

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION/INFORMATION

December 16, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOHNATHAN S. MILLER  
PHILIP G. HUGHES

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Trip to Grenada

As we noted earlier, this idea has been informally run by Mrs. Reagan who understands that it is subject to approval by you and Donald Regan. However, she has given her "seal of approval" to the notion of this trip, provided that it is a "stag" trip and involves only one overnight. Accordingly, we have scoped out the scenario based on those guidelines of Mrs. Reagan.

The major purpose of the trip to Grenada would be to consult with heads of government from friendly Caribbean nations (probably the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and perhaps a few other Caribbean nations). This trip would be a continuation of our new policy of getting many heads of government together with the President at one time (such as the allied consultations that were held in New York during the UN, the Brussels NATO meeting and the proposed ASEAN meeting in Indonesia).

Not only is this meeting in Grenada cost effective, affording the President a unique opportunity to comprehensively consult Caribbean leaders on economic and security matters, it will also allow the President to be enthusiastically received at the site of one of his greatest foreign policy achievements. Finally it should be noted that the proposed date of the trip will be the fourth anniversary of the President's announcements of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, making this trip all the more timely.

The flight from Andrews to Grenada is approximately five hours in length and involves a one hour time change. Since Grenada can not support a Presidential overnight, we will have to preposition him somewhere in the vicinity and Jim Hooley has suggested it might be better to have the President on U.S. soil, hence the Virgin Island or Puerto Rico suggestion. In addition the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are closer to Grenada and in the same time zone. Thereby, making them more attractive options than Florida.

Attached is the proposed notional itinerary.

cc: Bill Martin  
Jim Hooley



Notional Itinerary for  
Trip to Grenada

February 25

Mid-afternoon departure from Andrews

Early evening arrival at either Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico  
(time change plus one hour - remain overnight)

February 26

9:00 a.m. - Departure from Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico  
for Grenada

Apprx 10:30 a.m. - Arrival in Grenada (will leave up to the  
Advance Office exact details of the schedule)

Visit on island will include:

Short visit with Governor General Scoon

Working Meeting/Luncheon with Caribbean  
Leaders at Governor General's Residence

Wreath Laying at Monument to Fallen  
American Soldiers or Visit to Medical School

Possible Dedication of Passenger Terminal at  
International Airport

Apprx 3:00 p.m. - Departure non-stop to Andrews Air Force Base

Apprx 7:00 p.m. - Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP


SUBJECT: Radio Marti (U)

The CPPG will convene on January 29, 1985, 4:30-5:30 pm in the White House Situation Room to discuss Radio Marti. (S)

The agenda for this meeting is as follows:

- To coordinate steps to implement Congressional briefing plan. (S)
- To review other implementing steps to comply with the 17 January NSC tasking memorandum. (S)

The Director of USIA will attend this meeting. Please notify Walter Raymond (395-6900) if you will attend and who if anyone will accompany you. (U)



J. M. Poindexter  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1987  
By W27 NARA, Date 3/14/00

Distribution

Donald P. Gregg, Office of the Vice President (395-4213)  
Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political  
Affairs (632-2471)  
Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (697-7200)  
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence (351-5151)  
Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, Joint Chiefs of Staff (697-9124)

cc: Charles Z. Wick, Director, US Information Agency  
(485-8742)

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STATUS REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDIENCE RESEARCH  
METHODOLOGIES FOR RADIO MARTI

Office of Research & Policy  
Audience Research  
July 10, 1985

Report: A Review of Audience Research Methods in International Broadcasting  
(VOA/RM/ORP/AR/ARM/No.1) July 1984

Description- An overview of audience research methodologies employed by international broadcasting, including those utilized by Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) and their relevance to Radio Marti.

Report: Applicability of Audience Research Survey Methods Used with Soviet and Eastern European Populations to the Cuban Audience of Radio Marti: Some Observations (VOA/RM/ORP/AR/ARM/No. 2) April 1, 1985

Description- 1) An examination of the survey methodology used by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and other Western broadcasters, with special emphasis on the comparative and continual sampling method which is the foundation of the audience methodology utilized by RFE and RL. 2) An analysis of whether or not the audience methodologies employed by RFE and RL are applicable to the Cuban audience targeted by Radio Marti.

Major Findings- 1) Procedurally there are no great difficulties in adopting the RFE/RL research methodology for comparable studies of the Radio Marti audience. 2) There are great differences in the attributes of the research population of RFE/RL and Radio Marti that feasibly are accessible for study. 3) Under the current situation, these differences in the research populations and their accessibility create real, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacles in the drawing of samples even approximately representative of the Cuban population at large, and on the applicability of the basic assumptions used in the Eastern European surveys to comparable surveys of Cuban travelers. The nature of the determinants of Cuban travel abroad seems to be much different from those influencing travel abroad from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.



Conclusions- In its present format the RFE/RL methodology cannot be used to study the reactions of the Cuban audience to Radio Marti broadcasts. The problem does not lie with issues associated with data collection or data handling, but rather with the interpretations made with that data, since there would be a lack of fit between some of the basic assumptions of the methodology and the characteristics of Cuban travelers abroad. In simple terms, samples drawn from Cuban travelers abroad would not meet the tests of representativeness as defined by RFE/RL investigators. Studies based on data gathered from these selected groups of travelers are likely to provide misleading results, not representative of the reactions and perceptions of the universe of Cuban radio-listeners.

Recommendations- The attributes of the accessible Cuban research population call for the development of carefully designed pilot studies that would help to determine the kinds of measuring instruments that could best be used to evaluate the behaviors and perceptions of interest of the Cuban radio audience.

Note- The design and implementation of pilot studies intended to better measure the Cuban radio audience currently are being developed by Audience Research at Radio Marti.

#### Audience Methodology Advisory Panel

Objectives - 1) To draw from the expertise of professionals in a variety of disciplines -- principally in audience research, social science and demography - in assessing the particular conditions involved in conducting audience research activities for the Radio Marti Program. 2) To help give initial direction to the development of audience research methodologies appropriate to Radio Marti's research problem. 3) To provide periodic and continuous evaluation of Radio Marti's progress in its development of audience research methodologies.

History - Originally proposed in December 1984, panelists were identified and recruited in March 1985 when the Audience Methodology Advisory Panel was officially established. The first meeting was held April 12, 1985. The first meeting was held April 12, 1985. The Panel is next scheduled to meet in September 1985.

Panel Recommendations - The consensus of the Panel was that the current emigre group represents the best source of audience and programming information for Radio Marti. The Panel further recommended undertaking the design and implementation of a series of pilot studies whose design are currently in development by Audience Research at Radio Marti.





Panel Members:

Dr. Juan Clark: Professor, Miami-Dade Community College. Researcher and investigator in numerous surveys and studies of recent Cuban emigres. Has published extensively on the characteristics of the Cuban emigre population.

Mr. David Lapovsky: Vice President, Research - Arbitron Ratings Co. Recognized internationally as a most reliable and professional provider of broadcast ratings services, has been at the forefront in the development of innovative research methodologies to measure the Spanish radio audience in the United States.

Dr. Marcelino Miyares: President, OMAR - a marketing & advertising research firm. President, WBBS-TV A Spanish language television station in Chicago. Born in Cuba. Has extensive knowledge of current Cuban society.

Mr. Peter Roslow: Vice President, Information & Analysis. A marketing & research firm. Previously with Strategy Research Corporation and Pulse Inc., directing the companies audience measurement efforts for television and radio. Extensive experience in the design of audience measurement efforts for television and radio. Extensive experience in the design of audience studies and surveys among the Spanish speaking population.



## MARTI TENTATIVE TIMETABLE

### FOR PLANNING PURPOSES

Please note that there are many variables that could come together to create delays well beyond the timetable. However, we are taking special precautions to anticipate these kinds of problems as quickly as needed.

#### PERSONNEL

|             |                           |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| February 1: | Initial staffers cleared. |
| March 5:    | First hires on board.     |
| April 2:    | Core staff (48) on board. |
| June 1:     | 100 on board.             |
| July 4:     | 125 on board.             |
| Aug. 1:     | 150 on board.             |
| Sept. 1:    | 188 on board.             |

#### SECURITY

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| February 1:  | Guards in place, Washington and Marathon.                 |
| February 15: | Washington building secured.                              |
| March 5:     | Security construction under way, Washington and Marathon. |
| June 4:      | Security construction complete, Washington and Marathon.  |

#### SPACE AND FACILITIES

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| February 1:  | Telephones installed, 400 6th Street.   |
| February 13: | Furniture orders placed.<br>Office equipment orders placed.<br>Editing Equipment ordered.                                       |
| February 20: | Task Force moves to 400 6th Street SW.  |
| March 12:    | New staff arrivals.<br>First furniture shipment arrives.<br>First office equipment arrives.<br>First editing equipment arrives. |
| March 26:    | Second shipments arrive.  |
| May 1:       | Third shipments arrive.   |
| May 27:      | Final shipments arrive.   |

#### SATELLITE TRANSMISSION

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| February 1:  | Negotiations continue with Mutual Radio. |
| February 27: | Contract Approved.                       |
| March 5:     | Satellite service begins.                |

#### WASHINGTON STUDIOS

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| February 1:  | Statement of Work with Contracts Office.   |
| February 10: | Solicitation completed, sent to GC.        |
| March 5:     | GC completes review, sent to Reproduction. |
| March 9:     | Solicitation mailed to contractors.        |





|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| April 9:    | Bids received.                              |
| April 23    | Bids evaluated. Final negotiations.         |
| April 30:   | Bid to Director Wick for signature.         |
| May 14:     | Bid returned.                               |
| May 21:     | Award made to contractor (150 days begin).  |
| October 24: | Work completed. Inspection begins.          |
| November 1: | Inspection completed. Studios in operation. |

#### MARATHON CONSTRUCTION

|              |                                     |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|
| February 1:  | GC opinion on acquisition received. |
| February 20: | Land acquisition process begins.    |

#### BROADCAST SCHEDULE

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| March 1:  | Research staff begins functioning.                  |
| March 1:  | Core news staff begins operations.                  |
| March 15: | Preparation of pilot programs begins.               |
| April 2:  | Evaluation of pilot programs.                       |
| April 9:  | Preparations begin for first broadcasts.            |
| April 15: | Marti broadcasts begin, initially from VOA studios. |



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601, NARA, Date 11/15/00

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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February 7, 1984

National Security  
Decision Directive 124

CENTRAL AMERICA: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY,  
ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT, AND PEACE (S)

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (NBCCA) and the internal strategy review conducted for the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) agree that vital U.S. interests are jeopardized by the continuing crisis in Central America. Despite political and military gains in the past six months, Costa Rica and Honduras are increasingly threatened by the continuing Sandinista military build-up and the lack of real democratization in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas with Cuban/Soviet Bloc support continue to export subversion and insurgency throughout the region. In El Salvador progress on improving democratic institutions, human rights, economic development, and protecting internal reform is endangered by the growing, externally-supported insurgency. (S)

Both the NBCCA and the report to the NSPG endorsed four common objectives in our approach toward the region:

- Support for the advancement of democracy and implementation of a free and open electoral process in all countries of Central America.
- Support for economic development, including significantly increased economic and humanitarian assistance to raise the standards of living for the people of Central America.
- Resolution of regional disputes and conflicts through dialogue and the achievement of political settlements with verifiable agreements through negotiation.
- Provision for sufficient security assistance to ensure that democratic institutions, social reforms, and economic improvements are not threatened by communist subversion and guerrilla warfare. (C)

The recommendations of the NBCCA, taken en toto, provide a valuable framework for achieving these objectives in the mid to long term. It is important, however, that these recommendations, which I have endorsed in principle, be adopted in a diplomatic and security environment that will permit them to succeed. (C)

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In addition to developing an interagency approved comprehensive legislative proposal to implement the recommendations of the NBCCA, actions must also be taken in the near term which will provide for a satisfactory improvement in the present crisis situation. Therefore, the following measures from the Action Plan outlined in the Restricted Interagency Group Report "Where Next in Central America," are approved as a means of ensuring the successful implementation of the NBCCA proposals: (S)

- The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Directors of Central Intelligence and Office of Management and Budget, should pursue, in particular, the following objectives/actions which are consistent with the NBCCA report:

-- Nicaragua: Our approach to the Nicaraguan Government must focus on achieving the following:

- (1) Implementation of the democratic commitments made by the Sandinistas to the OAS in 1979.
- (2) Termination of Nicaragua's support to Marxist/Leninist subversion and guerrilla activity in any foreign country.
- (3) Removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel and an end to Nicaraguan military cooperation with communist countries.
- (4) Reduction in the Sandinista military apparatus to parity within the region.
- (5) Intensified efforts in the Contadora forum to achieve the political and security objectives defined in the Contadora Document of Objectives, with emphasis on the need for a comprehensive package with concrete, verifiable provisions that do not allow Nicaragua to circumvent its commitments.
- (6) Review and recommend such economic sanctions against Nicaragua that are likely to build pressure on the Sandinistas. Due consideration should be given to the net economic impact on Nicaragua, to U.S. public affairs, and to Congressional concerns. An action plan on these sanctions should be provided for review by the NSPG by March 1, 1984.
- (7) Reemphasize to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua that we will not tolerate the introduction into Nicaragua of advanced fighter aircraft or Cuban ground forces. (TS)

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
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-- El Salvador: Our approach must support the democratization process and the existing reforms against attacks from the violent left and the violent right. Our diplomatic and communications efforts should seek expanded political support for El Salvador from non-communist governments, and assure that if the communist-led guerrilla coalition again refuses to participate in the forthcoming elections, their refusal is made widely known in Latin America and among NATO and other friendly countries. The following actions should be taken in furtherance of these goals: (TS)

- (1) To effectively support land reform in El Salvador, funds should be requested in the FY-84 supplemental and an exception sought to the current prohibition on using AID funds to compensate owners of expropriated land.
- (2) Technical assistance for protecting participants in the judicial process and improvements in judicial investigative capabilities should be provided, utilizing the \$3 million earmarked for that purpose in the FY-84 Continuing Resolution.

- 
- (3) An assessment of short-term military needs indicates that the Government of El Salvador will need additional defense articles, services, and training before an FY-84 supplemental can be approved. Therefore, if necessary, action may be taken to provide requisite resources under the provisions of Section 21(d) of the Arms Export Control Act. If 60 days after billing for these items supplemental funding is still not available, the 60 day period will be extended up to 120 days.
  - (4) As part of our strategy to implement the recommendations of the NBCCA, a comprehensive legislative/public affairs campaign should be immediately undertaken to maximize prospects for approval of the Administration's proposal and appropriations at requested levels. (TS)

-- Guatemala: As Guatemala demonstrates its good faith toward its commitment to democracy and human rights, we should restore curtailed aid. Renewed efforts should be initiated to obtain new security and economic assistance programs as progress is ascertained. Increased efforts shall also be made to arrange a solution to the Guatemalan/Belize border dispute. (S)

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- [REDACTED]
- Regional Security Assistance. A \$259 million FY-84 military assistance supplemental for Central America (\$179 million for El Salvador) should be submitted to the Congress early in 1984. The amount of FY-85 military assistance for Central America should be increased to \$255.9 million through an FY-85 budget amendment. These requests should be submitted as part of the Administration's proposals to implement the recommendations of the NBCCA. (C)
- Public Diplomacy. Our public diplomacy and information programs/resources should be substantially expanded to counter the intensive Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan propaganda campaign. [REDACTED]
- Review of Economic Measures. Since the programs recommended by the NBCCA will not have immediate results, a special interagency task force should be convened by the Secretary of State to undertake an urgent review of economic measures to improve near term prospects for our friends in the region. Actions should be examined which would be helpful to those most immediately threatened by Nicaragua: Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Recommendations and an action plan for implementation should be submitted for review by the NSPG by March 9, 1984. (S)
- [REDACTED]

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- Expand political action programs in El Salvador to promote a large voter turnout in the forthcoming elections. Additional measures should also be taken to assist and strengthen genuine democratic parties, trade unions, and civic groups.
- Continue efforts to improve the effectiveness of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces. (TS)
- The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, should conduct U.S. military activities in the region that are sufficient to reassure our friends and enhance our diplomatic efforts. U.S. military assets in the region should also be employed to increase intelligence collection and assist in improving security for the Salvadoran elections: (TS)
  - Develop and implement plans for new exercises in Honduras and naval activities in waters off Central America in a manner that will maintain steady pressure on the Nicaraguans and deter Nicaraguan military actions against its neighbors.
  - In conjunction with U.S. military activities and exercises, U.S. units should continue civic action projects and humanitarian relief efforts in Central America. [REDACTED]
  - Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE) should be conducted in Honduras commencing in March and later in 1984, as necessary, to demonstrate of our commitment and resolve.
  - Regional security assistance teams and the Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) should be maintained at levels sufficient to assure the steady improvement of friendly military forces.
  - Measures should be taken within our diplomatic and regional military-to-military relationships to foster defense cooperation among the Central American countries. Subject to appropriate funding, U.S. security assistance should be provided to encourage such cooperation. (TS)

Ronald Reagan

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## RADIO MARTI

### Legislative History

-- Following expressions of Congressional interest, President Reagan established a Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba on September 22, 1981, by Executive Order 12323. The eleven members of the Commission were appointed in January 1982. The Commission submitted its final report to the President and to the Secretary of State on September 30, 1982, recommending the establishment of a government-sponsored Radio in the AM band using the name "Radio Marti".

-- The proposed radio broadcasting to Cuba legislation (H.R. 5427) was introduced by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Zablocki in February 1982. This bill, which would have placed "Radio Marti" under the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), passed the House of Representatives on August 10, 1982. In December, however, consideration of the bill was suspended by the Senate.

-- Legislation to support radio broadcasting to Cuba was reintroduced in the Senate (S. 602) in February 1983. After a compromise was reached between Senators Hawkins (R., Fla.) and Weicker (R., Conn.), it was adopted unanimously by voice vote in September 1983, and was subsequently adopted by the House. This bill made "Radio Marti" a service of the Voice of America (VOA). The President signed this bill into law on October 4, 1983, as Public Law 98-111, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act.

### International Broadcasting History

-- Informational radio broadcasting from one country to another is an established tradition. Along with the development of the inexpensive transistor radio, it has contributed directly to the worldwide revolution in communications and education. The Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Moscow and other national services have played key roles in this international service.

-- Cuba itself has become a leader in the field, broadcasting over 400 hours a week to a number of continents. Its extensive programming for Latin America and the Caribbean includes broadcasts in English, French, Portuguese, Creole, Guarani and Quechua, as well as Spanish.

-- The legality and morality of such broadcasts is unquestioned, subject to international technical regulations



regarding frequency, broadcast power and interference -- and less precise judgments on the differences between legitimate news and entertainment on the one hand and disruptive propaganda and instructions for terrorists on the other.

-- Among the pertinent international technical regulations are the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, the Rio Agreement of 1981 and the radio regulations of the International Telecommunications Union.

-- Accepted judgments on the performance of the various international broadcast services are a matter of public record. The VOA and BBC, for example, enjoy solid reputations for balance and comprehensiveness. And the level of one-sided propaganda from Moscow and Havana is clear to anyone who has ever listened to their programs. Respect for the technical requirements shows a similar dichotomy.

-- As significant as the content of the broadcast services is the history of reaction in various countries to radio transmissions from outside. Throughout the world, the people themselves have welcomed the opportunity; those cheap radios have become a symbol of participation in the larger world for poor people throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia -- and Eastern Europe.

-- Governments have reacted in direct proportion to their insecurity about their own people -- a high-tech litmus test of the openness of societies. As any ham radio operator knows, the U.S. has no fear of anyone else's news -- or propaganda. On the other side, 'jamming' of the VOA and Radio Free Europe has become a familiar phenomenon. And the Soviet Bloc and some third-world nations are promoting a "New World Information Order" which would limit "interference" from all kinds of foreign news sources.

-- But few acts so threaten international communication as the aggressive idea of deliberate interference with another country's domestic radio broadcasting.

#### Efforts to Deal with Cuban Radio Interference in the U.S.

-- Low levels of Cuban interference with commercial broadcasting in the U.S. have existed for many years. The U.S. has repeatedly sought to resolve the long-term problem of Cuban radio interference through negotiations.

-- An escalation came on August 30, 1982, when, in an apparent effort to influence U.S. Congressional consideration of the "Radio Marti" bill, Cuba generated considerable radio interference on stations located as far from Cuba as Des Moines, Iowa and Salt Lake City, Utah.



-- The Cuban Government has continued to threaten to disrupt U.S. domestic broadcasting in retaliation for "Radio Marti."

-- In August 1983, the United States and Cuba met in San Jose, Costa Rica, for talks on the long-term issue. The U.S. requested further talks in Mexico City in October 1983 with the objective of eliminating or substantially reducing the level of interference to broadcasting. The Cuban Government informed us that it did not intend to continue the talks.

-- In January 1985, Fidel Castro told visiting members of Congress and editors from the Washington Post that although no other bilateral problem was as significant as the immigration issue (which had just been resolved in the December 1984 Mariel Agreement), Cuba might consider discussing bilateral issues such as radio interference with the United States.

-- In a January 1985 address to Cuba over VOA, President Reagan announced that Radio Marti would be going on the air in the near future.

-- The Cuban Government was informed in advance of the May 20 inauguration of "Radio Marti" broadcasting.

#### The Radio Marti Opportunity

-- Reaction to the actual operation of "Radio Marti" will be an interesting test. We expect the Cuban people to appreciate a source of objective, accurate, balanced programs of news and entertainment, hewing to the high standards of the Voice of America.

-- What will be the response of the Cuban Government? There is no reason for that government to overreact to what is after all a change in programming of an existing VOA station which has been broadcasting to Cuba on a clear channel for decades -- and which will continue to operate under strict VOA standards. "Radio Marti" will not interfere with any existing Cuban radio broadcast.

-- A parallel Cuban Government reaction would be a similar clear channel broadcast into the United States. We do not fear, and will ourselves not react against, Cuban propaganda broadcast at the United States -- as long as the activity conformed to accepted standards and regulations, most especially that it did not increase the present level of interference which Cuban broadcasting causes in the United States.

0780h  
May 20, 1985



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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD S. BEAL

FROM: Ron Hinckley

SUBJECT: US-Cuban Communications During Grenada

DATE: November 14, 1983

I have pieced together some message traffic from intelligence and USINT Havana sources to depict the pattern of events shown in the accompanying timeline. I think it is interesting to note what might have been the level of Cuban awareness of what was transpiring in Grenada prior to the mid-October coup, what they might have known about U.S. plans in the area, and the sudden, unexplained loss of communications between USINT Havana and Washington at the most important information-flow time for US-Cuban relations during the crisis.

Circumstances indicate that the following might have been the scenario that took place:

1. The Soviet Union, Cuba, and the communist party in Jamaica were aware of what Coard was about, if not actually involved in instigating it.
2. Castro gave Coard a clear signal it was okay to topple Bishop on October 15.
3. Forgetting their own revolutionary furor, none of the communists expected the savagery that followed.
4. Cuba, however, anticipated U.S. reaction and tried to disipate it by suggesting bi-lateral talks.
5. When evidence mounted that the U.S. would not respond favorably to this approach, Castro cut the communication link between Havana and Washington so he could not be informed in advance of the U.S. operation.
6. The day before the invasion, with maximum propoganda in mind, Castro informs Grenada that his forces will only fight if attacked.
7. The invasion occurs before Castro receives the official U.S. response to his inquiry several days earlier. Castro now knows that the U.S. does not want a confrontation with Cuba, so he is free to enflame his public against the Yankees for killing his few "workers" on Grenada and rail to the world in one of his infamous press conferences that the U.S. attacked without warning despite his attempt some days earlier to enter into discussions about the problems brought about by events on Grenada.



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It appears that Castro, overtaken by events, sensed the U.S. response, tried to abort them, and when this failed manoevered into a position where he could sacrifice a small number of Cubans to demonstrated American brutality. This produced a public relations victory to replace the loss of his investment in Grenada. It might not be much, but he still got something where he should have got nothing had our information procedures been more secure with proper backups available.



MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD S. BEAL

FROM: Ron Hinckley *RH*

SUBJECT: US-Cuban Communications During Grenada

DATE: November 14, 1983

It appears that problems with communications between Washington and USINT Havana may have permitted Castro, overtaken by events in Grenada, to achieve a minor public relations victory to ease the pain of his lost investment there.

Recognizing and fearing that the U.S. was likely to take advantage of the turmoil in Grenada, Castro tried to defuse this by approaching the U.S. on 22 October, seeking a dialogue regarding the safety of both Cuban and American nationals on the island. Before the U.S. had a chance to reply, Castro probably learned of the imminent joint US-OECD action against Grenada.

With this knowledge, he probably did not want a reply. Coincidentally, at 1900 hours on 23 October, 17 telephone lines and the telegraphic circuit between USINT in Havana and Washington went dead. USINT Havana could not determine a technical reason for this outage which severed all communications between it and the outside world.

USINT Havana spent all day 24 October trying to get the local telephone company to make repairs. The Cuban Foreign Ministry was informed repeatedly of the problem and was notified that the problem could have serious implications for consultation on Grenada.

During the night of 24 October and the early morning hours of 25 October, Washington attempted to notify Castro, through USINT Havana, of the action against Grenada and that Cuban personnel were not a target. Because of the communication outage, they could not get through their regular channels in a timely manner and had to ultimately telephone the message to the head of the section at his home. He then relayed it to Castro, but it arrived one and one-half hours after hostilities had begun between Cuban and U.S. personnel.

The telephone lines were reconnected later that day by the local telephone company acting upon orders from the Cuban Foreign Ministry. However, at his news conference, Castro made a major issue of the length of time it took the U.S. to respond to his 22 October initiative and the fact that hostile action against Cuban civilians occurred without any warning from the U.S.

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BY *CH* , NADA, DATE 7/31/00





As USINT Havana put it, "the failure of USINT's communication system means, of course, that we walk[ed] straight into a propaganda left hook. Our response did arrive late; it matters not that the Cubans know the facts of the matter."

It appears that we were unable to counter Castro's claim that we had not notified him in advance of the action, as we intended to do. Since the communication outage occurred Sunday evening prior to a Tuesday morning operation, we should have had plenty of time to prepare back-up procedures to use for communications with Castro.

We should determine whether or not we tried to deliver the message to Castro through alternate routes (e.g. Cuba's Ambassador to the U.N., to Cuba through the U.S.S.R., and Cuba's Interest Section in Washington), and if not, why not? If we did, then we should have made note of it during the operation to counter Castro's claims. If not, we should evaluate the situation and prepare guidelines for future communications under such circumstances.

Our ability to control a crisis relates directly to our ability to communicate with all involved, even when they do not want to receive our messages. Information flow and communications are crucial during a crisis, especially when normal diplomatic channels are unavailable from the start, as with Cuba where we do not have formal relations. We are, and we were in this case, subject to others when we do not plan our crisis communication procedures with these circumstances in mind.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OPERATIONS CENTER

GRENADA WORKING GROUP

SITUATION REPORT NO. 27

SITUATION IN GRENADA AS OF 1700 EST, NOVEMBER 2, 1983

Military commanders in Grenada determined that hostilities ended as of 4 p.m. local time today. The latest U.S. casualty figures are 18 KIA, 89 WIA, with no MIA's. U.S. military personnel currently on Grenada include 5,980 Army and 249 Air Force servicemen. There are 353 members of the Caribbean Peace Force on the island.

The 57 Cuban wounded soldiers departed for Havana this morning, accompanied by 10 Cuban medical personnel and 5 ICRC representatives. They were transported by U.S. military aircraft to Bridgetown, where they transferred to an ICRC-chartered DC-8 for onward travel to Havana (ETA 2115 GMT). This brings the number of Cubans being detained in Grenada to 585. We are now prepared to authorize the repatriation of these detainees as soon as technical arrangements can be agreed upon.

There were virtually no exchanges or instances of gunfire in St. George's and environs today. The Grenadian constabulary continues to become more visible. St. George's was crowded with many civilians and many shops, restaurants, and post office branches were open for business. One Grenadian police officer reported that between 100 and 150 police officers were back on duty. Water, power, telephone communication, and plumbing have been restored to most areas of the country.

Relief activities are underway, including provision of required medicines, water, electrical generators, food, and contracts to remove rubble. Food captured in Cuban warehouses will be kept for feeding the Cuban detainees initially, while the rest of the goods (tools, building materials, recreation equipment, and foodstuffs not required by the detainees) will be distributed by private voluntary organizations.

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DECL: OADR

BY *Amf* DATE 1/10/00

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CIA [LDX]  
WHITE HOUSE [LDX]





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- 2 -

We have received a report that Nicholas Brathwaite, a Grenadian from the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat, and Tony Rushford, a citizen of Great Britain and former legal adviser to that country's Foreign Office, will be sent to Grenada to help Governor General Scoon form an interim administration at his request.

*Richard C. Brown*

Richard C. Brown  
Grenada Working Group

*Ruth A. Davis*

Ruth A. Davis  
Senior Watch Officer

~~SECRET~~





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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OCT 21 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ALAN MYER

FROM: CONSTANTINE MENGES AND ROGER FONTAINE

Attached is the draft portion of the Presidential speech for which we are responsible.

cc: Admiral Poindexter  
Oliver North



1400 25 October 1983

Fontaine/Menges

This week the United States responded to an urgent and unanimous request. It came from the democratically elected governments of the Eastern Caribbean and the democratic governments of Barbados and Jamaica to assist their joint effort in restoring peace and order on the troubled island-nation of Grenada. We responded to their request for help with our own armed forces. In Grenada today we have a provisional government which is intent not only in restoring a functioning government to that country, but restoring democratic institutions chosen by free elections as well.

To some it is difficult to understand why we should bother about the affairs of small island nations a thousand miles from our shores. Why particularly after the tragic loss of life in Beirut last Sunday should an American president commit combat forces to another part of the world? These are serious and solemn questions which I would like to talk to you about tonight.

As I explained on Tuesday morning we acceded to the multi-national request for three reasons. First, to protect American lives; some 1,000 Americans, including senior citizens and young medical students were living in Grenada. The protection of American lives is a special responsibility of any American president and it is a responsibility I discharged this week.

The second reason for our joint action was to prevent further violence and disorder in Grenada. The lives of many other innocent persons were also at stake. Finally, I agreed to the request in order to assist the Caribbean nations' efforts in restoring conditions of law and democracy to Grenada.

That island-nation until this week had been ruled by a brutal group of Marxist-Leninist thugs who violently seized power killing the Prime Minister, three cabinet members, two labor leaders, and many other civilians, including children. As I said on Tuesday morning, this joint effort was forced on us by events that have no precedent in the Eastern Caribbean and no place whatever in any civilized society.

What have these eight countries achieved in the first three days? We have restored order in that country. Police and other security forces from six Caribbean democracies are now protecting lives and property in Grenada. Second, a provisional government has been established in Grenada. The suspended constitution is once more in operation. The provisional government chosen by the Governor General of Grenada, a Grenadian, has formed this government with the participation of democratic Grenadian leaders. The provisional government expects to restore free elections to that island within six months. Third, through our joint efforts we have secured the release of many political prisoners jailed by the previous government of Maurice Bishop and its successor government run briefly and bloodily by General Austin. Fourth,



the Cuban presence has been reduced.

Let me now give you the background to these events:

--The island nation of Grenada became an independent member of the British Commonwealth in 1974. It inherited the democratic institutions of Great Britain complete with a constitution, a parliament and a competitive party system.

--In 1979, however, for the first time in the English-speaking and democratic Caribbean, an elected government in Grenada was overthrown by force and Maurice Bishop, a leader of the leftist New Jewel movement seized power. It soon became clear that Bishop was hostile to democratic institutions. He openly boasted that Grenada would never return to the Westminster model of democracy. His model was to be found elsewhere, in Moscow and Havana. In fact, Bishop's relationship with the Cubans before and after his March 1979 coup were very close. For example, Castro's ambassador to Grenada was one of his most skilled covert action operatives, Oswaldo Cardenas. Cardenas rapidly became Bishop's closest advisor attending even Cabinet meetings.

--In rejecting democracy and free elections the Bishop regime became increasingly repressive by harassing political opposition ending the free press and suspending human rights guarantees in the constitution. At the same time his already close links with Cuba and the Soviet Union became even closer.

--Grenada's neighbors--all small island democracies--were increasingly concerned over Grenada's cooperation with Cuba and the Soviet Union and even Libya in the export of subversion; by the increase in the size of the Grenadian army-- three times as large as Jamaica's--whose population is ten times the size of Grenada; and by the new Cuban-built airport at Point Salines which could accommodate any aircraft including any nuclear capable aircraft in the Soviet inventory.

--In recent months, however, Maurice Bishop seemed to be considering a move away from the Cuban-Soviet orbit toward more normal relations with his democratic neighbors. Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica has told me she believes that change for the better was because of pressure exerted by Grenada's democratic neighbors. I, too, was convinced that Bishop was at least contemplating a change in his earlier position. That is why I asked my Advisor on National Security, Bill Clark to meet privately with Prime Minister Bishop during his visit to Washington in June(?). It seemed we were cautiously taking some steps toward a new relationship. We shall regretfully never know.

--On October 12, the most hard line Marxist-Leninist faction of his regime arrested Bishop and his supporters. Within days Prime Minister Bishop and three cabinet members were summarily executed. Other political leaders were placed under arrest. Some disappeared. Others, civilians--innocent bystanders--including





children were killed by the Grenadian army in a brutal attempt to suppress any pro-Bishop demonstrations of support.

--The hardline Marxist-Leninist and military called its new "government" the Revolutionary Military Council. That Council cut off virtually all international transportation to and from the island and imposed a round-the-clock, shoot-to-kill four day curfew, an act of ferocity unknown in the Eastern Caribbean.

--These bloody events triggered both fear and revulsion among the democratic leaders and peoples of the Eastern Caribbean. In our own country the AFL-CIO issued a statement condemning the cold-blooded murders of Grenada's leaders by stating "this classic Communist purge was carried out through Stalinist-style executions".

--Twenty-five Caribbean democratic trade union federations called for a total economic boycott of the new Grenadian government.

--The Socialist International suspended the New Jewel Movement from its membership.

-- The five-member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States voted unanimously to carry out economic and political sanctions against the Military Council of Grenada. Other English-speaking democracies in the Caribbean community joined in those sanctions. And most importantly, these nations determined to form a Caribbean peace force to restore order and democracy in Grenada and in so doing invited us to assist them in their efforts.

The tragedy of Maurice Bishop's death needs closer examination. I have said it was the judgment of the Eastern Caribbean and in Washington that Maurice Bishop was rethinking his close ties to the Soviet Bloc. We have no direct proof--as yet--that the Cubans and Soviets were directly involved in the brutal murder of Maurice Bishop and his supporters. We do know, however, that the Soviets and Cubans are quite ruthless about allies who have second thoughts. The fact is, since 1978 leaders in Angola, South Yemen, and Afghanistan (on two occasions) were killed by either the Soviets or the Cubans after they had second thoughts about their close ties to the Soviet Bloc.

We do know that men who replaced Bishop all had long and close ties with both Cuba and the Soviet Union. Three of the Military Council have records as torturers and have a history of brutality even against their own families.

While the Soviets initially placed some distance between themselves and the new regime in Grenada, they did nothing to reduce the level of support to that new government. In fact, we





learned Cuban and Soviet advisors and Cuban troops were in near total command of that island's forces. Cuban soldiers in effect were fighting for a dictatorship that had brutally turned on its own people while the people of Grenada were welcoming their liberation from that dictatorship.

What are our hopes for the future? And more importantly what are the hopes of the Grenadian people and their neighbors?

--An interim democractic government has been established with the cooperation of Grenada's democratic neighbors.

--That government includes a number of distinguished, Grenadian democratic leaders from the political parties, trade unions and civic groups such as-----

--The provisional government expects to hold elections within six months and these elections will be open to all political parties.

We expect that the OAS or various regional democractic governments will provide help in organizing these elections and observers to provide fairness.

--Meanwhile, peace and order have been restored to Grenada. Our troops will soon leave. The Caribbean multi-national force will stay only long enough to train a new police force.

I believe the prospects for democracy have been strengthened and made secure by our joint actions, not only for Grenada, but for the rest of the Caribbean as well. Moreover, and let there be no mistake, the tide of Cuban subversion and agression in the Caribbean is receding. Castro cannot and will not be allowed to act with impunity in attacking friendly governments in the region. For our part, we will use the Caribbean Basin Initiative to provide economic assistance to the people of Grenada while also cooperating with democratic governments to bring about the return of representative government.



**United States  
Information  
Agency**

JAN 22 1985

Director



~~SECRET~~

Washington, D.C. 20547

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Paula Hawkins  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Washington, D.C. 20510

FROM : Charles Z. Wick

SUBJECT : Update on Progress of Putting the Radio  
Marti Program on the Air

I am responding to your letter to the President of December 12, 1984, to let you know that the time frame required to get the Radio Marti Program on the air is not attributable to red tape nor a bureaucratic tangle. We have been in touch with Jorge Mas every step of the way getting his valuable advice. Generally, there have been no major obstacles except for hiring the specialized talent, the long security clearance process involved in getting qualified personnel on board, the physical facilities to be planned and constructed, and the myriad support activities to be identified and implemented.

I want to assure you that all that can be done is being done to get the Radio Marti Program on the air with quality programming as quickly as possible.

Considerable progress has been made toward getting the Radio Marti Program on the air since my last Status Report to you on July 30, 1984. Attached is a classified briefing book which details actions taken to date on several key items including Programming, Personnel, Technical and Research. It will report the considerable progress made since the 98th Congress approved legislation establishing the Radio Marti Program.

The time frame at the Radio Marti Program compares favorably with the time required to start a new language service at the VOA, the BBC, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The BBC estimates it takes an average of one year to put a new language service on the air, without having to conduct the same rigid security checks required for the Radio Marti Program. In the case of the Pushtu service to Afghanistan, it took the BBC ten months to put together a fifteen minute daily program. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty took twelve months to put on Estonian broadcasts fifteen minutes per day three times per week. The same time frame was required for their Latvian broadcast. Unlike Marti, new language services are started at the VOA, the BBC, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty within an existing organization having administrative, technical, personnel support and facilities. (A full report from VOA Acting Director, Gene Pell, is included at Tab E of the briefing book).

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State G. Holmes, July 21, 1997

7/22/17



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The second of two interim studios under construction in Washington is almost complete. State-of-the-art broadcast studios and a master control room will be completed by July 1985, and phased in to an on-the-air Radio Marti program at that time. Space has been procured for the New York, and Miami News and Program bureaus. Their staffing process is underway.

As stipulated in the legislation, the broadcasts will be transmitted to Cuba from the VOA Marathon Key, Florida, transmitter at 1180 kHz (AM). The present 50 KW transmitter and antenna system were evaluated by a consulting engineer and found adequate for sustaining 14 1/2 hours of broadcasting per day until the new transmitter is installed and the antennas upgraded. The new 50 KW transmitter has arrived and will be put on line soon.

In order to cover all of Cuba and to respond to Cuban jamming, the Radio Marti Program will also use the best alternative identified to date: existing VOA shortwave frequencies. Discussions have been held in Miami and Washington with south Florida commercial radio stations in efforts to negotiate lease-time agreements in the event of jamming of the 1180 kHz signal. None has proved fruitful to date. The map and chart at Tab G of the briefing book indicate the coverage in Cuba for 1180 kHz. At Tab H is a detailed report on shortwave broadcasting to Cuba.

Since recruitment efforts for the Radio Marti Program began in October of 1983, nearly 1,000 applications and letters of interest have been received. Responses and applications were developed as a result of radio spots and over 35 advertisements in 17 publications nationwide. In addition, early last year, announcements were made to all U.S. Government employees through the Office of Personnel Management of positions available within the Radio Marti Program.

Ninety-four employees are now on-board and an additional ninety-three are being evaluated. I am including at Tab D the latest Radio Marti Program staffing chart. At Tab E is a chart showing the length of time it has taken to get employees on duty, it averages about four and one-half months.

The Office of Research and Policy has conducted comprehensive studies of audience demographics and listening habits, prepared crucial information on the Cuban government leadership and political and economic system, and formed outside panels to evaluate programs and provide advice on research methodology, unique to the Radio Marti Program (Tab B, K).

~~SECRET~~



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-3-

Numerous important accomplishments have taken place in the last five months. We are continuing to develop and improve programming in insure that the broadcasts of the Radio Marti Program will be of the highest quality.

The missing ingredient that has been so difficult to identify has been a Director with a long track record of successful broadcasting. It is one thing to have the right kind of substantive programming capability, which indeed we have assembled. It is another thing to have it broadcast professionally.

Over a period of time from the initial passage of the legislation, we have combed the United States for THE director. Many competent people have been interviewed and have been rejected by us as not being ideal or the job was rejected by the broadcaster for a variety of personal reasons.

For example, Emilio Milian, a Miami broadcaster and revered Cuban emigre came on board. Unexpectedly, he returned to Miami for personal reasons. Again, we had another extensive search for a Director. As of October 1, we hired Paul Drew, a well-known broadcaster and former Vice President of Programming at RKO Radio. On October 1, Drew became a full-time consultant. However, it became evident after some months that despite his expertise, he could not mesh with the critically important people who had already been assembled at Marti.

We have since recruited Kenneth Giddens. He is one of the most successful broadcasters in America. Giddens will provide the professional broadcast element until we find the ideal, right broadcaster with the professional capacity to meld the talented substantive people in Radio Marti. Ken owns the largest CBS-TV affiliate in the United States. It is located in Mobile, Alabama. He also owns several radio stations. For eight years, Giddens was the Director of the Voice of America.

We shall be happy to respond with any other information you may require. We appreciate your early and continuing support. Without you it would not have been possible.

Best wishes.

~~SECRET~~



the voice of truth to the Cuban people. I reject these arguments and I hope that most Members of this House will reject them also.

I think, on the argument that Cuba will cause interference with American radio broadcasters, that the interference is going on now and that it will continue no matter what we do with respect to Radio Marti.

The compromise which has been agreed upon answers the concerns that the operation of Radio Marti may provoke Cuban interference with American radio broadcasters. At the same time, it preserves the need for an identity for Radio Marti separate from programming broadcast by the Voice of America.

The establishment of Radio Marti is an important foreign policy initiative proposed by the administration. Its purpose is to foster the cause of freedom in Cuba by providing the Cuban people with accurate, objective, and comprehensive programming about their country, its policies, and its role in world affairs. Such information has not been available to them since Castro came to power 24 years ago. Radio Marti will act as a surrogate home radio service for the Cuban people.

The compromise legislation before us today, which was passed by the Senate on September 13, 1983, would establish Radio Marti as a separate Cuba service within the Voice of America. As part of the VOA, Radio Marti will operate in accordance with the standards of accuracy, objectivity, and balance for which the voice is so well known and respected. However, Radio Marti will be administered separately from the VOA. The Cuba service will have a separate staff which will be appointed by and report directly to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

In addition, the bill establishes an Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba within the Office of the President.

The Board will have only an advisory function. The Director of USIA is the official with primary responsibility for overseeing the establishment and operation of Radio Marti.

The Energy and Commerce Committee, on which I serve as ranking minority member, spent a great deal of time reviewing legislation to establish Radio Marti. The compromise bill before us today in large part meets the concerns which were expressed during this lengthy deliberation. I am pleased that agreement has been reached on this important measure. I urge the House to pass S. 602.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. Speaker, this measure has been worked on for a lengthy period of time and an effective compromise has been finally worked out. This measure will be of significant help in providing factual information to the people of Cuba. Accordingly, I urge my col-

leagues on both sides of the aisle to support it.

• Mr. BROOMFIELD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I support S. 602, as amended, legislation authorizing radio broadcasting to Cuba. I commend those who have worked long and hard on bringing such a measure, which is supported by the administration, to the floor.

S. 602 is a proposal designed to provide to the Cuban people a source of objective reporting and analysis. Such an undertaking can help break Castro's virtual monopoly on the news and information disseminated within Cuba. At the same time, the legislation is designed to minimize any adverse affects upon our domestic broadcasting industry as a result of Cuban transmission practices and is not opposed by the National Association of Broadcasters.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the legislation before us provides a satisfactory framework for initiating a special radio broadcasting service to Cuba.

I believe such a service warrants careful scrutiny during the next few years so we can assure that this initiative effectively advances our Nation's foreign policy concerns while protecting the legitimate interests of our domestic broadcasters. I urge my colleagues to support S. 602, as amended.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 312, the previous question is considered as ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the third reading of the Senate bill.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the Senate bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 302, nays 109, not voting 22, as follows:

[Roll No. 365]

YEAS—302

|              |           |         |
|--------------|-----------|---------|
| Ackerman     | Barnard   | Boggs   |
| Akaka        | Barnes    | Boland  |
| Albosta      | Bartlett  | Boner   |
| Alexander    | Bateman   | Bonker  |
| Anderson     | Bennett   | Borski  |
| Andrews (TX) | Bereuter  | Bosco   |
| Annunzio     | Bevill    | Boucher |
| Archer       | Bilirakis | Breaux  |
| Aspin        | Bliley    | Britt   |
| Badham       | Boehlert  | Brooks  |

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|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Brown (CO)    | Hopkins       | Petri         |
| Broyhill      | Horton        | Porter        |
| Bryant        | Howard        | Price         |
| Burton (CA)   | Hoyer         | Pursell       |
| Burton (IN)   | Hubbard       | Quillen       |
| Byron         | Huckaby       | Rahall        |
| Campbell      | Hunter        | Ray           |
| Carney        | Hutto         | Regula        |
| Carper        | Hyde          | Reid          |
| Chandler      | Ireland       | Richardson    |
| Chappell      | Jeffords      | Ridge         |
| Chappie       | Jenkins       | Rinaldo       |
| Cheney        | Johnson       | Ritter        |
| Clarke        | Jones (OK)    | Roberts       |
| Clinger       | Kaptur        | Robinson      |
| Coats         | Kasich        | Rodino        |
| Coelho        | Kemp          | Roe           |
| Coleman (MO)  | Kennelly      | Roemer        |
| Coleman (TX)  | Kindness      | Rogers        |
| Collins       | Kolter        | Rostenkowski  |
| Conable       | Kramer        | Roth          |
| Conte         | LaFalce       | Rowland       |
| Corcoran      | Lagomarsino   | Sawyer        |
| Coughlin      | Lantos        | Schaefer      |
| Courter       | Latta         | Schulze       |
| Coyne         | Leach         | Sensenbrenner |
| Craig         | Leath         | Sharp         |
| Crane, Daniel | Lehman (CA)   | Shaw          |
| Crane, Philip | Lehman (FL)   | Shelby        |
| D'Amours      | Lent          | Shumway       |
| Daniel        | Levine        | Shuster       |
| Dannemeyer    | Levitas       | Siljander     |
| Daub          | Lewis (CA)    | Simon         |
| Davis         | Lewis (FL)    | Sisisky       |
| de la Garza   | Lipinski      | Skeen         |
| Derrick       | Livingston    | Skelton       |
| DeWine        | Loeffler      | Slattery      |
| Dickinson     | Long (LA)     | Smith (FL)    |
| Donnelly      | Lott          | Smith (NE)    |
| Dowdy         | Lowery (CA)   | Smith (NJ)    |
| Dreier        | Lujan         | Smith, Denny  |
| Duncan        | Mack          | Smith, Robert |
| Durbin        | MacKay        | Snowe         |
| Dwyer         | Madigan       | Snyder        |
| Dyson         | Marriott      | Solarz        |
| Early         | Martin (IL)   | Solomon       |
| Edwards (AL)  | Martin (NC)   | Spence        |
| Edwards (OK)  | Martin (NY)   | Spratt        |
| Emerson       | Matsui        | Staggers      |
| English       | Mavroules     | Stangeland    |
| Erdreich      | Mazzoli       | Stenholm      |
| Erlenborn     | McCain        | Stratton      |
| Evans (IA)    | McCandless    | Stump         |
| Fascell       | McCloskey     | Sundquist     |
| Fazio         | McCollum      | Synar         |
| Feighan       | McCurdy       | Tauke         |
| Ferraro       | McDade        | Tauzin        |
| Fiedler       | McEwen        | Taylor        |
| Fields        | McGrath       | Thomas (CA)   |
| Fish          | McKernan      | Thomas (GA)   |
| Flippo        | McKinney      | Torricelli    |
| Florio        | Mica          | Traxler       |
| Foglietta     | Michel        | Udall         |
| Fowler        | Mikulski      | Valentine     |
| Frank         | Miller (OH)   | Vander Jagt   |
| Franklin      | Minish        | Vandergriff   |
| Frenzel       | Moakley       | Volkmer       |
| Fuqua         | Molinari      | Vucanovich    |
| Garcia        | Mollohan      | Walgren       |
| Gekas         | Montgomery    | Walker        |
| Gephardt      | Moore         | Watkins       |
| Gibbons       | Moorhead      | Weber         |
| Gilman        | Morrison (WA) | Wheat         |
| Gingrich      | Murphy        | Whitehurst    |
| Goodling      | Myers         | Whitley       |
| Gore          | Natcher       | Whittaker     |
| Gradison      | Neal          | Whitten       |
| Green         | Nelson        | Williams (MT) |
| Gregg         | Nichols       | Williams (OH) |
| Guarini       | Nielson       | Wilson        |
| Gunderson     | Oakar         | Winn          |
| Hamilton      | Obey          | Wise          |
| Hansen (ID)   | Olin          | Wolf          |
| Hansen (UT)   | Ortiz         | Wortley       |
| Harrison      | Oxley         | Wright        |
| Hartnett      | Packard       | Wylie         |
| Hatcher       | Pashayan      | Young (FL)    |
| Hefner        | Patterson     | Young (MO)    |
| Hightower     | Pease         | Zablocki      |
| Hiler         | Pepper        | Zschau        |
| Holt          | Perkins       |               |

NAYS—109

|              |            |          |
|--------------|------------|----------|
| Addabbo      | Bedell     | Carr     |
| Andrews (NC) | Beilenson  | Clay     |
| Anthony      | Berman     | Conyers  |
| Applegate    | Biaggi     | Cooper   |
| AuCoin       | Boxer      | Crockett |
| Bates        | Brown (CA) | Daschle  |



|               |               |            |
|---------------|---------------|------------|
| ✓ Dellums     | Kildee        | Ratchford  |
| Dicks         | Kogorsek      | Rose       |
| Dingell       | Kostmayer     | Roukema    |
| Dixon         | ✓ Leland      | Roybal     |
| Dorgan        | Levin         | Russo      |
| Downey        | Lloyd         | Sabo       |
| ✓ Dymally     | Long (MD)     | Savage     |
| Eckart        | Lowry (WA)    | Scheuer    |
| Edgar         | Luken         | Schroeder  |
| Edwards (CA)  | Lundine       | Schumer    |
| Evans (IL)    | Markey        | Seiberling |
| Foley         | Martinez      | Shannon    |
| Ford (MI)     | McHugh        | Sikorski   |
| Ford (TN)     | McNulty       | Smith (IA) |
| Frost         | Miller (CA)   | Stark      |
| Gaydos        | Mineta        | Stokes     |
| Gejdenson     | Mitchell      | Studds     |
| Gonzalez      | Moody         | Swift      |
| Gray          | Morrison (CT) | Tallon     |
| Hall (OH)     | Mrazek        | Torres     |
| Hall, Ralph   | Murtha        | Towns      |
| Hall, Sam     | Nowak         | Vento      |
| Hammerschmidt | Oberstar      | Weaver     |
| Harkin        | Ottinger      | Weiss      |
| Hawkins       | Owens         | Wirth      |
| Hayes         | Panetta       | Wolpe      |
| Hertel        | Parris        | Wyden      |
| Hughes        | Patman        | Yates      |
| Jacobs        | Paul          | Yatron     |
| Kastenmeier   | Penny         |            |
| Kazen         | Rangel        |            |

## NOT VOTING—22

|            |            |            |
|------------|------------|------------|
| Bethune    | Heftel     | Pritchard  |
| Bonior     | Hillis     | Rudd       |
| Brqomfield | Jones (NC) | Schneider  |
| Forsythe   | Jones (TN) | St Germain |
| Glickman   | Lungren    | Waxman     |
| Gramm      | Marleene   | Young (AK) |
| Hall (IN)  | O'Brien    |            |
| Hance      | Pickle     |            |

□ 1350

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Hance for, with Mr. Jones of Tennessee against.

Mr. SLATTERY, Mr. SCHEUER, Mrs. LLOYD, and Mrs. BOXER changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. TAUZIN, Mrs. BYRON, and Messrs. McCANDLESS, SLATTERY, and GORE changed their votes from "nay" to "yea."

So the Senate bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the Senate bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WHITLEY). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

□ 1400

## CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3415, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 3415) making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year

ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the conference report is considered as having been read.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of September 22, 1983.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. DIXON) will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. COUGHLIN) will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. DIXON).

## GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the conference report on the bill, H.R. 3415, and all amendments in disagreement, and that I be permitted to include a tabulation and summarization of the conference report.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, the conference report now before the House will provide the District of Columbia government with Federal funds totaling \$600.8 million. This amount, Mr. Speaker, is \$31.2 million above the budget estimates; \$56.2 million above the House Bill, and \$4.5 million above the Senate allowance.

In District funds, the conference agreement provides a total of \$2.2 billion in new budget authority. This is \$31.1 million over the budget estimates; \$56.1 million above the House allowance, and \$4.4 million higher than the Senate bill.

## FEDERAL FUNDS

At this point, Mr. Speaker, I would like to take a few minutes to explain this conference agreement to the House. It is true that the Federal funds part of the bill we bring back from conference is \$56.2 million above the House-passed bill. However, \$25 million of that amount is due to the increase in the regular annual Federal payment which was anticipated at the time of House action on this bill. That \$25 million is included in this conference report and is earmarked for three major items. They are first police, fire, and teacher's pension funds, for which \$12.2 million is allocated; second, St. Elizabeths Hospital which will receive \$4.7 million; and third, D.C. General Hospital which will receive \$8 million.

Mr. Speaker, as Members of this House can see, the \$25 million is split almost down the middle between pension programs and health care, two very important areas.

## CRIMINAL JUSTICE EMERGENCY INITIATIVES

In addition to the additional authorized Federal payment of \$25 million, the bill as agreed to by the conferees provides a one-time special Federal

payment of \$25.2 million for criminal justice emergency initiatives. Mr. Speaker, there is no question that the District's prison facilities are crowded and \$22.3 million of this special Federal payment will be used to hire additional correctional officers as well as expand vocational and education programs and make needed capital improvements to the city's prison facilities. We have also included report language recommending that the Attorney General of the United States develop and submit a plan to Congress by January 30, 1984, to cap the growth of the prison population at the city's correctional facilities in Lorton.

The balance of \$2.8 million of this special Federal payment is to provide seven new judges and related position and capital programs for the District superior court subject to approval authorizing legislation. Mr. Speaker, we are asking for an orderly process that hearings can be held by the authorizing committees to review the criminal justice system and determine what improvements should be made in addition to evaluating the need for additional judges. So while we have included funds required for additional judges, we leave it to the authorizing committees to make a final determination.

## EDUCATION INITIATIVE

The bill includes a one-time Federal payment of \$350,000 for the Board of Education to perform a study to explore various alternatives to recognize outstanding teachers through incentives of both a financial and career nature. The Senate bill included \$1 million for this purpose.

## ST. ELIZABETHS HOSPITAL

And finally, Mr. Speaker, the conferees recommend a one-time Federal payment of \$5.7 million as the last remaining link in bridging the \$25 million deficit in the fiscal year 1984 budget for St. Elizabeths Hospital. This deficit has been resolved through the mutual efforts of Federal and District officials. The Federal Government recently announced the implementation of management improvements to save \$14 million; a proposal has been made by the District government to save \$5.3 million by transferring patients from St. Elizabeths to existing city facilities; and now in our action we recommend the balance of \$5.7 million. In doing so, Mr. Speaker, we want to make it absolutely clear that at no time will we again recommend a special Federal payment for this purpose. In fact, we are disappointed that Federal and District officials have not been able to resolve their problems, and have directed them to do so and indeed expect them to have their problems resolved prior to the submission of next year's budget.

## HUMAN SUPPORT SERVICES

For the city's vocational rehabilitation programs, the conferees recom-