

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION.

PERSONNEL AND NUMBERS.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

HAVANA, March 30.—For all that yesterday's *Diario* published accounts of six fights and skirmishes won by Spaniards in the West, and though these accounts are more or less circumstantial, and backed by official statements, an impartial observer would be rash to believe all they say. So, if the authorities exported from Spain insist upon managing the news all their own way, they have no business to find fault if the world refuses to believe them, even when they speak the truth. Taking their word for it, they met in the late encounters 6,000 or 7,000 revolutionists, and, by death and wounds, put 2,000 of them out of the way. This would pair with the story of the Sierra Cubitas, where 1,500 Spaniards engaged 10,000 rebels, ambushed and intrenched, and settled a thousand or so during a five hours march through a woody mountain defile. Yet, to have it thus admitted at last that the Western rebels alone have been able to bring into the field 16,000 men, is interesting. Not less curious would be an accurate reckoning of all the Cubans who have been done to death in the newspapers since the war began. The following is only a rough comparison of losses on both sides, and is intended as a hint, and no more, to the future historian:

Losses.	Spain.	Rebels.	Losses.	Spain.	Rebels.
Valmaseda's march 30	2,000	Guaracabulla.....	1	1,000	
Dist. of Holguin.....	100	1,000	Manicarguena.....	15	1,000
Gibara District.....	50	300	Rio Damajagua.....	11	600
Nuevitas.....	50	600	Jaguey.....	11	600
Sancti Spiritus.....	50	4,000	St. Domingo.....	12	800
Bayamo.....	10	200	Mayajigua.....	5	500
Santa Cruz District	5	200	Sierra Cubitas.....	100	1,000
Sancti Spiritus.....	5	200	Other skirmishes.....	60	2,000
Trinidad.....	5	300			
Mayari.....	10	1,000			
Portavilla.....	10	1,000			
			Total.....	731	16,000

These figures make not the slightest pretense to accuracy, yet they are in accord with the proportions observed in the papers. The statistics of Count Valmaseda's campaign are just as they have been rendered at times by his circle of admirers in Havana. The losses in the Sierra Cubitas are of recent and well-known report. Commandant Herrera says that at Guaracabulla he routed 3,000 of the enemy, killed 126, and inflicted "an incalculable number of wounds." At Portavilla Col. Rios killed 150 and made 21 prisoners, beside "making an infinitude of wounds," the enemy numbering 2,000. A Spaniard's infinitude, as applied to wounds and Cuba, may mean anything from 500 to 1,000 in the present excited state of the news market. It cannot be successfully questioned that in most of the encounters reported the Spaniards have beaten their ill-armed adversaries, while they seem to be as far off from conquest as ever. Perhaps the best rule for estimating the comparative losses as we have them in the press of the capital would be to multiply those of the Spaniards and divide those of the rebels by a given number. What with being ambushed, and fired at from behind fences, and treated to all manner of guerillero cunning and dodging, as they themselves complain, the Spaniards ought to have support about as much, upon the whole, as their adversaries. They say far otherwise, yet unsway themselves besides. Allowing, however, everything in reason for the trained barbedness and pluck of the troops from Spain, there is no way of believing the general roorback about their unintermittent victories with inappreciable loss. That 1,500 men fought their way through a mountain against 10,000 men in ambush, is a Munchausen-like story; and it is due to strict history to say that the Government, in its reserved report of the affair in the Sierra Cubitas, has never insisted upon it. The Cubans avowed, upon letters received from Nuevitas, that not Quesada, but one of his lieutenants, Arteaga, opposed the Spaniards there, the main body of the insurgent failing to arrive in time. I cannot say that any account of this matter is to afford us the truth; yet though it is believed that the Spaniards lost far more in men, munitions, and artillery than they confess, the rebels also lost a large opportunity, commensurate with what appears to have been an exploit on the part of their foes.

All the tendencies of the situation are to a struggle in which the evils and misfortunes of a guerillero warfare may become chronic. Those who write for the Spaniards hold the devices of their enemy in supreme ridicule and contempt. The Cubans, they say, can never be coaxed to stand their ground, and when they run, they run for dear life, forgetting to mount the horses with which a great many of them are supplied. This elusive kind of warfare is very exasperating, and, of course, the fun made of it is somewhat in the vein of the laughing hyena. "All arms are good when managed with valor," quotes *Pero Grullo*, with reference to the way the rebels manage theirs. "In New-York," says the *Moro Muza*, "they are making granadas (hand grenades) like oranges—fruit worthy of those who combat with guayabos." Thus do these cheerful Spaniards jest and contemn, not always rightly, but sometimes wittily. The explanation of a caricature of Quesada is that "the troops having killed his horse, the Fenian Committee (i. e., the Cubans) in New-York send him a velocipede." The Cuban banquet there is celebrated in this witless but suggestive strain:

Many Yankees were there, the kind who eat much and drink more.

They spoke much, they ate much, they drank amazingly.

Johnson had not been invited.

Washington, Céspedes, Aguilera sent their pictures.

The name of Lincoln was pronounced one hundred and fifty thousand times.

That of Grant two hundred and fifty million times.

They gave three hurrahs for Washington.

Six hurrahs for Céspedes and Aguilera.

Twelve hurrahs for the hotel keeper who prepared the banquet.

Twenty four hurrahs for Lincoln.

Forty eight hurrahs for Johnson.

Ninety six hurrahs for Dulce.

And one thousand granadas for the Volunteers of Cuba.

Mr. Ferrer y Couto in a discourse very clear and sensible declared himself a Southerner, a Pro-Slavery man, a secessionist, an absolutist, a liberalist, a terrorist, and a drinker of water. This day, however, he would make an exception to his rule.

Pero Grullo maintains the old joke that the exiled Cubans are dying of the cold. A distinguished refugee with his nose in a bad state is thus enthusiastically addressed by a fellow-countryman just landed: "Is it possible, my friend, thou hast sacrificed thy nose to the autonomy of the country?" Several of the Fenian Committee are in another sketch doubled up with the cold. One remarks with a Spanish idiom that "the love of country is sweet over all," and the other says that the over-all is wanting. The revolutionary plan of campaign is ridiculed in a series of caricatures. This is the order of the day of the Mexican and Dominican auxiliaries: "Compadritos, if you find oxen, cows, gold, silver, and other stealables, be hard on them, but if you see soldiers with them you know your duty—to horse, and spare their lives." The *Moro Muza* does not spare even the poor prisoners doomed to the fatal and shameful exile of Fernand-Po. The day of their going it jests about as a saint's day, and suggests a prayer for "the souls of Morro and Cabana."

Ridicule and contempt, however, are not always in order. The worst ultraist of the Spanish press thinks it worth while to acknowledge now that some good men have gone over to the rebels of Camaguey or Puerto-Principe. "And who are those," it asks, "who follow this infamous leadership? Persons until now very worthy, and whose reputation was unstained. They are the three brothers Molina, whom we know as worthy, valiant, and noble. There are among them Richard Adan and Antonia Aguilera, honored citizens, good husbands, good fathers. These are Manuel Agramont and the brothers Betancourt, who we can hardly believe could abase their high-mindedness by submitting to those who to-day mislead them. There, too, is Cornelius Porro, whose instincts are against dishonor and whose heart is sensible and generous." It also laments that such men as the brothers Agramonte, who, with Cisneros, lately signed a proclamation of freedom to the slave, should have learned "to abhor the nation." That the same paper which approved the scenes of violence and blood acted out

in Havana should make these concessions is astonishing. But the aim of the *For de Cuba* is evidently to have it understood that for certain individuals there is still time to repent, and chance to leave their brethren in the lurch to their own eternal well-being. The article from which I have extracted is supposed to have been inspired by the Captain-General. To overbalance whatever moral allowances it yields to the rebels, the *For* treats their military leaders as idiots or knaves. The Marquis of Santa Lucia is spoken of as "one ruined by his vices, poor of spirit, and cowardly of heart," who has gone into the war to recruit his depleted fortune. Francisco Sanchez is "a haciendado of small intelligence, completely null as to education." Quesada is "a condemned thief," who escaped the penitentiary. Manuel Arteaga is a man of "despotic instincts." Emilio Zaldivar is "half imbecile." Angel Castello is a bankrupt who cheated his creditors. Bernabe Varona had conspired with negroes. Domingo Barreto was an old bandit, well known to his victims in the jurisdiction of Nuevitas.

On some points of biography I can, perhaps, set the foregoing authority right, and have, at any rate, something more to say about those who signed the late proclamation in Camaguey giving freedom to the blacks. They are among the very worthiest men in the island. Salvador Cisneros, the Marquis of Santa Lucia, is a cousin of the late Betancourt Cisneros, the father of the cause of annexation, and is esteemed by the Cubans as the heir to his ideas, and the natural leader of the annexation party of the Center. Francisco Sanchez is also a cousin of Betancourt, and a wealthy planter. The brothers Agramonte are doctors and lawyers, accomplished graduates of the Havana University and were but lately married. Zambrano was considered in his time the first scholar in the University here, and left town to join Quesada with the first expedition which reached him from Nassau. Manuel Arteaga Borego, second or third in command to Quesada in Camaguey, is a wealthy and popular planter, who, the Cubans say, commanded at the fight in the Sierra Cubitas. Neither he nor the brothers Arango, the sons of a leading Annexationist who died in New-York in 1853, were actual signers of the Decree of Freedom, but they ought to be mentioned here as among the most important leaders of the war in Camaguey. Quesada distinguished himself as a guerillero in Mexico, and intends to carry on in Cuba the same kind of war he helped maintain there. The scandal which a certain class of the Spaniards keep aloft with reference to his character and antecedents may have to be taken for what such stories are usually worth.

Many others of those who are called the *abecejas* of the insurrection are not, even according to the admission of their foes, what they are sometimes described—thieves, incendiaries, vagabonds, and men of no worth. Of those who led the small outbreak in Jaguey, the best known were lawyers, farmers, and overseers. Scriveners, lawyers, mid-owners, planters, merchants, and a railroad director, went into the rebellion in Cienfuegos. Manuel Ruiz, ex-Lieut.-Alcalde of Trinidad, is among the *abecejas*. Zayas-Bazarr, ex-Governor of San Miguel e Nuevitas, was lately reported killed on the side of the rebels. Col. Machado, not long ago an editor in Villa Clara, was badly wounded or killed the other day by the Spaniards. Jimenez, a doctor of Remedios, is one of the guerilleros in that quarter. All the principal leaders of the rebellion, were men of property and position, and not mere adventurers. Many planters in the island having been in debt, according to a habit of their class, it has been said, as in the case of Santa Lucia, that they have gone into the revolution to better their fortunes. Perhaps they have. Whatever may be the eventual character or fate of this promising movement of the Cubans, certainly they have enlisted in it their hearts and their purses. They have already so much impressed the enemy with the desperation of his problem, or, at all events, have so far exasperated him, that some of the most intelligent of the Spaniards here are now urging the Government to arm the blacks forthwith. That Spain will decide this particular question in any way different from that of Jefferson Davis, there is no positive reason to believe. But the subject is worth your attention.

THE WESTERN INSURGENTS.

HAVANA, March 6.—The one-sided story daily read in the Havana papers moves the suspicion that in Cuba trumpeting is as good a part of the actual art of war as fighting. Everywhere the Cubans are beaten; seldom do any Spaniards get killed or hurt; and still, there are a great many heroes. Spaniards are born to war, and it is perfectly true that the ill-armed Cubans very seldom wait to encounter a solid fire or charge of numbers; but at these must have been unrecorded instances where the chance has been given them to stand their ground. So thinking, the friends of the insurgents count several well-contested combats and victories in the Eastern Department, where the loyalists say they had none whatever. The insurrection, at any rate, is still rebel in all its parts. Railroads, telegraphs, and plantations, bear a new sign-manual of their hostility. Troops in four or five directions have been sent out across the country to find them. Sometimes they are found and beaten, according to report; but often they are not, for the rebels have a way of doing much mischief and hiding themselves. Yet for once the Spaniards confess they were fought. At Maguayara, in the jurisdiction of Villa Clara, the insurgents held a house and its surroundings against a body of cavalry and infantry under orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of Sagua, but were beaten at last, say the Spaniards, with a loss of 27 killed. One of the insurgent leaders was a haciendado of the neighborhood. Daniel Araoz, a young man who bore the commission of Brigadier, was captured and publicly shot in the town of Sagua. "The most terrible duty of justice is done," says the Sagua paper of the execution; "the pen drops from our hands. God take him to his bosom." Whether this act was done before or after the alleged assassination of seven Spaniards near Maguayara there is no knowing; but the Spaniards make sure of the latter tragedy by printing the words of a lament uttered at the grave of the victims by the aged Senor Ruiz Seco. "Look, my children," said he, "these bodies murdered were of men honored, who were guilty of no other offense than being born in Spain, and having come to enrich this ungrateful soil with their work. As they were barbarously killed, so will be your father, guilty also of their crime, if he falls into the power of the traitors. But if I succumb in the conflict, do not stop to give sepulture to my body; go forward with your brothers; bury my bones if you can find a place at your return." These may have been eloquent words, but they do not convince us that the rebels had no other reason for killing seven men than because they were born in Spain. The papers do not make their accustomed comment on the atrocity of the rebels, and perhaps something is wrong.

Other exploits of the loyalists are worth repeating, only because they give us hints of the whereabouts of the insurgents. Near San Miguel, in Villa Clara, the rebels had intrenched themselves, and fortified one of the houses of a hacienda. On their retreat they burned a sugar-mill. A cannon made of machine tubing, under orders of a brigadier whom the rebels called Yankee, came into Spanish hands. At places in the neighborhood the rebels gave in exchange for seizures of provisions, orders upon the Treasury of "the Liberating Army." In the same vicinity they forced a loan of more than \$3,000 from a number of farmers. The loyalists have it that they found these rebels finally in a wood and killed 27 of them. Somewhere about Hoyode-Limores, in the jurisdiction of Sancti Spiritus, the rebels were again discovered in the wilderness. Their camp in the middle of a woody peninsula of the Rio Vuelta was probably betrayed to the Spaniards who reached it through tortuous and narrow paths and thick woods. The peninsula was "perfectly and very intelligently,

fortified," but the rebels, 200 strong, abandoned their position without firing more than a few shots, many of them escaping to the woods. The Governor of Trinidad relates that one of his officers has dislodged the leader Martinez from a fortified position in the wooded hill of Guatabano, not far from a sugar-mill owned by this rebel. A party of rebels tore up rails, and made use of an engine near Guernicijola in Sagua; another appeared at Palmira in Cienfuegos. Remedios was still troubled.

Thus, if the Spaniards are active, the rebels persist in all the districts where they lately rose, and the former, according to their own accounts, may well esteem it a merit to catch them. People who came from Puerto-Principe to Villa-Clara say that they found no insurgents on the road, but the townsfolk shake their head, and declare that this means nothing, except that the rebels have private reasons for not showing themselves. Quesada, who surely had seven regiments of men, well armed, two months ago, is believed to have 10 regiments now, with better arms and officers than ever, having been supplied by way of La Guanaja, or some other point on the coast nearest Puerto-Principe. It was thought that Valmaseda, from Bayamo, was marching on Puerto-Principe simultaneously with other Spanish troops from La Guanaja—a place which the telegrams reported to have been taken by the rebels a short while since, but which was occupied by them long ago. As may be guessed, the present campaign of the Spaniards is to be mainly and earnestly directed against Quesada. The two forces indicated are to close upon him, if possible, by way of Puerto-Principe, while others sent from Havana and uniting at Villa-Clara, are to move upon him from the West. The trouble will be to find him, and then to beat him.

The immense strain in which the loyalists rejoice over their success can only be appreciated by actual quotation from their newspapers. "At 7 last night," says an account, "the train returned with our expeditionaries. We will not attempt to sketch the scene offered at the platform of the station and its surroundings. Neither the night nor a prolonged shower could rob it of its enchantment, its marvelous grandeur. The Bomberos and Reserved Volunteers stood in line of battle. The bands struck up the hymn of Riego; vivas to Spain and Cuba. Spanish thundered in space; our veterans and volunteers resisted with difficulty the ardor of the people who stretched out their hands to embrace them, to crown them with an enthusiasm which radiated deliriously."

The conclusion to be drawn from the Spanish accounts, if we are to credit them, is first, that the insurgents are hard to find, but when found, get slain; second, that many small columns of troops have been sent across the country; third, that the Spaniards in the west will, at the present rate, last the year out, though the loyal press promised some time that it would be over in a few months. It is certain that the Cubans express no discouragement. The prestige of a well-won battle on their part will be desirable. But while it is tacitly admitted that the insurgents can seldom win in open fight against their well-armed opponents, it is believed that the rebellion is as alive and widespread as ever. A summer campaign may bring forth, with the seasons and diseases enlisted, time will have to tell.