

Spain, Cuba and the Administration.

Events are crowding to a solution of the Spanish question in Europe and America, and the signs of the times indicate that the administration has awakened to the emergency and is disposed to enter with vigor upon the path of action. General Sickles, our new Minister to Spain, has been hurried off to his post with full and positive instructions adequate to the new aspect of affairs, and a cursory review of the field will throw much light upon the probable results to follow from the new point of departure. Spain has emerged from a great contest within herself with a wonderful solution of the great European problem of government, which, though spoken of as a temporary and transitory form, offers more elements of permanency than do half of the dynasties of the Old World. A monarchy without a king is a republic in essence, respecting at once the constitutional liberties of the people and the prejudices of a society long accustomed to monarchical institutions.

As a novelty in the field of politics its great dilemma is the financial question, and the revolution in Cuba has come at a singularly inopportune moment to increase its complications. Instead of receiving the usual remittances from that island, and having its stable treasury to draw upon in the emergencies of the State, the Ministry finds itself urgently called upon for large supplies of men and money to maintain the authority of the metropolis over its revolted colony. This fact has already exercised so great an influence over the measures of the Spanish Cabinet that it has felt itself compelled, as we learn from a statement in the *Imparcial*, one of the Madrid journals, to request the editors in the capital to treat the Cuban question in such a way as to evince a disposition on the part of the people and government of Spain to accept any peaceful solution of the situation which should be consistent with the national honor. There is but one possible solution of this kind, and that is through a friendly negotiation with our government, in which both may accept the changes that have now become inevitable.

The attitude of Cuba in this emergency is one which lends itself to a peaceful solution. The history of nine months of revolutionary contest has shown to every reasoning man the impossibility of a forcible suppression of the insurrection, and the recent address of General Rodas, the new Captain General, to the editors in Havana, was a wise recognition of the inefficacy of force. If he continues on this course and applies to the war now raging there the rules that restrain civilized contests and stops the inhuman butcheries of murdering prisoners, he will add a new element of strength to the possibility of a peaceful and honorable solution by Spain. The nineteenth century cannot accept the bloodthirsty proceedings of the Spanish volunteers, blinded as they are with passion and hate; and if these continue with the sanction of the new regency in the peninsula the sympathies of the whole civilized world will be enlisted against it, and its efforts to find stability for its rule will meet with cold repulses on every side.

It is in these new developments that we find an explanation of the seemingly contradictory professions and proceedings of the administration at Washington. It perceives the advance of the combatants by separate paths to the same solution—a negotiation with the United States. The republican, Céspedes, takes the longer road through war and its immense sacrifices, while the Regent, Serrano, appeals to the shorter one of existing friendly relations and the facilities of diplomatic intercourse. The latter can be soonest travelled, and should, therefore, be the first one tried; but the administration will be wise not to injure its own hopes by an extraordinary condescension to Spanish demands. If Spain could put down the revolution in Cuba she would not negotiate for the island, and her diplomacy will hasten or delay in its development in proportion as her hopes rise or fall. Her present conviction is that the revolution will find sympathy and aid in this country and that with this she cannot successfully contend. Convince her that our government will guard her from any such contingency, and the desires for a pacific solution will disappear and our friendly overtures will receive the same rebuff they have so often before experienced.