

## **The Revolution in Cuba—Review of the Positions of the Combatants.**

The recent authoritative announcements from Havana that the insurrection is almost at an end, render an examination of the positions occupied by the combatants at the last advices from the respective localities a matter of some interest. We shall therefore give a cursory review of the facts as they present themselves, premising only that, from the nature of the territory and the absence of communication with the insurgent forces, our deductions are based entirely upon Spanish accounts. Practically the war now existing in Cuba is carried on in five separate and distinct districts, with little communication or co-operation between them on the part of the insurgents, and independent command on the part of the Spaniards. These are the district of Villa Clara, generally known in Cuba as the district of the five towns, the district of Santi Espiritu that of Puerto Principe, the Bayamo district and that of Holguin, the first named comprising the western limit of the insurrection, and the last that of the operations of General Cespedes in the eastern portion of the island after his retreat from Bayamo, the original seat of the movement.

The Villa Clara district was the last to become involved in the revolutionary movement, and from its proximity to the capital has received more prompt and energetic attention from the government than the more distant sections. The elements for the insurrectionary movement were gathered principally from the jurisdictions of Cienfuegos and Trinidad, and the prompt arrival of troops from Havana caused the retreat of the newly formed bands to the mountains lying north of Trinidad, and which place at last accounts they are said to be threatening. Although the movement in this district has no doubt lost much of its impulse from the early encounters with the troops and the necessary evacuation of Siguaneya, which had been selected as its central point, it is plain from the Spanish reports of operations and successes that it has not been suppressed. Bands of insurgents also hold the field in the portion of this district contiguous to the northern shore of the island, and the recent order of the Spanish commander for the withdrawal of all the country stores to the garrisoned towns indicates that peace is not restored.

In the district of Santi Espiritu, lying east of Trinidad, from which it is separated by a very hilly section of country, operations are on a limited scale on both sides. Recent operations are reported in the vicinity of Mayajigua, and frequent excursions of the troops are announced.

The district of Puerto Principe has presented for some time the most formidable movements against the Spaniards, but no reports of serious operations have come recently from either side. General Lesca some time since succeeded in conveying relief to General Mena, who was and still is besieged in the city of Puerto Principe, and recent accounts state that an attempt to obtain further supplies for the Spanish troops from Santa Cruz resulted in their capture by the insurgents. General Quesada is in command in this district, and is variously reported to have in his army from ten thousand to twenty thousand men. Though we doubt the truth of many of these numerical reports, we have reason to believe that his command embraces many more men than he can arm and equip. This state of things, which is found also in the other revolutionary districts, constitutes the chief embarrassment of the revolution. The weakness of the Spaniards here is shown in the fact that they have not been able to open permanent communication from the coast to Puerto Principe.

Bayamo was for some months the headquarters of General Cespedes, the first who pronounced and who is looked upon as the principal leader of the revolution. It was subsequently occupied by General Valmaseda, who is second in command in Cuba on the Spanish side, and he still remains there. But the country all around him is reported to be infested with insurgent bands, and frequent accounts of Spanish successes there are found in the Havana papers. His communication with Santiago is kept up by strong convoys only. The principal military operations in this district, and that of Holguin, lying north of Bayamo, have been those for the occupation of Mayari, to which place General Cespedes withdrew on leaving Bayamo. That the insurgent chief still carries on the war vigorously there, is evident from the fact that the Spanish Colonel Benegas fell back from Holguin to Auras, and reports that at the latter place a population of seventeen thousand persons is gathered under his protection. The recent reports of Colonel Lopez Camara, who drove the insurgents from Mayari, indicate their presence through all the surrounding country.

From this review of the insurrection in Cuba it will be seen that the Cubans are operating with little or no unanimity of action or plan, and it is, perhaps, their greatest weakness, apart from the immediate want of arms and ammunition. Both Spanish and Cuban accounts agree that every Cuban is a revolutionist, and this gives them the force of numbers. But numbers can be effectual only through unity of counsel and action. This will be effected when the insurgents shall have formed a government which all will recognize and obey in behalf of one common cause. Thus far the world has not seen an organized government rise in Cuba, and this fact deprives the cause of Cuban independence of moral strength outside of the circle of its friends and promoters. Cespedes is thus far merely the incarnation of the Cuban idea and hope, and should receive a more formal recognition of his authority from the other leaders and the people. While he remains in the field Spanish accounts of the suppression of the revolution will be wanting in the chief requisite—belief.