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**U.S. State Department**  
**Central Files**

**CUBA**  
**1950-1954**

**INTERNAL AFFAIRS**

Decimal Numbers 737, 837, and 937

and

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Decimal Numbers 637 and 611.37

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PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, HABANA

223

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. - 1 Enc.

August 6, 1953

REF : D-165, July 28, 1953; D-191, July 31, 1953

15 For Dept. Use Only fap	ACTION	DEPT.
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SUBJECT: Aftermath of Attacks on Armed Forces in Oriente Province

Following the beating off of attacks on army posts at Santiago de Cuba and Bayamo in Oriente Province on July 26, the armed forces were reported for several days to be pursuing fugitive participants in the assaults who had taken refuge in the surrounding mountainous countryside. Several encounters were reported from which the deaths of fugitives were said to have resulted, although there has been no completely reliable report of the total number of persons killed in these affrays.

According to reports of Consul Story in Santiago de Cuba and of the Embassy's Public Affairs Officer who was in Santiago de Cuba on business just after the attacks, the belief was widespread among responsible members of the community that the Army, both during the attacks and in subsequent mopping-up operations, was showing no quarter to captured insurgents or suspected insurgents. Some color was lent to this belief by the reported number of wounded attackers which was very small in comparison with the wounded in the armed forces. A copy of the Public Affairs Officer's report is enclosed.

Possibly motivated by this belief, the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba and other prominent persons approached Col. Alfredo DEL RIO Chaviano, commander of the regiment that had been attacked, reportedly with a view to obtaining assurance that fugitives could surrender without fear of reprisals. Such assurance was given by the commanding officer and the Archbishop undertook personally to seek out fugitives and persuade them to surrender in accordance with the terms of reassuring proclamations issued by Col. Del Rio Chaviano. The prelate's efforts were successful to the extent that on August 1 the authorities took into custody, apparently partly through free surrender to the Archbishop and partly through unopposed capture, a group including Fidel CASTRO who is accused of being (and who claims to be) the leader of the attack on the barracks at Santiago de Cuba.

ECFornes, Jr.:rc  
REPORTER

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There probably are additional fugitives still uncaptured and the Army is actively continuing mopping-up operations. There have been no further reports of fighting since the detention of Castro and his companions. It appears that the situation in Oriente Province is completely under control and that inflamed passions have subsided considerably from the level seemingly provoked by the attacks.

Fidel Castro participated in the Cayo Confites expedition and has been accused of "gangsterism" as a University student and of several murders. He is reported to have been an Ortodoxo up to some months ago when he withdrew to become an independent. He is being held without bail in Santiago de Cuba on sedition charges. Reportedly through an evasion of censorship control, El Crisol published on August 3 a claimed interview with Castro. El Crisol reported that Castro assumed full responsibility for leadership of the attacks on July 26 and that he said that the attacks had no connection with the Auténtico-Ortodoxo Montreal pact; that the participants in the attacks were independent Ortodoxo followers of the Chibás program; that the arms used were acquired in Cuba; and that finances had not come from ex-President PRIO but had been raised by the attackers themselves. He was also quoted as saying that 120 had taken part in the attack in Santiago de Cuba and 28 in the uprising at Bayamo. In connection with finances, the Ministry of Information claimed on August 3 that employees of a company in Matanzas who were involved in the uprising, had forged checks on their employers for "several thousand pesos" to help finance the undertaking.

There is available no information regarding the total number of arrests in Cuba of persons who may have actually been implicated in the attacks or who were merely suspected on some ground of conceivable complicity. It is certain that there have been many arrests throughout the country but frequently the prisoner has been quickly released. Definite evidence of the continued detention of certain political figures was the denial on August 1 by a Habana court of habeas corpus writs in favor of Aracelio AZCUY, Emilio OCHOA, Manuel BISBE, Sergio MEJIAS, José Manuel GUTIERREZ, Eduardo SUAREZ Rivas, Lomberto DIAZ, Oscar ALVARADO, Lazaro PEÑA (Communist), Joaquin ORDOQUI (Communist), Carlos HERNANDEZ, and Aramis TABOADA. This was the first indication that Lazaro Peña was under arrest. It is not known whether other prominent Communists are being held by the authorities. Minor Communist leaders in various localities are reported to have been picked up, although not always retained in custody. It is possible that well-known Communists such as Juan MARINELLO and Blas ROCA, as well as non-Communists such as José PARDO Llada, have gone into hiding. The Ambassador was told by another member of the diplomatic

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corps that a number of political figures had taken refuge in the Brazilian and Mexican Embassies, although this report has not been officially confirmed.

Reports made to the Santiago de Cuba Urgency Court by Col. Del Rio Chaviano have just been published. The highlights of these reports are: the attacks were made by "elements directed" by leaders of the Prio Auténtico, Ochoa Ortodoxo and Communist parties; they were carried out with modern weapons, almost all coming from Montreal, Canada, by "Cubans and foreigners" numbering between 400 and 500; and that there had been seized 31 rifles, shotguns and carbines, a machine gun, hand grenades, and a quantity of ammunition, including explosive bullets.

An official of the Ministry of Information was assigned to write a story on the attacks for release to all newspapers. He gathered information on the ground at Santiago de Cuba and upon his return supplied the Embassy confidentially with his findings and observations. He said that five days before the attacks the Ministry of Information security officer had gone to Santiago de Cuba with a tip that attacks were to be made. He could attribute the surprise achieved by the attackers only to laxity or a "desire to have things happen as they did". This information is in line with a statement by Ambassador CONCHESO to Ambassador BEAULAC that the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) had known beforehand that the attacks were being planned (see despatch No. 191 of July 31, 1953). Despite the statements of Cuban officials the Embassy finds it hard to believe that the attack did not achieve complete surprise.

The Ministry of Information official also said that the weapons of the attackers could have been obtained in Cuba, that some of them were reconditioned, that the hand grenades were all old and some of them failed to explode, that only the explosive bullets would have had to be imported, and that he believed that all of the attackers were Cubans. He also expressed the opinion that the attackers in Santiago de Cuba could not have numbered more than 100.

On August 3 President BATISTA awarded the Cross of Honor, the highest Cuban military decoration, to the regiment stationed at Santiago de Cuba for its defense of its barracks there on July 26. In his speech to the regiment praising its action, condemning the attacks, and promising assistance to the widows and orphans of the killed soldiers, Batista revealed that representatives of ex-President Prio had approached him to arrange conditions for the latter's return to Cuba at a time before Texas, Mamaroneck and other discoveries proved the "worthlessness of Prio's word".

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Desp. No. 223  
From HABANA

Habana, August 3, 1953

To: The Ambassador  
From: JCanter  
Subject: Abortive Revolt in Santiago

My personal experience of the July 26 abortive revolt in Santiago de Cuba was as follows:

I took the Santiago-Habana bus for Santiago at Cabaiguán, Las Villas, at 12:15 p.m. on Sunday, July 26. There was no indication that any trouble was brewing until the bus had gone a few miles beyond Victoria de las Tunas, province of Oriente, when soldiers stopped and boarded the bus and scanned the passengers. This occurred around 5:00 p.m. Around 5:45 p.m. at the military barracks near Holguín three soldiers stopped the bus, ordered all passengers to disembark, and searched the baggage. At Bayamo, Baire and Contramaestre the bus was again boarded by soldiers and another search of the baggage was undertaken. At Palma Soriano, El Cobre, and at the entrance to Santiago all male passengers were ordered to disembark and they were searched for the possession of firearms. At the bus station in Santiago de Cuba the baggage was again searched. At all places where the bus was halted, I noted that a search was being made of private automobiles also.

I arrived in Santiago about 9:20 p.m. The city was quiet, and few people were in the streets. At the Hotel Casa Granda, where I stayed, there was no specific information as to exactly what had happened, but it was only there that I learned that an armed assault on the Moncada Barracks had taken place and that approximately fifty persons had been killed in the affair.

On Monday, July 27, there was no apparent disturbance in the city and I proceeded to the University of Oriente without hindrance. However, there were a number of soldiers stationed at various street intersections, as well as police dressed in civilian clothes carrying rifles. At the University, professors told me that they had received reports from persons living near the Barracks to the effect that the captured assailants had been shot down in cold blood and that the wounded assailants had also been liquidated. The story went that cries of "Don't kill me!" came from the Barracks. These were followed by commands to run and the firing of shots. After that, complete silence. Dr. Felipe MARTINEZ ARANGO, Director of Cultural Relations of the University and a member of the Ortodoxo Party, informed me that he had been picked up around noon on Sunday, detained at the

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From HABANA

Barracks, and then released about ten o'clock Monday morning. He said he saw bloodstains everywhere. The University professors also informed me that there had been gunfire at various parts of the city that same morning. Except for the sight of soldiers and police who remained at various intersections in the city, there was during that day or the next no sign of the disturbance. The park outside the hotel which is usually filled with people until 2 a.m. was deserted by 9 p.m. It was reported that the Army had ordered a ten o'clock curfew.

On Wednesday I went to Guantánamo by train. En route to El Manguito, where I was to take the train, the car in which I was riding was stopped near the town of Altosongo and at La Maya by members of the Rural Guard, who searched the baggage of the passengers. En route to the Naval Base from Guantánamo the car was stopped by members of the Naval Post at Caimanera and again the baggage was searched. A similar search was made at the same places on the trip back to Santiago on Thursday, July 29.

On Friday, July 30, while I was at the University, the Rector, Dr. Felipe SALCINES Morlote, told me that the day before he had gone to see the Commander of the Moncada Barracks, Colonel Río Chaviano, and requested that the Army allow fugitive assailants to give themselves up. It was known, Salcines said, that fugitives caught, instead of being allowed to surrender, were being shot down. Dr. Salcines stated that Colonel Río Chaviano had given him permission to contact the fugitives and to turn them over directly to the civilian authorities. Dr. Salcines told me that he had seen a dead fugitive dressed in army trousers who had received a bullet in the abdomen but the trousers showed no bullet holes. There were other cases of fugitives who had been killed, but no bloodstains were visible in the places where they were found. The assumption was that they had been killed elsewhere and their bodies moved.

I took the train from Santiago at 2:15 p.m. on Friday, July 31, and arrived in Habana at 7:30 a.m. Saturday, August 1. The train was not stopped at any point, nor searched by the military.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

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NO.: A-116 September 16, 1953


SUBJECT: Arms for Cuba.

TO: The American Embassy, HABANA.

Reference: Embassy's despatch No. 223, dated August 6, 1953,  
Subject: Aftermath of Attacks on Armed Forces in Oriente Province.

Embassy is requested to furnish the Department with a description of the weapons seized by the Cuban police in the Oriente case as well as in similar recent cases.

LOURIE  
ACTING



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
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**ACTION**  
is assigned to

AAA

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON  
National Executive Sec'y



September

11953  
D-1R

August 10, 1953

Mr. John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

*file*  
*Reply drafted 8/14/53*  
*WLD:SLT*

Dear Sir:

The government of General Fulgencio Batista has initiated a fascist reign of terror in Cuba. Democratic liberties have been suppressed. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly has been abolished. Wanton beatings, killings and jailings are taking place daily. The political opposition parties of all shades of political opinion are being persecuted. Hundreds of persons are in jail. The right to strike has been abolished.

Considering the tremendous influence of the United States government in Cuba, we do not believe that the Batista government would dare to carry out the present un-democratic measures without the approval of the United States government and State Department.

At a time when the United States government declares it is so concerned with world "freedom" we ask why it has done nothing about stopping fascist persecution in Cuba.

We demand therefore that the United States government make strong protests to the Cuban government concerning its brutal suppression of democracy, insist on restoration of democracy in Cuba.

Yours truly,

*William L. Patterson*  
William L. Patterson  
National Executive Secretary

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1953

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My dear Mr. Patterson:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 10, 1953 in which you comment on conditions alleged by you to exist in Cuba and make certain suggestions as to the course of action you feel the United States Government should take with respect to this situation.

The United States has a long-standing and well-defined policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, which has been advocated at numerous international conferences. So far as the other American Republics are concerned, the commitment of this Government to follow that policy as most recently stated is contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at the Bogotá Conference of 1948, and ratified by the United States on June 19, 1951, consent having been given by the Senate on August 28, 1950. Articles 15, 16, and 17 of that document are as follows:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

"The

Mr. William L. Patterson,  
National Executive Secretary,  
Civil Rights Congress,  
6 East 17th Street,  
New York 3, New York.

24

-2-

"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Robert F. Woodward  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
for Inter-American Affairs

ARA:MID:JLTopping:dwm 8/14/53

Edy  
AR

SSAM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum

File with our copy of letter  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ARA/MID - Mr. J. L. Topping

DATE: August 19, 1953

FROM : SCA - Scott McLeod

SUBJECT: Attached letter to Mr. William L. Patterson, Civil Rights Congress

General Smith has a philosophy, with which I agree, and which you no doubt have heard him cite. It concerns the time when the Russians made some charge against him while he was in Moscow and at which time Vishinsky told him, "since you have not denied it, it is true."

Applying this philosophy, it would appear to me the fact that your letter acknowledging receipt of Mr. Patterson's letter in which you say, "The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 10, 1953 in which you comment on the present situation in Cuba" amounts to tacit agreement that the situation is as Patterson describes it. I have no way of knowing whether it is or is not, but it appears to me that if we want to get along with Batista's government we should not tacitly agree that there is a fascist reign of terror in Cuba. If you feel that an outright denial of the statements made by Patterson is (a) not consistent with the facts, or (b) not good political judgment, I would suggest that you amend the letter by using language similar to the following:

"The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 10 in which you comment on conditions alleged by you to exist in Cuba",

making it clear that the situation Patterson describes is that which represents his view and not that necessarily of the Department.

## Attachments:

1. Proposed letter to Mr. Patterson drafted by Mr. Topping, 8/14/53.
2. Mr. Patterson's letter to the Secretary dated 8/10/53.

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FW 7-10-53  
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PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, MERIDA

7  
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

August 10, 1953  
DATE

REF : Dept's 1-2, July 31, 1953, rec'd 8/6/53

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION ARA REC'D Aug 11	DEPT. IN OTHER O	OLI CIA NAVY ARMY
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SUBJECT: Alleged Cuban Revolutionary Activities in Yucatan

An American source whose reliability is not questioned and whose information is usually accurate has stated that about one month ago it was rumored that activities connected with the Cuban revolutionary attempt had occurred in northeastern Yucatan, but that he did not consider them worthy of credence.

It is reported that neither Mario ANCONA Ponce, who was formerly head of the press and publicity section of Henequeneros de Yucatan and who resigned when Governor Tomas MARENTES was granted an indefinite leave of absence, nor his father Mario ANCONA Cirerol, has any lands of his own. At one time Ancona Cirerol managed a huge tract of land (reputedly some 500,000 hectares) known as the Colonia de Yucatan, situated south of Mottezuma (87° 42' N; 21° 23' W; approximately, and about 125 or 130 miles from Merida) and which extended as far as the Caribbean Sea on the east. It was in this area that activity was rumored.

Mario Ancona Ponce was born in Merida on May 5, 1924. He is a cripple whose right arm and leg are atrophied. He studied in Habana and lived there for a while. On May 17, 1948 he applied for and was granted a 3(2) nonimmigrant visa by this Consulate. At that time he gave as his permanent address 12 Calle 2 Miramar, Marianao, Habana, Cuba. His lameness has given him an inferiority complex which has made him dangerous and untrustworthy. He is the author of "Un Libro de Comunistas Para Anticomunistas" published in 1952 in Merida by the Editorial Yucatanense "Club del Libro." Several months ago he was implicated in the kidnapping of a child, but apparently charges against him were dropped.

Mario Ancona Cirerol has been inactive for the past twenty years or so. He is not favorably regarded in the community.

During the latter part of July and early in August it is known that several planes of the Cuban air force passed through Merida. It is reported that they came from Habana and that they departed for Guatemala. It is believed that their flights here were made in connection with patrolling activities designed to prevent any attempts that might be made to overthrow the Cuban government.

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From MERIDA

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The customs service, whose local headquarters are in Progreso, have alerted the twelve sub-stations, which lie between Celestun, on the Gulf of Campeche, and El Cuyo, north and somewhat to the east of Moctezuma, mentioned above. Officials of this service have stated that no Cuban revolutionary activities occurred in the area.

Further attempts to locate the airstrip supposedly located about midway between Merida and San Bruno, and mentioned in the Department's A-11, of July 7, 1953 to Embassy Mexico, have proven unsuccessful. American pilots, however, who fly over the area regularly, have been asked to continue their observations and inform the Consulate of anything they may discover.

Arthur V. Metcalfe  
American Vice Consul

2 copies to Embassy, Mexico, D.F.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AMEMBASSY, HABANA

244

DESP. NO.

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON - 1 Enc.

August 11, 1953

REF

AUG 17 1953

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SUBJECT: Political Statements by President Batista in Press Conference with Foreign Press Representatives

On August 6, 1953, President BATISTA held a press conference for correspondents of international press services and United States, Latin American and other foreign newspapers. According to an Embassy officer who attended the conference, the President was expansive in replying to questions regarding economic matters but was briefer in his statements on political questions, particularly when referring to the revolutionary outbreak of July 26 in Oriente Province. A copy of the Ministry of Information release regarding the conference, as it was published in El Crisol, is enclosed.

After speaking of the economic prospects of Cuba during the next two years, the President was asked whether plans covering such a period meant that the Government intended to remain unchanged for two years. Batista denied any such intention and said that "whatever the government might be that succeeds" him, it ought to continue constructive plans already made.

Touching on alleged Communist complicity in the Oriente uprisings, the President declared that "the Communist participation is demonstrated by the fact that red propaganda was found in the possession of those arrested and in addition by the Communist affiliation of some of them". He considered ex-President PRIO the person principally responsible for the uprisings.

Questioned regarding the attitude toward conspiratorial activities that should be adopted by countries where his political enemies are in exile, Batista said that he was satisfied "with the attitude assumed by all friendly governments, since not only Mexico but also the United States, Guatemala, etc., have at all times showed respect" for Cuba's Government and sovereignty. He added that it was a pity that the Cuban exiles did not respect the countries that gave them asylum.

RCForbes, Jr.:rc

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The President declared that he had been "forced" by developments to suspend constitutional guarantees, much against his deep-rooted feelings of democracy and tolerance, but that he did not believe that the situation would have to be maintained for 90 days, as the suspending decree provided. He also said that censorship was not intended "to silence truths that can be expressed by all but once and for all to put into effect a correct understanding of the exercise of freedom of the press, such as is practiced in such democratic nations as the United States, France, England, Mexico, etc., avoiding the propagation of insidious reports, slander and insults".

Regarding the general political situation, President Batista affirmed that "although the electoral process is in abeyance because of the suspension of (constitutional) guarantees, the date of the elections has not been postponed" and that he is "as he always has been, disposed to enter into conversations with the opposition in order to arrive at a national solution". This did not mean, he continued, that he was willing to accept such conditions as the restoration of the 1940 Constitution, the restoration of the 1943 Electoral Code, or his "retirement from the presidency which is equivalent to delivering the Republic into the arms of chaos".

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.:

  
Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:  
✓ Press clipping

UNCLASSIFIED



Enclosure to HABANA  
despatch No. 244  
dated August 11, 1953

EL CRISOL  
AUG 7 - 1953

AKA

## Entrevistan diaristas de prensa extranjera, al Presidente Batista

**El Presidente de la República contestó las preguntas que le fueron formuladas por la representación periodística del exterior**

El Ministerio de Información nos remitió anoche la siguiente nota oficial:

"Ministerio de Información  
Agosto 6, 1953, Dirección General de Publicidad y Prensa Escrita, Nota No. 8. Entrevista de Prensa Concedida por el Honorable Señor Presidente de la República General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, a los Corresponsales de la Prensa Extranjera Acreditados en Cuba.

estima halagueña la perspectiva para Cuba, y que se encuentra muy satisfecho de la política asumida por el gobierno que preside en materia económica, concretamente, con respecto a la economía azuquera.

(Continúa en la Página SIETE)

En las últimas horas de la tarde de ayer, en el Palacio Presidencial, tuvo lugar la entrevista de prensa, en la que el Honorable Sr. Presidente de la República, General Fulgencio Batista, respondiendo a preguntas de corresponsales de las distintas agencias de noticias, y de periódicos y revistas de varias capitales, formuló interesantes y trascendentales declaraciones.

Sobre muy variados tópicos fué interrogado el Jefe del Estado, y entre las muchas preguntas que le fueron formuladas destacan por su importancia en materia económica la del corresponsal de La Nación de Santiago de Chile, acerca del futuro económico de Cuba en los próximos dos años.

Sobre esto dijo el Presidente que

## Entrevistan diaristas de prensa

—(CONTINUACION)—

...rera, ya que la conferencia internacional que al respecto se viene efectuando en Londres, al fijar como cuota de consumo para el mercado internacional el de 5 millones de toneladas, ha dado la razón al Gobierno de Cuba, cuando restringió la producción azucarera cubana, con vista a la superproducción que se registró en la zafra anterior por la imprevisora política económica del anterior gobierno, que hubiera dado al traste con la primera industria de Cuba, de no haber segregado el gobierno del 10 de Marzo un millón setecientos mil toneladas. "Los azucareros cubanos siempre consideraron excelente una zafra de cinco millones de toneladas, esa es la zafra que le hemos dado, conservando un buen precio que de no haber sido por nuestras medidas previsoras —terminó diciendo el Presidente Batista— ese precio se hubiera ido por los suelos.

Sobre la ficticia crisis, el Presidente de la República dijo que aunque el Gobierno ha tenido que afrontar fraudes de la administración anterior por ciento cincuenta millones de dólares, ciento diez sustraídos de la Hacienda Pública y cuarenta falsamente incinerados, realmente una crisis no confronta el país, pues la estabilidad de la industria azucarera, y la fortaleza de nuestra moneda, que ha sabido resistir el impacto de la falsa incineración, así como el fomento de nuevas industrias, han permitido mantener un alto standard económico. Ahora, los llamados opositores, que están demostrando ser muy malos cubanos, se dedican a mandar hojitas anónimas y a hacer llamadas telefónicas diciendo que el gobierno intenta apoderarse de los depósitos bancarios. Es claro que nadie lo ha creído. Y los rectores de la economía cubana han hecho declaraciones expresas al efecto, pero, por esos procedimientos pueden ser juzgados. Nosotros por nuestra parte estamos trabajando en firme, y ya hemos ido a la aprobación de nuestro plan bienal.

Al referirse a esto, el propio Marchant preguntó al Presidente que si esto indicaba que el gobierno pretendía ser inalterable por lo menos durante dos años más, a lo que contestó el Presidente Batista:

—No, el inalterable es el Estado, y yo creo que cualquiera que sea el gobierno que me suceda debe tener esto en cuenta, todos los gobiernos que de verdad quieran servir al país deben hacer planes y comenzarlos, y si estos planes son constructivos deben ser continuados por el que le suceda.

Al referirse a esto, el periodista Martínez, de Tiempo de México, preguntó al señor Presidente acerca del procedimiento seguido por los gobiernos auténticos con las obras iniciadas por Batista, a lo que respondió el Presidente:

—Lamentablemente fueron abandonadas. Es lástima, porque habíamos planeado para el porvenir, se perdieron ocho años por puro revanchismo.

pañan a sus seguidores... pre que he intentado... nido que hacen frente... ción peligrosa, me... primera fila". En lo de... hasta el que los condujo... el momento preciso...

Acerca de la política que se considera deben seguir con respecto a las actividades conspirativas en los países en que se encuentran exiliados, dijo el Presidente: —"Estoy satisfecho de la actitud asumida por todos los gobiernos amigos, como México, como Estados Unidos, Guatemala, etc., han demostrado en todo momento respetar mi gobierno y la soberanía de Cuba. Es lástima que los cubanos exiliados no sepan respetar a los países que le dan asilo, como respeté yo en todo momento mientras estuve fuera de Cuba a los que me brindaron su fraternal hospitalidad panamericana".

Acerca de las actividades conspirativas y la suspensión de las garantías constitucionales, afirmó el Presidente, que no cree que esta situación tenga que ser mantenida por noventa días, que ante los sucesos de Oriente, el hallazgo de armas en un cayo cercano de Cuba, y otros hallazgos menores, y el desbocamiento de sus adversarios, se vió obligado, en contra de su sentir inveterado democrático y tolerante, a tomar estas medidas, porque lo importante es mantener la paz pública y con respecto a la censura, explicó, que no se trata de censura para acallar verdades que pueden ser dichas por todos, sino de poner en práctica de ahora y para siempre un sentido recto del ejercicio de la libertad de prensa, como el que se ejerce en naciones tan democráticas como Estados Unidos, Francia, Inglaterra, México, etc., evitando la propalación de noticias insidiosas y de calumnias e insultos, hechos previstos y penados por las leyes vigentes. Por último, acerca de la política nacional, afirmó el señor Presidente que aunque se hallan en suspenso los trámites electorales por la suspensión de las garantías, la fecha para la elección no ha sido pospuesta, que no obstante está, como siempre he estado, en disposición de mantener conversaciones con la oposición para llegar a una solución nacional, sin que esto quiera decir que esté dispuesto a acatar pretensiones incalificables como aquellas que se basan en la restauración de la Constitución del 40, que equivale a que vuelvan las cosas al mismo estado en que estaban el 10 de marzo; la restauración del Código Electoral, que equivale a que vuelvan a regir las fuerzas electorales, los que tuvieron que salir del país víctimas de sus propias faltas y vicios, y mi salida de la Presidencia, que equivale a entregar a la República en brazos del caos. Para eso no hice yo la revolución del 10 de marzo, —dijo el Presidente Batista— que evité el golpe funesto que perpetró Frio para el 15 de abril. El gobierno de facto se vió obligado a derogar la Constitución del 40, que se hizo, al amparo de las garantías que nosotros le brindamos, pero sabiendo que el sentir del pueblo estaba pla-

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, HABANA  
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.  
REF : Deptel 45, August 11

240  
DESP. NO.

737.00/8-1153

August 11, 1953

For Dept. Use Only RE	ACTION REC'D AUG 12	DEPT. IN OTHER O	OLI 1
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SUBJECT: Rumors of Renewed Revolt Activities.

The enclosed report dated August 10 from the Naval Attaché states that the Cuban Navy is alerted for a possible attack (landing) in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana Province, during the period August 15-20, the date considered most probable being August 15.

The Army Attaché reports that the Cuban Army was on a full-scale alert the week-end of August 8-9 and will be confined to barracks tomorrow, August 12, in spite of the fact that it has been declared an official holiday.

An American source (A-2) who recently made a short round trip to the United States, found himself on the same plane leaving Havana with an ex-Ortodoxo Congressman who informed him that he expected serious trouble in Cuba within the next twenty days. He believed that this time the trouble would be in Havana and the western part of the island. The Ortodoxo told source that he had nothing to do with any conspiratorial activity but he was sure that if anything happened he would be arrested and his family molested. He stated he planned to be out of Cuba several weeks to escape any trouble that might arise. He further stated that others were leaving Cuba for the same reason.

Reference is made in this connection to a message (DA-945672) received by the Army Attaché at Havana (Deptel 45, August 11).

Comment. The Embassy has received no information from other sources regarding the subject matter of the message received by the Army Attaché. As previously reported, very few people, if any, in Cuba expect the July 26 attack against the Santiago garrison to be the last.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.:

Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure  
cc: Mexico City

ETCrain:ep  
REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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737.00/8-1153

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Page \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_  
Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
(Classification)

Page 1 of \_\_\_\_\_  
Encl. No. 1  
Desp. No. 240  
From Habana

10 August 1953

Subj: Possible Landing at or Near Mariel

1. This office has obtained information that the Cuban Navy is alerted for an attack in the vicinity of Mariel from 15 to 20 August with the most probable date as 15 August. Captain Guillermo Driggs, Director of the Cuban Naval Academy, has been given the coast line from Mulata to Banes (Central Habana) as his area of responsibility and has prepared a communications plan covering this area.
2. It is known that the Naval Air Station, Mariel, is on a special alert; guns and search lights have been mounted especially against a landing of troops and arms.
3. Guajaibon, which is east of Mariel, is considered an excellent place for landing. A small pier exists there and road communications to the central highway are not too bad. It is known that there are many Autenticos living in this general area.
4. Although it is known that the Naval Air Station, Mariel, has been especially alerted, the Cuban Navy sent a general message to units west of Havana indicating that no special alert conditions exist.
5. This communication comes from two (2) different sources, both of which have been usually reliable in the past.

Respectfully,

W. M. RAKOW  
Captain, U.S. Navy

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR POUCH PRIORITY		CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)		DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE 737.00/8-1353	
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH		No. 153		August 13, 1953	
FROM :	AmEmbassy, Ottawa		DESP. NO.		
TO :	THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.		DATE		
REF :	Embassy's Telegrams No. 265 of June 4, and No. 267 of June 5, and Despatch No. 1314 of June 24, 1953.		BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS		
9	ACTION	DEPT.			
For Dept.	ARA	I N	EUR OLI I IFI P MC		
Use Only	REC'D	OTHER			
hm	AUG 17	O	CIA PSB		
SUBJECT: Conversation with Cuban Ambassador on Arms Shipments and Other Matters.					

In the course of a recent conversation, Senor Rupo, the Cuban Ambassador, stated that the Cuban Government had abandoned its original thought that the munitions captured from the rebels at Santiago and Bayamo might be of Canadian origin and was now inclined to think that Mexico was the more probable source. In this connection the Ambassador expressed appreciation of the correct attitude of the present Mexican government, but added that in spite of the improvement in government in Mexico in recent years, there were still undoubtedly to be found in Mexico, as in other countries, unsavory private individuals who engaged in arms smuggling.

External Affairs officials have informed this Embassy that in spite of press reports that officials in Cuba had announced that ammunition captured from the Cuban rebels was made in Montreal, no representations to this effect had been received from the Cuban government. External Affairs' own check had produced no evidence of any suspicious arms shipments in recent months.

With regard to Guatemala, Senor Rupo took a considerably less cordial view than in the case of the government of Mexico. Guatemala, he considered, needed correction by some outside power, possibly Cuba, since Cuba could speak sharply to Guatemala without running the risk, as would the United States, of being charged with imperialism. Senor Rupo did not indicate whether this remark was based on any specific Cuban differences with Guatemala or only on distaste for Guatemala as a center of Communist activity. Senor Rupo stated that Cuba had fortunately ceased to be a Communist center, but that Communists formerly active in Cuba were undoubtedly still active in the Caribbean area.

In regard to the situation in Cuba, Senor Rupo stated that General Batista was undoubtedly meeting with some political difficulties at the present time. He ascribed these difficulties, however, to adverse economic conditions, remarking that it was an unfortunate coincidence that each time Batista had assumed power, sugar prices had declined.

Page 2 of  
Desp. No. 153 8/13/53  
From \_\_\_\_\_


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(Classification)

Page \_\_\_\_\_ of  
Encl. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

Senor Irujo professed to believe that the General was essentially a democratic and non-military minded man, who had reassumed power only with the greatest reluctance. According to Irujo, Batista had three times refused to head a military revolt against Irujo, and had finally yielded to Army pressure only because the leaders of the Army had told him that they were determined to overthrow Irujo with or without Batista. Batista had then accepted leadership in order to be able to exercise a moderating influence.

The Ambassador greeted with pleasure the Liberal Government's victory in the Canadian elections of August 10 since it ensured the continuance in office of Trade and Commerce Minister Howe who, in spite of agitation by Canadian beet sugar interests, had shown an appreciation of the importance to Cuba of maintaining a reasonable volume of unrefined cane sugar exports to Canada.

For the Ambassador:

  
John H. Morgan,  
Counselor of Embassy

Copy to BNA

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11-18522  
30/3/51

Tab<sup>±</sup> 3  
1/6/c

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation	<u>737.00/8-1853</u>
	<u>dup. 282</u>
Date	<u>18 Aug. 1953</u>
From	<u>Am.Emb. Habana</u>
To	<u>State</u>

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
- ☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

<u>State</u>	<u>28 Oct. 82</u>
Authority	Date

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SECURITY INFORMATION  
(Security Classification)

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*Mr. Morrow n 2*

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, HABANA  
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.  
REF : D-258, Aug. 14, 1953 (Weeka No. 33)

289  
DESP. NO.

August 19, 1953  
DATE

71 For Dept. Use Only SME	ACTION ARA	DEPT. OLI I IBS IFI IPS
	REC'D 8-22-53	OTHER NAVY CIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Aug 21 1953 <i>file</i>	DC/R Central Files
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SUBJECT: Political Situation Causes Journalists and Others to Leave Cuba

The Embassy has been informed that several well-known journalists have left Cuba for an indefinite period, reportedly because of fear of imprisonment in the event of further revolutionary outbreaks or of severe application of the new Public Order Law. According to this information, those who have left the country include Sergio CARBO, director of Prensa Libre, Mario KUCHILAN, columnist for Prensa Libre, Pedro MARTINEZ Fraga, writer for Prensa Libre, and Luis ORTEGA, director of Pueblo.

Others who have been reported to be preparing to leave Cuba are Jorge QUINTANA, president of the newspapermen's association of Habana Province, and Manuel REY Araque, radio station owner.

It is now fairly definitely established that to date José PARDO Llada has not left Cuba, as was originally reported. His present whereabouts seems to be unknown, although the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) appears to be trying hard to locate him.

It has been verified that Rafael ("Pilin") MENDOZA, friend and confidant of ex-President Carlos PRIO, left the country on August 9, 1953.

The departure of Juan BOSCH, the Dominican exile, for Costa Rica is being reported separately in despatch No. 288 of August 19, 1953.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

*Earl T. Crain*

Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

FCFornes, Jr.:rc  
REPORTER

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: AMBASSY GUATEMALA

160  
DESP. NO.

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. August 19, 1953

REF: BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AUG 20 1953

18	ACTION	DEPT.
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*file pay*

SUBJECT: Cuban Exile Group Deny Cuban Gov. Revolt Had Foreign Connections.

Five Cuban exiles, taken from the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington, D.C., on July 26, 1953, and shortly thereafter made statements to the press which sought to convey the impression that the revolt was purely of popular inspiration and had no connection with the Cuban exile elements, or with "important Cuban politicians". In a press conference, their connection with the revolutionary movement, their spokesman reportedly asserted that they were "not even remotely connected with the plotters".

The five Cuban exiles who were taken from the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington, D.C., on July 26, 1953, and shortly thereafter made statements to the press which sought to convey the impression that the revolt was purely of popular inspiration and had no connection with the Cuban exile elements, or with "important Cuban politicians". In a press conference, their spokesman reportedly asserted that they were "not even remotely connected with the plotters".

According to Prensa Libre, the five individuals were:

- Antonio LOPEZ Fernandez
- Antonio LOPEZ Garcia
- Mario DALMAU
- Armando ARENCIBIA Garcia
- Benjamin de YURRE

The government of the people of Cuba, in its efforts to bring about a peaceful and democratic revolution, has no connection with the Cuban exile elements, or with "important Cuban politicians". In a press conference, their spokesman reportedly asserted that they were "not even remotely connected with the plotters".

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Page 2 of  
Ltr. No. 160  
From Guatemala

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Page - of  
Encl. No.  
Disp. No.  
From

Turning to the Cuban political situation, the Cubans said that the position of General Batista could not be maintained since his support came only from the Army which was costing \$13,000,000 per year - nearly half the national budget.

R. A. Selassie  
Ambassador to the United States

cc: H. Cova

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SECURITY INFORMATION

La Habana, Miércoles, 8 de Julio de 1953.

# Presna Libre

DIARIO DE LA MASANA  
Director: Sergio Cabó

HUBERTO MEDRANO: Subdirector.  
JOSE SOBRIÑO: Administrador General.

LUIS CARRO: Secretario de Dirección.  
ANGEL PERDOMO TORRES: Jefe de Información.  
JILIO OTAZO: Jefe de Redacción.

ALFREDO LLARONA: Secretario de Redacción.  
OFICINAS: MAXBIQUE 563

TELEFONOS: Administración: A-9085. — Jefe de Redacción: A-4150. — Redacción: A-4731 y M-3941. — Anuncios: A-6161. — Circulación: A-9778. — Suscripciones: M-3547. — Publices: A-8304. — Deportes: M-3432. — Imprenta: M-3446.

Departamento de Publicidad: Víctor Llerena. — Anselmo S. Montero y De Armas. — Enciso Freyre. — Teléfono: A-6161 y A-9793.

Representante en Miami, para anuncios y suscripciones: Francisco Turó, 1433 Collins Ave. Teléfono: 38 5741.  
P. O. Box 1547: MIAMI BEACH FLA.

La prensa es un baluarte de la civilización para sin libertad de prensa y sin libertad de palabra, nuestras ideas libertarias serían sofocadas y desaparecerían. — Franklin Roosevelt

## TRANCHEA DE OBREROS

MUY BIEN POR URBE

No los conocemos, pero nos han hecho llegar una guía muy práctica que lleva ese nombre y nuestro deber es felicitarlos. Es un servicio novedoso que presta esta guía telefónica por calles y edificios. Algo nuevo, y algo bueno. Al César lo que es del César. Para eso estamos los periodistas.

MISION CUMPLIDA

Así nos dice Antonio Resíñez, ex burguésastre simbólico de la villa de Pepe Antonio, y Presidente del Comité Pro Terminación de las obras del Acueducto de Guanabacoa, y también Emilio Álvarez, secretario del Comité. Ya, al fin y al cabo, han logrado que el acueducto de la Ciudad Industrial sea el Ayuntamiento, esto quiere decir que el propio Municipio de ellos lo administre. ¡Felicidades!, todo es posible cuando hay voluntad.

## PROBLEMAS OBREROS

# Líderes 'rojos' orientan la campaña de tabacaleros

DIRIGEN LOS CINCO COMUNISTAS EL MOVIMIENTO TABACALERO. TRATA MUJAL DE JUSTIFICAR EL PACTO. -- COMISION DEL RETIRO MARITIMO. -- GRAVE ACUSACION A PATRONOS DE COMPANIAS DE SEGUROS Y FIANZAS. -- PROBLEMA EN UN CENTRAL AZUCARERO.

Continúan los dirigentes de la CTC haciendo aclaraciones en relación con el pacto de los comunis- tas y la Federación Tabacalera. Pero los "rojos" están ya dentro del movimiento obrero y esto puede producir perjuicios en el futuro a los trabajadores cubanos. Parece que los líderes oficiales han olvidado las luchas contra el totalitarismo soviético que consisten en los obreros cubanos imborrables momentos de sacrificio y dolor. Por muchas declaraciones de los jerarcas "ceceistas" tratando de justificar el pacto, la realidad es que cinco comunistas están dirigiendo el movimiento tabacalero y se están realizando gestiones para darle ventrada a nuevos líderes rojos en distintas federaciones de industrias.

Dentro del Buró de Dirección de la Central Sindical existe una corriente de protesta contra el pacto de la Federación Tabacalera y se asegura que líderes oficiales están gestionando del ministro de Trabajo, Arsenio González, la anulación del V Congreso Tabacalero.

## DECLARACIONES DE MUJAL

Desde Estogolmo donde se están desarrollando las sesiones del Congreso del V Congreso Tabacalero.

## VAGOL VAGOL

PRENSA LIBRE

Re

E

Los comunistas que participan en el Congreso Tabacalero, fueron elegidos por sus sindicatos. Agrega Mujal y participaron en este evento como trabajadores y no como políticos. Además, están en evidente minoría con cinco miembros en un ejecutivo de 75, por lo que no están en condiciones de pararnos los permitiremos de pasar ninguna consigna política o cuestión ajena al interés de los trabajadores, teniendo la obligación de aclarar los acuerdos de la mayoría, que seguramente, será siempre contraria a su doctrina y procedimientos".

Finalmente expresó Mujal que rechaza la intervención del gobierno en los Congresos Obreros o cualesquiera internas del movimiento obrero.

## CONTRA LOS

Asociación de Estogolmos de San- ti Spiritus, de las manifestaciones del combativo líder de la CTC, Samuel Powell apoyando el pacto de los tabacaleros con los comunistas. Expresa García que causó enorme sorpresa en el V Congreso Tabacalero la lectura del ejecutivo, cuando se conoció que cinco comunistas aparecían en el mismo y se comprobó más tarde que fué realizado un pacto para darle la secretaría general a Luis R. Serrano Tamayo, desconociendo la voluntad mayoritaria de la clase tabacalera.

**RETIRO MARITIMO**  
Cumpliendo instrucciones del ministro de Trabajo, Arsenio González, ha quedado constituida la comisión que tendrá a su cargo evaluar cualquier consulta que se formule y proceder a la confección del Reglamento de la Ley-Decreto 880 de 1953 que modificó la Ley de Retiro Marítimo, de 3 de septiembre.

La citada comisión está formada por Gustavo Angulo, Antonio R. López del Castillo, Nicomedes Yelo, Lorenzo, Eloy González Pérez y Miguel Palmer.

**GRAVE ACUSACION A PATRONOS**  
Informe Víctor F. Alegría, secretario general de la federación de empleados de seguros y fianzas que

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

August 27, 1953

TO: S/S - Mr. Scott  
FROM: ARA - Mr. Cabot  
SUBJECT: Cuban Armed Forces and the Political Situation

I think General Smith will be interested in reading the  
attached memorandum from Mr. Topping of my office on the Cuban  
political situation (TAB A).

ARA:JMCabot:mk

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECURITY~~ ~~INFORMATION~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ARA - Mr. ~~Gale~~ *Res'd, Sep 10 - not shown to Mr Woodward*  
Mr. Woodward  
MID - Mr. Burrows *BB* DATE: August 26, 1953

FROM : MID - Mr. Topping

SUBJECT: Cuban Armed Forces and the Political Situation

## Background

Batista came to power with the support of the armed forces. His regime is unpopular with the people, and depends on continued loyalty of the military. Any revolutionary attempt could probably not succeed without the support of at least a portion of the armed forces.

## Discussion

Until recently available evidence indicated that the armed forces continued loyal; that there was some dissatisfaction and dissension, due to personal rivalries and jealousies and uneven promotions; that in time of crisis differences would be submerged and a united front presented. Reports are now being received, however, which indicate that dissension is deeper, and cast doubt on continued unity of the armed forces. Report No. R-89-53 from the United States Military Attaché at Habana, evaluated B-2, contains interesting information on this situation. It states that the heads of National Police and of the Military Intelligence Service are bitter rivals in a struggle for power. They are young and extremely ambitious. Neither would voluntarily relinquish the power they now have. The report continues that a group of young but high-ranking military men have on occasion blocked Batista, and sometimes use him as a front-man because of his prestige. They will never allow elections to be held under conditions unfavorable to the present administration, and if necessary will get rid of Batista and take over the government. There are other military men who apparently desire reform, but who are also personally ambitious.

## Conclusions

The present situation in Cuba may well terminate in violence. To date Batista has the loyalty of the armed forces. However, personal interests and ambitions are rendering continued loyalty of important military figures problematic. Batista may be caught between the necessity to negotiate with the opposition in order to avoid revolution and the determination to retain power of certain military figures surrounding him. His position is approaching a critical stage both with relation to his civilian opposition and to certain elements in the armed forces.

ARA:MID:JLTopping:jgh

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General  
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FROM : AMEMBASSY, HABANA

331

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

August 27, 1953

DATE

REF :

2 For Dept. Use Only rrm	ACTION	DEPT.
	ARA	OLI L SY
	REC'D	OTHER
	Aug 28	ARMY NAVY CIA

SUBJECT: Possibility of Request for Extradition of Former Cuban Officials Indicted for Alleged Currency Frauds.

On August 24, 1953, Dr. Andres de Jesus PEREZ Bustamante, Special Judge of Instruction in Cause No. 131 of the year 1953, Court of Instruction, First Section, of the City of Habana, returned a criminal indictment against eight former officials of the Cuban Government who served in the administration of Dr. Carlos PRIO Socarras. The eight officials, accused of a complex of acts involving malfeasance, falsification of official documents and malversation in the custody and administration of public funds and records, are Ramiro HERNANDEZ Bofill, Antonio ANTON Bianchi, Manuel GARCIA Martinez, José Martin GUTIERREZ Fernández, Benito BATET Camps, Pablo GUTIERREZ Fernández, Pedro QUIROS Fernández and Antonio PRIO Socarras. The indictment followed discovery in circulation of condemned currency (silver certificates) which had been listed as burned.

Of the eight accused officials, only Benito Batet Camps is in Cuba to answer the charges and bail for his provisional liberty has been fixed at 25,000 pesos. No bail is authorized in the cases of the other seven officials. Bond in the amount of 22,000,000 pesos is required of each accused official to cover pecuniary responsibility and an embargo of personal assets is ordered in each case in an amount sufficient to cover the bond if not posted.

It is possible that the Cuban Government may seek extradition of the seven officials now living in exile.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

*Earl T. Crain*

Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

RSAlfonzo:ep

REPORTER

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MID - Mr. ~~Burrows~~  
Mr. ~~Topping~~

DATE: August 28, 1953

FROM : MID - Mr. Wellman

SUBJECT: Further Letter from Eliseo Riera-Gomez to Congressman Lantaff regarding Conditions in Cuba (TAB A)

This letter and the effect of the release by Congressman Lantaff of the Department's reply to his letter indicate to me that it is desirable for the Department to avoid if possible further argument with the opposition to Batista with respect to the anti-communist position of the Batista Government or conditions in Cuba.

It was probably necessary to give Senator Hickenlooper an extensive answer to the allegations he had received from Carlos Hevia that the Batista Government is pro-communist (TAB B). It would have been preferable, however, if we could have avoided writing so fully to Congressman Lantaff (TAB C), who has so many Cubans in his district, many of whom are vigorously opposed to Batista. We must anticipate that a Congressman may make available to his constituents any letter or statement we send to the Congressman. I do not recall, however, that we knew that Congressman Lantaff intended to make public (as opposed to making available to interested constituents) our letter to him or that we agreed to that action.

If Congressman Lantaff should refer Riera-Gomez' further letter to the Department for comment, I think we should not endeavor to reply to the allegations, unless the Congressman's letter requires it or the Congressman insists upon it. If we have to make a substantive reply, I suggest that we do so orally by calling upon the Congressman at his convenience and discussing the situation. If this is not feasible and a written reply is necessary, I suggest that we emphasize in our reply that our comments are for the Congressman's information only and request that he not make them public or transmit them to his constituents.

I think the Congressman will agree that it is not desirable for the United States Government to engage in any argument with the opposition to Batista regarding the merits or nature of the Batista administration. The opposition has already construed our statement of evidence that the Batista Government is now anti-communist as an indication of United States Government support for Batista.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 10, 1953

SUBJECT: Political Situation in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS: The Under Secretary  
Dr. Aurelio F. Conchoso, Ambassador of Cuba  
Mr. John L. Topping, MID

COPIES TO: ARA - Mr. Woodward  
MID - Mr. Burrows  
AR - Mr. Cale; Mr. Jamison  
Embassy Habana (informally)

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Ambassador Conchoso stated that the attempted revolution at Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953 had strengthened the Government's position since it had shown that the armed forces are solidly behind the Government, which would handle promptly and efficiently any attempted revolution. He said that a portion of the opposition to the present Government was prepared to participate in elections, but that another portion, headed by deposed Carlos Prío and his adherents, had thus far preferred to undertake insurrectionary activities. He added that the attempt at Santiago de Cuba had not been directly connected with the Prío group, but that Prío had supplied money for the arms used in that effort.

In response to an inquiry from General Smith whether the Cuban Government now felt sufficiently secure to undertake a return to constitutional government, the Ambassador stated that constitutional guarantees would be restored in about four weeks and that the Government would proceed with its plans to hold elections for Congress in June 1954.

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ARA:MID:JLTopping:dwm

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

September 1, 1953

To: The Under Secretary

Through: S/S

From: ARA - Mr. Woodward *NW*

Subject: Appointment with Ambassador Concheso of Cuba

Discussion:

Ambassador Concheso has just returned from an extended visit to Cuba. He will probably mention the situation in Cuba and the recently concluded international sugar conference. The United States and Cuba were among 35 nations attending the International Sugar Conference in London from July 13 to August 21. An International Sugar Agreement was signed tending to stabilize the world sugar market. Cuba had financed surplus sugar and restricted production, and is appreciative of our material help in getting the agreement.

General Fulgencio Batista seized power by a garrison revolt on March 10, 1952. His regime is unpopular, and depends on continued loyalty of the armed forces. Deposed President Carlos Prío, and other exiles, plot revolutionary activity in collaboration with elements inside Cuba, and endeavor to obtain arms for that purpose. Batista is not considered pro-communist, but there are indications that his followers are collaborating with communists in the labor field.

There was an unsuccessful revolutionary attempt at Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, causing around 100 deaths. Many opposition leaders have been imprisoned, constitutional guarantees suspended, censorship imposed, the communist newspaper, Hoy, closed, and a Law of Public Order decreed giving the Government broad powers to suppress opposition and criticism.

Apprehension is now lessening, and the Government feels that the possibility of insurrection has subsided. Ambassador Concheso told our Charge in Habana in great confidence that he will discuss with Prío in Miami a plan developed by Batista for a return to constitutional government. He feels it would be acceptable to the opposition, but might not be liked by the armed forces.

Recommendation:

If Ambassador Concheso brings up the subject of arrangements with the opposition, it is recommended that he be told, with suitable expressions recognizing that it is an internal Cuban question, in which the United States does not desire to intervene, that this Government would be pleased to see the return of constitutional government in Cuba, the removal of censorship and the restoration of constitutional guarantees. Should a suitable opportunity arise, you might also indicate our concern over the increasing influence of communists in the Cuban labor movement.

ARA:MID:JLTopping:dwm

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no reply necessary  
JLT

Dear Sir:

I am taking the liberty of sending to you the following article which appeared in the Cuban newspaper, "El Mundo", written by the Cuban journalist and historian, Herminio Portell Vilá, and entitled "Diplomacy and Government". This article deals with the "13 points" issued by our State Department in Washington over the signature of Thurston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, exonerating Dictator Fulgencio Batista of Cuba from charges of having helped the Communist Party.

The above-mentioned "13 points" were given to Representative Lantaff after he had sent a series of articles, written by me, to the State Department. It should be made clear that the State Department issued this report without asking the writer of the articles which accused Batista, among other things, of being pro-Communist, for proof of his statements. The author of these articles has prepared supporting material, accompanied by documentary evidence, which has been forwarded to Congressman Lantaff.

Following is the article mentioned above.

#### DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNMENT

I do not know which North American diplomatic official informed a certain Florida Congressman about the assurances that the government in Washington has that Batista is anti-Communist. I imagine, however, that he is someone new and obviously not acquainted with the recent history of Communism in Cuba, unless facts and data to the contrary are being deliberately ignored.

In my opinion, it would have been better if the above-mentioned diplomat and his Florida correspondent had kept the communication which passed between them to themselves. Thus, they could have continued living with their "official and diplomatic truths" without provoking us historians to the point where we have to present the "real truth", which is completely different and follows facts.

Three or four days ago, while appearing on "El Mundo on Television", the present Secretary of Labor reminded the workers that it was Batista who in 1938 secured recognition of the CTC, at that time Communist dominated. Batista's co-worker, well informed on what he was saying, boasted to his then friends of the first step taken by Batista towards his "understanding" with the Communists, which was eventually to end with his having them in his cabinet as governmental Secretaries on various occasions; to backing Lázaro Peña's domination of the Cuban workers; to tolerating Communist activities in our country, including those of Fabio Grobart; to looking with favor on the workers' parades on May First, which in reality were propaganda demonstrations and exhibitions of Communist influence; to establishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and granting conspicuous privileges to men like André Simon, the leading Czech Communist who last year was executed in his own country after having been at one time an outstanding figure in international Communism.

The political coalition which put Batista in the President's Palace in 1940 had the specific backing of the Communist party, disguised as the Partido Socialista Popular. As recently as June 1950 the few Batista followers who formed the Partido Acción Unitaria, together with the Partido Nacional Cubano of Nicolás Castellanos and the Partido Socialista Cubano, were united in

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the elections in which Castellanos was elected Mayor of Havana. As a recognition of Communist support, Mr. César Escalante of the Partido Socialista Popular was elected Vice President, of the Municipal Council of Havana, together with Mr. Félix Ayón of the Partido Acción Unitaria who served in the capacity of Secretary.

Is it possible that, taking into consideration everything that has happened in the State Department in Washington during these last few years, it is not even aware of these antecedents which are common knowledge in Cuba? But let them bring on their "13 points", issued by the State Department exonerating Batista, as though they were an incontrovertible expression of truth. It is true that Batista put an end to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Legation after March 10th, but there is no overlooking the fact that it was he who established a Soviet Legation in Cuba in the first place.

Day by day, in spite of all the official boasting about anti-Communism, it is easier for Cuban Communists to travel from their own country to the Soviet Union and its puppet states, and return to continue their propaganda, than it is for a politician of the "bourgeois" opposition to make a round trip to the United States. The only difficulties are in the method of transportation and the stop in the United States; but if these obstacles could be removed, Cuban Communists would be free to move about the entire world at will.

If the McCarran Act were to be complied with to the letter, more than one member of the Cuban government who was at one time or another a candidate on the Communist ticket - including Fulgencio Batista - would, like Blás Roca, a Communist leader himself, have to get to Europe and Asia via Canada or Bermuda.

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This article is to serve as proof of Batista's background in Cuban politics insofar as Communism is concerned and which I submit to you for your information and files.

) Respectfully yours,

*Eliseo Riera-Gómez*  
Eliseo Riera-Gómez  
2521 N. Greenway Dr.  
Coral Gables, Florida



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: Sept. 10, 1953

SUBJECT: Political Situation in Cuba; Opposition to  
Batista; Desire for United States Intervention

PARTICIPANTS: Eliseo Riera-Gomez  
MID - Mr. Topping  
AR - Mr. Jamison

COPIES TO: SY  
AR - Amb. Dreier  
MID - Mr. Burrows  
H  
Embassy Habana (informally)  
ARA Board  
DPA

Mr. Riera-Gomez, a naturalized American citizen of Cuban birth, resident in Miami, has sent a number of communications to various persons, including the President, members of Congress, the Secretary and other officers of the Department, concerning the situation in Cuba. His communications express opposition to Batista and his regime, make various allegations about them, and generally urge that the United States take action indicating disapproval of the present situation in Cuba. His appointment with officers of the Department was arranged through the office of Representative Lantaff of Florida, after he had handed the Representative an undated communication in Miami, a few days before September 2, 1953, alleging that Batista supports and is supported by Communists in Cuba and stating that the report given Mr. Lantaff by the Department, and subsequently released for publication by him, concerning Batista and Communism is "either not based on facts or it shows a complete ignorance of recent Communist history in Cuba, unless facts and data to the contrary are being completely ignored".

The commitment of the United States to follow a policy of strict non-intervention, as set forth in Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as well as the great interest of the Latin American states, including Cuba, in promoting that policy, were explained to Mr. Riera-Gomez.

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The significance of the continuance of diplomatic relations with foreign governments in the light of Resolution 35 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference, was also discussed. The statements made in the Department's letter of June 29, 1953 to Mr. Lantaff were gone over with him, and it was pointed out that they were factual. He felt that there were other facts which the Department had not brought out, which would have established that Batista is pro-Communist, evidence in support of some of which he had submitted in his recent communication to Representative Lantaff. There was some discussion of the nature and pertinence of the data he had submitted, and of other reports and allegations which have come to the Department's attention, concerning the Communist sympathies of certain members of the Batista administration, Communist attempts at infiltration of other Cuban political parties, and the significance of recent Communist advances in the Cuban labor movement.

Mr. Riera-Gomez said that his activities against Batista were causing him personal difficulties. He felt that he had been investigated in Miami by agencies of this government, and said that when he and his wife (an American citizen) recently visited Cuba he was questioned and searched by Cuban authorities, and that his wife was taken into a separate room, stripped and searched by a matron. He said that he was sure that he and his wife would not be permitted to enter Cuba again so long as the present Cuban administration was in power.

Mr. Riera-Gomez gave it as his personal opinion that elections held by Batista would not be honest and that no prominent politician except possibly Grau San Martin would participate in them. He also felt that Batista would not agree to surrender power to a caretaker government which was the only arrangement for elections which would be satisfactory to the opposition. He said that the unsuccessful revolutionary attempt at Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, and its prompt and bloody suppression by the Army, had aroused the Cuban people, who were now ready to revolt. He said that many military officers were also disgusted with the situation, and would join a movement against Batista.

Mr. Riera-Gomez said that he had met Carlos Prío Socarrás, deposed President of Cuba, a few times in Miami. There was no indication that he knew other members of the Prío family. He said that Prío had been most anxious to step down as President of Cuba, since he had been fully aware that the excesses of members of his government, especially of his brothers, had made him unpopular with the people. Those excesses had also greatly

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disturbed him, and he had planned to leave Cuba and Cuban politics after the election. For that reason, Mr. Riera-Gomez said, Batista's allegation that he had staged his own revolt in order to forestall one by Prío was absurd. He added that Prío was now determined to overthrow Batista, and that he was willing to expend his entire fortune to that end. He added that the Cuban people looked to Prío to lead the movement against Batista, and to furnish the funds for that movement. He displayed no knowledge of Prío's plans or activities, though he appeared confident of their successful outcome. His final comment was that Batista would be overthrown and that there would be a new government in Cuba within ninety days.

Mr. Riera-Gomez requested authorization from the Department to make public the information contained in his recent undated communication to Representative Lantaff, a copy of which he had sent the Department. He was told that the communication originated with him, was not addressed to the Department, was **not in response to any** indication from the Department, and that consequently the Department was not in a position to express any opinion in connection with his request. He inquired whether the Department would object to a future Cuban government headed by Carlos Prío Socarrás, and was informed that the answer to his question was inherent in the policy of non-intervention. He asked what the United States would do in the event there were two warring governments in Cuba, and was told that the question was hypothetical and no definite answer could be given in advance of the event. The general criteria for the continuance of relations with foreign governments were explained to him.

Mr. Riera-Gomez stated a number of times during the interview that he was not acting as an agent or representative of any Cuban group or individual, but rather that he was completely independent and was engaged in what he described as a "one man crusade". He stated that he hoped to interest the American press and Congress in the Cuban situation, and left a copy of an article by Ralph McGill, date unknown, which he said he had recently clipped from the Atlanta "Constitution", entitled "Return of the Monster". He said he was spending a few days in Washington, and was then proceeding to New York. He was accompanied to the Department by Mr. Wyatt of the Washington "Daily News", who waited for him but was not present during the interview.

Mr. Riera-Gomez offered no corroborative evidence for any of his statements. He did not appear to have a knowledge of Cuban affairs deeper than that to be gained by a cursory perusal of Cuban periodicals. He is by his own statement deeply and

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emotionally concerned over the present Cuban situation, and resolved to do all in his power to change it. His emotional involvement with affairs in his mother country has confused his sense of loyalty. He repeatedly used "we" to refer indiscriminately to Americans and Cubans, employing such phrases as "We are determined to get rid of Batista".

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: AMEMBASSY, HABANA  
TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON  
REF:

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DESP. NO.

September 16, 1953  
DATE

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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BATISTA'S SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1953

On September 4, 1953, the 20th anniversary of his first assumption of power in 1933, President BATISTA delivered a speech at Camp Columbia which was the highlight of the program of ceremonies and social events that marked the event. A copy of the speech is enclosed.

The speech had been awaited with great expectation, especially since it was anticipated that the President would take advantage of the occasion to announce the lifting of censorship of information media, some move toward restoring constitutional guarantees, and possibly a government plan regarding elections that would lead to a compromise solution of political problems. The speech was a disappointment in this respect since the President touched on these subjects only in generalities and said nothing that differed very much from his previous public statements on these matters.

It is evident that the speech was changed just before it was delivered to include the quotation (see below) from the issue of Time magazine that had appeared just before September 4. However, there is evidence that revisions other than this obvious one may have been made at the last minute. The Ministry of Information had given definite indications that important statements regarding censorship and constitutional guarantees could be expected, while such a close mirror of government opinion as Alerta had commented on the probable encouraging effect of the speech on election prospects. Hence, there is reason to believe that Batista had intended to be more specific on the subjects of censorship, constitutional guarantees and the elections, but had changed his mind at the last moment, possibly under pressure from the armed forces which may have felt that the time was not ripe for relaxation of strict measures to control the situation.

The speech in general was a kind of "state of the nation" oration covering the political and economic situations. Batista defended the March 10 coup and his regime in much the same fashion as he has done before and emphasized the recent court decision that upheld the validity of his regime as a de facto government.

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From Habana

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From \_\_\_\_\_

He devoted considerable space to an enumeration of the achievements and programs of his Government in connection with economic matters.

In touching on the political situation, Batista said that he preferred periods of the most complete liberties to those in which liberties were restricted. "The restrictions that exist today," he continued, "were set up to protect . . . society . . ." and when the peace of the country and its economic structure are endangered, there is no alternative but to combat the "treacherous campaign that has already cost the loss of precious lives." He said that Cubans must "trust that when constitutional guarantees are restored excesses will not again disturb the clear road to elections." Commentators have deduced an intent to seek a solution to the election problem from the following words used by Batista in his speech: "The political parties of the opposition and of the Government must lead the citizenry to the goal of constitutional normality." He closed this part of his address by affirming that he reiterated "the most sincere intent of continuing to fight for the reestablishment of democratic traditions" bequeathed by Cuban forebears.

As a further indication of Batista's public attitude at this time toward Communism, that part of his speech dealing with this subject warrants translation in full.

"We must watch out for widely differing angles of opposition policy. There are important groups lying in ambush. Among them is Communism which is an enemy of constant danger. And it is such not only because of the ideas it defends but also because of facility of adaptation and lack of scruples in the means used to achieve the end set before it. It is rejected by public opinion and the opinion of the working classes in general, but nonetheless it succeeds in slyly infiltrating even institutions and groups of conservative ideas. Wherever there may be a reason for economic or social disturbance there Communism will be with a demagogical demand or deceptive request. Its principal tactic consists in sowing seeds of discord. The police organizations have proof of agreements reached by the directors of Cuban Communism regarding assistance to certain campaigns of hostility to the regime begun by some groups that might be supposed to be in the opposite extreme, such as the Catholic Action groups. Even there the fifth column of the party entered, taking advantage of the agitation promoted by other partisan elements in isolated cases."

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Dev. No. 405  
From Habana

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Comments on Communism were interrupted by a denunciation of "insidious propaganda" of which the President cited as an example an article in the September 7 issue of Time magazine regarding the head injury suffered by the Cardinal Archbishop of Habana, which article he quoted in part. He also quoted an editorial by Ram6n VASCONCELOS, director of Alerta, in which Vasconcelos ascribed indirectly to the Communists the rumors to the effect that the police were responsible for the Cardinal's injury. Vasconcelos called these rumors an attempt to create dissension between the Catholic government and the Catholic people of Cuba. After these two quotations, Batista concluded his remarks on Communism as follows:

"These (referring to Vasconcelos' statement of the objective of the rumors in the case of the Cardinal) are, among others, the immediate objectives of Communism in Cuba. The Communists always reckon with a plan previously drawn up; with the iron discipline of their organization; and with the cooperation of the groups in opposition to our regime which in such sense serve them as a pretext and a support."

Batista ended his speech on the note that the Government should not go to excesses in exercising power but had to maintain its authority and that the interpreters of public opinion and sentiment should not abuse the rights conferred upon them by law.

For the Charg6 d'Affaires a.i.:



Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure *W*

✓ Copy of speech

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MINISTERIO DE INFORMACION.

4 DE SEPTIEMBRE, 1953.

DIRECCION DE PUBLICIDAD DEL PALACIO PRESIDENCIAL.

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DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL HONORABLE SEÑOR  
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA, MAYOR GENERAL  
FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDIVAR, EN COLUMBIA, -  
CON MOTIVO DEL 4 DE SEPTIEMBRE.

Compatriotas, compañeros:

RECuento Y PLEGARIA

En estos 20 años he tenido el honor de celebrar aquí, con ustedes, trece aniversarios gloriosos; y desde esta misma tribuna me dirigí siempre a nuestro pueblo para hacer recuento y enfocar el porvenir.

El 4 de Septiembre es un día jubiloso para la gran familia militar. Siempre lo hemos esperado con alegría rebo- sante, como deben esperarse las faustas fechas de la Patria. Pero este año hay un pesar que agobia al corazón, y en nuestros labios una tierna, una profunda, una devota plegaria que se eleva al cielo conmovido y se traslada, a través de las heroicas y legendarias montañas orientales, a los silenciosos panteones en donde reposan los restos gloriosos de los valientes compañeros que resultaron víctimas de la alevosa agresión de que fueron objeto en Santiago de Cuba y Bayamo.

LA AGRESION A LOS CUARTELES.

Aquel ataque por sorpresa a los cuarteles el día de Santa Ana, el pasado 26 de Julio -incalificable por su crueldad y su insania- fué una dura experiencia para los que creían en el arrepentimiento de los resentidos. Apuñalear a centinelas, asesinar enfermos, ensañarse con heridos moribundos, indefensos, fué la obra de manos criminales obedientes a un odio insólito y enfermizo, y al oro saqueado al pueblo que salió de Cuba es- puramente.

El traidor ataque a los cuarteles fué una voz de alar-

ta para todos. Dió la medida de la crueldad y de lo que son capaces nuestros enemigos; pero a tan grande mal siguió el alto ejemplo de abnegación, de valor y de unidad en nuestros hombres -murallas inexpugnables de patriotismo y de entereza- puestos al servicio de Cuba, del decoro ciudadano y de la causa que en favor de nuestro pueblo defendemos.

Aquel Regimiento consagrado en la gran prueba de combate, ganó la Cruz de Honor, condecoración la más alta y la menos prodigada en las Fuerzas Armadas. Los bravos que sobresalieron en la acción y su bizarro Jefe, lucirán en sus viriles pechos la Cruz Maceo, nombre glorioso que ostenta con legítimo orgullo aquel mando. Cuba entera, estremecida de espanto, ha podido percatarse de los excesos a que podrían haber llegado con ese odio revanchista, si sólo por unas horas hubieran logrado enseñorearse de la ciudad o de otras ciudades en el país.

#### UNA MIRADA ATRAS.

A veinte años de distancia podemos situarnos para analizar el dramático proceso que nuestro pueblo ha vivido; el trayecto nos es suficientemente conocido. Como cubanos, hicimos nuestra la lucha que la Nación sostenía contra el gobierno que fue derrocado el 12 de Agosto. Queríamos empujar hacia adelante la causa popular, porque nos dolía, como una herida en el pecho, la tragedia de la nacionalidad en frustración. Transcurridas las horas del día, desde las once de la mañana, hora en que proclamamos la revolución en este Campamento, y constituida la asamblea de clases y soldados bajo mi jefatura, distribuidos ya los mandos en toda la República, pasadas las diez de la noche, representantes de sectores diversos participaron en aquella eclosión revolucionaria inolvidable. Todos, militares y civiles, nos llamábamos a la sazón compañeros. Todos nos considerábamos militantes de la revolución cubana. Pero había tal heterogeneidad ideológica, que cada cual le dio interpretaciones



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 22, 1953

SUBJECT: Political Situation in Cuba; Opposition to Batista;  
Desire for United States Intervention

PARTICIPANTS: Eliseo Riera-Gomez  
MID - Mr. Topping  
AR - Mr. Jamison

COPIES TO: AR - Mr. Jamison  
AR - Ambassador Dreier  
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Embassy Habana (informally)

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This second meeting with Mr. Riera-Gomez was also arranged through the office of Representative Lantaff of Florida. At the same time that office inquired whether an interview could be arranged between Mr. Riera-Gomez and Ambassador Gardner, and was informed that this office was not prepared to do so.

Mr. Riera-Gomez stated that he had seen a number of newspapermen during his visit to New York, including Herbert Matthews of the New York Times. He hoped to develop an interest in the press and among the American people concerning the situation in Cuba, feeling that if the people were aware of true conditions in that country public clamor would be sufficient to oust Batista promptly. He also stated that he hoped to interest members of Congress in his "crusade", which he stated was personally most inconvenient and expensive for him, since he had no assistance whatever.

Mr. Riera-Gomez again asked whether this Government could not make some official statement to the effect that it looked with disfavor upon dictatorships, and that the present Cuban Government was a dictatorship, and was told that such action did not appear to be possible. It was pointed out to him that the non-intervention policy was one adopted by this Government after long experience, and the opinion was expressed that it would not be lightly modified.

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Mr. Riera-Gomez again requested "permission" from the Department to release the information contained in his undated communication to Representative Lantaff and was again told that the Department had no control whatever over communications prepared by himself. He requested my approval of a press release he had prepared covering his conversations in the Department and was told that the Department could express no opinion on such a document. (The release appeared well-prepared and non-committal.)

Mr. Riera-Gomez appeared to be friendly and honest, and upon departure reiterated his determination to continue his campaign against Batista.

The following day Mr. Roscoe Snipes of UP called to inquire whether I had spoken with Riera-Gomez, who had called on him that morning. I explained to him the background of the conversations, and in general terms the subjects discussed. Mr. Snipes expressed the opinion that the matter was not newsworthy.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AMEMBASSY, HABANA

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 525

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 13, 1953

REF

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 19	DEPT. IN OTHER
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SUBJECT:

Transmitting Report from Consulate at Santiago de Cuba  
on Political and Economic Conditions in Oriente Province

The enclosed report, dated October 5, 1953, from the American Consulate at Santiago de Cuba is devoted principally to an account of a conversation between Vice Consul Arthur W. Feldman and Sr. Luis CASERO, ex-Mayor of Santiago de Cuba and former Minister of Public Works in the Prío Government. Sr. Casero discussed at length the attack on the Moncada Barracks. His version of the attack is believed to be fairly, though probably not completely, accurate. However, the Embassy is not prepared to go along with Sr. Casero's opinion that the leader of the attack, Fidel CASTRO, is strictly an idealist. The Embassy's impression of Fidel Castro is that he is an extremely ambitious and ruthless opportunist, obviously not adverse to violence when it serves his purpose.

It will be noted that Sr. Casero stated that he is trying to obtain permission to leave Cuba and if this is granted, he will go with his family to the United States and remain there "until the next change of Government which should not be too far off in the future." Plot rumors have died down in the past few days and the Embassy has no information as to the basis for Casero's prediction.

For the Ambassador:

*Earl T. Crain*  
Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure

Copy of report dated 10/5/53

ETC:crain:ep

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Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

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Page 1 of  
Encl. No. 1  
Desp. No. 525  
From Habana

COPY

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, October 5, 1953.

RESTRICTED

Harold M. Randall, Esquire,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.,  
American Embassy,  
Habana.

Sir:

I have the honor to report on a conversation held this afternoon with Mr. Luis CASERO y Guillén concerning the attack on Moncada Cuartel. Mr. Casero was Minister of Public Works in the Prio Government and after March 10, 1952 returned to Santiago to become an insurance agent.

He was one of those arrested after July 26, and, along with seventy others, was found not guilty today of having participated in the assault.

He has had long conversations with Mr. Fidel Castro in jail and has come away with the impression that Mr. Castro is an idealist and an intellectual. Mr. Castro informed him that he represented the youth of Cuba and would have nothing to do with the existing politicians whose moral values are not high enough to serve Cuba. That is the reason why in organizing the revolt, he enrolled only young persons. He claims that he gave them no information concerning the real reason for gathering in Santiago outside of the fact that they would make a demonstration against the Government. It was only before starting out on the attack that the plan was exposed and there was opposition from about five of the men. This delayed the attack about one hour which was to have taken place at 4:30 A.M. when all the soldiers would be sure to be asleep. The intention was to drive the cars (about fifteen) into the cuartel, form a barricade and call upon the soldiers to surrender peacefully. The attackers, it is claimed, did not have the intention of engaging in warfare but hoped to take the cuartel by a show of force.

The first car, in attempting to enter the cuartel, stalled and threw the plan askew. The soldiers, being alerted, began shooting and the men took refuge in the nearest buildings, which were the military hospital and the homes of the military. Since all but one were strangers to the city, he claimed that they had no knowledge of the layout of the cuartel and the surrounding buildings. It was brought out in the trial that none of the patients were killed by stabbing, as first reported, but by the

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From Habana

shooting between the attackers and the attacked. Mr. Casero informed me that Castro accounted for every cent collected for this attack and that this money, \$16,480, came from the group themselves who raised it by loans and from their meager savings to buy the guns used, which were all purchased in Habana from stores and which consisted of: 36 Remington Automatic 22 calibre and 22 Savage 22 calibre rifles, 60 pistols, one Winchester and one machine gun. Mr. Casero asserted that all of the participants were Cubans and that the evidence failed to show any Communist or other political group's participation. He stated that the Government tried to show that Communists as well as Prio's followers had had a hand in the attack but neither of these claims have as yet been proven in the trial and practically all of the evidence has been submitted to date.

Mr. Casero stated that the rebels were in the main members of the Orthodox Party and that there were a few from the Autentico Party. He also reported that from his conversations with Mr. Castro he learned that the plan was to take the cuartels at Santiago and Bayamo, to set up a constitutional government in Oriente and call upon President Batista to return constitutional controls to the government with guaranteed free elections. They were not afraid of being counter-attacked from the air since the cuartels are centrally located in the cities and are near hospitals and homes and it was known to them that the air force did not have the know how for pin point bombing and would not risk it. Mr. Castro made a very favorable impression on Mr. Casero.

Some of the above facts are at variance with information given me by Major Andrés Perez Chaumont, who claimed that there were about eight unidentified slain men who were not Cubans and who were short, dark and hairy. He also stated that Communist literature had been found on some of the attackers and that Prio and his group were backers of the assault. None of the Major's information was substantiated at the trial and in fact Lázaro Peña was found to be not guilty of any participation.

Mr. Casero informed me that the court has been requested to give each of the guilty prison sentences of 27 years but it is believed that the court will attempt to assign sentences in accordance with and proportionate to the responsibility held by each of the accused.

The Court House is guarded during the trial sessions both by soldiers and by police, the former armed with rifles and sub-machine guns. There have been no public demonstrations in favor of the accused and the sentiment which immediately after July 26 was in favor of the Army has veered to the opposite, what with the reported initial killing in cold blood of those captured and

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the subsequent arrests of persons who were supposedly innocent of collaboration with the rebels but who were outspoken against the Government and its practices. Most recently at the reception given in honor of Congressman Jackson, it was quite evident that the presence of the military chiefs was not welcomed by many of the Cubans present and the contacts between both groups were coolish and few. The Americans present acted as a buffer between both groups.

Mr. Casero is trying to obtain permission to leave Cuba and if this is granted, he will go with his family to the United States and remain there until the next change of government which should not be too far off in the future, he claims. He informed me that he felt the Government could not remain long in power since a recent poll showed that only 7% of the people were in favor of it. He expressed the hope that he would be able to take a part in the next government and that he would advocate reorganizing the Army for which there is no great need and bring into it youth from the middle class who are educated and have some realization of moral ethics and responsibilities.

The city has returned somewhat to a normal outward appearance with few soldiers and police seen about.

The local economic situation has shown no improvement and many concerns have reported the month of September as being one of their worst. Bank collections and collections in general are very poor with demands for extensions and protests everyday events. Some credit has recently been requested to purchase Christmas stock and rice. It is anticipated that the coffee crop will get good prices since this year it is expected to be less than the demand. One bank has reported that for the first time in years it has earned less than its current expenses. The Electric Light Company has also reported that last month was the first time in many years that they had, not only no increase in customers but had a loss of four.

Further information will be transmitted concerning developments as they occur.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur W. Feldman,  
American Vice Consul

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM AMEMBASSY, HABANA

548

DESP. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 19, 1953

DATE

REF Embassy D-541, October 16, 1953

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
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	10/21	NAVY-3

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SUBJECT: Cuban Minister of State Issues Strong Anti-Communist Statement.

Ambassador Arthur GARDNER presented his credentials to President BATISTA on October 17. In the exchange of speeches at that ceremony pledges of cooperation were exchanged. On the same day the Cuban Minister of State released the following statement to the Cuban press:

"First: That the Government of the Republic-- as is well-known--maintains its firm position of opposition to Communism and its penetration in this hemisphere.

"Second: That it fulfills all the Inter-American resolutions against such penetration."

"Third: That it has just declared itself in favor of the inclusion in the agenda for the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, of the theme: 'The Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics.'

"Fourth: That it is opposed, naturally, to any Communist action in this continent."

Press clippings of the statement as published on October 18 are enclosed.

The English language Habana Post, in an editorial published October 18, referred to the release of the statement as "the long arm of coincidence" which "on infrequent occasions . . . reaches out and gently arranges the pieces on the chess board so that they make a great deal of sense . . .". The editorial

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From Habana

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(copies of which are enclosed) concluded by stating:

"It is one thing to pay lip service to anti-Communism and quite a different matter to take effective steps to combat this evil, such as has been done by the Cuban government. Ambassador Gardner undoubtedly is well aware of this but we are sure that it must be a matter of considerable satisfaction to him to see that the friendship and cooperation of which he and President Batista spoke has a real and practical meaning in the Republic of Cuba."

An editorial published October 17 by Información (copies enclosed) stated that Cuba's "firm and rotund ratification of Cuba's anti-Communist policy" will surely be applauded without reservation not only by all Cubans, but by all peoples in the Americas.

The timing of the statement was considered opportune "because already there is noted throughout the Continent a reaction to work for the elimination of all possibility of Communist penetration in the western hemisphere."—Its particular virtue was considered to be the fact that the declaration "does not limit itself to proclaiming opposition to the Communist penetration, but asks that action be taken against it . . . concerted action by all the nations of the Continent in an inter-American agreement that would commit all of them to that action."

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#### Comment

Coinciding with the commencement of Ambassador Gardner's mission to Cuba, the Minister of State's declaration of policy supports the anti-Communist item proposed by the United States for the agenda of the Tenth Inter-American Conference as well as the United Kingdom's anti-Communist action in British Guiana. It ties in closely (and helpfully) with the statement of U.S. policy as expressed in the October 14 speech of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. John Moors Cabot, before the General Federation of Women's Clubs. It places the Cuban Government squarely on the side of the United States in its dispute with the Communist-ridden regime in Guatemala.

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
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From \_\_\_\_\_

The Cuban statement, used in connection with the enclosed  
USIA commentary on Mr. Cabot's speech, appeared in six newspapers  
in Habana and the interior and will be broadcast by perhaps  
thirty radio stations throughout the country.

For the Ambassador:



Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures

Newspaper clippings  
USIA commentary

cc: Amembassy, Guatemala.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM AMEMBASSY, HABANA

610

DESP. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 2, 1953

REF Embassy Despatch No. 548, October 19, 1953.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D	DEPT. IN OTHER
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SUBJECT: Draft Law-Decree Against Communism.

The Cuban Minister of Information announced to the press that in its night session beginning late on October 30, 1953, the Council of Ministers approved a draft law-decree against communism. The Minister's announcement read as follows:

"There was approved a draft law-decree of the Ministry of the Interior complementing agreements of the IX Inter-American Conference at Bogot  in 1948 and the 8th resolution regarding strengthening of internal security adopted by the fourth consultative conference of Foreign Ministers held in Washington in 1951, and declaring the meddling political action of international Communism prohibited and contrary to the full exercise of national sovereignty".

The text of this law-decree will be transmitted to the Department when it is published in the Official Gazette. The Minister of Information's report of the draft indicates that the Cuban Government is formalizing in legislation the anti-communist statement issued by the Minister of State on October 16, 1953 (see despatch under reference).

For the Ambassador:



Earl T. Crain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

FOR FILES, JR./CV

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM AMEMBASSY, HABANA  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

612  
DESP. NO.

NOV 3 1953  
737.00/11-253  
November 3, 1953

REF

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D	DEPT. IN F O OTHER	DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 1953
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SUBJECT: Transmitting Clandestine Resistance Paper.

Many officers of the Embassy have received through the mail copies of a clandestine anti-BATISTA and anti-government publication called "Liberation, Organ of the Cuban Revolution" (Liberación, Organo de la Revolución Cubana). The issue now being circulated is No. 4 of Volume 1 for August-September 1953, and is accompanied by a supplement dated October 1953, copies of both of which are enclosed. Nothing is known to the Embassy regarding the persons responsible for its publication and distribution.

The following are articles of particular interest that appear in the attached copy of "Liberación". Under the headline on Page 1 of "Massacre in Orient" (Masacre en Oriente), there appears an account alleging that many of the attackers of the army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26 were murdered after they surrendered. Also on Page 1 appears an article headed "The Truth About the Arteaga Case" (La Verdad Sobre el Caso de Arteaga). In this story it is claimed that the head injury suffered in August by Cardinal-Archbishop Arteaga occurred when he opposed efforts of agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) and the Bureau of Investigations to obtain from him a report and evidence submitted by the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba regarding the killing of July 26 revolutionaries who had surrendered.

In a box on Page 5 under the heading "Political Kidnappings" (Secuestros Políticos), the Government is accused of kidnapping and torture using for such purposes not only the SIM and the Bureau of Investigations, but also "known gangsters hired by those specialists in blackmail, attack and torture, Rolando MASFERRER and Ernesto DE LA FE."

included  
Also on the inside pages is a representation of Batista as "a disguised pro-Communist" (Batista: Un Pro-Comunista Disfrazado).

For the Ambassador:

Earl T. Crain

Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:  
Publication.  
HCFornes, Jr./cv

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**"Esos hombres que han alcanzado el mando tras la felonía, merecen implacable hostilidad".**

**-MAURA.**

**LIBERACION**

SUPLEMENTO

**Contrarreste la censura  
haga circular este  
periódico.**

## **"El Régimen de Batista es de Estilo Soviético" dice el Dr. Carlos Prío en carta al New York Times**

LIBERACION abre sus páginas para insertar la carta que el Presidente Constitucional de Cuba, Dr. Carlos Prío Socarrás, remitió al editor del diario norteamericano "New York Times", con motivo del sensacional editorial cuya traducción publicamos en nuestra edición número 4.

Dice así la carta:

Al editor del New York Times:

El pueblo cubano debe al New York Times un tributo de gratitud por su reciente y magnífico editorial sobre "El dilema de Batista". El editorial describe con exactitud las condiciones trágicas de Cuba bajo la dictadura que tergicó nuestros principios democráticos. Esto subraya la propia impotencia del dictador para romper el "círculo vicioso" que la tiranía pone en movimiento, lo cual está implacable e inevitablemente empujando a Cuba dentro del dolor de la violencia, de la rebelión y del colapso económico.

Si no fuera por la abrumadora censura establecida por Batista, y por las represalias de los estatutos —tipo soviético— actualmente redactadas en el arbitrario "Decreto Ley 997 de Orden Público", el cual usted menciona en su editorial, usted indudablemente recibiría cientos de mensajes de felicitación de los cubanos en cada paso de su vida.

Desde que la libertad de pensamiento ha sido brutalmente suprimida por Batista bajo la ley marcial, el régimen estilo soviético y la brutalidad de la policía, estimo que es mi obligación, como último Presidente electo constitucionalmente en Cuba, expresar la sentida gratitud de mi pueblo por la posición que ustedes han tomado en sus horas de sufrimiento. Su sufrimiento es tan aterrador como la suerte de cualquiera de los infortunados pueblos de Europa que están cautivos detrás de la Cortina de Hierro del dominio soviético.

Su artículo le hace un gran honor al pueblo de Cuba cuando usted dice: "Mientras que el Ejército permanezca así (a Batista) la tapa permanecerá errada —aunque no siempre, no con un pueblo como el de Cuba". Usted puede estar seguro que el pueblo de Cuba corresponderá en su oportunidad la alta opinión en que ustedes lo han colocado.

Ellos demostrarán una vez más que merecen la libertad por la cual han

peleado tan inflexiblemente por más de cien años, y la generosa actitud del pueblo americano cuando en una Resolución Conjunta del Congreso declararon que el pueblo de Cuba —por entonces peleando en una batalla de muerte contra España—, "es, como exigen los derechos, libre e independiente". Este acuerdo, que fué sellado con la sangre de americanos y cubanos en los campos de batalla durante la guerra española-americana, es hoy en día tan verdadero como en el tiempo en que fué solemnemente pronunciada por su Congreso en el año 1898. Cuba está dispuesta a reconquistar su libertad a cualquier precio —aunque el precio terrible sea en penas, sangre y lágrimas.

Necesitamos ahora, como necesitábamos en 1898, una comprensión de nuestra pena por parte del pueblo americano. En esta ocasión no sería necesario para la nación americana de tomar parte armada en el conflicto. Ayuda espiritual, tal como la dada por ustedes en su editorial, es todo cuanto sería necesario para traer, con el menor sufrimiento y calamidad posible, el restablecimiento en Cuba de los principios democráticos.

Indiferencia por parte de este país a los apuros de la nación cubana, resultarían en un abandono de la herencia democrática de la que envió a sus hijos a Cuba a luchar y morir hace 55 años alrededor de Santiago de Cuba, en el mismo lugar donde sangre cubana fué derramada recientemente en un intento poco maduro pero heroico de derrocar la dictadura brutal de Batista.

Los valientes jóvenes que sacrificaron sus vidas allí en ese día fatal —muchos después de ser tomados prisioneros y ser atropellados y torturados salvajemente— estaban tratando de seguir los pasos de los americanos y cubanos que invadieron la Loma de San Juan y El Caney en otra mañana de julio con Teodoro Roosevelt y Calixto García.

La tiranía que todos los cubanos dignos están resistiendo, es mil veces más peligrosa para la seguridad americana que la soberanía de España en Cuba porque por medio de la injusticia, la destitución y el despecto hace surgir, justamente en el umbral de los Estados Unidos, las condiciones que la tiranía soviética está ahora tratando de fomentar en el mundo libre para poder implantar su dogma de la lucha de cla-

ses y de falso nacionalismo. Y esto a su vez es un arma mucho más efectiva y atemorizante que cualquier grado de eficiencia que los soviéticos hayan alcanzado en el desarrollo de la Bomba H.

Ea, sobre estas armas de desintegración moral, más que sobre su habilidad de un posible ataque de Bomba H, que los tiranos del Kremlin cuentan en su esfuerzo universal contra la democracia y los pequeños tiranos, como Batista, son —conscientemente o inconscientemente— sus más efectivos aliados en la lucha que nos ha envuelto a todos.

Carlos Prío Socarrás.

**"Hay hombres que viven contentos aunque vivan sin decoro. Hay otros que padecen como en agonía cuando ven que los hombres viven sin decoro a su alrededor. En el mundo ha de haber cierta cantidad de luz. Cuando hay muchos hombres sin decoro, hay siempre otros que tienen en sí el decoro de muchos hombres".**

**José Martí.**

### **FRACASA...**

—Conclusión de la pág. 3—

hecha mientras permanecen injustamente detenidos o procesados varios líderes opositoristas, mientras se viola la autonomía universitaria y mientras son torturados los presos políticos, como en el caso de Arnando J. Hernández.

En tanto no se cumplan las condiciones exigidas por la oposición en reiteradas ocasiones —restitución de las garantías, reimplantación de la Constitución de 1940; derogación de la llamada Ley de Orden Público; suspensión de la censura periodística; libertad de los presos políticos, etc.—, no será posible hablar de elecciones.

Hacerlo, sería traicionar a la Revolución y burlarse del pueblo.

### **Sea discreto**

**en su trabajo: en cualquier parte puede haber un espía.**

# BATISTA: UN PRO-COM

## Procuró siempre el apoyo del comunismo y fué el candidato presidencial de los stalinistas

**L**a campaña de prensa pagada por la dictadura —en la que se emplean miles de pesos de los que paga el contribuyente cubano— trata de demostrar que Batista es un furibundo anticomunista.

En julio, un cable de la "United Press" informaba que el Departamento de Estado americano había llegado a la conclusión de que el dictador no simpatiza con los comunistas. Trece puntos hábilmente urdidos se relacionaban en ese cable, a fin de confundir a la opinión pública americana, intentando demostrarle que Fulgencio Batista repudia la doctrina roja.

Sin embargo, documentos y hechos irrefutables comprueban el filocomunismo del usurpador.

Independientemente de que ha mantenido al frente de un importante ministerio a un conocido comunista, las

pruebas fotográficas que presentamos en esta página deben dejar convencidos a los lectores de los rejugos y los orígenes políticos comunistas del ex-taquígrafo de Columbia.

● Uno de los principales colaboradores de Batista, MIGUEL ANGEL DE LA CAMPA, Ministro de Estado, figuró, como puede apreciarse en la fotografía, junto a prominentes comunistas, en el Comité Cubano que hubo de ganar partidarios y levantar fondos para el discutido Congreso Pro Paz de los rojos.

● Otro de sus ministros de mayor confianza, CARLOS SALADRIGAS, figuró en 1944 como candidato presidencial en la boleta del Partido Socialista Popular (comunista), como también puede ver el lector en otra reproducción fotográfica.

## Comité Nacional por la Paz INDUSTRIA 452 :- LA HABANA

José M. Valdés Rodríguez  
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Gustavo Alderregula  
Luis Gómez Wangüemert  
Fernando Campoamor  
Quirino García Rojas  
Ena Mourão  
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Carlos Rafael Rodríguez  
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Nicolás Guillén  
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Lázaro Peña


● El mismo FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDIVAR, fué candidato a la presidencia de la República en la boleta del Partido Unión Revolucionaria COMUNISTA, como puede apreciarse en la foto.

● Todo el mundo sabe que durante la primera etapa del batistato, los comunistas recibieron innumerables indulgencias, se les legalizó el partido y se les entregó el control del movimiento obrero, organizado.

La historia desniente la publicidad interesada y la propaganda pagada.

## LOBOS DE LA MISMA CAMADA

Fulgencio Batista y su régimen dictatorial se preocupan diligentemente por proteger a sus viejos servidores. Acaba de publicarse en la Gaceta el Decreto No. 2116 por el que se designa Agregado Comercial al tenebroso ex-comandante MARIANO FAGET, uno de los favoritos del régimen usurpador, al que se le gratifican, con este nombramiento, sus valiosos servicios como alicario del batistato. Son lobos de la misma camada...



## Devaluación de la Moneda

El ministro de facto de Hacienda, Gustavo Gutiérrez, está dando los últimos toques a un proyecto para devaluar la moneda nacional.

Cuando se convierta en ley dicho proyecto —que es un verdadero peligro para la economía del país—, el gobierno usurpador percibirá cuantiosos beneficios para reforzar sus extenuados fondos.

Se trata de una verdadera expropiación, pues al depender Cuba del extranjero en muchos artículos de primera necesidad, incluyendo los alimentos, se producirá una subida general de los precios de esos artículos de importación, ya que el peso cubano valdrá mucho menos que en la actualidad.

Cuando un cubano tenga en su bolsillo un peso, en realidad tendrá noventa y pico de centavos o menos, lo que rebajará su capacidad adquisitiva y su estándar de vida.

## "ENTREGA SOMOZA A SU HIJO LA PRESIDENCIA"

¡Ojo con Batista! A lo mejor quiere imitar también al despota de Nicaragua y tengamos el espectáculo de "papi" entregándole la silla a "Papo".



612-Quib...

# MASACRE EN ORIENTE

- LOS BRAVOS DEL CUARTEL MONCADA FUERON ASESINADOS DESPUES DE LA
- RENDICION.—CINCO HORAS DE LUCHA DESIGUAL.—HUBO SOLDADOS AL LADO
- DE LOS MUCHACHOS DESESPERADOS POR LA LIBERACION DE SU PUEBLO.



## MILITARES CRIMINALES RECUERDAN LOS PEORES DIAS DE LOS ASESINATOS EN MASA DEL NAZISMO

AQUELLA madrugada, por la amplia avenida de Garzón, todo era silencio. Algún que otro noctámbulo carnavalesco regresaba al hogar. Sobre las 5 de la mañana en el centro del campamento —polígono, cuerpo de guardia— nada indicaba el audaz asalto a la madriguera de los traidores marcistas de Santiago de Cuba. Por la posta 3, dos jóvenes de uniforme, con paso firme y ademanes confiados, se detuvieron ante los que, ametralladora en mano, pedían el santo y seña. No hubo otro remedio que pelear. Aquéllos sí eran hombres. Se presentaban ante la posta sin el salvoconducto de los traidores; no como los de la posta 6 de Columbia. La brecha quedó abierta. En menos de 10 minu-

—Continúa en la página 2—

## BATISTA: PRO COMUNISTA DISFRAZADO

—VEA DOCUMENTOS EN  
LAS PAGINAS CENTRALES.

## Horripilante Siega de Vidas

Desde los primeros momentos, los valientes insurrectos del "Moncada" se hicieron fuertes, llegando a dominar casi por entero la madriguera de Río Chaviano. Pero sobre ellos se concentró todo el fuego mortífero de las ametralladoras del siniestro Teniente Rico, sordo al reclamo de parlamento de quienes, faltos de parque, no tenían otra salida que la rendición. Cayeron como buenos, en defensa de las libertades públicas ultrajadas.

## "Batista se encamina a la Tiranía"

—dice The New York Times

El periódico norteamericano "The New York Times", el de mayor circulación en los Estados Unidos, publicó el 25 de Agosto un editorial titulado "El dilema de Batista", que copiamos a continuación literalmente, y cuyas consideraciones dejamos a la perspicacia e inteligencia del lector:

—Continúa en la página 7—

## LA VERDAD sobre el caso de ARTEAGA

El "accidente" sufrido por el Cardenal Arteaga el miércoles 12 de agosto, resultaba sumamente sospechoso. Muchos recordaban la "caída" en las escaleras del SIM del profesor García Bárcena. En efecto, la cortina de hierro echada por el gobierno usurpador sobre este caso, despertó la suspicacia de pueblo. Por muy eminente que fuera la jerarquía eclesiástica del Arzobispo

—Continúa en la página 2—



La frente del Cardenal luce la grave herida que le produjeron los esbirros enfurecidos del batista.



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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 737.00/11-653  
Office memo  
Date 6 Nov 1953  
From State - SY - Flinn  
To State - Mr. Elliott

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
- ☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

State - FBI  
Authority

28 OCT 82  
Date 1/10/82

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Page 1 of \_\_\_\_\_

Encl. No. 2

Desp. No. 645

From HABANA

LAW-DECREE NO. 1170 PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1953

INTERIOR

I, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, President of the Republic of Cuba, proclaim: That the Council of Ministers has approved and I have sanctioned the following:

WHEREAS, At the Ninth International Conference of American States held at Bogotá in 1948, the Republics therein represented agreed to the adoption within their respective territories and in accordance with the constitutional precepts of each State, of the measures necessary to impede the intermeddling political action of international communism which, assisted and incited by foreign governments, organizations or individuals, tends to subvert the politico-social order and to break the solidarity of the people of America;

WHEREAS, The Eighth Resolution, regarding the strengthening of internal security, adopted by the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Washington in 1951, declared that to supplement the measures of mutual cooperation which assure collective defense as well as the social and economic well-being of the people, upon which the vitality of political institutions depends to such a high degree, it is necessary to adopt internal security measures which check the intermeddling and subversive action of international communism;

WHEREAS, The second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitutional Statute of the Republic declares unlawful the formation and existence of organizations contrary to the regime of democratic government of the Republic or subversive of the full exercise of national sovereignty, and in this respect there are conferred upon the Minister of the Interior the powers set forth in the Fourth Transitory Disposition of Title Four of the said Constitutional Statute;

THEREFORE, Exercising the powers conferred on it by the Constitutional Statute of the Republic, the Council of Ministers resolves to dictate the following:

Law Decree No. 1170

Article I. The intermeddling political action of international communism is declared unlawful as contrary to the regime of democratic government of the Republic and the full

UNCLASSIFIED

Page. \_\_\_\_\_ of  
Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

Page. 2 of  
Encl. No. 2  
Desp. No. 645  
From HABANA

exercise of national sovereignty and, in consequence thereof and in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitutional Statute of the Republic, there are declared prohibited organizations, whether or not constituted as juridical persons and whatever may be the nature of their constitution in case they are such, that aid or facilitate or have aided or facilitated in Cuba the said intermeddling political action of international communism.

Article II. The Minister of the Interior, exercising the powers conferred on him by the Fourth Transitory Disposition of Title Four of the Constitutional Statute of the Republic and other laws in force, shall dictate the measures that may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the preceding Article, and in any case shall decree the suspension of all activities of the organizations to which this Law-Decree refers or shall provide for their intervention through a delegate of the Ministry.

Article III. Such laws and measures as are opposed to the fulfillment of this Law-Decree are annulled and it shall become effective from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic.

THEREFORE, I order that the present Law-Decree be complied with and executed in its entirety.

GIVEN at the Presidential Palace, in Habana, on the 30th of October 1953.

UNCLASSIFIED



NOV 16 1953

# Batista Set To Halt Red Activities

## Cuba May Propose Anti-Red Measures

By BEN F. MEYER

President Batista yesterday declared that he is determined to put a stop to Communist activities in Cuba, "from whatever quarter they may appear."

The President added that Cuba will continue to cooperate a hundred per cent with the other American nations to that end. "We are studying the possibility," he added, "of presenting to the Inter-American Conference which will meet next March in Caracas measures to fortify the anti-communist front."

In an interview granted to the Associated Press, the President of Cuba also said:

1. That Cuba will propose at Caracas the "strengthening of the Inter-American position against the interference of any government in the affairs of other countries. "We all have our own problems to solve and it would be much better to mind our own business," he said, adding that he did not refer to any country in particular, but only to a principle.

2. The much-attacked Public Order Law is going to be modified "to prevent any restriction of freedom of the press, radio and television. Those organs are cooperating with us in the modifications. All we want is to put an end to abuses, and nobody who knows Cuba can deny that there excesses have been committed."

3. Cuba "will continue its great progress in the coming years. It will do so with the cooperation of labor, of capital, of the nation, of foreign nations, especially the United States, and of the government. The labor unions already recognize that it is against their interests to continue doing things which kill the desire to invest capital to help develop the country."

4. Cuba "is going to hold real elections in November 1954. All the political parties (the Communist Party does not exist in Cuba) will have full guarantees to participate. This, of course, includes the sympathisers of ex-president Carlos Prío Socarras, the various groups of the opposition party known as the Cuban People's Party and any

(Continued from Page 1)

others. If they do not conduct any electoral campaign, that will be their fault, not ours."

5. "Very shortly" the situation of the public treasury will be remedied. "Nobody could imagine the disorder which reigned in the treasury when our revolutionary government assumed power on March 10th, 1952. The previous regime had stolen the money — dozens of millions of dollars."

The President said that his campaign against the communists is "aimed mainly at preventing the propaganda of Moscow, breaking up any Communist organization and keeping communism out of the schools and dependencies of the government."

"It is easy to condemn the Communists but it is not easy to make laws against them. That is because we do not which to restrict in any way the freedom of other people, as individuals or as political groups. Any political organization which works for what it considers of benefit to the country is worthy of protection: Communism, under the orders of Moscow, should be rooted out."

"Communism is humiliating. It made me ashamed to see photographs of Cubans proudly parading with the Cuban flag beside the Red banner of Communism in Moscow at the beginning of this year."

The President said that the two latest meetings of the American nations had adopted measures against Communism: the Inter-American Conference of Bogota in 1948 and the Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Washington in 1951. "If we can reinforce those measures, we want to do so," he concluded.

(Continued on Page 2)

ACCION LIBERTADORA

Rec'd in CIRA - Dec 31, 1953  
in envelope addressed to Mr.  
Woodward, post marked International  
Airport, Florida, Dec 28  
file

Havana, December 4, 1953.

Honorable John Moors Cabot,  
Under-Secretary of State,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The report submitted to the President of the United States by Mr. Milton Eisenhower on his return from a trip throughout part of Latin-America, is a document without equal in the history of foreign relations of this Hemisphere. It shows a great understanding of the position which your country occupies within the continent and its responsibilities towards the neighboring countries.

Mr. Eisenhower has clearly understood that the United States cannot live in harmony with the other countries of the Continent unless it treats them - economically, politically and culturally - as nations that have their own personality, with whom it should deal without discrimination and with a full understanding of their specific creative virtues, different perhaps, but not inferior, to those of the United States.

However we must not take too literally all the opinions expressed by Mr. Eisenhower regarding the Latin-American countries. We believe that the best compliment that can be added to his report is an opinion such as the one we are sending you; underscoring, from our own point of view, observations which we believe opportune and healthy, for the mutual benefit of both parties.

Mr. Eisenhower stresses economic problems and he has tried to find means of harmonizing the interests of his country with those of our countries. His painstaking comprehension of the specific interests of these countries, however could never be complete, because it is an outsiders' point of view, no matter how friendly. Besides, Mr. Eisenhower has apparently interviewed only officials of the respective governments. It is a well known fact that, unfortunately, the majority of our nations are governed by oligarchies who have taken over the governments by the force of arms, replacing democratic regimes.

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ACCION LIBERTADORA

It is not our desire, Mr. Moors Cabot, that the principle of non-intervention, won by our republics in Montevideo as a protection against the dollar diplomacy, (which has fortunately disappeared), will work, at this time, against our economic progress and democratic faith. What is more, we maintain that if the ideals that govern the human spirit have value, the aid given to dictators constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention, as it helps keep in power governments that do not represent the true desires, sentiments and necessities of our countries. It supposes, in conclusion, an intervention against the democratic ideals that have been and will always be cherished by America, justly called the Continent of Democracy.

Respectfully submitted,

*Ruiz*

ACCION LIBERTADORA  
-Secretario General-



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

*Reg. act*

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MID - Mr. Burrows (Attention: Mr. Wellm *W*)

DATE: DEC 8 1953

FROM: *DAF* SY - Mr. Flinn

SUBJECT: Reports on Preparations for Revolutionary Activity Against Cuban Government

Reference is made to your memorandum of December 1, 1953 in the above-entitled matter.

The suggestions contained in your memorandum relative to the dissemination of information furnished by the FBI were discussed with Mr. Bartlett, FBI liaison officer.

Mr. Bartlett stated that in his opinion information obtained within Cuba and in the possession of the Legal Attache of the Embassy was being turned over by the Legal Attache to the Ambassador.

Mr. Bartlett also advised that the Bureau had no objection to the Department's forwarding to the American Embassy, Habana, information contained in the Bureau's reports.

SY has been handling on a priority basis all FBI reports concerning activities against the Batista Government. There is no objection to your forwarding the information contained in the reports to the American Embassy at Habana. In your transmittals to the Embassy please indicate that the information has been furnished for the confidential use of the Department only.

SCA:SY:FDJohnson:mjk

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

FILED

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Information from those sources is necessarily biased. It does not come from people who are close to the economic and political life of those nations, endeavoring to improve them for the common good, but from a bold minority who are in power for their exclusive gain. It represents, at best, the interests, necessarily transitory, uncertain and illegitimate, of a very questionable alliance between political adventurers - sometimes of a military origin - and businessmen who hope to progress by favors granted by the people in power, rather than by keeping their roots in the national economy.

Once this exception is made clear, we will go into the economic sphere on which Mr. Eisenhower's report is based. On the question of the increase in production of the Latin-



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CO  
(Sec)

NO.: CA-3201 December 15, 1953

SUBJECT: Report of revolutionary preparations in Central America against Cuban Government

TO: GUATEMALA, HABANA, SAN JOSE

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There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum on the above subject received from another agency within the Government. A photostat of the memorandum was given to the agency by an informant of unknown reliability who stated that the memorandum was obtained by him from an American businessman in Latin America who in turn had received it from another source. It is alleged that the author of the memorandum is a Cuban, a former communist who had abandoned communism, and who was allowed to return to Cuba after furnishing the information to the Cuban Government.

The Department would appreciate any comments the missions may have on the basis of information in their possession and of such investigations as are practicable of the reported concentration of military forces and equipment in Guatemala and Costa Rica.

SMITH, ACTING

Send  
J.P.B.

Enclosure  
Memorandum

NOV 55

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(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: ARA:MID:HRWellman:mal 12/4/53

APPROVED BY: MID:HRWellman

CLEARANCES:

MYD

DRA  
WLP

RSY

DEC 15 1953 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO  
DC/R 737.00/12-1553

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interest of their country in promoting the economic development of our nations. Unfortunately, this understanding has not brought about enough tangible practical results. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that these ideas are not fully accepted and, above all, put into practice by the major part of the officials of your country. It is not unusual therefore, that these public statements are considered, for the most part, propaganda.

The international organizations - where the United States exercises such a decisive influence - have not made available to Latin-America their financial facilities, technical assistance and commercial expansion on the same scale as that granted other countries, especially in Europe. Your legislators have not established legal procedures that would facilitate and stimulate, through tax exemptions, the exportation of private North American capital for economic investment; on the other hand, and equally detrimental to us, you have maintained laws that obstruct or completely hinder an increase in our exportations to the United States.

It is true that our political and economic relations have improved substantially since 1933, especially during the years immediately following the Second World War. It would be unjust on our part not to recognize the goodwill of your country towards Latin-America and not to value the advantage for us that the most powerful nation of America, and of the world, is a country so democratic and with no desire for territorial expansion.

But, in very recent times a policy has become apparent in this relationship which impairs and even threatens to destroy our common purpose of economic, social and political benefits for Latin-America. This practice, which we see reflected in many actions of the North American foreign policy, considers all Latin-American governments as legitimate representatives of their respective countries. With all sincerity, we wish to point out that this policy is, in our opinion, harmful both to your country and to the legitimate rights of the people of the unfortunate neighboring countries who have dictatorships.

The democratic minds of our countries are alarmed by the fact that statesmen of the prestige of Milton Eisenhower and you, have publicly expressed themselves in favor of that policy. Frankly, we regret having seen in the United States press, - interpreting the policy of the State Department, phrases such as:

"As for other governments in Latin America - even



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Early in April of 1952, about a month after the overthrow of General Fulgencio Batista, the deposed president, Dr. Prio Socarrás entrusted to his ex-minister of Education, Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango the responsibility of organizing a vast subversive movement, created to depose in turn Batista, and return to power the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano) if this were at all possible. The first steps taken by Dr. Sanchez Arango were to give a political form to the movement, and to create favorable conditions for an uprising (putsch) at the precisely opportune moment, to be called "the zero hour". Immediately after Batista took over the PRC found itself destitute of any kind of influence, since all former officials were dismissed by Batista. Hence Dr. Sanchez Arango began to reconstruct the PRC, placing in the positions of command some of the most sincere members of the party, most of whom had formerly been in secondary status in party affairs, and in Government affairs.

While Dr. Antonio de Varona was again made president, men such as Dr. Arcelio Acui, Dr. Armando Hernandez and a few others became the most prominent figures of the Party. Immediately the PRC began a campaign of passive legal opposition to the administration of the Batista Government, whose every step received the condemnation and adverse criticism of the Propaganda Committee of the Party. In addition, three times a week in the Newspaper, Free Press (Prensa Libre), articles by Dr. Arcelio Acui and Dr. René Fiallo pictured the present Government as a "do nothing" one, with policies, or lack of policies, contrary to the public interest. At the same time the articles were designed to restore to the party the faith which formerly it had enjoyed from the Cuban masses.

In the meantime, Dr. Sanchez Arango initiated the opposition by force in the Central American Countries. Almost immediately he found out that the reconstructed PRC was gaining no ground with the people and that he would have to create a new political formula to draw to the side of the opposition of insurrection, the general populace, by now disgusted not only with the Batista Government, but with the PRC as well. It was proposed that Dr. Roberto Agramonte, head of the Peoples Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano) have an interview with Dr. Prio in Miami, but the former declined on the ground that his party wanted to remain neutral in the whole affair. However, Emilio M. Ochoa opposed openly the ideas of his chief (Dr. Agramonte) advocating an alliance of the two parties to make the opposition more effective. To this end he went to Guatemala to see Dr. Sanchez Arango. While there, conferences were held in

the home

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The home of Dr. Raul Osegueda, then Ambassador of Colombia and now Foreign Minister of the Government of Colombia. There warlike aspects of the movement were discussed, and the merging of the two parties. On the return of Sr. Osegueda, eventually the amalgamation was effected with equal admiration on the part of both of the parties. This end was hastened by the surreptitious visit of Dr. Arango (Sanchez) to his native land (he was then a political refugee in Guatemala).

From the moment Batista took over the power in Cuba, Guatemala placed itself unconditionally on the side of Dr. Prio and served as a base for the military preparation of the conspiracy. Immediately the Caribbean League (Legion) at the time reduced to impotency, began to function again, to take a preponderant part in Latin American relations. In the latter part of 1952, the military plan was drawn up by Sanchez Arango with the aid of Foreign Minister Raul Osegueda and, often in the conferences the presidential candidate (Costa Rica) Jose Figueres took an active part, promising the support of Costa Rica, should he be elected president. Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo participated as well, to the extent of using his influence with the Guatemalan Army officials that they might join the movement later. On the Caribbean coast of Guatemala is a place called Livingston. To the west, there is a road which leads to a little native village (indigena) name for the moment forgotten by this agent. To the southwest of this place there is a very bad road which ends in a little valley at the end of which there is a series of low hills. Back of these hills is situated a camp of the Caribbean Legion. Here is established the General Headquarters of Aureliano Sanchez Arango. There exists here a force of 4000 men regularly trained, quartered and fed. War practice is held daily under the direction of General Abelardo Cuadra, veteran of the Spanish Civil War and one of the organizers of the movement of Cayo Confites.

The force situated here is divided into two battalions, one named Battalion #4, PABLO DE LA TORRIENTE BRAU; the other Battalion #5, IGNACIO AGRAMONTE. The force is divided into small groups and taught to use machine guns (tripod type) also hand type Garand Rfiles, automatic repeating rifles M-1. Nearly all the officers are veterans of the Spanish Civil War. In addition to the military practice the officers get together once a week for conferences over historical and political matters as expounded by Juan Jose Arevalo, Romulo Betancourt, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, etc.

Near Livingston there is a little gulf on which is situated Puerto Barrios. South of this port there is a tiny port not marked on the map named Montagua. In this place with landing craft practice is held.

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PAGE 3  
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is held with the idea of disembarking in Cuba. From Montecarlo several shipments of arms have been made to Cuba. The main concentration of men and arms is in Costa Rica.

Northwest of Puerto Limon on the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica there is a place known as La Virgen. Back of this reached by a small country road, back of some low hills is found the camp. There are 2,000 men or more divided into three battalions, #1 Augusto Cesar Sandino, 2, Morazan, 3, Antonio Maceo. A little north of this camp there is a kind of landing field which contains four (English) Lancaster Bombers, acquired from Canada by Ingeniero Carlos Hevia in Canada. The men in this camp carry English Repeating rifles but they also have Thompson machine guns and Mendoza machine guns with plenty of ammunition. The men in Guatemala also have this additional arm.

The plan is that on landing in Cuba of the "patriots" these arms will be given to all the civilians who are sympathetic with the cause. Cubans generally are more familiar with this type of arm than the English repeating rifle, whose use is not easy to learn in a few minutes. The crews of the planes are English. The leader of the outfit is a Canadian named Chrisholm who was a Captain R.A.F. during the war, flying Lancaster Bombers. He is a personal friend of Carlos Rios Monegro. This camp did not amount to much when Otilio Ulate was president of Costa Rica, but the minute Figueres came to power, the arms and men began to flow in in quantity, from Guatemala, which has been the great center for the accumulation of arms. From a place in British Honduras named Middlesex, many rifles were secured with the connivance of British officers stationed there, then passed across the border.

The plan of invasion is as follows: When the zero hour comes, planes from Costa Rica and Guatemala will arrive at Habana prepared to drop bombs over the most important military posts in Cuba. As stated before the crews of these planes are English "mercenaries" who, for money have agreed to take part in this adventure, regardless of their politics. Coincidentally the men from the camps in Central America will be landed in various parts of the Island. At the same time there will appear in the streets members of both parties, well armed, to battle the local police, capture them, take over the civilian authority. While all this fighting is going on, leaders of the political parties under the direction of Eufemio Fernandez and Jesus Gonzales Cartas will capture the personages most prominent of the actual administration, who, once the revolution is successful, will be put in jail under the charge of murder. With this action, it is expected that most of the citizens will come over to the side of the conspirators. Judging from things heard by this agent in an interview held in a Mexico Hotel between Juan Jose Arevalo and

Ex-Colonel

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No.:

PAGE 141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(Security Classification)

Ex-Colonel Martin Elena, the battle is set to take place in the general sale of the next sugar crop, about January of next year. While not within the province of this agent, he knows that General Peron is favorable to the conspiracy, sending Argentine manufacture to the Central American Camps.

On various occasions cargoes of arms of different kinds have been introduced into the island, a procedure not very difficult because of the vigilance of the Cuban air force, which constantly patrol the seas between Cuba and Central America. This agent knows about the following concentrations: In the hands of "Cuban orthodox youth" headed by Jose Iglesias, Max Lesnick and Bernardo Blanco Goudin, there are more than 600 machine guns, Mendoza, 10,000 grenades (hand type) all of Mexican manufacture. The arms are hidden in the "finca" of the sone of Jose Manuel Cortina, in Pino del Rio. In the hands of Pedro Guzman head of the youth movement in Marianao are about 100 machine guns, 50 grenades and 10 or 12 rifles M-1. The arms are hidden in a house situated near the "Central Toledo" property of the secretary general of the workers of that central.

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(Security Classification)

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XR 110.15CA

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, HABANA 771 DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. December 16, 1953

REF :

2 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION ARA-4 REC'D 12-18	DEPT. IN DC/R-2 OTHER O
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
SUBJECT: Letter to Assistant Secretary of State Cabot from Cuban Opposition "Acción Libertadora"

The Embassy today received a copy of a letter dated December 4, 1953 addressed to Mr. Cabot and signed (illegibly) by the "Secretary General" of "Acción Libertadora", a Cuban clandestine opposition group (Embassy despatch 665 of November 17, 1953). The letter is written on an "Acción Libertadora" letterhead and was delivered in an official Ministry of State penalty envelope addressed to Mr. Crain.

The letter compliments Dr. Milton Eisenhower on his report on Latin America which it describes as "a document without equal in the history of foreign relations of this Hemisphere". It also criticizes the U. S. for its alleged support of Latin American dictatorships.

A copy of the letter will be transmitted to the Department in the event the original, addressed to Mr. Cabot, was not received.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

  
Earl T. Crain  
First Secretary of Embassy

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1953 DEC 18 AM 11 13  
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ETCrain:rc  
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ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

73 7.00/12-2153

FROM : AMEMBASSY, GUATEMALA

534

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 21, 1953

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION ARA-4	DEPT. DC/R-2 CL-6
	REC'D 12/30	OTHER CIA-7

SUBJECT: CUBAN POLITICAL EXILES ARRIVE IN GUATEMALA.

The government-owned Diario de Centro América of December 18 reported that Lincoln DIAZ Beire, Lt. Col. Vincente LEON y León and Dr. Salvador VIIASECA y Forné, Cubans who had sought asylum in the Guatemalan Embassy in Havana, arrived by air in Guatemala City on that date.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

William L. Krieg  
Counselor of Embassy

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1953 DEC 30 AM 11 53

DC/R  
RECORDS BRANCH

cc: Havana

JCHill:cs

REPORTER

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

JAN 7 1954  
OFFICE OF  
DESP. NO.

737.00/12-2953

XR 618.37

FROM : AmEmbassy, San José

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 29, 1953

REF : Dept's CA-3201 of December 15, 1953

5- For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	1/3	DC/R-2 CL-1-6 SY-2 AIR-3 ARMY-3 NAVY-3 CIA-7

SUBJECT: Revolutionary Activities in Costa Rica Against Cuban Government

The memorandum enclosed with the above-reference Circular Airgram has been read with interest. That part which refers to a camp at La Virgén, northwest of Puerto Limón, Costa Rica, with 2,000 men in training and four Lancaster bombers at a nearby airfield, seems far-fetched. In a country the size of Costa Rica such a concentration would not go unnoticed.

There is a place known as La Virgén, some 80 miles as the crow flies northwest of Puerto Limón. It is situated on the Sarapiquí river and can be reached by a bad road from San José. The country around La Virgén is well-dotted with cattle ranches and it is certain that such a concentration could not be kept from the public for long. Also, it would be next to impossible to place the men on the Caribbean coast unless they were flown in.

The Embassy is investigating the possibilities, however, of such a concentration.

For the Ambassador,

*C. Allan Stewart*

C. Allan Stewart  
First Secretary of Embassy

CC: Guatemala  
Habana

CASTewart:mjf  
REPORTER

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ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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
This document is to be returned to

737.00/12-2953



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of the Ambassador  
Habana, January 7, 1954



Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am sending you by hand a letter which will serve two purposes. Mr. Terrell will explain in further detail the matter you and I discussed. Your thought in the matter seems doubly important now that I have returned to Cuba and checked such information as we have. There is little doubt in my mind that we are going to have an election, the results of which will unquestionably be of far-reaching effect. There appears to be only one man qualified as a true administrator, but there is considerable doubt as to whether he can be elected. I am referring to Batista. Suggestions such as you made will go a long way toward answering this question.

There is another matter which I want to bring up. We have been overrun with official visits, military and otherwise, and my feeling is that the Cubans are going a little sour on the procedure. Normally, the military men who come are the finest kind of Ambassador; but too many of them, with the consequent cost to the Cuban Government, is not very popular. Informal visits are of great help, but the official type is a strain on everybody. Would it be possible in the future to have proposed trips discussed with us before the decision is made?

It will be nice to see Frank Nash and his group of officers, but their visit will come within a short time of sixteen jets, a hundred private planes, a Navy show, and some helicopters.

The Honorable  
Walter Bedell Smith  
Under Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

This Document is to be  
737.00/1-754

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553  
O.C.B. Brock  
for Truman



-2-

Please be assured this is in no way a criticism. It is simply that it would be helpful to us to have advance consultation, in adjusting our schedule and in trying to work out what is best for Cuba and ourselves.

With warm personal regards,

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Arthur Gardner', written over a horizontal line.

Arthur Gardner

AIR POUCH

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(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

737.00/1-1354

FROM

AMEMBASSY, HABANA

862

DESP. NO.

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 13, 1954

DATE

REF

Dept's. Inst. CA-3201, Dec. 15, 1953.

17 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F O
1/15	ARA-4	Dele-2 ol-6 sy-2 P-1 MC-2
		Cia-7 Army-3 Navy-3 Air-3

SUBJECT:

Report of Revolutionary Preparations in Central America  
Against Cuban Government.

There is no information in the possession of either the Embassy or its service Attachés that would tend to confirm the information contained in the report transmitted by the reference instruction. From time to time in the past rumors and reports of invasion attempts based on Guatemala have circulated locally (see Embassy despatches Nos. 38, July 7, 1953, and 98, July 14, 1953). In the Embassy's opinion it would be extremely difficult for 4,000 anti-Batista men to be training in Guatemala and 2,000 in Costa Rica without such activity becoming generally known. The mere feeding of such numbers of men concentrated in or near small communities in countries the size of Guatemala and Costa Rica would seem certain to result in widespread knowledge of their presence. The Embassy therefore doubts the truth of these statements. It would evaluate other statements appearing in the report no higher than "possibly true".

In connection with the clandestine introduction of arms into Cuba, reference is made to the Embassy's despatches Nos. 788 of December 22, 1953, and 825 of January 6, 1954, as well as previous despatches on seizures by the authorities of alleged contraband arms. The Embassy believes it quite likely that here and there in the Island there are concentrations of arms, such as described in the report under consideration, that have been collected for revolutionary purposes.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall  
Counselor of Embassy

cc: AmEmbassy, Guatemala City.  
AmEmbassy, San José (Costa Rica).

FCFornes, Jr./cv  
REPORTER

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737.00/1-1354

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### **The Cuban political panorama as the elections of June 1, 1952, approached.**

In accordance with the Electoral Code, in force since 1943, the term of organization and reorganization of the political parties was opened in the last months of 1951.

In March 1952, the Cuban political parties, to the number of EIGHT, were arrayed, with a view to the elections called for June 1 that year, as follows:

**GOVERNMENT COALITION:** Composed of the Cuban Revolutionary (Authentic) Party, Democratic Party, Liberal Party and Cuban National Party, with over a million and a half members. It nominated Carlos Hevia as candidate for the Presidency.

**THE CUBAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (ORTHODOX):** Founded by the deceased leader Eduardo Chibás and responsible for the principal opposition to the government of Prío Socarrás. It had approximately 400,000 members, but the great popularity of this party made it the logical rival of the government coalition. It nominated Dr. Roberto Agramonte, professor of the University of Havana, for President.

**UNITARY ACTION PARTY:** Founded and presided over by Senator Batista, boasted some 200,000 members and nominated Batista as its candidate.

**PARTIDO DE LA CUBANIDAD:** Founded and presided over by Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, ex-president of the Republic. It had less than 100,000 members and nominated Dr. Grau San Martín as its candidate.

**POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY:** Official members of the Comintern, with less than 100,000 members, which nominated its visible leader, Dr. Juan Marinello Vidaurreta.

### **Peaceful and legal progress of the electoral campaign.**

Up to the 10th of March, 1952, the political campaign, intense and impassioned, as always, proceeded in an atmosphere of peace, order and guarantees. There was not a single protest from the opposition nor did they point to one single abuse or coercion on the part of the government.

Batista himself carried out his political activities not only freely but OFFICIALLY PROTECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, to the extreme that on the very night of March 9 to 10 he held a public meeting in the city of Matanzas under the protection and guarantees of the government. Shortly after his return from that meeting he went secretly to Camp Columbia and carried out his Army "coup".

AIR POUCH

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(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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737.00/2-1054  
XR 720.00

FROM : AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA

691

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 10, 1954

DATE

REF : Department's CA-3201, December 15, 1953

FEB 10 1954

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	2/12	CIA-7 Army-3 Navy-3 Air-3

SUBJECT: Revolutionary Activities in Guatemala against Cuban Government.

The memorandum enclosed with the above-reference Circular Airgram has been studied with interest. Concerning that portion which refers to the General Headquarters of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango in the area of Livingston, Guatemala, it is noted that the source states a force of 4000 men are quartered there and that they are given daily training and practice in war tactics. It is noted the source further states the men are trained in the use of machine guns and rifles.

Discreet questioning of an individual who ordinarily would be aware of such a concentration of arms and men in the area mentioned in the airgram has met with negative results. The person to whom the Embassy directed its questions is reliable and has lived in Guatemala for many years. His reaction was to scoff at the idea that 4000 men could be concealed for even a few days in the area of Livingston.

The Embassy is following up this matter and any information which comes to its attention will be forwarded to the Department.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Krieg  
Counselor of Embassy

cc: San José  
Habana

HG Jacobson:rd

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APR 1 1954

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ARA - Mr. Cabot

DATE: February 23, 1954

FROM : MID - Mr. Wellman *HW*

SUBJECT: Monthly Summary for Caribbean Affairs, February 1954.

Attached is the monthly summary for Caribbean Affairs for

*138.00*  
*134.00*  
*734.00*  
the month of February, 1954.

ARA: MID: HRWellman: nf

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MAY 10 1954

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THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO  
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137.00/2-2354  
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CUBA

Political Situation in Cuba at end of 1953 - The following is a brief summary of a useful commentary received from the Habana Embassy:

The Batista Government which came to power by military coup in March 1952 has after two postponements announced general elections for November 1954 and the electoral preliminaries have begun. Further revolutionary attempts, boycott of the elections by major opposition groups, and opposition of the armed forces are all possible obstacles to an electoral solution. The opposition is divided into factions on the issues of participation in the scheduled elections and passive resistance or violence, and is ineffective. No opposition party has been registered by the principal party leader. Batista, who is probably unpopular with a majority of voters, has not announced whether he will be a candidate but obviously is planning through a flexible political coalition of doubtful strength, a public works program and concessions to labor to maintain himself or his government in power. Although the loyalty of the armed forces, which maintains a continuous semi-alert, seems to insure the continuing stability of the Batista regime, delay or suspension of elections would result in further disorders, while evidence of intention to hold fair elections would promote stability. Organized Cuban labor which has taken no important action not approved by Batista, may exact a price for its continued collaboration. The anti-communist measures of the Batista Government--diplomatic break with Russia, prohibition of communist organizations and publications, and harassment of communists--outweigh its toleration of some probable communists in government, army and labor. It has cooperated closely with the United States in a bilateral military program, the Licaro nickel project, the UN and the OAS. It has improved relations with all its neighbors except Guatemala with which relations have deteriorated.

Electoral Machinery Begun for General Elections in November - On December 10, 1953, the period terminated for applications to be filed with the Superior Electoral Tribunal for registration as a political party. From February 14-28, 1954, affiliates of each political party are being registered, and about the end of March, the Electoral Tribunal will examine certificates of party affiliation and will cancel the registration of any party not having

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- 2 -

an affiliation equal to at least 4 percent of the total registered and photographed voters at the end of the affiliation period. On April 18 the parties elect their executive committees and delegates to municipal assemblies, which elect delegates to the provincial assemblies, which in turn elect delegates to the national assemblies. On May 5 the Electoral Tribunal calls for elections to federal positions and subsequently for elections to provincial and municipal offices. The electoral period begins May 15 after which public officials are prohibited from taking action to coerce or influence an elector. Between August 3 and 30 certificates of candidacy are submitted to the appropriate electoral control body. August 20 is the latest date upon which President Batista if he should accept a coalition nomination would have to certify he had left the presidential office. On October 25 all party electioneering must cease, and on November 1 the elections are scheduled.

Old Constitution Restored when Elected Officials Take Over - The Electoral Code provides that elected municipal aldermen and mayors will take office on January 3, 1955, provincial governors on January 15, senators and representatives on January 28, and the president and vice-president on February 24, the anniversary of the Grito de Baire, the beginning of the war of 1895-98 for Cuban independence. On January 28 when the Congress takes office, the provision of Batista's Constitutional Statutes providing for the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council will be annulled and these bodies will cease to exist. On February 24, when the president-elect takes office the 1940 constitution will be re-established in its entirety. Only at this point however will the provision of the 1940 Constitution return to effect, which bans an ex-president from occupying the office for eight years after he has left it. Thus Batista is not prohibited from being a candidate.

Government Coalition and two Opposition Parties Registered - On December 10, six pro-government and two opposition national parties had been registered, subject to organization and qualification by affiliation of sufficient voters. The pro-government parties are the Partido Accion Progresista (PAP) of President Batista; the Partido Union Radical (PUR), headed by three then cabinet members; the Partido Accion Unitaria (PAU), the Liberal, the Demócrata, and Labor parties. The PAU will not be organized, most of its members joining the PAP, and the Labor Party of José C. Muñal, Secretary General of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, will also not be organized. The coalition is of unknown strength. The strongest element is the PAP; the PUR is designed to appeal to labor and other elements more to the left; the Liberal and Demócrata parties are splinter groups opposed by those sections who refuse to cooperate with Batista.

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- 3 -

Registered Opposition Not Representative - The two registered opposition parties are the PRC (Autentico) and the PPC (Ortodoxo). The former was registered by ex-President Grau over the opposition of the party leaders both in Cuba and in exile. By this action Grau took the Autentico name away from Prio and his followers who, whether or not devoted to a revolutionary solution, unite in refusing to participate in elections under Batista. It remains to be seen how many voters will register Autentico under Grau's program to participate in any elections with himself as a candidate. Batista is reportedly so eager to have Grau qualify as an opposition candidate that he is prepared to "lend" him some affiliates if necessary.

The Ortodoxo party name was registered by ex-Senator Fernandez Casas, an Ortodoxo of little previous importance, without the agreement of the leader of either of the two principal groups of the splintered party, Agrarista, apostle of passive resistance to Batista and Millo Ochoa, advocate of collaboration with Prio and other opposition groups, possibly in revolutionary plans. The three Ortodoxo groups which have been discussing bases for unity and participation in elections, recently announced agreement on a new party president, the termination of electoral activity, and conditions for elections which Batista is not likely to grant.

Communist Party Not Registered - The Partido Socialista Popular (Communist) did not register, doubtless would have had its registration cancelled under the anti-communist law of November 1953 had it applied, and probably could not have secured sufficient affiliates to qualify under the new electoral law in any event. Reportedly its members were infiltrating the PAU (not to be organized) and may attempt the same tactics with the PURS.

Elections may not Bring About Stability - At present Grau is the only avowed opposition candidate and his party the only opposition party sure to participate if sufficient affiliates are secured. If in addition to the Prio Autenticos, the Ortodoxos should also abstain from elections, the electoral result would hardly represent a popular choice, although there should be an honest vote and count. In such case the election would not be likely to bring about a high degree of political stability.

Modification of Public Order Law - The public order law decreed after the uprising at Santiago in July 1953, which provided for punishment of criticism of the government and its agencies and officials, caused much resentment in Cuba and effectively limited free public comment. Some opposition groups demanded its withdrawal as one condition for participation in the November

elections

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- 4 -

elections, and the press called for its abrogation. By a law decree published on February 4, the Batista Government amended the law to repeal the provisions which penalized illicit propaganda and which permitted courts to grant provisional liberty to accused persons only if so requested by the prosecutor, and to make other changes in the law and the Social Defense Code. Although reaction to the modifications has been limited, the Habana Embassy perceives indications that additions made to the Social Defense Code restore to some extent the broad objectionable powers which had been conferred on the government by the provisions of the law which have been repealed. On February 17 the Ortodoxo Party listed among "basic demands for a national election" complete repeal of the Public Order Law as amended.

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(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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737.00/4-2354

FROM

AMCONSULATE, MERIDA

55

DESP. NO.

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

April 23, 1954

REF

CA-5885, dated April 16, 1954

34 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION ARA-4 REG'D 4-25	DEPT. IN DC/R-2 01-6 L-2 SY-2 PD-1 OTHER CIA 7
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SUBJECT

Carlos GACEL Castro

On April 22, 1954, the Principal Officer of this post went to Campeche and talked to three American sources, all believed to be reliable, concerning Carlos GACEL Castro.

Gacel is described as a Cuban negro who has been in the state of Campeche for about one year. Part of this time he lived in the city of Campeche, and for the past several months has lived on a farm near Champotón (about 40 miles south of Campeche, on the coast) working for Javier Cabazas, a buyer of rice, corn, and beans. He is supposed to have entered the Yucatan peninsula from Belize, and to have gone to Merida before going to Campeche.

He is said to have admitted to being a former Communist (CP of Cuba) but claims that he is no longer one of them. He is a political refugee who is opposed to the Batista regime. He is believed to be legally in Mexico and is not known to have had any trouble with any authority here. As far as is known he is not taking part in any political activities of any kind. He has alleged that he knows where guns and munitions are stored in various parts of Central American countries (and perhaps Cuba) and that he has been promised a pardon if he would divulge this information to the Cuban authorities. He is described as a former Cuban newspaper reporter. Informants have no confidence in his veracity.

On two occasions Gacel's parents have come to visit the Subject. Each time they have stayed at the Castelmarr Hotel. It appears that some time ago one of the owners of the hotel went to Cuba with colored films of the hotel and the surrounding country side for advertising purposes and that the parents were of material help in arranging exhibitions for them. The parents seem to have money and it is probable that they get reduced rates when they come to Campeche. Gacel stays at the Castelmarr Hotel (the best in Campeche with rates at present about \$1.25 a day, U.S. currency). It is doubtful if he could afford to do this on his estimated farm labor income of ten to twelve pesos a day (12.50 pesos equal \$1.00), and that he too receives a cut rate of free room from the management (the Castelmarr is operated by Sr. Vda. de Sansores and her two sons, Jose Maria Sansores and Ruben Sansores). Gacel's father is said to be a lawyer and by one

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SECRET TWO



Page 2 of  
Desp. No. 55  
From Merida

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Page \_\_\_\_\_ of  
Encl. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

source to be a Communist as well.

It was learned yesterday that for a considerable period of time Gacel lived in the Campeche apartment of Peter and Jean Crown and their three children. The Crowns are white and believed to be Americans from New Jersey. He was a builder of boats but apparently could not make a living - she was a housewife who was reported to have worked for a time at least in the Cocoteros Hotel bar (at Progreso, 20 miles north of Merida) as a "B" girl. Of the Crowns little is known except that they were in Mexico illegally, that they had no funds, and that they owed many people. Unable to buy passage back to the United States it is reported that they arranged a rendezvous with a shrimp boat, the MILDRED K (illegally in Mexican waters) off shore near Seibaplaya and left the country during the night of April 21, 1954. Informants do not know from what port the Mildred K operates but most of the shrimpers who come to this area are from Florida, principally Tampa. If the Mildred K can be reached when it arrives in port it is possible that the Crowns can provide items of interest. It was reported by one source that a full report of GACEL'S activities had been submitted to the FBI by a third party.

Arthur V. Metcalfe  
American Vice Consul

cc: Embassy Mexico  
in duplicate

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, HABANA

1303

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

APR 28 1954  
April 27, 1954  
DATE

REF : Letter from Charles R. Burrows to Carlos C. Hall of

Feb. 15, 1954

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	IN	OTHER
	REC'D		
	ARN-4	DC/R-2 SY-2	CL-6 REP-2 PD-2
	4/29	CIA-7	PC-1 OCB-1 ARMY-3 NAVY-3 OSD-2

SUBJECT: Apparent Breach of U.S. Laws

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BUREAU OF  
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

U.S.-1

There is enclosed in single copy a leaflet bearing the titles "Instructions to the Civil Population in Case of Air Raids" and "General Instructions specially useful to civilian personnel lacking knowledge of military tactics." These were air mailed April 23, 1954 from Miami, Florida in separate envelopes to some 500 addressees apparently selected at random from the telephone book (one was sent to this Embassy at its old address). All were confiscated by the Cuban authorities--an easy task since all the leaflets were inserted in identical, semi-transparent envelopes.

These leaflets, inciting to revolution, bear the name of "Saviur" (Salvador) CANCIO Peña, the American citizen who on January 12, 1954 wrote an anti-Batista letter to the President, sending copies to the Secretary and to the Attorney General (Department's transmittal slip of January 27, 1954). At that time he gave his address as 6901 Yumuri Street, Coral Gables, Florida. The sketches appearing thereon were evidently lifted from current U.S. Army training manuals.

On April 24, 1954 the Naval Attaché received word from Naval Intelligence, based on an FBI report, that the printing of 1,000 of the leaflets would be completed "by the group around Prío Socarrás" in Miami that day. The Cuban police must have received a similar warning from their own sources since they seized the first 500 immediately upon their arrival.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall  
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure

Leaflet and cover

Not attached 6-2354

CC: Hall

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ACTION COPY - DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action taken must appear on this permanent record copy to EO/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

737.00/4-2754

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 18 1954



SERIE / NO. 9 X-Y-Z

INSTRUCCIONES PARA LA POBLACION CIVIL EN CASO DE RAID AEREO.

LAS NECESIDADES TACTICAS DE LAS FUERZAS DE LIBERACION PUEDE TRAER CONSIGO EL EMPLEO DE AVIONES EN DETERMINADOS SECTORES DE LA REPUBLICA. ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES DEBEN OBSERVARSE Estrictamente POR LOS CIVILES ESPECIALMENTE LAS FAMILIAS QUE VIVEN CERCA DE CUARTELES, ESTACIONES DE POLICIA, CENTROS FERROVIARIOS O CUALQUIER LUGAR DONDE SE ENCUENTREN ESTACIONADAS, ACUARTELADAS LAS TROPAS DEL GOBIERNO DEL DICTADOR, QUE PUEDAN SER ATACADAS DESDE EL AIRE POR NUESTROS AVIONES, QUE ATACARAN SIN PREVIO AVISO.

SAVIR CANCIO PEÑA. X-Y-Z

A LA PRIMER EVIDENCIA DE UN ATAQUE AEREO NO PERMANEZCA EN LAS CALLES NI EN LAS CERCANIAS DE CUARTELES, ESTACIONES DE POLICIA, ETC. ADEMAS DEL PELIGRO DE LAS BOMBAS, SE EXHIBE AL FUEGO DE LAS AMETRALLADORAS DE LOS AVIONES. NO PERMANEZCA EN LAS CALLES.

EL ATAQUE AEREO SE HACE, GENERALMENTE CON BOMBAS DE DEMOLICION DE ALTO EXPLOSIVO Y CON BOMBAS INCENDIARIAS (NAPALM) QUE PRODUCEN INCENDIOS INTENSOS. PROBABLEMENTE EL TIPO QUE SE USARIA DURA 20 MINUTOS ARDIENDO Y EL CALOR QUE GENERA ES TAN INTENSO QUE PRENDE LOS ALREDEDORES. AGUA EN ABUNDANCIA O EXTINGUIDORES QUIMICOS APLICADOS INMEDIATAMENTE SON EFECTIVOS EN EXTINGUIR LAS LLAMAS, EN LOS PRIMEROS MOMENTOS.




TIPO DE BOMBA INCENDIARIA  
DE MARCHA Y TERMITA. AC ALETAS  
YANEROS. PESO 2 1/2  
PARA 1000 GALLEGAS DE LARGO.


SIEMPRE SE LANZAN VARIAS AL MISMO TIEMPO. OTRO TIPO DE BOMBA ES LA DE FOSFORO VIVO - DE 10 O MAS LIBRAS. SI PARTICULAS DE ESTA BOMBA ALCANZAN UNA PERSONA PRODUCE QUEMADURAS DOLOROSAS Y PROFUNDAS.

TENGA CUBOS CON AGUA LISTOS Y ARENA EN ABUNDANCIA. TENGA A MANO EXTINGUIDORES DE INCENDIO Y USELOS SOBRE LA BOMBA ENSEGUIDA, Y BAÑE LOS ALREDEDORES.

LAS BOMBAS DE DEMOLICION SON DE VARIOS TIPOS Y PESOS. SE UTILIZAN CONTRA LOS CUARTELES, INSTALACIONES MILITARES, PUENTES, ETC. AL EXPLOTAR PRODUCEN UNA CORRIENTE DE AIRE TAN FUERTE QUE ROMPE CRISTALES DE VENTANAS, VIDRIERAS, ETC. EN DETERMINADA DISTANCIA Y PUEDE SER FATAL PARA LAS PERSONAS.



BOMBA DE DEMOLICION.



## BOMBA DE FRAGMENTACION

ESTAS BOMBAS SE USAN  
CONTRA CONCENTRACIONES DE TROPAS. SON  
DE 15 A 30 LIBRAS DE  
PESO. SUS FRAGMENTOS  
SE ESPARZEN A  
UNA GRAN VELOCIDAD  
POR CIENTOS DE YAR-  
DAS DEL LUGAR DON-  
DE EXPLOTAN. UN PE-  
DAZO DEL TAMAÑO DE  
UN CHICHARDO MATA A  
UNA PERSONA A MUCHAS  
YARDAS DE DISTANCIA.

LA MEJOR PROTECCION  
ES TIRARSE AL SUELO.  
BOCA ABAJO Y PROTE-  
GER LA CABEZA LO ME-  
JOR QUE SE PUEDA.

**¡QUEDESE EN SU CASA  
CON SU FAMILIA!**

SI ENCUENTRA  
SIN EXPLOTAR  
ELABORE A UN  
EXPLOSIVO  
BRE ELLO D  
TANDO AL  
NIENIENTEMENTE  
HAYA CAIDO,

**NO PERMANEZCA  
AZOTEAS O TUBERÍAS  
CASAS. NO**

TAS NI VEN  
CERCA DE C  
CUARTEL MO  
EJEMPLO, V  
PRONTO POS  
ALREDEDOR  
ESTALLE LA  
DE LA LIBER  
MO SE APL  
NES DE POL  
Y EDIFICIOS

DE LA DICT

MANEJE  
AFEREC. N

FILED IN  
NAID'S FILE

GAN A LA C

50] PADRE  
A BUSCAR

CINE, CAFE,  
SALGA HASTA

ATA QUE.

LLE CORRA  
ALGUNA CAS.

LO. BOCA ABAN  
AERAS SDNY

IN ESPERADO  
MINUTOS, P4

D. DRES. SI  
CHACHA TR

UN CARRO

EN UN AVI  
ATACADA, T

DEL VEHICULO  
LAS PUERTAS.

CIMIENTO, P.  
NA OPORTU


ALGUIEN EN

DA REFUGIO  
NUESTROS P

DIRIGIDOS CU  
MILITARES

RO ESTIMAMU  
CAUCIONES

SI SE LANZAN VARIAS AL MISMO  
PUNTO. OTRO TIPO DE BOMBA ES LA  
FOSFORO VIVO- DE 10 O MAS LI-  
BRAS. SI PARTICULAS DE ESTA BOMBA  
LANZAN UNA PERSONA PRODUCEN  
HERIDAS DOLOROSAS Y PROFUN-  
DAS. CUBOS CON AGUA LISTOS Y  
EN ABUNDANCIA. TENGA A  
MANO EXTINGUIDORES DE INCENDIO  
Y USELOS SOBRE LA BOMBA ENSE-  
GUIDA, Y BAÑE LOS ALREDEDORES.  
LAS BOMBAS DE DEMOLICION SON DE  
VARIOS TIPOS Y PESOS. SE UTI-  
LIZAN CONTRA LOS CUARTELES,  
ESTACIONES MILITARES, PUEN-  
TES, ETC. AL EXPLOTAR PRODUCEN  
UNA CORRIENTE DE AIRE TAN  
FUERTE QUE ROMPE CRISTALES,  
VENTANAS, VIDRIERAS, ETC. EN  
TERMINADA DISTANCIA Y PUE-  
DE SER FATAL PARA LAS PERSONAS.



BOMBA DE DEMOLICION.

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UNA GRAN VELOCIDAD  
POR CIENTOS DE YAR-  
DAS DEL LUGAR DON-  
DE EXPLOTAN. UN PE-  
DAZO DEL TAMAÑO DE  
UN CHICHARRO MATA A  
UNA PERSONA A MUCHAS  
YARDAS DE DISTANCIA.

LA MEJOR PROTECCION  
ES TIRARSE AL SUELO  
DEBAJO Y PROTE-  
GERSE CON LA MANO LO ME-  
JOR QUE SE PUEDA.

PROTEGETE EN SU CASA  
O EN SU FAMILIA.

SI ENCUENTRA UNA BOMBA  
SIN EXPLOTAR, NO LA TOQUE,  
LLAME A UN EXPERTO EN  
EXPLOSIVOS O DISPARE SO-  
BRE ELLA DE LEJOS, APAR-  
TANDO AL PUBLICO CONVE-  
NIENTEMENTE, SEGUN DONDE  
HAYA CAIDO, NATURALMENTE.

**NO** PERMANEZCA EN LAS  
AZOTÉAS O TEJADOS DE LAS  
CASAS. **NO** ESTE EN PUER-  
TAS NI VENTANAS. **SI** VIVE  
CERCA DE COLUMBIA, O DEL  
CUARTEL MONCADA, POR  
EJEMPLO, VAYASE LO MAS  
PRONTO POSIBLE DE SUS  
ALREDEDORES EN CUANTO  
ESTALLE LA INSURRECCION  
DE LA LIBERACION. LO MIS-  
MO SE APLICA A ESTACIO-  
NES DE POLICIA, MUELLES  
Y EDIFICIOS DEL GOBIERNO  
DE LA DICTADURA. **NO**

MANEJE DURANTE UN RAID  
AEREO. **NO** DEJE QUE LOS  
NIÑOS EN UN COLEGIO SAL-  
GAN A LA CALLE HASTA QUE  
SUS PADRES NO LOS VENGAN  
A BUSCAR. **SI** ESTA EN EL  
CINE, CAFE, TIENDAS, ETC. **NO**  
SALGA HASTA QUE PASE EL  
ATAQUE. **SI** ESTA EN LA CA-  
LLE CORRA A PROTEGERSE EN  
ALGUNA CASA, O TIRESE AL SUE-  
LO, BOCA ABAJO. LOS RAIDS  
AEREOS SON MUY RAPIDOS E  
INESPERADOS; CUESTION DE  
MINUTOS, PERO SON DEVASTA-  
DORES. **SI** VIAJA EN UNA  
GUAGUA, TRANSMIA O ESTA EN  
UN CARRO DE TREN, O AUN  
EN UN AUTO, EN UNA ZONA  
ATACADA, TIRESE DEBAJO  
DEL VEHICULO, ETC. CIERRE  
LAS PUERTAS DE SU ESTABLE-  
CIMIENTO, PERO DE LA HUMA-  
NA OPORTUNIDAD DE QUE  
ALGUIEN EN LA CALLE SE PUE-  
DA REFUGIAR EN EL EDIFICIO.

NUESTROS RAIDS AEREOS VAN  
DIRIGIDOS CONTRA LOS OBJETIVOS  
MILITARES DEL DICTADOR, PE-  
RO ESTIMAMOS TODAS LAS PRE-  
CAUCIONES POCAS.

EL LUGAR MAS SEGURO PARA  
PROTEGERSE DENTRO DE LA CA-  
SA, CONTRA EL FUEGO DE AMETRA-  
LLADORAS DE LOS AVIONES ES DE-  
BAJO DE UNA CAMA, O MUEBLE  
MUY PESADO. **SI** ES POSIBLE, SE  
ACUMULAN COLCHONES U OTROS  
MUEBLES SOBRE LA CAMA. LOS  
PROYECTILES PUEDEN ATRAVEJAR  
TECHOS DE TEJAS, MADERA Y  
GUANO. FACILMENTE.

EL MAYOR PELIGRO EN UN BOM-  
BARDEO AEREO ESTA EN LA POSI-  
BILIDAD QUE LAS BOMBAS NO  
DEN PRECISAMENTE EN EL BLANCO  
Y ALGUNA PUEDA EN LOS ALRE-  
DEDORES DE LA POSICION ATACA-  
DA CAER, ESPECIALMENTE SI EL  
RAID ES NOCTURNO. **SI** UNA  
BOMBA CAE EN UNA CASA, ESTA DE-  
BE ABANDONARSE INMEDIATAMEN-  
TE AUN CUANDO APARENTEMENTE  
ALGUNAS DE SUS PAREDES PAREZ-  
CAN INTACTAS. **NUNCA** ECHES  
AGUA SOBRE UNA BOMBA INCEN-  
DIARIA, PORQUE EXPLOTA. LAS  
BOMBAS INCENDIARIAS COMIENZAN  
A ACTUAR POR IMPACTO A LOS PO-  
COS SEGUNDOS DE CAER. UNA  
FORMA DE COMBATIRLAS UNICA-  
MENTE EN EL PRIMER MOMENTO ES  
ECHARLE ARENA HASTA CUBRIRLA  
PONERLA EN UN CUBO Y SACAR-  
LA DE LA CASA, O ALEJARLA DEL  
LUGAR DONDE ESTE.

MODO DE SACAR UNA  
BOMBA INCENDIARIA  
PALO  
CUBO CON  
ARENA  
ACTUE RAPIDAMEN-  
TE ANTES QUE  
LA MATERIA IN-  
FLAMABLE DE LA  
BOMBA SE EXTIEN-  
DA. NO USE EXTINGUIDORES A BASE  
DE TETRACLORIDO DE CARBON. SO-  
LO USE LOS DE SODA-ACIDA. USE  
ARENA EN ABUNDANCIA.

LA UNICA FORMA DE ACABAR  
CON LA DICTADURA BATISTIANA  
ES LA REVOLUCION!

PRESTARSE A LA COME-  
DIA ELECTORAL DEL  
DICTADOR ES UNA  
TRAICION A CUBA.

SAYUR  
CANCID  
PEÑA.



SERIE I-NO. 10-X-Y-Z

## INSTRUCCIONES

GENERALES UTILES ESPECIALMENTE PARA EL PERSONAL CIVIL QUE CAREZCA DE INSTRUCCION TACTICA MILITAR. EN TODO CASO SE DEBE CONSULTAR A LOS TECNICOS MILITARES Y EXPERTOS.

SAYUR LANCID PEÑA.

ES DE ESPERAR QUE NUESTRA LUCHA DE LIBERACION SEA BREVE Y QUE SE DESENVUELVAN EN LAS CIUDADES Y PUEBLOS. PUEDE SER MAS BIEN UNA LUCHA DE CALLES NO OBTAN-TE MUCHO DE LO INDICADO EN ES-TE BREVE MANUAL PODRA APLICAR-SE EN LA TACTICA A SEGUIR SE-GUN ORDENEN LOS TECNICOS Y EXPERTOS MILITARES QUE GUIA- RAN A NUESTROS HOMBRES.

$$\boxed{X-Y-Z}$$

OBSERVACION


**OBSERVACION** UNA VEZ ACORDADO EL PLAN DE ATAQUE, Y EN TODO TIEMPO, LA OBSERVACION DE LOS MOVIMIENTOS DEL ENEMIGO SON VITALES PARA EL DESARROLLO DE LA LUCHA. OBSERVENSE CUIDADOSAMENTE LOS DIBUJOS Y ESTUDIENSE.

FORMA  
CORRECTA  
DE UN  
OBSERVA-  
DOR.



SI PUEDE CUBRIRSE LA  
CARA CON HOJAS, O  
LLENARLA DE TIERRA,  
MEJOR.

FORMA  
INCORRECTA




FORMA INCORRECTA.

FORMA CORRECTA, SIN HACER  
SINUETA - SIEMPRE CON UN  
FONDO ATRAS. ASI SE CON-  
FUNDE Y NO SE DESTACA.

SE DESTACA FACILMENTE POR NO TENER NADA EN EL FONDO.

UNA TELA METALICA COLO  
CADA EN UNA VENTANA DE-  
TIENE LAS GRANADAS, QUE  
NO CAEN DENTRO, ASI COMO  
LAS BOMBAS DE GAS LA-  
CRIMOGENO. REACTAN.




CORRECTA ↑  
ENTRE MALEZA Y ARBUSTOS



INCORRECTA

NO SE PARE,  
NI SE AGA-  
CHE - ACUES  
TESE - NO SE  
MUEVA.



CORRECTA

CORRECTA

PROCURESE


CONFUNDIRSE CON EL FONDO. NO PRESENTE NUNCA SILUETA. CUBRASE CON EL

FOLLAGE • NO SE  
MUEVA INNECESARIA-  
MENTE • NO FUME •



INCORRECTA

CUBRA LAS COSAS  
QUE BRILLEN. NO  
USE ROPA BLANCA.



LA TIERRA COLD-  
RADA, O EL MISMO  
LODO, EMBADURNADO POR LA CARA Y  
BRAZOS, Y SOBRE LA ROPA HACEN UN  
MAGNIFICO CAMOUFLAGE.

EL OBJETIVO DEL OBSERVADOR ES VER SIN SER VISTO.

SI DEBE ACERCARSE AL OBJETO OBSERVADO, ARRASTRESE, DESPACIO, SOLO LEVANTE LA CABEZA PARA VER, Y SOLO EL TIEMPO NECESARIO UNICAMENTE.

COMO SE PUEDE APRECIAR, ESTO SE  
APLICA A CAMPO DESCUBIERTO, EN

LA CIUDAD NO ES LO MISMO, PERO COMO PRINCIPIO GENERAL, TIENE SU APLICACION.

ASI SE LLAMA  
CUANDO  
TAPE EL  
GATILLO  
Y PEINE  
RA QUE  
NO COJA  
TIERRA

CORRE  
NUNCA  
TARDO PA  
QUE SE

NUNCA S

UNA VENA  
ES MUY  
GROSO.

NO USE  
PAJA LA  
O CARME

PROCURE  
SILUETA C  
CIELO • C  
SIEMPRE  
FOLLAJE,  
ETC • NU  
GRUPOS  
YARDAS  
DISTANCI

**INCORRECTA**  
NO SE PARE, NI SE AGACHE - ACUES- TESE - NO SE MUEVA.

PROCURESE CONFUNDIRSE CON EL FONDO. NO PRESENTE NUNCA SILUETA. OCURASE CON EL FOLLAJE. NO SE MUEVA INNECESARIAMENTE. NO FUME.

OCURASE LAS COSAS QUE BRILLEN. NO SE ROPA BLANCA.

LA TIERRA COLORADA, O EL MISMO POR LA CARA Y ROPA HACEN UN CONTRASTO.


SERVADOR ES VER

AL OBJETO OBSER- DESPACIO, SOLO PARA VER, Y SOLO UNICAMENTE.


RECIBIR ESTO SE DESCOBERTO, EN NO ES LO QUE COMO PRINCIPIO AL TIENE SU APLICACION.

LA METALICA COLO EN UNA VENTANA DE LAS GRANADAS QUE EN DENTRO ASI COMO BOMBAS DE CASAL CUANDO REBOTAN.

ASI SE LLEVA EL RIFLE CUANDO SE ARRASTRA. TAPE EL CAÑON, GATILLO, MIRA, Y PEINE, PARA QUE NO COJA TIERRA



**CORRECTO**  
NUNCA ESCOJA UN ARBOL SOLITARIO PARA OBSERVAR, A MENOS QUE SEA MUY DENSO.



NUNCA SE ASOME A UNA VENTANA. ES MUY PELIGROSO.


PROCIERE PERMANECER LO MAS ADENTRO QUE PUEDA. PERMANEZCA EN LA OSCURIDAD.

NO USE ROPA BLANCA NI SOMBREROS DE PAJA. LA MEJOR ROPA ES COLOR OLIVO, O CARMEYITA.


PROCURE NO HACER SILUETA CONTRA EL CIELO. CAMINE SIEMPRE CONTRA FOLLAJE, PARED, ETC.

NUNCA DEBE CAMINARSE EN GRUPOS COMPACTOS. DE 5 A 20 YARDAS DE UNO A OTRO ES UNA DISTANCIA BUENA Y PRACTICA.

**MARCHA.** FORMACION TACTICA DE OCHO HOMBRES.



ESTA ES UNA FORMACION IDEAL DE UN GRUPO DE OCHO HOMBRES CON LAS DISTANCIAS APROXIMADAS.



FORMACION DE 25 HOMBRES. LAS DISTANCIAS VARIAN SEGUN LA NATURALEZA DEL TERRENO. AUNQUE SEPARADOS LOS HOMBRES VAN A LA VISTA UNO DEL OTRO. NOTESE LA FORMA ESCALONADA ENTRE LOS HOMBRES DE LA COLUMNA.

SAVIOR CAMERO PENA. X-42



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Affiliate: Public Relations Management Corporation, 112 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y.

28 April 1954

APR 28 3 17 PM '54

Honorable Sherman Adams,  
The Assistant to The President,  
The White House,  
Washington 25, D.C.

RECEIVED

Dear Sherman:

File: *WUSA*

Only 90 miles away from our shores the threat of Communism is rearing its ugly head.

On behalf of my client, former President of Cuba, Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras, whom I represent in Washington as public relations counsel, via the New York public relations firm of John David Griffin, I am taking the liberty of presenting a memorandum which shows the growing threat of Communism in the Republic of Cuba to the United States.

The attached memorandum has been prepared by my Associate, Eliseo Riera-Gomez, a United States citizen of Cuban ancestry and a World War II veteran of the United States 31st Infantry Division.

The aforementioned memorandum will show Dictator Batista's growing intimacy with Communist leaders of Cuba which he has been developing since he first overthrew the Constitutional Cuban Government in the 1930's and which he has expanded since his Coup d'Etat in 1952.

Cuba, due its strategic location to our shores, offers considerable threat to our national security should Communism be able to secure control of the Cuban Government and Institutions:

It is hoped that the attached memorandum will prove of interest and value to you and it is being presented with this thought in mind.

Your comments and suggestions will be gratefully appreciated.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincerely,

KROCK - ERWIN ASSOCIATES, INC.

THOMAS P. KROCK, PRESIDENT

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**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *H* **Department of State**

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FROM: Habana  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 239, May 22, 5 p.m.  
NIACT

Control: 10571  
Rec'd: May 22, 1954  
8:15 p.m.

*DWA*  
*AHH*  
*WAB*

File: *WAB*

*Reply 5/23/54*  
*WAB*

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Prompted by studies Embassy indications and recent Central American developments Batista is prepared take vigorous action against Cuban Communists. Thursday his police took up Marinello's passport, latter planning to fly to next day to Europe. Campa, Godoy and Saladrigas meeting Monday noon to frame anti-Communist law expected to be approved by full Cabinet Friday. This would deprive and forbid members Popular Socialist and Communist Parties all positions municipal provincial and national governments as well as posts as officers of all syndicates.

Batista instructed Saladrigas confidentially consult Embassy re expediency this measure since they under impression Beaulac opposed similar proposal last year, recommending as preferable use of judicial procedures against subversion and not action on basis political affiliation. Batista believes Cuban judicial machinery uncertain and too slow also subversive intent too difficult to prove in court of law. He feels procedure he proposes take only feasible one.

Saladrigas last night suggested Batista receive Ambassador confidentially in order discuss growing influence local Communists. President agreed but said he would prefer first be able show Ambassador he taken some concrete measures against perill.

Embassy feels Batista should be encouraged in his endeavor. Reply if possible Monday morning.

GARDNER

AE:JM

NOTE: Mr. Sowash (MID) notified 5/22/54 9:15 p.m. EMB CW

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*CRB*

MAY 23 1954

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Origin

Info

737.00/

This Government sees no reason why Cuban Government should not take such action as it considers practicable and effective against Cuban communists to meet threat of international communist intervention confronting Cuba and hemisphere, including measures described EMBTEL 239, May 22. We view with satisfaction withdrawal Marinello's passport and hope Cuban Government will institute further measures in accordance with inter-American commitments to control movements of persons travelling in service of international communist conspiracy.

Dulles (2.2.7)  
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Desired  
(Offices  
Only)

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ARMED: CRBurrows

Telegraphic transmission and  
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C. R. Burrows

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5-23-54

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**Department of State**

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FROM: Habana

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 245, May 25, 6 p.m.

C

P

PRIORITY

OLI

OP

OCB

CIA

By pure coincidence member SIM\* 11 a.m. today recognized occupant of station wagon parked in country club area near residence as "Pincho" Gutierrez and gave alarm. Later pursuit involving gunfire resulted in capture of former and Cesar Laneis. Accompanying automobile too speedy for capture believed to be occupied by Aureliano Sanchez Arango.

Search of station wagon's chauffeur's house revealed three hand grenades, Laneis carried pistol with two extra magazines. Suitcase ditched nearby said to contain extensive subversive documentation not (repeat not) yet well analyzed but mentioning Sanchez contacts throughout the island. Interesting document contained complaint that Batista's movements were unpredictable, that he invariably chose different routes when making announced visits, different methods of transportation, varying ways of announcing to his staff time of departure etc. One source carefully studying and reporting Batista's habits was found to be palace newspaper reporter. General Cantillo admits President well aware possibility assassination hence takes every possible precaution.

Country club area and beyond still blocked off with slight hope of locating car which escaped.

GARDNER

JM

As received, will be serviced upon request.

Note: Mr. Wellman (MID) notified 5/25/54 10:40 p.m. EMB(CWO).

737.00/5-2554

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MAY 28 1954

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(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

737.00/5-2654

XR 714.001

FROM

AMEMBASSY, HABANA

1431

DESP. NO.

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 26, 1954

DATE

REF

Embtel 239 of May 22, 1954; Emb. D-1428, May 26, 1954.

23 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
5-28	OC R/A-2	041-6 U/OC-1 P-1
	Cia-7	Army-3 Navy-3 Air-3

SUBJECT

Proposed Anti-Communist Measures

OC B-1 USA-10

When the Ministers of State, Justice and Labor met on May 24 to discuss measures to be taken in order to curb Communist activities in Cuba, the question of denying passport facilities to members of the PSP and other Communists came up. Minister Campa pleaded that the Government has no way to determine who are Communists and who are not, without assistance from the American Embassy. (NOTE. Sr. Campa's ministry issued a passport last March to Juan MARINELLO about whose Communism even the least informed cannot doubt.) Minister Saladrigas has now made the suggestion that the Embassy lend this cooperation to the Cuban Government.

It is realized that effective passport control cannot be expected from the Cubans operating alone, yet the aid requested would offer certain perils to our interests. It could well endanger our sources of information, and sooner or later it would inevitably become known that the issuance of a Cuban passport was subject to the placet of the American Embassy, leading to charges of undue influence in internal affairs and even of usurpation of sovereignty. Instructions in this regard are requested.

Later on Monday Eusebio Mujal was called in by President Batista and told, in the presence of Saladrigas, that the Government intended to issue a law barring Communists from holding office in the syndicates. Mujal had learned this fact from the morning newspapers and was very much upset thereby. He insisted that the CTC be allowed to clean its own house of Communists, without legal compulsion. The President temporized to the extent of giving Mujal one or two weeks to effect this change, after which time the proposed law would be issued in any case. Mujal has called the directorate of the CTC to apprise them of the situation.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall  
Counselor of Embassy

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LWO

OCT 1 1954  
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## THE CASE OF THE CUBAN DICTATOR BATISTA AND THE COMMUNISTS

by

Carlos Hevia  
Former President and former  
Minister of State of Cuba

At 2:00 A.M., the 10th of March, 1952, former Dictator Batista entered Camp Columbia, and by offering to double the pay of soldiers, sailors and policemen, established himself again as a dictator, supported exclusively by the army. In so doing he discarded the Cuban Constitution and assumed the powers of Congress. He knew the pattern (it was Lenin's), when by a mutiny of the Russian Army the way was paved for the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. And Batista had already practiced it in 1933 when he helped to organize a mutiny of soldiers, sailors and policemen against their officers; and the Communists, informed beforehand, attempted to use the mutiny to Sovietize Cuba. Only through the strong opposition of democratic, nationalistic and anti-Communist Cubans - I was one of those who fought against Dictator Machado - was this Communist attempt foiled, yet Batista remained at the head of the mutinous army and ruled Cuba from Camp Columbia as a dictator until elected President in 1940.

In 1937 Batista established formal and important contacts with the Communist Party, and during the early days of September, 1938, (about the time of the Munich Pact) he ordered the Governor of Havana to recognize the Communist Party of Cuba as a legal entity and organization, which in its first by-laws registered itself as a subsidiary of the International Communists. The recording of the Communist Party as a legal organization was made the 13th of September, 1938, in the Provincial Government of Havana.

Already in an intimate union with the Communists, Batista immediately moved to put the whole labor movement of Cuba in the hands of the Communists, and after several interviews with Communists Blas Roca, Lázaro Peña and Juan Marinello, the Cuban Confederation of Labor was placed under the absolute control of Lázaro Peña on January 22nd, 1939, in a gathering which took place under threats and violence supported by Dictator Batista.



After the recognition of the Communist Party as a legal entity, and with its absolute control of the labor movement of Cuba, Batista planned also to bring Communists into the government of Cuba, and to that end united, in March, 1939, the Communist Party and a small political party called "Unión Revolucionaria" and together they made "Unión Revolucionaria Comunista" which took part in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 1939. As he was already an aspirant for the presidency of the Republic, Batista utilized the Communist Party as shock troops in his political campaign. He gave them arms, money and authority to act in the whole country. And with their help he was elected President in 1940. Batista ran for President on the "Socialist-Democratic Coalition", and a member of that coalition was the "Unión Revolucionaria Comunista" mentioned above. He, Batista, adopted in his program many basic ideas for which the Communist Party stood, including their famous motto "Cuba, Out of the Imperialist War". At this time Hitler and Stalin were allies.

One of the most important Russian Communist agents in Latin America, well known to those who had to fight Communist activity in this area, has been a man who has used the names of Otto Modley, Aaron Sinckowitz, José Michelin, Abraham Grobar, and lately Fazio Grobar. He was finally chased out of Cuba in 1950 by actions of the Cuban government when the overthrown constitutional President Prío was in power. However, he was able to escape from the Cuban police with the aid and assistance of Mr. Fomin, Charge d'Affaires of Russia at the time, who in an official automobile of that legation took Grobar and placed him aboard the Russian ship "Demetri Papanaris", which entered the Cuban port of Manatí the 23rd of June, 1950, to load sugar, and left that port July 4th the same year for England. In April, 1951, the information of the Cuban police was that Grobar was in Paris, France, on his way to the Middle East.

Grobar entered Cuba for the first time in 1924. He was a graduate of the Political University of Moscow and came to Cuba to organize the Communist Party of Cuba. In 1930 he registered as José Michelin, a native of Poland, son of Mater and Rachel, registration number 68432 of the "Control de Dependientes" of Havana. At that time he already used the name Aaron Sinckowitz to act as delegate of the International Communists in the Caribbean region. He was captured by the police and was deported October 1, 1932 on the steamship "Heerlen", under the name of

Sinckowitz, stating then he was a native of Roumania, sailing for Rotterdam. In March, 1933, with false passports, he entered Cuba again.

He was in Cuba as a delegate of the Communists, and during the Cuban Revolution of 1933 he attempted to convert it to a Communist Revolution, using banners with the Hammer and Sickle in some sugar mills and inciting the army to rebel in favor of Soviet Russia. However, this attempt was put down by the then President of Cuba, Grau San Martín.

In January, 1935, he was registered in the Alien Registration Bureau under the name of Jose Michelin, with card number 153297. He was captured by the police the 23rd of November, 1935, in a secret Communist meeting and was sentenced to six months in prison by the courts, and to be deported, but on the 28th of April, 1936, when Batista was ruling Cuba as a dictator from the Cuban Army's Headquarters at Columbia, by Decree Number 1095, published in the Official Gazette (equivalent to the Congressional Record) of the 28th of April, 1936, the deportation order was revoked.

On the 27th of July, 1936, under the name of Abraham Grobar, this same person requested the Department of State of Cuba to issue him citizenship papers, submitting affidavits that appeared to be issued at the municipal court of the township of Batabanó, stating that Grobar had renounced his Polish citizenship and requested the Cuban. Citizenship papers were issued in November, 1936, under the name of Abraham Grobar. However, as these affidavits were false, criminal proceedings were instituted for falsification of official documents (No. 244 of 1938, Cuban Criminal Courts, First Section), but the so-called Grobar was included in the Amnesty Law of 1938. At this time Batista was ruling Cuba as a dictator.

During this period this person had variously been known as José Michelin, Otto Modley, Aron Sinckowitz and Abraham Grobar, but after September 13, 1938, when Batista legalized the Communist Party, he adopted the name of Fabio Grobar. He was the foremost leader of Russian Communism in Cuba; he helped organize Marxist schools, and helped place Lazaro Peña at the head of the Confederation of Labor of Cuba. In 1940, orders from Moscow designated him as Instructor for Latin America, and a number of meetings were held under his leadership in various countries.



In January, 1942

Batista being President, the Russian Fazio Grobar,

Delegate in Cuba of the Caribbean Soviet Secretariat, called a meeting of all Communists in Santiago de Cuba in which he read instructions that he had received, stating that the entrance of the United States in the war had destroyed the campaign against that nation made by Russia and had increased the moral influence of the United States over the peoples of Latin America; and that it was necessary to start a campaign of defamation against Great Britain and the United States with the objective of keeping the mentality of the people of Latin America favorable to Russia, so as to have a prepared field when in the post war commotions Sovietization of Latin America would be attempted. After this gathering, the Central Committee of the Communist Party met in Havana and designated the Communist leader Blas Roca to tour Latin America to the end above mentioned. In the Official Gazette of June 18th, Batista, as President, signed the Decree Number 1625, designating Blas Roca as an official delegate of the Minister of Labor assigned to visit Latin American countries.

It has been shown that Grobar was permitted by Batista to remain in Cuba when he was Dictator by cancelling his deportation order; second, by letting him receive Cuban citizenship papers and applying to him the Amnesty Law of 1938; and later when the Communist Party was legalized, permitting him to act freely in Cuba, organizing the Communists and helping them to control Cuban labor. Also, during Batista's presidency, he sent Blas Roca to visit Latin America in 1942 to prepare the minds of the people against the United States and in favor of the Russians during the expected post war commotions.

Batista, as President, elected in 1940, designated Juan Marinello, President of the Communist Party, as Minister Without Portfolio in his cabinet, and another Communist leader, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, became a member of the cabinet when Marinello was nominated Senator. Batista helped Communists obtain three seats in the Cuban Senate and several in the House of Representatives and townships of Cuba. The Senators were Juan Marinello, César Vilari and García Aguero. In 1943 Batista gave to the Communists one of the most important international wave lengths for their radio broadcasting station, called "1010". Also when he was President, he designated as Head of War Propaganda Vicente Martínez (a.m.c.1), one of the key men of the Communist newspaper "Bohemia".



Batista had many meetings with Communist leaders Blás Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (former member of Batista's cabinet) before the 10th of March, 1952, possibly when he was preparing the coup d'etat, on the farm of his former Minister of War, Sosa de Quesada (now a general in the Cuban army and head of legal matters for the Army). After the coup d'etat, the Communists adopted a very peculiar attitude of protest, declaring that they were against any revolutionary or violent attitude directed against Batista; and working for the formation of a popular front, including themselves and other political parties to work out a peaceful solution; by that action fomenting discord in the opposition to Batista.

During the presidency of Batista, 1940-44, the corporation "Noticias de Hoy, S. A.", owner of the Communist newspaper "Hoy", was organized in Havana the 9th of February, 1943, and registered in the General Registrations of Corporations the Second of April, 1943, Page 1965, Folio 179, Book 25. During Batista's term as President, this newspaper "Hoy" had a large circulation and government support.

When the overthrown constitutional President of Cuba, Carlos Prío, was Minister of Labor in 1946 he undid Batista's work of handing over to the Communists the labor movement of Cuba, and after a tough struggle broke their power and placed Cuban anti-Communist labor leaders at the head of the labor movement.

Carlos Prío, as President, also attempted to stop the anti-democratic and anti-American campaign carried in the newspaper "Hoy" by the Communists. When the Communists lost control of the Cuban labor organization C. T. C., as the newspaper "Hoy" was established with money paid by the Cuban workers, the Cuban labor union C. T. C. claimed ownership of the newspaper. Then the Cuban government closed it, declaring that ownership was in dispute. The Communists started legal action, stating that the corporation "Noticias de Hoy, S. A." owned and published the newspaper "Hoy", not the Cuban labor organization C. T. C., and ordering in a letter to President Prío that a group of prominent Communists were the owners of that corporation. In a civil suit the courts declared that corporation the legal owner of the newspaper. Then President Prío again ordered, in July, 1951, the occupation of the paper by the police, stating that as it was owned by

a group of Communists it was an illicit organization and it was again closed. To this action of the Cuban government, Batista made a strong public protest in defense of the Communist newspaper "Hoy".

From these facts it is shown that when Prió was President the Communist newspaper "Hoy" was interrupted in its campaign against the democracies. And in so doing, the government of Prió undid another pro-Communist work of Batista.

Since Batista staged his coup d'etat of March 10, 1952, the Communist newspaper "Hoy" has had free circulation in Cuba, and big trucks carry the newspaper throughout the Island. And he is, in an undercover way, helping the Communists to gain again control of the labor movement of Cuba. At the same time, democratic radio commentators are silenced, broadcasting stations closed, newspaper commentators and writers jailed and brutally beaten.

While Batista has forbidden public gatherings yet the Communists have been permitted to have large meetings in the National Theater in Havana, on October 10, 1952, as well as the 7th of December the same year. All Communist leaders are in Cuba without the government harrassing them in the least; most of them recently returned from Russia, arriving freely by plane at the Rancho Boyeros Airport. The so-called Batista's break of relations with Russia, as published in the American Magazine "Time" is just the opposite, for Russia broke relations with Cuba, possibly as it had a friend in power it did not need it any longer. And we must remember that May 1, 1952 there were two labor parades, one of the Cuban democratic workers in front of the Presidential Palace of Cuba; and the Communists and the labor section of Batista's Party, P. A. U., marched together in the Havana Stadium.

Batista has been in conversations with the Communists so that the so-called Anti-Communist law that he has claimed to be preparing will finally be drafted in such a manner that it could be used against those who oppose him and favor democracy, and not against the Communists.

When Batista organized his present party, P.A.U., about 1949, the Communists helped him; and thousands of them, including some of their best organizers, joined the new party; and these same Communists and their bosses are again gaining control of important positions in the government and in the labor movement of Cuba.



Many Communists have come to the front after the coup of March 10, 1952; Raúl Lorenzo, Minister of Commerce in Batista's present cabinet, was a member of the Communist Secretariat in the Province of Las Villas, 1936-37, using the pseudonym "Lauro".

Arsenio González, Undersecretary of Labor, is a former Communist, and as late as the 18th of February, 1952, he was legal advisor for Lázaro Peña (the prominent Communist leader in whose hands Batista and the Communists put all Cuban workers from 1939 until 1946. Peña, who had been in Russia several times, together with Blas Roca and the above named Grobar, have been the three key men of Communism in Cuba), in a legal suit to regain the position of Secretary-General for the Communists, as is shown in the judgment of the Cuban high court "Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales y Sociales" of the Supreme Court of Cuba, signed on the 18th of February, 1952, under the number 503-951.

A large number of Communists, some of whom are related below, are now working with Batista's Party in the government, or as members of that Party's labor organization, for example:

Several members of the labor section of Batista's Party in Havana Province are Communists, among them are José Pérez González, Gilberto Galán, Galo Guerra Santana and Julio Grass.

Communists also are Manolo Alonso, Secretario Federación de Licoreros y Refrescos (union of workers in the liquor and beverage industries), and Maria Luisa de Pedro, who wishes to become Secretary General to the Union of Women Tobacco Workers (Gremio Despalilladoras de la Habana).

Ridel Mederos, former Councilman for the Communist Party in the City of Matanzas, is working with the P. A. U. (Batista's Party).

In an election in the cigar makers' industry after Batista's coup d'etat, all the anti-Communist labor leaders were defeated, and Communist Mario Valdés Díaz was elected Secretary General, together with ten other Communists, to the Executive Committee.

Pablo Sotolongo, member of the Central Committee of the Communist labor organization for the Province of Camaguey until recently, is now helping the labor committee of Batista's Party in the same Province.



Justo Ramiro was elected Congressman for the Communist Party 1940-42, has been a prominent Communist leader in the Province of Camaguey until 1950 at least, and is now supporting Batista.

Raúl Ortiz, President of the Municipal Assembly for the Communist Party and Councilman in the City of Florida, Province of Camaguey, is now working with Batista's Party.

Batista's insidiousness is magnified by his pose against Communism, when he knows that he is actually using large numbers of Communists in important positions, especially in workers' organizations. And what makes Cuba one of the most hazardous places now is that in other countries the attitude of the government is usually well known, while here we have Dictator Batista allied to the Communists yet posing to the contrary.

The Communistic inclinations and indoctrination of Batista has been recently shown in his totalitarian actions as Dictator; attacks on the freedom of the press; discarding the Cuban Constitution; assuming the powers of Congress; modifying by ukase the laws regulating the judiciary power by retiring four justices of the Supreme Court; killing, beating and torturing many persons; creating insecurity that has caused an economic collapse; modifying Articles of the Constitution by placing the police and the soldiers out of the jurisdiction of the Courts of the land; establishing twenty new taxes without the approval of Congress. But the anti-Communist feeling and love for liberty and democracy of the Cuban people will win in the end.

April 1952

**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

**Department of State**

**ACTION COPY**

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11  
Action

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Info

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OCB  
CIA

41  
**FROM: Habana**

**TO: Secretary of State**

**NO: 264, June 4.**

**SENT DEPARTMENT 264, REPEATED INFORMATION PANAMA UNNUMBERED.**

Aureliano Sanchez Arango and six other persons involved  
Country Club area plot leaving this afternoon for Panama  
with safe conduct Cuban Government. Remainder persons who sought  
asylum local Embassies last week have departed for Mexico.

~~2634~~  
**Control: 2474**  
**Rec'd: June 4, 1954**  
**8:50 p.m.**

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JAK-8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BUREAU OF  
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

JUN 4 1954

File: *[signature]*

737.00/6-454

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AMEMBASSY, HABANA JUN 7 1954 1470

DESP. NO.

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 4, 1954

DATE

REF

Department's A-480 of June 2, 1954

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For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	ARA-4	CCR/R-2 SY-2 MC-2

SUBJECT:

Salvador CANCIO Peña

ack. 6/11/54  
AMEMB  
Dep. Sec. to Hqs. 6/17/54

The Embassy has read with interest the instruction cited and cannot understand how an American citizen, CANCIO, appears to carry on revolutionary activities, seemingly untrammelled, on United States soil and directed against a friendly nation. Reference is made to the Embassy's despatch No. 1303 of April 27, 1954.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall  
Counselor of Embassy

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1954 JUN 8 PM 1 47

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

737.00/60/754

FROM: ALCONSULATE, Mérida, Yucatán. 68

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

June 17, 1954.  
DATE

REF: Consulate's Despatch No. 55 of April 23, 1954.

20 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	IN F O	OTHER	CCR/R-2 OLI-6 L-2 PD-1 SYD -A-7
	REC'D				
	6/21				

SUBJECT: Carlos GACEL.

As of, possible interest there follows below the text of an unsolicited letter received by this Consulate from Carlos Gacel on June 14, 1954.

Tuxtla Gutierrez,  
May 9, de 1945

Mr. Attht Metcalff,  
USA Vice Consul,  
Mérida, Yucatan.-

Mr. Metcalff:-

I am the friend of mr. Ed Wilkiamson from Campeche.

I now that yuo want information from me and I have interest en to have one conversarion with yo because I have in my powder impor ants information for the Government of The United States of America.

Maybe in pre o four days~ I wil send you another letter.

I am in condition of coopertae whith you and your government.

Sincerili.

Carlos Gacel

To date nothing further has been heard from Mr. Gacel.

Embassy Mexico  
in duplicate.

Arthur V. Metcalfe  
American Vice Consul

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THE HAVANA POST

JUN 1954

Enclosure to  
D-1555, Habana

## Accusation of Prio That Batista Favors Reds Refuted by De la Fe

Statement by Ernesto de la Fe, member of the Cabinet and authorized spokesman for the government of President Fulgencio Batista—June 4/54.

Each new public statement by Carlos Prio seems to be more asinine than the previous one, and there is no doubt in my mind but that he makes his statements for just two reasons. One, he wants to divert the attention of the North American public from the fact that he is now being tried for violating the laws of the friendly nation, which gives him asylum. Two, he wants to take advantage of the anti-Communist feeling in the United States — a feeling with which I am in complete accord — to establish himself as the one and only champion of democracy among the statement of Cuba.

Prio knows very well that the people of Cuba laugh at his statements that President Batista and his government are in sympathy with anything resembling communism, but, as I say, he is talking for the people of the United States, where he stands indicted for crimes against the laws of the

country, and not for the people of Cuba. Apparently he thinks that the people of the United States are more gullible than the people of Cuba. The Cuban people gave up on Prio and his band of speculators and plunderers some years ago and he is thoroughly discredited in his own country.

Prio, who has the dubious honor of having headed a gangster state during the nearly four years he served in the presidency of Cuba, knows very well that no such thing as a police state exists in Cuba today. He also knows that the people of Cuba enjoy more freedom and security today than they did at any time during his administration, when gangster killings were common occurrences in the streets of Havana and when shakedown artists molested innocent

and innocent people. These things were done by Prio and there was no part to state in the main public order.

It would be interesting to know why Prio, during the years of his administration, did not eliminate one of the main places in the Havana underworld, I refer to the Soviet espionage and which had its quarters in the Soviet Consulate in Havana, under the nose of the government, during the entire

(Continued on Page 10)

(Continued from Page 1)

rior he served as the nation's chief executive. Here in Havana, during the Prio regime, hundreds of communist agents were housed, trained, exchanged, assigned and re-assigned without one word of protest from Prio or any member of his government. Here in Havana, communist agents falsified passports and other documents, paid off their spies and openly abused diplomatic privileges, and there is no record of Prio ever having moved to destroy the nefarious system. It is not illogical to think that some of the communist agents who have caused so much trouble recently in some of our neighboring countries obtained part, if not all, of their training here in Havana, during the years Carlos Prio was president.

The whole communist setup was destroyed by law enforcement agents of the Batista government within weeks after it came into power in the spring of 1952, and Cuba and Soviet Russia broke all diplomatic relations. Nor have the people of Cuba forgotten that the golden era of communism in Cuba—the period of communism in Cuba—the period of greatest gains among Cuban workers—was precisely during the time Carlos Prio was serving as Minister of Labor in the administration of President Ramon Grau San Martin.

Prio is fully aware of the fact that Batista's government has passed laws which bar communists from employment in the federal, the provincial and the municipal governments of Cuba. He knows that the same government has outlawed the distribution of communist literature through the mail or by any other means of communication, and that it has enacted a law providing for the deportation of foreigners who engage in the dissemination of communist propaganda.

I do not think any intelligent measures Batista's government has taken as an indication that we are pro-communists. Contrarily, our actions show very clearly that we are one hundred percent against communism in all its forms.

Prio's statements seem to be the statements of a desperate man. And Prio certainly has a right to be desperate. He has been thoroughly discredited in his own country and he is in serious trouble with the laws of the United States.

Perhaps we should be charitable and consider his predicament when we read his statements. Maybe this is a case for pity rather than censure.



AIR POUCH

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AMEMBASSY, HABANA

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF

D-1565, June 24, 1954; Dept's. Inst. A-507, June 21, 1954.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	ARA-4	OCR/R-2 OLI-6 SY-2 P-1 EUR
	6-26	CIA-7 DIS-1 NAVY-3 USIA

SUBJECT: Activities of Salvador Cancio Peña.


As further evidence of the subversive activities against the Government of Cuba by Salvador CANCIO Peña, there are enclosed two copies of the violently anti-Batista, clandestine publication called "Liberation - Organ of the Cuban Revolution". On page six appears a reproduction of a cartoon signed "Saviur Cancio Peña". This issue dated May 1954 was distributed among the persons attending a pro-Guatemala meeting held by the University Student Federation (FEU) in the University on June 22, 1954. This meeting is reported in the Embassy's despatch under reference.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall  
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. 2 copies of pamphlet as stated.



Memo to 744  
dated 7/29/54  
LCN:SY:JFM  
file

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

737.00/7-1654  
XR 200.3712

FROM AMEMBASSY, HABANA JUL 19 1954 67

DESP. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

July 16, 1954

DATE

REF -

5 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F OTHER
	ARA-4	CC/R-2 041-6 P-1 L-2
	7/20	CIA-7 USIA-10 NAVY-3

SUBJECT: "Rescued" Revolutionary May Cause Dispute Regarding Right of Asylum.


BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

On the night of July 12, 1954, Gustavo ARCOS Vernés, who had been condemned to 20 years' imprisonment for participation in the uprising at Santiago de Cuba in July 1953, was "rescued" from a local hospital. He had been transferred from the prison on the Isle of Pines to the Habana hospital for treatment of a spinal wound received in the uprising. In true gangster fashion four men disguised as hospital attendants penetrated to Arcos' room; intimidated with pistols, bound and gagged his guard; and made off with the patient. A person suspected of being one of the "rescuers" and several hospital employees suspected of complicity have been arrested. The police have so far failed to locate Arcos.

It was immediately rumored that Arcos had or would seek asylum in a foreign diplomatic mission. The press reported that the Ministry of State had declared that "this was absurd since there is involved a condemned person who cannot have recourse to the provisions of international agreements on the right of asylum".

END UNCLASSIFIED

(OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Comment. The Embassy has confirmed that, in spite of some question as to the support afforded such an interpretation by the Habana Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the present thinking in the Ministry of State is that Arcos was convicted of a common crime and asylum that might be granted him should not be recognized.



For the Ambassador:

*Carlos C. Hall*  
Carlos C. Hall  
Counselor of Embassy

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MID/P

110

DESP. NO.

August 13, 1954

DATE

AUG 14 1954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BUREAU OF  
FRONTIER AFFAIRS  
Embassy, San José

AUG 18 1954

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

For Dept.	ARR-4	DEPT.	OC/R-2	OL-1-6	P-1	VO-1	MC-2	AK
Use Only	REC'D	IN	OTHER					
	8/17		CIA-7	NAVY-3				

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Rómulo Betancourt

The reporting officer received from the Venezuelan exile, Rómulo BETANCOURT, a personal letter dated August 6, to which was attached a memorandum in which he seeks information about having the time of his visitor's visa extended; asking for prompt notification when his status as a defector is decided upon and asking about securing a gun permit during his visit to New York and presumably in any other state or the District). In connection with the gun permit, Betancourt stated that "I have the reasoned conviction that my life is menaced by agents of the government of my country". He included a photostatic copy of the alleged Cuban secret police report entitled "Frustrated Attack on Rómulo BETANCOURT", dated November 1951. The attack was widely publicized at the time.

Betancourt says in his memorandum that two Cuban agents were sent to do away with him about the middle of last year. It will be recalled that two Cubans were found slain in the month of September on a lonely hillside outside San José. The murders have never been solved.

Betancourt has the idea that he should not be required to appear before the immigration authorities in event he seeks an extension of his time in the U. S. The Embassy assumes that the Department, after reading the enclosed memorandum, will communicate with him regarding the points raised.

In his personal letter to the writer, Betancourt stated that he was unable to see Assistant Secretary Holland because he missed his plane connections and added that Governor MUÑOZ Marín "speaks in high terms of the Assistant Secretary". He said that he and his family were leaving soon for the mountains (San Puerto Rico) because of the heat.

Spanish Copy of Memorandum  
Translation of Memorandum  
Photostatic copy of police report  
Cancas  
Venezuela Desk Officer

For the Ambassador:

C. Allan Stewart  
First Secretary

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From \_\_\_\_\_

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(Classification)

Page 1 of \_\_\_\_\_  
Encl. No. 1  
Desp. No. 110  
From San José

TRANSLATION

MEMORANDUM

1. Mr. Walter M. Walters extended attentions to me in Miami which I appreciate and value.
2. I was informed in the U. S. Consulate in San José, Costa Rica, that I had authorization to remain 90 days in this country. This period, he added, could be extended while the existing situation was being carried through and resolved [defector's status]. On arriving in Miami, I gave as the time of staying in the U. S. as 90 days. I hope that the extension (ampliación) referred to is being carried through and I would like to be duly advised at my address here what has been done on the matter. I wish to go to the continent [presumably South America] at the end of September and take the time necessary to renew old friendships and see at first hand how some institutions in which I am interested are functioning. But it is obvious that for reasons of proper respect, referring to my title as an ex-Chief of State and as president of a democratic party in my country, it is not for me to take the initiative before the immigration authorities. I must make my personal and family plans and decide beforehand whether I am going to remain for some time (algún tiempo) in the United States or return to Costa Rica, country from which I departed, against the wishes of its government and even against my own convenience, and as a demonstration of the proposition of not serving as a pretext for foreign hostilities against a democratic government, which by so being is disagreeable to dictatorships.
3. I have the reasoned conviction that my life is menaced by agents of the government of my country. It is a calculated risk which I accept as a part of my patriotic responsibilities. The text of the Habana police report, which is included in photostatic form speaks for itself. Two Cuban mercenaries travelled to Costa Rica the middle of last year with the mission of repeating the attempt which failed in Habana in 1951. Under these conditions, it seems reasonable that I should be permitted to carry a firearm for my personal defense. I have already obtained authorization in this respect in Puerto Rico from the insular police. It would interest me to know if there exists a procedure which would make possible obtaining a similar permit when I go to New York.

My address in Puerto Rico is: Calle Dos Hermanos, No. 257, Apt. 4, Santurce. Telephone 26422.

Rómulo Betancourt

SECRET

NEGOCIADO DE

ASUNTOS POLITICOS y  
SOCIALES.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE GOBERNACION

REFERENCIA AL **Atentado  
frustrado al Sr. Ró-  
mulo Betancourt.**

POLICIA SECRETA NACIONAL

INFORME CONFIDENCIAL

**ASUNTO:** Párrafos del informe sobre las in-  
vestigaciones practicadas por la  
Policia Secreta Nacional, en rela-  
ción con el frustrado asesinato  
del ex-Presidente de Venezuela, se-  
ñor Rómulo Betancourt; hecho ocu-  
rrido en la ciudad de La Habana el  
pasado 11 de abril de 1954/-

Como es bien sabido, el día 11 de abril del año en curso, en  
la ciudad de La Habana, a las 10 de la tarde, el señor Rómulo  
Betancourt fué atacado por la espalda por un sujeto que trató de  
inyectarle una sustancia tóxica con una jeringuilla elaborada ad-  
hoc.

De las averiguaciones practicadas por este Cuerpo para esclari-  
ficar el hecho, merece atención especial una confidencia recibida  
por esta Jefatura.

De acuerdo con esa confidencia, el atentado fué perpetrado por  
tres individuos que se trasladaron desde TAMPA, FLORIDA, contrata-  
dos para ejecutar el asesinato del ex-Presidente de Venezuela, a  
esta ciudad de La Habana. Según el informe obtenido, fué un domi-  
nicano de nombre CARLOS TORRES, residiendo en MIAMI, quien hizo  
el trato con la banda de malhechores que opera en la mencionada  
ciudad de TAMPA, para su traslado a La Habana y ejecución del plan  
señalado, mediante el pago de una suma que al parecer ascendió a  
150.000, facilitados, según la misma fuente de información, por  
la Junta de Gobierno de Venezuela.

Al decir del confidente, los componentes del "gang" que vinie-  
ron a La Habana con el propósito de asesinar al señor Rómulo Betan-  
court, contratados por el TORRES, fueron:

JOE WILSON, quien fuera el ejecutor directo del frustrado atentado.  
Este sujeto, cuatro meses después del hecho, partió pa-  
ra Venezuela. Se ignora si aún permanece allí.

JOE CACHATORE, quien hace poco tiempo fué condenado por las autori-  
dades judiciales de FLORIDA a 30 años de prisión y  
debe encontrarse cumpliendo condena en el correspon-  
diente presidio norteamericano.

EL OTRO INDIVIDUO que vino a La Habana junto con WILSON y CACHATORE,  
fué asesinado por este último en TAMPA.

ENRIQUE PIETRO, quien, aun cuando no vino a La Habana, forma parte  
de la banda y tuvo que ver en el asunto. Posee una  
finca en las afueras de Tampa y se dedica al tráfi-  
co de billetes falsificados.

Estos individuos habían estado en La Habana en oportunidad an-  
terior organizando un asalto al Tren Central. Plan que les fracasó  
al ser conocido por la Policía Secreta Nacional y puesto en conoci-  
miento del Sr. Jefe del Ejército Gral. Ruperto Cabrera y del enton-  
ces Jefe del G.R.A.S. Coronel Martínez Martorell, quienes tomaron  
las medidas que, si no lograron el apresamiento de la banda, impi-

NEGOCIADO DE

ASUNTOS POLITICOS y  
SOCIALES.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE GOBERNACION

REFIERASE AL

Excmo. Sr. Ministro

mullo Betancourt.

POLICIA SECRETA NACIONAL

- Hoja No. 2 -

dieron el asalto.

Agrega la confidencia que los mencionados sujetos regresaron a Tampa en el vapor Florida, tres días después del malogrado intento de asesinato, temerosos de que fuese descubierta su presencia en la ciudad. Asimismo, asevera, que la sustancia contenida en la jeringuilla no era "Yperita", como lo informara el Doctor-Jefe del Laboratorio de Toxicología del Gabinete Nacional de Identificación, sino VENENO DE COBRA traído, a ese efecto, por los componentes de la banda de malhechores.

La Habana, noviembre de 1951.

  
ERUNDINO VILELLA PEÑA

Jefe de la Policía Secreta Nacional.



AIR POUCH  
PRIORITY

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.  
REF : --

396  
DESP. NO.

October 15, 1954  
DATE  
OCT 19 1954

2 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION ARR 4 REC'D 10-20	DEPT. IN F O OC/R-2 061-6 CIA 7 NAUG-3 USIA-10 OCB-1	MC-2 11
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SUBJECT: Seizure of Explosives and Alleged Terroristic Plot. ARMY-4

(BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED) On October 12, 1954, the police arrested eight persons in Habana and charged them with complicity in a terroristic plot designed to interfere with the elections. All eight were accused of membership in the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by Rafael GARCIA Bárcena who had been sentenced to two years in jail in connection with the 1953 Easter Sunday plot but who was amnestied and released in June of this year.

The police claimed to have seized in two places in downtown Habana (one the headquarters of a normal school teachers' association and the other the medical office of one of the persons arrested) a quantity of explosives including 32 hand grenades, 18 pipe bombs, dynamite and dynamite caps, material for making bombs, and a few army uniforms. The first press reports of the alleged seizure exaggerated the quantity of explosives involved. The medical office is located in a building also occupied by a kindergarten, a point that was made much of by the chief of the National Police and aroused some indignant editorial comment. At a third address a large quantity of MNR leaflets were claimed to have been found; five copies of this leaflet are enclosed.

The Bureau of Investigations of the National Police was the organization chiefly responsible for the raids and arrests.

It was reported that under orders of the Bureau of Investigations four persons in Santa Clara in the Province of Las Villas and five persons in Santiago in the Province of Oriente were arrested under charges of being local leaders of the MNR and sent to Habana. The latter five were later reported to have been released by the Bureau.

The eight persons arrested in Habana, mostly in their twenties, and the four from Santa Clara were promptly brought before the Urgency Court of Habana which ratified their arrest and set trial for October 20th.

FCFornes, Jr.,mgw  
REPORTER

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Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_

Rafael García Bárcena is said to have left the country but at present it is uncertain whether this is correct or whether he has gone into hiding in Cuba.

The police case is indicated by the report of the chief of the Bureau of Investigations to the Urgency Court in which he is said to have declared that "all the persons arrested ... belong to the illegal National Revolutionary Movement and agreed, following the instructions of its head, Dr. Rafael García Bárcena, to carry out a plan of dynamite and personal attempts to create alarm throughout the Republic and impede the elections". This report was also said to contain the following charge:

"Rafael García Bárcena held an interview with the personal delegates of ex-President Carlos PRIO Socarrás (Menelao MORA, Fernando NOEL del Pino, Cándido DE LA TORRE and José DUARTE Oropesa), reaching an agreement to join together to carry out the plans in question, with the members of the MNR and the abstentionist elements of the PRC, the latter under the direction of the ex-President himself and Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango, acting without distinction under a single command."

Cándido de la Torre and José Duarte, both involved in the arms cases in the United States, have been reliably reported to have recently come surreptitiously to Cuba to engage in revolutionary or terroristic activities.

Three of those arrested in Habana, including the doctor in whose office some of the explosives were alleged to have been found, were said by the police to have admitted membership in the MNR but to have claimed that they were gathered together at the time when arrested solely to discuss politics. The doctor was reported to have declared that the explosives in his office had been delivered to him in March 1953 (just before the Easter Sunday affair) by a person unknown acting on orders from Rafael García Bárcena. He reportedly alleged that the explosives had since then remained in his office and had been made available to no one. (END UNCLASSIFIED)

(OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Comment. As in other previous cases of alleged seizures of arms and explosives, it is impossible to estimate to what extent the present case may have been manufactured or dressed up by the authorities, a possibility that cannot be overlooked in incidents of this kind. The amount of explosives seized would seem to be inadequate for an island-wide reign of terror sufficient to force calling off the elections, even as the equipment therefor of a small group of participants. Nevertheless, there have been reports and


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From HABANA

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rumors that some such attempt would be made. This may therefore be the breaking up of an amateurish attempt by García Bárcena whose talents as a revolutionary leader were demonstrated by the Easter Sunday affair to be on the meager side. It is also possible that the police seized upon the MNR as a convenient and perhaps innocent (the leaflet of the MNR "repudiates any intent to use ... any form of terrorism") vehicle to impress others of the vigilance and alertness of the government to suppress violence designed to interfere with the elections.

  
Carlos C. Hall  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

✓ Enclosures

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## **El Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario**

(M. N. R.) hace públicas las siguientes manifestaciones:

1—El M. N. R. se mantiene en plena actividad luchando por la libertad de Cuba y por el triunfo definitivo de la Revolución Nacional, cuyo líder en la presente etapa histórica es **RAFAEL GARCIA BARCENA**

2—El M. N. R. repudia todo intento de emplear como método de lucha cualquier forma de terrorismo.

3—El M. N. R. no admite contribuciones forzadas o no voluntarias ni aporte económico que no provenga del sacrificio de sus militantes o de la donación de sus simpatizantes.

4—El M. N. R. no considera como enemigos a las Fuerzas Armadas de la República, ni identifica a la totalidad de sus miembros con los que mantienen aherrajadas y pretenden responsabilizarlas con todos los hechos cometidos a partir del 10 de Marzo de 1952.

5—El M. N. R. se mantiene dentro de la **LÍNEA DE INDEPENDENCIA REVOLUCIONARIA** que le señalara su fundador, y a tal virtud mantiene abiertas sus filas a los luchadores honestos de todas procedencias políticas que acepten sus bases, se adapte sólo a su disciplina y se adhiera sinceramente a su orientación revolucionaria.

6—El M. N. R. rechaza todo intento de concurrir a los falsos comicios, por la tiranía, y afirma que el derrumbe de ésta no podrá lograrse realmente más que a través de la acción de las vanguardias revolucionarias, apoyadas por los elementos sanos de las Fuerzas Armadas del país.

7—El M. N. R. no considera el derrumbe la actual tiranía como un fin en sí mismo, sino como un medio de lograr que se abra ante nuestra colectividad un ancho camino de progreso y felicidad pública, y que se liquiden para siempre los conflictos nacionales que han generado las diversas fructaciones cubanas. El M. N. R. ha hecho suyo y se mantendrá fiel al mismo desde el Poder el lema de combate de Antonio Maceo: "Mientras quede una injusticia que reparar, la revolución redentora no habrá terminado".

8—El M. N. R. dado que sus finalidades no son egoístas ni sectarias, sino patrióticas y de naturaleza nacional, declara que al asumir el Poder no dilapidará en inútiles venganzas ni en estériles persecuciones las energías revolucionarias que sólo deben emplearse en la tarea de convertir en realidad nuestro indeclinable e histórico propósito de hacer de Cuba una gran nación.

**EL M. N. R. HARA DE CUBA UNA GRAN NACION**

Page \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

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Page 1 of 1

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 319

From \_\_\_\_\_

ROMULO BETANCOURT  
Dos Hermanos, 257.  
Ap. 4. Santurce.

San Juan, P.R. 11, oct. 1954

Sr. Thomas Mann,  
a/c Embajada de EE. UU.,  
Guatemala.

Estimado amigo:

Ha sido para mí una noticia grata, transmitida por Morales Carrión, la de saberlo a Ud. en America Latina. Es de obvia utilidad que personas realmente conocedoras de nuestros problemas y de sus hombres públicos, sean destacados por su gobierno a puestos diplomaticos mas aca del Río Grande. Conoci tambien a su Embajador allí, señor Armour, en la Conferencia de Bogotá y conservo un buen recuerdo suyo.

Aquí estoy, no se hasta cuando. Salí de Costa Rica, por propia decisión y en contra del deseo del Presidente Figueres y de sus colaboradores. Era mucha la presión que ejercían los dictadores del Caribe sobre el pequeño país, por mi presencia allí. Me vine a Puerto Rico, porque aquí tengo estudiando en la Universidad a mi única hija. Se casará en diciembre y mi deseo sería estar aquí para el matrimonio. Pero no se aun si será posible. El lobby de los dictadores se ha trasalado de San Jose a Washington, y a esta fecha no se si será prorrogada mi visa de visitante, que termina a fines de este mes. No estoy haciendo esfuerzo alguno directo en ese sentido. Ud. me ha visto actuar, como gobernante y como exilado. No precipito los acontecimientos, y se esperar. Es que me anima una total confianza en la causa que represento y se, sin lugar a dudas, que terminará por imponerse. En Venezuela, la democracia volverá.

Nada más por el momento, sino un saludo cordial de quien le estima y aprecia sinceramente,

/s/ Romulo Betancourt

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PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

737.00/11-1854

XR 437.118

0. Taft

FROM AMEMBASSY, Habana

507

DESP. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

137.00 MC

ARA ER POLICIA OSD

November 18, 1954

REF Embassy's Telegram No. 124, Oct. 27, 1954

5 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION MC-2 REC'D 11/26	DEPT. IN F O REF-2 OC/R-2 ARA-4 E-4 P-1 02116 CIA-7-OSD-4 ARMY-4
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SUBJECT: Inventory of Arms Cache Seized on October 26, 1954.

The Cuban Military Intelligence Service (SIM) has supplied the Embassy with an inventory of the arms seized by the authorities on October 26, 1954, in a concealed cellar in the home of ex-Representative Francisco CAROL Garrido (a Prío Auténtico). A copy of the SIM inventory is enclosed for the Department's use in investigating possible American sources of the arms.

The inventory covers the following equipment:

- 94 Johnson 30 cal. automatic rifles.
- 8 Johnson 30.06 cal. light machine guns with bipods.
- 5 Remington model 14 rifles.
- 2 Remington model 14 rifles.
- 10 New Springfield 30 cal. (1903) rifles.
- 10 Springfield 30 cal. (1896) rifles.
- 8 Remington 12 gauge, model 870 shotguns.
- 22 Mexican 30 cal. rifles (marked Fabrica Nacional de Armas de Mexico).
- 2 Mexican rifles, Mauser system.
- 5 Assorted Winchester rifles.
- 17 Barrels for Mendoza 7.12 machine guns.
- 2 German carbines.
- 2 English Lewis machine guns (incomplete).
- Miscellaneous, including ammunition, clips, detonators, and 265 hand grenades.

The hand grenades in the cache were of the ordinary fragmentation type and, according to the Embassy's Army Attaché, were definitely not of American manufacture. He was told that they were believed to be Mexican-made.

At the court trial of persons arrested in connection with this seizure, Francisco Carol assumed full responsibility for the cache. He testified that the arms had been acquired through a contact, SA CARL Arango and brought to his house between June and December 1953; that they were intended "to defend the Constitution", i.e., for anti-Batista revolutionary activity; and that only he,

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Desp. No. 507  
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
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From \_\_\_\_\_

Sanchez Arango, and an unnamed "informer" know of their existence in his home. Cairol admitted that there had been a conspiracy headed by Sanchez Arango but asserted that it had been broken up by his own arrest in connection with the shooting in the Country Club residential area in May 1954, which subsequently also forced Sanchez Arango to take asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. Cairol is currently serving a four-year prison sentence imposed after conviction on charges growing out of the Country Club shooting.

ACTION REQUESTED. The embassy would appreciate being informed of the results of any investigation of possible American sources of the arms identified in the enclosed inventory.

For the Ambassador,

  
Carlos C. Hall,  
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:  
Inventory, as stated.

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NOV 24 1954 FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONSULATE, Merida, Mexico  
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

17  
DESP. NO.

November 24, 1954  
DATE

REF : Consulate's Despatch No. 68, June 17, 1954


3 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D 11/29	IN OTHER CIA 7

SUBJECT: Carlos GACEL Castro

A reliable source in Campeche has informed the Consulate that Carlos Gacel is reported to have definitely left Campeche and to have established himself in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, where he is working (activities unknown) and that on at least one occasion he was in touch with former president Lázaro Cárdenas.

Gacel did not write to the Consulate again after his letter of May 9, 1954 (the date as written on the letter itself was May 9, de 1945 which was quoted in the despatch under reference.

Arthur V. Metcalfe  
American Consul



Av Metcalfe/smc

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Page 1 of  
End. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Desp. No. 507  
From Habana

RELACION DEL MATERIAL BELICO OCUPADO EN EL SOTANO DE LA RESIDENCIA  
DEL EX-REPRESENTANTE FRANCISCO CATROL.  
.....  
FUSILES AUTOMATICOS JOHNSON CAL .30

- |           |           |           |           |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1.-B4832  | 12.- 7073 | 23.-A9553 | 34.- 6590 | 45.-B3442 | 56.-A3824 |
| 2.-B6791  | 13.-B8802 | 24.-B8536 | 35.- 3913 | 46.-B2470 | 57.-.6605 |
| 3.-B7945  | 14.-B7153 | 25.-A4113 | 36.-B8630 | 47.-B3328 | 58.-B6224 |
| 4.-B6682  | 15.- 8456 | 26.-A4976 | 37.-A6125 | 48.-B7857 | 59.-B5915 |
| 5.-B8361  | 16.- 9252 | 27.- 9203 | 38.-B6021 | 49.-B4132 | 60.- 9462 |
| 6.- 9214  | 17.-B7953 | 28.-B1910 | 39.-B7323 | 50.- 6934 | 61.- 6644 |
| 7.- 7834  | 18.-A1350 | 29.-B3645 | 40.-A9191 | 51.-B0144 | 62.-B6919 |
| 8.-B0919  | 19.- 8841 | 30.-A0144 | 41.-A4832 | 52.- 8284 | 63.-B2822 |
| 9.-B0691  | 20.-B4111 | 31.- 6852 | 42.- 8339 | 53.-B2773 | 64.-B8647 |
| 10.-B3044 | 21.-B4480 | 32.-B7440 | 43.-B7795 | 54.-B4975 | 65.-A9141 |
| 11.-A3755 | 22.- 6667 | 33.-B6118 | 44.-B6677 | 55.-A8889 | 66.- 6198 |

- |           |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 67.- 8950 | 78.-B3465 | 89.-B2602 |
| 68.- 7805 | 79.-A2311 | 90.- 9434 |
| 69.-B6334 | 80.- 6495 | 91.-A4644 |
| 70.- 6137 | 81.-B6751 | 92.-B4552 |
| 71.- 9593 | 82.-B4325 | 93.- 2534 |
| 72.-B7831 | 83.-B7580 | 94.-B1406 |
| 73.- 7718 | 84.- 4003 |           |
| 74.-B2469 | 85.-B2230 |           |
| 75.-B5354 | 86.-B6176 |           |
| 76.-B4903 | 87.-L2451 |           |
| 77.- 9539 | 88.-B0905 |           |

ARMAS LIGERAS JOHNSON CAL.30.06 CON BIFOCES

- |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1.- 1071 | 2.- 2340 | 3.- 1708 | 4.- 2133 | 5.- 0487 | 6.- 0665 |
| 7.- 2503 | 8.- 1796 |          |          |          |          |

REMEDIOS REMINGTON MODELO 44

- |           |            |            |            |            |
|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1.-6212-C | 2.-68254-C | 3.-37612-C | 4.-94296-C | 5.-34839-C |
|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|

REMEDIOS REMINGTON MODELO 14

- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| 1.-401132 | 2.-105850 |
|-----------|-----------|

FUSILES CAL. SPRINGFIELD CAL 30 (1903)

- |           |           |            |           |           |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1.-239083 | 2.-394793 | 3.-34067   | 4.-407400 | 5.-358918 | 6.-124263 | 7.-408025 |
| 8.-40252  | 9.-407765 | 10.-460715 |           |           |           |           |

FUSILES SPRINGFIELD CAL 30 (1896)

- |          |          |           |          |          |          |          |
|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1.-27464 | 2.-31855 | 3.-75705  | 4.-24035 | 5.-31244 | 6.-29290 | 7.-28295 |
| 8.-68319 | 9.-32794 | 10.-74346 |          |          |          |          |

REMEDIOS REMINGTON CAL 12 MODELO 870

- |             |             |             |             |             |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 1.-136789-V | 2.-155219-V | 3.-123088-V | 4.-197362-V | 5.-157000-V |
| 6.-17312-V  | 7.-157621-V | 8.-142290-V |             |             |

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Page \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

Desp. No. \_\_\_\_\_

From \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

(Classification)

Page 2 of \_\_\_\_\_

Encl. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Desp. No. 507

From Habana

FUSILES MEXICANOS CAL 30 (FABRICA NACIONAL DE ARMAS DE MEXICO)

(The serial numbers of these 82 Mendoza Mexican-made rifles are not copied herein since it is believed that they would serve no purpose in the Department's efforts to trace the arms).

2 FUSILES MEXICANOS SISTEMA MAUSER SIN NUMERO

RIFLES WINCHESTER

1.-233933 Cal 3055 Mod 1894 2.-746816 Cal 44 Mod 1892 3.-Sin Nro. Cal 38 4. Sin Nro Cal 44 Mod 1892 5.-6576 Cal 401 de repetición

47 CARABINAS PARA AMETRALLADORAS MENDOZA CAL 7.62

CARABINAS ALEMANAS ---1.-3558 2.-3968

AMETRALLADORAS HEWIS ROULES (T.M.C. HEWIS) --- 1.- 8082 2.- 32458

Capsulas Cal 30 para fusiles MS .....	22,085
Capsulas Cal 30-30 para fusiles .....	2,700
Capsulas Cal 351 para fusiles .....	4,300
Capsulas Cal 45 para pistolas .....	29,003
Capsulas para Carabinas .11 .....	7,100
Capsulas Cal 38 para revolvers .....	100
Magazines para carabinas .11 .....	1,480
Magazines para ametralladoras Thompson .....	19
Magazines para ametralladoras ligeras Johnson .....	75
Magazines espiral para pistola luger .....	1
Cartuchos Cal 12 de perdigones .....	700
Cubre llamadas para ametralladoras Mendoza .....	40
Cargadores para magazines de carabinas .11 .....	381
Telefonos para campana .....	2
Transcivers .....	2
Cargadores de lona .....	7
Bolsas de lona .....	14
Estuches de pasta .....	3
Luces de bengala .....	8
Bayonetas para fusiles automaticos Johnson .....	125
Vainas para bayonetas de fusiles automaticos Johnson .....	135
Armazones de pistolas .....	3
Granadas de fragmentacion (de mano) .....	285
Detonadores Nro 8 .....	1,000
Detonadores Nro 6 .....	100
Detonadores Nro 4 .....	150
Detonadores Mark I modelo 1 .....	11
Detonadores (Desconocidos) .....	50
Detonadores para granadas de mano .....	7

SECRET

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: AMEL BASSY, Habana

589

DESP. NO.

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 16, 1954

REF: Embassy's despatch No. 1576, June 25, 1954. DEC 17 1954

35 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
12-21	12-21	0

cc/R-2 O-L-6 P-1 Em/x-1 S4-2  
Via -7 Navy-3 USIA-10 JUS

SUBJECT: Activities of Salvador (Savior) CANCIO Peña.

As additional evidence of the subversive activities against the Government of Cuba by Salvador (Savior) CANCIO Peña there are enclosed single copies of issues of a "Panfleto" (Pamphlet) dated November 15 and December 1, 1954. Savior Cancio Peña is described in the "Panfleto" as its "Editor-Director and Solely Responsible". The leaflet openly advocates armed revolution. It will be noted that the November 15 issue of "Panfleto" prominently displays a cartoon calculated to arouse anti-American sentiments and states that "this 'Panfleto' has been distributed among members of the Congress of the United States".

For the Ambassador:

*Carlos C. Hall*  
Carlos C. Hall,  
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

One copy each of leaflet, as stated.

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## ¿QUE HACER?



**NICARAGUA. SANTO DOMINGO... CUBA...**

**'DICTADURA RECONOCIDA, DEMOCRACIA DESTRUIDA!'**

### LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO

CUANDO la Vida, la Libertad y el derecho a la Felicidad se ven amenazados por cualquier forma de gobierno, el pueblo tiene el derecho de abolir ese gobierno e instituir otro, cimentándolo en tales principios y organizando sus facultades en la forma que crea más indicada para lograr su Seguridad y Felicidad.

De los Principios Fundamentales de la Declaración de Independencia Norteamericana, 1776.

### CONSIDERANDO QUE

La Vida, la Libertad y el Derecho a la Felicidad del cubano se ven amenazados por la forma de gobierno-dictadura actual, el pueblo de Cuba tiene el inalienable derecho de abolir ese gobierno y sustituirlo por otro que lo reintegre al ritmo constitucional y democrático que le arrebató el dictador. PARA lograrlo recurre a la forma más indicada: LA REVOLUCION ARMADA. Interferir la lucha libertadora de los cubanos es temer la libre determinación de un pueblo. ES contrario a los principios fundamentales de la democracia. ES ser cómplice de la dictadura.

SAVIUR

## CARLOS PRIO Y LA REVOLUCION

UNA memoria revolucionaria, audaz y solidamente organizada derribará de un golpe la dictadura. Liquidará rápidamente el dictador, sus secuaces human y la estructura del gobierno se derrumbará automáticamente. Ninguno de sus secuaces querrá asumir el mando, y si una minoría ambiciosa del régimen quisiera apoderarse del poder, sucumbirá prontamente. El grupo civil-militar formará un gobierno pro-

visional presidido por CARLOS PRIO. Este devolverá al país su ritmo constitucional y democrático, convocando de inmediato a elecciones libres, honradas y con garantías para todos. CARLOS PRIO, fiel al pacto de Montreal, ratificado en la Junta de México, no aspira a la restauración, sino a cumplir un ineludible compromiso de honor con el pueblo que lo eligió legítimamente.

## ¡MILLO OCHOA ES LA FIGURA!

Milillo Ochoa, líder del Partido Ortodoxo, está firme en su puesto de jefe. Los grupos honrados, capaces y puros, cierran las filas del Partido. El pueblo está dividido. SI MILLO OCHOA logra su propósito, el próximo presidente constitucional de Cuba, será el APOCALIPSO. NO HAY OTRA. Y así no habrá sido estéril el sacrificio de MILLO OCHOA.

# PANFLETO

Editor-Director y único responsable SAVIUR CANCIO PENA

Panfleto de la Revolución. Veraz, sin miedo y sin tacha.

Noviembre 15, 1954 Tercer Año de Oprobio Núm. 2

**EL HOMBRE SOMETIDO A UNA DICTADURA VIVE EN ABYECTA SUMISION Y EXTREMA MISERIA MORAL.**

SAVIUR

(Este Panfleto ha sido distribuido entre miembros del Congreso de EE. UU.)



**TEMBLAD, GRANUJAS!**

TEMBLAD, inmundicia piara de políticos podridos, insignes fariseos, colaboradores de la dictadura. Hicisteis el juego al mulato malo para treparos, sin escrúpulos, en las curules... Sois la hez de los pillos de siempre, ladrones de ayer, de hoy, y de mañana, mercenarios asquerosos de la política. Rastros, abyectos y sumisos, incondicionales vasallos de vuestro amo, pretendéis representar al pueblo que NO os eligió. ¿Dónde está vuestra integridad para tal menester, si no la conocisteis? Por eso, TEMBLAD cobardes, que la Revolución viene, y con ella vuestro inevitable y ejemplar castigo. NO podréis huir, ni tendréis piadoso exilio. TEMBLAD YA, GRANUJAS!

**"LA REPRESION ES LA SIMIENTE DE LAS REVOLUCIONES"**

Woodrow Wilson.

La represión de la libre expresión del pueblo, los encarcelamientos, la farsa electoral, las persecuciones, las torturas y los asesinatos de la dictadura, traen la revolución en Cuba. Así se cristaliza la clara visión del ilustre norteamericano.



Al impacto inicial de la Revolución la dictadura se disgregará. Part del ejército, marina y policía se sumarán al movimiento, y precipitarán el derrumbe del régimen.

Revolución y guerra civil son diferentes. Una puede producirse sin la otra, aunque la revolución es en sí, un acto de guerra civil, y se convierte en esta si el estallido revolucionario no es decisivo en el primer momento.

Las dictaduras se disfrazan de pseudo-democracias para engañar al pueblo. Cuando se descubre el fraude y las masas se rebelan, el dictador recurre al terror para aplastarlas.

En las dictaduras sólo viven bien los incondicionales del régimen opresor. Los demás perecen de hambre.



(Impreso clandestinamente en algún lugar de Cuba)

## ORIENTACIONES



**REVOLUCIONARIAS**

Los golpes revolucionarios bien preparados vencen siempre con desconcertante facilidad y generalmente, sin combatir, siendo asombroso el reducido número de víctimas.

**LO PRIMERO QUE HAY QUE HACER ES LIQUIDAR AL DICTADOR**



¡PLAUDIT, CIVES!

(Aplaudid, ciudadanos).


## EL DÍA DEL GRAN ARRASTRE!

CAERA la bestia negra y sus cachorros. Ese día rendirán cuentas los hediondos lacayos del Consejo Consultivo, los ministros rapaces y ladrones; los jefes y oficiales del ejército que traicionaron la constitución que juraron defender, los repugnantes esbirros del SIM, del Buró y de la Policía que torturaron y asesinaron; el nauseabundo y canallesco jefe de la PORRA azul; los espías y chivatos; los líderes obreros que se vendieron al régimen; los que prorrumpieron su pluma y su voz; los jueces que, sumisos al dictador, traicionaron la justicia, los asesinos amarillos del Cuartel Moncada; los fascinerosos políticos que se prestaron al teatro electorero; los pillos que lucran con la miseria del pueblo; los farsantes, adulones, y colaboracionistas del maldito azote de Cuba.

SAVIUR.

## NO DEBE ESCAPAR NI UNO SOLO!

## TODOS SON IGUALES !!



SAVIUR  
CANCIO  
PENNA



Colgar a Batista  
debe ser el lema  
del pueblo cubano

# PANFLETO

Editor-Director y único responsable SAVIUR CANCIO PENNA  
Panfletista de la Revolución. Veraz, sin miedo y sin tacha.

Diciembre 1, 1954 Tercer Año de Oprobio Núm. 8

EL LADO TEMIBLE DE UNA REVOLUCION ES  
SIEMPRE LA VENGANZA. EN CUBA SOLO  
SE HARA JUSTICIA.

LA VIOLENCIA ES EL MOTOR  
DE LAS REVOLUCIONES

SAVIUR.

## CARLOS PRIO

TIENE el compromiso de honor con el pueblo de Cuba de restaurar la democracia, el orden constitucional y la libertad perdidas; hacer ejecutar a los traidores del 10 de marzo, convocar y presidir unas elecciones honradas, con garantías para todos, entregar el poder al Presidente Constitucional electo por la voluntad soberana del pueblo, y RETIRARSE.

CARLOS PRIO será entonces uno de los cubanos más grandes de la historia.



MAXIMAS  
REVOLUCIONARIAS

AAA

En Cuba hay hoy más hambre, más miseria, menos libertad, más persecución y más desesperación que nunca. Y los pueblos desesperados derriban sus gobiernos.

## MILLO OCHOA

ES el indiscutible líder del Partido Ortodoxo, que en ningún momento claudicó, ni abandonó su postura cívica y honorable ante el dictador. Jamás se tramitó ni desertó del Pacto de Montreal y México. AYER en el exilio, y HOY, en algún lugar de Cuba, se mantiene en la línea insurreccional, única forma viril de liquidar la dictadura.

MILLO OCHOA es la esperanza de un pueblo.

XYZ

Ningún dictador es eterno. Todos caen. En los pueblos débiles y atrasados duran más. En los viriles, duran menos.

La dictadura vive en constante miedo. Minadla y se tambalea. Se sostiene mientras es fuerte. Si el movimiento revolucionario, desconcierta al gobierno, este vacila, y al más ligero soplo, se desploma, sin combatir.

En tanto el poder cuente con la fuerza armada, es fuerte, y se mantiene. Si el estallido revolucionario es efectivo en la primera fase del movimiento, el ejército hace causa común con la revolución, porque éste se pasa SIEMPRE al bando que está ganando. ELIMINAD al dictador y el triunfo está asegurado. ESTO es un axioma de las revoluciones a través de la historia, en todos los tiempos.

(Impreso clandestinamente en algún lugar de Cuba)

LOS COMPLICES DEBEN CAER JUNTO CON EL DICTADOR



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TO: Department of State

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FROM: HABANA 110 January 16 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: WEEKA NO. 2 FOR STATE, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR DEPARTMENTS  
FROM SANA

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POLITICAL

Although there is still no outward sign of Government instability in Cuba, the Embassy has received a third report (originating with a Cuban Army officer [Weeka No. 1, JAN 6]) that a widespread group of Cuban Army officers plan a bloodless coup at the first propitious moment to set up a Military Junta for the purpose of "eliminating corruption". Although it lacks any tangible evidence that an attempt will be made to put the alleged plot into effect, the Embassy must take cognizance of these reports. As previously indicated, conditions in Cuba appear normal at this time.

The American Ambassadors' Conference to be held at Habana JAN 18-20 is receiving extensive favorable attention in the local press. The Cuban GOVT has expressed its pleasure that Habana was chosen as the seat of the Conference. Minister of State HEVIA will hold a reception for the Delegation and other attentions are planned.

José M. BOSCH on 9 JAN took oath of office as Minister of Finance replacing Antonio PRIO (Weeka No. 1 JAN 6). Four other Ministers also seeking elective office must resign or request leave of absence on official acceptance of nominations as party candidates. The Ministers affected are Virgilio PEREZ of Agriculture, Segundo CURTI of Defense, Edgardo BUTTARI of Labor and Primitivo RODRIGUEZ who is a Minister without Portfolio. Cuban Ambassador to the United States, Sr. Oscar GANS, continues to be mentioned as the probable next Foreign Minister.

The President's Autentico Party is preparing a "gigantic" celebration on 15 JAN on which date his brother Antonio PRIO is scheduled to accept the Autentico Party nomination for the office of Mayor of Habana in the June 1, 1950 elections.

It has been semi-officially announced through the President's other brother, Senator Francisco PRIO (representing Pinar del Rio Province), that the President favors Cuba's

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3 Habana 110

Lawrence MYERS, Head USDA Sugar Branch, has again been in Habana conversing with Cuban sugar officials regarding prospective United States Government purchases of 1950-crop sugar for ECA.

Intervention of the Havana Electric Railways has been extended 45 days from January 15, 1950 (Weeka No. 41 SEPT 9, 1949).

MILITARY

Major General CABRERA, Cuban Army Chief of Staff, has postponed his proposed visit to the United States to a later date (Weeka No. 1 JAN 6).


AIR

The Chief of the Cuban Air Force disclosed to the Air Attaché that they were interested in the purchase of two B-17 type heavy bombardment aircraft plus some fighters. They would prefer to purchase new North American T-28's in place of obsolete F-51's or F-47's if same are procurable.

Mr. WILBUR, President of Aerovias Cubanas Internacionales, advised this date that his line would discontinue its European run for the next 30 days or more and that a consolidation was being effected with Trans-Ocean's European run emanating from Venezuela. The new consolidation will place Habana as the second stop from Caracas thence Bermuda-Azores-Lisbon-Madrid-Barcelona and Paris.

SUBVERSIVE

Communist newspaper Hoy in its issues of JAN 12 and 13 has featured stories regarding the alleged "insubordination of Yankee military chiefs", naming General McArthur specifically, in connection with the United States Government's policy relative to Formosa.

  
C. Burke Elbrick  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Participants: CBElbrick, HSTewell, ETCrain, RHCraane, CMMoore, Glenn (AA), Schaffer (MA), Duke (NA).

Copies to Embassies: Ciudad Trujillo, Port-au-Prince, Managua, Tegucigalpa.

MA (3) for COMGENUSARCIB and CGUSARFANT.

MA (3) for COMBENCAIRC and Ramey Field, Puerto Rico.

SECRET

SECRET

2 Habana 110

U.N. Ambassador, Sr. Inocente ALVAREZ, as the Autentico Party's candidate to fill the Pinar del Rio senatorship vacated through the death of Senator CASANOVA. Alvarez himself has also announced his availability for the post. The Republican Party may throw its support to ex-PRES GRAU to fill this vacancy. During the week the Autentico group in Oriente Province named GRAU as its delegate to the Party's National Assembly. This is another indication of GRAU's persisting political influence.

The University of Habana resumed classes on 9 JAN without disturbances. Plans for any further student elections have not been announced.

The local press reported 13 JAN that the Cuban Red Cross Chief, Rodolfo HENRIQUEZ, has telegraphed to the Dominican Red Cross Chief urging him to agree to a joint request to the International Red Cross for a probe of Dominican charges that the Cuban Red Cross has been involved in preparations for an attack against the Dominican Republic.

The local press of 10 JAN reported the transfer of the Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Antonio TAFFI, from Habana, where he was Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, to the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua. It is not stated in which country Msgr. Taffi will establish residence. The Nuncio is Titular Archbishop of Sergiopolis and was assigned to Habana in 1947.

#### ECONOMIC

Although 23 of Cuba's 161 sugar mills are now grinding, normal development of the season was further impeded this week by sugar workers, who threateningly presented 8 demands to President Prió including the demands that (1) all 1950 wages be paid at decreed 1947 peak level; (2) workers be paid back sums due them on basis of 48 hours pay per week for 44 hours work; and that (3) Government enforce the existing "legal" limitation against the use of bags containing over 200 pounds. Statements credited to the Minister of Labor appeared in the 12 JAN morning press, saying a solution to the problem had been found, but high Federation officials flatly denied the statements. No solution of crisis has yet been announced (Weeks No. 1 JAN 6).

Following large reported sales of world market sugar, the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute agreed yesterday to increase by 200,000 tons (long Spanish) the 1950 Free World Export Quota.

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