U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers
Co-Chairs
* Uncorrected Proof *
CONTENTS
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Summary and Framework of Recommendations
Recommendations
Additional and Dissenting Views By Members
Additional and Dissenting Views By Observers
Task Force Members
Task Force Observers
Appendix
FOREWORD
In 1998 the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored
an Independent Task Force on U.S.-Cuban
Relations in the 21st Century. Chaired by
two former assistant secretaries of state for inter-American
affairs, Bernard W. Aronson and William D.
Rogers, the Task Force made recommendations for U.S.
policy toward Cuba in light of the end of
the Cold War and the inevitable transition to come on the island.
Immediately after the Task Force completed
its deliberations, the Clinton administration adopted a
number of policy measures recommended by the
Task Force, in particular those that would increase
people-to-people contacts between Americans
and Cubans.
After publishing the first report, I asked
the co-chairs to continue the Task Force on a stand-by basis and
invited several new members to join. The Task
Force convened on several occasions over the ensuing
two years to review developments in bilateral
relations and on the ground in Cuba. The Task Force now
includes widely respected scholars, lawyers,
businesspeople, labor leaders, and former government
officials representing a broad range of views
and backgrounds. A number of congressional, State
Department, and White House staff members
participated in Task Force meetings as observers. In
addition, under William Rogers' leadership,
the Task Force staff conducted research and consulted with a
group of experts to review property expropriations
in comparative perspective and to consider
alternatives for property-claims settlement
in the Cuban context.
At the same time, the policy community, the
Congress, and the public have been engaged in an evolving
debate over the appropriate course for beginning
engagement with the Cuban people and preparing for
and facilitating a peaceful transition on
the island. This debate has focused largely on agricultural and
medical exports and on American travel to
Cuba. In July 2000 the House and Senate voted to end
sanctions on food and medical sales to Cuba.
The House also voted in favor of a measure that would, in
effect, end the travel ban. But the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act passed by
Congress and signed by the president contains
prohibitions that, by barring U.S. commercial financing, will
virtually proscribe food sales to Cuba. And
by codifying travel regulations, the new law stands to dampen
the possibility for the executive branch to
expand people-to-people initiatives, if the next president so
desires.
For the purposes of considering the new chairmen's
report, the Task Force met on two occasions in fall of
2000. In addition to the members of the Task
Force and the listed observers, the Task Force sought
comments and input from a wide variety of
individuals, holding meetings in Minneapolis, Miami, and
Houston. As in the endeavor that produced
the first report, the Task Force continued to explore
pragmatic policy measures toward Cuba based
on the conditions shaping the bilateral relationship,
domestic Cuban developments, and the evolving
debate in the United States. In the first report, most of
the recommendations called for presidential
action rather than new legislation. The Task Force continues
to recognize that, despite recent changes
in the law, the president retains broad authority to modify policy
toward Cuba. But in light of recent congressional
engagement, many of the recommendations in this
follow-on report can be implemented either
by the Executive branch or through legislative change. In both
cases, the Task Force favors a bipartisan
policy toward Cuba, and moreover, demonstrates that such an
approach is indeed possible.
In this follow-on report, the Task Force again
demonstrates that the U.S. government can take many
useful steps short of lifting economic sanctions
and restoring diplomatic relations. Indeed, this report
moves beyond recent congressional action in
several important respects, by recommending, for example:
selling agricultural and medical products
with commercial U.S. financing, though not government credits;
travel to Cuba by all Americans; direct commercial
flights and ferry services; environmental and
conservation cooperation; continued counternarcotics
cooperation and low and mid-level exchanges
between the United States and Cuban military;
working with Cuba to support the Colombian peace
process; limited American investment to support
the Cuban private sector and to capture the market
generated by increased American travel to
Cuba; actively promoting international labor standards in
Cuba; resolving expropriation claims by licensing
American claimants to negotiate settlements directly with
Cuba, including in the form of direct joint
venture investments; and supporting Cuban observer status in
the World Bank and Inter-American Development
Bank.
I would like to extend my thanks again to Bernard
Aronson and William Rogers, the co-chairs of the Task
Force, for their commitment and leadership;
to Julia Sweig and Walter Mead, the co-project directors for
their excellent work; and to Council members
and others around the country for their input and
perspective. Finally, the Task Force members
themselves deserve my sincere thanks for lending their time,
intelligence, and integrity to this important
issue.
Leslie H. Gelb
President
Council on Foreign Relations
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Independent Task Force on U.S.-Cuban Relations
in the 21st Century sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations has benefited from the assistance
of many individuals. For two years now, we have
worked under the intellectual leadership provided
by the Task Force co-chairs, Bernard W. Aronson and
William D. Rogers. We are also indebted to
the members and observers of the Task Force, whose
experience and knowledge contributed substantially
to the success of this report.
The Task Force also benefited from discussions
held through the Council's National Program with the
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
of Rice University in Houston, the Dante B. Fascell
North-South Center at the University of Miami,
and the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs of
the University of Minnesota. Many of the comments
we received in these sessions helped shaped the final
report, and we are grateful for the candor
and wisdom we found outside of our habitual Washington-New
York enclave.
At the Council on Foreign Relations we would
like to acknowledge the support for the Task Force
provided by the Council's President, Leslie
H. Gelb, Senior Vice President Mike Peters, Vice President
Jan Murray, Director of Publishing Patricia
Dorff, Communications Director April Palmerlee, and National
Programs Deputy Director Irina Faskianos.
Our colleagues on the Task Force staff, specifically Research
Associate Jessica Duda and Program Associate
Meghan Bishop, provided expert research and
administrative support without which this
report could not have been produced.
Finally, we are grateful to the John D. &
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the General Services
Foundation, and the Christopher Reynolds Foundation
for the financial support each provided for the
work of this Task Force.
Julia Sweig
Walter Mead
Co-Project Directors
Council on Foreign Relations
INTRODUCTION
In the last quarter of 1998, following the
visit to Cuba of Pope John Paul II, the Council on Foreign
Relations convened an Independent Task Force
to assess U.S. policy toward Cuba in the post-Cold War
era. The Task Force represents a bipartisan
group of former State Department officials, congressional
staff, labor leaders, and students of Latin
American affairs and U.S. foreign policy from a cross-section of
think tanks, academic and religious institutions,
businesses, trade unions, and government agencies. In a
chairmen’s report issued in January 1999,
the Task Force recommended a number of steps to strengthen
civil society in Cuba, expand people-to-people
contact between Cubans and Americans, and "contribute
to rapid, peaceful, democratic transition
in Cuba while safeguarding the vital interests of the United
States." [1]
Three key assumptions guided the Task Force
in its efforts to develop a bipartisan consensus, spanning
the liberal-conservative spectrum, for changes
in U.S. policy toward Cuba. First, we agreed that the
United States should set its sights beyond
President Fidel Castro and focus on how to build bridges
between the American and Cuban people. Second,
we determined not to recreate the continuing public
debate over whether to tighten or lift the
embargo. Instead, with rare exceptions, we have proposed new
policy measures that could be implemented
within the framework of current law through regulations
authorized by the president. Finally, we determined
that no change in policy should have the primary effect
of consolidating, or appearing to legitimize,
the political status quo on the island.
Our first set of recommendations therefore
focused on family reunification, people-to-people contacts,
humanitarian aid, the private sector, and
the national interest. Among the measures we proposed were to:
lift restrictions on travel by Cuban Americans
to Cuba and on the amount of remittances family members
can send to the island; allow Cuban Americans
to claim tax exemptions for dependents living in Cuba; lift
most restrictions on the sale of food and
medicine to Cuba; allow increased travel to Cuba for research,
scientific, cultural, religious, educational,
humanitarian, and athletic purposes, as well as commercial flights;
ease restrictions on travel to the United
States by Cuban academics, artists, athletes, and mid-level
officials; open limited American commercial
activity on the island; probe areas for counternarcotics
cooperation; and consider military-to-military
confidence-building measures. [2]
SUBSEQUENT POLICY CHANGES
Shortly after we concluded our work, the Clinton
administration announced a series of measures which,
though more limited in scope than those we
had urged, were consistent with the spirit of our
recommendations and, in the case of people-to-people
exchanges, adopted certain of the Task Force’s
recommendations. In making these announcements,
the White House noted that a number of additional
measures contained in our report would remain
under active consideration for future implementation.
The most significant of the administration’s
January 1999 steps were designed to allow greater
people-to-people contact. These included substantially
expanding legal, licensed travel for Americans
wishing to visit the island, streamlining
the temporary visa process for Cuban professionals who wish to
visit this country, and allowing charter flights
to Cuba to depart from Los Angeles and New York as well
as Miami, to Havana and other cities in Cuba.
Other measures proposed by the Clinton administration
would begin direct mail service between the
two countries as authorized by the 1992 Cuban Democracy
Act, increase funding for Radio and TV Martí,
and use public diplomacy to call attention to human rights
abuses.
In light of a broader congressional debate
over sanctions policy, particularly regarding food and medicine
trade bans, the Clinton administration indicated
it would streamline the licensing of medical sales to Cuba
and license the sale of food and agricultural
inputs to non-governmental entities on the island.
In addition, the administration proposed to
Cuba a series of steps designed to enhance counternarcotics
cooperation. Direct bilateral talks in 1999
resulted in the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard official this year
at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, as
a liaison with respect to searching vessels for contraband. The
two countries also upgraded their communications
regarding counternarcotics from fax to phone.
In addition to these measures that echoed our
earlier report’s proposals, this year the U.S. Department of
State has announced that it found no evidence
to support including Cuba on the annually updated "majors
list" of countries that the U.S. government
determines are involved in illicit drug production and transit, and
are therefore eligible for U.S. government
assistance only if certified by the president.
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FOLLOW-ON REPORT
Since early 1999, congressional and public
debate over U.S. policy toward Cuba has continued to
evolve, suggesting that the desire within
our Task Force to reach a new bipartisan consensus on Cuba
policy is shared by the wider community.
In March 2000, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) worked with GOP
colleagues to include in an authorizations
bill an amendment ending sanctions on the sale of food and
medicine to Cuba. This bill passed by voice
vote in the full committee. Similar votes in the Senate and
House followed last summer, as well as a vote
in the House to lift—or, more precisely, not to
enforce—the travel ban. Simultaneously, the
congressional vote in favor of Permanent Normal Trade
Relations (PNTR) for China helped strengthen
the consensus for engagement as opposed to isolation as
the primary policy option for promoting economic
and political freedom.
In addition, the new people-to-people measures
successfully facilitated bridge-building across a broad
spectrum including the humanitarian, religious,
cultural, athletic, academic, public health, environmental,
and scientific arenas. In 1999 an estimated
150,000 to 200,000 Americans traveled to Cuba, up from
fewer than 40,000 in 1998. Likewise, the number
of Cubans visiting the United States on temporary visas
increased substantially—to 40,000 in 1999
from 9,000 in 1998. The year 2000 will record even higher
numbers of two-way travel.
None of this, however, has led to a loosening
of Cuban policy toward dissidents or improvements in
human rights. Cuba remains a one-party state
that seeks to suppress any independent political activity.
The Cuban National Assembly in 1999 passed
laws criminalizing the transmission to foreigners of
economic and foreign investment information
related to the enforcement of Helms-Burton, and Cuban
intellectuals experience intensified pressures
for conformity. Although international human rights groups
and activists on the ground in Cuba report
a reduced number of political prisoners—300 to 350—they
also note that extended jail-time is now reserved
for high-profile dissidents, while lesser-known activists
face harassment, house arrest, or temporary
detentions. The government has failed to make good on its
promise of allowing greater freedom for the
Catholic Church. Both dissident activity and repression of
dissident activity continue. [3] Periodic
expulsions of journalists and others who attempt to support the
dissident movement in Cuba continue. And,
the Inter-American Press Association recently noted that
"faced with harassment and persecution, more
than 20 independent journalists have been forced to go into
exile over the past six months," and condemned,
"Havana’s totalitarian regime." [4]
Nevertheless, we have been heartened by the
fact that the international community has begun to focus
greater attention on the condition of human
rights on the island and on the importance of promoting a
peaceful democratic transition and defending
human rights in Cuba. When King Juan Carlos II of Spain
joined Spanish prime minister José
María Aznar and such Latin American heads of state as Mexican
President Ernesto Zedillo at the November
1999 Ibero-American Summit in Havana, they and other Latin
American heads of state pointedly sought meetings
with prominent dissidents, including veteran human
rights activists Elizardo Sánchez and
Gustavo Arcos and independent journalist Raúl Rivero. These
leaders also spoke publicly and critically
about the lack of democracy in Cuba.
Moreover, in April 2000 at the United Nations
Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva, several
Latin American and European countries that
each year previously had voted against the U.S. embargo at
the U.N. General Assembly, either voted for
or abstained from a resolution condemning human rights
practices in Cuba, which passed by a vote
of 21 to 18 with 14 abstentions. [5] The vote prompted Cuba
to withdraw its application for membership
in the post-Lomé accord for trade with the European Union
and to opt instead for bilateral aid relationships.
In light of these developments and the change
in the U.S. administration, the Task Force decided to issue
a follow-on report. We do so because we continue
to believe that with regards to U.S. policy toward
Cuba, we are in a new era and a new environment
that requires the United States to rethink its policy
toward Cuba. We say this for a number of reasons.
The Cold War has ended. The Soviet Union, once
Cuba’s chief military, economic, and ideological
supporter, has disappeared. The east European
nations once under Soviet domination with which Cuba
had close supportive relations are now among
the most forthright critics of Cuba’s suppression of human
rights. In nations throughout the Western
Hemisphere, the democratic ideal has triumphed. Despite
continued challenges and setbacks, electoral
democracy is widely considered to be the only legitimate
form of government in the Western Hemisphere
and no serious observer believes the Cuban political
model represents the wave of the future. Although
authoritarian tendencies and flawed elections continue
to challenge the Americas, Cuba remains isolated
as the only nation in the Western Hemisphere in which
the head of state rules without having been
subject to competitive elections.
On the economic front as well, the closed,
statist economic model has collapsed in nation after nation. The
future clearly belongs to open economies that
can integrate with global finance, trade, and investment.
Although there is a vigorous debate in the
Western Hemisphere and worldwide about the best way to
marry open markets with economic equity, no
serious observer believes that the closed economic model
represented by Cuba will survive. Indeed,
the loss of Soviet bloc subsidies and the pressures of the global
marketplace have forced Cuba to legalize the
dollar, seek joint ventures with foreign partners, accept
labor dislocation in its domestic economy,
and allow private economic activity to begin.
Echoing our first report, the primary and overriding
objective of the United States—containing the spread
of Cuban communism in this hemisphere—has
been achieved. We believe that whatever shape it may
take, Castro-style communism will not long
survive the post-Castro era in Cuba. Indeed, we believe that
many Cubans, including many who may hold official
positions, understand that a transition to a democratic
and free-market Cuba is inevitable.
For all these reasons, we therefore continue
to believe that the United States can discuss policy toward
Cuba with confidence and from a position of
strength. Although Cuba’s official rhetoric remains
antithetical to American values, we note that
in a 1998 report cleared by the entire U.S. intelligence
community, the Defense Intelligence Agency
concluded that "at present, Cuba does not pose a significant
military threat to the United States or to
other countries in the region." [6] We note, also, that whether
from conviction or from necessity imposed
by the loss of military and economic assistance from the former
Soviet Union, Cuba has publicly renounced
its former policy of material support for violent revolutionary
movements. We are heartened by the east Europeans’
success in replacing communist dictatorships with
democratic societies and note the important
role that civil society played in these successful transitions.
While we recognize that Cuba is in many respects
different from these east European examples and that
civil society remains effectively repressed
and suppressed, we continue to believe that engagement with
ordinary Cubans, and also with those mid-level
officials who recognize that a transition is coming, can help
promote the emergence of civil society and
a more rapid, peaceful transition to democracy on the island.
We are aware, however, that in the past, political
instability in Cuba has repeatedly created pressures for
U.S. intervention on and around the island.
Many future scenarios could unleash these types of pressures
on the United States. Should a successor government
emerge in the wake of Fidel Castro’s death or
incapacity, for example, it is unlikely to
command the same authority as the current government. Indeed,
such a government might feel the need to demonstrate
its control early in its tenure at the same time as
Cuban citizens might be tempted to test its
perceived weakness.
There are many possible future scenarios that
could lead to pressures for the United States to intervene
militarily. Thousands of Cubans might seek
to flee the island and a successor regime might use force to try
to stop them. Also, civil unrest could break
out for a variety of reasons, and one branch of the armed
forces might be reluctant to use violence
against its citizens. If, under any of the above scenarios,
thousands of Cubans set out in rafts and makeshift
vessels for the United States, their relatives and friends
in Florida would likely head to sea to rescue
them, as occurred in the Mariel Harbor boatlift of 1980.
Fighting on the island could also break out
and involve U.S.-based Cuban citizens or Cuban Americans
who would find it difficult to stand by while
their relatives were under attack or they perceived their
homeland might be liberated. We hope none
of these scenarios unfolds, but policymakers must be
prepared for the worst case and not merely
hope that such developments will not occur on their watch.
We believe that the recommendations we have
prepared may well enhance the prospects for a nonviolent
and democratic political process in Cuba and
lessen the likelihood of confrontation and conflict that might
inspire calls for American intervention. By
issuing these recommendations, we are not predicting violence
in Cuba's future. We continue to believe that
a rapid, peaceful transition to democratic government is what
the Cuban people want—it is certainly what
we hope will transpire. Nevertheless, we believe that the
United States should now adopt a series of
measures that may reduce the chances of U.S. military
involvement, should Cuba's transition go awry,
and by doing so, make Cuba’s peaceful transition to
democracy more likely.
We note, also, that in the wake of the divisions
generated by the case of Elián González, relations between
U.S. federal authorities and the Cuban-American
community have been damaged and frayed by distrust,
anger, bitterness, and recriminations. Whatever
one believes about the merits of that case, the new
administration in Washington should make a
major, sustained effort to rebuild communication and trust
with Cuban Americans. Several of our recommendations
are directed to that end. We believe that a
trusting working relationship between the
federal government and the Cuban-American community is
crucial for managing potential future crises
on the island.
Our recommendations in this second report also
attempt to confront and resolve some of the most
intractable problems that a successor, democratic
government in Cuba might inherit. We have learned
from watching the transitions from communist
dictatorships and command economies in other
nations—whether Nicaragua or the states of
the former Soviet Union—that even after electoral
democracy triumphs, the burden of the past
weighs heavily on a nation’s capacity to recover, particularly
economically. In Nicaragua, for example, sorting
out competing property claims posed a major obstacle
to economic growth and foreign investment
for the new democratic government in 1991 and remains an
irritant in U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral relations.
We also know that the failure of new democracies to grow
and prosper can relegitimize anti-democratic
forces and threaten a return to authoritarian policies—a
danger that has hovered over post-communist
Russia. With regard to Cuba, we believe it is both
important and possible for the United States
to begin to identify issues, such as outstanding U.S. property
claims and labor rights, that can be addressed
now rather than leave them as an albatross around the neck
of a successor, democratic government.
We thus have sought to identify such problems
as well as the prospects for current and future American
investment and trade, that may be addressed
prior to a transition. Our hope in doing so is to help ease the
difficulties of a transition democratic government
and reduce the obstacles to rapid economic recovery
and growth.
SUMMARY AND FRAMEWORK OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Two years ago we began our recommendations
with a statement of basic principles. That statement
remains relevant today and continues to guide
our approach. [7] We then made a basic decision that our
Task Force would not join the protracted public
debate over whether the United States should unilaterally
lift its embargo. That is still the case today,
especially since we continue to believe—as our first report
demonstrated—that there indeed exists significant
common ground for advancing U.S. policy toward
Cuba in other ways.
Our new set of recommendations builds on the
first set; in some cases, it goes beyond them. For example,
the first set contained recommendations almost
entirely directed toward the executive branch. To be sure,
some of the Task Force members felt that any
executive action taken toward Cuba should fully reflect the
views of the Congress, and some Task Force
members dissented from certain of the first report’s
recommendations. Given the extent of the subsequent
debate in Congress, we felt it was appropriate for
this follow-on report to make some recommendations
that Congress may consider as well.
Our recommendations seek to build and strengthen
bridges between the Cuban and American people;
promote family reunification; address current
and future matters of U.S. national security; promote labor
rights and facilitate resolution of property
claims; and further expose Cuba to international norms and
practices.
We note that in the final days of the 106th
Congress, the House and Senate voted to approve an
agricultural appropriations bill that includes
an amendment to remove food and medicine from unilateral
sanctions. We find two provisions of the new
law troubling, one regarding export sanctions and the other
regarding travel. First, the amendment grants
the president the authority to allow the sale of food and
medicine to each of the countries on the State
Department’s terrorist list—Sudan, Libya, North Korea,
Iran, and Cuba—under a one-year general license.
However, only with respect to Cuba does the new
law prohibit U.S. banks from providing private
commercial financing for such sales—the amendment
permits only third-country financing. This
provision was set into law despite two previous votes in the
Senate and one in the House, which called
for an end to agricultural and medical sanctions on Cuba
without restrictions on private U.S. financing.
The second provision of the new law relates
to travel by American citizens to Cuba. It was included
without public hearing on the matter and despite
a vote in the House of Representatives, by a margin of
232-186, to lift the travel ban indirectly
by withholding the funds necessary to enforce current restrictions.
The new provision codifies into law twelve
existing categories of legal travel, currently set forth in the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, that can
be licensed under specific or general licenses, while creating
an additional category for specifically licensed
travel to Cuba by potential American agricultural vendors.
The new provision states that all travel to
Cuba outside of the existing categories will be considered
"tourism." And "tourism," under the new law,
is explicitly prohibited.
The travel categories codified by the legislation—travel
by journalists, government officials, Cuban
Americans, and professional researchers, as
well as for religious, academic, athletic, informational, artistic,
and humanitarian exchanges—excludes an additional
category that heretofore gave the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) discretionary authority
to issue licenses for the purpose of travel not specifically
covered by the other twelve categories. Under
a strict interpretation of the new provision, many common
sense matters that require travel to Cuba,
for example, morale-related visits by friends and family to U.S.
officials based there, a Medevac helicopter
to provide emergency care for American citizens, travel by
authorized travel-service operators such as
airline charter companies, federal prosecutors and private
defense attorneys to take testimony in Cuba
(in espionage cases, for example), could be prohibited. And
although at the time this report was issued
it was too early to determine definitively the chilling effect of this
new legislation, we have learned from one
president of a major travel agency licensed by the
administration to provide charter air travel
that these provisions, now the law of the land, would bar the
managers of licensed travel-service providers
from traveling to Cuba to arrange future licensed travel. In
addition, as President Clinton noted, the
law will certainly constrain the American president’s ability to
pursue creative people-to-people initiatives
and will dampen efforts by Cuban Americans to maintain the
family ties they choose with their relatives
on the island.
We note below the extent to which these new
provisions of law affect our recommendations regarding
family reunification, agricultural and medical
exports, and travel.
RECOMMENDATIONS
BASKET ONE: FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND MIGRATION
Over the last 41 years, political persecution
and exile, as well as the hostile division between our two
countries, have forcibly kept Cubans and their
loved ones apart—sometimes for decades, sometimes
forever. The publicity over Elián González,
the six-year-old Cuban boy found clinging to an inner tube off
the coast of Florida, alerted many Americans
to the human dimensions of this tragedy. Like thousands of
other Cuban citizens, Elián's mother
trusted her own life and that of her son to an ill-fated voyage on the
open sea. Elián's survival caught the
world's attention. Since 1959, some 200,000 Cubans have crossed
the Florida Straits on inner tubes, rafts,
and boats; 600,000 have fled by plane. In the early 1960s, many
Cuban parents became desperate enough to send
their children to the United States under the Catholic
Church’s Operation Pedro Pan, so that their
children might grow up in a free society. One of these
children is now a member of our Task Force.
We believe that for both humanitarian reasons
and the national interest and security of the United States,
U.S. policymakers should take all possible
steps to remove the obstacles that divide Cuban Americans
from their family members in Cuba and promote
lawful family reunification. In making these
recommendations, our Task Force wrestled with
the moral dilemma posed by the practice of returning
Cubans to the island. Some on our Task Force
felt that Cuba should be considered a special case, and
that as long as a closed, repressive system
persists in Cuba, the United States has a moral obligation to
accept anyone attempting to flee, whatever
his or her motive or circumstance. On the other hand, a
special policy of open borders for all Cubans
encourages people to take to the sea and tempt death. We
do not want to legitimize the dangerous practice
of alien smuggling, either from Cuba or from any other
country in the world. That is why the recommendations
in this section, taken together, attempt to maximize
the opportunity for family reunification and
safe, legal migration to the United States.
1.End Restrictions on Family
Visits. At present, the United States permits Cuban Americans to
travel only
once per year to Cuba without first asking permission, and then only for
a humanitarian
emergency. We
recommend an end to all restrictions on visits by Cuban Americans to Cuba.
Since
current travel
regulations do grant Cuban Americans a general license for travel once
annually, we
propose that
the president eliminate the once-per-year limitation and permit Cuban Americans
to
travel under
a general license as often as they like—the same rights currently accorded
to
professional
researchers and full-time journalists. The federal government should not
be the judge
of how often
Cuban Americans—or any other Americans—need to visit relatives living abroad.
Nor should existing
or forthcoming regulations and laws force Cuban Americans to violate the
law
in order to
see their family members, for whatever purpose they deem fit.
2.Lift the Ceiling on Remittances.
Current regulations permit all American citizens to send $1,200
per year to
any Cuban family other than those of high-ranking government officials.
Indeed, an
estimated $500
to $800 million in annual remittances—sent mainly by Cuban Americans—provide
a lifeline to
hundreds of thousands of Cuban citizens, provide them with a modicum of
independence
from the Cuban state, and support the creation and growth of small businesses.
We
recommend eliminating
the ceiling so that personal decisions and financial resources, rather
than
government regulations,
determine how much financial support Americans can provide to their
Cuban families.
3.Allow Cuban Americans to
Claim Relatives as Dependents. Currently, American citizens with
dependent relatives
living in Canada and Mexico can claim them as dependents for federal income
tax purposes,
provided they meet the other relevant Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requirements.
As in our first
report, we recommend an amendment to U.S. tax laws so that American taxpayers
with dependents
who are residents of Cuba can also claim this deduction. Moreover, we would
recommend that
the same rights be extended to taxpayers of other national origins who
have
dependents in
their home countries, if they meet the other relevant IRS requirements.
4.Allow Retirement to Cuba
for Cuban Americans. As we suggested in our first report, we
recommend that
retired and/or disabled Cuban Americans be allowed to return to Cuba if
they
choose, collecting
Social Security, Medicare, and other pension benefits to which they are
entitled
in the United
States, and be accorded corresponding banking facilities, as is the principle
with
respect to other
countries.
5.Revise Criteria for Temporary
Visas. The United States should do more to facilitate visits by
Cuban citizens
to see their relatives in the United States. Current policy on temporary
visas treats
Cuban applicants
like it treats those from other foreign countries, applying a selection
of high
criteria such
as salary, types of bank accounts, age, or property ownership to estimate
their
likelihood of
returning home voluntarily. The nature of the Cuban government and economy
makes
these standards
not only prohibitive but inappropriate for Cuban applicants. Moreover,
recent spot
checks by the
United States Interests Section in Havana have found a surprisingly high
rate of
return to the
island among those who visit the United States, a finding that should ease
the anxiety
of consular
officials who are concerned that temporary visitors from poor countries
will not abide
by the terms
of their visas. Although we do not minimize the task of adopting new criteria
for Cuba,
we believe that
it should be done and that Cuban applications that meet these criteria,
provided the
applicants have
letters of invitation from relatives in the United States, should be processed
as
quickly and
favorably as possible. We recommend also that visas should be granted for
a longer
period of time
than the customary thirty-day allotment and that the appropriate visa be
granted to
Cuban nationals
visiting the United States for fellowships and study. We note that in the
last year
the number of
Cubans visiting the United States on temporary visas has increased more
than
four-fold, to
40,000 in 1999 from 9,000 in 1998. We applaud this development and hope
the
issuance of
temporary visas—a practice that allows Cubans to develop their own, independent
views of American
society—continues to increase. We recognize as well that unnecessary
impediments,
such as bureaucratic obstacles and exorbitant fees erected by the Cuban
authorities,
prevent many
Cuban citizens from taking advantage of visa opportunities to travel to
the United
States. We call
upon the Cuban authorities to remove these barriers.
6.Public Education to Accelerate
Safe, Legal, and Orderly Family Reunification. Cubans can
currently pursue
four programs to migrate legally to the United States: the immigrant visa
program;
the Special
Program for Cuban Migrants, known as the "lottery system;" the program
for political
asylum seekers;
and the worldwide lottery system. The most widely known is the "lottery
system,"
established
following the 1994 migration accords, under which the United States agreed
"that total
legal migration
to the United States from Cuba will be a minimum of 20,000 Cubans each
year, not
including immediate
relatives of United States Citizens." Several thousand more slots are potentially
available in
addition to the annual 20,000, the figure incorrectly and widely assumed
to be the
maximum available
amount. For example, many of the 1.4 million people of Cuban origin living
in
the United States
(including the 125,000 who have come since 1994) are not aware that they
may
acquire permanent
residence status that would make their immediate relatives—children, spouses,
and parents—eligible
to apply for immigrant visas. We therefore recommend that the Immigration
and Naturalization
Service (INS) and the U.S. State Department, together with local authorities
and community
organizations, intensify public education efforts to inform Cuban-American
residents
of the available
legal mechanisms they may exercise. This way, their immediate relatives
wishing to
migrate may
obtain immigrant visas, a category of legal migration that the United States
makes
available over
and above the 20,000 visas distributed each year mostly to winners of the
"lottery."
Moreover, we
strongly encourage the Cuban government to permit radio, television, and
the print
media to transmit
this information regarding legal options for migration to the United States
to the
Cuban people,
and we urge the Cuban government to disseminate this information widely
itself.
Though participating
in the "lottery" or waiting for an immigrant visa may extend the period
of time
Cubans must
wait to enter the United States legally, we believe that taking advantage
of the
enhanced opportunities
for legal migration is an important step toward reducing the life-threatening
dangers of efforts
to leave Cuba irregularly. If funds for a public information-community
outreach
program are
currently not available in relevant agency budgets, Congress should make
such an
appropriation.
7.Expand Consular Services.
Since our first report was issued, the demands on the U.S. Interests
Section in Cuba
have increased greatly. Current U.S. consular services in Cuba should not
be
limited to Havana.
To process an increase in the number of legal Cuban migrants, we recommend
that the United
States open a subsection of its Havana consular office in Santiago de Cuba,
a step
that will also
help the United States to fill the annual quota of several thousand slots
available for
political asylum
seekers each year and better monitor the treatment of Cubans returned to
the island
under the migration
accords. Moreover, we recommend that the United States negotiate a
reciprocal agreement
with Cuba that will allow each country to expand its consular
services—perhaps
with Cuba opening a subsection of its current consulate in another U.S.
city—to
accommodate
increased contact between citizens of both countries.
8.Prosecute Alien Smugglers.
In spite of expanded opportunities for legal migration, there has been
a troubling
increase in alien smuggling from Cuba to the United States—a dangerous
practice in
which smugglers
extract exorbitant fees for the perilous journey across the Florida Straits.
The
September 9,
1994 "Joint Communiqué on U.S.-Cuba Immigration Agreement" states
that the
United States
and Cuba "reaffirm their support for the recently adopted U.N. General
Assembly
resolution on
alien smuggling," and "pledged their cooperation to take prompt and effective
action
to prevent the
transport of persons to the United States illegally." The communiqué
also notes that
"the United
States has discontinued its practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants
who reach
U.S. territory
in irregular ways. The Republic of Cuba will take effective measures in
every way it
possibly can
to prevent unsafe departures using mainly persuasive methods."
Adherence by
both Cuba and the United States to the 1994-95 migration agreements (the
fundamental
objectives of which are to prevent the loss of life and to safeguard American
borders)
requires the
United States to prosecute smugglers. Family reunification measures—combined
with a
review of current
automatic parole practices and criteria, including the existence of prior
criminal
records, and
a more judicious application of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act—will, in
our view,
reduce the risk
to life that so many Cubans are now undertaking while enhancing their opportunities
to migrate to
the United States legally and safely.
9.Confront Neglected Immigration
Issues. A number of migration-related technical issues, such as
fee structures
and the timeliness and prohibitions of exit and entry-paper issuance for
temporary
and permanent
migration, require more regular and serious communication. We believe such
contact can
increase the expanded opportunities for safe, orderly, and legal family
reunification and
is in the interest
of both the Cuban people and the United States. Therefore, we recommend
more
regular, routine,
and substantive contact through the Interests Sections in both capitals.
We also
hope that the
governments of both Cuba and the United States will seriously address the
issues that
each would bring
to the table during such talks. These talks would provide the opportunity
to revisit
a stalled 1996
U.S. initiative proposing a return agreement with Cuba to repatriate, in
a mutually
acceptable,
timely fashion, those with criminal records who are not already included
on the list of
"excludables"
agreed to under the 1984 migration agreement.
BASKET TWO: INCREASING THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS
In our first report we noted that expanding
human contact to help spread information, new ideas, and
fresh perspectives can help break the isolation
of, and expand engagement in, Cuba. We recommended
more licensed travel not only by individuals,
but by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As a result of
the adoption of these recommendations, new
bridges between the American and Cuban people now exist.
We also continue to believe that—as we have
seen in successful transitions from communism to
democracy in nations such as Poland, Nicaragua,
and the former Soviet Union—often some officials in the
old regime, because of long-standing conviction,
a change of view, or a desire to adapt to changing
political realities, can help the peaceful
establishment of a new democratic polity.
The Task Force wrestled with the issue of lifting
the ban on travel. Many members were concerned that
this travel would largely be of a "tourist"
nature, and that the proceeds would go to the Cuban government
through its joint ventures with foreign hotel
concerns, and thus strengthen its repressive capacities. Others
noted, however, that no apparent weakening
of the instruments of official repression was evident when
Cuban state income was more constrained in
the early 1990s. Still others argued that allowing unlimited
travel by Cuban Americans to the island, as
we propose, but not by all Americans, as we also propose,
raises serious constitutional questions about
whether such a distinction is warranted. Moreover, the large
increase in people-to-people travel proposed
in our first report and implemented by the Clinton
administration has already significantly increased
the number of Americans staying on the island, many of
whom, no doubt by necessity, stay in joint-venture
tourist hotels. However, we also note that in many
regions of Cuba, small, privately run restaurants,
bed and breakfasts, and informal taxi and guide services
are springing up—they benefit from this increased
travel outside the confines of state authority.
On balance, the Task Force believes that freedom
is contagious and that people-to-people contacts by
ordinary American citizens will help convey
democratic and free-market ideas to ordinary Cubans, while
continuing to dispel the Cuban government’s
propaganda about the American government’s hostility
toward Cuba. We believe that when possible,
in providing normal travel guidance about Cuba to visiting
Americans, the State Department should highlight
the availability of informal and private services in Cuba
and note that the proceeds from such services
benefit ordinary Cubans substantially more than the
proceeds of state-owned facilities.
Thus, to speed the dynamic currently underway,
we propose strengthening some of our previous
recommendations.
1.Issue a General License
for Travel by All Americans. Following the Clinton administration’s
January 1999
measures, new travel regulations have effectively expanded licensing for
American
travel to Cuba—to
nearly 200,000 for 1999, by most estimates. Trusting in the power of freedom
and democracy,
and in view of the success of people-to-people contacts, we recommend that
the
president issue
a general license to all Americans wishing to travel to Cuba. Americans
traveling
freely, without
government licensing or program restrictions, will support the expansion
of
free-market
activity in Cuba and will build links with Cuban society that no government
program
would envision.
If the Cuban government blocks Americans from visiting the island, it alone
will be
held responsible
for isolating its population. American citizens personify American ideas
and values.
We note that
despite the recent codification of travel regulations, the House of Representatives
voted recently
to indirectly lift the travel ban by withholding funds to enforce current
restrictions.
Whether through
a change in law by Congress, which would be preferable, or through the
existing
licensing authority
of the executive branch, all Americans should now be able to travel freely
to
Cuba. The effect
of a general license for all American travel will be to eliminate the current
requirement
of prior approval from OFAC; it will thereby end the ban on travel to Cuba
by
Americans excluded
by current regulations.
2.Make Federal Funds Available
to Support People-to-People Exchanges. According to
OFAC, more than
200 American NGOs are currently engaged in some sort of exchange with
Cuban institutions.
At present, only a handful of private foundations support these exchanges.
Many
of the American
NGOs now building new ties with Cuban institutions receive federal funds
for a
range of their
international activities, including from the National Endowment for the
Arts, the
National Endowment
for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, the National
Endowment for
Democracy, the Fulbright Scholarship Program, the United States Information
Agency (USIA),
as well as from the Inter-American Foundation and many sources at other
executive branch
agencies, such as the Department of Education, the Department of Agriculture,
the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Smithsonian Institution. But current practices
reduce
the potential
impact of these programs by preventing NGOs from spending these funds for
licensed
exchanges and
forcing them to compete instead for limited funds from private foundations.
We
therefore recommend
an end to the current practice of prohibiting the use of such funds to
support
American NGOs’
people-to-people programs with Cuba, which include programs between
American and
Cuban official and independent trade unions, and sponsorship for undergraduate,
post-graduate,
and mid-career study by Cubans in the United States and Americans in Cuba.
We
recognize that
many NGOs will avoid federal funding, for fear of compromising their integrity
and
independence
in Cuban eyes. But we think the decision should be theirs, not the government’s.
In
addition, Cuban
professionals should be invited for USIA-sponsored international education
tours.
We also recommend
an increase in the number of staff at the U.S. Interests Section to help
facilitate the
emergent partnerships between American and Cuban NGOs and private foundations.
And finally,
we urge private sector and U.S. government support for book and literature
programs
focused on democracy
and market reform. Such materials should be made available to Cuban
religious organizations,
students, scholars, and independent civic groups.
3.Direct Commercial Flights
and Ferry Service. In our last report, we recommended that the
United States
permit commercial airlines to open routes from major U.S. cities and hubs
to Havana
and other Cuban
cities. Since then, charter service has expanded from Miami, New York,
and Los
Angeles to Havana,
Santiago, Camagüey, and other cities. We again recommend that commercial
airlines be
permitted to fly to Cuba; to that end, we recommend that the United States
negotiate a
civil aviation
agreement with Cuba. In addition, we recommend that OFAC be authorized
to issue
licenses for
regular ferry services between Florida and Havana.
4.Expand Links Between American
NGOs and their Cuban Counterparts to Promote
Environmental
Health and Conservation. Americans and Cubans have a common interest in
protecting species
such as manatees, sea turtles, and migratory birds that share our ecosystems.
The long-term
health of the Cuban population and its prospects for future prosperity
will depend on
the wise stewardship
of the Cuban environment. Conservationists within Cuba can provide an
important counterpoint
to those who would despoil critical ecosystems such as the Biramas and
Zapata wetlands,
or the remaining forests of the Sierra Maestra and Sierra del Rosario.
Yet
restrictions
on developing joint programs with their Cuban counterparts hamper American
NGOs’
efforts to build
exchanges in the area of environmental conservation. For example, joint
environmental
research between American NGOs and scientists at Cuban universities and
research
institutes is
hindered by restrictions that prohibit the transfer of funds and equipment
for joint
field-based
activities. This is because research scientists tend to be based at universities,
research
institutions
such as botanical gardens, and centers such as the Institute of Ecology.
Although these
entities can
be defined as branches of the Cuban government, the technical specialists
working
there are individuals
who will be active in conserving Cuba’s environment well into the future,
beyond the current
regime. An investment in developing cooperative environmental and wildlife
conservation
projects between the United States and Cuba would receive broad support
in both
countries. We
therefore recommend issuing the requisite licensing to American NGOs for
the
purpose of transferring
funds and equipment for joint field-based activities.
BASKET THREE: SECURITY
Whatever the precise shape Cuba’s future political
evolution takes, the Cuban military will likely play an
important role, either permitting or seeking
to suppress a peaceful democratic transition.
One of the most heartening trends in eastern
Europe—with the exception of Yugoslavia—have been the
strongly positive roles played by the military
forces in a number of the former Soviet satellites. Many
NATO generals served as officers in the armed
forces of former communist regimes. This is true even in
Poland, where as recently as 1986, the Polish
Army was enforcing martial law against the Solidarity trade
union. In our own hemisphere, in El Salvador,
for example, former guerrillas now participate in the
democratic process and have become political
party activists and elected officials. We note also that the
Southern Command (SouthCom) has begun to interact
with the Nicaraguan army, once under total
control of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación
Nacional (FSLN), but now serving under elected civilian
rule.
We hope the Cuban armed forces will move down
the same road and accept civilian control in a future
democratic state. We believe that as the Cuban
armed forces gain confidence that the United States will
not take military advantage of a political
opening on the island (as government propaganda claims), the
more likely it is that the armed forces will
permit, or even support, such an opening in the future. We want
to enhance the chances that this will happen.
Some Task Force members are reluctant to grant
the present Cuban regime and its military and security
agencies the legitimacy that the exchange
recommendations listed below seem to imply. These members
emphasize, in any event, that such exchanges
can serve U.S. interests only if they involve mid-level,
younger officers in the Cuban armed forces,
not merely the most senior—and presumably most
ideologically committed—officers. These Task
Force members emphasize also the value of
civilian-to-military exchanges: they note
that the United States must encourage the armed forces in former
communist nations that have carried out successful
transitions to democracy, such as Poland, to conduct
similar exchanges with the Cuban armed forces.
Finally, they stress that one of the central messages that
the U.S. military should convey to its Cuban
counterparts is that future relations, and indeed the status of
the Cuban military itself, will depend significantly
on whether it plays a constructive role in a peaceful,
democratic transition.
We share these concerns and believe that any
program of military-to-military contact should be designed
accordingly, and that such contacts be carefully
calibrated and reviewed regularly. Nevertheless, although
we recognize the risks involved, we take a
pragmatic, realist view. The Cuban military exists. Indeed, it is
one of the few strong institutions on the
island. Its attitudes and behavior will be crucial to Cuba’s future
political course. We believe that the vital
interests of the United States will be served by taking steps now
to prepare for that future.
1.Develop Military-to-Military
Contacts. Several former Commanders in Chief (CINCs), such as
General Jack
Sheehan and General Charles Wilhem with responsibility for the Caribbean
have
stated that
Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and his
staff
should be able
to sit down with their Cuban counterparts to discuss security issues relevant
to their
responsibilities,
in such areas as drugs, crime, joint disaster relief, and joint air-sea
rescue. At a
lower level,
it would also be beneficial to promote contacts at the O-4 and O-5 rank
(lieutenant
commanders and
commanders, majors, and lieutenant colonels). On the Cuban side, these
officers
will be in key
positions of responsibility seven to ten years from now, so now is the
best time to
start developing
the kinds of professional ties and relationships that will facilitate future
communication,
dialogue, cooperation, and better mutual understanding. If, after a trial
period, the
United States
determines that such engagement is having no constructive effect or that
the Cuban
government is
so manipulating and limiting the contacts as to nullify their purpose,
the nature and
scale of the
engagement can be reviewed.
2.Continue Counternarcotic
Contacts. It is in the interests of the United States to develop an
active program
of counternarcotic contacts with Cuban counterparts, through the exchange
of
information
regarding drug trafficking, organized crime, and human rights. Cuba is
geographically
central to the
drug economy of the Caribbean Basin. Regarding drug trafficking, the goals
of such a
program would
be to cooperate in the exchange of information related to the shipment
of drugs
through, over,
and around Cuba and the Caribbean, whether the drugs’ ultimate destination
is Cuba
or the United
States. The intelligence to be shared would be the information useful for
deterring and
suppressing
the drug trade. Intelligence exchanges focused on information related to
the drug trade
and organized
crime would be beneficial to the United States and support the broader
U.S.
objective of
a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous Caribbean Basin. At a minimum,
these should
involve some
limited exchanges of personnel between both countries to foster cooperation
on these
vital matters
of mutual interest. If Cuba’s public commitment to battle the drug menace
in the
Caribbean proves
hollow, and the counternarcotic-exchange effort yields no early harvest,
it should
be discontinued.
3.Explore Regional Cooperation
on Colombia. We note that Colombia has invited Cuba to join
with Norway,
France, Spain, and Switzerland, in a group of países amigos (friendly
countries) to
"accompany"
Colombia in its search for a negotiated settlement to the country’s conflicts.
The
government of
Colombia has indicated that, particularly with respect to the Ejercito
de Liberación
Nacional (ELN)
guerrillas, the government of Cuba has played a constructive role in the
negotiations.
We recommend that the United States government actively and formally work
with
Cuba, if the
opportunity presents itself, in support of the Colombian peace process.
BASKET FOUR: TRADE, INVESTMENT, PROPERTY, AND LABOR RIGHTS
Our last report recommended a series of measures
designed to relieve the suffering of the Cuban people
today while building the basis for a better
relationship between Cuba and the United States in the future.
Here, we elaborate on some of these proposals
and include additional recommendations that focus on
two fundamentals that Cuba will need to address
in the future: labor rights and the legacy of property
nationalizations.
1.Food and Medicine Exports.
In January 1999, the White House, echoing this Task Force’s
earlier recommendation,
announced that it would open up commercial sales of food and medicine
to Cuba. However,
when the new regulations were promulgated five months later, they banned
private financing
and limited food sales to "independent, non-governmental entities," noting
that
"end-users"
must have no relationship with the Cuban government.
Prior to the
final congressional vote on sanctions reform in October 2000, bipartisan
majorities in
the House and
Senate voted to end the sanctions on sales of food and medicine to Cuba
without
the private-financing
restrictions carried under the new law. Recognizing the bipartisan support
that
now exists,
this Task Force recommends that whether by law or as a matter of presidential
policy,
all sales of
food, agricultural products and inputs, and medicine and medical products
to
non-governmental
institutions, governmental agencies, and private citizens in Cuba be permitted,
for
cash or with
conventional 90-day commercial (but not government-subsidized) credits.
Currently,
the Cuban government
does not permit cooperation among private farmers and independent small
businesses in
the purchase of U.S. food or medical products or inputs. We call upon the
government of
Cuba to permit all "end-users" to purchase American products.
2.Permit Investment in and
Export of Newly Created Informational Products. The 1988
Omnibus Trade
Bill amended the Trading with the Enemy Act to legalize the export of informational
material to
countries otherwise subject to the prohibitions in the Act. The Treasury
Department
interpreted
the new law to include exports only of finished products, such as published
books,
compact discs,
artwork, movies, and so on. The original intent of the new law was to allow
Americans to
export not only these finished products, but also to invest in the production
for export
of newly created
informational materials. Consistent with Recommendation Four in this basket,
we
recommend, as
we did in our first report, that OFAC be instructed to revise existing
regulations to
permit direct
American investment in the creation and export of new informational products.
3.Facilitate Resolution of
Expropriation Claims. President Eisenhower banned U.S. trade with
Cuba forty years
ago, in October of 1960, in response to Cuba’s nationalization, without
compensation,
of properties and businesses then owned by Americans on the island. Cuba
had
taken over agricultural
lands and sugar mills soon after the 1959 revolution; in 1960 it seized
the
U.S.-controlled
nickel mines, the telephone company, petroleum refineries, electrical generation
and distribution
facilities, cement and tire plants, supermarkets, and banks.
Individual (largely
residential property) claims to one side, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC)
valued the U.S. corporate properties taken at $1.6 billion in 1972.
Calculating
interest at the rate of 6 percent utilized by the FCSC, this gross loss
would be roughly
$5.52 billion
today, though the impact on the companies has been reduced by tax benefits.
The embargo was
tightened by President Kennedy in February of 1962. It has remained in
place
ever since.
Titles III and IV of the 1996 Helms-Burton law—the provisions that penalize
foreign
companies and
have created serious tensions with Europe and Canada—are both directed
at
foreigners who
"traffic" in the expropriated U.S. property.
The uncompensated
claims of U.S. citizens, in short, have been central to the U.S.-Cuba
confrontation
for four decades. As a first step toward resolving the claims issue, we
propose a
solution that
would be more meaningful to the business prospects of the expropriated
U.S.
companies than
would be the uncertain possibility of some discounted cash recovery at
some future
date from a
future Cuban government for their net losses, after taxes, for property
taken more than
forty years
ago. The proposal would at the same time reduce the likelihood of confrontation
between the
United States and its allies over Helms-Burton.
Our recommendation
requires some background. In recent years, the Cuban government has
legalized dollar
holdings and transactions, delegated authority to managers of the state
enterprises,
and enacted
Law Number 77, entitled the Foreign Investment Act ("Law 77"), which establishes
a
framework for
foreign investment in joint ventures in Cuba.
A number of European
and Canadian companies have entered into joint ventures with Cuban state
companies. Others
are under active consideration. In at least one case involving property
confiscated
from a U.S. claimant, ITT, the Italian phone company STET reached a settlement
with
ITT as a result
of which STET was able to enter into a joint venture with the Cuban telephone
company without
facing a risk of challenge under Helms-Burton.
Like the Europeans
and Canadians, certain U.S. companies with claims certified by the FCSC
are
interested in
future business opportunities in Cuba. Many of these "certified claimants"
are prepared
to resolve their
forty year-old nationalization claims against the Cuban government in the
context of
joint venture
agreements with the relevant Cuban enterprises, through which they would
again be
able to participate
in—and contribute to—the Cuban economy. They would do so by renouncing
their certified
claims in exchange for equity in joint venture projects under Law 77.
Such resolution
of a certified claim is not inconsistent with Helms-Burton it is the essence
of the
statute that
a determination not to pursue a claim, or its abandonment or relinquishment,
requires no
authorization
from the U.S. government. The decision is the certified claimant’s to make.
Title III
establishes
that claimants—both certified and non-certified—have causes of action against
"traffickers,"
(which, for the moment, they cannot pursue because of the suspension of
Title III
access to U.S.
Federal courts). But Title III does not require a claimant to sue to obtain
a
recovery. A
claimant may litigate or desist as the claimant chooses. Settlement of
a claim in the
context of a
joint venture would be, in substance, nothing more than a voluntary decision
to desist
from pursuing
a Title III suit.
The transaction
by which the U.S. company may propose to enter into a joint venture with
the
Cuban enterprise
would have to be licensed under the present regulatory scheme—and it could
be
licensed. Helms-Burton
"codified" the embargo of Cuba as it stood on March 1, 1996. It thus
preserved the
ban on U.S. persons engaging in business transactions in Cuba in the absence
of a
license, "except
as specifically authorized by the U.S. Secretary of Treasury." [8] Thus,
the
proposed settlements
could be licensed under the economic embargo of Cuba in effect on March
1, 1996, consistent
with Helms-Burton.
We recognize
that this proposal addresses only claims certified by the FCSC and not
claims by
Cuban Americans
who lost property. Some members of our Task Force believe the American
government should
espouse the property claims of Cuban Americans. Others believe doing so
would reinforce
the current Cuban government’s nationalist rhetoric and also be highly
destabilizing
to a new, democratic
government; they argue that this issue should instead be left to another
day,
and properly
subject to judicial proceedings in a sovereign Cuba, without participation
by the U.S.
government.
We limit our
recommendations now to a first step toward addressing what will inevitably
prove a
long and complicated
process involving the claims of American citizens, whatever future political
course Cuba
takes. We believe, however, that the opportunity to resolve the vexing
expropriation
claims should
not be limited to the claims of business enterprises. Any holder or transferee
of a
claim should
be permitted to negotiate an exchange of that claim for whatever value
is deemed
adequate to
satisfy that claim. In short, other exchanges of value, in addition to
participation in a
joint venture,
should be permitted (and indeed encouraged); the sooner this bone of contention
can
be resolved
and the ancient claims disposed of the better.
At this time
we recommend that the president prepare to issue licenses for the purpose
of
negotiating
and implementing such settlements as we describe herein.
The proposal—to
allow expropriation claims against Cuba to be resolved by claimants as
part of a
joint venture
arrangement—raises the issue of whether U.S claimants who settle existing
claims in
exchange for
equity positions in their original, or other, industries, would then be
free to invest and
expand on their
equity, or would remain passive owners only. Without the ability to further
capitalize their
investment, some claimants might have less incentive to go forward. On
the other
hand, to allow
them to invest without limitation might be seen as creating a privileged
class of
individuals
and companies–either the original claimants or those who had purchased
rights to a
claim—who would
be legally allowed to invest in Cuba, to the exclusion and perhaps commercial
disadvantage
of all other U.S. individuals and companies. The Task Force chose not to
resolve this
point. There
seemed to be a consensus for taking the first step of allowing U.S. claims
to be
resolved through
equity ownership, but not a consensus in favor of the next step of allowing
follow-on investments
by the new U.S equity owners. Some suggested that the discriminatory effect
was reason to
reject the proposal; others thought that the logical solution was to license
investment
generally.
The dilemma,
in other words, raised a broader issue that reached beyond the mandate
the Task
Force had set
for itself: whether removing the present ban on U.S. investment in Cuba
is in the
national interest
and would promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. The
debate
has often been
articulated elsewhere in narrow and sterile terms—whether the United States
should
simply lift
the embargo or tighten it, as a means to alter the political structure
in Cuba. Not enough
thought has
been given to the possibilities of allowing U.S. investment in Cuba subject
to certain
norms that would
promote human and worker rights and the evolution of independent trade
unions.
Around the world,
U.S. corporations are taking the lead in adopting codes of conduct that
make
many important
standards—regarding child labor, working hours and conditions, human rights,
sexual harassment,
and non-discrimination—a condition of partnership with producers.
We think a serious
discussion among those who wish to see a more thoughtful and creative policy
toward Cuba
needs to begin about this subject. Certainly, with regards to communist
countries
such as China
and Vietnam, U.S. policy has evolved toward engagement by the U.S. private
sector, as an
instrument of opening markets and stimulating democratic change. In South
Africa,
such codes of
conduct promoted by American companies played a constructive role in that
society’s evolution
from authoritarian racism to multi-racial democracy. As the debate in the
Task
Force on claims
settlement elucidates, the subject of U.S. investment in Cuba needs the
same kind
of creative
and pragmatic thinking.
Opponents of
lifting the ban on investment argue that, given the economic structure
of joint ventures
in Cuba, investment
would simply channel hard-currency reserves into the regime, strengthen
its
capacity for
political control and repression, and thus perpetuate the regime. This
is a serious
concern. However,
the Task Force, in both its first and second reports, also reached a consensus
that engagement
with Cuba, through significantly expanded people-to-people exchanges, on
balance promotes
democratic change. The fact is that such exchanges—by bringing hundreds
of
thousands of
Americans to Cuba—also bring additional hard currency to the government.
So too
do others of
our recommendations: lifting the current limit on remittances by Cuban
Americans;
extending remittances
to all Americans; ending the limit on visits by Cuban Americans to their
families; lifting
the ban on travel by all Americans; and permitting limited investment on
the island to
support these
activities in the small but growing private sector there. Therefore, much
more open
and creative
thought must be given to judging the real effects of U.S. investment. Practices
around
the world suggest
that in general, U.S. corporations overall are far more likely to impose
codes of
conduct, direct
pay of workers, and other labor and human rights as a condition of investment.
Moreover, substantial
evidence exists to show that workers in firms in which non-U.S. investors
are involved—despite
the clear effort by the Cuban government to control hiring and siphon off
a
substantial
percentage of workers’ earnings—reap substantial economic benefits. These
benefits
both allow them
to provide better for their families and also reduce their economic dependence
on
the government,
which is an important lever of its social control. Although the Task Force
has
chosen not to
join the investment debate outright, we believe strongly that there is
a need to try to
find creative
new ideas that could break the old deadlock on issues of investment, such
as outlined
above, and promote
the goal that unites Americans of good faith: promoting rapid, peaceful,
democratic change
in Cuba.
4.Begin Licensing Some American
Business Activity. The Cuban government has been slow to
enact liberalizing
economic reforms. It prohibits, for example, Cuban citizens from investing
in small
businesses on
the island. We believe that permitting certain limited American investment
on the
island can further
the economic reform process in Cuba and begin to help all Cubans to participate
fully in their
economy. To that end, we reiterate a recommendation from our first report:
that four
limited categories
of American business routinely receive licenses to operate in Cuba. As
in our first
report, they
are: 1) news gathering or the procurement and creation of informational
material; 2)
providing on-the-ground
services to capture the business resulting from increased American and
Cuban-American
travel; 3) activities related to the distribution of humanitarian aid and
sales; and 4)
activities related
to culture, including the production, purchase, and sale of new cultural
materials
and artworks,
such as theater, music, architectural preservation and restoration, photography,
urban planning,
and the media and the verification of Cuban Adherence to intellectual property
rights. In our
judgment, each of these categories supports objectives clearly specified
in U.S. law.
In addition,
one of the greatest obstacles to the development of an independent trade
union
movement in
Cuba and to greater rates of foreign investment is the monopoly the state
currently
holds on the
hiring and paying of workers. Although it may make more fiscal sense for
the state to
capture tax
revenue through tax policy rather than through a direct labor tax, we are
more
concerned by
the state prohibition on direct hiring. As it becomes apparent that Cuba
is reducing
the role of
the state in the hiring process, we recommend consideration of American
investment
beyond these
four categories, contingent upon demonstrated progress in adhering to workers’
core
labor rights,
as identified by the International Labor Organization (ILO). [9]
5.Conduct an Independent
Study of Labor Rights in Cuba. The development of a free and
independent
trade union movement, and protection of core labor rights such as the right
to strike
and organize,
count among the foundations of democracy. We note the leading role played
by the
independent
Solidarity trade union movement in Poland, with strong support from the
AFL-CIO
and by trade
unions in South Africa in the successful transition to democracy and the
end of
apartheid, respectively.
Today, many core ILO standards and internationally recognized labor
rights are denied
in Cuba, where official trade unions largely serve the interests of the
state. The
current Cuban
law, to cite just one example, that requires foreign investors to contract
workers
indirectly,
violates internationally recognized labor rights. The overall result is
that foreign investors
pay several
hundred dollars per month per worker, but the worker receives a fraction
of that
amount in pesos.
This amounts to a labor tax of approximately 90 percent. This tax, along
with
many other economic
hardships and inequities experienced by Cuban workers, grows out of their
fundamental
inability to exercise the right to free association and collective bargaining.
In practice,
foreign investors
as a rule supplement this base pay with monthly dollar bonuses and basic
hygiene
and food products.
Indeed, even many state enterprises and some government institutions now
supplement peso
salaries with regular dollar bonuses. Earlier in the 1990s, coveted jobs
in the
mixed-enterprise
sectors were once reserved for party loyalists and the military. Today,
jobs in
tourism and
related services, private and cooperative farming, and microenterprises
have
expanded; it
has thus become much more difficult for the government to subject hiring
practices to
a political
litmus test.
Cuban workers
can and should play an important and positive role in a peaceful democratic
transition to
a society capable of protecting existing social benefits for workers, while
also sharing
the benefits
of the new global economy with all of its working people. As we have seen
from the
experiences
in the former Soviet Union and many nations of eastern Europe, this is
a daunting but
essential task.
Recently the AFL-CIO and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions
(ICFTU) have
led delegations to Cuba to discuss the fundamental importance of an independent
trade union
movement in the defense of workers’ rights, and how best to prepare the
Cuban labor
force to function
in a more open economy. The process of dialogue and discussion needs to
be
broadened and
deepened. We therefore recommend an independently funded study of labor
rights
in the mixed
and state-enterprise sectors, comparing Cuban law and conditions to those
of
comparable economies
in the region, and to basic worker rights guaranteed under the ILO. The
study should
also examine the issue of race and ethnicity in the Cuban work force to
examine the
extent to which
Cubans of color have equal access to jobs in the joint-venture sectors,
especially
tourism. Such
a study should draw on the work in this area already done by the AFL-CIO
and by
other research
conducted on the ground in Cuba, to provide interested parties—such as
American
and international
trade unions, businesses, and human rights groups—with a baseline of information,
and to suggest
directions for further initiatives to prepare Cuban workers and management
for their
inevitable encounter
with the demands of the global economy. We recommend that after the study
is completed,
the U.S. administration consult with labor, business, and congressional
leaders to
discuss how
to implement its findings.
6.License American Universities
and the Private Sector to Establish Management Training
and Labor Rights
Institutes. In recent years, Cuba has been sending young managers of
joint-venture
enterprises to Europe for training in business management. Among the most
competitive
fields in Cuba, now attracting some of the brightest young people, are
international law,
business, and
economics. Indeed, the mixed-enterprise sector continues to expand, providing
a
training ground
for those individuals who will emerge as the forces driving the emergence
of a
market economy.
The American private sector, directly and through university programs,
can play
a valuable role
in this process. We recommend that the president issue licenses to American
businesses,
business schools, and NGOs to establish management training institutes
in Cuba with
European, Canadian,
and Latin American partners. We likewise recommend that Cuban students
be awarded scholarships,
paid by universities and the private sector, to attend business school
and
management training
programs in the United States. We believe a similar program should be
considered in
cooperation with the AFL-CIO, to educate Cuban workers about internationally
recognized labor
rights and the organizing of free trade unions. Finally, we call on the
government of
Cuba to permit
its students and other citizens to take advantage of such opportunities
as they arise.
7.Support Cuban Observer
Status in the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
Since the collapse
of the Soviet bloc, the Cuban government has undertaken sporadic economic
reforms, but
has rejected a comprehensive liberalization of the economy. We recognize
that Cuba
has a considerable
distance to go and much to learn about how modern market economies and
the
international
financial system function before it will be eligible for full membership
in the international
financial institutions.
The process of exposing Cuba to the norms and practices of the international
community should
include the opportunity for Cubans to understand those institutions that
are
relevant to
implementing economic reforms that will be necessary to compete in the
global
economy. As
a first step in laying the groundwork for an economic transition in Cuba,
we
recommend that
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank consider granting
Cuba observer
status.
8.Oppose Cuba’s Readmission
to the Organization of American States (OAS). Admission to the
OAS is another
matter. The OAS and its member states labored long and hard over the last
decade to strengthen
the institution’s commitment to democracy as the only legitimate form of
government in
the Western Hemisphere and to take on a collective responsibility, as first
enunciated
in the Santiago
Declaration in June 1991, to defend democracy when it is at risk. We believe
Cuba’s readmission
to the OAS now would undermine that important institutional commitment
to
democracy. Therefore,
until Cuba accepts the democratic disciplines of regular, free elections
embraced by
every other nation in the region, we oppose its readmission to the OAS.
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS BY MEMBERS
On Addressing Lifting the U.S. Embargo
We strongly support the Task Force’s recommendations
but believe that its objectives can be best
achieved by addressing the central issue of
U.S.-Cuban relations: the embargo.
The current U.S. embargo obstructs humanitarian
aid and obscures the failure of the Cuban government’s
economic policies, which is the central cause
of the very significant human suffering in Cuba today. The
new president has a historic opportunity to
work with a new Congress to lift the embargo, specifically all
restrictions on trade and travel, and he should
be encouraged to do so.
We agree with the report’s conclusion, however,
that the ban on American investment should be treated
differently. It should only be lifted as the
Cuban government allows Cuban citizens to participate in the
Cuban economy through direct employment, business
ownership, and other economic rights.
María de Lourdes Duke
Micho Fernandez Spring
On Travel and People-to-People Exchanges
There are two reasons why, in spite of some
differences in tone and even in content, I am willing to sign
this report. One is that it properly assumes
that the task before us is to devise a policy for the middle and
longer term, taking as a given the biological
fact of Fidel Castro’s mortality. The other is that the report
largely frees us from the trap of waiting
for reciprocity from Havana. That will never come under the
present regime. A proper U.S. policy toward
Cuba takes its point of departure from the notion that we
know what we want. Whether the current government
of Cuba—which after all has never been
elected—wants it too should properly be a
matter of indifference to us. As we are not omnipotent, or
even "hegemonic," we may not get where we
want to go, but that should not stop us from identifying and
using the many assets we do possess.
Cuba is a very special Latin American country.
Although supposedly very nationalistic, it is nonetheless
permanently fascinated by and attracted to
the United States—our culture, our institutions, our way of life.
Indeed, I would not be a bit surprised to
see the next government in Cuba, or the ones that follow it,
&