

prevent the United States recognizing the Cubans and to enable her to hold on to the island. Of course the Secretary of State would not be influenced directly or knowingly by Spanish gold, but may he not indirectly and unwittingly? It has been rumored—and a Boston newspaper gives currency to the rumor—that Mr. Fish's son-in-law receives large fees from the Spanish government for some service. As large a sum as forty thousand dollars is named. This gentleman, when he was private secretary to President Pierce, dabbled in the Nicaragua land and emigration scheme under Colonel Kinney, and, therefore, seems to have a taste for such outside speculations. We do not charge Mr. Fish's son-in-law with anything, and he may get forty thousand dollars, or any other sum, for fees from the Spanish government in his profession as a lawyer; nor do we say the Secretary of State has been indirectly influenced by him. But we state it as a rumor, and only remark that it seems to be a curious circumstance in connection with the persistent opposition of the State Department to the recognition of the Cubans. Mr. Fish is a weak, timid man, and no doubt is easily influenced by those near to him, though he may be highly honorable and patriotic himself. He is unfit to handle questions of great national policy where comprehensive views and boldness of action are required, as in this one concerning Cuba. We hope and believe the President and Congress will take the matter out of his hands. The whole civilized world outside of Spain looks to the United States for a solution of the Cuban difficulty. Any other great Power with the interests we have in securing the independence of Cuba would have recognized the Cubans long ago. Over a year has passed since that people have struggled successfully against the power of Spain, and they are stronger to-day than ever. They are entitled to recognition, and it would be an everlasting disgrace to the American republic if our government should not speedily recognize them.

Position of the Administration on the Cuban Question.

As the time is approaching when the policy of the administration with regard to Cuba will be made public in the President's message to Congress, there is naturally some anxiety to know, particularly among the large class of our citizens who warmly sympathize with the Cubans, what the President will say and what he will recommend. We think the information we have received will enable us to satisfy the anxiety of the people on this subject. The message of the President will be the direct expression of his own sentiments and views, and we shall see none of the red tape style or diplomatic subterfuge of the State Department in it. The President, we believe, will first state the course and action of the government on the Cuban question. We shall know, probably, the facts relative to the offered mediation of the United States with Spain for the independence of Cuba through General Sickles, and whether any other agencies have been employed. We shall learn, no doubt, what the motive was that inspired this offer, the manner in which the friendly offer was received, the state of the case as it stands at present, and the prospect of any mediation or negotiation being practicable in future. Then the President will, we think, vindicate the action of the government in enforcing the neutrality laws in the seizure of Cuban expeditions and vessels, as well as in the case of the Spanish gunboats. He will also indicate, we believe, his own views as to what the future course of the government should be, and leave the matter with Congress, either for special legislation or for an expression of opinion for the guidance of the administration.

There can be no question as to the sympathy of General Grant for the Cubans and as to his desire to see the Cuban revolution successful. He has frequently expressed this. It accords with his well known republican sentiments, with his love of republican institutions, with his broad views of American policy on all American questions, and with his desire to extend the power and grandeur of this great republic. We saw in the case of the Maximilian empire and French occupation of Mexico, when he would have marched an army across the Rio Grande and driven the intruders out, how broadly national and bold he was on a great American question affecting the stability and progress of republican institutions on this Continent. Looking at his whole public history, his character and expressed views, there is every reason to believe he is heartily in favor of Cuban independence. He has strictly enforced the neutrality laws because it was his duty as the Executive of the republic, while he regretted the necessity of thus indirectly favoring Spanish despotism and hindering the cause of republican liberty. Nor is he insensible to the sentiment of the American people which calls for the recognition of the Cubans. He has had the hope, too, that the Spanish government would appreciate the moderation of this country and would listen to the advice and overtures he has offered. We think that had the lamented General Rawlins, or any other high-toned American patriot, been at the head of the State Department, instead of Mr. Fish, belligerent rights would have been accorded to the Cubans or their independence acknowledged before now. Having confidence in the patriotism and wisdom of his Secretary of State, General Grant was not willing to act even upon his own views or wish, though he is firm and bold enough to do so when a crisis comes or any question culminates. The Cuban question has come to a point when we believe the President feels it will be proper for the government to act decisively in support of the Cuban cause, and that his forthcoming message to Congress will show this.

We understand there is a great pressure made upon the government, and especially upon the Secretary of State, by a secret service of Spanish agents in Washington, to prevent the President touching the Cuban question in his message. But all this, there is good reason to believe, will prove unavailing. No doubt a great deal of Spanish money is being used in this country, poor as the Spanish government is. The prize at stake is a valuable one. The Spanish Regency has refused a hundred millions of dollars for Cuba. Spain has drawn forty millions or more of revenue a year from the island. An army of hungry Spanish officials have fed upon the unfortunate Cubans. Of course Spain would willingly spend large sums upon agents in this country—corrupt Americans and others—to