

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION.

Eight Recent Expeditions—Their General Success and Effect.

From the New York Tribune, 2d instant.

We have special and creditable advices that, by means of seven or eight expeditions which have within a few months left New York and Philadelphia, the Cubans have received large and somewhat surprising quantities of arms and munitions of war. The Cuban authorities here and in Washington have, as we are informed, been incessantly active, and the result of their efforts is seen in the animated hopes and renewed spirit of the patriots in the field. On the strength of the recent help given to their cause, or promised them at no late day, the campaign of General Quesada is believed to have assumed a new aspect, in proof of which are the series of successes lately achieved for Cuba at Las Tunas; Altigracia, Sabana Nueva, the Bay of Nipe, and near Puerto Padre, all of which are claimed by Quesada's forces. The following is an authentic list of the expeditions alluded to, and their cargoes of military supplies:

By the *Salvador*, from Key West, 1,500 arms and three field-pieces. From Nassau, by the same, 2,500 guns and 5 cannon. By the *Perrit*, 3,660 guns and 8 cannon. By the *Grapeshot*, 4,000 guns and 2 cannon. These vessels originally left New York. Those sent from Philadelphia in the first expedition therefrom were three schooners with 3,500 arms and 4 steel guns. This cargo was delivered near Trinidad on the 17th of April, and has already, if report be credible, told with effect on the situation in that greatly disaffected quarter. The second expedition had its landing at the same place with 3,500 guns in a small steamer. The third expedition has just gone with 2,500 arms. By these various expeditions the Cubans have received 21,100 small arms and 22 cannon or field-pieces. These supplies, received within a period comparatively brief, constitute the most decided and extensive aid the Cubans have ever obtained. There is reason to believe that the Cubans are powerfully supported in a new and unexpected quarter, of the character of which we are not permitted to speak. Their cause is not likely to fail, we understand, for the want of efficient sympathy on the part of the North. Never have the patriots of Cuba seemed so confident of victory.

We are favored with private advices from Havana, representing the extreme corruption of the Spaniards there, and the venal indifference of a number of their officials to the failure or success of the war. So gross had the avarice of these officials or officers become, that it was a matter of belief that they had privately sold arms and supplies of all kinds to the enemy. Indeed, it is known to Cubans resident in New York that the first supplies of arms, some thousands in number, received by the Cubans, were bought from the Spaniards themselves. Charges or reports of corruption are still common at the capital and in the field. Not less significant is the fact that Spanish papers betray a tone of concession to the rebels, one of them going so far as to admit that the rebellion is gaining headway.

PERU'S RECOGNITION OF CUBAN BELLIGERENCY.

New advices have been received here from Cuba relative to the recognition of the belligerency of Cubans by the Government of Peru. This was brought about, it appears, not through the persuasion of a special envoy, as has been stated, but by an official communication, addressed by Gen. Cespedes to the President of that Republic, describing the progress of the revolutionary movement in Cuba and the prospects of the patriot cause. Similar communications, it is presumed, have been sent by Cespedes to the Presidents of the other Republics of South and Central America, and it is confidently expected that the example of Peru in this matter will shortly be followed by all her sister republics.

AFFAIRES AT ST. JAGO DE CUBA.

ST JAGO DE CUBA, May 13.—On the 21st ultimo Don Simon de la Torre, our Governor, returned here at the head of his column of 3,000 men, and announced to us that after the attack made on the insurgents at Ramon, fifteen leagues from this place, the insurrection was completely put down; but the same paper, *El Redactor*, which published the official despatch had an editorial article, inspired by one of the officers of the expedition, in which it was said there had been no attack whatever, because the insurgents, not being able to cope with so large a body of troops, and being in want of even powder, abandoned their camps. The column of General de la Torre, however, did not return to St. Jago without leaving behind signs of the most barbarous executions.

Overseers of estates, white and black, who, fearing the order of Valmaseda, had remained in their houses awaiting the arrival of the troops, were barbarously sacrificed. The number so killed amounted to twenty. Colonel Ormachea ordered the men to follow the camp, and when they obeyed him he ordered them to be shot. The presence of De la Torre in St. Jago de Cuba has been the signal for fresh executions. Don Delfin Aguilera, who arrived with a safe conduct from Colonel Camara, was imprisoned, and, by the instigation of the Catalans, was shot. He died like a hero. Four days after, a family of the name of Ausya, well connected, consisting of a father and three sons, were also executed. These acts have given to this city a sepulchral air. Sorrow is seen in every face, as well as indignation. The insurgents have responded to these offences against civilization by executing a double number of the Spanish prisoners in their hands, and by burning down the properties of all those who might give assistance to the Government.

The most magnificent estates have been a prey to fire, and every night we see from this city the immense glare produced by these acts of incendiarism. All the jurisdiction of St. Jago de Cuba is under the military, but the soldiery cannot prevent these acts of revenge, and in order to give an idea of the secret means that are employed, I might tell you that a few nights ago eight houses were burnt down in Cobre close to a barrack of five hundred soldiers. General de la Torre had threatened to execute any proprietors who should give money to the insurgents to prevent the destruction of their properties. With this threat hanging over them they could not comply with the engagements made with the insurgents. This disappointment caused the latter to commit depredations. On the other hand, the Spanish Government, also feeling the want of means, proposes to collect the taxes in advance. This is another cause inducing the insurgents to destroy property.