

of a popular struggle. The pressure of events and ideas in Spain is preparing a new danger for General Dulce and the political and social system he seeks to establish in the probable abolition by the Cortes of slavery throughout the Spanish dominions. The conflict which portends is a purely American one, and among the great questions upon which General Grant and his administration will be required to take a new point of departure that of Cuba and its relations to the Union is one of the most important and most urgent. This island, with a population of a million and a half of souls, lying in close proximity to our shores and along the immediate line of our immense Atlantic coastwise commerce, is to-day the scene of a revolution which will inevitably sever the island from the dominion of Spain. We say that it will produce an inevitable separation, because Spain herself is on the eve of a civil war, which already precludes her from sending to Cuba the forces necessary to triumph over the present revolution, and will consume all the resources she can possibly command for a long period of time to come.

Herein lies the true point of view for General Grant and his Cabinet to take. The principle of diplomatic intervention is everywhere admitted in the school of European politics when a threatened conflagration in any State portends danger to the interests of its neighbors. It is a logical rule, and holds good in America as well as in Europe. The proximity of Cuba to our shores; the great material interests of our trade, which are affected by her weal or woe; the political combinations which have existed in the past, do now exist and will ever continue to exist, all call imperatively for action on our part. To show that this is not an imaginary call we need cite only the fact—which is prominent in the family traditions of Admiral Porter—that in 1825-30 the United States was forced, in order to protect its own commerce, to follow the pirate fleets of that day into many of the inlets and bays of Cuba and to burn a pirate settlement where the city of Cardenas now stands. A policy of American intervention is, therefore, imperative to us, and all circumstances and conditions combine to force it upon the immediate attention of the incoming administration. The first step should be the unhesitating adoption of such a course of action as will at once impress upon Spain the conviction that she will not be permitted utterly to destroy a purely American community because it will not consent longer to be governed under her antiquated sixteenth century notions of public policy.

In adopting this course General Grant has the opportunity to lay the corner stones of the coming great and American party in our national politics on foundations as broad and as secure as were those laid by Jefferson and Jackson. The tone and temper of the people require such a new party organization, which shall ignore old party lines and be free from old party corruptions. The circumstances of our public affairs, both domestic and foreign, are favorable to it, and General Grant himself has the prestige necessary for its successful accomplishment. President Tyler tried to do this thing, and he failed, because the people were not prepared for it. President Johnson also tried it, and he failed, because he had not the requisite personal prestige. The opportunity is now offered, by a concatenation of great events, to General Grant, and as he resolves or fails to accept his mission will he go down to history as a Jefferson or a Jackson or as a Tyler or an Andy Johnson. The initial step is involved in the Cuba question, and General Grant should be prepared to give it an early and a prompt recognition.

The New Phase of the Revolution in Cuba—A Question for the Incoming Administration.

Every breath of tidings that comes to us from "the Gem of the Antilles" brings intelligence of multitudes fleeing from the island. Men of wealth are conveying their families and their fortunes to other lands; men of note in society and government are seeking safety out of the vortex of Cuban politics, and men of action are hurrying to and fro preparatory to the coming strife. The latest breathing of the telegraph is that Don José de Armas y Cespedes, the head of the peace commission appointed by General Dulce, the confidant of his plans and powers, after long journeyings and conferences with the revolutionary leaders in the central and eastern districts of the island, has returned to Havana and departed thence for the United States, saying that he is disgusted with the state of affairs. These are not the indications of a return to peace; they are the mutterings of the coming tempest. What this is to be and what course it will take are subjects worthy of inquiry. Perhaps there may be found natural causes that will indicate the probable course of the storm.

When Cespedes pronounced in October last at Yara in favor of absolute independence for Cuba he struck a living chord in every Cuban bosom. The idea spread with the rapidity of wildfire through the Eastern Department of the island, and in a very short time the petty Spanish garrisons were driven to the coast or huddled together in a few interior towns. The Central Department quickly followed the lead of the Eastern, and from Cape Maysi to Moron the island blazed with the fires of revolution. The hilltops around the Spanish cities of refuge were covered with insurgents and panic prevailed in every Spanish bosom. With these achievements one half of the island was in possession of the new order of things; but here the revolution, without any visible check, came to a halt. The Western Department, the great seat of population and wealth, did not follow its sisters in the movement. Disagreements on questions of greater or lesser vitality to the revolution sprang up between the leaders of the centre and the east. Inaction ensued among the insurgents, and as a natural consequence large numbers of the people, uncontrolled by discipline and wanting in the inspiration of a logically proclaimed and common cause, returned to their homes. The Spanish population of the island took new heart and filled the ranks of the government forces with volunteers. General Dulce arrived, commissioned with extraordinary powers from the new government of Spain. Throwing open the prison doors to large numbers of political *détenus*, he proclaimed a general amnesty, freedom of press and speech and representation in the Cortes for the island as an integral portion of the Spanish monarchy. Before these ostensible causes the revolution is seen to dwindle; large numbers of men accept the amnesty, and yet the living exodus points to the fact that fears of the future, not the assurances of peace, prevail in the Cuban mind.

There is, then, an unavowed if not a secret cause for this state of things, and it lies in the logic of events, which is ever stronger than the promise of words. In the first rapid march of revolution its promoters took advantage of all the elements which presented themselves to their grasp, and not a few slaves and contracted Chinese laborers engrossed the files of the insurgents, to the utter demoralization of productive labor. This was the first great fact, and not any effort of the Spanish troops which prevented the extension of the revolution through the west. Following this came the proclamation of General Cespedes, giving a conditional freedom to the slaves. Though carefully worded and very guarded in its clauses, this was the torch of discord to the revolution. The Eastern Department, with few slaves, and but a limited number of these engaged in agricultural labor, embraced at once the new idea. The central portion of the island, with greater interests at stake, divided upon it, and the western, where the slave investments preponderate over all others, rejected it altogether. Herein lies the secret of the present condition of affairs in Cuba. Under the pressure of the slavery question the revolution has changed its character from a war for independence to a struggle for universal emancipation. Nor is the danger confined to the limits