

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 April 1966

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-33
By sig, NARA, Date 10-4-94

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Joint CIA-DIA Team Report on The
Military Posture in Cuba As It
Pertains to Strategic Weapons

1. We are continuing to keep under review all reports and rumors of strategic weapons and troops in Cuba, as we have done since prior to the October 1962 missile crisis. It is our estimate--based on a continuing analysis [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] --that there are no strategic weapons or foreign troop units in Cuba at this time. While we recognize that some strategic weapons could be deliberately concealed or clandestinely reintroduced on the island, it is our judgment that this has not taken place.
[REDACTED]

2. Cuba's present missile inventory is confined to defensive and tactical weapons. The number of operational surface-to-air (SAM) sites varies slightly from month to month, but totals 23 at the present time. The SAM sites are deployed to defend major population centers and military installations. The Cubans may have equipment for as many as four more sites. The approximately 600 SA-2 Guideline missiles are in Cuba to support these sites. Some of these missiles are being replaced as their shelf-life of about six years expires. This has given rise to several reports alleging that strategic weapons are once again being introduced into Cuba.
[REDACTED]

3. Other tactical missiles and related equipment possessed by the Cubans include:

(1) Four coastal defense sites equipped with 50 KENNEL cruise missiles with a range of about 40 nautical miles;

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(2) 100 more ground-to-ground KENNEL missiles;

(3) six to eight Free-Rocket-Over Ground (FROG) launchers;

(4) twelve KOMAR cruise missile boats.
[REDACTED]

4. Soviet combat units as such returned to the Soviet Union by mid-1964. We believe some 1,000 to 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisers are still in Cuba. They aid in the maintenance of military equipment and the training of Cubans throughout the armed forces, and are estimated as follows:

Ground Forces: 400 to 800

Air Defense:

(a) aviation 100 to 200

(b) SAM and radar 300 to 600

Navy 200 to 400 [REDACTED]

5. Fidel Castro and other high regime leaders appear purposely to have avoided making an issue of US reconnaissance flights over Cuba since the fall of 1964. On 29 October of that year, Castro intimated [REDACTED] that he would shoot down US reconnaissance flights if legal remedies and negotiations did not bring about their cancellation. In late January 1965, however, Castro said he had decided not to take action against the flights, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Castro reportedly was worried that Moscow might not come to his assistance should Cuba unilaterally shoot down a U-2 plane. Moreover, Castro subsequently has been impressed with forceful US actions in the bombing of targets in North Vietnam and in sending troops to the Dominican Republic. [REDACTED]

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7. The CIA-DIA team will meet regularly on the third Tuesday of each month to assess the military posture in Cuba, focusing on the problem of strategic weapons possibly still on the island. The CIA-DIA team will convene for special meetings should items of unusual interest bearing on this problem come before the intelligence community. 