outside the scope of the charges; since it was not subject to defense cross-examination; and since it was not minimized by evidence offered by the accused.

Id. at 113.

The second factor cited in Bonanno - whether the government is responsible for the publication of the objectionable material - must also weigh in defendants' favor. The news articles submitted in support of this application were clearly based in large part on information which could only have been supplied by the prosecutor's office. This is particularly true of those details of the investigation which would not be matters of public knowledge or available from any other source.

Moreover, the ~~government must assume responsibility~~ for the ~~sensationalism added to this case by the prosecutor's decision to indict and seek to extradite the Chilean officials~~. Although the decision to proceed in that fashion may have been a perfectly proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion, it was, nonetheless, clearly foreseeable that such actions would generate ~~widespread publicity~~. In this regard, this case is again analogous to Delaney v. United States, supra. There, congressional hearings were the cause of the undesired publicity. In such a case, the court found, the publicity must be deemed to have been "~~instigated by the United States.~~"

The Government, after ~~imposing "this burden,"~~ is ~~in a poor position to contest the defendant's application~~ for relief from its consequences:

We think that the United States is put to a choice in this matter: If the United

States, through its legislative department, acting conscientiously pursuant to its conception of the public interest, chooses to hold a public hearing inevitably resulting in such damaging publicity prejudicial to a ~~person awaiting trial~~ on a pending indictment then the United States must accept the consequence that the judicial department, charged with the duty of assuring the defendant a fair trial before an impartial jury, may find it necessary to postpone the trial until by lapse of time the danger of the prejudice may reasonably be thought to have been substantially removed.

Id., 199 F.2d at 114.

Turning to the third Bonanno factor, it is clear that the government would experience little difficulty if the proceedings in this case were transferred to another district. It appears from the information disclosed by the prosecution to date that most of their witnesses will have to be brought to this district from other parts of the country (or hemisphere) for trial. Indeed, of the ~~forty-one overt acts described in the indictment~~, at least ~~thirty took place outside the District of Columbia~~.^{*} This being the case, it would be as easy for the government to transport ~~their witnesses to another district~~ as it would be ~~to bring them here~~.

The fourth factor cited in Bonanno - whether a substantially better panel could be sworn in a different district - also militates heavily in favor of a change of venue. As previously explained, the events underlying the charges in this case are regarded as uniquely threatening to the security and prestige of this district. Particularly when ~~fed~~, as here, ~~by sensationalistic coverage~~ accompanying every step of the investigation and legal proceedings, such local prejudices clearly pose a serious threat to the defendants' fair trial rights.

Based on the considerations set forth above, there is a substantial probability that prejudice will result if the defendants

^{*} Overt acts 1-13, 15 and 41 took place in South America; overt acts 16, 17, and 19 took place in New York; overt acts 20-23 and 33-35 took place in New Jersey; overt acts 38 and 39 took place in Florida; overt acts 18, 36, and 40 took place in combinations of places all outside the District of Columbia; and overt acts 14, 27 and 32 took place at undisclosed locations. Only overt acts 24-26, 28-31 and 37 took place, entirely or in part, in the District of Columbia.

are brought to trial in this district. Consequently, they are entitled to a change of venue. Lesser forms of relief, such as expanded voir dire and continuance, are simply not adequate to insure juror impartiality.

The overwhelming weight of recent authority warns of the dangers of the trial judge relying too heavily upon the (voir dire.) The ABA Standards quoted earlier in this memorandum, (subsection (d)) recommend strongly that the court should act to protect the defendant before trial, at the time when the motion for transfer is made. The Advisory Committee, in explaining the reasons for subsection (d), stated:

Subsection (d) deals with the relationship between a motion for continuance or change of venue and the process of jury selection. It has in many jurisdictions been common practice for denial of such a motion to be sustained if a jury meeting prevailing standards could be obtained. There are two principal difficulties with this approach. First, many existing standards of acceptability tolerate considerable knowledge of the case and even an opinion on the merits on the part of the prospective juror. And even under a more restrictive standard, there will remain the problem of obtaining accurate answers on voir dire - is the juror consciously or subconsciously harboring prejudice against the accused resulting from widespread news coverage in the community? Thus if change of venue and continuance are to be of value, they should not turn on the results of the voir dire; rather they should constitute independent remedies designed to assure fair trial when news coverage has raised substantial doubts about the effectiveness of the voir dire standing alone.

The second difficulty is that when disposition of a motion for change of venue or continuance turns on the results of the voir dire, defense counsel may be placed in an extremely difficult position. Knowing conditions in the community he may be more inclined to accept a particular juror, even one who has expressed an opinion, than to take his chances with other, less desirable jurors who may be waiting in the wings. And yet to make an adequate record for appellate review, he must object as much as possible and use up his peremptory challenges as well. This dilemma seems both unnecessary and undesirable.

The Committee therefore proposes in subsection (d) that when a motion for change of venue or continuance is made prior to the impaneling of the jury, it shall be disposed of before impaneling. And if it is renewed after impaneling, the fact that a jury meeting prevailing standards has been obtained shall not be regarded as determinative.

(pp. 126-27).

As the Advisory Committee noted, in cases such as the present one, the voir dire may itself be unreliable and, in its exercise, create an unfair and undesirable dilemma.

The modern rule is well stated in United States v. Marcello, 280 F.Supp. 510, 514 (E.D.La., 1968), where the court noted that, "the efficacy of depending upon the voir dire to determine whether substantial prejudice exists has recently been seriously questioned." For other cases holding that change of venue rather than voir dire is dictated by substantial adverse pre-trial publicity, see, e.g., the following: United States v. Rossiter, 25 F.R.D. 258 (P.R., 1960); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.Tex. 1955). Cf. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 503 (1965). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that there is a denial of the very right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment where a state statute prevents a change of venue in misdemeanor cases even though the palliatives of voir dire and continuances are available. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).

Continuance is likewise inadequate to cure the problem in this case. The events underlying the charges are already several years old. Further delay would only make preparation of a defense more difficult. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

Moreover, even the passage of time would not reduce the reaction of the residents of this district to these charges, or the interest of the press in the trial proceedings, whenever they may occur.

Change of venue is therefore the preferred, and indeed the only appropriate, remedy in this case. Absent such relief, there is no feasible way for this Court to insure that these defendants will receive the fair trial by an impartial jury to which they are constitutionally entitled. The defendants therefore request that this Court enter an order directing that these proceedings be transferred to another district.

CONCLUSION

FOR THE ABOVE-STATED REASONS, THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANTS' APPLICATION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE.

Respectfully submitted,

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SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1976

C1

Our Heritage — The Exile Cuban Terrorists

By George Crile III

IT IS ALL but certain that Cuban exile terrorists were responsible for the bombing of an Air Cubana plane last month and the resulting death of the 73 aboard. Another exile organization is suspected in the assassination two months ago of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier. These were simply two incidents in an epidemic of bombings, killings and kidnappings carried out by anti-Castro exiles based in Miami over the past three years. The frequency and ruthlessness of these attacks have reached the point where the possibility must be considered that we are witnessing the coming of age of the first serious American-based terrorist movement. An effort to understand who these people are and to gauge the danger they pose might well begin with a single stark case history.

Luis Crespo seemed a most unlikely candidate for terror. He was a shy, 32-year-old father of two, a drug store salesman, just another of the 450,000 or so Cubans in Miami. But there he was in March of 1974 assembling a C4 bomb. Just after midnight he was fitting the C4 ex-

plosive into a hollowed-out copy of "British at the Gate" when it blew up in his hands.

Crespo, believing himself dying, was rushed to the hospital shouting "Viva Cuba Libre." The police, unnerved, shackled Crespo to his bed. The Miami papers identified him and his partner in the venture, Humberto Lopez Jr., as members of the National Cuban Liberation Front, a newly formed anti-Castro terrorist group. But why this group had formed, exactly who its members were, and why such seemingly upright young men were attempting such acts went unexplained.

It might all have seemed less puzzling if the background had been examined. Far from being suddenly possessed of terrorist notions, both men were veterans of guerrilla campaigns against Castro backed in another era by the CIA.

Lopez had participated in an Agency-financed program based in Nicaragua. Crespo had been a member of one of the CIA's elite commando teams operating from Miami during the Kennedy years. He had been trained in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques and was then sent on raids to Cuba. Like all of the CIA's full-fledged agents, he had signed a secrecy oath, submitted to polygraph tests, served under the command of an American case officer.

See CUBANS, Page C3



Luis Crespo, manacled to a hospital bed after a bomb he was assembling exploded.

Miami Herald — 1974

Crile is Washington editor of Harpers magazine and author of a book to be published by Doubleday on the CIA's Cuban operations.

When he went to work for the CIA, he was just 21, one of almost 2,000 Cubans recruited in Miami for Operation Mongoose, the Kennedy administration's secret war on Cuba. He served under Rip Robertson, the legendary American case officer who had led the Brigade ashore at the Bay of Pigs. There had been no question in those years about the U.S. commitment to the exiles' cause.

Crespo was then a totally reliable instrument of U.S. policy. The policy changed in time but, like the broom of the sorcerer's apprentice, Crespo could not be induced to stop.

When President Johnson halted the CIA's paramilitary operations in 1965, Crespo left the Agency and began to mount independent raids with other Agency veterans. When Customs and the Coast Guard began to arrest the raiders, he turned to terrorism as the only tactic available.

Then came the bomb accident. From the hospital, he was taken to the Dade County jail. When I talked to him here, he had just started a hunger strike to dramatize his cause. He now looked the martyr, an emaciated, boyish figure with a hook where his right hand had been.

He had long ago, Crespo explained, committed his life to the cause of "liberating" Cuba. Any regrets for his losses were outweighed by pride in his sacrifice and the outpouring of sympathy and respect from his fellow exiles. "I have been paid richly in moral payments, far more than I deserve, for what little I have done."

His only smile came when he spoke of Rip Robertson. He liked the CIA men he had known. They were honest, dedicated anti-Communists. But he did not see how he could be criticized for resorting to terrorism. He was only doing what he had been trained to do. And what, after all, had Robertson been if not a terrorist, like him, against Castro?

Foreign Connections

IT IS PEOPLE like Crespo, driven by similar ambitions and molded by the same conditions, who are at the heart of the terrorist cadres today.

There have been over 100 bombings in Miami since Crespo's bomb blew up two and a half years ago. Earlier this year Rolando Otero, who at the age of 16 had been the youngest soldier in the CIA's 2506 Brigade at the Bay of Pigs, was arrested for bombing the Miami FBI, the State's Attorney's office, the Dade County police department and Miami International Airport. These attacks were clearly targeted against officials investigating the terrorists; it is a miracle that no one was seriously injured.

Even more alarming are the political assassinations. Five exile leaders have been murdered since the Crespo incident, and several others seriously wounded. Some of the victims advocated moderation toward the Castro regime. Emilio Milian, the leading exile radio commentator, had both legs torn off by a bomb in his car after he had criticized the terrorists for committing such acts within the United States.

A similarly designed bomb killed Letelier. Significantly perhaps, that assassination came only a matter of months after the machine-gunning of Bernardo Leighton, a former Chilean Christian Democratic leader, and his wife in Rome.

Although at least one press report suggests that Italian fascists were responsible for the Leighton incident, some investigators tend to believe it was the work of ZERO, a particularly ruthless Cuban exile organization which claimed credit in a communique describing the weapons used, the number and caliber of shots.

It is known that a number of exiled activists have been working closely with the right-wing Chilean junta. And, according to U.S. government sources, they may have carried out or arranged the Leighton shootings as part of an ongoing mutual assistance agreement with DINA, the junta's secret service.

The extent of the foreign assistance available is particularly significant. Just as the Palestinians have been able to operate only with the help and financial backing provided by Libya and other Arab countries, so too do the Cuban terrorists require the support of friendly governments in this hemisphere.

They have built-in bases of support within a number of Caribbean and Latin American countries. Venezuela, for instance, has a prosperous and influential exile population of about 25,000, and exiles have held sensitive posts in the Venezuelan intelligence service since the early 1960s, when the country was under attack from Castro trained and armed guerrillas. Some of those arrested in Venezuela in connection with the Air Cubana bombing were meeting with high government officials not long ago. They had even been given a \$1,000-a-plate fund raising dinner for their cause in Caracas.

One of the men indicted, Luis Posada Carilles, had been both a CIA veteran and a high Venezuelan security official. He is reported to have been a link between the government of Venezuelan President Perez and the Chilean junta.

A Violent Tradition

THE EASE with which upright members of the exile communities of the Caribbean murder their political enemies, or finance those who do, may startle people in the United States, but terrorism does not carry the stigma among Cubans that it does for Americans. Rather, it is the time-honored instrument of revolutionaries against any regime they considered unjust. Had it not been for the CIA's virtual monopoly on the anti-Castro activities in Miami in the early 1960s, there probably would have been major outbreaks of organized terror earlier. As it was, there were two short-lived campaigns inspired by men who figure prominently in recent events.

The first began in 1964 with the mortar attack on the U.N. when Che Guevara came to address the General Assembly. This was the work of the fanatically right wing Cuban Nationalist Association, made up of disgruntled Bay of Pigs veterans who warned the exiles not to trust the CIA, calling instead for an Algerian-styled terror.

Today the Nationalists are active once again; two veterans of the U.N. bombardment (the Novo brothers) are prime suspects in the Letelier assassination.

The second outbreak came in 1968 with bombings in Miami harbor of ships flying the flags of countries that had relations with Cuba. Readers of Miami's daily papers were introduced to "Ernesto," the mysterious leader of "Cuban Power," through "clandestine, exclusive" interviews in which the terrorist would appear in a black hood and whisper his intentions to bomb Cuban installations and kidnap and assassinate Cuban officials around the world.

Later, "Ernesto" dropped the nom de guerre and revealed himself as the well-known pediatrician, Dr. Orlando Bosch. Today Bosch is considered the terrorists' guiding force. In testimony before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee this year, he was accused of plotting the assassination of Secretary of State Kissinger. He is now in jail in Venezuela under indictment for an alleged role in the Air Cubana bombing. Rumors persist that Bosch had received CIA training before the Bay of

The New Cuban Terrorists

figs. But there are no indications that he was ever a controlled agent. On the contrary, he was one of the first exile leaders to turn against the Agency.

In the mid 1960s, Bosch bitterly denounced the CIA for "dispersing, dividing and destroying the anti-Castro revolution." He, for one, would pursue an independent path. Thanks to his Cuban Power, Miami led the world's major cities in bombings — 44 — in 1968. The terror promptly stopped late in that year when Bosch and eight followers were arrested and jailed.

Some exiles responded favorably to Bosch's efforts in the 1960s, but few of the CIA's Cubans or the mainstream anti-Castro leaders took his work seriously. They saw the bombings as symbolic gestures without real impact, and they continued to look to the U.S. government as the last, best hope of liberating Cuba. Once the Vietnam struggle ended, they believed, the green light would be given by Washington to resume the secret war.

But events were under way which would radicalize many of the mainstream exiles and, in 1973, precipitate the first popularly supported terrorist campaign. The decisive development came when the United States signed a treaty against hijacking with Cuba and began vigilantly to arrest those exiles still trying to raid the island; in some cases they were the very veterans the CIA had trained and sponsored on such missions only a few years before. Sens. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) went to Cuba and Dr. Kissinger began talking as if he planned to open negotiations with Castro.

"Fish" in the "Sea"

IT WAS AT this moment, when all seemed lost for the exiles, that Palestinian gunmen were demonstrating that terror could make a considerable political and public relations impact; soon Yasir Arafat would appear, with a pistol at his belt, to address the U.N. General Assembly. With the example of the Palestinians very much in mind, the bickering factions among the exile activists moved to unite and to renew their war. Conveniently, Dr. Bosch had just been paroled after four years in prison; the activists swiftly embraced him as their prophet, theoretician and indisputable leader. In the autumn of 1973 70 different exile organizations gathered in San Juan for a congress; an umbrella organization was formed and shortly thereafter the terrorist campaign was initiated by the bombing of several Cuban diplomatic missions.

It is a part of the doctrine of "liberation" movements that terrorists must function as "fish" in the "sea" of a supportive environment. The "fish" men such as Luis Crespo, seem to be in abundant supply among the exiles. The critical factor is the hospitable sea. Without it, a terrorist cannot finance his activities, cannot escape his enemies and, perhaps most important, cannot sustain himself emotionally. It is here that the shift in sentiment among the mainstream exiles counts; it has created a substantial subculture within the Miami community which has so far provided the support needed to sustain the current terrorist war.

Take the instructive reaction of Carlos Prio Socarras, the last constitutional president of Cuba, to the new developments. From his exile in Miami, Prio warned that exiles would react violently to any move by the United States to recognize Castro, adding:

"My position is against indiscriminate terrorism. I don't like dynamite — it is too blind. It's not good to kill innocent people. But it is good to attack the Castro people wherever they are. That's okay. I'm not against this kind of political terrorism just because it is inside the United States. It's all right with me."

Perhaps even more significant was the position voiced by Dr. Miro Cardona, who had been Castro's first prime minister and then, as president of the Revolutionary Council, the man selected by the CIA and the Kennedy administration to become president of Cuba once Castro was overthrown.

He was a highly respected jurist, but over the years he had become increasingly embittered. As he neared the end of his life, he began to meet with Dr. Bosch and to advocate a policy of terrorism:

"We are alone, absolutely alone . . . there is only one route left to follow and we will follow it: violence, the internationalization of the struggle for the freedom of Cuba at all levels."

Miro's words, spoken at the end of 1973, served as a battle cry and moral justification for the new campaign. Overnight, the initials of the new exile front, FLNC, were painted on walls across Miami's Little Havana. Either out of respect or fear, no one painted them over. Later that year, when a young terrorist died while trying to bomb the Cuban embassy in Paris, he was given a martyr's funeral in Miami. Hundreds, including former President Prio, attended. An article in the Miami Herald went so far as to make analogies between the slain man and Jose Marti, the father of Cuban independence.

And then, early in 1974, a FLNC communique declared that henceforth "anyone, anywhere who negotiated with Castro would become a military objective."

Shortly after this warning, George Davis, the FBI's chief Cuban expert, served a subpoena on the man whose house had been Luis Crespo's bomb factory. The following morning a car without lights started up rapidly behind Davis and, accelerating, bore down on him. He was barely able to leap to safety.

A week later, on Good Friday, exile leader Jose de la Torriente was assassinated in his living room while



Dr. Orlando Bosch: jailed in Venezuela on bombing charge.

Miami Herald

watching "Ben Hur" on television. His killer left a note identifying the assassination as the work of the same group which claimed responsibility for the Leighton machine-gunning in Rome. A subsequent letter threatened other old-style leaders who had "misled" the exiles in the past. Alarmed by these developments, the FBI advised Senators Pell and Javits, who had become identified in exile eyes with the effort to renew U.S. relations with Cuba, to vary their routes to and from work in the Capital, just in case.

Though the terrorism created bitter debate within the exile community, the new campaign did gain in popularity. At a rally held to raise a defense fund for Luis Guepe and Humberto Lopez, hundreds of simple folk in Little Havana walked in off the street and contributed more than \$12,000, mostly in \$1 and \$2 donations. And when the two men went on trial, Miami's Mayor Maurice Ferere wrote the judge asking that mercy be shown to the patriots.

The Brigade's Decision

THERE HAVE been hundreds of anti-Castro organizations formed in Miami over the years; at one point the police files listed 105 revolutionary groups. Nevertheless, only one of these organizations, the (Bay of Pigs) Brigade 2506 Association, commands universal respect.

The Brigade Association, with its approximately 1,500 members, has always managed to remain aloof from Little Havana's internecine intrigues. Until a year ago it had been a fraternal organization. But at its 14th anniversary ceremonies in April, 1975, a marked shift was apparent, a shift which would soon bring about a fundamental change in the terrorists' campaign.

Twelve years earlier the Brigade had presented its flag to President Kennedy. The President hailed the Brigade as the standard-bearer of freedom in the hemisphere and, before tens of thousands of cheering exiles in the Orange Bowl, pledged to return its flag to the free soil of Cuba.

Now the Brigade veterans were making speeches accusing the United States of betraying their cause, and they demanded that the Kennedy Library return the flag, threatening to storm the library if refused. (Wisely, the flag was returned.) The Brigade concluded its ceremonies by awarding its first Freedom Award to Gen. Pinochet of the Chilean junta.

Dr. Bosch, too, was apparently establishing close links with the Chileans. He had jumped parole, fleeing the United States just after the Torriente killing. He was interviewed in Curacao by an exile newsman who reported that Bosch was being escorted by a band of armed Chileans and had access to all the money he needed. (The reporter also said Bosch was reading a biography of Yasser Arafat.)

State Department files indicate that the Chileans were offering safe haven, passports and even the use of diplomatic pouches to some Cuban terrorists. One government investigator says that a remote control detonating device, used in the assassination of the exile leader Rolando Masferrer in 1975, had been brought into the United States in a Chilean diplomatic pouch.

The Chilean connection is beyond dispute; the question is just how far it goes. Max Leznik, the publisher of Little Havana's largest newspaper, Replica, says that some of the exile terrorists are performing strong-arm services for DINA. "The Chileans are using the Cubans; they use them because the Cubans are crusaders. You tell them there are 10 Chileans in Paris who were close to Allende and that Allende was close to Castro and they..."

Like other prominent exiles, Leznik has resorted to bodyguards. At the end of our interview he pulled out a .45 and said, "It's incredible, but I need this to survive as an editor. You American newsmen feel you don't need to carry a gun, but think what it was like in the Old West. It's like that here. Everywhere I go, I take a man with a pistol and other weapons. If the police take them away from me, then I die."


Leznik's problem is particularly thorny because he is a professed socialist and fought alongside Castro in the Sierra Maestra. Some of the exiles, he says, cannot distinguish between socialism and communism and doubt his loyalty to the anti-Castro cause. However misguided they may be about Leznik, it is understandable that some exiles are confused about the loyalties and even the identities of their comrades.

Such suspicions were reinforced by the nature of the violence in 1974-75. Although the terrorists did strike at some Castroite targets abroad, they concentrated their attacks in Miami and most of the targets were other exiles. The campaign was by no means universally supported, but none dared to be outspokenly critical.

Some of the exiles, however, came to see the terror campaign as suspiciously counterproductive. It not only spread fear and suspicion within the community but also alienated the U.S. government and public.

That the exiles have been deeply penetrated by agents from Havana is a view long held within the FBI and other interested agencies. No one seriously questions the fanatical sincerity of most of the terrorists, but some exile leaders and U.S. officials have begun to theorize that agents provocateurs were behind some of the inflammatory incidents most likely to create dissension within the exile community or to enrage U.S. opinion.

Such observers cite the history of Carlos Rivero-Collado, Brigade veteran, son of a pre-Castro prime minister and a leading member of the oldest and most fanatically right-wing exile terror group, the Nationalists. He was said to have been one of the Nationalists' most formidable members, with a personal following among the younger terrorists. Suddenly, in the fall of 1974, several months after Torriente's assassination, Rivero-Collado



United Press International

Radio commentator Emilio Milian had his legs blown off when a bomb exploded in this car.

defected to Cuba, publicly denouncing the terrorists as fascists and — more significant — describing their membership in detail. Their plans, he claimed, included assassination of U.S. officials.

The Offensive Begins

THE CIVIL war aspects of this supposedly anti-Castro terror campaign grew in intensity after Rivero Collado's departure, culminating in December, 1975 with a sudden rash of bombings, including those against the FBI and state's attorney's offices. Then the violence in Miami all but stopped. And a true offensive was launched against Cuban targets in Europe and the Americas.

The apparent explanation for this reversal in targets is to be found in the sudden entry of the veterans of the Bay of Pigs Brigade into the struggle. The decision was reached at the 13th reunion of the Brigade on April 1, this year. The Brigade leaders claim to have reached an agreement with the other terrorists to call war at home; in return, the Brigade would take the anti-Castro war.

This new coalition was apparently responsible for the following incidents:

April 6 — two Cuban fishing vessels machine gunned; one Cuban killed. April 22 — a bomb kills two Cuban officials in Lisbon. July 5 — Cuban U.N. office bombed. July 9 — bomb explodes in luggage car before being loaded aboard Air Cubana. July 10 — Cuban airlines office in Barbados bombed. Aug. 9 — two embassy officials in Buenos Aires kidnapped. Late August — one Cuban official killed in Mexico City, and an unsuccessful attempt made to kill another in Yucatan.

In the midst of the campaign last summer, Echeverria met in the Dominican Republic with representatives of Dr. Bosch and of several terrorist groups, including the Nationalists. A new agreement was reached to form a united front to carry out a coordinated campaign of international terror against Castro targets which they could be reached. The new organization's name, COCU (Commandos of United Revolutionary Operations), would not become known to the Americans until the group was implicated two months later in the crash of the Air Cubana plane en route from Bogota to Havana.

During the Labor Day weekend the Brigade took an unprecedented step, apparently designed to broaden the base of the terror movement. It held its first congress and there announced the opening of a war chest to establish an exile "government in arms." The only organization universally respected among the exiles has lent its prestige to terror.

Like Luis Crespo, the Brigade's leaders do not understand why the United States should disapprove their latest effort, now that the violence in Miami has abated. Seventy exiles have reportedly been subpoenaed to testify before a Grand Jury in Miami; others have been called before a Grand Jury in Washington in connection with the Letelier killing.

The leaders of the Brigade's terrorist arm say they have violated no American laws. Most are Americans and they are careful to conspire abroad.

One of them, a long time veteran of America's wars against Cuba, spoke of his bitter resentment at being labeled a terrorist. "To us a terrorist is a man who sets a bomb off and doesn't care who he kills. A revolutionary is a man who uses the methods and equipment available to him at the moment to hit Fidel Castro. We are revolutionaries."

The explanation he offered for the Air Cubana crash was that the new terror campaign is aimed at the Cuban economy. The crash, it was assumed, would damage tourist trade.

"Also," he said, "98 per cent of the people on that plane were Communists and our war is against Communists." It was hoped, he added, that the terror attack would lead to increased tension between the United States and Cuba.

Facing Realities

AND INDEED Castro quickly abrogated the anti-jacking treaty, charging that the CIA was behind the terrorism. This was just what the terrorists wanted — to put Cuba and the United States back at loggerheads.

There is no reason to believe Castro's charge that the CIA is sponsoring today's terrorists, but there is also no way of denying the past intimate CIA connections with many of these men.

The impression should not be left here that all or most of the CIA's Cuban veterans have become terrorists, that all or most of the exiles support the terrorists. That is not the case. But there are enough militants and supporters to cause terrible problems for some time to come.

The Air Cubana bombing, which caused the death of the entire Cuban national fencing team among others, taken by the Cuban people as a national tragedy.

In a speech shortly after the crash, Castro warned that henceforth his government would retaliate for attacks. The terrorists, for their part, say there will be new attacks, and soon. The prospects are ominous.

The natural tendency is to dismiss the exile terrorists as fascists or part of some lunatic fringe. But not so long ago they were our closest military and ideological allies, acclaimed by President Kennedy as the champions of freedom in the hemisphere.

If we are now to find a way of containing these men, we must begin by remembering our own part in starting them down the desperate path they are following.

By JACK ANDERSON:

Slain Chilean tied to Havana

Secret papers found in Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier's attache case after his assassination show he had been collecting a mysterious \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection." The papers also reveal that Letelier's office had been in close contact, perhaps innocently, with a top Cuban intelligence agent named Julian Torres Rizo.

The respected Letelier, a former Chilean foreign minister, was blown to oblivion on Sept. 21 as he was driving down Washington's tranquil, tree-shaded Embassy Row. Accompanying him in his blue Chevrolet were two passengers, Mike Moffit and his wife, Ronni. The bomb blast also killed Ronni, but Mike miraculously survived.

He telephoned us afterward in anguish and pleaded with us to investigate the assassination. Our preliminary findings indicated that Chile's dread secret police, known as DINA, probably had been behind the bombing. Now our investigation has turned up some unexpected developments.

The blast that killed Letelier, we have learned, revealed that he had been leading a strange double life. The evidence was locked in a Samsnite attache case, which investigators salvaged from the wreckage.

The briefcase was returned to the murdered man's family. But first, intelligence agents copied the contents for possi-



ble clues that might lead to the assassins.

They found some unexpected clues that were even more fascinating. The briefcase contained papers so sensitive that Letelier probably carried them to prevent their theft by CIA housebreakers. We have now seen some of these hush-hush papers.

They show that Letelier received \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection." His contact was none other than Beatrice (Tati) Allende, daughter of Salvador Allende, the Chilean president who was slain in 1973 by a military junta. Tati now lives in Havana with her husband, who is a Cuban official.

In a May 8, 1975, letter to Letelier, she notified him that he will receive \$5,000 as an advance payment "para apoyar tu trabajo" — "to support your work." This was to be followed by the monthly \$1,000 payments. The money would come, she said, from the Chilean Socialist Party in exile. The disbursement had been approved, she explained, by the party's leader, Carlos Altamierano, who is reported to be living in exile in East Berlin.

The Chilean Socialist Party has offices in East Berlin, Havana and Rome. Intelligence sources contend that money couldn't have been transmitted to Letelier without the Cuban government's approval.

Another letter in Letelier's briefcase was written on Sept. 14, 1976, by one of his young colleagues. It tells of a meeting in Havana with Emilio Brito, a Communist Central Committee functionary. According to our intelligence sources, Brito is affiliated with the Cuban planning group that directs the subversion of Puerto Rico and the United States.

The letter thanks Brito for some scholarly material "received from the hands of Julian Rizo." The writer promises to send other academic information to Brito through "la Mision," meaning the Cuban mission at the United Nations.

Officially, Rizo was listed as the first secretary of the Cuban mission. But as early as March 1, 1976, we identified him as a spy in diplomatic disguise. "His mission at the United Nations," we wrote, "is to develop contacts with radicals in this country."

We have omitted the name of Letelier's young colleague, because he has received an assassination threat. But we questioned him for an hour. The young man contended persuasively that he was totally unaware of the intelligence roles of Brito and Rizo.



Dead Chilean exile had link to Cuba

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

WASHINGTON — Secret papers found in Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier's attache' case after his assassination shows he had been collecting a mysterious \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection."

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Letelier, at the time of his death, was affiliated with the Institute for Policy Studies. The Institute's director, Marc Raskin, said he had no knowledge of Letelier's secret payments. "What he did for his Chilean concerns was totally outside his Institute work," Raskin told us.

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The Washington Star

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WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 1977

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LETELIER'S ORDER FOR TWO GUNS

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

On March 7, 1973, a short letter was sent to a Washington-area firearms dealer by Ambassador Orlando Letelier of Chile on embassy stationery.

It read:
"Please enter my order for two Ingram M11 Systems .380 ACP cal. for test and evaluation. Very truly yours, Orlando Letelier, Ambassador of Chile."

In less than two days, the State Department's Office of Munitions Control had signed the export license, and the transfer was also signed by Rex Davis, director of the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms. Both documents are dated March 9, 1973.

Late that afternoon, a messenger from the firearms company arrived at the Chilean embassy residence, where he received a check from an administrative officer named Hernan Navarro in the amount of \$476.80. The check was signed by Letelier.


THE CHILEAN ambassador then left for a 10-day visit in Santiago via LAN Chile Airlines Flight 451 with his luggage and, apparently, the package from the Washington-area arms dealer. The package contained two Ingram 9mm submachine guns. These weapons are equipped to fire a 32-cartridge clip, effective at 100

meters single-shot and more if sprayed at the full-automatic setting.

With the sound suppressor, or silencer, the Ingram is described by U.S. authorities as a lethal counterinsurgency weapon that has no other purpose than killing by stealth. With the silencer and clip removed and the wire shoulder stock folded inside the gun, the weapon is no larger than a .45-caliber pistol of the standard American make.

The reason for the purchase of two of these submachine guns with silencers, plus 200 rounds of ammunition, by Letelier — six months before his Marxist Unidad Popular government was overthrown by the Chilean

See LETELIER, A-12.



—Washington Star Photographer Ray Lushig

The type of submachine-gun purchased by Letelier, equipped with silencer and with 32-round clip in place. With stock folded as shown and silencer removed it is about the same size as Colt .45 automatic in picture.

600

LETELIER

Continued From A-1

armed forces — is as much a mystery today as his murder here last Sept. 21 when a bomb exploded under his car.

FEDERAL OFFICIALS and Washington police investigating the murders of Letelier and his associate, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, discovered that he had bought the weapons. The Washington Star began checking the same ground last week after Letelier's widow, Isabel Letelier, told a Georgetown University audience that her husband had been falsely accused by the military junta of involvement in drug trafficking and weapons smuggling.

Dets. Stanley R. Wilson and John R. Chaillet of the Metropolitan Police homicide squad, assigned to the Moffitt-Letelier case, were asked about the junta accusations and Mrs. Letelier's response. Although they refused to discuss any aspects of their investigations, the detectives said there was no evidence of any kind that Letelier had been involved in drug trafficking.

They did confirm, however, that Letelier had bought two weapons before he was recalled from his ambassadorship here in May 1973, but declined to disclose any further details of the purchase. But The Star located the arms dealer, who also insisted on anonymity, and has obtained a copy of Letelier's order for the submachine guns.

The dealer insisted that the sale was legal and showed the U.S. government documents he obtained at the State and Treasury departments before making the delivery to the ambassador. The dealer said he hand-carried the documents to State and Treasury for the necessary signatures. A State Department source said the transaction apparently was expedited by officials because normally the necessary approvals could not be obtained in a two-day period.

THE SILENCERS, according to Deputy Director James D. Hataway, could not be exported now under State Department policies established since Letelier bought the silencers and submachine guns.

The Ingram submachine gun was designed for use with a silencer and is out of balance without it. Without the silencer and with the stock at full extension, the weapon is easily concealed inside a suit coat. It has little recoil and, with the silencer, is almost noiseless.

While it could not be ascertained whether Letelier took the weapons with him to Chile on March 9, 1973, the messenger who delivered the package to the chancery was told that the ambassador needed the package for his journey. Bringing the weapons out of the United States and into Chile would not have been smuggling because Letelier had all the necessary permission from U.S. authorities. There would have been no difficulty in getting the weapons past customs since Letelier could either have carried them in his luggage or in the Chilean diplomatic pouch.

THE ARMS DEALER said he had no idea whether Letelier wanted the weapons for his own use, was taking them to Chile for someone else or whether the "test and evaluation" motivation was genuine. Officials say the normal procedure for any government acquiring weapons for test and evaluation is through military attaché channels. In any case, it is not known what Letelier did with them.

The Chilean Embassy here, now representing the military junta, said it would have to ask Santiago if the Ingrams and the silencers were captured when the armed forces took power. The serial numbers of the weapons bought by Allende are 3-300819 and 3-3001047. The silencer numbers are S-3-2000379 and S-3-2000460, according to the records of the arms dealer here.

Letelier returned to Chile in May 1973 and became successively foreign minister, minister of interior and defense minister. He was taken prisoner by the armed forces on Sept. 11, 1973, when the coup d'état was carried out by the armed forces under Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and spent much of the next year on bleak Dawson Island near the Straits of Magellan.

About a week after the coup, a Star reporter visited Mrs. Letelier in her Santiago home and was asked if her husband had had any weapons. She said he had a pistol that was given to him by fellow employees when he was leaving the Inter-American Development Bank. Mrs. Letelier, who now lives in Bethesda, said she turned this souvenir pistol over to the Chilean national police as soon as the junta issued a decree requiring that all weapons be handed in.

The Ingram submachine gun and silencer were made by the Military Armament Corp. of Powder Springs, Ga. The local arms dealer said the company since has gone out of business.

Cubans Harassed in Letelier Case?

By Jeremiah O'Leary
and Toni House

Washington Star Staff Writers

Members of an anti-Castro exile group under scrutiny in the murder of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier have charged U.S. officials with harassment and said the jailing of one of their members for refusing to testify before a grand jury was a "fishing expedition."

Leaders of the Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano from the northern New Jersey area made the charge in a press conference after U.S. District Judge John Lewis Smith yesterday sentenced Jose Dionisio Suarez to jail.

Suarez had refused to testify under immunity before the grand jury investigating the Sept. 21 car-bomb murders of Letelier and his associate, Ronni Karpen Moffitt.

SUAREZ' ATTORNEY, Oscar

Gonzalez Suarez (who is not related to the witness) declared after the sentencing, "It would appear that (the prosecutor) wants to pit one anti-Castro group against another."

"They are trying to get any information they can about what every anti-Castro organization is doing and that's a fishing expedition," said the lawyer.

Suarez, an Elizabeth, N.J., car salesman, and another MNC member, Alvin Ross Diaz, were granted immunity from self-incrimination in the Letelier probe April 14. The two Cubans, along with eight other exiles now living in New Jersey and Miami, made their first grand jury appearance here April 6 but refused to answer questions.

Yesterday, accompanied by their attorney, they came to Washington for a second grand jury appearance.

Suarez, the only witness called by Asst. U.S. Atty. Eugene Propper, re-

fused to answer any questions before the grand jury. The prosecutor immediately halted Suarez before Smith, where Propper requested that the witness be held in contempt.

Smith ordered the Cuban exile to be jailed for the life of the grand jury, which does not expire until next March, or until he testifies.

ATTORNEY SUAREZ and another MNC leader, Guillermo Novo, told reporters they objected to testifying about other Cubans groups with which they said they have no connection. Novo said the MNC is not subordinate to the exile terrorist organization, CORU, or its leader, Orlando Bosch, who is in jail in Venezuela. Novo, of Union City, N.J., declared that the MNC is "100 percent opposed to indiscriminate violence."

Novo and the other Cubans also denied any connection with DINA, the Chilean secret police.

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JACK ANDERSON and LES WHITTEN

WASHINGTON—Congress has called for military equipment, including planes, radar, sensors and satellites, to bolster the faltering battle against drug abuse.

This unusual request has been forwarded to the Pentagon by the Senate Permanent Investigations subcommittee. In a private letter to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the senators pleaded: "This country is fighting a self-proclaimed war on drugs. When fighting a war, you use the best resources available and make every effort to win. This is not being done."

The letter, signed by Sens. Sam Nunn, (D-Ga.) and Charles Percy (R-Ill.), contends that drug abuse costs the United States a staggering \$17 billion annually. More than 5,000 Americans die each year from the improper use of drugs; thousands more are killed and injured in drug-related crimes.

The sheer magnitude of the drug problem has led the subcommittee to seek drastic countermeasures. "Within the federal government," declare the senators, "the Department of Defense alone possesses the air and land vehicles needed to pursue and overtake the drug traffickers."

They point out that the Customs Service "lacks sufficient planes, radar, sensors and other equipment to adequately protect our borders; the equipment it does have largely consists of second generation or ill-equipped models." To curb the deadly drug traffic, the senators insist, will take "resources comparable in sophistication to those used by the smugglers themselves."

FOOTNOTE: A spokesman said the Pentagon has received the proposal and is preparing a response.

Cuban officials have tipped off visiting Americans that the Cuban terrorist, Orlando Bosch, is the man behind the dynamite death of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier in Washington last September.

This conclusion is based upon Fidel Castro's own investigation of the assassination. His agents, rep

that the Chilean military junta enlisted Bosch to bankroll the plot. He was chosen, according to the Cubans, because he was fanatical and honest enough not to steal the murder money. He allegedly parceled out the money to other anti-Communist Cubans who actually blew up Letelier and a companion as they were driving down Washington's tree-shaded embassy row.

Last August, we revealed that this same Orlando Bosch was involved in a plot to assassinate former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica. Bosch slipped into Costa Rica on a false passport, ready to gun down Kissinger, but was clapped into jail four days before the visiting secretary arrived in

the country. Bosch is now in a Venezuelan jail on suspicion of bombing a Cuban airliner. This caused the deaths of 73 Cubans, some reportedly Castro secret agents.

FOOTNOTE: Cuban foreign ministry sources passed on the information about Bosch to American visitors. There is always the possibility, of course, that the information may be fabricated to embarrass the Chilean dictatorship.

Saudi Arabian sources have made the startling suggestion, in the strictest of privacy, that the Arab oil states may be willing to provide financial aid to Israel if the Middle East conflict is settled. The Saudis pointed out that the Israelis and the Arab moderates have a common interest in keeping the Communists out of the Middle East.



Foreign spies get CIA cooperation

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

WASHINGTON — Some of the world's most sinister secret police are operating in the United States with the blessing of the Central Intelligence Agency. There is evidence that these foreign agents have arranged murders, committed burglaries, attempted kidnaping and terrorized political opponents in violation of U.S. laws.

In past columns, we have reported that the CIA has a secret understanding with such notorious foreign intelligence agencies as Chile's DINA, Iran's SAVAK and South Korea's KCIA. Not only does the CIA work closely with these police agencies; the agents operate within one another's countries by mutual consent.

Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has quietly started an investigation into the activities of foreign intelligence agencies in the United States. The committee is particularly curious about the CIA's role in these activities.

On the House side, Rep. Donald Fraser, D-Minn., has also asked the CIA to divulge the details of its reciprocal arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies. The CIA has refused to cooperate.

As far back as July 17, 1975, we published charges that the KCIA had terrorized Korean exiles, had set up illegal front groups to manipulate U.S. public opinion and had tried to buy off U.S. congressmen. We also cited documents from SAVAK's files as evidence that the Iranian secret police were intimidating opponents of the shah in this country. The documents included detailed instructions on how to burglarize homes and offices.

In our reports on the Chilean police, we warned on Nov. 16, 1975: "There is reason to believe that DINA has hired thugs to track down and and assassinate prominent exiles." Ten months later, Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier was blown up in his car on Washington's embassy row. Investigators are now convinced that DINA hired Cuban killers to murder Letelier.

As additional evidence, we have now obtained an explosive document from

DINA's own files. It is a memo, dated Sept. 16, 1975, from DINA chief Manuel Contreras Sepulveda to Chilean President Augusto Pinochet.

The memo requests "an additional allotment of \$600,000 for the (DINA) budget." Among four reasons for the extra money, this was the most fascinating: "Additional expenses for the neutralizing of the principal adversaries of the government junta in the exterior, especially in Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, France and Italy."

We can only speculate of course, what the phrase "neutralizing of the principal adversaries" means. But the memo was followed by an assassination attempt against Chilean dissident Bernardo Leighton on the streets of Rome. Then Letelier was dynamited to death on the streets of Washington.

The FBI also learned of murder plots against two other Chilean exiles. Gabriel Valdes and Rodomiro Tomic, who were given protection.

We hand-delivered a copy of the DINA memo to the Chilean embassy in Washington and waited a week while embassy officials examined it. A spokesman then denounced the document as "completely false." He said Contreras' signature was a "forgery." The fact that the memo was not written on a DINA letterhead, the spokesman asserted, was additional proof that the document was a fabrication.

The memo was delivered to us by sources who have been reliable in the past. For three weeks, we painstakingly checked it with a number of sources including U.S. officials. They all agreed it not only appeared genuine but was consistent with their own intelligence information.

A DINA defector now in asylum in the Italian embassy in Santiago, according to competent sources has confirmed the authenticity of the memo. We have also had access to other DINA documents, which the Chilean government has acknowledged are authentic. These resemble the disputed document in every detail. Many, incidentally, are not written on DINA letterhead.

On the Trail Of a Murderer

WASHINGTON — The man behind the murder of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier, as federal investigators have pieced together the mystery, is probably Chile's shadowy secret police chief, Manuel Contreras Sepulveda.

In one of the most complicated investigations since Watergate, FBI sleuths have traced the man who ordered the killing to Contreras' office in Santiago, Chile. They are not yet certain, however, whether Contreras himself gave the order or whether it came from a top aide.

Most federal sources believe the murder could not have been carried out without Contreras' direct approval. In fact, some Justice Dept. sources speculate that Chilean President Augusto Pinochet himself personally suggested the assassination.



No one working on the case will comment directly. But we have learned that the FBI has stepped up its activity among terrorists in Miami and hopes to resolve the case in the near future, complete with the names of the actual assassins.

Letelier was killed by a bomb, which was attached beneath his Chevrolet. The bomb exploded last Sept. 21 as he was driving down Washington's tranquil Embassy Row with two American colleagues, Mike and Ronnie Moffitt.

The blast killed Letelier and Mrs. Moffitt but miraculously spared her husband. Afterward, an anguished Mike Moffitt begged us to investigate the bombing. We have kept in close touch, therefore, with the federal investigation.

Within a few weeks, we were able to identify Chile's notorious secret police, known by the dread initials DINA, as the probable culprits. Now we can describe the murder plot.

We are told that Pinochet expressed his displeasure with Letelier to the DINA chief. We have reason to believe that Contreras, in response to the Chilean president's wishes, dispatched a DINA officer to the United States to meet with two leaders of Brigade 2506, an organization of Bay of Pigs veterans.

Some members of the brigade, trained in

violence by the CIA, allegedly have become right-wing terrorists. The DINA agent was put in touch with them, according to our sources, by a Chilean diplomat in the United States, who secretly works for DINA.

We reached the diplomat who reportedly has been interrogated by U.S. authorities. At first, he told us through an interpreter that the affair was his "private problem." Then he refused to comment; then his aide told us the charge was "ridiculous."

Investigators tell us, however, the two brigade leaders contacted among others a Cuban demolition expert, Guillermo Novo, in New Jersey. At that time, he was on probation after conviction for illegal use of explosives. He violated his probation and is now a fugitive.

The assassination plot was worked out, our sources say, at a secret rendezvous near Bonao in the Dominican Republic. It was decided that a special shaped plastic charge was needed for the bombing.

The explosive was available on the streets of Miami, and the bomb materials were bought and fashioned in the United States, most sources believe.

However, one source told us the bomb was actually constructed in Chile.

It was later delivered to the Miami area by a Chilean military official carrying a diplomatic passport and flying in a military airplane, the source said. The device was transmitted to a member of Brigade 2506, we are told. He then carried it to New Jersey where the assassination team was waiting for it. They used the bomb, according to our sources, to kill Letelier.

The Justice Dept. had no formal comment on the case. We have learned that prosecutors, however, are trying to figure how to get testimony from Chileans with diplomatic immunity and how to extradite potential defendants from Chile.

Footnote: The Chilean government has repeatedly denied any involvement with the assassination. Spokesmen for Brigade 2506 also have sworn that their members had nothing to do with murdering Letelier. Incidentally, Chile has announced the dissolution of DINA. But our

The FBI has traced the man who ordered the killing of Chilean Orlando Letelier to the office of the chief of Chile's secret police.

sources say its duties simply have been taken over by other organizations.

Around the World

Chilean in Letelier Probe Linked to Secret Police

SANTIAGO, Chile—A military source here has identified the second of two men sought in connection with the death in Washington of former ambassador Orlando Letelier as Armando Fernandez Larios, an Army captain attached to the Chilean secret police, special correspondent John Dinges reported.

The source, who said he has known Fernandez since military school, said he recognized the officer from pictures printed Saturday in the Santiago press.

The Chilean government has refused to comment on the identity of the two men. The Washington Post reported Monday that Chile has said the two men sought by the United States—identified initially as Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara—do not exist in military or civilian files.

Williams' picture has been recognized by several persons who said he was an American, Michael V. Townley, with a reputation for right-wing activity in Chile.

Another informed source revealed that the two published photos were obtained by the U.S. government from a consulate in Paraguay. The source said the two men applied for U.S. visas using unspecified false documents.

It has been reported that two men using the names of Williams and Romeral traveled to the United States on official Chilean passports with U.S. visas.

The Washington Post

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-CIA Aide, 3 Cuban Exiles Focus of Letelier Inquiry

y Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA explosives expert and
an exiles will soon be
deral authorities for ques-
the investigation of last
ssy Row bomb-murder of
ean Ambassador Orlando
ccording to informed

Wilson, the former Cen-
gence Agency operative,
e Miami-based Cuban ex-
the attention of federal
en they learned that Wil-

son was under FBI investigation in an
unrelated assassination plot abroad.

Wilson allegedly sought to recruit
the three Cubans to kill a political op-
ponent of the Libyan leader, Col.
Muammar Qaddafi, last year, accord-
ing to the sources.

Wilson heads a small consulting
firm here called Consultants Interna-
tional. It is involved in the arms ex-
port business. Wilson was out of the
country yesterday and could not be
reached for comment.

In reviewing information developed
in the Libyan investigation of Wilson,
investigators have established these

possible connections with the Letelier
case:

- Wilson had a secret contract with the Libyan government to provide de-
tonation devices called "timing pen-
cils"—a tube filled with chemicals
that can be remotely controlled to
trigger explosions. Such a "timing
pencil" is believed to have been used
to detonate the bomb that exploded
beneath Letelier's car.

- The three Cuban exiles arrived in
the Washington area just three days
before the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing of
Letelier's car.

- One of the Cuban exiles, an ex-

plosives expert believed to have been
trained by the CIA in the 1960s, met
in Miami recently with a close associ-
ate of other Cuban exiles who have
been chief suspects in the Letelier
case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M.
Propper, who is in charge of the Lete-
lier investigation, met with CIA offi-
cials last week and asked for all files
and information on Wilson and the
three Cubans, the sources said.

The three Cubans are not among
the 10 anti-Castro Cubans who have
reportedly been questioned already
by the grand jury investigating the
Letelier murder.

"These are new Cubans and a com-
pletely new direction for the case,"
said one source familiar with the in-
vestigation. The sources said, how-
ever, that the extent of Wilson's in-
volvement, if any, could not be
learned until Wilson is questioned.

In the Libyan investigation, the
sources said that Justice Department
attorneys are not sure if any U.S. law
has been violated because the depart-
ment has no jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed abroad.

The Libyan case is now in the Jus-
tice Department Criminal Division for
review.

That investigation began last year

when CIA officials learned that a for-
mer employee was allegedly recruiting
Cubans for terrorist activity.

According to the sources, Wilson
was acting under a contract with the
Libyan government and wanted the
Cubans to assassinate a Libyan who
had exiled himself to Egypt much like
Letelier had exiled himself to the
United States after the September,
1973, coup in Chile and a year of im-
prisonment there.

The Cubans turned down the job of-
fer, which was made by Wilson at a

See LETELIER, A12, Col. 1

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Ex-CIA Aide, Cuba Exiles Focus of Letelier Probe

LETELIER, From A1

meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, according to the sources.

Upon learning of this, the CIA requested the FBI open an investigation of Wilson. This case was so sensitive that President Ford was personally informed of it.

Wilson's contract with Libya included a promise to supply thousands of timing pencils. "It is one of the most alarming things I've ever seen," one source said. "There were enough (timing pencils) contracted for to support terrorist activity for the rest of the century."

The Libyan government has in the past supported terrorist activity. At a news conference last July 19, President Ford said, "We do know that the Libyan government has in many ways done certain things that might have stimulated terrorist activity."

In addition, the sources said that there is some evidence that Wilson may have had contact with one or more current CIA employees who have access to supplies of timing pencils.

It is not clear from the investigation if any or how many timing pencils Wilson actually supplied to the Libyan government.

The sources said Wilson also tried to recruit other former CIA employees to be explosives instructors in Libya.

One former CIA employee was offered \$100,000 a year but turned it down. Wilson himself had contracts valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars with Libya, according to the sources.

Wilson has declined to answer ques-

tions from FBI agents in the Libyan investigation, the sources said.

Consultants International is located at 1425 K St. NW. An official there said yesterday that the firm was not involved in any questionable activity.

According to the firm's own promotional literature, Consultants International could supply an army with equipment including patrol boats, parachutes, airborne accessories and armor-protected vehicles.

"Armaments can be arranged to meet the requirements of the purchaser," the literature says.

Sources said that Wilson had a contract with Libya to clear land mines but the contract was the "cover" for the real purpose of supplying detection devices.

"Explosive detection devices" are one of the items on the firm's sales list.

Wilson's firm has received numerous licenses from the State Department Office of Munitions Control to export arms related material though no license has been granted to export any thing to Libya, according to government records.

Letelier, 44, former Chilean ambassador to the United States, was foreign minister and minister of defense in the government of the late Chilean social President Salvador Allende.

At the time of his death, Letelier headed a foreign affairs research program at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. A staff member of the Institute, Ronni K. Moffitt, also died in the explosion. Her husband, Michael, a research associate, survived the blast.

Ben Weiser assisted in the reporting of this article.



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The Letelier Case: M1

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

One of the first police officers to arrive at the scene of the explosion watched the debris still floating through the damp air to the ground like ash from a campfire. He looked at his watch and noted the time: 9:38 a.m. on Sept. 21, 1976.

Stately Sheridan Circle on Embassy Row was soon filled with investigators from the D.C. police, the FBI, the Executive Protective Service, which guards diplomats and embassies here, and the U.S. Treasury's Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms unit, which investigates crimes involving explosives. As smoke continued to rise from the mangled Chevelle on the roadway of the circle, the investigators scurried to collect every possible bit of evidence from the debris around it.

They shook tiny particles down from tree leaves, drained a rain puddle and strained its contents, vacuumed debris from the grass, and unceremoniously put ladders up against embassy walls to search rooftops. By the end of the gray, rainy day, thousands of tiny plastic bags had been filled with fragments that were taken to an FBI laboratory for analysis.

Painstaking work in the laboratory produced the first clues to the nature of the crime. The bomb had been strapped with precision above the I-beam of the Chevelle's frame so the driver would be hit with the full force of the blast. The high power of the expertly constructed explosive was clearly intended to kill. And the fact that it could have been detonated by remote control was further evidence of the sophistication of the crime.

The next clue was the identity of the target of the crime: Orlando Letelier, a former ambassador to the United States from the Chilean government of Marxist president Salvador Allende and an outspoken opponent in exile of the current Chilean president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who overthrew Allende in 1973.

Letelier had been working here at the Institute for Policy Studies, a liberal "think tank" that gave him a platform for speeches and writings critical of Pinochet's government and the Chilean secret police, then known as DINA.

Two colleagues of Letelier's were in his Chevelle when it was blown apart on Sheridan Circle. One of them, Ronni Moffett, who was riding along side Letelier in the front seat, died quickly of a severed artery. Her husband, Michael, who was in the back seat, was thrown clear of the car and survived.

Letelier's colleagues at IPS, which itself had been infiltrated and spied upon by informants for the FBI during the anti-Vietnam war years, immediately decided that DINA had murdered Letelier to shut him up. And, because of disclosures of CIA involvement against Allende in Chile, they doubted the U.S. government's determination to find and bring Letelier's killers to justice if it meant embarrassing the Pinochet government. Their suspicions and anger grew when they discovered that investigators, checking out every possible motive, were asking whether anything in Letelier's and the Moffetts' private lives might be connected to the killing.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper of the major crimes division was sitting in the cafeteria in the federal courthouse here that September morning when the investigation of the Letelier killing began. Propper had just told friends at the table that two police officers with whom he had an appointment could not show up because "some ambassador" had been killed when one of Propper's supervisors came by and asked him to work on the Letelier case.

His supervisors warned him that such crimes are among the most difficult to solve and prosecute and that this one seemed particularly likely to involve unpleasant political pressures. But Propper, a prosecutor who had already begun thinking of leaving the U.S. attorney's office for private practice, agreed to take the case anyway.

A few blocks away in the Washington field office of the FBI, agent Carter Cornick had been waiting for his assignment here to take shape after his recent transfer from Puerto Rico. When the Letelier bombing occurred, Cornick was selected by FBI agent-in-charge Nick F. Stames for the job because of Cornick's availability, his knowledge of Spanish, and his investigations of other bombings in Puerto Rico.


Cornick is an outgoing man descended from several generations of Virginians who is frequently given to humor—traits not often expected in the dry stereotype of FBI agents.

Propper and Cornick, who had never met before, would spend the next 18 months on the unusually painstaking and often frustrating investigation that only last month produced arrests of a number of suspects and word that federal prosecutors here knew the details of the crime and had traced its origins to DINA and the Chilean government.

Unknown to the victims' friends and colleagues at the Institute for Policy Studies, the FBI investigation already had turned toward Chile. Agents in the nation's Cuban exile communities, aware of a growing affinity between some very militant anti-Castro Cubans and the rightist Pinochet government in Chile, began checking Cuban informants.

The FBI and the Justice Department soon realized that this part of the investigation necessarily would involve intelligence information here and abroad, so they began laying delicate groundwork. Propper, Assistant Attorney General Stanley Pottinger and CIA Director George Bush met to determine to what extent that agency could help in the investigation. A carefully worded agreement placing the Letelier case in a "national security" status allowed that cooperation.

The investigation quickly focused on the Cuban exile connection after Venezuelan authorities informed the United States that Cuban exile leader



MICHAEL TOWNLEY
... decided to cooperate

Orlando Bosch—who was being held in that country for the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner in which 73 persons died—had implicated "the Novo brothers" in the Letelier case. By the end of October 1977, the Novos and other Cuban exiles were being brought before a federal grand jury here for questioning.

The Novo brothers—Ignacio Novo Sampol and Guillermo Novo Sampol—were known in the U.S. Cuban community and to federal agents as leaders of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, a group that wants to regain its homeland without help from the United States.

In 1964, they had fired a bazooka from across the East River toward the United Nations while Che Guevara was speaking there. They were arrested, but charges against them were dropped because they had not been properly informed of their right.

Ignacio Novo also had been charged in the early 1970s in New Jersey with an explosives-related case, according to court records. And Guillermo Novo was on probation for a 1974 conviction in New Jersey in connection with a plot to blow up a Cuban ship and other property in Montreal.

The Cuban exile movement headed by the Novos, who had been living in this country for nearly two decades, was considered extreme even by some other militant anti-Castro Cubans. They eventually were "adopted" in a sense by the rightists in the Pinochet government in Chile, according to some sources, at a time when anti-Castro forces here felt betrayed by the U.S. government's effort at rapprochement with the Fidel Castro government.

The government's Cuban exile informants were reluctant to appear before grand juries as witnesses. Police officers and FBI agents who had used them for years were reluctant to disclose even to other central investigators the names of persons providing them with information in the Letelier case.

At the same time, in early 1977, U.S. investigators began checking the foreign travels of some of the persons whom they believed, based on information from the Cuban exile informants, to be centrally involved in the murder conspiracy. They also were planning ways to put pressure on some of those persons so they might be forced to cooperate.

In early March 1977, while most law enforcement people here were occupied with 12 Hanafi Muslims barricaded in three Washington buildings, Propper, Cornick and Assistant U. S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr. were in Venezuela meeting with that country's secret police.

There they learned that Guillermo Novo had traveled to Chile and Venezuela in late 1974, in apparent violation of his probation in the United States. They determined to use that information to try to put pressure on Guillermo Novo.

Then, in April 1977, they decided to grant immunity from prosecution to two Cuban exiles, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel and Alvin Ross Diaz, if they would cooperate with investigators. Suarez refused to testify to the grand jury, and was sentenced to jail for an 11-month contempt of court sentence with the vow that he would never talk. At a press conference at the time, Ignacio Novo and Ross accused the government of harassing Cuban exiles.

In June 1977, prosecutors made their attempt to have Guillermo Novo's probation revoked. However, Novo failed to show up for that Trenton, N.J., hearing and became a fugitive for the next 11 months.

Then prosecutors learned in the late fall of 1977 that two persons whom they believed could have been DINA agents had come into the United States on official Chilean passports and met with Cuban exiles shortly before Letelier's murder.

Propper, Cornick and others decided to make one more attempt to shake loose information on the case in February 1978. The term of the original grand jury in the case was expiring soon, and investigators felt it was time to go public with some of what they knew. The procedure took the form of "letter rogatory," a legal maneuver in which the court of one country asks the court of another country for help.

The United States used that approach to ask Chile to produce for questioning the two persons who had traveled here with the official Chilean passports and met with Cuban suspects in the Letelier investigation. That highly irregular move left the clear implication that someone in the Chilean government was involved in the murder.

Within a week, photographs of the two men had been leaked to Washington Star reporter Jeremiah O'Leary and published here and in Santiago. Almost immediately, sources in Chile identified one of the men as an American-born DINA agent, Michael Vernon Townley.

Townley, 35, is a soft-spoken and in-

ST

urder and Diplomacy

tensely articulate man who has made Chile his home for the past 20 years after his father headed a large American automotive operation there.

As he is described by people who know him, Townley is an acknowledged electronic technician with the capability of building devices to detonate bombs by remote control. He had been active in commando raids against former President Allende. He had been charged with murder in a raid in which a night watchman was killed, but the charges were dropped when Pinochet came to power in late 1973 and Townley became a DINA agent.

Diplomatic sources reportedly made it clear without making specific threats that Washington was ready to sever relations with Chile if Townley were allowed to stay there. Evidently for that reason, Chile turned Townley over to the United States.

Faced with possible prosecution for murder in the Letelier case and possible assassination himself because of his knowledge of numerous other international terrorist activities, Townley made a deal with prosecutors here. He would enter a guilty plea to a less serious charge and cooperate with the Letelier investigation. But he would not be asked to provide information on anything else.

While Townley was deciding to cooperate, FBI agents in Miami had also struck paydirt. In mid-April, they had discovered—with the help of Miami area police—two other persons believed to be involved in the Letelier case: Guillermo Novo Sampol, who 11 months earlier had failed to show up at his probation hearing, and Alvin Ross Diaz, once granted immunity but now considered a suspect in the murder. They had been caught with cocaine and weapons, apparently in the midst of a plot to sell drugs and flee the country.

Once Townley's cooperation became known publicly, FBI and prosecutors worked swiftly to begin rounding up others whom they suspect participated in the bombing. They had hoped to catch Ignacio Novo, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel (freed from prison when the term of the first grand jury probing the Letelier case expired) and Virgilio Paz Romero, all in the same night. However, after a lengthy stake-out in northern New Jersey, only Ignacio Novo was apprehended.

In the hopes that Paz and Suarez will be caught and a trial could be held by autumn, prosecutors have begun putting together a case that focuses on a Chilean-ordered Letelier murder plot carried out by Cuban exiles.

Although details remain sketchy because of the government's desire to withhold the amount of its knowledge from unarrested suspects, the following outline of the government's case has emerged from various sources:

About a month before Letelier and Moffitt were killed, two Chilean secret police agents, Townley and Chilean Army Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, were sent to the United States to find someone to kill Orlando Letelier. Townley met with Cubans in Miami with whom he had become acquainted when he lived there in the early 1970s, and with Cubans in northern New Jersey.

Over the next 10 days, the bomb was planted in Letelier's car and plans were made to blow it up with him in it. The date of the blast happened to coincide with a major 1865 event in Chilean military history, when a vice admiral named Juan Williams broke through a Spanish naval blockade off the coast of Chile and became a Chilean Naval hero. Juan Williams also was the fake name under which Townley had entered the United States.

Dramatic Political Change Caused by Pressures on Chile

By Charles A. Krause

Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, Chile—The political situation here has changed dramatically in recent months after almost a decade of harsh authoritarian military rule.

President Augusto Pinochet, whose name has become associated abroad with total suppression of political liberties and brutal repression of human rights, is clearly on the defensive as a result of internal and external pressures—not the least of which is the investigation into the 1976 assassination of exiled Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier.

These pressures have already forced Pinochet to relax his grip on the country and to consider an end to the military dictatorship that he has headed since 1973, when he led the overthrow of leftist president Salvador Allende. The question is no longer whether the military will leave power but under what circumstances.

Last January, Gen. Pinochet said he could see no reason to hold another election in Chile for 10 years and added that the military had no intention of leaving power until 1990 or 1991.

By March, Pinochet had cut nine years off his timetable for when the next election would be held and six or seven years off his schedule for returning Chile to civilian rule. Pinochet announced that he would have a proposed new constitution written by the government ready by the end of this year, that there will be a plebiscite to approve or disapprove the document next year and a return to an elected government here by 1984 or 1985.

Most observers here believe that the details of Pinochet's timetable for phasing out military rule and his ideas for the kind of civilian government he would like afterwards are less important than the fact that he felt it necessary to discuss the subject

in the context of other liberalization measures and concessions to foreign critics that have perceptibly changed the atmosphere here.

"The fundamental shift that has occurred is that it is now worthwhile to talk about what the future might look like," said one diplomatic observer. "It's possible that this change in ambience will be ephemeral. But, at the moment, the Christian Democrats and the other opposition parties are riding high."

A Chilean lawyer who is a leader of a centrist political party—all parties are still officially outlawed—was both more cautious and more optimistic during a recent interview.

"At this time, there isn't much repression because of international pressure. But we believe that Pinochet doesn't really want to return to democracy and that the repression could return. The Letelier case is very serious for the government—and will have

an important effect on what happens," he said.

Since the United States has not yet charged any Chilean former secret police officers with a role in the political murder and the evidence against them has not yet been made public, the lawyer said, "it is impossible to say exactly what is going to happen."

"But I have the most profound belief that we will return to democracy because, really, this is a democratic country. In 1973, after the coup, I was optimistic in the long term. Now, I am optimistic in the shorter term."

Most observers here seem to believe that the 1973 coup was welcomed by the vast majority of people here after the last year of economic and political chaos under the Allende regime. But most Chileans have never considered a military solution permanent.

It has been viewed as an interlude—less agreeable to some than to others—that would eventually end. The beginning of the end started last Jan-

uary, according to most observers, and the question that could be answered within the next several months is whether civilian government will be restored in six or seven years, as Pinochet has said, or sooner, as many people here now think.

At the same time, the government has enough support and power to clamp a temporary lid on the liberalization that has already occurred if Chile's unions, political parties and leftists reassert themselves too quickly or try to provoke a direct confrontation.

The government, for example, broke up the first May Day labor demonstrations since the coup last month. But, significantly, there was little police violence and all of those arrested were allowed to go home within hours.

The hunger strike that ended last week did not achieve its primary objective of getting the government to

See CHILE, A36, Col. 2



GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET
... how much longer in power

Chile, Under Pressure, Accelerates Move to Civilian Rule

CHILE, From A31

admit that more than 600 leftists have disappeared, probably at the hands of the secret police, since 1973, but for the first time the issue was given prominent coverage in newspapers—which are closely watched by the government.

This weekend, the government announced that it will allow the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to visit Chile later this year.

"I don't think that Chile is going to take as long to return to democracy as Pinochet and some of those around him wish," said another diplomat. "But the situation is delicate. Things are vastly improved but the bottom line is that there's nothing to prevent the government from going back. There hasn't been an institutional leap. Most of the generals haven't seen the light."

What they have seen, apparently, is that Chile's worldwide reputation as a gross violator of human rights has severely weakened the country diplo-

matically and militarily. Chile no longer receives arms aid from the United States and has obtained little diplomatic support for its border disputes with neighboring Argentina and Bolivia.

The generals also thought they saw an attempt by Pinochet last January to turn the results of a plebiscite on his rule—which netted him 75 percent of the vote—into a means of personalizing the regime. It is said that the military sensed that Pinochet harbored designs of converting the junta with power shared by the army, air force, navy and national police—into a one-man dictatorship.

Opposition to Pinochet, led by air force commandant Gen. Gustavo Leigh, began to surface. Leigh began to talk about a return to democracy as a way of countering Pinochet's apparent grab for power, according to many observers.

Then came the U.S. investigation

into the Letelier murder and a continuing stream of allegations that it was carried out by the secret police, known here as DINA, at the behest of Gen. Manuel Contreras, a close confidant of Pinochet's who headed the organization.

Supporters and opponents of the military agree that Pinochet has already been hurt by the revelations from the Letelier investigation and the intense international scrutiny and pressure to improve the human rights situation here.

The series of liberalization measures announced by the government so far—an end to the state of siege, a political amnesty, appointment of a majority civilian Cabinet and the speeded-up timetable for the constitution—are seen here as tactical concessions to world opinion.

Many opponents of the junta be-

lieve that Pinochet had no intention of seriously beginning the transition to real democracy but that the liberalization measures, coupled with continuing international pressure, have taken on a life of their own.

The country's largest political party, the Christian Democrats, has been working with two smaller parties to write a constitution that could serve as an alternative to the government effort, which is based on principles that would give interest groups—rather than political parties—representation in a new legislature.

A group of more conservative lawyers is also known to be working on a constitution while a source close to the absolutely illegal Communist Party said that a working group had been formed to consider which of the conservative economic policies implemented by the government the party

could support after a return to democracy.

The likelihood of the military allowing the Communists to become legal again, even after some form of democratic government is restored, is not considered to be very great, however.

The real unknown is the outcome of the Letelier affair. Many people here believe a large number of Chileans, including some military, could not stomach the idea that DINA carried out a political assassination and many people would find it hard to believe that Pinochet did not know about it.

There is intense debate over whether Pinochet could continue as president in the wake of clear evidence that his old confidant Contreras was involved. At a minimum, it is thought that the return to democracy would be hastened if the junta is discredited by U.S. indictments.



LETELIER
ation raises issues

DISTRESSED PROPERTY SALE

Carter Makes the Right Move on Chile and Human Rights

an act that became an an president and a human dvocate.

y Carter called home our ad to Chile. He improved t decisive diplomatic act by ing that he would halt a ship- bombs destined for the ruling cargo that a San Francisco remen's local had refused to a matter of conscience.

mediate grounds for the re- George Landau from Santiago serve notice on Chile's dicta- n. Augusto Pinochet, that he t away with murder — not on ington street, anyway. The of the junta, the Justice De- nt investigators decided, was ding evidence in the assassi- of Orlando Letelier, the Chi- ile leader, who died in the xplosion of his car at Sheridan n Sept. 21, 1976.

ER POINTEDLY noted that his time in the United States, assador would participate in ough review of the human

rights situation in Chile, which has been a flagrant violator since the junta seized power, with CIA help, in 1974.

Further, the State Department announced that it is reconsidering all military aid, which is still being sent despite a congressional embargo because it is "in the pipeline," to countries with bad records.

No human rights advocate could ask for more. Last week, Carter in a speech before the Organization of American States, warned that he would "continue to demonstrate that there are costs to the flagrant disregard of international standards." The OAS, which was still meeting when the recall was announced, was startled by his prompt follow-up. Several delegates told U.S. representatives they were not surprised. They could, however, talk of nothing else.

The Chilean exile community is delirious. They see the beginning of the end for the Pinochet regime, which was, until Argentina caught up with it in mass jailings and kidnappings, the most brutal in Latin America.

Mary McGrory

Pinochet has reacted with furious charges that Carter and the Justice Department lawyers who pressed the Letelier investigation are "members of a Communist conspiracy." But he knows that the military is restive at the prospect of facing new world condemnation for exported political assassination.

AS LONG AS A dictator gets one dime or one gun from the United States and has an American ambassador on the scene, he is in some kind of shape at home. Pinochet still gets millions from six private U.S. banks, who declined to explain themselves to Chairman Henry Reuss of the House Banking Committee. They may now wish to answer Reuss' letter of two months ago — or even reconsider their loan policies.

Chile was made something of a pet by right-wing economists like Milton Friedman of Chicago and former Treasury Secretary William Simon, who thought of creating a model capitalist nation. But implication in a murder on a Washington street is something that the staunchest Tory cannot countenance, and Pinochet cannot expect any outcry from his patrons in U.S. banks and corporations.

The hero of this astonishing state of affairs is a Justice Department lawyer, 35-year-old Eugene M. Propper, a dogged, "non-ideological" investigator who had no thought of changing American foreign policy when he took on the investigation of the death of Letelier and his companion in the bombed car, Ronni Moffitt.

Propper, an assistant U.S. attorney, initially resisted the "Chilean connection" in the murder when it was urged on him by Letelier's widow, Isabel, and Michael Moffitt, the husband of Ronni. At one point, the FBI leaked the contents of Letelier's briefcase which purported to show he was a Castro agent. When Isabel Letelier told a U.N. Human Rights Commission that Justice had Santiago under suspicion, Attorney General Griffin Bell denied it. The Chilean Solidarity Movement, a tight network, and practiced in the uses of public opinion from its democratic tradition, complained that Bell was dragging his feet.

PROPPER, LOOKING neither to right nor left, saying nothing, tracked the clues. With the attorney general's backing, he moved into the dark corners of the Cuban exile community; he made several trips to Chile. Pinochet, who claimed he had nothing to hide, went through the motions of cooperation. Propper negoti-

ated the extradition of a vital witness, Michael Townley, an American expatriate and erstwhile agent of DINA, Chile's notorious secret police. He persisted. His most recent visit, the Pinochet press protested, was "unnecessary and officious." He held the final pre-recall negotiations with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Chileans, and American liberals, think he has brought the Justice Department its finest hour.

When Pinochet came to Washington to participate in the Panama Canal Treaty signing, he said — when asked about his involvement in the Letelier murder — "I wouldn't have anything to do with anything like that."

Now Jimmy Carter officially doesn't believe him. And has stopped sending him bombs. He is in trouble. And Jimmy Carter has become again the hope of deliverance for millions of Latin Americans who daily face the fear of prison, torture, kidnapping or death from the likes of Augusto Pinochet.

Paraguayan Links Chile's DINA to

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

An FBI agent last week quietly slipped into the capital of Paraguay, Asunción, and conducted a secret interview with a high-ranking Paraguayan official that establishes the crucial link between the Chilean secret police and the assassination of Orlando Letelier.

This "Paraguayan connection" is another piece of evidence the United States has collected showing that the secret police of four right-wing Latin American governments — Chile, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay —

have been secretly collaborating for several years in organized operations against exiles and political enemies from each country, even to the extent of cooperating in assassination conspiracies.

The interview with the unnamed Paraguayan official by FBI Special Agent Calvin Clegg, according to sources close to the probe, is expected to wrap up the Justice Department's case against DINA, the secret police organization of Chile.

While officials of the State and Justice departments and the FBI would not comment on the "Paraguayan connection," the deposition of the

Four Latin Nations Cooperate Against Dissident Exiles

Paraguayan official was essential for the indictments a federal grand jury is expected to return, sometime after July 25, against former DINA chief Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda.

Contreras, one of the best friends of Chile's President Augusto Pinochet, was forced into retirement recently because of exposes of the DINA plot with Cuban exiles to kill Letelier.

THE "PARAGUAYAN connection" involved official collaboration between the governments of Chile

and Paraguay to get U.S. visas for two DINA agents under false names and with phony Paraguayan passports.

There is no evidence, officials emphasized, that the Paraguayan official or his government knew what the DINA murder team planned to do in the United States. It is probable that Paraguay did not know anything except that Contreras had asked one of his counterparts for help in getting the visas in what might be called a visa-laundering operation.

Letelier Slaying

The State Department said that the Paraguayan government had cooperated fully with the investigators.

But the Clegg mission, which was arranged in large part by the State Department and Ambassador to Paraguay Robert White, resulted in the disclosure that the U.S. government has long known about the collaboration of right-wing governments in southern Latin America.

For several years, American officials have confirmed, Washington has known about the secret cooperation of the intelligence services of the four military governments in opera-

tions against exiles from each country.

EXISTENCE OF the four-nation cabal was known to the State Department and the CIA, according to well-informed official sources, for some time before the Sept. 21, 1976, assassination in Washington of the Chilean leftist politician and diplomat, Letelier.

But U.S. officials emphasized that they had never expected that there would be a political murder of a Latin dissident in the United States.

See PLOT, A-4

PLOT

Continued From A-1

It was after the investigation was begun into the Letelier murder by Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and the FBI that officials discovered the so-called "Paraguay connection." This was the August 1976 trip by two members of the Chilean secret police to Asuncion, where they tried, but failed, to obtain official U.S. visas with the aid of a high-ranking Paraguayan official by passing themselves off as Paraguayans.

Sources in two U.S. government agencies said it was one thing to know about the multinational secret police collaboration and another to discover that it had reached out to cause the death of two people in the heart of Washington, Letelier and his colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt.

INFORMATION available to U.S. officials about the four-nation secret police pact has been closely held and carries the highest security classification. In part, officials said, this is because the CIA had succeeded in penetrating one of the four secret police services and the cables containing reports on this penetration are accessible to only a handful of officials.

In August 1976, one month before Letelier's car was blown up, Washington learned that Michael V. Townley, 36, an American expatriate living in Chile and working for DINA, and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios of the Chilean army had gone to the Paraguayan capital.

There, with the aid of the unnamed Paraguayan official, they applied at the U.S. consulate for official U.S. visas. Reportedly one of the Paraguayan clerks in the consulate noted that the applicants were obviously not Paraguayans.

Both the Paraguayan woman consular employee and the Paraguayan official who requested the U.S. visas for the two Chileans would be important witnesses at the expected trial of Townley and three or more Cuban exiles, investigators said.

U.S. officials have realistically determined that, even if indicted, no Chilean officers will be extradited under the Chilean military government for a trial here.

COINCIDENTALLY, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay in 1976 was George W. Landau, who is now ambassador to Chile. The applications came to Landau's attention through the embassy chain of command and he asked Washington for instructions.

The then-assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Harry

Shlaudeman, now ambassador to Peru, was aware of the four-nation compact for secret police mutual assistance. Shlaudeman has told The Washington Star that he cabled back immediately to Asuncion the instructions to retrieve the visas issued to Townley and Fernandez in the invented names of "Juan Williams Rose" and "Alejandro Romeral Jara." Consular officials did manage to get the visas back and the photographs that appeared to be of no importance at the time were filed away.

It was this incident in Paraguay that gave U.S. authorities possession of photographs of Townley and Fernandez, alias Williams and Romeral, a month before Letelier was assassinated in downtown Washington. No one realized the significance of the Asuncion matter in August 1976, but it was remembered by several U.S. officials aware of the four-nation secret police arrangement as soon as they heard that Letelier had been killed by a bomb.

Tracing the Asuncion pair was not easy. At first, U.S. officials in Washington decided they would have to permit Propper, Assistant U.S. Attorney Larry Barcella and FBI Special Agent Clegg to have access to all State Department cable traffic regarding both the Letelier killing and the secret police agreement.

PROPPER, BARCELLA AND CLEGG have declined to comment on any aspect of the Latin secret police matter or the case, but it is now well established that the CIA's files and reports also were made available to the investigators.

In tracking down every application for U.S. visas made from several Latin capitals, investigators soon noted that men named "Williams" and "Romeral" had made similar applications in the Chilean capital, Santiago, after being turned down by the U.S. consulate in Asuncion.

But the mystery was that the photos of the two men in Santiago bore no resemblance to the two who applied for visas in Asuncion. And when U.S. investigators asked to see "Williams" and "Romeral," they were shown pictures of two men who bore no resemblance to the two of the same name who applied in Paraguay.

Subsequently, investigators learned that the applicants in Asuncion were really involved in the Letelier case while the applicants in Santiago essentially had been used as a smokescreen. The latter two had nothing to do with the Letelier case.

In fact, investigators learned that Townley came to the United States under one of many aliases he is known to have used, while Fernandez used still another name and passport.

This point caused considerable confusion at the early stages of the probe of Letelier's murder.

WHEN THE ASUNCION photos were published by The Star and then in Chile by the newspaper El Mercurio, the true identities of Townley and Fernandez were quickly made known by readers. Identifications were made both in Washington and Santiago by people who know Townley and Fernandez.

The important point for U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers was that the governments in Santiago, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Asuncion were working together, at least on the secret police level.

All four countries of the so-called Cono del Sur (southern cone) have many citizens from the other nations living within their boundaries. Argentina, particularly, has many Paraguayans who, because of politics or economic pressures, leave their landlocked nation and go to live in Buenos Aires. Uruguayans and Argentines quite frequently cross and recross the Rio Plata estuary. A number of Chileans, either voluntarily or through fear, went to live in neighboring lands.

One of the most obvious cases of secret police terror was that of Gen. Carlos Prats, who was commander of Chile's army and defense minister until three weeks before the armed forces rose up against the elected Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Prats and his wife went into exile in Argentina but within a year they were killed by a bomb blast in Buenos Aires. This assassination occurred after Prats wrote a letter denouncing Pinochet as a traitor without parallel in Chile's history.

U.S. OFFICIALS carefully do not say that Argentina collaborated in the Prats murder. But the agreement among the four South American secret police forces, as U.S. officials understand it, would have permitted DINA agents to operate freely in Argentina.

Since the death of Letelier, there have been substantial changes in the region and U.S. officials say collaboration among the four dictatorships is no longer as close.

Relations between Chile and Argentina have cooled over the Beagle Channel territorial dispute.

Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay were all condemned in varying degrees for human rights violations by the Organization of American States, although the four are now trying to improve their image on that score.


However, U.S. officials say, the investigation into Letelier's murder has shed so much light on the secret police forces of the Southern Cone countries that they have been heavily curbed in their operations.

THE LETELIER INVESTIGATION

7/16/78



Chilean secret police agent Michael Townley in 1973.



Prosecutor Eugene Propper: from petty criminals to spies.

The assassination of a former Chilean Ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C., has resulted in a grand jury investigation that reveals the chilling presence of a network of trained terrorists at work not only in Latin America, but in this country as well.



Rescue workers remove the bodies of Orlando Letelier and his aide, Ronni Moffitt, from the wreckage of Letelier's automobile. Ronni's husband, Michael, walked away with only minor injuries.

By Taylor Branch

SEPTEMBER 21, 1976 — Eugene M. Propper sat eating lunch in the cafeteria at the Federal courthouse in Washington, D.C., the courthouse where Judge John Sirica presided over the Watergate trials. Only 29, tall, slender and neatly bearded, Propper had worked upstairs for almost five years as an Assistant United States Attorney, but planned to leave soon for private practice, having tired of casework in burglaries and petty corruption.

When a superior dropped by his table and asked him to look into the double murder of a former Chilean Ambassador named Orlando Letelier and his American aide that had occurred that morning, Propper agreed on a hunch that the case might become an interesting finale to his prosecutorial career. He had no idea that the case would totally preoccupy him.

With only a newspaper reader's knowledge of undercover operations among Cubans and Chileans, gleaned from the most publicized C.I.A. stories of recent decades, Propper was far re-

Taylor Branch is a Washington-based freelance journalist.

September 11, 1973 — L

moved from the world of Latin American terrorism, a world of coups d'etat, murder and drug trafficking. It was a world populated by a small army of agents, some trained in the 1960's by the United States. For a hard-working prosecutor like Propper, it would be a long leap from street crime to the spy underworld and the heights of diplomacy.

The Letelier case would be interesting on two levels, Propper would soon learn. It was, of course, a dramatic international murder case of great significance. But beyond that, Propper would find that the more he probed the murder, the more he would learn about this country's controversial and often shadowy involvement in Latin American affairs.

The murder itself is still being investigated by a Federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., with indictments expected later this month. What the grand jury has found so far is secret, but sources predict that the indictments will involve not only important Cuban exile leaders but also officials high in the Chilean Government's secret police.

Propper would learn that men like Orlando Bosch, leader of the Cuban terrorist organization, CORU; Orlando Garcia, a top-level official in the Venezuelan secret police; Ricardo Morales, a master spy who had worked for a number of intelligence agencies, including the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.; Ignacio Novo, the leader of the U.S.-based Bay of Pigs veterans' organization; along with others, like Michael Townley, the American-born Chilean secret police operative, would play major parts in the Letelier investigation.

To many experts, the training of these men, and others like them by the C.I.A., was an experiment that was bound to someday backfire. For, as American policy toward Castro softened, a trained cadre of Cuban exile terrorists, embittered and frustrated, spread throughout Latin America, ultimately occupying important posts in various national police and intelligence agencies.

Propper's case would involve double agents, double crosses and double meaning, as well as a double murder. It began the morning of September 21, 1976, as Orlando Letelier drove down Massachusetts Avenue on his way to work at Washington's Institute for Policy Studies, accompanied by two young colleagues, Ronni and Michael Moffitt, 25-year-old newlyweds and newcomers to capital politics. As institute researchers and aides to a prominent Chilean exile like Letelier, they had plunged quickly into the thick of things. In 1976, Chile was much in the news, with revelations coming out about the C.I.A.'s persistent interventions in that country leading up to a 1973 military coup against the left-wing government of Salvador Allende. At the same time, there was a growing number of reports documenting a campaign of torture and murder by the Chilean junta's secret police, known as DINA.



Augusto Pinochet, leader of the Chilean military junta that ousted Allende, surrounded by

Letelier knew a lot about the coup and about the DINA. As Allende's Defense Minister, he was arrested during the coup and then imprisoned and tortured for nearly a year in a makeshift DINA work camp. In exile, Letelier, who had a wide circle of influential and highly placed friends — including United States Senators and European government ministers — became friend and mentor to the Moffitts. Traveling the globe, he employed all his contacts and all his talents in opposition to General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's junta in Chile. The junta, in return, stripped Letelier of his Chilean citizenship.

But Letelier felt safe in the United States. Entering Sheridan Circle, his car moved past the embassies of South Korea, Turkey and Rumania. Suddenly, Michael Moffitt, sitting in the back seat, heard a loud hissing sound that seemed to run up the driver's door to the roof of the car, and he saw a flash of light on the dashboard. The floor erupted directly under Letelier, blowing off the car door and crumpling the roof. Careening into a Volkswagen parked in front of the Irish Embassy, the car settled among the scattered glass and debris. Letelier's legs lay in the street nearby, his torso pinned in the wreckage. He died shortly after reaching the hospital. Ronni Moffitt, while not mutilated like Letelier, died a few minutes later, drowned in her own blood. Michael Moffitt walked away from the carnage with only minor physical injuries.

In the heart of the American capital, in daylight, within sight of at least a dozen foreign embassies, terrorists had dared to carry out a major gangland-style political execution.

From that frozen moment of terror, there grew a mystery that investigators refused to abandon through long months of frustration and disillusionment. They would hold fiercely to the moment, shaking it, until, finally, questions were answered and governments began to feel the repercussions of the investigations.

As in Watergate, the original crime led back into a maze of official crimes and collateral scandals whose magnitude would come slowly into view. But, unlike Watergate, no Cubans were caught red-handed and there were no suspects.

From the beginning, Propper was surrounded by chaos. He helped settle chronic jurisdictional disputes among various agencies, especially the police and the F.B.I., and at the same time tried to arrange some sort of truce between F.B.I. agents and the victims' relatives and their friends at the Institute for Policy Studies. This last was no easy task, for the F.B.I. and I.P.S. had been classic political enemies for years. No F.B.I. agent needed to be reminded that I.P.S. had filed a \$1 million damage suit against the bureau for political harassments during the Vietnam war. The institute, called the intellectual home of the American left in Washington, housed assorted radicals who customarily assailed the conduct of the U.S. Government. By almost any

Continued on 629

LEGACY OF T



Orlando Bosch, Ricardo Morales and Ign

The lack of consistency in the United States policy toward Castro left a legacy that some experts believe finally came to include terrorist acts like the murder of Orlando Letelier, as the stories of Orlando Bosch, Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales illustrate. Trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1960's, when American policy toward Castro was very firm, these terrorists — with the support of American-based exile leaders like Ignacio Novo — later employed the tactics they had learned on behalf of other Latin American countries after United States policy toward Cuba softened.

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Orlando Bosch, recruited by the C.I.A. in 1960, along with a number of other anti-Castro Cubans, is now one of the most famous terrorists in the Western Hemisphere. Quarreling with C.I.A. officers over his role in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, he called on Cubans to wage their own war against Castro and became something of a laughingstock among Miami operatives who, at the time, believed their cause was hopeless without American support.

But by 1974, the last hopes for secret American help had died among the anti-Castro agents, and Bosch was in fashion. The militant Cuban exiles not only felt betrayed, they felt the C.I.A. was actively undermining their efforts and, according to reports, Bosch reflected their anger by taking public credit for inspiring a series of gangland slayings of "C.I.A. stooges." Bosch then left the country, sources say, to make alliances with anti-Communists in Latin America — including officials of the Chilean DINA.

In June of 1976, Bosch was chosen to lead an umbrella group of Cuban political factions, CORU, whose members agreed upon a marked escalation of violence against Castro sympathizers. Bosch returned to his base in Venezuela and confided in two Cuban contacts within the DISIP there — Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales.

Orlando Garcia is a pro, one of the C.I.A.'s best intelligence operatives from the early 60's, sources say. When

ERROR



acio Novo: Old boys in the Latin American terrorist network.

the Vietnam build-up caused a drastic reduction in the huge Miami C.I.A. station, he joined other Cubans with C.I.A. training who fanned out among the intelligence services of Latin America in the mid-60's. "It worked out well for everybody," said a C.I.A. official. Over the next decade, Garcia rose to the top of the Venezuelan DISIP, hiring younger Cubans to join him.

One of them, Ricardo Morales, was a member of the elite C.I.A. commandos — an explosives expert, highly praised within the agency for his quick wits and courage. By 1964, discouraged by "the Company's" half-hearted effort against Castro, he agreed reluctantly to go on a highly secret mission to the Congo (now Zaire) on the promise that his group could resume raids against Castro after this "big favor" for President Lyndon Johnson.

Returning to the United States, he was told his knowledge of the Congo operations made him a security risk. Morales left the agency in disgust. He was arrested on bombing charges in Miami in 1968, but, according to sources, he was "prosecution proof" because of his C.I.A. past, and he went free as an F.B.I. informant. His testimony convicted Orlando Bosch that year.

Marked as an informant, Morales survived two assassination attempts over the next six years. In 1974, a bomb demolished his car in Miami, but Morales emerged from the wreckage and was soon joking with reporters at the scene. Such panache was part of his legend. Having worked for Castro's secret police, the C.I.A., F.B.I. and reportedly for a number of other foreign intelligence agencies, Morales achieved fame as a master spy who manipulated his numerous involvements, playing off one of his agencies against another. In 1975, Morales left Miami to work for the Venezuelan DISIP, working with Orlando Garcia and meeting his old enemy, Orlando Bosch. Conventional labels of "cop" and "bad guy" are hopelessly outmoded in the world where these three operate.

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The April 1974 assassination of the

first "C.I.A. stooge" touched off a spree in which assassins attacked no less than nine prominent Miami Cubans in the next two years, killing six. In addition, law enforcement officials reported 200 major bombings. The same methods, materials and agents of terrorism showed up in bombings all over the hemisphere. "There's only one part of the United States now that's literally exporting terrorism," said a Justice Department source, "and that's south Florida."

Prosecutors labored under a disadvantage that is a legacy of all the clandestine operations in Miami from the 1960's: The suspects are trained and connected.

During the gangland outburst, embittered leaders of the 2506 Brigade (a creature of the C.I.A. since its formation before the Bay of Pigs) sued the Kennedy Library for the return of their flag. Almost simultaneously, they bestowed the brigade's first "Freedom Award" on Chile's President Pinochet. Representatives of the junta began to appear regularly at brigade rallies.

Radical new leadership took over the brigade in its 1976 elections, calling for anti-Castro terrorism. One of the official new "military leaders" was Ignacio Novo, now charged with conspiracy to murder Orlando Letelier. He is not a Bay of Pigs veteran or a C.I.A. trainee or even an exile from the Castro regime — having left Cuba in 1954 along with his brother Guillermo. Their New Jersey-based political group was nationalist to the point of fascism, and the Novo brothers had a wild and rather disreputable image among most Cuban exiles through the 1960's, according to a number of exiles. Like Orlando Bosch, they became prominent only as the more established exile leaders moved toward terrorism.


At Ignacio Novo's first congress of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association — attended by a complement of United States Congressmen and candidates — delegates voted to endorse the brigade's membership in CORU, Orlando Bosch's new terrorist consortium.

Letelier was killed less than a month later.

— T.B.

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standard, they were personally incompatible with F.B.I. agents such as L. Carter Cornick, a conservative Virginian who joked that his family had boycotted the Washington newspapers ever since they started running pictures of "pinkos" like Eleanor Roosevelt back in the 1930's.

Propper and Cornick somehow managed to win the personal confidence of the scholars at I.P.S., but the I.P.S. people made no secret of their mistrust of the F.B.I. and the Government as a whole. No sooner did Propper and Cornick have the I.P.S. people convinced that they would follow the case anywhere than I.P.S. came back again, incensed over press reports that contradicted these assurances; Newsweek published an item stating that "The C.I.A. has concluded that the Chilean secret police were not involved in the death of Orlando Letelier..." Propper, somewhat exasperated, could only repeat that the investigation was just beginning.

THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTION

OCTOBER 1976 — The investigation quickly received a heavy dose of intrigue when its focus shifted to Venezuela, of all places. On Oct. 6, less than three weeks after the Letelier-Moffitt murders, a bomb exploded inside a Cubana Airlines jet en route from Barbados to Cuba, killing all 73 people on board. Fidel Castro, blaming the C.I.A., promptly canceled the 1973 anti-hijacking treaty with the United States. Shortly afterward, Venezuelan authorities arrested more than 20 people, almost all Cubans, who they said were involved in a terrorist network responsible for bombings in several countries. The Venezuelans charged a number of them, including a Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch, with conspiring to blow up the Cuban plane.

This became more than a gruesome news item to Propper when F.B.I. agents reported that Bosch had told the Venezuelan secret police that two New Jersey-based Cuban-American brothers named Guillermo and Ignacio Novo Sampol had been involved in killing Letelier. But who were the Novo brothers? The F.B.I. received information from

Bosch through two Cuban exiles high up in DISIP, the Venezuelan secret police, who also said the Chilean junta had been putting out murder contracts on Chilean exiles like Letelier.

While Propper's investigation moved hesitantly forward in Venezuela, it abruptly ran into a strange roadblock. Surprisingly, the Venezuelans refused to supply further information. Finally, Propper resorted to an official means of international inquiry known as Letters Rogatory, in which a court of one nation asks a court of another nation to seek out information useful to a pending case. Propper sent the Letters, which he had obtained from the First District Court in Washington, D.C., to Caracas secretly, to avoid diplomatic repercussions, but the Venezuelan courts declined to cooperate with the Letters, and the Venezuelan Government innocently maintained that it has no authority over the courts.

Struggling to learn why he was getting so little cooperation, Propper and his colleagues discovered that the Venezuelan Government appeared to work both with and against the terrorists. They also learned why Bosch and two DISIP Cubans — Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales — came together in that country, and how they were linked in one way or another to many people who might know about terrorist acts like the Letelier murder. According to sources, the three Cubans all had different kinds of C.I.A. careers; when Propper found them riding the razor's edge of terrorism in Venezuela, they were still "in the business" of espionage and intelligence. [See box, Page 29.]

OCTOBER 1976 — After Propper's Cuban sources implicated Guillermo and Ignacio Novo in the murders, Propper subpoenaed the Novo brothers before a Federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., at the end of October. The testimony produced no important evidence, sources say, but it did contain statements that became the basis for a charge of perjury relating to the murders.

At the same time, Propper stepped up his efforts to secure some cooperation from the C.I.A., since the crime appeared to be of international origin and since the witnesses and suspects appeared to have C.I.A. backgrounds. A Justice

Department delegation met with the agency's Director, George Bush, and its general counsel, Anthony Lapham, to seek a working arrangement. Sources said the participants "got around" legal restrictions on the C.I.A.'s involvement in criminal investigations through a high-level exchange of letters, initiated by the Attorney General, which stipulated that the agency would only provide information, not direct evidence. The parties recognized explicitly that if the Attorney General and the C.I.A. Director should disagree on whether a witness or a piece of evidence could be presented in open court, they would refer the dispute directly to the President.

Under these agreements, the C.I.A. began turning over to Justice Department officials background information on Cuban exile political groups and on foreign organizations such as the Venezuelan DISIP and the Chilean DINA. No source would say, however, that the agency ever provided a major new clue.

PROPPER'S FIRST BREAKTHROUGH

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1976 — Propper felt confident enough in the Venezuelan leads and in other evidence to intensify his investigation of the Chilean DINA. At a time when Propper and the F.B.I. refused publicly even to list DINA as a possible suspect in the case (to the dismay of Letelier's colleagues at I.P.S.), they committed enough F.B.I. manpower to sift through the visa applications of every single Chilean who entered the United States between May and September of 1976. It was laborious, unglamorous work, stretching out through the early months of 1977. One member of the search team put the number of visas in the initial batch at more than a thousand.

Operating on the theory that any Chilean conspirators "would not be dumb enough to travel on an official passport," as one F.B.I. source puts it, the agents started out looking for the people who had applied for non-official visas. By hunches and guesswork, they threw out the most unlikely ones first — the large families on vacation in California, and so on. "We went through them all," said a source involved in the search later. "We went all

through the forest to get a tree."

At the end, a small number of visa applicants attracted suspicion for one reason or another. Among them were two Chilean army officers named Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara. When the suspect names were circulated among other governmental, police and intelligence agencies for signs of recognition, a report from an alert Ambassador in Paraguay about Williams and Romeral popped up from the records of the State Department. These records brought the first excitement to the investigation, the first moment when suspicions and clues came together in a promising way, and they documented the first of many episodes that would make United States Ambassador to Paraguay George Landau a hero to the investigators.


FLASHBACK: THE ALERT AMBASSADOR

JULY 1976 (two months before the Letelier-Moffitt murders) — Ambassador George Landau received a phone call at his embassy office in Asuncion, Paraguay, from a high official of the Paraguayan Government, who inexplicably wanted to assure the Ambassador that the two Chileans who had just been granted official U.S. visas in Paraguay were O.K. The caller said the Paraguayans would vouch for them even though the Chileans were not — as diplomatic custom requires — attached to the Chilean Embassy in Paraguay. After puzzling over the call, Landau made calls of his own to check on the story.

Whatever he learned, it did not remove his suspicions. On the contrary, he called the Paraguayan official back that same day and notified him formally that the two Chileans' visas had been revoked. He then forwarded the visa photographs of Williams and Romeral to the State Department in Washington, along with a cable setting forth the details of the story. Such reports (especially from a known smuggling center like Paraguay) are fed into the Government's "Watch List" to alert security agencies. But for some reason Landau's cable and the photographs sat unnoticed in the bureaucracy until six months after the as-

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
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sassinations. They arrived late, but sources believed it would have been almost impossible to break the case without them.

THE CHILEAN CONNECTION

MARCH 1977 — Propper and his investigators possessed not only Williams' and Romeral's visas, but also visa applications — two sets of suspicious records. If, as investigators believed, these men arranged the Letelier assassination for the DINA, investigators believed, they committed many blunders. By seeking official visas in Paraguay, they not only drew attention to themselves but they had also submitted photographs. Then, incredibly, they apparently returned to Chile after their covers had been blown and applied for U.S. visas in Chile — official ones, requiring no photographs but supported by a letter from the Chilean Foreign Ministry. Thus, they left a paper trail that included not only revoked visas and photographs, but also a letter tying them to the top levels of the

Chilean Government.

Still, the paper trail very nearly went undiscovered, and investigators believed that the mistakes might well have been consistent with other errors in the murder — including the death of an innocent American, for example. Agents of the Chilean secret police might well have made such mistakes. "The DINA," noted a C.I.A. official who served in Chile, "is not a sophisticated service. It was only created in 1973, to defend the coup, so it's new. It took us about 15 years to get our own State Department to issue false official passports for our agency, so you can imagine how much trouble the Chileans might have."

FAILURE IN THE GRAND JURY

Through the spring and summer of 1977, Propper called more than 20 Cuban witnesses before the Letelier grand jury, some of them several times. He used all the legal leverage he had to secure testimony to support the Venezuelan leads and informants' reports. He

had one Cuban suspect (later sought as a fugitive in the Letelier murder) jailed for refusing to testify under a grant of immunity. He told the president of Miami's Bay of Pigs Veterans Association (Brigade 2506) that he was a direct suspect in the case, and he threatened to have Hector Duran, a Chilean consul in Miami, declared persona non grata if he were not more forthcoming. Despite all this, and much more, the Cuban witnesses wouldn't talk. One F.B.I. source said that not a single witness recognized the photographs of Williams and Romeral. "This case was not made in the grand jury," sighed a prosecution source.

As in Venezuela earlier, Propper had accumulated a batch of tantalizing intelligence reports and then ran into a stone wall. The lack of hard evidence was especially frustrating, because the informants and the testimony showed how the same harsh currents that brought Orlando Bosch together with the DISIP agents in Venezuela had also brought Cuban exiles together with DINA agents in Miami in an atmosphere of violence. The same condition that per-

petuated Miami's violence — too many informants, too few witnesses — kept hard evidence in the Letelier case out of reach.

GAMBLE IN CHILE

SEPTEMBER 1977 — One long year after the murders on Sheridan Circle, President Pinochet arrived in Washington to attend the signing ceremonies for the Panama Canal treaties. At the same time, Propper and Cornick, stymied after months of work on the American side of the murder conspiracy, had been forced to look outside the United States for new leads. They managed to have discreet interviews with Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales of the Venezuelan DISIP, and they also interviewed a young Cuban named Rolando Otero who had spent several months of 1976 in Chile, conferring with DINA officials who wanted him to kill the junta's enemies abroad. The United States Government had twice stopped Otero's efforts to testify about his DINA contacts,

but Propper was determined to hear what Otero knew. He wanted information about Williams and Romeral, and about the names of DINA officers who planned foreign murders. If the conspiracy could not be traced from America to Chile, Propper would have to reverse direction and, using diplomatic leverage, go straight after the DINA in its own land. It was an extraordinary move, based on the ironic notion that it would be more fruitful to pursue an American murder case in a foreign country.

Through the fall and winter of 1977, Cornick and his F.B.I. colleagues used routine Interpol channels in Chile to seek Williams and Romeral, as though they were suspects in a normal criminal case. The Chilean military dragged on cooperating with Interpol's efforts to locate the two men. Finally, one Chilean general broke the investigator's patience by leaving on a five-and-a-half week vacation.

After long deliberations with Justice Department superiors, Propper decided to send Letters Rogatory to the Chilean Supreme Court. Unlike the Letters to Venezuela a year

(Continued on Page 39)

Continued from Page 35

earlier, these would be publicly announced and transmitted to the Chilean junta along with a high-level message from the State Department to underscore their importance. Attorney General Griffin Bell and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance approved the substance of the plan.

FEBRUARY 1978 — Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher summoned Chilean Ambassador Jorge Cauas to his office. Christopher handed him a draft letter covering the Letters Rogatory, explained their purpose briefly, and then delivered the message that had been prepared in advance: "It is of the utmost importance that the Chilean Government recognize the gravity of the situation and the possible implications for the future of our relations." The meeting was over within 20 minutes.

In Chile, the branches of the armed forces declared one by one that they had never heard of any "Williams" or "Romeral." For 10 days, American officials in Santiago stressed the importance of the two suspects, while the Chileans shrugged their shoulders.

MARCH 1978 — Once again, Propper and his colleagues found themselves in danger of being shrugged off indefinitely. Sources later said they did not have any idea of the real identities of Williams or Romeral. Nor could they reveal what intelligence information they had received from the Venezuelan sources without showing how little they had connecting the two suspects to activities in the United States. So, it appears, they decided that one gamble required another.

All sources in the Justice and State Departments and the F.B.I. denied giving the "Williams" and "Romeral" photographs to Washington Star reporter Jeremiah O'Leary, but his story on March 3, across that newspaper's entire front page, appeared to be the result of a leak at the highest levels. The story said that "the United States is prepared to sever diplomatic relations with Chile" if the two men in the photographs were not produced to comply with the Letters Rogatory. Newspapers all over the world, including those in Chile, reprinted the photographs that had been squeezed up through the United States security system as a result of Ambassador George Landau's suspicions back in Paraguay.

Since that time, Ambassador Landau had been trans-

ferred to Chile, a development that Propper's colleagues took as a good omen in view of the Ambassador's previous actions in Paraguay.

Publication of the photographs lit the Letelier case like a fuse. Two days after the O'Leary story, the largest newspaper in Santiago, El Mercurio, identified "Williams" as Michael V. Townley, a 35-year-old American who had lived most of the last 20 years in Chile. El Mercurio had consistently advanced the thesis that Letelier had been murdered by his own socialist friends in a double-jointed plot to create a leftist martyr. Its identification of Townley was a stunning event in a Chile that had lived under strict censorship for more than four years.

The news breaks in the Letelier case had become too delicious to be suppressed. Teams of Chilean reporters besieged junta spokesmen for details of Townley's life and wrote profile after profile on his politics and upbringing. On March 9, El Mercurio identified "Romeral" as Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios of the Chilean Army, and profiles were written about him, too. On March 10, President Pinochet broke his silence on the case by declaring his Government's innocence and attacking the U.S. investigation. "I have the impression," he stated, "that this is a very well-mounted campaign like all the campaigns that the Communists mount to discredit the Government."

By this time, the Chilean press was discussing the untimely death of Protocol Chief Carlos Guillermo Osorio, the man who had signed the supporting letters for the visa applications of "Williams" and "Romeral." The death certificate stated that he had died of a "heart attack" the previous October. However, the papers learned that Osorio's relatives had secured an autopsy in November, during which doctors found that Osorio had died of a gunshot wound in his forehead.

Having appointed three separate panels to investigate the circumstances of the "Williams" passports, the junta's machinery insisted long after the press identifications that the identities of the two men were still in question. Meanwhile, the name "Michael Townley" circulated quickly among law-enforcement agencies in the United States. Investigative sources said they were startled to learn that their suspect was an American — and were even more surprised at the news that he had lived in the Miami area in 1967-

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Tom Collins: 1 1/2 ozs. Gordon's Gin, juice of 1/2 lemon. Pour over ice in highball glass. Add sprinkle of powdered sugar. Fill with soda. Decorate with orange slice and cherry.



Salty Dog: 1 1/2 ozs. Gordon's Gin over ice cubes in old-fashioned glass. Fill with 3 ozs. grapefruit juice. Add dash of salt.



Rickey: 1 1/2 ozs. Gordon's Gin, juice from 1/2 lime with rind into highball glass with ice cubes. Fill with soda water. Stir.



Daisy: 1 1/2 ozs. Gordon's Gin, teaspoon of grenadine, juice of 1/2 lemon, 1/2 teaspoon powdered sugar. Stir contents over ice cubes in highball glass. Add soda water to fill.



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Highball: 1 1/2 ozs. Gordon's Gin into highball glass filled with ice. Twist in lemon peel. Pour on ginger ale.



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1971 and 1973-1974. Agents
rushed out to interview
friends, relatives, co-workers,
family doctors, landlords and
anyone else they could find. In-
ternational travel records
were combed for Townley's
name, and helpful signs
popped up here and
there. "Townley's name got
hot very fast," said an investi-
gator.

THE FIRST SHOWDOWN

On March 19, Propper him-
self flew to Chile to help move
things along. Two days later,
Chile's newspapers reported
more stunning news: General
Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda,
who had ruled the DINA with
an iron hand as President
Pinochet's chosen man, had
suddenly and mysteriously re-
signed from the Army. Con-
treras had wielded such im-
mense power that his depart-
ure stimulated gossip in Chile
that he must have been in-
volved in the Letelier affair.
Diplomatic sources, picking
up on the Watergate analogy
that had become popular in
Chile, remarked that Pinochet
seemed to be "sacrificing his
Haldeman."

Over the next two weeks,
news about Michael Townley
sent shock waves all through
Pinochet's Government. Since
he had worked for the DINA,
some Chilean Army officers
were said to be blaming
General Contreras for fouling
the honor of the Chilean Army
with ugly Mafia tactics, while
other officers were said to be
equally disgusted with Presi-
dent Pinochet for allowing for-
eigners to push around the
sovereign nation of Chile.
There were many signs that
factions within the junta were
jockeying for position in case
of a coup. Two diplomatic
sources said that the Ameri-
can Embassy in Chile had re-
ceived warnings that Con-
treras and his former DINA
colleagues might try to have
Townley killed. Factions
within the Chilean Govern-
ment maneuvered to protect
him.

The American position to-
ward the Chilean Government
boiled down to one sentence:
"We want Townley." In one
especially stormy session with
the Chilean Foreign Minister,
sources say, Ambassador Lan-
dau declared that if Townley
were not produced, Propper
would have to go back to
Washington and report a lack
of cooperation. In that case,
the Ambassador added, he ex-
pected the Carter Administra-

tion to break off relations with
Chile. And if for any reason the
United States decided not to
sever relations under those
circumstances, the Ambassa-
dor continued, he himself
would resign.

The drama in this meeting
was matched by a continuing
excitement in the press and in
the streets of Chile. F.B.I.
agents L. Carter Cornick and
Robert Scherrer scurried
around Santiago looking for in-
formation about Townley, and
Chilean citizens, recognizing
them from photographs in the
newspapers, approached them
just to shake hands. Eugene
Propper was even more of a
public figure in the streets of
Santiago. His red beard stood
out like a matador's cape. On
several occasions, throngs of
Chileans surrounded Prop-
per's embassy car, wanting to
say hello to the "Fiscal"
(prosecutor).

APRIL 1978 — L. Carter Cor-
nick and Robert Scherrer were
eating breakfast the morning
of April 8 when an urgent call
from the American Embassy
reached them with orders to
go directly to the Santiago air-
port. They were not to pack,
not to check out — just go.
Now. Within minutes of their
arrival at the airport, an un-
marked car pulled up, and offi-
cers of the Chilean secret po-
lice emerged with Michael
Townley — in DINA hand-
cuffs.

RUSH TO COURT

The prosecutors worried
that all the people Townley
might implicate in the crime
would be taking precautions.
Propper threw himself into the
effort to "turn" Townley into a
Government witness, conduct-
ing intensive negotiations with
him and his lawyer, former
Watergate prosecutor Sey-
mour Glazer. When Townley
agreed to plead guilty to a
charge of conspiring to mur-
der Letelier, investigators
took his testimony in a rush —
checking his leads, following
his clues to other suspects. The
case was breaking.

MAY-JUNE 1978 — Propper
simultaneously prepared wit-
nesses for the first trial, and
traveled back to Chile in
search of more suspects on the
basis of Townley's evidence,
this time higher up the DINA
line toward General Con-
treras. Negotiations over such
important Chilean officials
grew so tense in June that Am-
bassador Landau was recalled
to the United States for consul-
tations.

In the State Department, of-


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officials prepared for possible negotiations with the Pinochet junta. The question was whether the United States would be satisfied if the Chileans were to try certain suspects (including DINA officials) in Chile instead of turning them over to United States authorities. In Miami, Justice Department sources grumbled that terrorism in Florida continued without anything like the Federal commitment to stop it that had pushed the Letelier case forward. Those sources also said that only the "least connected" Cubans would be indicted in the Letelier murder, excluding any Miami operatives.

In Washington, the victims' relatives and their colleagues at the Institute for Policy Studies continued to press for the case to be followed to the top of the Pinochet regime, where, they always insisted, the conspiracy began. From the outset, however, the I.P.S. people had expressed their trust in the efforts and integrity of Propper and Cornick, and this odd bond between the cops and the institute took on more meaning in the wake of Townley's confession, and his subsequent testimony before the grand jury.



Like the cracks and reforms in the Pinochet regime, these developments have all come about before a single indictment has been issued in the Letelier case, in a period when judges have sealed all charges filed thus far. When the first indictment is handed down sometime this summer, it will open the doors to the case the prosecution intends to prove in court — spelling out, in the manner of conspiracy indictments, the meetings and movements and transactions and other "overt acts" that took the murder conspiracy from beginning to end. It will, according to sources, trace the assassination plot from its roots in Chile into the United States, detailing how the conspirators recruited assistance and assembled the explosives, the detonator, and other necessary equipment. Only fragments of such details have reached the public. The sinister drama will begin to unfold as the case moves toward the courtroom, when the witnesses and defendants emerge publicly to tell their tales. Journalists and prosecutors will pick apart the histories of the participants in an effort to explain how a crime like this one could have happened and how, against all odds, some justice could be done. ■

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
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The Weather

Variable cloudiness and with a 30 percent chance of storms, high near 90. Thursday—Partly cloudy, humid, high. Yesterday—3 p.m. AQI: 35. Range: 85-73. Details on B2.

The Washington Post

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1978

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Eight Indicted in Letelier Slaying

Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

A 22-month investigation, a grand jury here yesterday indicted eight men, including the former head of Chile's security forces (DINA) and seven others in the slaying death of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier on Monday in Washington's Embassy Row.

The indictment of Gen. Juan Manuel Rodríguez Sepúlveda, a close associate of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, is believed to be the first in the United States against a high official of a foreign intelligence agency.

Two DINA operatives in the slaying of five Cuban exiles living in

the United States were charged by the grand jury with plotting, carrying out and covering up the September 1976 murder of Letelier, a prominent and outspoken critic of the Chilean government at the time. The explosion that ripped through Letelier's 1975 Chevrolet also killed an aide, Ronni K. Moffitt, and injured her husband.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper said yesterday that the U.S. government would ask Chile for the immediate arrest and jailing for extradition of Contreras, DINA operations director Pedro Espinoza Bravo, and DINA agent Armando Fernandez Larios.

Chilean officials had no immediate response to that request, which ap-

parently is unprecedented in diplomatic and judicial channels.

The indictment accuses Espinoza of ordering the assassination during a meeting in Chile and Fernandez of coming to the United States to spy on Letelier so that the assassins would know when to strike.

The Cubans, members of the New Jersey-based Cuban Nationalist Movement, a militant anti-Castro group, are accused of helping to carry out the bombing.

The 15-page indictment was explicitly detailed because of the cooperation with U.S. authorities of American-born DINA agent Michael V. Townley, who has agreed to plead guilty to planting the bomb.

The indictment outlines with precision the alleged plot that resulted in the 9:30 a.m. blast on Sept. 21, 1976, on the placid Sheridan Circle area of embassies, chanceries and diplomats' homes.

Letelier was killed instantly when the bomb atop the A-frame of his car ripped up through the floorboards under his legs as he drove around the circle. He was on his way to work at the Institute for Policy Studies, where he had become internationally known for his outspoken criticism of the Chilean military regime.

Ronni Moffitt was sitting on the passenger's side of the front seat. She died a few seconds after the blast as she staggered from the shattered,

burning car. Her husband, and IPS coworker, Michael Moffitt, suffered slight injuries.

The Letelier car came to rest against a Volkswagen parked within 100 yards of the Chilean ambassador's residence, and set the stage for a massive worldwide FBI investigation into the first diplomatic assassination here.

Letelier's coworkers, and others in leftist circles, immediately accused DINA, at the time the focus of allegations of massive human rights viola-

See LETELIER, A10, Col. 1

Backgrounds of the principals in the Letelier indictments. Page A11.



ORLANDO LETELIER
... victim of 1976 bombing

Eight Are Indicted in Letelier

LETELIER, From A1

tions and torture of political prisoners, of the bombing. They said DINA was concerned about the continuing attention that Letelier was able to focus on the Pinochet regime, and silenced him for that reason.

The FBI, with help from the D.C. Police Department, began the intensive lab work and search of the bomb scene. Its agents began the first of thousands of interviews, weeding out the possibility of domestic plots and other suspects before focusing on political motivations.

The Justice Department worked out careful alliances with the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to allow their cooperation with the investigation. Within a month of the blast, the investigation was centered on the Cuban Nationalist Movement and the allegation by a jailed international terrorist that two CNM members—Ignacio Novo Sampol and Guillermo Novo Sampol—were involved in the plot.

The Novos, known for their firing of a bazooka at the United Nations in 1964 when Che Guevara was speaking there, were brought before the grand jury and questioned. Yesterday's indictment accuses them of committing perjury when they told that grand jury that they did not know anything about Letelier, DINA or the slaying.

p

A few months later, another Cuban Nationalist Movement leader, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel, was called before the same grand jury and granted immunity from prosecution if he would testify about his alleged involvement in the plot. He refused, and was jailed for contempt of court for 11 months until that particular grand jury's term expired this year.

In February 1978, prosecutor Proper and lead FBI agent L. Carter Cornick decided to make a public request to Chile that the country produce for questioning two men who had traveled to the United States on official Chilean passports and had met with Cuban suspects in the plot.

Chile denied the existence of the two men, but after The Washington Star obtained and published the photographs of the men they were quickly identified as DINA agents Townley and Fernandez.

The United States was able to pressure Chile into turning Townley—an American citizen who grew up in Chile while his father headed a U.S. auto firm there—over to them. Once he arrived in the United States, Townley agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier. He spent day after day telling FBI agents and prosecutors the additional details they needed to charge others in the plot.

According to the indictment returned yesterday, the plot began in July 1976 when DINA chief Contreras asked the Paraguayan military intelligence service director to authorize the

issuance of Paraguayan passports for two DINA agents to use on an unspecified secret mission to the United States.

Contreras then ordered Fernandez to go to Paraguay to meet with that country's military intelligence agency in connection with a two-man mission, about which Espinoza would give him more details, the indictment said.

Espinoza gave false identification materials to Fernandez for the Paraguayan trip to pick up the passports, and Fernandez called Townley to arrange for Espinoza to meet him, according to the indictment.

At a second meeting that month, Espinoza told Townley that he and Fernandez "were being ordered to go to the United States on a DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier," the indictment stated.

After the two men obtained Paraguayan passports, Contreras ordered Fernandez to travel to the United States in August on a DINA mission, the indictment alleges, and Espinoza gave him a ticket to the United States, where Fernandez and another DINA agent arrived on Aug. 26 to begin surveillance of Letelier.

On Sept. 7, 1976, according to the indictment, Espinoza sent Townley to the United States to "carry out the previously discussed mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier."

Townley, using a passport in the name of Hans Petersen Silva, arrived at Kennedy International Airport on Sept. 9 and got the Letelier surveillance information from Fernandez, the indictment said.

Then, according to the indictment, the following acts occurred over the next two weeks:

Sept. 9—Townley, driving an Avis rental car, went to New Jersey to meet with CNM leader Virgilio Paz Romero and asked him to set up a meeting with Guillermo Novo.

Sept. 10—Townley met in New Jersey with Guillermo Novo and Suarez and "requested their assistance" in his DINA orders to assassinate Letelier.


Sept. 13—Townley outlined the Letelier murder plot to members of the governing council of the CNM during a meeting at the Chateau Renaissance motel in North Bergen, N.J. Alvin Ross Diaz, another CNM leader, joined the others at this meeting.

Sept. 15—Guillermo Novo and Suarez gave Townley and Paz explosives and a remote-control detonating device.

Sept. 16—Paz and Townley drove to the District and checked into a Holiday Inn in Northeast Washington.

Sept. 17—Additional wires and other elements of a bomb were purchased by Paz and Townley at a Sears Roebuck and Co. store in Northeast Washington.

Sept. 18—Novo, Suarez and Ross got additional bomb parts in New Jersey, and Suarez drove to the District of Columbia to join Paz and Townley. Suarez registered at the Best Western



MICHAEL MOFFITT
... "we feel vindicated"

Envoy Motel on New York Avenue NE.

Sept. 18—Paz, Suarez and Townley constructed the bomb in a Washington motel room.

Sept. 19—In the early morning hours, Paz, Suarez Townley drove to Letelier's house in Bethesda, and Townley crawled under the car and strapped the bomb into place.

Sept. 19—Townley called his wife, Mariana Ines Callegas de Townley, who also was a DINA agent, in Santiago to have her tell DINA the bomb was in place.

Sept. 19—Townley flew back to New Jersey and was picked up by Ross. They met with Guillermo Novo, and Townley flew to Miami.

Sept. 21—The bomb exploded, and investigators surmised it was detonated by Suarez, the only member of the assassination team remaining in Washington. Later that day, Townley called Ignacio Novo in Florida and Novo told him that "Something had happened in the District of Columbia." Novo and Townley met in Florida, where Novo was briefed on the mission.

Sept. 23—Townley flew back to Chile from Florida.

Sept. 24—"Within the Republic of Chile, Michael Townley advised Pedro Espinoza that the DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier had been carried out," the indictment states.

The indictment specifically charges the three Chileans and four of the Cubans—all but Ignacio Novo—with conspiracy to murder Letelier and the murder of Letelier under federal statutes, murder of Letelier under local statutes, murder of Moffitt under local statutes, and murder by use of explosives under federal statute. Each count carries a possible life sentence.

Guillermo Novo and Ignacio Novo are charged with two counts each of lying to a grand jury, and Ignacio Novo was charged with failing to tell law enforcement authorities about the crime after it occurred—a federal

charge known as misprision of a felony.

Yesterday's indictment before U.S. District Chief Judge William B. Bryant ended 22 months of often pessimistic waiting by Michael Moffitt and others who had closely watched the progress of the investigation.

Moffitt, 27, was sitting in his office at the Institute for Policy Studies when the official news of the indictment arrived.

He said he was "satisfied, but there's still more to be done" in terms of seeing how diligent the United States will be in making sure the charges against the Chilean officials are tried.

"I hate to say, 'I told you so,'" Moffitt said, but "we feel vindicated (by the charges against DINA). We knew who was responsible and we never changed that."

IPS staffers, whose leftist think tank was infiltrated and otherwise spied on by the FBI and police during the antiwar years, early in the case publicly doubted the willingness of the FBI and other U.S. agencies to solve a crime against a leftist diplomat such as Letelier.

"It was difficult for a while until there was some kind of trust—not trust in the mushy sense, but respect," Moffitt said. He said FBI agent Cornick and prosecutor Propper are "decent people. Cornick is a damn good cop... there are obviously good cops in the FBI and Carter Cornick is one of them. We weren't trying to sell them our whole political program. We just wanted to see justice done."

Moffitt said that he now lives "out of a coffee cup and out of a beer glass and it's no substitute for a marriage. My work (anti-Chilean junta activities) is my life because the junta was responsible for the death of my wife."

He and Ronni Moffitt had been married for four months before the bombing.

Letelier had been imprisoned by the military regime after the fall of Marxist Chilean president Salvador Allende in a 1973 military coup. But after his release from a one-year prison term, he had returned to Washington—where he had served Allende as ambassador to the United States—and built up a strong following in leftist political circles.

His wife, Isabel Letelier, was vacationing in Martha's Vineyard, Mass., yesterday and could not be reached for comment.

U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert and his top aides, all of whom were present when the indictment was brought yesterday, praised the investigation of the case by the FBI and its Washington field office. He also commended the work by Propper and Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., the two prosecutors who will try the case before U.S. District Judge Barrington D. Parker.

Ross, Ignacio Novo and Guillermo Novo have already been arrested on Letelier-related charges and are in custody. Paz and Suarez are fugitives, and warrants have been issued for their arrest.

Also contributing to this story was Washington Post staff writer Lawrence Meyer.

The Cubans

Men of Long-Held Political Passions

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Staff Writer

They are veterans of a long, lost war, the five Cubans indicted yesterday in connection with the slaying of a former Chilean ambassador. Though some of them led outwardly calm, industrious lives, they were also familiar with the darkest sides of life in the Cuban communities of New Jersey and Miami.

Among the most radical, right-wing elements of those communities, conspiracy often blends with intense political hatreds, the intense desire to return to a Cuba purged of Castros revolution, and passions burn like fuses.

It is also a world of secrecy from which there erupts occasional, sometimes spectacular, outbursts of violence.

Some of the first names to come to light in the investigation of Orlando Letelier's murder were those of the Novos—Ignacio Novo Sampol an unemployed shoe and auto salesman, and his younger brother Guillermo Novo Sampol. They were implicated by another Cuban exile leader who was being held in Venezuela at the time in connection with the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner in which 73 persons died.

The Novos were leaders of the militant Cuban Nationalist Movement based in Union City, N.J., and their names had long been familiar to the federal agents who keep an eye on the exiles' counter-revolutionary underworld.

It was the Novo brothers who were charged in 1964 with firing a bazooka at the United Nations building while Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara was speaking there, though the charges later were dropped.

Ten years later, Guillermo Novo was convicted of plotting to blow up a Cuban ship anchored in Montreal.



IGNACIO NOVO SAMPOL
... widely known in exile community

By April of last year, another member of the Cuban Nationalist Movement was drawn into the investigation. But, even though he was offered immunity for his testimony, 38-year-old salesman Jose Dionisio Suarez, Esquivel, of Elizabeth, N.J., refused to talk, and spent 11 months in jail.

Both the Novos and Suarez testified under oath that they knew nothing of Letelier's murder.

According to yesterday's indictment, however, Guillermo Novo, Suarez, and their compatriots, Virgilio Paz Romero and Alvin Ross Diaz met with DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley on Sept. 13, 1976, to plot the murder of Orlando Letelier.

By Sept. 18 the same four members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement had helped Townley construct a bomb, according to the indictment.

On Sept. 21, Letelier died when a bomb blast destroyed his car.

The Chileans

DINA Officials Inspired Fear

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Staff Writer

There were many people in Chile who believed that Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the first and only head of the Directorate of National Intelligence, was the second most powerful man in the country. He was certainly one of the most feared.

Before it was dissolved last year, his agency, known as DINA, was blamed for the disappearance and torture of thousands of people as it sought to fortify the strength of the military junta and suppress its opposition, both in Chile and abroad.

As head of DINA, Contreras was answerable only to Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, with whom he reportedly was on intimate terms.

On March 21 of this year, however, as international criticism of Chile's human rights record mounted, and the investigation of Orlando Letelier's murder heated up, Contreras resigned from the Army and all government posts he had held since DINA was abolished. No official explanation for the resignation was given.

Contreras is accused in the indictment of having ordered Letelier's assassination, but the man the indictment charges with most of the plotting and supervision for the operation is Pedro Espinoza, a colonel in the Chilean army and currently commander of a garrison in southern Chile. At the time of Letelier's death, Espinoza was director of operations for DINA. Little else is known about him, though according to several sources familiar with Chilean politics, it had been widely suspected that Espinoza was in charge of stifling criticism from exiled members of the former government.

Armando Fernandez Larios, the man accused of organizing the actual



CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA
... answerable only to president

assassination of Letelier, and, with Michael Vernon Townley, contacting and coordinating the activities of the Cuban exiles involved, is a captain in Chile's army.

The son of a retired Air Force general, he took part in the storming of the Moneda Palace during the 1973 coup, and now works at the Ministry of Defense in Santiago.

THE WITNESS

Townley: He Followed Orders

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Michael Vernon Townley, a soft-spoken, intense and articulate 35-year-old man who has made Chile his home for the past 20 years already is starting to be known in some circles as the "John Dean" of the Letelier affair.

He is an unlikely figure to be found in his current role—as the heavily guarded informant who has calmly told FBI agents and prosecutors how he followed orders to plant an explosive whose blast left its intended victim so mangled that hardened investigators became sick at the scene of the crime.

As he is described by people who know him, Townley is a skilled electronic technician capable of assembling devices to detonate bombs by remote control. He had been active in commando raids against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende, whose Marxist regime was toppled in a military coup by the current Chilean president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet.

Townley, an American who grew up in Chile where his father headed a large U.S. automobile operation, had become a familiar sight to Americans there by the early 1970s. He was known as a political activist who was suspected of participating in military activities of Patria y Libertad, a right-wing Chilean party.

Although he had been charged with murder for his alleged participation in a Concepcion raid in which a night watchman was killed, the charges were dropped when Pinochet came to power in late 1973 and Townley became an agent of DINA, the Chilean secret police agency.

Townley reportedly viewed his DINA role as that of a soldier, a man who followed orders. He is said to have worked at high levels—often

meeting directly with DINA chief Manuel Contreras Sepulveda before carrying out a mission—and went about his "business" in a calm, professional manner.

His wife is a Chilean and was also a DINA agent, according to yesterday's indictment. She is known for her flamboyant expressions of political ideology. Townley, on the other hand, has soft blue eyes and a disquietingly peaceful demeanor, according to persons who have seen him in his new role as a cooperative government witness.

Townley was expelled from Chile in early April after the U.S. put intense pressure on the country to turn him over. In the U.S., his attorneys, Seymour Glazer and Barry W. Levine, struck up a deal by which he would enter a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier and would in return cooperate in the Letelier investigation.

The deal apparently was made in hopes of a possible early parole for Townley. In the meantime, he is being escorted under heavy guard and in strictest secrecy to protect him from harm while in custody.

As a part of the deal, Townley will only have to cooperate with and provide information to U.S. authorities on his role in the Letelier murder. He reportedly has additional information about terrorist activities in other countries, but is not required to give that information to the U.S., sources have said.

As was John Dean in the Watergate affair, Townley was, by his own account, directly involved in the execution of crimes and has decided to testify against his close associates. And, as in Watergate, Townley could, as did Dean, play a central role in questioning the activities of a country's highest government officials.

U.S. Extradition Request Expected to Face Hurdles

SANTIAGO, Chile (AP) — While the Foreign Ministry was presented with a U.S. diplomatic note yesterday asking the arrest of Chile's former security police chief and two other agents on murder charges, expert observers felt chances are slight that the men will be extradited as requested.

They believe it possible, however, that a trial will be held here for retired Brig. Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Col. Pedro Espinosa Bravo and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios.

Informed sources said Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos received the U.S. note from Charles Crover, deputy chief of mission. Ambassador George Landau is travelling outside Santiago.

The Chileans were included for murder yesterday by a Washington grand jury in connection with the 1976 bomb killings there of exiled Chilean Socialist Orlando Letelier and an American co-worker.

The 1902 extradition treaty between Chile and the United States provides that each country will deliver persons charged with crimes in the other country, but it says neither country is bound to hand over its own citizens.

Under a later Pan American Convention of 1933, Chile obligated itself to try its own citizens if it does not extradite them and if the only reason for not extraditing is that they are Chilean citizens.

The government of President Augusto Pinochet ignored requests by The Associated Press during the past month for the chance to discuss Chilean extradition customs and procedures with a court or government expert.

Other sources said the procedure

would be somewhat like this: after arrest, the extradition request will make its way to the Chilean supreme court, which is then responsible for conducting hearings to determine the validity in Chilean jurisprudence of evidence made available by the United States.

If the court finds validity in the charges, then Contreras, Espinosa and Fernandez must either be extradited for trial in the United States or be brought to trial here. A Chilean investigation is already underway.

Apparently no special treatment is accorded military officers under the two extradition agreements.

It is understood that Chile generally chooses not to extradite its own citizens, but diplomatic sources said they believe it was done in at least one previous case.

A member of the four-man ruling military junta other than Pinochet recently told a journalist he felt certain Chile would not hand Contreras over to the United States.

A diplomatic source said the only reason he could see why Chile might agree to extradition was that the rest of the world would not believe the three were getting an unbiased trial here.

The Chilean court system has by tradition been independent and respected. The junta has no decrees limiting the court's independence as such, but anti-government lawyers claim the court is practicing a form of self-restriction.

The supreme court, for example, was hesitant to investigate accusations against the Contreras-run DINA. A former court president has complained that DINA agents blocked whatever attempts were made to investigate.

The Letelier Prosecutor: An Unlik

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

In Chile, he is greeted by hordes of Spanish-speaking reporters shouting "Prosecutor Propper, Prosecutor Propper" and hidden photographers wait to snap his picture as he walks down streets or comes out of buildings.

His comings and goings are documented with bold red headlines, and newspapers speculate on matters ranging from his briefcase, which they think is "James Bond-equipped," to the specially built car they say is flown to Chile from the United States for his use there, and even his alleged love life when he is in Santiago.

The object of the attention is 31-year-old Eugene M. Propper, whose life is not nearly as exotic as the Chilean press proclaims.

One of 161 assistant U.S. attorneys in the District of Columbia, he was assigned by chance two years ago to investigate what many people thought would be the unsolvable assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier.

Tuesday, he stood before a federal judge here and calmly asked that three Chilean secret police (DINA) officials—including the feared ex-director of the agency—be arrested in the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing murder of Letelier and an aide, Ronni K. Moffitt, on Sheridan Circle.

Along the way, in a manner unrivaled in many major investigations, the flamboyantly bearded Propper and drawling FBI agent L. Carter Cornick have become the international symbols of the dogged persistence of U.S. authorities to solve the Letelier murder case.

Propper and Cornick say they cannot directly discuss the Letelier case because of the pending trials. But a clear picture has emerged of two well-matched, plodding and innovative investigators who have come out, so far, smelling like roses in a case that easily could have generated a very different aroma.


On Sept. 21, 1976, Propper was sitting in the U.S. Courthouse cafeteria when his supervisor, Donald E. Campbell, asked him if he would take the case. He knew nothing about Chile other than what he had read in newspapers, and spoke no Spanish.

Cornick, a 38-year-old University of Virginia graduate and ex-marine, had a reputation of sorts of minor boat-rocking in the normally staid world of look-alike FBI agents, some of his acquaintances say. He had just arrived in the Washington field office after a stint in bomb-rocked Puerto Rico, and he came to mind when Washington FBI agent-in-charge Nick F. Stames was looking for a Spanish-speaking agent to assign to the Letelier case.

Cornick and Propper seemed to work together well quickly according to people who watched them at the time. Propper's ego was such that he would make seemingly outrageous demands; Cornick would soft-soap those demands so that they seemed perfectly normal when they were relayed.

Propper, who is from New Hyde Park, Long Island, earned an undergraduate degree in economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and a law degree from the University of Minnesota. He worked briefly for the Justice Department be-

Celebrity in Santiago



EUGENE M. PROPPER
... at first, royal treatment

'... a cocky young man, outspoken in his views about ... office policy, but not any sort of star ...'



The Washington Post
Chilean newspaper and magazine articles devoted to "El Fiscal Propper."



L. CARTER CORNICK
... Spanish-speaking boat rocker

fore joining the U.S. attorney's office in 1972 to get trial experience.

He had worked in various sections of the prosecutor's office trying crimes including murders and rapes, and had joined the fairly elite major crimes division—where he dealt with such matters as contract murders and the widely publicized second Sting project involving undercover agents who operated a fake stolen-goods shop. At the time of the Letelier blast,



E. LAWRENCE BARCELLA JR.
... behind-the-scenes supervisor

he was contemplating leaving the office to enter the more lucrative field of private practice.

Propper was known as a cocky young man, outspoken in his views about some aspects of office policy but not any sort of "star" in the courtroom or in his handling of investigations.

In one of the more touchy aspects of the early part of the investigation, the Justice Department and the FBI

had to "sell" themselves to the friends and coworkers of the victims, who had worked at the Institute for Policy Studies, a leftist think tank here that had been spied upon and otherwise infiltrated by the bureau during antiwar days.

Despite IPS outcries for special prosecutors and meetings with two attorneys general about the slowness with which they thought the investigation was being conducted, Propper and Cornick quietly won the grudging respect of the leftists. As the case neared its apparent completion, leftists praised Cornick and Propper in one breath and castigated the agencies for which they worked in the next.

Both Propper and Cornick quickly say they have not "solved" the Letelier case, and they lavish praise just as quickly on their superiors and the hundreds of FBI agents across the United States and other investigators throughout the world who have brought the Letelier case this far.

Other point out that, in many ways, the case was the type in which the FBI is at its best—lots of laboratory work, use of informants, massive manpower available for the tedious job of solving international terrorism problems.

Two other major investigators have come to the limelight recently, for example. Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., one of Propper's supervisors, has worked behind the scenes on the case for more than a year and will join Propper in trying the case.

Robert W. Scherrer, the FBI's legal attache in Santiago, also has been indispensable to the case because of the network of contacts and the respect he had built up in eight years in South America, according to several persons involved in the case.

But the major focus of media attention in Chile was on Propper—called "Fiscal" or prosecutor there—and on Cornick or Barcella as they made a total of three trips to Santiago this spring. They have told associates how reporters for the sensationalist press in Chile would try to talk their way into hotel rooms at 8 a.m. for interviews, guess the identity of who might be with Propper at any one time, seek them out in restaurants, and try to identify persons with them by bracelets or rings.

During the first two trips, the U.S. investigators were treated royally by the press. But by the third trip, when the seriousness of the investigation and its possible aim at high Chilean officials was clear, the atmosphere changed, they have said.

That was when a racy journal accused Propper of using U.S. funds to come to Chile for an assignation with an attractive female journalist. Newspapers proclaimed in English, "FBI GO HOME." And, as in a Peter Sellers movie, photographers hanging out of flat windows chased an embassy station wagon at high speeds through a market district, scattering chickens as they went, trying to take pictures of Barcella and Propper.

Propper, his fame changing to notoriety so quickly after his whirlwind romance with the Chilean press, said he has no plans to return there soon.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, August 4, 1978

ownley Guilty Plea Acceptance Delayed by Judge

by Timothy S. Robinson

Washington Post Staff Writers

istrict Judge Barrington D. yesterday postponed any ac- of a guilty plea from Mi- mon Townley, the key gov- witness in the Orlando Lete- er case.

did not disclose his reasons he wanted to review the

plea-bargaining agreement before de- ciding whether to accept it. But The Washington Post learned later that the snag developed over a section of the agreement in which the govern- ment agreed that a specific prison term would be imposed upon Town- ley.

The presentation by prosecutors of a plea-bargaining agreement involving a specific prison-term promise for a

defendant is extremely rare here since U.S. judges prefer to exercise sole authority over the sentencing process. However, such agreements are legally allowable and are used regularly in some jurisdictions.

The exact length of the prison term to which government prosecutors agreed for Townley could not be as- certained, although it reportedly would require him to serve "substantial" time in prison. The count to which Townley has agreed to plead carries a maximum prison sentence of life.

Townley, who grew up in Chile and became a secret police agent there during the current Chilean military regime of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, has agreed with prosecutors that he will plead guilty to one count of conspir- acy to murder Letelier, former Chi- lean ambassador to the U.S.

Letelier and a coworker, Ronni K. Moffitt, were killed Sept. 21, 1976, when a bomb exploded under the car in which they were driving around Sheridan Circle NW.

According to court testimony by an FBI agent, Townley has admitted that he was sent by the secret police agency, DINA, to the U.S. to assassi- nate Letelier, and actually placed the bomb under Letelier's car.

Townley's agreement three months ago to plead guilty in the case is be- lieved to have been a major break leading to Tuesday's indictment of five Cuban exiles in the U.S. and three DINA officials in Chile for Letelier's murder.

Townley served as the conduit be- tween the two groups as well as being directly involved in the actual assassi- nation, according to investigators.

The still-secret plea-bargaining pact, in which Townley reportedly agrees to provide information only about ac- tivities he many have been involved in on U.S. soil or involving U.S. citi- zens or property, was worked out in more than two weeks of negotiations between his attorney, Seymour Glan- zer, and the government.

Reporters had been notified yester- day, in the usual Justice Department

manner, that Townley's plea was ex- pected before Judge Parker at 2 p.m. The proceeding was delayed, however, by a meeting in the judge's chambers involving prosecutors and Glanzer.


Around 2:40 p.m., Townley—a bearded, thin man wearing a blue suit—was brought into the courtroom to join the attorneys who had assembled there.

When Parker took the bench, he called Townley forward and told him that he had just learned about the plea-bargaining agreement and that he did not feel the court had been "fully advised" yet about the deal.

Parker said he wanted to "step back and review" the agreement, and re- schedule the plea for some time in the far future.

"As a result, there will be no pro- ceeding at this point," Parker said.

The indictment accuses former DINA head Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda of ordering Letelier's mur- der, and two other DINA operatives in Chile with executing the details of the plan.



MICHAEL VERNON TOWNLEY
... judge reviewing plea-bargain

Suspect's Action In Letelier Case Disputed by Diary

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Washington Star Staff Writer

A child's diary says Jose Dionisio Suarez, a Cuban exile accused in the assassination of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier, was with his family in New Jersey on Sept. 19, 1976, not placing a bomb here as the government contends, his wife insists.

The wife, Marta, 37, says a diary kept by her 14-year-old daughter, also named Marta, indicates that Suarez was in Elizabeth, N.J., on that date. Mrs. Suarez, now a teacher in San Jose, Calif., said in a telephone interview that she only recently discovered her daughter kept a careful record of events in 1976.

"She does not permit me to read her diary," Mrs. Suarez said. "But she has a record in the diary that on Sunday, Sept. 19, 1976, she enjoyed telling her father about how she played the guitar at Sunday mass that day.

"And later, the diary records that my husband stayed home that Sunday to make some repairs in the bathroom so we could sell the house. My daughter also wrote that we came home from the movies, a double feature, and that she also told her father about what movie we saw."

THE MASS WAS at St. Catherine's Catholic Church. The movies attended by Mrs. Suarez, Marta and a second child, Victor, 9, were, according to the diary, "Murder on the Orient Express" and "Big Bus."

"I have not told the FBI about this," Mrs. Suarez said.

"If my husband was working here at home on that day, listening to Marta talk about the guitar mass and the movies, he could not have been in Washington as the prosecutor says," she said.

According to the grand jury indictments returned here, Suarez came to Washington on Sept. 18, three days before the explosion that killed Letelier and a colleague, Ronni Moffitt.

The FBI contends that Suarez and other members of the anti-Castro Cuban Nationalist Movement joined forces with Michael V. Townley, 35, an American in the service of Chile's DINA secret police, to assassinate Letelier.

The indictments allege that Suarez, subject of a nationwide FBI manhunt, and his Cuban-born associates, Guillermo Novo, Alvin Ross Diaz and Virgilio Paz, joined in the conspiracy to kill Letelier.

IT IS ALLEGED that the conspiracy was set into motion by Army Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, chief of DINA; Col. Pedro Espinoza, his operations chief; and Capt. Armando Fernandez.

Townley and Fernandez came to the United States to execute the plot but Townley, an American citizen with a Chilean wife, is the government's primary witness against the other conspirators, the government says.

Indictments Against 8 Outline Alleged Plot to Kill Letelier

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

There was nothing to attract special attention about the arrival of the young Latin American couple at New York's JFK Airport on Aug. 26, 1976.

Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios of the Chilean army and his woman companion passed through immigration, customs and the JFK traffic jam without incident.

But, according to a grand jury indictment handed up yesterday in U.S. District Court here, the couple's visit was to have dramatic consequences, because the captain was here as an agent of DINA, the Chilean secret police, and was on a mission to spy on former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier.

He was to pass the information on to the men who intended to kill Letelier, a murder squad of one American and several anti-Castro Cubans, the indictment charges.

The details of how Fernandez and the woman known to the FBI only as "Liliana Walker Martinez" allegedly carried out the mission are part of the 10-count indictment in connection with the murders of Letelier and his colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt.

THE GRAND JURY indicted eight persons, including the former DINA chief. Letelier and Moffitt were killed when a bomb attached to the exiled



ORLANDO LETELIER
Murdered diplomat

diplomat's car exploded at Sheridan Circle on Sept. 21, 1976.

The indictment charges that Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former DINA chief and close friend of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, initiated the conspiracy. The panel did not implicate anyone of higher rank in Chile, but said Contreras "ordered the assassination of Letelier either alone or with others unknown to the grand jury."

The indictment said the order to kill Letelier was conveyed by Lt. Col.



MANUEL CONTRERAS
Ex-Chilean secret police head

Pedro Espinoza, DINA's director of operations, to Fernandez and Michael V. Townley, an American expatriate working for DINA. It said Contreras and Espinoza used the resources of DINA to arrange international travel, false documentation, cash and intelligence contacts for the assassination.

The prosecutors, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eugene M. Propper and Lawrence Barcella, immediately requested that Chief U.S. District

See **LETELIER, A-8**

Continued From A-1

William B. Bryant issue bench warrants for the arrest of the three army officers and two Cuban named in the indictment who are in custody.

STATE DEPARTMENT said in a diplomatic note to Chile regarding the detention of the three officers and advising the Santiago regime that formal requests for extradition will be made as soon as possible.

Santiago, the military government, last night ordered the arrest of the three officers after receiving the detention request. The Chilean foreign ministry said they were placed under military detention pending the outcome of legal proceedings.

The alleged conspirators are in custody: Townley, the 36-year-old Argentine who, U.S. officials say, gave them a full account of the brothers Guillermo and Ignacio Novos, members of the anti-Castro Cuban Nationalist Movement, which operated in northern New Jersey; Alvin Ross Diaz, also an anti-Castro activist.

The FBI is seeking two other Cuban exiles, Virgilio Paz and Jose Dionisio Suarez.

A GRAND JURY charged that the plot was carried out as follows:

In July 1976 Contreras contacted the director of Paraguay's military intelligence service to request that he authorize Paraguayan passports for the DINA agents to be used on an unclassified mission to the United States.

In mid-July Contreras ordered Fernandez to travel to Paraguay to make contact with the Paraguayan military police. The DINA director of operations, Espinoza, gave Fernandez a false identity card for this mission.

About the same time, Fernandez told Townley to arrange meetings between him and Espinoza.

On or about July 1976, the exact date being unknown to the grand jury, Pedro Espinoza told Michael Townley that Townley and Fernandez were being ordered to go to the U.S. on a DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier," the indictment charges.

TOWNLEY IS MENTIONED only as a co-conspirator in the indictment and is not charged. Officials have indicated he will make a court appearance this week to plead guilty to one count of murder of a foreign diplomat. He is expected to testify for the government at the trial.

Fernandez and Townley went to Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital, July 20, 1976, and returned a week later to Chile with special Paraguayan passports issued under false names. The whole transaction was noted by American officials, who recalled it two months later when Letelier was killed.


Fernandez and his woman travel companion flew to the United States and, a couple of weeks later, began keeping tabs on Letelier's movements. Meanwhile Espinoza gave Townley his orders to come here and carry out the assassination.

Townley arrived at JFK Airport on Sept. 9, using false identification papers from DINA. He was met there by Fernandez, who gave him the information about Letelier's movements between his Bethesda home and his office near Dupont Circle. Fernandez and his companion left that day for Chile, and Townley rented a car.


DURING THE NEXT four days Townley had several meetings with Paz, Guillermo Novo, Suarez and Ross, told them of his orders from DINA and asked their help in carrying out the assassination.

On Sept. 15 Guillermo Novo and Suarez gave some explosives and a remote-control detonating device to


LETELIER: Indictment Outlines Murder Plot



JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ



VIRGILIO PAZ



IGNACIO NOVO

These three are among those indicted in the slaying of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier.

Townley and Paz, who then drove to New Jersey to Washington.

On Sept. 16 Townley and Paz checked in at a Holiday Inn here and the next two days busied themselves getting parts — some at Sears Roebuck — to be used in the bomb. Guillermo Novo, Suarez and Ross obtained other parts for the bomb, and on Sept. 18 Suarez checked in at the Western Envoy Motel here. It was the day Paz, Suarez and Townley built the bomb.

On Sept. 19 Paz, Suarez and Townley drove from Northeast Washington to Letelier's home, where Townley placed the bomb in the car. That

same day Townley made a phone call to Chile to tell his wife, Mariana Ines Callejas de Townley, also a DINA agent, to advise DINA that the bomb had been placed.

LATER THAN DAY Townley went from Washington to Newark, N.J., and from there to Miami. Two days later, Sept. 21, the bomb was detonated, killing Letelier and Moffitt in morning rush hour traffic. Later that day, Townley met Ignacio Novo in Miami, briefed him on the mission and then, on Sept. 23, flew from Florida to Chile.

The indictment does not say who

set off the charge, only that the "bomb was detonated," but an FBI agent testified at a U.S. magistrate's hearing on the case in June that Townley believed Suarez had detonated the bomb.

All the defendants except Ignacio Novo are indicted for conspiracy to murder a foreign official, murdering a foreign official, two counts of first-degree murder and murder by use of explosives. Conviction on each of these charges carries a sentence of life imprisonment. Charges including false declarations could net the Novo brothers \$10,000 fines and five years imprisonment.

HOW AN EX-CHILEAN DIPLOMAT WAS KILLED IN D.C.

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

NEWARK, N.J. — When Michael Vernon Townley arrived in New York from Chile in September 1976 he seemed an unremarkable traveler.

Sandy-haired, well-dressed, English-speaking men in their 30s do not attract attention at John F. Kennedy International Airport.

But Townley was on a grim mission.

According to the FBI, although Townley is an American citizen he was on assignment from DINA, the Chilean military government's secret police, to kill leftist former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier.

He brought some of his equipment with him, 10 "electric matches" or blasting caps used to set off explosives, the FBI says, and he knew he could get dynamite from anti-Castro Cuban activists in the New Jersey-New York area.



PAZ
Sought by FBI in Letelier Slaying



SUAREZ

The rest of the things he needed to blow up Letelier's car in Washington, D.C., were available in the nation's capital, the FBI noted.

BEFORE 11 A.M. Sept. 21, 1976, Letelier and a colleague, Rorri Karpen Moffitt, were dead. They were killed when a powerful bomb exploded under Letelier's car in morning rush hour traffic at Washington's Sheridan Circle.

Yesterday FBI Special Agent Carter Cornick testified to these and other details of the double murder in court here. It was the first time the government disclosed much of its case against Townley, five Cuban exiles and an undisclosed number of Chilean officials the United States says were involved in the conspiracy to kill Letelier.

The occasion was a removal hearing sought by Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper to transfer one of the Cuban suspects, Alvin Ross Diaz, to federal custody in Washington.

According to Cornick's testimony, under questioning by Propper and Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella before U.S. Magistrate Serena

See LETELIER, A-4

Continued From A-1

Parretti, Townley constructed the bomb and attached it under the front seat of Letelier's car while it was parked near his Bethesda, Md., home.

The bomb was triggered, Cornicksaid, by Jose Dionisio Suarez, a Cuban exile sought by the FBI.

CORNICK'S TESTIMONY was largely based on the account Townley, 36, allegedly has given FBI agents of the conspiracy and how it was carried out.

There was no mention yesterday of the so-called "Chilean connection," except that Townley was assisted in the United States by Chilean Army Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios.

The testimony did not say who authorized the DINA agents to murder Letelier.

As Cornick reconstructed the events of the murder, Townley arrived at JFK airport Sept. 9, 1976, and immediately called one of the Cubans, Virgilio Paz, and asked to meet with him. The two men had known one another from a previous relationship, Cornick testified.

The special agent testified that Paz and Townley met somewhere in the Newark area. Townley indicated what his mission was and asked to be put in touch with some members of the Cuban nationalist movement, Cornick said.

PAZ, ACCORDING TO the testimony, arranged for Townley to meet with Suarez, Guillermo Novo Sampol and himself at the Chateau Renaissance, a local motel, on Sept. 11 or 12. It was at this meeting, the government contends, that the conspiracy became an active scheme. Townley told Paz, Novo and Suarez of his plan to assassinate Letelier and requested their assistance.

Ross also was present at the meeting but Cornick said Townley has not mentioned anything that Ross may have said then.

Townley, who is being held for his own safety at a military base near Washington, told Cornick of his intentions and received agreement of the Cubans to help two days later, about Sept. 13 or 14.

Meanwhile a fellow DINA officer, Fernandez, was in Washington, and Townley has told the FBI that Fernandez' role was to maintain surveillance of Letelier's comings and goings so that the plotters could work out a timetable.

"TOWNLEY SAID HE and Paz went to Newark where they obtained the TNT on Sept. 15," the FBI agent testified. "Then Townley and Paz drove to Washington in Paz' Volvo. Suarez joined them later. They stayed in Washington and tried to confirm the surveillance of Letelier,

work, as carried out by Fernandez. They also bought other parts that were used in making the bomb."

Since Townley brought the electric matches with him from Chile and obtained the dynamite from the Cubans in Newark, all he needed were batteries and a receiver to set off the explosion. But there was no testimony introduced to give all details of where the bomb parts came from.

Cornick testified that Townley has admitted the bomb was constructed by himself and Paz, but that Townley himself placed the bomb in position under Letelier's car. Paz and Suarez accompanied him to the Letelier neighborhood for the actual placing of the bomb, Cornick said.

AS SOON AS THE bomb was in place, Townley left Washington so as to be elsewhere when the bomb was detonated, Cornick said. That left Paz and Suarez in Washington on Sept. 21 when the fatal blast occurred.

"Did Townley tell you which of them triggered the explosion?" asked attorney Paul Goldberger, representing Diaz.

"He said he didn't know which but he had a pretty good idea," Cornick testified. "He told us he had talked to Paz at his home and he concluded, as we have, that Suarez triggered the bomb."

by a federal grand jury here last spring and was sent to jail for nearly a year when he refused to answer questions despite a grant of immunity. Less than two months ago, federal officials had to release Suarez because the life of the grand jury had expired.

Townley, a 20-year-resident of Chile, was ideologically attuned to the military regime there and became an activist against the leftist government of Salvador Allende before joining DINA.

PROPPER AND Cornick escorted Townley to the United States from Chile when he was expelled by the Santiago government under heavy U.S. pressure and then was charged with conspiracy to murder a foreign diplomat. Since his arrival in the United States, Townley has told Propper and the FBI everything about the plot but no details have been released about which Chilean higher-ups may have been involved.

Magistrate Perretti agreed to the transfer of Ross to federal custody in Washington, and in about a week Ross will be brought to District Jail by U.S. marshals.

Indictments against the five Cubans, Townley and an unknown number of Chileans are expected to be returned by the grand jury in late June or early July.



—Associated Press

AMBASSADOR LANDAU
To return indefinitely

U.S.-Chile Ties Hit New Low as Envoy Recalled

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

The State Department's recall of Ambassador George W. Landau to Washington "for consultation" because of Chile's lack of cooperation in the Letelier murder investigation plunges U.S.-Chilean relations to the lowest point since the military government took over in Santiago five years ago.

Landau, a 58-year-old career diplomat, is expected to arrive here Monday for what will probably be an indefinite stay. Officials say that's because the federal investigators of the bomb-murder of former Chilean diplomat are determined to try to extradite three army officers of the Santiago military regime.

See CHILE, A-8

CHILE

Continued From A-1

In another application of diplomatic pressure on Chile, State Department spokesman John Trattner announced yesterday that the United States will delay a shipment of bomb fins to Chile until it has completed a review of human rights under the military regime. California longshoremen had refused to load the fins for shipment in protest against Chile's rights policy.

CHILE HAS ABOUT \$60 million of military equipment on order arranged before Congress imposed the cutoff in 1976 as a means of registering its indignation at the alleged violations of human rights in Chile.

Chile's president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and his chief military assistants have adamantly fought extradition of Chilean military men to the United States.

Recall of the ambassador could be followed by a break in diplomatic relations if Chile continues to impose obstacles to the investigation being carried out by Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and the FBI.

The State and Justice departments appear determined to back Propper in his investigation of the murder of Letelier and his colleague, Ronni K. Moffitt, on Sept. 21, 1976.

The best outcome American officials say they can hope for realistically is that the Chilean government will put the three officers on trial under Chilean laws while Propper does the same in federal court here with other suspects.

The three officers suspected of taking part in the conspiracy are Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, retired former chief of the DINA secret police and once the inseparable com-

panion of Pinochet; Lt. Col. Pedro Espinoza, former DINA operations chief; and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, who is accused of tracking Letelier in Bethesda and Washington for several days before the bomb was put under the driver's seat of the Letelier car.

The recall of Landau was announced at the State Department's noon briefing yesterday by Trattner, who said:

"**AMBASSADOR LANDAU** is being recalled from Santiago for consultations with officials of the State and Justice departments concerning the Letelier-Moffitt assassination investigation. The Chilean authorities have not been forthcoming on important requests by the Justice Department which have been pending for some time. The ambassador's presence in the U.S. will also give us an opportunity to review the current state of human rights conditions in Chile and related issues."

Chile's new foreign minister, Hernan Cubillos, attending a meeting at the Organization of American States here, sought to minimize the significance of the action. He even said the recall might be useful in that it will permit Landau "to explain in detail the information which we have been making available to him lately." Cubillos did not elaborate.

Propper declined to say what requests the Chilean government was not honoring. However, from the wording of the statement, it is possible that the Chileans have failed to respond to all the questions put forth by Propper in the so-called letter's rogatory sent to the Chilean Supreme Court several months ago by Chief U.S. District Judge William Bryant.

THERE IS ALSO speculation that Propper may have asked Chilean officials to let him question Con-

treras, Espinoza and Fernandez and been turned down.

The decision to recall Landau was reached after two meetings this week between Propper and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The U.S. action represents one of the few forms of pressure the United States has with the Chilean government since there is no more military program for Chile and economic aid is minimal. Chile has ample reason for wanting very badly to retain U.S. friendship since it is in more or less continual confrontation with three hostile neighbors, Peru, Bolivia and Argentina.

The diplomatic maneuver comes at a time when Propper and the FBI have under arrest four suspects in the murder and as a nationwide manhunt continues for two other suspects.

The key figure is an American, Michael V. Townley, 36, an electronics expert who espoused rightist causes and worked for DINA. The expatriate Townley was expelled by the Chileans into the custody of FBI agents and he has been charged with one felony count of conspiracy to murder a foreign diplomat.

ACCORDING TO THE FBI, Townley is cooperating with the investigation and has acknowledged that he placed the explosive charge in Letelier's auto.

The government also charges that Townley and Fernandez, one of the Chilean army officers, as DINA agents, conspired with a terrorist cell of anti-Castro Cubans to kill the leftist Chilean politician.

Under arrest on conspiracy charges are Alvin Ross Diaz and two brothers, Guillermo and Ignacio Novo. The Cuban fugitives are Virgilio Paz and Jose Dionisio Suarez, who is believed to have detonated the remote control bomb that killed Letelier and Moffitt at Sheridan Circle.

Letelier Murder Also Nettlesome

Chile's Military Still Stained By Participation in Coup

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile — Man for man, the armed forces of Chile are regarded as the best in Latin America, but in recent years the code of honor by which the nation's soldiers are governed has been under a cloud, and the military has suffered.

The problem stems from the military's role in the coup of 1973 and from the murder of Orlando Letelier.

An experienced diplomat explained the state of mind of the Chilean armed forces this way:

"Every officer who graduates from the military academy here is made to swear a most sacred oath on the hilt of his sword to protect not the people or the president, but the constitution of Chile.

"When the order came on September 11 five years ago to attack the elected government of President Salvador Allende, there was no question of disobedience.

"No order in the chain of command is questioned. But it was traumatic for the Chilean officers because the order for the uprising amounted to forcing them to violate their oath.

"And that is a serious matter to Chilean officers. I think many of them decided that if they had to sully their honor, a lot of other people were going to suffer with them."

THAT EXPLANATION makes more sense than any other of the violent attack on La Moneda, the presidential palace, the arrest and imprisonment of thousands, the deaths of an unknown number of Chileans, the disappearances, the curfew and the rigor of the rule imposed on 10 million Chileans by the armed forces.

It may even be a partial explanation of how Chilean officers could have been involved in the bomb-murder of the former foreign minister, Letelier, in Washington and perhaps other murders committed by DINA, the secret police organization.

the United States on the expulsion of Michael V. Townley in the Letelier plot and has his own inquiry going against the Chilean officers involved.

The police still make political arrests and clean out small leftist cells. But their actions do not approach the magnitude of the mass seizures of 1973 when people were jailed by the thousands in open-air stadiums.

And Pinochet retired his closest friend, the DINA chief, Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, when the Letelier case began coming home to roost.

The speculation here is that Chile will prosecute the three army officers allegedly involved with Townley in the Letelier assassination but would never allow them to be extradited to the United States. In fact, the signs are that the United States is cooperating with Chile so that Gen. Hector Orozco, chief of intelligence, can proceed with the inquiry.

A **HIGH-RANKING** Chilean official, who did not want his name used, said the United States is sending Chile some of the evidence on which it has charged Townley and five Cuban exiles with conspiracy to commit murder and which everyone in Chile expects will lead to indictments of Contreras, Lt. Col. Pedro Espinoza and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios.

Orozco, it was learned this week, traveled to the United States in April and was granted access to Townley, who is in custody at a military base near Washington for his own safety.

Orozco's legal adviser, attorney Miguel Schweitzer, has been to Washington three times to see Townley and to confer with Eugene Propser, the assistant U.S. attorney handling the case, and FBI agents investigating it.

Townley's Chilean wife, Mariana, has been in Washington for the past week to testify before a grand jury. She is expected to return to Santiago Saturday.

Chile has a literate, middle-class, European society with a long tradition of democratic institutions that have worked. In these surroundings, perhaps like some parts of Germany in Hitler's heyday, many Chileans could not bring themselves to believe that their officers, their DINA, could commit such acts as the arranged murder of Letelier, or the imprisonment of thousands and the disappearance of 617 persons.

It is a small country where people tend to know about one another. It has been a great shock to the Chileans to learn from the press, the church and from each other that so many atrocities were committed in their name.

Diplomats stationed here say that the majority of the people still support the military junta headed by Gen. Augusto Pinochet or see no alternative to it. It is possible that Pinochet enjoys more support from the mass of the people than he does within the regime, where institutional rivalries are rife.

The longer the Chileans are in confrontation with the United States over the Letelier affair, the more disturbed the Chileans become. There are even some signs of anti-Americanism here because it is the United States that is pressing Chile the hardest to put its house in order on the human rights issue, the Letelier case and ultimately a return to democracy.

TO SOME EXTENT, Pinochet has modified the authoritarian nature of the regime. He has cooperated with

In Letelier Indictment

By Charles A. Krause

Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, Chile — The Chilean government last night arrested and placed under military detention three Chileans indicted yesterday in Washington in the September 1976 bombing death of former Chilean foreign minister and diplomat Orlando Letelier.

The three were identified yesterday in the indictment as Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former head of Chile's secret police (DINA), and two other DINA employees, operations director Pedro Espinoza Bravo and agent Armando Fernandez Larios.

The government statement announcing their arrests failed to say where they were being held or when they had been arrested.

The U.S. Embassy here had formally asked for the arrest and detention of the three yesterday afternoon, touching off what is expected to be a complicated legal battle over their extradition.

The statement also stressed that the three are innocent until proven guilty, and expressed the hope of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet that the case would be cleared up.

Contreras is a close associate of Pinochet.

The statement, issued by Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez, said there would be an extradition hearing before a Chilean court, but no date for the hearing was given.

A U.S. Embassy note asking for the arrests was delivered by Charles Grover, second deputy chief of mission, with the concurrence of U.S. Ambassador George W. Landau, who was in northern Chile when the indictments were announced yesterday.

The detention of the three is the first step in extradition proceedings that probably will culminate ultimately with a hearing before the Chilean Supreme Court, according to terms set forth in a 1900 treaty between Chile and the United States and later amended in 1935.

The legal battle over the extradition of the three will hinge on two seemingly contradictory provisions of the 1900 treaty, Chilean legal experts say.

According to the first provision, murder and "comprehending assassination" are extraditable offenses. But a second provision clearly sets forth that a "criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense . . . be of a political character; or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to punish him for an offense of a political character."

The three suspects are expected to fight extradition.

Contreras has already retained a

prominent Santiago lawyer, Sergio Miranda Carrington, who once offered to defend Nazi war criminals at the Nuremberg trials at the end of World War II.

Miranda could not be reached for comment, but is expected by other lawyers in Chile to argue that the Letelier assassination was a political crime, and is therefore not covered by the treaty.

However, one source pointed out yesterday that Contreras and the other two Chileans are also charged with the murder of Ronni Moffitt, the female colleague of Letelier who was riding in his car at the time it was blown up.

This source said a possible way around the treaty's prohibition against extradition for political offenses might be to argue that Moffitt's death could not be considered politically motivated and that the three Chileans should be extradited to stand trial in the United States for her murder.

Another section of the 1900 treaty clearly states that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this treaty." This section is interpreted here to mean that the Chilean Supreme Court could order extradition, but is not obliged to do so, even if the court decides there is sufficient evidence for the three Chileans to stand trial for the charges brought in the United States.

Another complication cited by legal sources here is that under Chilean laws conspiracy to commit a crime is not in itself a crime. The Supreme Court, these sources said, might well decide not to grant extradition for that reason.

The 1935 treaty says that if the person whose extradition is sought is a citizen of the country to which the request is addressed the surrendering state must determine whether to deliver him.

Both treaties provide for the arrest and detention of a person accused of a crime in another country when that country plans to ask for extradition.

Even if the Chilean Supreme Court does not order the three Chileans to be extradited to stand trial in the United States, many observers believe the airing of the evidence against them in public will have a significant impact on Chilean public opinion about the alleged involvement by their government in the assassination of Letelier, who served as the late Salvador Allende's ambassador to Washington as well as his foreign and defense minister before Chile's 1973 coup.

By Charles A. Krause
and Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. authorities have informed Chilean government officials that it is virtually certain that formal murder charges will be filed in the United States against at least three senior Chilean secret police officials in the Washington murder of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier, according to diplomatic and investigative sources.

The notification has touched off a sharp reaction in Chile, evidenced publicly by a strong anti-American sentiment in the progovernment press and privately by an apparently orchestrated attempt in some government circles to limit Chile's continued

cooperation in the U.S. investigation, the sources said.

The shift in focus of the investigation from the United States to Chile began in April after an American-born, admitted Chilean secret police (DINA) agent, Michael Vernon Townley, acknowledged participation in the murder plot and began cooperating with the investigators.

He reportedly has provided detailed evidence about the participation of at least three of his Chilean DINA supervisors in the murder plot. Townley said he was working for them when he recruited five anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States to carry out the assassination.

See SANTIAGO, A25, Col. 1

SANTIAGO, From A1

Among those reportedly implicated by Townley is Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the head of DINA at the time of the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing.

Letelier and an associate, Ronni K. Moffitt, were killed when a bomb attached to the car was detonated by a remote control device as it traveled around Sheridan Circle.

In Santiago, Chile's military government, its supporters in the press and its friends in business circles have become both frightened and furious as the U.S. investigation has turned toward the involvement of Chilean citizens.

The Chilean government has recently questioned the motives of the U.S. Justice Department official conducting the investigation in addition to not cooperating fully with U.S. requests for information, according to well-informed sources in Santiago.

The wave of anti-American feeling is the first in decades, among conservative Chileans who have traditionally looked to the United States as a friend in their efforts to stop leftists and Communists from gaining control of Chile.

"Why does your government always have to meddle in our affairs?" a very well-connected conservative businessman asked a reporter the other day. "The United States really is imperialistic."

The marked change in attitude began about three weeks ago during the most recent visit to Santiago of Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper, who is heading the investigation into the murder of Letelier, a former foreign minister and Chile's ambassador to the United States during the leftist government of former president Salvador Allende. Until his death, Letelier was an outspoken critic of the right-wing military regime that overthrew Allende in 1973.

Propper, accompanied by Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. and two FBI agents, made what was his third visit to Santiago in the past three months to gather evidence to present to a grand jury investigating the Letelier affair in Washington.

On the most recent visit, the first after Townley's deportation and questioning, it soon became clear to Chilean government officials that the evidence Propper was after would be used to indict three former secret police officers, including Contreras. The former secret police head, who left the investigative agency when it was reorganized last fall, has long been a confidant of President Augusto Pinochet.

The reaction in Santiago to the Propper mission and to the headlines it generated was instantaneous and harsh as the realization sunk in that U.S. authorities and the grand jury would almost certainly charge the three Chileans with having ordered or participated in the Letelier murder.

The Chilean press reaction to Propper's visit was at times hostile. It was a sharp contrast to the earlier visits to Chile by Propper and FBI agent L. Carter Cornick, who were covered by

an unmuzzled press that considered them high-ranking American officials and treated them with respect.

Indignation, a sense of helplessness and, finally, cold anger swept through the government and its supporters at the implications of Propper's requests for information. No issue is as dangerous to the continued viability of the military government here as the Letelier case because many political observers believe that, faced with absolute proof, large numbers of Chileans would find it impossible to continue supporting a government that had ordered a cold-blooded political assassination.

The Letelier case is particularly dangerous for Pinochet because of his close connection to Contreras. "Pinochet might not have known about the Letelier murder, as the president has said he did not," said one lawyer who is not closely associated with either the government or the opposition. "But far fewer people would believe him" if Contreras is indicted in the United States.

After Propper returned to the United States, the Pinochet government went on the offensive. On May 26, Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez issued a statement which said there had been "no precise objective" for Propper's third visit to Santiago.

The statement suggested that the investigator might have had "ulterior political" motives for personally coming to Chile. The government said the visit had contributed to an "artificial climate with which Chile's enemies pretend to involve our authorities" in the Letelier case.

Persons familiar with the relationship between Chilean and U.S. officials during the case said Chilean investigators have never directly accused the U.S. investigation of being political and have treated Propper and Cornick as nonpolitical investigators.

Since the alleged involvement of DINA officials has become public, the Chilean government has begun conducting a military inquiry into the alleged Chilean involvement in the plot. Chilean investigators have traveled to Washington to gather information for use in that investigation, sources said.

The Fernandez statement also stressed that Chile would continue cooperating with U.S. authorities, but, according to informed sources in Santiago, the Chilean government has failed to turn over several pieces of information that Propper requested during his trip there.

One source said the government apparently is withholding the information, hoping that Propper will be unable to obtain a grand jury indictment without it. Other sources have said, however, that Contreras and the other two DINA officers will be indicted even if the information requested is not provided.

Top Chilean Police Face Murder Charges Here

Townley's Wife Knew Of Plot to Kill Letelier

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile — Mariana Callejas, the wife of Michael V. Townley, the accused assassin of Orlando Letelier, is candid.

"Why did you tell the reporters at the airport last night that your husband put the bomb in Letelier's car?" she was asked at her home here yesterday after a flight from Washington.

"I can't lie. I don't know how. It's difficult for me to lie or to ignore people," Callejas said.

In any case, she added, FBI agent Carter Cornick had already testified in court a week ago that her husband placed the bomb that killed Letelier, so she said she didn't see anything so new in that.

"But did you know about the assassination plot beforehand or that they were going to put a bomb in Letelier's car?" she was asked.

"Yes. Including the day that the attempt was made (Sept. 21, 1976), when Michael called me from Miami," she said.

CALLEJAS, WHO has kept her maiden name as many Chilean women do, was completely composed although tired from the 7,000-mile

flight from Washington to Santiago.

She said she went there at the invitation and expense of the U.S. government to testify before the grand jury and to see her husband, Michael, 36, who is in custody somewhere near Washington.

Townley's home in the Lo Curro hills overlooks the smoggy basin in which Chile's capital is located. There is a swimming pool the family has never used. The view of the snow-capped Andes is magnificent.

But Callejas is difficult to get a fix on. A wistful smile constantly plays across her face even when she discusses calamity or hardship.

One of those hardships is that she is raising two children, Chris, 15, and Brian, 12, both bilingual and blond like their father, but no money is coming in to the chalet on at 4925 Via Naranja.

"I have sold one of the cars in order to feed my children," she said.

"Obviously the government of Chile cannot help us because that would be an admission of guilt. Michael told me I ought not to be giving interviews for free when we need the money so badly."

AS SHE TALKS Callejas skips from subject to subject without distress and always in low key.

See TOWNLEY, A-4

TOWNLEY

Continued From A-1

One moment she says, "I am a Chilean and I will always be a Chilean." The next, she says clearly but without passion that she is angry that her government gave her husband over to the United States without due process of Chilean law.

At the same time, Callejas says, the grand jury treated her nicely because they are nice people and she spoke well of Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and FBI agents Cornick and Robert Scherrer.

What did she have to tell the grand jury last week?

"Not very much," Townley's wife said. She said they questioned her for about 20 minutes.

"But I am not a woman to ask many questions. I knew Michael was with the DINA and that he is good with electronics, but we didn't talk much about what he was doing," she said.

She slowly wanders around the house where she and Michael Townley lived together.

"It is very lonely here now," she said.

THERE ARE NOT many books. A couple of paperbacks catch the eye: "The Terminal Man" and something in sci-fi called "The Shores of Death."

The bar contains only a bottle of tequila, looking long ignored. The hi-fi is impressive, wired by Michael, but none of the records is in sight.

"I write. I read. I keep busy with the children," Callejas said.

"What do you think of the United States? Don't you have some children by a previous marriage living there?" she was asked.

"That is a thing of the past," she said. "But I do not like it when the U.S. blackmails Chile and other countries as they do. The Americans say you'll get no food unless you do as we say. That is not right."

Mariana Callejas, three times married and now separated from her husband by one of the most publicized acts of violence ever committed in Washington, does not think she would attend a trial.

She says she cannot afford the trip and that she has to take care of the children. But it comes out that she would not want them exposed to sight of their father as a prisoner in jail and in the dock.

SHE IS A FEY woman who seems to move through life as if it were a dream, or a nightmare. It is hard to say whether she is the perfect victim of circumstances or as clever as her conversation indicates she may be.

She has told Chilean interviewers at various times that she has been a Communist, a Socialist, a Zionist, an

anti-Allende activist and, during a stay in the United States, a supporter of Eugene McCarthy.

"But he was a disappointment," she said with a sigh, as if all her men might fit that description.

Born in the small town of Rapel in the province of Coquimbo, her father was a justice of the peace. She attended high school and then college but dropped out. She explains that by saying, "I am an Aries and Aries people are always complicated. I was preoccupied with the problems of the world at an early age and this made problems with my father who was anti-Communist."

And there were her marriages. The first lasted six months until she was 17. Her second husband was Jewish and took her to live on a kibbutz in Israel.

SHE MARRIED Michael Townley after a 10-month courtship. They lived in Florida, where she worked for McCarthy's cause.

When they came back to Chile, she said, she became a collaborator in the right-wing Patria y Libertad organization against President Salvador Allende.

Life looks bleak to Mariana Callejas, but her omnipresent smile makes one wonder if she really understands how serious a turn her life has taken.

It is all very disorganized, some woeful sculpture, the unused pool, the flea market quality of the furnishings in a house that has one of the most beautiful views in Latin America.

But that view is lovely only looking outward. It is very probable that the electronic equipment and explosive caps used to kill Letelier in Washington were assembled in this house on the Via Naranja.

THIS IS HOW IT WAS DONE

SAUL LANDAU and RALPH STAVINS


Six months have passed since Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt were murdered on Embassy Row in Washington. No arrests or indictments have occurred. From our own investigation, published reports and Justice Department sources the names of several of the suspected assassins are known. From independent evidence that we have gathered, the suspects' motives and key details of the crime have emerged. The FBI and Justice Department findings concur in crucial detail with the conclusions drawn from our inquiry.

The actual plot for the murder began during a debate within the Chilean junta in June 1976. Letelier had received a letter from a reliable source which described this discussion. The question arose whether or not to assassinate Letelier, whom all members of the ruling council judged a danger to the regime. Gen. Augusto Pinochet made special reference to Letelier's public attempts to isolate and denigrate the ruling junta—his part in blocking a \$63-million Dutch investment, his testimony before the United Nations and other world bodies about torture in Chile, his relationships with members of Congress and State Department officials (Letelier lunched from time to time with William Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and had close contact with outspoken legislative critics of the junta, Senators Kennedy, McGovern, Abourezk and Humphrey, and Congressmen Fraser, Miller, Moffett and Harkin); his influence at international banking and lending agencies (Letelier was an economist and a former high official of the Inter-American Development Bank). Letelier stood for the Chilean law and constitution, for human rights and reason—in a word, legitimacy, underlined by his presence in Washington. All the junta had to rule with was terror.

The "moderates" around the Santiago decision-making table argued that, while Letelier constituted a clear and present danger, his assassination at that time would not augur well for future relations with Washington. The "hards" said, "kill him; the United States is soft on communism anyway." They no longer felt concerned over possible U.S. reaction to assassinations. They already felt betrayed.

The moderates prevailed. Instead of assassination a compromise was agreed upon: Letelier was stripped of his Chilean nationality by a junta decree. This decision, reached in June, was not published in the official *Gazette* until September 10, 1976.

Several elements entered into the junta debate. The most important factor was that, contrary to the public impression, U.S.-Chilean relations had suffered a steady decline over the previous year. Because of flagrant and well-documented violations of human rights, the U.S. Congress began to reduce the large benefits it had been



Marcelo Moncke

granting to the junta since the overthrow of Allende. Congress stopped all military aid, sharply cut back economic aid, and inserted human rights provisions in aid legislation. From a 1975 peak of \$273 million, U.S. aid was halved in fiscal 1976 and halved again for fiscal 1977. Three members of Congress and their staffs traveled to Chile and, upon their return home, gave eyewitness accounts of the horrors of daily life under the military dictatorship. In addition to such open condemnation of the regime by Congressional leaders, the Ford administration voted in early 1976 to denounce Chile at the United Nations for its systematic violation of human rights, and the State Department through the U.S. Embassy in Santiago delivered signals of diplomatic disapproval.

The sum of these gestures did not indicate an impending break in relations; indeed, one could interpret them as messages to mend one's brutal ways. But the junta responded with puerile rebelliousness. Its leaders, realizing that Congress was determined to cut their aid significantly, boasted that they didn't want it anyway. Chile's economic minister announced that Chile needed no more foreign loans, since the Chilean economy was already glutted with foreign credit.

Saul Landau and Ralph Stavins were co-workers with Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. Landau, a film director (Fidel), is acting director of the Transnational Institute, IPS's international program. Stavins directs IPS's project on official illegality.

U.S. legislators. Senator Kennedy was branded a Communist leader and cartoons in the junta-controlled Santiago dailies portrayed other powerful Senators conspiring against the junta, with Mrs. Hortensia Allende, the slain President's widow, goading them on.

Pablo Rodriguez, leader of the ultra-Right *Patria y Libertad* movement, asked on Chilean TV, "Why has Chile become an electoral banner used in the U.S. to win votes? I believe it is because to a great extent international communism has been attracting those nations where eventually there might be a conflict." Détente, according to officials in Chile, had proved that the United States could no longer be trusted. (Shortly after the murders, former Chilean Ambassador Manuel Trucco, responding to Presidential candidate Carter's attack on the junta and U.S. involvement in the coup, wrote Carter warning that his advisers were Marxist dupes.)

Letelier's published writings continued to throw doubt on the junta's economic and political legitimacy. In the August 28, 1976, issue of the *The Nation*, he published an article, "Chile: Economic 'Freedom's' Awful Toll," which connected the campaign of state terror to the junta-Milton Friedman economic model. Despite the ubiquitous terror, Letelier concluded, the generals showed no capacity to mold a viable economy, and future investment in Chile was foolhardy.

On September 10, 1976, Letelier learned of the decree stripping him of his nationality. At a scheduled speech at Madison Square Garden, New York, he gave his reply: "I was born a Chilean, I am a Chilean and I will die a Chilean. They, the Fascists, were born traitors, live as traitors, and will be remembered forever as Fascist traitors." The overflow crowd roared its approval. DINA agents attended the rally and reported to Santiago.

We believe that General Pinochet and his DINA chief, Manuel Contreras, called a special meeting to discuss these, for them, unfavorable recent events. This time the moderates lost. Pinochet ordered DINA to "hit" on Embassy Row in Washington, D.C. as Pinochet's "symbolic" response both to Letelier's resistance and to the United States' "betrayal" of its promised support.

From several sources inside the U.S. Government, we have learned that a high-level DINA official was instructed to conspire with Cuban exiles in the United States for the actual killing. The DINA-exile connection, by then many months old, had come about as naturally as a marriage between Mafia families. Shortly after the 1973 coup, Col. Eduardo Sepulveda, a close friend of Pinochet, was dispatched to Miami to meet with Cuban exile leaders. Ramiro de la Fé, a Bay of Pigs veteran who had served time for possession of explosives, and who was a spokesman for several terrorist groupings, consulted with Sepulveda and helped him set up a front group in the United States to promote the junta's image. In return, according to former exile activist, Carlos Rivero Collado,* Sepulveda promised moral and ma-

* Carlos Rivero Collado was active in Cuban exile affairs until he recently returned to Cuba, revealing all he knew of exile politics.

terial aid in the exiles' private war against Castro and the Cuban Revolution.

In early 1974, the junta blessed the arrangement by sending Julio Duran to deliver a keynote speech before the exile community in Miami. Duran, Chile's delegate to the U.N. General Assembly and a leading figure in *Patria y Libertad*, promised the exiles that henceforth, Chile would support their cause.

The exiles, most of whom the CIA had abandoned because of periodic policy changes and the fallout from Watergate, became the junta's adopted sons. The junta and the exiles shared the same enemies and ideology. Chile, not the United States, was dedicated to the overthrow of Castro; Chile, not the United States, was now the hemispheric leader in the struggle against international communism; Chile, not the United States, was willing to use terror as a routine tool of policy. The exiles had new parents, and, judging from the frequency of their visits to Chile, a new home. In 1975 Brigade 2506, composed of Bay of Pigs veterans, awarded Pinochet its "medal of freedom."

According to Carlos Rivero Collado, from 1974 to 1976 the Cuban exile terrorist groups, with Chilean moral and material aid, launched a number of violent attacks in and out of this country. Their targets included not only the Cuban Revolution but some of their newly defined enemies in the United States. In one incident, Emilio Milian, a Miami-based Cuban exile, who advocated détente with Cuba, had his legs severed when a C4 bomb exploded in his car, the identical method used later to eliminate Letelier. (For details of atrocities committed by Cuban exiles in the recent past, see "Miami, Haven for Terror," *The Nation*, March 19.)

Our evidence indicates that a high-level DINA agent landed in Miami on September 13, 1976, and met with a group of Cuban exiles who had already been alerted that a "contract" was in the offing. The DINA agent worked out the details of the Letelier assassination with four young terrorists noted for their daring and cold-bloodedness. Having secured a plastic explosive and a detonating device, they departed for Washington. There they met with DINA agents, posing as Chilean officials, stationed at the Chilean Embassy. The Washington-based operatives briefed the exiles on Letelier's habits, his car description, daily departure times, route to work, parking location, and probable work schedule at the Institute for Policy Studies during the following week.

The next afternoon, Justice Department sources confirm, a group of Cubans made an official call upon their Chilean Ambassador, Manuel Trucco, to "protest" the extradition of Rolando Otero, a fellow Cuban exile, from Chile to the United States, there to stand trial for bombings in the Miami area. This visit to the Chilean Embassy could serve in the future, should it be necessary, to explain their presence in Washington.

Upon leaving the Chilean Embassy, they probably drove to an alley behind the Institute for Policy Studies, where Letelier routinely parked his car. The explosive was taped to the I-beam of the car, under the driver's seat, for maximum impact. The car may have been

from his office and when Letelier arrived at his house at 6:30 that evening, one of his companions pointed out that the right front door was ajar. He shrugged it off, saying, "Oh, I must have gotten out on the wrong side today."

The next morning Letelier drove to National Airport, parked his car for the day, and took an Eastern shuttle to New York. He returned on Saturday for a party at his house to celebrate Chilean Independence Day.

Monday, the day before the assassination, Letelier worked at his office. At the end of the day, he phoned Isabel, his wife, confirming a dinner-work engagement at home for that evening with Michael and Ronni Moffitt. When Moffitt discovered that his own car would not start, Letelier phoned again explaining that the Moffitts would drive with him. They stayed until midnight, and then drove Letelier's car to their own home, it being agreed that they would pick him up and drive to work together the next morning.

At 8:45 Tuesday morning, a Latin woman walking in front of Letelier's residence noticed a late-model gray sedan parked near the Letelier driveway. Three occupants sat inside and one man stood by the car. She identified him as "certainly a Latin," about 30, wearing a gray suit and tie. The four appeared to be enjoying an "inside joke," she said.

At 8:55 the Moffitts arrived in the Letelier car, and pulled into Letelier's driveway. Engaged in conversation, they did not notice any other vehicles nearby. As soon as they entered the Letelier residence, one of the group of four must have crawled under Letelier's car and attached the detonating device to the plastic charge—a procedure that requires only seconds.

At 9:15, Letelier, Ronni and Michael Moffitt left the house and began the drive from Bethesda to the District of Columbia. Letelier took the route he always drove—River Road to 46th to Massachusetts Avenue. They talked about the day's business and the dreary weather. No one paid attention to a gray sedan trailing them at a "safe" distance.

As Letelier entered Sheridan Circle, a hand in the gray car depressed a button. Michael Moffitt heard the sound

of the explosion, which threw the unconscious Letelier from the wreckage on top of his car. His legs had been snapped from his body and catapulted some 15 feet away. Ronni Moffitt stumbled away from the smoldering Chevrolet; she seemed to be O.K., in fact had suffered a severed artery and soon bled to death. Michael screamed out into the world, "Chilean Fascists have done this."

This reconstruction of the assassinations, based on evidence gleaned in six months of probing and some educated guessing, is supported by what we know of FBI findings. In crucial areas, our conclusions match those of the Justice Department exactly: a DIA official, himself under orders from "above," ordered and supervised the "hit"; Cuban terrorists carried it out; a plastic explosive was the murder instrument.

Most of the FBI and Justice Department officials investigating the murders have made a concerted effort to bring the perpetrators to the bar of justice. At the same time, other agents inside the government have leaked material from Letelier's briefcase, seized by the police as potential evidence at the time of the explosion. The leaked material first appeared on the desks of several officials of the Inter-American Development Bank where Letelier had served for many years. Next, the briefcase material was given to newspaper columnist Jack Anderson and then to Evans and Novak. The columns which these men wrote attempted to discredit Letelier and divert attention from the actual killers—General Pinochet, the Chilean junta, the DINA and their Cuban exile hit men.

The names of most of the killers, their motives, and their *modus operandi* are now known to the Justice Department. What remains are the more fundamental questions: will the U.S. authorities be allowed to gather sufficient evidence to bring the killers to trial? Will they name General Pinochet and other ruling junta members who ordered the assassinations? And will the role of U.S. intelligence and defense agencies, which had previously trained junta leaders, DINA agents and the exiles, be revealed in full? □

The Witness

Townley: He Followed Orders

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Michael Vernon Townley, a soft-spoken, intense and articulate 35-year-old man who has made Chile his home for the past 20 years already is starting to be known in some circles as the "John Dean" of the Letelier affair.


He is an unlikely figure to be found in his current role—as the heavily guarded informant who has calmly told FBI agents and prosecutors how he followed orders to plant an explosive whose blast left its intended victim so mangled that hardened investigators became sick at the scene of the crime.

As he is described by people who know him, Townley is a skilled electronic technician capable of assembling devices to detonate bombs by remote control. He had been active in commando raids against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende, whose Marxist regime was toppled in a military coup by the current Chilean president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet.

Townley, an American who grew up in Chile where his father headed a large U.S. automobile operation, had become a familiar sight to Americans there by the early 1970s. He was known as a political activist who was suspected of participating in military activities of Patria y Libertad, a right-wing Chilean party.

Although he had been charged with murder for his alleged participation in a Concepcion raid in which a night watchman was killed, the charges were dropped when Pinochet came to power in late 1973 and Townley became an agent of DINA, the Chilean secret police agency.

Townley was expelled from Chile in early April after the U.S. put intense pressure on the country to turn him over. In the U.S., his attorneys, Sey-



MICHAEL VERNON TOWNLEY
... unlikely figure in current role

mour Glanzer and Barry W. Levine, struck up a deal by which he would enter a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier and would in return cooperate in the Letelier investigation.

As a part of the deal, Townley will only have to cooperate with and provide information to U.S. authorities on his role in the Letelier murder. He reportedly has additional information about terrorist activities in other countries, but is not required to give that information to the U.S., sources have said.

As was John Dean in the Watergate affair, Townley was, by his own account, directly involved in the execution of crimes and has decided to testify against his close associates. And, as in Watergate, Townley could, as did Dean, play a central role in questioning the activities of a country's highest government officials.

Halt in Arms for Chile Is Passed and Reversed

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House yesterday voted to halt U.S. arms shipments to Chile until the government there surrenders three men indicted in the murder of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier. Then, after protests from the Justice Department, the House reversed itself.

The confusing sequence of events stemmed from Tuesday's action by a federal grand jury, which indicted eight persons in connection with the 1975 car-bombing deaths of Letelier and an American friend, Ronni K. Moffitt, as they drove through Washington's Embassy Row.

Among those indicted were Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former head of the Chilean secret police (DINA), and two DINA employees, Pedro Espinoza Bravo and Armando Fernandez Larios. Contreras, a close associate


of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, is believed to be the first high-ranking foreign intelligence official indicted in this country.

Yesterday, as the House was considering the fiscal 1979 foreign military aid bill, Rep. Thomas R. Harkin (D-Iowa), an outspoken human-rights advocate, introduced an amendment calling for the cutoff of all arms shipments to Chile until the three are extradited to the United States.

Congress halted military assistance to Chile in 1976 to protest alleged repression and rights abuses by the Pinochet government. However, an estimated \$24 million in so-called pipeline shipments — equipment purchased or contracted for before the cutoff—has been continuing.

The Harkin amendment called for halting all

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PRESIDENT PINOCHET
... a close associate indicted

Halt in Arms to Chile Voted, Then Reversed

ARMS, From A1

material in the pipeline until the three have been extradited by Chilean authorities. After an emotional debate in which House member after member took the floor to denounce Chilean "death squads," the amendment was adopted by voice vote.

But, when word of the House's action got out, it sparked an immediate protest from the Justice Department on the grounds that it was premature and inappropriate. The department then instructed its congressional liaison officers to begin contacting members of the House to make known its objections.

Robert Keuch, deputy assistant attorney general in the criminal division, said in a telephone interview last night:

"We feel such an action is improper at the present time because the formal request to Chile for extradition

hasn't been made yet, and there is no sign at this point that the Chilean judicial process will not be forthcoming in meeting the request for extradition."

Keuch said the extradition papers probably will be filed within the next two weeks, and added that it's likely to take some time before the matter is decided by the Chilean courts. He said Justice was aware of news agency reports from Santiago quoting Pinochet as saying there was some doubt about whether the three Chilean nationals will be extradited.

But, Keuch added, the interests of justice require that the appropriate legal channels be used and given an opportunity to work without actions that could be construed as undue political interference.

Privately, other Justice Department sources said actions like the House amendment could seriously impede ef-

forts to bring the three Chileans to trial, because it could be cited within Chile as an interference by Congress in its internal affairs and a politically inspired maneuver to topple the Pinochet government.

The arguments made by the Justice Department apparently had considerable impact within the House. Late in the afternoon, Rep. Charles E. Wiggins (R-Calif.) moved to reconsider the Harkin amendment, and, on that go-around, it was overturned on a roll-call vote, 243 to 166.

In the indictment, Contreras and Espinoza, DINA operations supervisor, were charged with plotting the assassination of Letelier, an outspoken foe of the Pinochet government. Fernandez Larios was named as being one of two DINA agents—the other being an American citizen, Michael V. Townley—who came to the United States to carry out the plot in cooperation with militant Cuban exiles.

Pinochet: U.S. Must Now Prove Chilean Stresses Barriers Facing Extradition of 3

By Charles A. Krause
Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, Chile — President Augusto Pinochet, reacting sharply to the U. S. indictment of three Chilean secret police officers for the assassination of Orlando Letelier, said yesterday that these charges are merely accusations and extradition will require presentation of evidence.

Asked if the action against Chile's former secret police chief and two associates could bring down his government, Pinochet defiantly replied: "Absolutely not." He also told U.S. State Department officials, "I have no business getting involved."

Pinochet insisted in a meeting with reporters that he expects U.S. requests for extradition to be handled in conformity with Chilean law and international commitments. It was widely felt here, however, that he does not expect the three accused to be delivered to Washington for trial.

The key responsibility for extradition falls under the jurisdiction of Chile's Supreme Court and Pinochet made it clear that he does not intend to supersede that process by personally ordering that the three be put in U.S. hands.

Extradition procedures are spelled out in a 1902 treaty between Chile and the United States. The Supreme Court, which is officially independent of the military government, is nonetheless thought to be influenced by it.

The Supreme Court, even in the days when it functioned under democratic governments, rarely has granted extradition of Chilean citizens. Furthermore, the U.S.-Chilean extradition treaty makes it clear that crimes of "a political character" are not extraditable offenses.

At the same time, however, assassination and murder are crimes for which extradition may be granted, an apparent contradiction which lawyers here said will be the basis of the legal

See CHILE, A15, Col. 2



JUAN CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA
... accused former DINA chief

Pinochet: U.S. Must Prove Its Case to Get Extradition

CHILE, From A1

battle that is expected once the United States formally asks for the extradition of the three former secret police officers charged with the murder of Chilean exile Orlando Letelier two years ago in Washington.

If extradition is not granted, another treaty signed by both the United States and Chile provides that Chile has the obligation to try the accused here if the accusations against them are considered to be crimes under Chilean law.

Pinochet has denied since the day Letelier was assassinated that he had any personal or prior knowledge of the affair. He has continued to maintain that his government had nothing to do with it.

The Chilean president pointed out

again yesterday that the charges brought against the three former officers—Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former head of the National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), Pedro Spinoza Bravo, former director of operations at DINA, and Armando Fernandez Larios, a DINA agent who allegedly helped carry out the murder—do not constitute proof of their guilt under the U.S. system of justice.

Since it became publicly known several months ago that Contreras was under investigation, there has been widespread speculation here about whether or not Pinochet would have known about the assassination if it was in fact carried out at the instruction of Contreras—a personal friend of Pinochet's who reported directly to

the president during his years as head of DINA.

It is generally believed here that only Pinochet and Contreras know for sure what the Chilean president knew before and after the assassination occurred near Sheridan Circle in Washington. Contreras' extradition and trial in the United States could prove extremely dangerous for the current Chilean government, according to many observers in Santiago.

Supporters of Pinochet argue that he would never have ordered the expulsion to the United States of Michael Townley last April if he had suspected that DINA was involved in murdering Letelier. Townley, an American who worked for DINA, has admitted his part in actually carrying out the Letelier assassination and has provided much of the evidence against Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez.

The Chilean government announced Tuesday night that it had placed the three Chileans under arrest after the United States formally asked for their detention pending the formal request for extradition.

The U.S.-Chilean treaty provides for the arrest and detention of accused persons for a period of two months when extradition is contemplated.

Pinochet stressed the two-month invitation yesterday in calling for proof of the charges.

Although the indictment of the three Chileans had been predicted for some time, the action of the grand jury in Washington on Tuesday has met with intense interest here. Groups gathered around newspaper kiosks reading newspaper headlines about the Letelier case.

Nonetheless, none of Chile's officially banned political parties issued statements or otherwise indicated reaction to the indictments, which some politicians were saying until recently could lead to the end of the military government.

Envoy to Chile Recalled Over Letelier Probe

By John M. Goshko
and Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States, in a strong gesture of disapproval, yesterday recalled its ambassador to Chile because of that country's alleged failure to cooperate with the investigation into the 1976 murder here of Chilean dissident Orlando Letelier.

Letelier, an outspoken critic of Chile's military regime, and an American associate, Ronni K. Moffitt, were killed on Sept. 21, 1976, when a bomb destroyed their car in the heart of Washington's Embassy Row.

In announcing the U.S. action, State Department spokesman John Trattner said: "Ambassador George W. Landau is being recalled from Santiago for consultations with the State and Justice departments. The Chilean authorities have not been forthcoming on important requests for information in the Letelier-Moffitt murder case pending by the Justice Department for some time."

The United States has said the murders were planned in Chile by the former Chilean secret police agency, DINA, and carried out here by DINA agents in collaboration with anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

Under U.S. pressure Chile expelled an American citizen, Michael V. Townley, who is now in custody here and who has admitted being the DINA agent who placed the bomb under Letelier's car.

Townley also reportedly has implicated in the plot three Chilean army officers who were assigned to DINA: Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, retired former chief of DINA and a close friend of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet; Lt. Col. Pedro Espinoza, former DINA operations chief; and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, who reportedly worked with Townley in bringing the bomb device to Washington.

Trattner refused to discuss the nature of the U.S. requests that the Chileans allegedly have not honored. However, reliable sources said the most important was a request that a key witness—apparently a DINA supervisor of Townley—either come to the United States to testify before a federal grand jury or allow himself to be questioned by U.S. officials in a third country.

In addition, the sources said the United States feels Chile has not cooperated in efforts to obtain information from the government of Paraguay about an attempt that was made there to obtain U.S. visas for Townley and Larios under false names.

Other sources said the decision to

See CHILE, A11, Col. 1

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Santiago, Cites Chile's Failure to Aid in Probe

CHILE, From A1

recall Landau — a step that stops just short of breaking diplomatic relations — was made jointly by Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher and Eugene M. Propper, the assistant U. S. attorney heading the murder probe for the Justice Department.

However, the sources revealed, Justice Department officials were surprised and angered by the way in which the State Department, in announcing the recall, seemed to link it to controversies about human rights in Chile.

The Pinochet government, which took power in a bloody 1973 coup that included the killing of Marxist President Salvador Allende, has been accused of murdering, torturing and imprisoning its opponents. Letelier had served in the Allende government as defense minister and as ambassador to Washington.

When Trattner announced that Landau was returning to Washington, he added: "Ambassador Landau's visit will also give us a chance to review the human rights situation in Chile."

Under questioning by reporters, Trattner also said that a shipment of practice bomb parts for the Chilean air force, which has been held up in California because West Coast longshoremen refuse to load them aboard a ship, "will not be loaded while this assessment of the human rights situation is going on."



GEORGE W. LANDAU
... to consult with State, Justice

Justice sources protested privately that State had acted improperly in leaving the impression that the hu-

man rights and murder investigation questions were tied together.


By so doing, these sources said, the State Department had undermined Justice's contention that it is interested only in bringing the murderers to trial and not in Chile's internal politics. There recently have been escalating chases within Chile that Washington is using the murder probe as a pretext to topple the Pinochet government.

Reliable sources said the decision to include the language about reviewing the Chilean human rights situation in State's public announcement was made by Christopher, who oversees human rights policy within the State Department.

However, the sources were unable to explain why Christopher, who is a former deputy attorney general, felt the two issues should be linked or whether he had checked this move with Justice.

Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos, who is in Washington attending the annual meeting of the Organization of American States, responded to the announcement of Landau's recall by charging that the United States was not cooperating with Chile's own internal investigation of the Letelier affair.

Another Chilean government source, who declined to be identified, said the Pinochet government had been informed of the decision to recall Landau last week. Yesterday's announcement, the source charged, had



EUGENE M. PROPPER
... heads Justice Department's probe

been timed to embarrass Chile in the midst of the OAS meeting.

In addition to Townley, five other persons, all Cuban exiles, have been charged so far in connection with the Letelier assassination plot. Three are in custody in the United States, and two others are fugitives.

All of the Cuban exiles are said to be members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, based in northern New Jersey.

Chilean Calls U.S. Move 'Out of All Proportion'

By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Staff Writer

Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos charged yesterday that the U.S. Justice Department is applying unacceptable pressure on his country and is failing to live up to an agreement for full cooperation in the investigation of the assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier.

U.S. handling of the case, he said, raises the question of whether the Americans' aim "is seeing justice done or bringing down a military regime that they don't like."

Cubillos, here for the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, called yesterday's recall "out of all proportion. I find it strange that they have taken a diplomatic re-

action to what is really a criminal case."

However, he added, "I think it will help, because maybe he can explain to people here the Chilean position—as I would have done if I had the chance."

Cubillos, who two months ago became the first civilian foreign minister since the military coup of 1973, indicated that U.S. tactics could complicate extradition of any Chileans charged in the 1976 murder of Letelier.

Insisting that Chile maintains "a will to collaborate in the investigation," he said the proof of this "is the fact that we handed over" Michael Townley, the American expatriate who worked for Chile's secret police

and is accused here of playing a major role in Letelier's death.

Chile strained its own judicial process to accommodate U.S. demands at that time, he said. "We told the United States we wanted reciprocity [of cooperation] in the case. That has not been forthcoming. We are being pressured on several aspects of the case without any respect for our legal proceedings."

He pointed out that Chile initiated its own investigation on the basis of official passports with false names issued to Townley and a Chilean army officer for a trip to the United States prior to Letelier's death.

Cubillos also stated that, contrary to published accounts, an amnesty decreed by the Chilean junta in April

does not apply to persons who might eventually be charged in the Letelier case.

"We felt that somebody could be involved and we didn't want to cover it up," he said.

"The Department of Justice does not trust us or our legal system," he added.

Cubillos is a former executive of a Santiago conglomerate and was instrumental in operation of its El Mercurio newspaper when it was a principal opposition voice to the late president Salvador Allende.

At that time, according to a U.S. Senate committee investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency funneled \$1.7 million to the newspaper.