Reaching Out to, But Not Touching, Cubans
Foreign Policy: U.S. initiatives mean well, but they fall short of affecting most of the island.
By GILLIAN GUNN CLISSOLD
It's absurd," laughed an elderly Cuban woman to her
companion. "How do they think we are going to buy food
from the U.S.? It means nothing for people like us." That comment,
overheard at a Havana bus stop earlier this week, reflects the
sentiment of many Cubans regarding recent adjustments of U.S.
policy toward their country. While the Cuban government has
adopted a cautious wait-and-see approach, many individual Cubans
have already concluded that the new initiatives President Clinton
announced on Jan. 5 will mean little to their daily lives.
If the measures really are intended to "send a message of hope" to
the Cuban people, as Clinton claims, the White House has a lot
more work to do.
Many Cubans, both in intellectual circles and at the street level,
argue that the new measures--permitting U.S. food sales to private
restaurants and agriculture input sales to private farmers--are
meaningless, because imports cannot clear customs without
government permission. Since the measures are designed, in
Clinton's words, "to provide the people of Cuba with hope in their
struggle against a system that for four decades has denied even
basic human rights," Cuban authorities may be ill-disposed to such
sales. Why should they approve a measure openly intended to
weaken them?
The Cuban government is already curtailing the activities of small
private restaurants because they do better than their state
counterparts on prices and service. The government also is carefully
monitoring private farmers amid accusations of profiteering.
In addition, Cuban authorities are well aware that private activities
reduce government leverage on citizens by providing a source of
income outside of state control and may therefore be reluctant to
approve private-sector requests to purchase items from the
"enemy."
Even if the government decides to authorize the purchases, only
those citizens with dollars will be able to participate, and they will
sell their products in hard currency. The very small portion of
Cuban "haves" will get richer but there will be little impact on the
"have nots."
In addition, the decision to extend to all Americans the right to send
remittances of up to $1,200 per year to Cuban families, a right
previously restricted to Cuban Americans with relatives on the
island, is not expected to benefit many Cubans. Because of U.S.
travel restrictions, few Americans have developed relationships in
Cuba that are sufficiently strong to trigger such generosity.
The provision permitting even larger remittances to "entities in Cuba
that are independent of the Cuban government" is assumed to be
meaningless, since those recipients deemed "independent" by
Washington may be considered counter-revolutionary by Cuban
authorities.
The last time a U.S. administration tried to "reach out to the Cuban
people," it turned out badly. In the early 1990s, Washington quietly
sought to facilitate greater contact between U. S. and Cuban
scholars. In 1995, when conservative critics complained this was
"helping Castro," the Clinton administration abandoned its past
discretion and proclaimed that such contacts were part of a "Track
Two" policy designed to "subvert the Cuban system" by exposing
Cuban scholars to "democracy and capitalism."
The hard-line element within the Cuban government, already uneasy
about greater contact with Cuban scholars, used the U.S. rhetoric
to justify a crackdown that damaged many academic careers.
Because of this history, repetition of "Track Two" language in the
new proposals rings alarms. Scholars hold U.S. officials' impolitic
language partly to blame for the crackdown. Though terminology in
the new initiatives is slightly more tactful than that of four years ago,
the unmistakable message is that contacts are intended to hasten a
transition to a new political system.
Finally, Cubans feel these new measures are a poor substitute for
the much-touted commission proposed by 24 U.S. senators from
both parties to conduct a comprehensive review of Cuba policy.
Rightly or wrongly, many Cubans believe Clinton abandoned the
commission proposal due to pressure from the Cuban American
right-wing and that this proves he lacks the courage to provide
genuine leadership on Cuba policy.
If the Cuban people are to believe that the new measures are
genuinely meant to assist them, two things must happen.
First, the "Track Two" style
"we-are-opening-contacts-in-order-to-subvert" theme must be
further minimized. The fact that the language of the Jan. 5 measures
is slightly less provocative than that of 1995 provides grounds for
hope that some members of the administration appreciate the need
for discretion. Whether they will be able to mute the subversion
theme further in the face of conservative pressure remains in doubt.
Second, the implementation of the new initiatives must maximize the
opportunity for average Cubans to benefit from U.S. largess.
Specifically, "entities independent from the Cuban government," and
thereby eligible to benefit from the new policy adjustments, must be
defined broadly enough to encompass more than Cuba's small
private sector, religious institutions and dissidents. This will require
a
sharp departure from past practice, since the departments of
Treasury and Commerce have placed restrictive interpretations on
previous presidential decisions to adjust aspects of the embargo.
Without these steps, Clinton's new measures could simply
consolidate popular Cuban cynicism regarding U.S. intentions.
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Gillian Gunn Clissold Is Director of Georgetown University's
Caribbean Project