

war with the United States would only bring overwhelming disaster to them. The factions which are now rending that unhappy country would become more active and stronger, and the horrors of civil war would be increased and continued. Nor could Spain hope for any assistance from the European Powers. None, no, not even France or England, would lift a finger. They know too well the power of this country, and the interests they have at stake would prevent their interference. None of these Powers will ever again meddle with American affairs unless driven to do so on their own account and to protect their own honor and interests—a contingency which is not likely to occur till the future reveals far greater complications than can be foreseen at present. All the talk of European sympathy and aid for Spain on this Cuban question is balderdash. There need not be and will not be any war about Cuba, though the United States should not hesitate to recognize the Cubans and to take any other action to secure their independence, even at the risk of war.

If we be right in our conjecture that the naval movements referred to indicate the speedy recognition of Cuba by the government, the views we have expressed frequently as to the President's sympathy for and purpose regarding the Cubans will be confirmed. In spite of the weakness and timidity of the Secretary of State on this question, and the Spanish influence operating upon him indirectly through those near him and related to him, as well as through certain newspapers and Washington correspondence under the same Spanish influence, we have never doubted that General Grant would in due time take this matter in his own hands and show a vigorous and determined policy. Any other course would be in direct opposition to the broad and national views of the President, to the republican and generous impulses of his nature, to his love of liberty, to his ardent patriotism and desire for American progress and the aggrandizement of his country, and, in fact, to his whole character and history. He has been waiting, probably, for the assembling of Congress or till he could confer with the representatives of the people before taking decided action in favor of Cuba, and in the meantime has faithfully executed the neutrality laws, though acting against his own sympathies, so that there should be no stain upon the national honor. Now, however, as the members of Congress begin to reach the capital, he learns what their sentiments are, and, if we mistake not, is preparing to recommend and take a bold course worthy of this great republic. The unanimous expression of the House of Representatives at the close of the last Congress in favor of Cuban recognition will be reiterated, no doubt, with much more force by both houses as soon as Congress meets. The President will then have the full support of that body, and the administration will find itself acting in harmony both with the representatives of the people and public opinion. From all the signs of the times we think the belligerent rights of the Cubans will soon be recognized and the independence of Cuba secured.

#### Extraordinary Naval Movements—Have They Reference to Cuba?

The unusual activity of the Navy Department and extraordinary movements of war vessels are not without cause, or they indicate precautionary steps, at least, to meet some particular or possible contingency. The question naturally arises whether all this has not reference to Cuba and the policy the government is about to pursue with regard to that island. It is certain there can be no other reason for these movements; for there is not the least probability of trouble, either at home or with foreign nations, except that which might possibly arise with Spain relative to the Cuban question. Not that we believe or that the government thinks there would be reason to apprehend war with Spain should the United States recognize the belligerent rights or independence of Cuba, but if such a step be contemplated by the administration precautionary measures to meet even a contingency so unlikely are proper. Besides, a powerful naval force in the neighborhood of Cuba, in the event of our government resolving on such a policy, would impress the Spanish government with a sense of the determination of the United States and the futility of using force to restrain the action of this country. Indeed, instead of leading to war, the display of such power and preparation for war is the way to prevent it. We conclude, then, that the activity in naval matters—the order for the Miantonomoh to be ready for sea, the ordering into commission and fitting out rapidly of the Swatara and two other vessels, the sudden transfer of stores and army supplies to the Albany, with orders for that vessel to sail immediately for Cuba, and other important movements—indicate that the government is about to take a decisive course on the Cuban question and in favor of Cuban independence.

Months ago General Sickles, our Minister at Madrid, told the Spanish regency officially, in that famous note which created such a stir in Spain, that public opinion in the United States would soon compel his government to recognize the Cubans. He wrote what he was instructed to write, and what, as an experienced and astute public man, he knew to be true. The Spanish government has been forewarned and must expect such action on the part of the United States. It knows the irresistible power of public opinion in this republic, and it has really more reason to thank the administration for great moderation in delaying to recognize the Cubans so long, and that against the popular will, than to be surprised or offended at recognition now. There is no cause of war in such an act, nor do we imagine Spain would be foolish enough to make it so. She cannot even subjugate the Cubans. Indeed, they have been gaining strength all along and are stronger to-day than ever, in spite of the armies and fleets of Spain. What, then, could Spain do in a war with this mighty republic? She could not land an army, and if she could it would be instantly annihilated. Her navy would be swept from the ocean, and as to any damage she might do us by letters of marque to privateers—which would be very little—we could do far more to her in the same way. We could extinguish Spanish commerce and deprive Spain of her remaining colonies. Such a conflict would be child's play, comparatively, to the United States.

But it is folly to talk of war; the Spanish government has not the money or other means for such a Quixotic undertaking. Should Prim and the other leading men of Spain be insane enough to suppose they could reunite the people and consolidate their power by war, they would be much mistaken. Ignorant as the Spanish people may be, they must know that