

50. Polavieja to Teniente Coronel Rodon, Apr. 7, 1880, in *Recopilación*, p. 326. Polavieja instituted a policy of destroying all farms and food in territories dominated by the insurgents. He also employed the strategy of reconcentration which became so crucial in the final War of Independence.

51. Comandante Recas to Polavieja, May 5, 1880, in *ibid.*, p. 357.

52. On maroon settlements (*palenques*) in Cuba, see José Luciano Franco, *Los palenques de los negros cimarrones* (Havana: Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1973); Francisco Pérez de la Riva, "Cuban Palenques" in *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas*, ed. Richard Price (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 49-59; Gabino La Rosa Corzo, "Los palenques en Cuba: Elementos para su reconstrucción histórica," in Instituto de Ciencias Históricas, *La esclavitud en Cuba* (Havana: Editorial Academia, 1986), pp. 85-123; and Gabino La Rosa Corzo, *Los cimarrones de Cuba* (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 1988).

53. Polavieja to Blanco, Dec. 16, 1879, p. 68; Polavieja to Brigadier Ayuso, Nov. 2, 1879, p. 125; Polavieja to Coronel José López, May 7, 1880, p. 359; Juan Tejada to Polavieja, Jan. 25, 1880, p. 167; and Zárate telegram, Jan. 28, 1880, p. 174, all in *Recopilación*.

54. Pérez Guzmán and Sarracino, *La Guerra Chiquita*, pp. 202-03.

55. The new *poblados* included Botija, Hongolosongo, Sueña el Agua, Banabacoa, and Santa Rita. Polavieja also planned to establish two more with surrendered insurgents from the 1879 struggle. These were to be located in Monte Dos Leguas (near Palma Soriano) and in Demajayabo, near las Yaguas (Polavieja to Blanco, July 7, 1880, in *Conspiración*, p. 93). See also Leyva y Aguilera, *La Guerra*, p. 12.

56. Polavieja to Coronel Leandro Carreras, May 7, 1880, in *Recopilación*, p. 359; Polavieja to Blanco, Jul. 7, 1880, in *Conspiración*, p. 93.

57. Polavieja to Leandro Carreras, May 7, 1880, in *Recopilación*, p. 359.

58. Botija was in the same area as the rebel camp visited by *New York Herald* correspondent James O'Kelly during the Ten Years' War (O'Kelly, *The Mambi-Land*, pp. 181-91).

59. García, "Documento," in *Recopilación*, p. 572.

60. See, for example, *Recopilación*, pp. 168, 505-18, 545, 565, 675-76; and Pérez Guzmán and Sarracino, p. 209.

61. *Recopilación*, pp. 350, 572.

62. *Conspiración*, pp. 5-9, 23, 100-01.

63. See Eugene Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979). Robert Paquette has also used Genovese's dichotomy in his analysis of Cuban slave rebellion (*Sugar is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict of Empires over Slavery in Cuba* [Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1988]). For a critique of distinctions between "personal" and "selfless" motivations for resistance, see James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 291-96.

LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR.

Cuba and the United States: Origins and Antecedents of Relations, 1760s-1860s

ABSTRACT

This article examines relations between Cuba and the United States during the period in which commerce served to link the destinies of both countries. It is argued that trade and travel between Cuba and the United States served as factors to integrate the economy and culture of Cuba with the North American system.

RESUMEN

Este artículo examina las relaciones entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos durante el período en que el comercio vinculó los destinos de ambos países. Se sostiene que el intercambio mercantil y el viajar sirvieron como factores que facilitaron la integración de la economía y la cultura de Cuba con el sistema norteamericano.

I

Conventional historiographical wisdom has long advanced the proposition that the North American presence in Cuba had its beginnings in one of two periods: during the 1880s, in the aftermath of the Ten Years' War and during a decade of economic dislocation, and during and immediately after 1899-1902, the years of the U.S. military occupation followed by the opening of the Cuban economy through the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903.¹ Certainly both periods were characterized by rapid expansion of North American political influence and economic control on the island. Indeed, in some sectors this control was as dramatic as it was total. But it is also true that much of what occurred after 1878 was in fact a continuation and culmination of a process with antecedents in the eighteenth century, one that had already shaped the form and function of the North American role in the Cuban political economy and set the course of future relations. Certainly geography played a part, and proximity alone serves to explain much about the nature of Cuban-U.S. relations, includ-

ing maritime traffic, patterns of commerce, political developments, and international relations. At the same time, however, North American entree into the island was also very much a function of specific political decisions made by Spain and development strategies adopted by Cubans. Increasingly the Cuban economy expanded beyond Spain's capacity either to sustain continued growth or service the emergent infrastructure. Proximity to the United States magnified these shortcomings, and indeed even contributed to creating them, promoting conditions for close economic, political, and cultural ties.

II

Relations between Cuba and the United States began modestly enough: irregular commercial contacts, mostly illicit, between peripheral European colonies in the New World, trading to obtain otherwise scarce commodities or to elude exorbitant colonial taxes—and sometimes both.

This trade was both practical and logical for both partners, but especially for the Cubans. The eighteenth century brought comparatively good times to Cuba, a period of sustained if not spectacular economic growth. Local producers and consumers were in need of wider markets for expanding production and increased imports in response to growing demands. Much of this expanded trade centered on the production of tobacco commodities, largely in the form of powdered tobacco for snuff, cut tobacco for pipe smoking, and leaf for cigar manufacturing. The production of hides also expanded, and exports both legal and illicit soared. But sugar registered some of the more notable advances during the first half of the eighteenth century. The number of mills increased, the cultivation of cane expanded, production modernized. During the 1730s, Cuban output reached a record 2,000 tons, more than doubling by the end of the 1750s to 5,500 tons.²

But this expansion was not an unmixed blessing. Success of this type, and especially during the reign of the Bourbons, brought Cuban prosperity to the attention of the always penurious royal exchequer. The Bourbons had introduced a new efficiency to colonial administration, and there was no mistaking the purpose of Bourbon policy: it aspired to nothing less than complete control over colonial resources and receipts. The early Bourbons promoted the development of state monopolies, most notably the *Factoría de Tabacos* (1717) to control production, prices, and distribution of tobacco, and *Real Compañía de Comercio* (1740), to regulate trade and commerce between Spain and Cuba. Results were not long in coming. To the dismay of Cuban producers and consumers, the opportunities to export their goods and the prices paid

for their products declined even as imports diminished and their prices increased.

Cuban complaints were not confined to the state monopoly schemes. No less irksome were the endless proliferation of new taxes and the increase of old ones. Indeed, taxation was a central feature of the Bourbon strategy for transferring revenues from the colony to the metropolis. The number of taxes increased and collection improved. Profits went down, prices went up. No sector of Cuban society was immune from taxes, in one form or another.

There were further problems with economic organization. In fact, rising Cuban production had overtaken existing transportation capacity and available markets. Two developments were occurring: transportation bottlenecks were frustrating Cuban efforts to expand production, both from production points to ports, but especially from ports to overseas markets. Spain could not provide Cuban producers with adequate shipping, on a sufficiently regular basis, to accommodate expanding sugar production. Equally troublesome, Spain was losing the capacity to absorb Cuba's rising production but nevertheless resisted Cuban demands for free access to other markets. Spain was not always consistent in these efforts, nor were they always unsuccessful. That was, in fact, part of the problem.

These conditions underscored the growing anomaly of a dynamic colonial economy dependent upon a stagnant metropolis. Spanish producers could not supply enough imports at reasonable prices, both essential to sustained economic growth. No less important, Spain's inability to provide Cuban planters with African slaves in adequate numbers, with regularity, and at reasonable prices, also thwarted the expansion of Cuban production. Spanish colonialism was increasingly unable to accommodate the changes transforming the Cuban economy.

What made some of the more opprobrious features of Spanish colonialism bearable during the early decades of the eighteenth century were alternate markets and new sources of imports, principally the North American colonies. Spanish authorities had long been ambivalent toward trade between Cuba and British North America, alternating between acquiescence and resistance. Local officials recognized the logic of this commerce with nearby markets and access to cheap, dependable supplies. It promised also to meet some of the more outstanding Cuban demands, and even provide additional sources of revenues in the form of tax receipts and trade duties.

But colonial authorities were not without misgivings. The very benefits of trade with the thirteen North American colonies also made it threatening in the long run. Authorities in Cuba understood the perils of

proximity, meaning imports at lower costs and exports at higher profits, and that both portended a growing foreign influence on the island and Spain's eventual loss of the Cuban market altogether. Government authorities were themselves subject to countervailing pressures from *peninsular* merchants in Cuba and manufacturers in Spain who continually demanded the preservation of exclusive trade privileges with the island, no matter what the cost to local producers and consumers. The North American trade connection was to be severely restricted, to be sanctioned only in the service of larger Spanish national interests.

So it was that contraband and illicit trade served an important function in the Cuban economy. There was an element of dependability about illegal commerce, even with its inherent uncertainty. North Americans were ready buyers and sellers, and Cubans learned to thrive on these illicit contacts. They found outlets for their products and obtained otherwise scarce goods, at good prices, without taxes. Cubans provided sugar, molasses, cocoa, tobacco, and hides; the North Americans provided textiles, foodstuffs, manufactures, and slaves. Indeed, perhaps as much as half of all consumer goods available in Cuba arrived through illicit channels.³

How these commercial contacts, legal and illicit, flourished was often a function of Spain's European diplomacy, and on whether it could impose its will on the colonists. The result was a policy characterized by irresolution and unpredictability—trade sometimes sanctioned, sometimes suspended; contraband sometimes permitted, other times prohibited. Periodic attempts to suppress contraband often only created new problems and exacerbated old ones. Occasionally, and especially under the early Bourbons, Spain moved vigorously against illicit trade. In fact, however, smuggling continued, often at greater costs to Cubans, because risks were greater. Spanish authorities merely disrupted the flow of contraband trade without adequately meeting the increase in local demand. This caused hardship. Almost always decisions were made from above and abroad, in the pursuit of policies that Cubans often neither approved nor understood, and almost never influenced.

If Spain often acted to contain Cuban development, occasionally it inadvertently released them, as occurred in 1762. The entry of Spain in the Seven Years' War between England and France (1756–1763) transformed the Caribbean into a zone of military operations and Cuba into a key military objective. In 1762 the British struck and seized Havana.

The British occupation of Havana promoted ties between Cubans and North Americans on a hitherto unprecedented scale. One-quarter of the 22,000-man expeditionary force, much of which was outfitted in the thirteen colonies, consisted of North Americans. The opening of Ha-

vana further demonstrated to Cubans what was possible under optimum circumstances, and that such circumstances were indeed possible. It created opportunities that producers in Cuba could only have previously dreamed about. The port was thrown open to free trade with Great Britain and its New World possessions. Trade taxes were abolished. Vendors and jobbers from England descended upon Havana, offering Cubans a dazzling array of coveted consumer goods, staple items, and industrial wares: linens, textiles, manufactures, and especially sugar machinery. Merchants and traders from the North American colonies established themselves in the Cuban capital, selling grains, tools, and foodstuffs. Also available now in Cuba, and on a scale hitherto unknown, was the most highly coveted commodity of all: African slaves. The Cuban demand was almost insatiable. Slave traders of all nationalities converged on Havana in a scramble for a share of the newly opened Cuban market. During the ten-month occupation, an estimated 10,000 slaves were introduced into Havana—as many slaves as would have normally entered in ten years.

Producers and traders in Havana, for their part, prospered through their participation in this expanded commerce. New markets became available for Cuban sugar, tobacco, molasses, and hides. During these months, Cuban merchants in increasing numbers, and with increasing frequency, traveled to North American ports, establishing trade contacts that endured long after the British had departed from Havana.

III

The rebellion of the thirteen colonies in 1776 provided new trade opportunities between Cuba and North America. Spain opened Cuban ports to North American commerce officially in November 1776, with appropriate pomp and protocol. The decision was in part inspired by opportunism, in part by self-interest: a gesture of support for the North Americans and a snub to the English. Spanish authorities moved with dispatch to aid these new enemies of their old adversary. Access to Cuban ports promised the struggling North Americans a market for their exports and an alternate source of tropical commodities previously obtained from the British West Indies.

It was a very popular decision in Cuba. The opportunity to trade with the North Americans, on a scale reminiscent of 1762–1763, was a boon to the local economy. When the thirteen colonies rebelled in 1776, Cuban producers were in an ideal condition to benefit from the revival of North American trade. The North Americans were in need of substitute sources of sugar supplies; Cuban producers sought new markets for

expanding output. The rebellious colonies lost access to their former suppliers of tropical imports from the British Caribbean. Cuba served as an alternative and increasingly important, North American producers acquired alternative customers for products previously sold in the English Antilles. North American merchant vessels were again welcomed in Havana harbor, and Cuban producers once more had wider markets for their sugar and molasses, receiving in return flour, manufactured goods, lumber, and slaves. Spain's official participation in the war against England after 1779 further stimulated trade. Unable to guarantee shipments of foodstuffs and vital provisions to Cuba, Spain sanctioned increased Cuban trade by relaxing, and in some cases removing, old commercial restrictions. Not since the English occupation of 1762–1763 had Havana harbor been so crowded with foreign merchant vessels. The economy expanded. Merchants and producers alike prospered during these years, and trade with North America seemed to have no limits.⁴

But the advantages derived from North American trade were short-lived. Once more Spain intruded itself into Cuban affairs. In January 1784 Spanish authorities fully restored trade restrictions, effectively proscribing Cuban commerce with all countries except Spain. North American commercial houses were closed, U.S. agents and jobbers were expelled, and foreign merchant vessels barred from Cuban ports. The total number of ships voyaging annually between Havana and the thirteen colonies that had increased from four in 1776 to 368 in 1782 dwindled to ten by 1785.⁵

These policies announced Spain's intentions to restore *peninsular* commercial exclusivism, fully and immediately. Advantages accrued once more to Spanish manufacturers and merchants, to the detriment of Cuban producers and consumers. Cubans were again officially forced to sell cheap and buy dear, and otherwise make do with contraband and smuggling as the alternate means of conducting commercial transactions with North America.⁶

For the newly independent colonies, however, previously one of the principal collaborators in this clandestine trade, contraband could no longer meet expanding commercial needs. The North Americans soon offset the loss of Cuban markets through increased trade with the French colony of St. Domingue. By 1790, the value of North American exports to St. Domingue was more than the combined value of all exports to the rest of the Caribbean, some \$3.3 million out of a total of \$6.4 million. At the same time, St. Domingue provided almost all the sugar, molasses, cocoa, and coffee entering the United States. Cubans were the losers.⁷

Again Cuban producers were reminded of the vagaries to which they were periodically subject and had little control over. Such policy reversals were causing havoc in Cuba and became increasingly intolerable. Each policy shift caused more disruption. War between Spain and France (1793–1795) resulted again in opening Cuba to North American commerce. In June 1796, Madrid closed Cuba's ports, only to reopen them the following October, when Spain allied itself with France in a war against England. For the following five years, the island was opened to the shipping of neutral nations, which especially favored the North Americans. Trade with the United States flourished. Cuba exported sugar, molasses, rum, and coffee; the United States provided food supplies, clothing, furniture, manufactured goods, and slaves. During these years, too, North American vessels were permitted to carry Cuban exports to European markets. In 1798, for the first time—briefly but portentously—the volume of commerce between Cuba and the United States exceeded trade between Cuba and Spain. “The wealth and importance of this colony,” exulted U.S. consular agent George C. Morton from Havana in 1801, “has increased during the few years that it has been open to the American trade, in almost astonishing degrees, with regard to the habits of industry, knowledge of commerce, general civilization, and comforts of life.”⁸ Not long thereafter, Spain abruptly reasserted trade exclusivism and suspended Cuban trade with the United States. Once more these decisions wrought havoc on the Cuban economy. Between 1800 and the end of 1801, North American exports to Cuba declined from \$8.4 million to \$5.7 million, while Cuban sugar exports to the United States dropped from 37,000 tons to 8,000 tons. By 1802, trade had deteriorated further, as North American imports declined to \$938,289 and Cuban sugar exports dropped to 4,000 tons.⁹ A year later, Spain and France were again at war with England and North American merchant vessels were welcome in Cuban ports. During 1806–1807, the value of North American exports increased to \$12 million, while Cuban sugar exports increased to 43,000 tons.¹⁰

The Cuban economy expanded during these years, not spectacularly to be sure, but in fits and starts, and over time registered discernible gains. Indeed, twenty years after the British occupation of Havana, far-reaching changes had overtaken Cuban society. If the availability of new markets had made the expansion of sugar production profitable, the availability of new slaves had made it possible. The slave trade flourished during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Slaves, long a coveted commodity, had been the stock in the illicit trade for almost two centuries. But the contraband slave trade as the principal means of meeting expanded labor needs was inadequate. Vital to the Cuban strategy of

expanded sugar production, was not only an increased supply of slave labor but also a guaranteed supply of slave labor. The British occupation, followed by the Bourbon liberalization of trade, was a powerful boost to the importation of slaves. During the previous 250 years of Spanish rule between 1512 and 1763, an estimated total of 60,000 slaves had been introduced into Cuba; between 1764 and 1800, the number approached 100,000, averaging approximately 3,000 slaves a year.¹¹

This had immediate effects on the economy. The number of sugar mills increased, the cultivation of cane spread, production expanded. New trade contacts between 1763 and 1783 stimulated both the conversion of old land to sugar and the expansion onto new land. The acreage devoted to sugar cane increased in spectacular fashion—from 10,000 acres in 1762 to 160,000 in 1792. After the 1760s, new mills were organized in regions where none had previously existed. By the early 1800s, there were almost 500 sugar mills. Sugar production increased, rising from 10,000 tons annually during the 1770s, to 12,000 tons in the 1780s and 16,000 tons in the early 1790s.

In fact, these production advances added new pressure to expand and stabilize Cuba's trade relations with markets other than Spain and brought problems of another kind. As Cuba moved inexorably toward monoculture in the eighteenth century, dependence on imports—foodstuffs, clothing, manufactures—increased, as did the importance of merchants. And so too did the importance of trade with North Americans, upon whom Cubans were becoming increasingly dependent.

IV

Cuba neared the end of the eighteenth century enjoying modest economic growth, stimulated largely by expanded sugar production and increased, if erratic, trade opportunities. But Cubans were comparative latecomers to sugar production. The opportunity for expansion was limited, and by the end of the eighteenth century Cuba was approaching capacity.

One problem was competition. By the late eighteenth century, the French colony of St. Domingue was arguably the most prosperous European colony in the New World. An estimated 800 estates produced an annual average of 71,000 tons of sugar, nearly 3,000 coffee farms produced more than 30,000 tons of coffee, accounting for more than 60 percent of the world supply. Only one-third of this vast production was consumed in metropolitan France, the balance reexported to other world markets.

Cuban producers could not compete. They had increased sugar pro-

duction in steady but modest increments, but they lacked the means to sustain their expansion and the markets to expand into. Costs were higher, customers were fewer, and as a result of both Cubans found few incentives to expand.

There were other problems. Cuban producers operated within a restrictive trade system and retrogressive tax structure, producing for limited markets, expanding with meager capital resources. Spain could neither fully consume Cuban products nor adequately provide for Cuban needs, yet insisted upon regulating the terms of the trade. What growth had taken place was the result largely of improvised responses to fortuitous circumstances. Continued economic growth was contingent on finding new markets or expanding into old ones, and in the late eighteenth century the prospects for either were poor. The vast productive capacity of St. Domingue alone so determined world supply and demand, so influenced the market price and profit margin as to make the position of French producers all but unassailable.

V

The opportunity for Cuban producers came unexpectedly in August 1791, when the slaves of St. Domingue rose in rebellion. For the remainder of the decade, the French colony was ravaged by civil strife. Successively, England, Spain, and France took turns at attempting to pacify the rebellious colony without any effect other than to prolong the conflict and add to widespread havoc and devastation. The results were dramatic and permanent. The plantations were destroyed, production collapsed, the planters departed.

The effects reverberated across the Atlantic. The world supply of sugar declined. Demand increased. Sugar prices followed, increasing from 12 *reales* per pound in 1790 to 36 in 1795.

There were other, more immediate, effects. As a result of the turmoil in St. Domingue, the United States lost its principal trading partner in the Caribbean. This loss was, in part, offset by the sporadic opening of Cuban ports in the following decade. It stood to reason that Cuba would be an obvious beneficiary of the disruption of production in St. Domingue, and it was to Cuba that North Americans first turned after 1791. But it was also apparent that Cubans could not hope to sustain a stable trade relationship with the North Americans so long as the terms and duration of that trade remained subject to capricious dictates of Spanish authorities.

The need for Cuba to develop new and expanded trade relationships assumed added urgency in the decade immediately following the col-

lapse of St. Domingue. Indeed, few other circumstances could have favored the expansion of Cuban sugar production so swiftly. Cuban producers inherited all at once rising prices, increasing demand, and mounting world shortages. Sugar expanded in a frenzy, an immediate and improvised response to soaring world prices. Old producers increased production. New ones initiated production. The number of estates increased, the zones of cultivation expanded. Between 1774 and 1827 the total number of mills more than doubled, increasing from less than 500 to 1,000.¹² New acreage passed into sugar production: an estimated 1,700 acres a year in the 1790s, increasing to about 3,500 acres annually by the 1810s, and reaching 13,000 acres a year by the 1840s. Production soared, from an annual average of 12,000 tons during 1786–1790, more than doubling to 26,000 tons for 1796–1800, and more than tripling during 1831–1835 to 88,000 tons.¹³

The opportunity to expand production after the fall of St. Domingue was also very much aided by timely expansion of trade contacts. Between the early 1790s and early 1800s, Cuban producers increased exports to old markets, and nowhere perhaps were gains registered as quickly and with such effect as with the United States. Between 1790 and 1799, the total value of North American exports to St. Domingue declined from \$3.3 million to \$2.8 million, while exports to Cuba increased from \$147,807 to \$9 million.¹⁴ No less dramatic were the changes in imports from the regions classified by the U.S. Treasury Department as the “French West Indies,” principally from St. Domingue, and the “Spanish West Indies,” principally from Cuba (see table 1).

Cuban opportunities to expand trade and commerce were, to be sure, more a function of Spanish political requirement than Cuban economic

TABLE 1
Selected U.S. Imports from the West Indies, 1790–1799

	<i>Sugar</i>	<i>Coffee</i>	<i>Cocoa</i>	<i>Molasses</i>
<i>French West Indies</i>				
1790	9,316,834	2,377,584	395,827	5,056,138
1799	3,186,108	2,057,004	123,550	189,383
<i>Spanish West Indies</i>				
1790	529,610	6,314	661	525
1799	6,621,337	321,216	92,588	1,715,623

Note: All units in pounds except for molasses, which is given in gallons.

Source: *American State Papers, 1789–1809: Commerce and Navigation* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1832), 1:37, 441.

needs, and trade under these circumstances was not an unmixed blessing. But Cuban producers prospered. The benefits to Cuba of these shifting if short-lived trade opportunities on the world market were manifest. For almost two decades, the island enjoyed the fruits of more or less free participation in international trade. There could be no return to the restrictive policies of Bourbon mercantile exclusivism. Nor did Spain try. In November 1791, Spain renewed authorization for trade in slaves for another six years, and indefinitely thereafter. In February 1818, in response to growing demands from Cuba, Spain opened the island to free world trade.

Spanish policy was not entirely unconditional or unselfish, however. Spain devised alternative ways to exploit Cuban prosperity. Exorbitant customs tariffs discriminated against foreign imports carried aboard foreign ships. Cubans protested and Spain relented, reducing customs only slightly between 20 to 36 percent ad valorem. It was not, hence, “free” trade: Cubans paid for it.

VI

Changes no less far-reaching were also transforming the organization and orientation of Cuban foreign trade. The rise of sugar exports signaled the decline of other sources of foreign exchange, for the expansion of sugar came at the expense of the latter. Inexorably, Cuba developed into an export economy dependent upon the production of one crop, and increasingly for one market. In 1761, Cuba was still an exporter of jerked beef; by 1792, Cuba was importing jerked beef by thousands of pounds. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, sugar accounted for an increasing portion of total Cuban export earnings: 60 percent in 1840, 68 percent in 1850, 74 percent in 1860, and increasingly a greater share of Cuban sugar exports was expanding into North American markets. These patterns were fixed early. The United States was an ideal trading partner: it was near, with a dynamic merchant marine, a growing population, rising demand, and an expanding economy.

The United States was as important a source of Cuban imports as it was a market for exports, and this factor figured prominently in Cuban production strategies. After 1818, with the opening of the island to world trade, the Cuba–United States trade nexus began to replace Spanish commercial connections, creating for Cuban producers new prospects, but also new problems. To expand production for export at the expense of production for domestic consumption was both practical and profitable, because Cuba could easily remedy local shortages with foreign supplies. Indeed, it was more cost-effective to rely on food imports

for the local market than to sacrifice sugar exports for foreign markets. That the United States could meet these needs, as well as provide Cuba with necessary industrial and manufactured supplies, quickly and reasonably inexpensively, both encouraged and facilitated the expansion of Cuban sugar production.

It served also to increase the importance of trade with the United States. The number of North American ships arriving to Cuba increased from 150 in 1796, to 606 in 1800, 783 in 1826; from 1,702 during 1846–1850 to 2,088 during 1851–1856.¹⁵ Commerce flourished. Trade contacts expanded steadily. North American ships from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and New Orleans provided Cubans with box shooks, staves, caskets, barrels, hoops, nails, tar, textiles, salt, fish, corn, lard, flour, and rice. They returned loaded with sugar, cocoa, tobacco, molasses, and coffee.

The inexorable logic of these circumstances gradually transformed the United States into Cuba's single most important trading partner. In 1850, Cuban trade with the United States represented 39 percent of the total, followed by England (34 percent), and Spain (27 percent). Five years later, the North American share increased to 42 percent and rose again to 48 percent in 1859 (see table 2). In the following decades, these trade patterns continued. In 1865, Cuba exported 65 percent of its sugar

TABLE 2
Cuban Trade with the United States, England, and Spain, 1846–1859 (in pesos)

	Imports	Exports
United States		
1846–1850	27,838	37,426
1851–1855	35,978	61,817
1856–1859	40,308	68,339
England		
1846–1850	21,682	35,105
1851–1855	31,991	42,388
1856–1859	29,406	37,294
Spain		
1846–1850	27,210	16,957
1851–1855	44,729	17,717
1856–1859	31,042	20,974

Source: José R. Alvarez Díaz, et al., *A Study on Cuba* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1965), p. 129.

to the United States and 3 percent to Spain. By 1877, the United States accounted for 82 percent of Cuba's total exports, followed by Spain (5.7 percent) and England (4.4 percent). In some sectors, Cuban dependency upon North American imports was striking (see table 3). The implications of these developments were far-reaching and clear. "The trade of the country is falling into the hands of foreigners," observed traveler Anthony Trollope from Cuba in 1859, "into those principally of Americans from the States. Havana will soon become as much American as New Orleans."¹⁶

Cuba had previously obtained a number of important commercial concessions, particularly in trade relationships with Spain. These benefits were of limited value, however, for Cuban trade was no longer organized around Spain but the United States. Spain could neither offer Cuban producers adequate markets nor guarantee sufficient supplies. The United States promised both. Spain could no longer fully consume Cuban sugar exports, and lacking refinery capabilities, could not reexport Cuban sugar to other markets. Cuba's economic needs diverged increasingly from those of Spain.¹⁷

By the mid-nineteenth century, Cubans realized that they could not achieve the full potential of their productive capabilities within the traditional framework of empire. The anomaly was not lost on them. And, indeed, the Cuban economy had already expanded beyond existing colonial structures. But trade with Europe and the United States was still subject to the constraints of Spanish policy. Spain could not supply the goods, the shipping, or the markets demanded by Cuba, but persisted in obtruding itself between Cuba and world markets. Spain was superfluous to the Cuban economy in every way but one: it regulated the terms of the exchange, increasingly a point of contention. Official efforts to

TABLE 3
Selected Cuban Imports for Domestic Consumption, 1852

	Total	From the United States
Fish	\$668,425	\$152,171
Rice	1,046,604	811,462
Grain and pulse	320,212	115,991
Lard and butter	948,144	902,635
Lumber	2,042,187	1,864,997
Specie	989,424	532,468

Source: Alexander von Humboldt, *The Island of Cuba*, trans. John. D. Thrasher (New York: Derby and Jackson, 1852), p. 302.

promote Spanish exports and encourage the use of Spanish carriers cost Cuban residents dearly. The island was subjected to a series of discriminatory customs duties. By the terms of the 1853 tariff law, foreign products shipped on Spanish carriers paid 21.5 to 25.5 percent ad valorem, and on foreign carriers 29.5 to 35.5 percent. *Peninsular* products carried by national shippers paid 6 percent ad valorem; carried by foreigners, the duty increased 19.5 percent. So too with island exports: goods shipped by foreigners paid 7.5 percent, Spanish carriers 3 percent. Revised and modified periodically in the years that followed, the colonial tariff schedule had the net effect of increasing significantly the Cuban cost of living. The 1867 schedule, given in table 4, provides a representative price listing of basic commodities.

Colonial authorities levied custom duties on imports, imposed taxes on exports, and assessed freight charges on foreign carriers, all of which lowered profits for Cuban producers and raised prices for Cuban consumers. By the mid-nineteenth century, these duties were particularly odious, for the vast majority of Cuban imports originated from foreign producers, carried by foreign shippers.

A 35 percent ad valorem was only the beginning. Added to this levy were other surcharges, including port appraisals, tonnage duties, municipal and provincial surcharges, and retail taxes. Not infrequently, consumers in Cuba paid more than double the original market price on U.S. imports. One mid-century estimate calculated that approximately \$15 million worth of North American textiles, agricultural goods, furniture,

TABLE 4
Tariff Rates on Selected Cuban Imports, 1867 (in pesos)

	Product			
	Spanish		Foreign	
	Carrier		Carrier	
	Spanish	Foreign	Spanish	Foreign
Flour (100 kg)	free	.81	2.44	3.26
Tallow (50 kg)	1.05	1.95	2.60	3.90
Fish (100 kg)	.38	.76	1.14	1.91
Lard (50 kg)	.65	1.30	2.60	3.90
Fuel oils (50 kg)	.42	.85	1.72	2.60
Rice (50 kg)	.26	.42	.80	1.35
Vermicelli (50 kg)	.80	1.50	2.00	2.62

Source: Spain, Minister of Colonial Affairs, *Tariff Rates of Duties Payable on Goods, Wares, and Merchandise Imported into the Island of Cuba* (Havana: n.p., 1967). pp. 4-6.

and tools was resold in Cuba for more than \$30 million. A total of \$73,000 in duties was paid on \$91,000 worth of U.S. flour.¹⁸

VII

Exorbitant customs duties and discriminatory tariff rates did not, however, interrupt the expansion of trade. Indeed, so vital was the U.S. connection in Cuba that local producers grudgingly accepted colonial taxes as part of the normal cost of doing business with the North Americans. And even with these patently specious surcharges, ties between both countries continued to deepen. Through the first half of the nineteenth century, North Americans in increasing numbers successfully integrated themselves into strategic sectors of Cuba's emergent agrarian capitalism. North American traders shrewdly and effectively pursued the Cuban market, providing slaves and manufactured goods at reasonable prices, often extending generous credit arrangements, and accepting sugar and molasses as payment. U.S. interests in Cuba increased as the North American capital and commercial stake on the island expanded. Direct U.S. investments in Cuba increased in value and variety. North American merchants, bankers, and shippers established commercial houses in the principal seaports, most of which played the dual role of trading establishments and moneylenders. Trade companies established themselves in Havana, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Cárdenas, Sagua la Grande, Trinidad, and Santiago de Cuba and soon became ubiquitous across the island: Moses Taylor & Co., Charles Tying & Co., Martin Knight & Co., Storey & Co., George Harris & Co., Drake Brothers & Co., Howland Brothers & Co., Dudley Selden & Co., Safford, Smith & Co., and Moreland & Co. They provided credit, purchased the sugar crops, and supplied imports. Increasingly, the trading companies expanded their control over the carrying trade and augmented their shipping lines to handle Cuba's coastwise traffic. But more importantly they controlled the service linking Cuban ports to New Orleans, Savannah, Charleston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.¹⁹

From these positions, North American capital expanded into other sectors of the local economy, including sugar plantations, mills, and coffee farms. The Howland Brothers Cuban properties included "El Dorado" sugar plantation and "Ontario" and "Mt. Vernon" coffee *fincas*. North American investments in mining increased. As early as 1833, U.S. investors acquired interests in the Juraguá iron mines near Santiago. Other North American claims followed in quick succession: copper mines in El Cobre, iron mines in Daiquirí and Manicaragua, and the Bayestabo mines in Nuevitas (American Mining Company).²⁰ Thomas B. Smith and

Hezekiah Bradford operated the Compañía de Minería Cubana near Cienfuegos. The New York Ore Dressing Company owned mines in El Cobre. Other North American enterprises secured concessions to work bituminous coal deposits near Havana.

These developments stimulated further the value and volume of the Cuba-U.S. trade. More and more, too, U.S. capital goods became an even larger factor in the development of Cuba's industrial and transportation infrastructure. As early as 1819, a North American-built steamship took up the coasting trade between Havana and Matanzas, thereby becoming one of the first steam vessels employed outside the United States. During these years, too, growing numbers of planters introduced steam power into mills. The first successful steam-powered mills began operation after 1817, principally with machinery imported from Great Britain. As the popularity of steam power increased, however, North American manufacturers displaced English producers.²¹ Between 1834 and 1838, decades before the completion of the first track in Spain, North American engineers under the supervision of Richard Cruger, using U.S. equipment, completed the construction of a fifty-one-mile rail line between Havana and Güines, the first railroad in Latin America. Sugar machinery and equipment, railroad cars, and especially locomotives, became the stock in trade around which much of the commerce between Cuba and the United States subsequently expanded and the Cuban economy organized.²²

These developments, in turn, had other consequences. North Americans in increasing numbers were taking up residence in Cuba, some temporarily, others permanently, distributed largely in or near the principal port cities. The numbers of U.S. citizens increased steadily, from 1,256 in 1846 to 1,580 in 1850. The 1862 census counted almost 2,500 North American citizens on the island.²³ This population increased after 1865 with the defeat of the Confederacy and a wave of southern emigration to Cuba. Former Confederate officers and politicians, as well as planters, merchants, and professionals, together with their families and personal slaves, migrated to Cuba. For a brief period immediately after Appomattox, Havana hotels were crowded with ranking representatives of the defeated Confederacy, including Generals John C. Breckenridge, Robert A. Toombes, Birkett D. Fry, John B. Magruder, Hamilton P. Bee, William Preston, Jubal A. Early, Commodore John N. Maffitt, Colonel Wood Taylor, and the former governor of Louisiana, Thomas Overton Moore. Some eventually returned to the United States, but many remained and joined the growing ranks of North American planters and property owners in Cuba. Eliza McHatton-Ripley, her husband, and two personal slaves emigrated from Louisiana to Matanzas, where

they purchased a debt-ridden mismanaged Desengaño sugar plantation and a contingent of forty slaves from the Royo family. Louis Lay emigrated from New Orleans and soon owned a trading company and hotel in Havana. A year after the end of the Civil War, the U.S. consul in Havana reported of the large numbers of "refugees from New Orleans" who arrived to Havana with their personal slaves.²⁴

North American residents were mostly connected with trade, commerce, shipping, and agricultural production. Their influence was well out of proportion to their numbers, and in some regions their participation was vital to the local economy. The city of Cárdenas was founded in 1828 by local North American planter Woodbury, in need of a convenient port from which to export his sugar, and by merchant William F. Safford (W. Safford & Co.), who handled the expanding Cárdenas trade. In the years that followed, Cárdenas became known as an "American city" in Cuba due to its large North American population. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, more than 90 percent of Cárdenas's trade was with the United States.²⁵ "From day to day the colonies of the Americans on the island increase," reported Captain General Conde de Alcoy in 1850, "as can be seen in the increases registered in Sagua la Grande, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cárdenas, etc. Daily the Americans purchase extensive territories and under their auspices Cárdenas is being reborn into a new city."²⁶

North Americans settled everywhere in Cuba, but tended especially to favor the north coast, most densely in Havana, and as far east as Gibara. "Havana is crowded with *Americanos*," observed George W. Williams in 1855.²⁷ The *Mercantile Weekly Report* was published in Havana expressly for the North American colony. In 1855 a new hospital was established in Havana to serve the needs exclusively of the North American community in Cuba. So prominent was the North American presence along the north coast between Havana and Sagua la Grande as to prompt Richard R. Madden to observe in 1849, "Some districts on the northern shores of the island, in the vicinity, especially, of Cárdenas and Matanzas, have more the character of American than Spanish settlements."²⁸ This view was echoed more than ten years later by R. W. Gibbes visiting Matanzas. Observed Gibbes: "Matanzas being mainly settled by citizens from the United States, our language is more common there than in any other Cuban city, and the customs of the place are more Americanized."²⁹ Further east, traveler John Glanville Taylor observed that the "district of Holguín, of which Gibara is the port of entry, can boast of more English-speaking society, than many other foreign place, of equal size and note."³⁰

A network of boardinghouses developed along the north coast, oper-

ated principally by North Americans, mostly women, catering to visitors from the United States. In Havana Mrs. West operated a boardinghouse on Calle Obrapia; Mr. Fulton was the proprietor of an inn on Calle Inquisitador; Mrs. Cutbush was the owner of the Washington Hotel on Calle Obispo; Messrs. Davis and Parage operated the American Hotel and sponsored the American Club in Havana. Mrs. Alexander, Mrs. Brewer, Mrs. Robbins, Mrs. Lawrence, Mrs. Chambers, and Mrs. Butts also operated boardinghouses in Havana popular with North American travelers. Mr. Woodberry's hotel in Güines acquired a reputation for fine meals. The Planter's Hotel in Matanzas was also said to set an excellent table, as did the Ensor House. In Limonar, Mrs. Hudson's inn was the only one on the island known to have a chimney in its parlor. Also in Limonar, Mrs. Oliver's guest house was on the grounds of a small coffee *finca* and enjoyed a reputation for excellent service at reasonable prices. In Cárdenas the boarding house owned by Mrs. Lawrence was said to be unrivaled for its cleanliness and hospitality. Mr. Lovett's inn in Cárdenas suffered by comparison, but made up for it by charging lower prices for food and board. In Santiago de Cuba, Mrs. Sauce's boardinghouse had a reputation for cleanliness, good meals, and fine wine, all for two dollars a day.

These boardinghouses served as the central point of congregation for North Americans, travelers and residents alike. They sponsored social functions and operated evening card games; on occasion they provided theater productions and cabaret entertainment and housed foreign dignitaries. U.S. national holidays were celebrated with grand festivity and the obligatory mixture of speechmaking and merriment. Local Cubans and Spaniards were frequent participants. In their own modest way, the boardinghouses served as centers of cultural diffusion, a point at which North Americans and Cubans converged socially, talked politics, trade, and commerce, and just came to know each other.³¹

Around the boardinghouses and inns on the north coast developed a variety of other establishments owned by North Americans that catered to the needs of both North American travelers and local residents. Along the principal bay streets appeared bars, brothels, and restaurants. Billiard rooms were especially popular, providing still one more point where Cubans and North Americans socialized.

North American tourists had early discovered Cuba and were especially fond of Havana. Visiting Cuba in the mid-1880s, British historian John Anthony Froude was dismayed by the numbers of North Americans in Cuba. He found his hotel "full to overflowing with them" and lamented that he had "not been better advised" about the choice of a hotel. "The dining saloon rang with American voices in their shrillest

tone," wrote Froude. "Every table was occupied by groups of them, nor was there a sound in the room of any language but theirs."³² In 1884 U.S. tourist James McQuade wrote from Havana, "American intercourse is modifying manners and customs."³³

As their numbers increased, and their roles expanded, the importance of North Americans also increased. Many married into prominent creole families. The Phinney family of Rhode Island married into the Quintanas of Matanzas. No less important, more North Americans were arriving to operate the expanding Cuban industrial manufactures imported from the United States—especially modern steam-powered mill machinery and railroad locomotives—and to service the tracks and rail lines. North American *maquinistas* arrived late in the fall and remained in Cuba through June, the length of the sugar harvest, for which they were typically paid \$2,500, plus room and board. In Regla, the great depot of the molasses trade, the foundry vital to the maintenance of local molasses tanks was managed by North American engineers. The island's coastwise shipping was handled increasingly by steam vessels manufactured in the United States and, increasingly, piloted by North Americans.³⁴ During the late 1850s, as railroad construction activity expanded across the island, hundreds of North Americans were employed in construction, repair, and maintenance capacities. In 1858 alone, more than 1,800 workers from the United States, principally engineers, mechanics, and artisans, arrived in Cuba under contract to work on the railroads. The following year, 5,034 North American travelers arrived in Cuba, 3,106 of whom remained to work.³⁵

Cuban producers early developed a dependence on North American machinery and technicians to service it. "American steam-engines are fast taking the place of animal power," observed Maturin M. Ballou in 1854, "and more or less are monthly exported for this purpose from New York, Philadelphia and Boston. This creates a demand for engineers and machinists, for whom the Cubans are also dependent upon this country; and there are said to be at this time two hundred Bostonians thus engaged at a handsome remuneration, upon the island."³⁶ Traveling in Cuba several years later, Richard Dana met a North American engineer on a Matanzas plantation, "one of a numerous class, whom the sugar culture brings annually to Cuba." Dana added, "They leave home in the autumn, engage themselves for the sugar season, put the machinery in order, work it for the four or five months of its operation, clean and put it in order for lying by, and return to the United States in the spring. They must be machinists, as well as engineers; for all the repairs and contrivances, so necessary in a remote place, fall upon them."³⁷ Also traveling in Cuba during the late 1850s, Carlton H. Rogers observed:

"The cars on this [Havana-Güines] road are of American manufacture (that is, built in the United States), are drawn by American-built engines, and conducted by American engineers."³⁸

Spanish colonial authorities saw the implications of Cuba's deepening reliance on technology and technicians from the United States. Governor General José G. de la Concha complained in 1853 that the number of Cuban students graduating as lawyers was well out of proportion to local needs, to the neglect of professions and occupations essential to the well-being of the island. "Ever since the introduction of steam-powered machinery in the sugar mills and the construction of the first railroad," de la Concha observed, "the need for Spanish *maquinistas* increased, for the consequence of giving foreigners, mostly North Americans, access to the mills was forseen." De la Concha complained that while the island had five educational institutions offering a full curriculum for law studies, it lacked even one school to train *maquinistas*, sugar masters, and engineers—"all so necessary for the principal industry of the country."³⁹ This trend continued through the end of the nineteenth century. Of the 846 total students enrolled in the University of Havana during the academic year 1887–1888, 280 were in law, 250 in medicine, 234 in pharmacy, 44 in philosophy, and 38 in science.⁴⁰

Cuban imports of U.S. machinery increased through the nineteenth century, and the sugar industry expanded around these imports. The relationship between the two was obvious, as were the implications. The relationship was fixed early in the nineteenth century, and attempts to disengage Cuba from U.S. markets, or restrict imports from the United States, or in any other way interrupt the transactions upon which Cubans depended more and more, threatened the island with dire consequences. Cuban prosperity developed around the North American connection, and as this dependency increased, so too did North American influence. Richard Madden observed during his travels in Cuba as early as the 1830s, "The prosperity of the island has derived no small advantage from those numerous American establishments. Improved modes of agriculture, of fabrication, of conveyance, were introduced by the Americans." Madden added:

The substitution in Cuba of the old grinding-mill, rudely constructed of wood, by steam-engine machinery, is also chiefly due to the Americans. To them, therefore, Cuba is indebted for the various improvements in the fabrication of sugar, and modes of conveyance of the produce of its plantations, which enable the proprietors to compete so successfully with those of the English colonies. Cuba, ever since I knew it, has been slowly but steadily becoming Americanised.⁴¹

Through the first half of the nineteenth century, capital and credit from the United States, as well as investments and imports, were shaping the course of Cuban economic development. Although comparatively few in numbers, North Americans were located at strategic points in the economy. Increasingly, they were property owners, adding further to the power of the North American presence. William Stewart of Philadelphia owned the "La Carolina" estate near Cienfuegos, a plantation of about 5,000 acres worked by 500 slaves. Augustus Hemenway of Boston purchased the "San Jorge" estate near Sagua la Grande in 1840, a property of more than 2,500 acres with 160 slaves.⁴² Other North American proprietors included George K. Thorndike, owner of the "Santa Ana" plantation in Sagua la Grande; J. W. Baker from Philadelphia owned the "San Jose" estate near Cienfuegos; the Phinney family owned "La Palma," "Roble," and "La Sonora," all near Cárdenas; the Russell Jenks family owned extensive holdings in the Yumurí valley of Matanzas.⁴³ North Americans acquired estates, purchased slaves, and otherwise increased their participation in the expanding sugar industry. Observed one traveler in the mid-nineteenth century:

The great amount of American capital invested in slave property in Cuba, and the energy with which the new American settlers have entered on the cultivation of new land (the establishment of new American plantations averaging during the last three years, twenty a year), have largely contributed to give an impetus to the trade which has been fatal for the efforts for its suppression.⁴⁴

The expanding American presence in Cuba presaged the new order of things. Its influence knew no boundaries. A predominantly Catholic society opened up to a Protestant migration that although comparatively small was nonetheless associated with modernity and progress. Wrote Richard Davey, "During the last seventy years . . . the country has been overrun by Americans, who have introduced every form of Protestantism, from Episcopalianism to Quakerism, and even Shakerism."⁴⁵

North Americans were moving into Cuban finance, trade, and commerce. They were moneylenders and shippers, buyers and sellers, engineers and machinists. Cubans, in turn, were becoming increasingly dependent on U.S. technology and technicians, on U.S. markets and imports, U.S. capital and credit. Above all, this presence facilitated the integration of the Cuban economy into the North American system and weakened Cuban cultural and institutional ties to Spain, with far-reaching consequences. "The Anglo-Norman and Spanish races here meet," observed Fredrika Bremer at mid-century, "for good and for evil, secretly and

openly combating for dominion; and in the midst of this wonderfully beautiful scenery, . . . beneath the tropical sun, among the palm-trees and coffee plantations, one sees already the homes of the North American, rail-roads, and shops. The Anglo-American 'go-a-head' here comes in contact with the motto of the Spanish Creole, *poco-a-poco*; and—will run it down sooner or later, that is not difficult to foresee."⁴⁶

As the Cuban economy continued to organize around the expanding North American presence, other changes, affecting other aspects of Cuban society, were set in motion. Increased shipping between Cuba and the United States meant a proportional decrease in maritime traffic between Cuba and Spain. These developments, to be sure, reflected mid-nineteenth-century commercial realities. Moreover, the decline of commercial maritime activity between Cuba and Spain also reduced the only means of travel between the island and the peninsula. As U.S.-Cuban passenger travel expanded and improved, transatlantic maritime service became increasingly irregular, infrequent, and unreliable. At the same time, the U.S. merchant fleet expanded, service improved, and steamships replaced sailing vessels, thereby reducing travel time still further. A voyage to New York was completed in less than four days; to New Orleans in half that time. Passage to Spain often took two weeks of travel and, given the infrequency of shipping and unreliable service, often twice that long. For the same reasons, wealthy Cubans in growing numbers were sailing to Europe in North American vessels. It was easier and more reliable to travel to England or France via New York than via Spain.

These developments reflected changing economic conditions and caused other changes in Cuba. The failure of colonial authorities to provide adequate education facilities, and especially the backward condition of higher education, obliged wealthy Cuban families to seek schooling for their children outside the island. If Cuba had better educational facilities, observed Abiel Abbott during a visit to Cuba in the 1820s, "the rich would have less occasion to send their sons abroad for education."⁴⁷

Improved transportation service to the United States increased the appeal of United States institutions. Schools were near, travel was convenient, costs were lower. "The lack of communications," complained Governor General José G. de la Concha in 1853, "and the failure to allocate to Cuba sufficient resources for the education and instruction of the well-to-do youth, has meant that rather than coming to Spain, as in other times . . . they have gone to foreign countries, and principally the United States for their education." De la Concha stressed that it was not only the proximity of the United States, "but because of the facility and comfort of the trip, even before the inauguration of steamship service

that today makes communication between the island the American Union so frequent and rapid, there existed more and better means of travel to that country than to the Peninsula." These circumstances were producing the "most baneful consequences," especially with regard to the "preservation of the national spirit." De la Concha urged Madrid to improve transportation to and from the island and modernize its maritime fleets with new steamships. Improved transportation between Spain and its Caribbean possessions, de la Concha predicted, would not only "strengthen the ties between the metropolis and the Antilles, but provide additional indirect means to promote immigration from Spain to the islands without the inconveniences of breaking relations and weakening family ties."⁴⁸

VIII

Developments during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries prepared the way for close ties between Cuba and the United States. In many ways, early relations between both countries shaped the Cuban social dynamic and accelerated Cuban disaffection with Spanish colonialism. As producers of commercial export crops, Cubans demanded direct access to foreign markets and cheap prices for foreign imports. They resented *peninsular* control of overseas trade, they resisted Spanish taxes on foreign commerce.

The clash of rival economic interests between Cubans and Spaniards exacerbated political tensions between the colony and the metropolis. Spanish customs duties on the foreign imports upon which Cubans increasingly depended, foodstuffs no less than agricultural and industrial equipment, raised the cost of living and increased the cost of sugar production. Creole property owners demanded not only economic policies to protect and promote their interests, they demanded too the political positions to implement the policies themselves, according to their needs. Cubans demanded freedom to promote their own interests, arrange their own taxes, regulate their own economic growth. They demanded freedom to expand, to develop resources according to their needs on their terms, to earn more by producing more and to expand more by exporting more. They needed, above all, access to political power to protect their economic interests.

At the same time, the early North American presence in Cuba, particularly as it was strategically located in the local economy, set the stage for the vast influx of U.S. capital and promoted the trade connection. By mid-century, Cubans and North Americans were familiar with each other and well understood each other's needs. Decades before the Spanish colonial

regime came to an end, important sectors of the Cuban economy, no less than key representatives of local elites, had been integrated into and become dependent upon North American capitalist structures.

NOTES

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4. María Encarnación Rodríguez Vicente, "El comercio cubano y la guerra de emancipación norteamericana," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* (Seville), 11 (1954), 61-106; LeRiverend, *Historia económica de Cuba*, pp. 183-184; Basil Rauch, *American Interest in Cuba: 1848-1855* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 11-12.
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7. *American State Papers, 1789-1809: Commerce and Navigation* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1832), 1:33.
8. George Clark Morton to James Madison, April 21, 1801, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Havana, 1783-1906, General Records of the Department of State, 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Despatches/Havana).
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10. *Ibid.*, pp. 721, 749-69. For a comprehensive assessment of the Cuba-U.S. trade during these years, see René Alvarez Ríos, "Cuba: desarrollo interno y relaciones con los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica," *Política Internacional* (Havana) 2 (1964), 59-135.
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42. Hazard, *Cuba with Pen and Pencil*, pp. 402–03; Frederic A. Eustis, *Augustus Hemeway, 1805–1876: Builder of the United States Trade with the West Coast of South America* (Salem, Mass.: Peabody Museum, 1955), p. 102.
43. See Williams, *Sketches of Travel in the Old and New World*, p. 38. For an account of a visit to the Jenks estate, see Julia Ward Howe, *A Trip to Cuba* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1860), pp. 138–40.
44. In Portell Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* 1:310.
45. Richard Davey, *Cuba, Past and Present* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1898), p. 19.
46. Fredrika Bremer, *The Homes of the New World; Impressions of America* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1854), 2:421.
47. Abiel Abbot, *Letters Written in the Interior of Cuba* (Boston: Bowles and Dearborn, 1829), p. 132.
48. De la Concha, *Memorias sobre el estado político, gobierno y administración de la isla de Cuba*, pp. 341–42, 348–49.

On Men Reforming the Rights of Men: The Abrogation of the Cuban Adultery Law, 1930

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the mentalité of men who abrogated Spanish Penal Code Article 437 that had permitted husbands to kill adulterous wives. While a Cuban woman's movement opposed *femicidio*, it failed to mount a campaign to force the law's nullification. Men abrogated the adultery law as a means of breaking with colonial policy and instituting a bourgeois, republican order, but not with an eye toward addressing issues of sexual double standard or unjust gender relations.

RESUMEN

Este ensayo analiza la mentalidad de hombres que abrogaron Artículo 437 del Código Penal el cual permitía a los maridos matar a las esposas infieles. Aunque había un movimiento femenino cubano y aunque su movimiento se oponía al femicidio, no organizaron una campaña para forzar anulación de la ley. Los hombres revocaron la ley de adulterio como parte de la corriente modernizadora que buscaba romper la política colonial y instituir un orden burgués y republicano. Pero su objetivo fundamental no era corregir el doble "standard" en el terreno amoroso o las relaciones injustas entre mujeres y hombres.

On February 16, 1930, Cuba's all-male congress, with only verbal urging from women and feminists, abrogated article 437 of the penal code, thereby ending a centuries-old provision permitting a husband to kill his adulterous wife. The legal and social implications of this act ended the punitive authority men had over women, and it raised the possibility of mutual expectations of marital fidelity. Without sanctioned wife-killing and in accordance with the 1917 and 1930 divorce laws, divorce became the only means of ending adulterous marriages, and women as well as men could file suit. Under the new terms of sexual and marital relations, patriarchal control of women's sexuality, so central to male honor and identity, no longer had *legal* sanction.