

25 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 24 September 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Vance, and General Carter.

Mr. John Crimmins and Mr. Desmond FitzGerald were present for  
Items 2, 3, and 4.

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-106**  
**By CB, NARA Date 2-11-00**

1. Coordination of OPLAN 34-A.

a. In regard to the coordination of OPLAN 34-A, Ambassador Thompson underscored the points made in the paper submitted by the Department for utilizing the 303 Committee as the basic instrument of coordination. He was particularly concerned over the possibilities of contradiction and confusion when air, sea, and ground operations of various units are subject to schedule delays and sudden political changes.

b. Mr. Bundy said he recognized this but thought the place to coordinate was outside of the Committee whose basic task is covert operations, not day-to-day operations which are well on the way to being surfaced. Mr. Bundy suggested that State place their responsibility in an office of sufficient forcefulness to deal directly as necessary with the SACSA office of Major General Rollin Anthis. Mr. Vance explained that for this purpose this unit was directly answerable to him. He requested that Ambassador Thompson send a memorandum indicating which person or persons he would designate and how he envisaged the coordination could work most efficaciously. Ambassador Thompson agreed. Mr. Bundy foresaw no objections if, on a monthly basis, the 303 Committee were asked to review basic overall plans but repeated that the principals should approve and coordinate the bulk of the planning outside of the 303 Committee.

c. At General Carter's request, the responsibility for obtaining clearances for overflights of North Vietnam was delegated to the office of General Anthis.

2. ARANZAZU Incident

a. Mr. Crimmins explained in detail some of the complexities resulting from the ARANZAZU incident and the ensuing assurance by the Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador that the United States would assist in the investigation of the incident. He emphasized some of the pitfalls and booby traps along the way. The question was raised of paying indemnity to the



Spanish government via some exile organization for the loss of life incurred, but it was decided that any such gesture should come considerably later and certainly not before some sort of resolution had been reached with the Spanish. It was apparent that the Spanish government foresaw certain opportunities to exploit the issue for extraneous motives.

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(b)

b. [REDACTED]

c. One of the imminent headaches, Mr. Crimmins stated, was the need for him to provide a preliminary evaluation for the Spaniards on the basis of what is known so far. Again it became obvious that some finding was desirable to the effect that the perpetrators remain unidentified on the basis of evidence thus far. General Carter noted that some reports from Madrid indicate the Spanish officials were "cooling off." Finally, Mr. Crimmins requested that the principals advise their staffs that any contacts with Spanish officials which reflect on this matter be brought to his attention.

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(b)

3. Cuban Exile Problems

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES

-3-  
c. Major Erneido Oliva (see minutes dated 10 July 1964) was reported as still being in Brazil making contacts with potential backers.

4.

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(6)

5.

6. ZEBRA STRIPE

It should be recorded that the DOD ZEBRA STRIPE operation (see minutes dated 11 September 1964) was rejected at the meeting of the principals on Tuesday, 15 September 1964.

  
Peter Jessup

Distribution

Ambassador Thompson  
Mr. Vance  
Mr. McCone