upon the sward, he shrugged his shoulders, and began to take care of his own wound by twisting a leathern thong from Gilbert's saddle very tight upon his upper arm, using a stout oak twig for a lever. Then he plucked a handful of grass with his left hand, and tried to hold his dagger in his right, in order to clean the reddened steel. But his right hand was useless, so he knelt on one knee beside the body, and ran the poniard two or three times through the skirt of Gilbert's dark tunic, and returned it to its sheath. He picked up his sword, too, and succeeded in sheathing it. He mounted his horse, leaving Gilbert's tethered to the tree, cast one more glance at the motionless figure on the grass, and rode away toward Stortford Castle.

(TO BE CONTINUED.)

PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE "MAINE."
BY HER COMMANDER, CAPTAIN CHARLES DWIGHT SIGSBEE, U. S. N.

FIRST PAPER.

I. OUR RECEPTION AT HAVANA.

THE explosion of the Maine at Havana, on February 15, 1898, was the ultimate incident which impelled the people of the United States to regard Spain as an impossible neighbor. Although the war which followed was not founded on the destruction of the Maine as a political cause, that disaster was the pivotal event of the conflict which has terminated Spanish possession in the Western World. Considerations like these must continue to give the Maine a unique place in the history of the United States, especially since the character and magnitude of the disaster make it one of the most shocking on record.

The story of the Maine leading up to the explosion may be said to begin at the Southern drill-ground of the North Atlantic Squadron, as far back as October 9, 1897. The New York, Iowa, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Indiana, Texas, and Maine—all now historic—had been on a cruise along the New England coast, ending at Bar Harbor on August 31. From Bar Harbor they proceeded in squadron to the Southern drill-ground, about twenty-five miles to the eastward of Cape Charles, a locality set apart for drills by reason of its comparative remoteness from the common commercial route of coasting-vessels, as well as its convenient depth of water for anchorage. The squadron was under the command of Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard. The night of October 8 terminated a period of hard work of the kind which brought overwhelming victory later. Part of the time had been spent at Hampton Roads in recoaling, and at Yorktown in sham-fighting on shore, and in small-arms target practice. The days at sea had been spent in squadron evolutions, target practice, and signaling, and the nights, at least in part, in night-signaling, search-light drill, and in secondary-battery practice, simulating the conditions of attack by torpedo-boats. It was not mere routine; it was the business of warfare, pursued with stern official conscience, under a commander-in-chief who throughout his whole career had been conspicuous for official conscience.

On the night of October 8, the squadron was at the Southern drill-ground awaiting the arrival of the Brooklyn, which had gone to Hampton Roads for minor repairs. It was expected that the whole squadron would get under way for Boston that night. We of the Maine were wondering at the delay of the Brooklyn, when, toward midnight, the torpedo-boats Porter and Ericsson joined the squadron from Hampton Roads, with despatches for the commander-in-chief. As a result of these despatches, the Indiana (Captain H. C. Taylor) was detached and sent to Hampton Roads, and the Maine, my command, to Port Royal, South Carolina. The Indiana got away during the night, but the Maine was repairing some injury, and did not part company with the squadron until dawn of the following day. Thus began a virtually unbroken tour of independent service for the Maine, which was connected more or less intimately with the disturbed condition of affairs in Cuba, and culminated in the explosion at Havana.

The Maine arrived in Port Royal Sound on October 12. The next day she was taken up the river, and moored in a hole just large
enough to fit her, immediately above the naval station, and about four miles below Beaufort. She remained there until November 15. Having visited the place before, she excited no interest among the people of that locality. Excepting our pleasant association with friends at the naval station, we had a dull time. Having been ordered to Port Royal unexpectedly, the depleted state of my own larder made it difficult for me to return the dinners given me at the station. I resorted to invention, which suggested roast pig highly ornamented. My pig was brought on the table whole, bearing a silken banner emblazoned with the legend: "This little pig went to market." My guests were courteous enough to make me believe that the pig was acceptable. My next subterfuge was to have been a possum. I had him undergoing the fattening process, but the Maine left before he had reached an amplitude that was satisfactory. One Sunday morning some of us were taken to a negro church by a party from the station. The officiating clergyman was a stout, thickset negro, doubtless a very good man. He felt keenly the difficulty of preaching to a well-educated party of white people, and re-
marked, with some concern, "You got me in a tight place." After the prayer and hymn, he announced his text with a striking attitude. With uplifted hands and wide-spread arms, he paused for attention, and, getting it, gave the text, which was: "I am the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valley." He said various things strange to cultivated ears, but his sermon was effective, and deeply impressed those for whom it was primarily intended.

Although my orders to Port Royal gave me no information as to the purpose, it was hoped at the time that the ship might be able to dock there; but the water outside the dock proved to be too shallow. It is probable, however, that in the visit of the *Maine* to Port Royal it was intended to have a United States man-of-war nearer Cuba. Many citizens were then very restless as to the safety of our own people in that island. I had no instructions to take any measures whatever; the *Maine* was simply awaiting further orders.

We left Port Royal on November 15, as already stated, and steamed north to the Norfolk navy-yard, where the vessel was docked and put under slight repairs. While at Norfolk, Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, the executive officer,—and a very able one,—was detached. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, who afterward got his opportunity, and distinguished himself in command of the *Gloucester*, off Santiago de Cuba.

The *Maine* and the *Texas* were the first of the modern steel battle-ships built by the United States. The *Maine* was originally designed as an armored cruiser, with a considerable spread of square canvas. Her sail plan in my possession shows her as a bark with squaresails to topsail, but no head-sails nor booms. It was then contemplated to give her 7135 square feet of canvas. Later, sails were abandoned, and she was styled a *second-class battle-ship*. She was designed at the Navy Department and built at the New York navy-yard. Her last keel-plate was laid September 17, 1889; she was launched November 18, 1890, commissioned September 17, 1895, and left the navy-yard at 10 A.M. on November 5, 1895, drawing 22 feet and 1 inch forward and 21 feet and 8 inches aft. When fully supplied with coal and provisions she was "down by the head." The *Maine* differed greatly in appearance from all other vessels of the United States navy. Instead of one superstructure, as commonly seen, she had three, forward, after, and central. All were of the same breadth transversely. Their sides at the bow and stern were formed by the continuation upward of the outside skin of the ship. Along the sides of the superstructures there was a clear deck-space affording enough room for formations and drills. I have frequently been asked to state the color of the *Maine's* outside paintwork.
Her hull was white to the rail; the superstructures, funnels, and masts, and all permanent fittings above the rail except the pilot-house, were dark straw-color. The boats and bower-anchors were white; the guns and search-lights were black. There were larger ships in the navy than the Maine, but none more delightful to command or to serve in. Her quarters were ample for everybody, although certain compartments were rather too hot for comfort in warm weather. The members of the crew were berthed chiefly in the forward and the central superstructures, and on the berthing-deck forward of the junior officers’ quarters. This distribution of the crew, when considered in connection with the region of the explosion, explains the loss of so many of the crew as compared with the officers. The quarters of the officers were aft; mine were in the after-superstructure, all of which had been apportioned to quarters for a flag-officer and the captain. The Maine was not a flagship; therefore the captain acquired the admiral’s quarters in addition to his own. The ward-room state-rooms were on the berthing-deck, below the captain’s cabin. On the starboard side of the compartment immediately forward of the ward-room was the ward-room officers’ mess-room; and forward of this, also on the starboard side, and in the same compartment, were the junior officers’ quarters. All forward of this compartment was assigned to the crew. It was chiefly on the berthing-deck that the greatest destruction of sleeping men resulted from the explosion. The Maine had two “winged” or “sponsoned” turrets; that is to say, they were at the sides and projected a few feet beyond the hull. They were placed between the superstructures, one on each side of the ship, as is shown in the many photographs of the vessel. In each were two ten-inch breech-loading rifles. In addition, she carried six six-inch breech-loading rifles, besides seven six-pounder and eight one-pounder rapid-firing rifles. She had four above-water torpedo-tubes on her berthing-deck. The arrangement of her compartments was simple for a battleship, so she responded readily to any work done on her to make her look clean and orderly. She had two hundred and fourteen water-tight compartments. All that were not occupied by the officers or crew were closed at night. The following are statistics relating to her: extreme length, 324 feet; beam, 57 feet; displacement, 6650 tons; indicated horse-power, 9290; trial speed, 17.45
THE SECOND-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP "MAINE." BLOWN UP IN HAVANA HARBOUR, FEBRUARY 15, 1898.
knots. She had an armored belt extending 180 feet at the water-line on each side, over which was a flat, armored deck. Joining the two forward ends of the belt was a heavy steel bulkhead, at the bottom of which was an armored deck that continued to the stem. The flat, steel deck above armor dipped down abaft the belt, and was continued to the stern, one deck below, with a slightly diminished thickness. Her barbettes and turrets were of heavy steel. The barbettes rested on the armored deck below.

From Norfolk the Maine was ordered to Key West, where we arrived on December 15, and moored in the harbor off the city. My orders there were confidential, but they were of such nature that they might at any time have been made public with propriety, had the government so desired. They were, in brief, that the Maine was to proceed to Havana in case of grave local disturbances in that city, to give asylum to American citizens, and to afford them the usual protection. The immediate judgment as to the necessity for the services of the Maine was to come from General Fitzhugh Lee, United States consul-general at Havana. I promptly opened communication with General Lee, both by letter and by telegraph. My letters were sent in such a way as to be entirely secret. There was no impropriety in the measures that were taken. True or false, the Havana post-office was not free from the suspicion of delaying letters. It was arranged between General Lee and myself that on the receipt from him, by telegraph or otherwise, of the words “Two dollars,” the Maine was to make preparations to start for Havana two hours after further notice. The actual start was to be made on the receipt of a second precoured message.

The form of our correspondence was a matter between General Lee and myself. Toward the last it was deemed necessary to make occasional tests to ascertain if telegraphic communication continued open. Therefore nearly every day I sent a message to General Lee, and he answered it. Some of these messages were rather absurd. In one I inquired of General Lee the state of the weather on the south side of Cuba. He promptly replied that he did not know—which was quite as gratifying as if he had been fully informed. At another time I cabled, “What is the price of bull-fight fans?” to which he replied, giving me quotations. Afterward I bought some of the fans commonly used as souvenirs of a Havana visit, and they were lost with the Maine.

One night, about six or seven o’clock, I got the preliminary message. The Maine was immediately prepared for sea. Knowing that Key West would be alert as to any sign of movement, I gave orders that all hands should repair on board immediately upon the firing of a gun from the Maine; then, in company with a number of the officers, I went on shore to a dance at the hotel, my particular object being to divert suspicion. I was asked a number of questions as to the departure of the Maine; but we had managed so well that some of the crew had already given out that we were going to New York.

The final message to the Maine from General Lee never came. During the whole visit I was kept fully informed as to the state of affairs at Havana. The riot that occurred about that time in the streets, in which certain newspaper offices were the chief object of attack, most naturally led us to fear that there might be danger to American citizens.

While at Key West I was directed by the Navy Department to assist the collector of that port in operating against filibustering expeditions. At that time the Spanish press was indignant because it assumed that the United States was doing nothing to put a stop to filibustering. Certainly the American public had far more ground for indignation; it was almost impossible to put a complete stop to filibustering where there were so many bases of operation as existed along the Florida reefs and on the coasts north of them. It was generally the case that when
THE "MAINE" ENTERING HAVANA HARBOR. MORRO CASTLE ON THE RIGHT.
an expedition was able to leave the United States, it landed in Cuba according to schedule. At one time five vessels engaged in watching for filibusters were in touch with the Maine by telegraph; and the Maine’s steam-launches, as well as the Marblehead’s launches, were out at night, bringing-to vessels moving out of Key West harbor. We did our work conscientiously.

On Christmas Eve and again on Christmas night, the Maine was illuminated with hundreds of electric lights, to the great delight of the people of Key West, very few of whom had ever seen such a display. The following is quoted from one of the local newspapers:

“The beautiful illumination of the battleship Maine, on Christmas Eve and night, was one of the finest displays of electricity ever witnessed in the city, or perhaps in the South. Hundreds of incandescent lights from the bow to the stern, up the masts and funnel, and around the ship’s sides, made her one mass of lights. It was a picture not often seen in the tropical regions.”

It became known after a time that the other large vessels of the North Atlantic Squadron, under command of Rear-Admiral Sicard, were to come to the waters about Key West for fleet drills and evolutions. At that time of year it was impracticable to have the drills elsewhere. The United States could not afford to abandon its best winter drill-ground for no other reason than its proximity to Cuba. The squadron came and had its drills, as intended, but until war was opened never went nearer to Cuba than Key West and Tortugas, nor, so far as my knowledge goes, was it ever intended that it should.

During our visit to Key West I had inquired as to the best pilot for the reefs. There was a general concurrence of opinion that Captain Smith was the best man. He held himself subject to my call during our whole stay at Key West, when I might have been obliged to go out at night with the search-lights. The squadron was duly reported off Jupiter Inlet, on its passage south. We knew, therefore, at Key West, very nearly the hour when it would arrive off the reefs. The Maine had received orders to join the squadron when it appeared. The squadron arrived off the reefs on Sunday, January 23, 1898. I sent ashore for our pilot, who in response was obliged to report that the pilot commissioners refused to let him take the Maine out, because their local rule of precedence required that the pilot who brought us in should by right take us out.

I appealed against this rule as being merely one of local convenience or comfort, out of all proportion to the value of the Maine and the important public interests involved. The board of pilot commissioners weakened not—neither did I. The Maine went out without a pilot; so somebody lost nearly one hundred and fifty dollars, which remained in the coffers of the United States. After the departure of the Maine, the torpedo-boat Cushing, Lieutenant Albert Gleaves, was charged with the maintenance of communication with General Lee.

On Sunday night, the squadron, including the Maine, eight vessels altogether, anchored outside the reefs, off Sand Key light. The next day it got under way and steamed west. It anchored that night on the bank about ten miles to the southward of the southeastern entrance to Tortugas Roads. After anchoring, the vessels were directed by signal to bank fires. Later, while the squadron was receiving night-signals from the flagship, a vessel’s running lights were sighted to the eastward. From the disposition of the lights it was evident that the vessel was of very low free-board and of very narrow beam. I assumed, therefore, that it was a torpedo-boat coming from Key West with despatches for the commander-in-chief. It occurred to me also that she was bearing despatches for the Maine to go to Havana. It was an intuition, nothing more; but without waiting for orders, I directed that fires be spread and preparations made for getting under way. The torpedo-boat, which proved to be the Dupont, communicated with the flagship. After some delay the flagship made signal for the commanding officer of the Maine to repair on board, and for the Maine to prepare to get under way. The Maine replied that she was all ready. My gig had already been lowered, and I was soon off for the flagship, some distance away. There was a fairly rough sea and a strong tidal current. The night was dark. Presently the bow of the Dupont was seen looming up over the gig. She had seen us, but the gig had not made out the Dupont clearly until close under her bow. I was taken aboard, and the gig was sent back to the Maine. The Dupont then steamed nearer the flagship, a boat was sent for me, and I presented myself to the commander-in-chief.

Admiral Sicard announced that he had received instructions from the Navy Department to send the Maine to Havana. I do not
know personally the precise reason which induced the United States government to act at that particular time. My orders were to proceed to Havana and make a friendly visit. I was left to act according to my own judgment, in the usual way; that is to say, it was undoubtedly assumed that I would know how to act on my arrival in Havana, and it was intended to hold me responsible for my action. The situation seemed to call for nothing more than a strictly careful adherence to the well-known forms of naval procedure and courtesy. It was to be expected that the Spanish people in Havana would prefer that the Maine should stay away; but with a lingering insurrection, the end of which was not in sight, with American interests in Cuba affected adversely, and American citizens in Cuba alarmed for their safety, the United States had decided to show its flag from a public vessel in Cuban waters. It is quite certain that I gave myself no concern over the peculiarities of the situation. My vessel was selected to go to Havana, and I was gratified at the choice, just as any other commanding officer would have been. I volunteered the remark to Admiral Sicard that I should try to make no mistakes.

The Maine got under way about 11 P.M., and stood to the southward into the Gulf Stream. I did not desire to reach Havana at early daylight, but rather to steam in when the town was alive and on its feet; therefore a landfall was made at daylight the next morning, well to the westward. That was on Tuesday, January 25. The vessel was then slowed down and the decks were straightened up, so that she might present the usual orderly appearance for port. The crew was required to dress with exceptional neatness in blue; the officers were in frock coats. When all was ready, the Maine was headed to the eastward, nearly parallel to the shore-line of the city, and toward the entrance. She was sent ahead at full speed as she passed the city, and the United States national ensign was hoisted at the peak, and the "jack" at the foremost-head. This disclosed at once the nationality and purpose of the vessel; that is to say, the Maine was a United States man-of-war that desired a pilot to enter Havana harbor. All pilotage in and out of Havana, or within the harbor, is under the direction of the captain of the port, who is a naval officer. The pilot service is entirely official.

A pilot put off promptly to the Maine, and boarded her to seaward of the Morro quite in the normal way, without objection or unusual inquiry. He took her in through
the narrow entrance slowly, and with such care and excellent skill that I complimented him for it after we were made fast to the buoy. I also commended him to the captain of the port, later. There were then in the harbor, moored to permanent mooring-buoys, two other men-of-war: the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII, which never changed her position from the time the Maine arrived until the Maine was sunk; and the square-rigged German training-steamer Gniesenau. The Maine moved slowly in, passing between the two men-of-war, and was moored to a mooring-buoy chosen by the pilot, about four hundred yards south of the German vessel in the man-of-war anchorage off the Manchuria or Naval “Shears.” She never left this buoy, but carried it down with her when she sank. It was approximately in the position of buoy No. 4, as shown on chart No. 307, published by the United States Hydrographic Office. At the time of the explosion of the Maine the Spanish despatch-boat Legazpi occupied the berth which had been held formerly by the Gniesenau. A day or two after the arrival of the Maine, the square-rigged German training-steamer Charlotte entered the harbor. Other vessels were anchored or moored in localities more or less remote from the Maine—two hundred yards and upward.

Probably no forms of etiquette are more stable than those observed among navies in reciprocating courtesies. They are laid down in the navy regulations and are established by rigid international convention. Those relating to reciprocal courtesies between naval ships and military and civil authorities are quite as well established; they are known in all ports much frequented by naval vessels. On the arrival of a foreign vessel in port, the chief naval officer present of the nation to which the port belongs sends an officer of the rank of lieutenant, or below, to the commanding officer of the arriving vessel with an offer of civilities, or to express the wish of the naval authorities to give any assistance in their power. On the departure of the officer who makes this “visit of ceremony,” an officer of the arriving vessel is promptly despatched to acknowledge the visit and to express the thanks of his com-

![The "Maine's" Baseball Nine as Organized at the Time of the Explosion.](image-url)

All were lost with the exception of Bloomer. Newton was the ship's bugler and sounded taps just before the explosion. The goat was left behind at Key West.
manding officer. The next step, in respect to visits, is for the commanding officer of the arriving vessel to call on the commanding officers senior in rank to him in the navy of the nation to which the port belongs. These visits must be returned, by convention, within twenty-four hours. It is also customary to visit the highest civil officer and the highest military officer. By these forms of naval ceremony I was required to make visits at Havana to the captain-general (who is also governor-general), the Spanish admiral in charge of the station, the captain of the port, and the captain of the Alfonso XII. Visits are also exchanged in the United States service between the captain of an arriving man-of-war and the consular representative of the United States. General Fitzhugh Lee, as consul-general, was entitled to the first visit from me.

In command of the Maine at Havana, I had but one wish, which was to be friendly to the Spanish authorities, as required by my orders. I took pleasure in carrying out my orders in this respect. The first Spanish officer to come on board was a naval lieutenant who represented the captain of the port. His bearing was both dignified and polite (which, by the way, is invariably the rule with Spanish naval officers), but I thought he looked embarrassed and even humiliated in carrying out his duty. I greatly regretted that such should be the case, and did all that I could to make him feel at ease. After the arrival of a second Spanish lieutenant, who seemed to take matters more philosophically, and of a German lieutenant, the naval officer who had arrived first appeared to lose his embarrassment. I made all the visits required of me by usage, and was everywhere received with courtesy. It is hardly to the point whether there was any great amount of actual friendliness for us beneath the surface. The Spanish officials on every hand gave us absolutely all the courtesy to which we were entitled by usage, and they gave it with all the grace of manner which is characteristic of their nation. I accepted it as genuine.

It is not essential to enter here into the details of usage in connection with salutes. It is enough to say that convention required the Maine to salute the Spanish national flag and also to salute Admiral Manterola. But such salutes are given only when it is known that they will be returned. I therefore deemed it prudent to determine this point, although the visit of a Spanish officer to the ship would ordinarily be thought sufficiently convincing. In the course of conversation with the Spanish naval officer who was the first to visit the Maine, I said: “I am about to give myself the honor of saluting your national flag; from which battery will the salute be returned?” He replied: “From the Cabaña.” With that assurance both salutes were fired and returned. The salute to the Spanish admiral was returned by his flagship, the Alfonso XII.
Shortly after the arrival of the Maine, I sent my aid, Naval Cadet J. H. Holden, ashore to report to General Lee, and announce that I would soon follow. I promptly gave orders that no officers or men of the vessel should go ashore, unless by my express order. I desired first to test public feeling, private and official, with reference to the Maine's visit. I made my visit to Admiral Manterola in full dress, with cocked hat, epaulets, etc. I landed at the Machina, the man-of-war landing, which is virtually at the Spanish admiral's residence. There was a crowd assembled, but only of moderate size. There was no demonstration of any kind; the crowd closed in about me slightly. I thought the people stolid and sullen, so far as I could gather from an occasional glance, but I took very little notice of anybody. On my return, however, I noted carefully the bearing of the various groups of Spanish soldiers that I passed. They saluted me, as a rule, but with so much expression of apathy that the salute really went for nothing. They made no demonstration against me, however, not even by look.

The same day I made my visit to General Lee, and arranged with him for my visit to the acting captain- and governor-general, who at that time was General Parrado, Captain-General Blanco being absent on a tour of the island. It is customary in the case of high officials to make the visit at an appointed time. When I made my visit, on January 27, accompanied by General Lee, there seemed at first to be a probability of embarrassment. We called at the palace of General Blanco at the appointed time, and apparently nobody at the palace knew anything about our appointment. The ever-present American newspaper-man relieved the situation; he ascertained that General Parrado was in a residence across the way, where he was expecting us. We promptly repaired the mistake, and were received by General Parrado with great courtesy. He had a table spread with refreshments for our benefit. All of my official visits were returned promptly. General Parrado returned my visit in person, and was given the salute of a captain- and governor-general; that is to say, of the governor of a colony—seventeen guns, the same salute which is prescribed for the governor of one of the United States.

All visits were made without friction and with courtesy on both sides, and apparently with all the freedom of conversation and action usually observed. I showed General Parrado through the Maine, and he seemed much pleased.

It had been announced in the local newspapers that there would be a series of bull-fights in Havana, in which would appear Mazzantini, the famous "gentleman bull-fighter of Spain." I had decided to go to the bull-fight, notwithstanding the day of its celebration was Sunday. I was anxious to know from my own observation the true feeling of the people of Havana toward the Maine. Knowing that the common people were likely to be greatly excited at the bull-fight, I decided that my presence there would afford the very best opportunity for my purpose. I told General Parrado of my intention, and he at once offered me a box. I declined the offer, saying that some of the officers of the Maine and I would go simply as ordinary observers. However, within a day or two, General Parrado sent me tickets for a box, which was an act of kindness greatly appreciated by us.

On the first Sunday after the arrival of the Maine at Havana, General Lee gave a luncheon-party to the officers of the ship, at the Havana Yacht Club at Mariana, a place on the sea-shore, about eight miles west of Havana. There we met some Cuban gentlemen, a few members of foreign consulates, and a number of press correspondents. In going there I was taken by the sea route, in a small steam-launch owned by one of the Cuban gentlemen. We went close alongshore, past all the batteries west of the entrance. There was no impropriety in this, because one could see the batteries to better advantage merely by driving along one of the most frequented driveways of the city. At Mariana there was a small Spanish garrison. Sentries were posted at various places, and at one time, I believe, they had occupied the roof of the club-house. There was no excitement or even special interest shown by the soldiers at the appearance there of United States officers. The entertainment passed off very pleasantly. General Lee toasted the naval party, and we toasted General Lee. Complimentary speeches were made on each side.

The box at the bull-fight which had been provided us by the courtesy of General Parrado contained six seats. I reserved one ticket for General Lee, one for Naval Cadet Holden, and one for myself. The other three I sent to the ward-room and the junior officers' mess, to be chosen by lot. The party therefore consisted of six people. We returned to Havana from the yacht club by
¡Españoles!

¡VIVA ESPAÑA CON HONRA!

¿Qué haces que os dejais insultar de esa manera? No veis lo que nos han hecho retirando a nuestro valiente y querido Weyler, que á estas horas ya hubiéramos acabado con esta indigna canalla insurrecta que pisotea nuestra bandera y nuestro honor?

Nos imponen la Autonomía para echarnos á un lado y dar los puestos de honor y mando á aquellos que iniciaron esta rebelion, estos mal nacidos autonomistas, hijos ingratos de nuestra querida patria!

Y por último, estos cochinos yankees que se mezclan en nuestros asuntos, humillándonos hasta el último grado, y para más vejámen nos mandan uno de los barcos de guerra de su podrida escuadra, después de insultarnos en sus diarios y desde nuestra casa!

Españoles! Llegó el momento de acción, no dormiteis! Enseñemos á esos vile traídores que todavía no hemos perdido la vergüenza y que sabemos protestar con la energía que corresponde á una nación digna y fuerte como es y siempre será nuestra España!

Muera los americanos! Muera la Autonomía! Viva España! Viva Weyler!

Facsimile of the copy of the Circular sent to Captain Sigisbee through the Havana Post-office. (For a translation see the opposite page.)

The words underscored, with the hand pointing to them, mean “rotten squadron.”

...train, and could not help remarking the suitability of the country for guerrilla warfare. While we were yet in the train, an American gentleman discussed with us the propriety of going to the bull-fight. He explained that the common people on such occasions were generally greatly excited, and as our visit to Havana was not well regarded by the populace, there was a probability that one single cry against us might set the audience afame. I believed that it was inconsistent with the friendly visit of the Maine that her officers should not be accorded the same freedom of appearance and action that was permitted to officers of other navies; therefore, I reasserted our intention to go. Our friend said: “Well, if they will allow you there, they will allow you anywhere.”

As we emerged from the train and passed out of the station on our arrival at Havana, I was handed by somebody (I think by one of the newspaper correspondents) the gelicose circular which has since been published in the newspapers. It was a small printed slip containing a protest to the public against submission to a visit from the Maine, and, translated, reads as follows:
SPANIARDS!

LONG LIVE SPAIN WITH HONOR!

What are you doing that you allow yourselves to be insulted in this way? Do you not see what they have done to us in withdrawing our brave and beloved Weyler, who at this very time would have finished with this unworthy, rebellious rabble who are trampling on our flag and on our honor?

Autonomy is imposed on us to cast us aside and give places of honor and authority to those who initiated this rebellion, these low-bred autonomists, ungrateful sons of our beloved country!

And, finally, these Yankee pigs who meddle in our affairs, humiliating us to the last degree, and, for a still greater taunt, order to us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron, after insulting us in their newspapers with articles sent from our own home!

Spaniards! the moment of action has arrived. Do not go to sleep! Let us teach these vile traitors that we have not yet lost our pride, and that we know how to protest with the energy befitting a nation worthy and strong, as our Spain is, and always will be!

Death to the Americans! Death to autonomy! Long live Spain! Long live Weyler!

I put it in my pocket, and we went to the bull-fight, by means of the ferry plying between Havana and Regla. I have been asked many times what I thought of the circular. At the time I thought it of no importance whatever, and I have not changed my opinion. It could only have been the screaming appeal of some bigoted and impotent patriot. When a would-be conspirator finds it necessary thus to go out into the public streets and beg anonymously for assistance, he demonstrates that he is without friends. Circulars of that kind are not at all uncommon in Havana. General Lee received them frequently. In his case, the date was generally set for his destruction. He gave himself no concern over them, but let it be known generally that any one attempting to injure him bodily would be treated very summarily by himself. His poise in matters of that kind made murderous bulletins positively humorous.

There had formerly been a bull-ring in Havana, a well-appointed one, but for some reason it was closed, and the smaller ring at Regla had taken its place. When we arrived at the ring, we found that our box was high up above the rows of seats, and close to the box occupied by General Parrado, who was the presiding official at the sport on that day. Members of his staff were with him. Stationed at intervals throughout the audience were individual soldiers, under arms, and there were about twenty in the seat directly in front of our box. General Parrado bowed to me pleasantly, but I thought that he and the officers about him were not entirely free from embarrassment because of our presence. General Parrado was always especially kind in his intercourse with me. I felt very friendly toward him. Occasionally on looking up suddenly I detected glances at me that were far from friendly.

Six bulls were killed during the day. Our party arrived as the first one was being hauled away dead. After the fifth bull had been despatched, it was decided, as a considerate measure in favor of General Parrado, that we should leave the building and return to Havana early, so as to avoid the crowd. We therefore left very quietly, just before the sixth bull entered the ring. We tried to reach the ferry promptly, so that we might return to Havana on a steamer having but few passengers. Three members of our party were successful in this attempt, but General Lee, Lieutenant Holman, and I failed. On our arrival a steamer had just left the landing. We then hailed a small passenger-boat, and were pulled to the Maine. While General Lee and I were conversing on the quarter-deck of the Maine, a ferry-boat came across the bay, carrying back to Havana a large number of people from the audience. There was no demonstration of any kind. The passengers were doubtless those who had left early, hoping, like ourselves, to avoid the crowd. The next ferry-boat was densely crowded. Among the passengers were a number of officers of the Spanish army and of the volunteers. As the ferry-boat passed the Maine there were derisive calls and whistles. Apparently not more than fifty people participated in that demonstration. It was not general, and might have occurred anywhere. I have never believed that the Spanish officers or soldiers took part. It is but fair to say that this was the only demonstration of any kind made against the Maine or her officers, either collectively or individually, so far as was made known to me, during our visit. Adverse feeling toward us was shown by the apathetic bearing of soldiers when they saluted, or of tradesmen when they supplied our needs. After the Maine had been sunk, and when the Montgomery and the Fern were in Havana, Spanish passenger-boatmen exhibited bad temper by withholding or delaying answers to our hails at night. The failure of the Spanish authorities to compel the boatmen to answer our hails impressed me as being very closely akin to active unfriendliness. It was at the
time when the Vizcaya and the Oquendo were in Havana, using picket-boats and occasionally search-lights at night, apparently to safeguard themselves. Hails were made sharply and answered promptly between the Spanish men-of-war and the boats constantly plying about the harbor at night. It must have been plain on board the Spanish men-of-war that the boatmen were trifling with us. This was after the Vizcaya had visited New York.

I have been taken to task on some sides in the United States for going to a bull-fight on Sunday. Perhaps I should confess that I attended two bull-fights in Havana, on successive Sundays, that being the only day, I believe, on which bull-fights take place. On the second occasion I went with an American friend and a party of Cuban gentlemen. To comprehend the Spanish bull-fight it should be considered as a savage sport passed down from generation to generation from a remote period when human nature was far more cruel than at present. If the sport had not so developed, it is a fair infer-
ence that it could not now be instituted or tolerated by the Spanish people. Similar considerations might be thought to apply to our own prize-fights. During the progress of the last bull-fight that I attended, several poor, docile horses were killed under circumstances that were shocking to the American mind. In a box near that which my friends and I occupied, a little girl ten or twelve years of age sat apparently unmoved while a horse was prostrate and dying in prolonged agony near the middle of the ring.

As to the circular that was given to me before going to the first bull-fight, it may be stated that I received a second copy through the Havana mail. That copy was probably sent by some American, who judged it to be important. I sent it home, and afterward it was reproduced in the newspapers. I think General Lee sent a copy of that circular to the secretary-general of Cuba, Dr. Congosto. There was nothing to do in respect to the circular, even though I had believed it an influential attempt to foment disturbance. Every precaution that could be taken against injury or treachery was taken on board the Maine, so far as could be permitted under the restrictions of my orders requiring me to make a friendly visit. If one, when dining with a friend at his home, were to test the dishes for poison, he would not be making a friendly visit. The harbor could not be dragged without giving offense; it could not be patrolled by our own picket-boats at night, nor could the search-lights be kept going; but every internal precaution was exercised that the situation suggested. There were sentries on the forecastle and poop, quartermaster and signal-boy on the bridge, and a second signal-boy on the poop, all of whom were charged with the necessity for a careful lookout. The corporal of the guard was specially instructed as to the port gangway, and the officer of the deck and the quartermaster as to the starboard gangway.

Instead of the usual anchor-watch, a quarter-watch was kept on deck at night. The sentries were supplied with ammunition; a number of rounds of rapid-fire ammunition were kept in the pilot-house and in the spare captain's pantry inside the after-superstructure. An additional supply of shells was kept at hand for the six-inch guns. In order to be prepared more completely to work the hydraulic mechanism of the turrets, steam was kept up on two boilers instead of one; special instructions were given to watch all the details of the hydraulic gear and to report defects. The officer of the deck was charged by me to make detailed reports, even
in minor matters, acting on the suspicion that
we might be in an unfriendly harbor. I per-
sonally instructed the master-at-arms and
the orderly sergeant to keep a careful eye
on every visitor that came on board, and to
charge their own subordinates to the same
purpose. I instructed them to follow visitors
about at a proper distance whenever the ship
was visited below; they were carefully to
watch for any packages that might be laid
down or left by visitors, on the supposition
that dynamite or other high explosives might
be used. They were also required to inspect
the routes over which visitors had passed.
The officer in charge of the marine guard
was required to make at least two visits dur-
ing the night to the various posts of the
vessel. The purport of my own orders and
instructions was that we should consider the
Maine in a position demanding extreme vigi-
lance, and requiring a well-sustained routine
both by day and by night.

Until the night of the explosion nothing
whatever was developed to show that there
was any special need for extreme vigilance.
Many people visited the ship, chiefly in
parties. It is probable that nearly all were
Cubans. These were chiefly representatives
of the refined class in Havana, who took
great pride in visiting the ship—more, per-
haps, than I could have wished, in view of
the situation. There must have been three
or four hundred of them on board from time
to time. They were warmly demonstrative
toward us, and at first were inclined to ask
us to return their visits. I believe some of
the Maine's officers took advantage of their
invitations; but I always explained that my
position in Havana was a delicate one, that
I desired to know socially both the Spaniards
and the Cubans, but that I should not feel
free to accept hospitalities until the Spanish
people first showed a willingness to accept
the hospitalities of the ship. I often made
inquiries in a rather jocular way as to the
politics of the ladies who visited the ship.
The ladies pointed out to me visitors of dif-
ferent shades of opinion, but I have my doubts
whether any of them were really in sympathy
with the Spaniards. I let it be known every-
where that it would please me greatly to
entertain the Spanish people on board, and
made considerable effort to bring about the
desired result, but without success. It was
evident that the Spaniards would not visit us socially; they would do their official duty, but would not go beyond it.

I finally decided to make a very special effort. I knew two charming young Spanish ladies of American descent on their mother's side. Both were engaged to be married to Spanish army officers. Their father had been a Spanish officer. All their associations had been in Spanish military circles. They assured me that it was a mistake to suppose that the Spaniards would not visit us in a friendly way. To demonstrate their view, they offered to bring aboard the Maine, on a certain day, a party of Spanish officers. The ladies came at the appointed time, their mother being one of the party; but with them there was only one Spanish officer, and he was in what we might call a civil branch of the army. Each lady gave a somewhat different excuse for the absence of the officers, which only served to make it clear that the officers would not come at all, and that there was a general understanding that the ship should not be visited by Spanish officers, except officially.

I then believed that I had made all the effort that was proper to put the visit of the Maine on a friendly plane socially. I made no effort thereafter beyond continuing to make it known in a general way that Spaniards would be welcomed. For about two days after the arrival of the Maine, her officers were not permitted to go ashore; after that they went freely, day and night. During the whole visit the crew remained on board, with the exception of an occasional visit to the shore, on duty, by some well-trusted petty officer. I regretted very much to retain the crew on board, because it had been my custom to give liberty freely before visiting Havana. Even the bum-boatmen did not seem to care especially for the custom of the men, doubtless because of the

THE WARD-ROOM OF THE "MAINE."

Lieutenant-Commander Marx, left foreground, was executive officer of the Maine when this photograph was made, but was detached before the explosion. He served as judge-advocate at the Court of Inquiry. Chaplain Childwick stands in the middle background, and facing him is Lieutenant Jenkins, who was lost.
undercurrent of feeling against us. The crew never complained—not in a single instance that I am aware of; they took the situation philosophically. I myself drove through the streets of Havana, day or night, entirely alone, just as I liked, without hindrance of any kind. To all outward appearance Havana was as orderly a city as I have ever seen.

Prior to the destruction of the Maine, I was unwittingly involved in one case of official friction. According to precedents, I was entirely in the right. The autonomistic government of Cuba had been established by General Blanco. The members of the government were much-respected gentlemen of the island. As captain of the Maine, I was not expected to show any political preference, but it was my duty to preserve good relations with the government as it existed. In visiting the captain-general, who, as already stated, is also the governor-general, and the naval authorities, I thought I had fulfilled all the courtesies required by usage; therefore it had not occurred to me to visit the civil members of the autonomistic council. In my cruises about the West Indies, I had made visits to colonial governors and to the naval and military authorities; but it had never been expected of me to visit the members of the legislative council of a British colony. I was therefore greatly surprised to find that it had been reported to the United States government in Washington that I had failed to visit the members of the autonomistic council. I got several telegrams from the Navy Department referring to the matter. The despatches may not have been clearly deciphered on board the Maine, but I did not gather from them that I was required to make a visit to those officials. I hesitated to act without decisive orders after the matter had been carried to the government at Washington. Finally, I thought that I could detect in the telegrams a desire on the part of the Navy Department that I should, of my own volition, make the visit.

General Blanco had then returned to Havana, where he resumed his custom of giving receptions to gentlemen on a certain night in each week. General Lee had made an appointment for me to visit General Blanco officially the next day, and I took advantage of the reception to promote good feeling. In civilian's evening dress, I attended General Blanco's reception with General Lee, and took pleasure in the act. I said
to General Blanco that I attended his reception that evening informally, and that I would come officially the following day, according to appointment. General Blanco is a fine type of the Spanish gentleman—a man of distinguished bearing and address. I remarked to General Lee that General Blanco might pass for a very benevolent United States senator. This was a double-edged compliment intended to cut favorably in both directions. At the reception and on all other occasions General Blanco received me most kindly.

Soon after our arrival at the reception, General Lee introduced me to Dr. Congosto, the secretary-general of Cuba. Dr. Congosto immediately said, “May I introduce you to the members of the autonemistic council?” I replied that the introduction would give me great pleasure, and that I should gladly have acted on an earlier invitation. I was then introduced to several members of the council, including Señor Galvaez, the president. All were men that one would feel greatly honored to meet, whether officially or privately. I thought that I had a right to speak plainly, because I had been put in a false position. I informed the gentlemen that there had been no time since my visit to Havana when I should not immediately have given myself the honor of visiting them had I received an intimation that a visit would be agreeable. I stated that I had not made a visit because I knew no precedent for it in naval etiquette, and that visits to civil officials on shore, if in excess of usage, might not be taken kindly, because a return visit afloat might not be convenient. I expressed the pleasure that I should take in going as far beyond precedent as might be agreeable to them. If permitted, I should visit the council officially the following day, after which I hoped the gentlemen of the council would visit the Maine and receive a salute.

The next day, with General Lee, I called on General Blanco officially, just as I had called on General Parrado when he was representing General Blanco. I admired General Blanco as a man and as a patriot, and desired to receive him on board the Maine and do him honor. I gave him an urgent invitation, stating at the same time that I knew it was not necessary for him to return my visit personally. He seemed pleased, and remarked pleasantly
that there was a decree against captains-general visiting foreign men-of-war, for the reason that many years ago a captain-general, while visiting an English man-of-war, had been abducted. I replied that on merely personal grounds I would be glad to run away with him, but I promised good behavior. He stated that it might be possible to make a visit—he would think it over. I assured General Blanco that the visit of the Maine was sincerely

terminates a visit to Spanish officials. It was observed in this case. After taking leave in the usual way, in the room where the interview was held, General Blanco and Dr. Congosto accompanied us to the head of the stairs, and the civilities were repeated. There they remained until we had reached the first landing below, when we turned, and the visit was ended by mutual salutation. After leaving General Blanco, I called on

friendly and that my orders contemplated nothing further than the ordinary visit of a man-of-war. He expressed his appreciation of my commands against giving liberty on shore to the Maine's crew, and asked, as had other officials, how long the Maine would remain at Havana. To this question I always made the same reply, viz., that when our war-vessels were in telegraphic communication with the Navy Department it was not customary to include in their orders the time of their departure from a port; they were required to await further orders. I repeated to General Blanco what I had already said to General Parrado, that I hoped the Spanish men-of-war would reciprocate by reviving their friendly visits to the United States; that the cordiality of their reception could not be doubted. An exceptionally pleasing ceremonial feature the members of the council, and was received with cordiality. I think the members of the autonomistic government had really felt that I was trying to evade a visit, so I was glad to convince them to the contrary.

The gentlemen of the council returned my visit promptly. They were received with honors, and shown through the Maine. We greatly enjoyed their visit. Near the close, refreshments were served in my cabin, and Señor Galvez made a complimentary speech in Spanish, which was interpreted to me briefly. The last thing that I desired was to involve myself in the politics of the island. I conceived that it would be highly injudicious on my part, as a foreign naval officer, to seem to take sides in any way, either by expression or by action. I made a response to Señor Galvez's speech, assuring him that it had given me much gratification to make

HAVANA PASSENGER-BOATS AROUND THE SPANISH CRUISER "VIZCAYA" ON A VISITING DAY. (SEE PAGE 95.)
my visits to the council, and renewing my statement that I should have made an earlier visit had I known that it would have been agreeable. I welcomed them formally to the ship, and expressed the hope that they would return with their families and friends, and make social and informal visits whenever they thought they could find pleasure on board. Believing that the gentlemen of the council were desirous that I should give some expression of approval of the autonomistic form of government, I evaded the point, and said only: “I beg to express my admiration for the high purpose of your honorable body.” My reply was afterward printed in at least two newspapers in Havana, but the terms made me favor autonomistic government for the island. I disliked this result when I considered it in connection with the censorship, but raised no protest against it. Judging from outward evidence, the autonomistic government was then unpopular and without effective influence.

The next day the families and friends of the members of the council came aboard, and were received by me and the officers. It was a merry party, and many evidences of good will were given. This ended the only frictional incident prior to the destruction of the Maine.

While lying in the landlocked harbor of Havana, the Maine looked much larger than her actual size; she seemed enormous. Doubtless her strength was overestimated by the populace of Havana. The people apparently believed that we had sent our best ship to make a demonstration. There was much misconception on all sides, even among Spanish officers, as to the fighting strength of the United States navy. Evidently the Spaniards did not regard us as their equals in battle; their traditional pride made them overestimate their own fighting ability—or underestimate ours. On the other hand, to show how people may differ, I have never known it to be entertained in our own service that the Spanish navy could match ours. The Spanish naval officers that I met were alert, intelligent, and well informed professionally. They all had their polished national manner. Superficially, at least, their vessels were admirable; they seemed clean and well kept. Their etiquette was carefully observed, but apparently their crews were not comparable with ours, either in physique or in intelligence. I saw very little drilling of any kind on board the Spanish men-of-war at Havana. After the destruction of the Maine, General Weyler was credited in the press with the remark that “the Maine was indolent.” If General Weyler did in fact make the remark, he must have got advice relative to the Maine that were not well based on observation. While at Havana, the Maine had no drills on shore, as a matter of course, but afloat she carried out her routine of drills day after day, except that she omitted “night quarters” and “clearing ship for action,” as likely to give rise to misunderstanding. She also exercised her boats under oars and under sails, and had gun-pointing practice with the aid of a launch steaming about the harbor. In this latter practice, care was taken that our guns should never point toward the Spanish men-of-war. Every morning and evening the crew were put through the development drill. Most of the drills of the Maine were in plain view from without, by reason of her structure; she had no bulwarks on her main or upper deck.

After the destruction of the Maine, and while the Vizaya and Oquendo were in the harbor, we could observe no drills taking place on board those vessels, although it is possible that they might have gone on without our being able to observe them. There was much ship-visiting on board. In everything they did, except in respect to etiquette, the practised nautical eye could not fail to note their inferiority in one degree or another to the vessels of our own squadron at Key West. Our vessels were then having “general quarters for action” three times a week, and were keeping up their other drills, including night-drills, search-light practice, etc. The vessels of the Vizaya class, below in the captain’s cabin and officers’ quarters, were one long stretch of beautiful woodwork, finer than on board our own vessels. The smaller guns of their primary batteries, and the rapid-firing guns of their secondary batteries, were disposed between the turrets on two decks in such dovetailed fashion that in order to do great damage an enemy needed only to hit anywhere in the region of the funnels. I remarked several times—once to Admiral Sampson, who was then Captain Sampson of the court of inquiry on the destruction of the Maine—that the Spanish vessels would be all afame within ten minutes after they had gone into close action, and that their quarters at the guns would be a slaughter-pen. Future events justified the statement. Afterward, when I boarded the wreck of the Infanta Maria Teresa near Santiago de Cuba, her armored deck was below