CUBA
1950–1954

INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Decimal Numbers 737, 837, and 937

and

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Decimal Numbers 637 and 611.37

NOTE: A printed reel guide has been provided for your use.
Aftermath of Attacks on Armed Forces in Oriente Province

Following the beating off of attacks on army posts at Santiago de Cuba and Bayamo in Oriente Province on July 26, the armed forces were reported for several days to be pursuing fugitive participants in the assaults who had taken refuge in the surrounding mountainous countryside. Several encounters were reported from which the deaths of fugitives were said to have resulted, although there has been no completely reliable report of the total number of persons killed in these affrays.

According to reports of Consul Story in Santiago de Cuba and of the Embassy's Public Affairs Officer who was in Santiago de Cuba on business just after the attacks, the belief was widespread among responsible members of the community that the Army, both during the attacks and in subsequent mopping-up operations, was showing no quarter to captured insurgents or suspected insurgents. Some color was lent to this belief by the reported number of wounded attackers which was very small in comparison with the wounded in the armed forces. A copy of the Public Affairs Officer's report is enclosed.

Possibly motivated by this belief, the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba and other prominent persons approached Col. Alfredo DEL RIO Chaviano, commander of the regiment that had been attacked, reportedly with a view to obtaining assurance that fugitives could surrender without fear of reprisals. Such assurance was given by the commanding officer and the Archbishop undertook personally to seek out fugitives and persuade them to surrender in accordance with the terms of reassuring proclamations issued by Col. Del Rio Chaviano. The prelate's efforts were successful to the extent that on August 1, the authorities took into custody, apparently partly through free surrender to the Archbishop and partly through unopposed capture, a group including Fidel CASTRO who is accused of being (and who claims to be) the leader of the attack on the barracks at Santiago de Cuba.
There probably are additional fugitives still uncaptured and the Army is actively continuing mopping-up operations. There have been no further reports of fighting since the detention of Castro and his companions. It appears that the situation in Oriente Province is completely under control and that inflamed passions have subsided considerably from the level seemingly provoked by the attacks.

Fidel Castro participated in the Cayo Confites expedition and has been accused of "gangsterism" as a University student and of several murders. He is reported to have been an Ortodoxo up to some months ago when he withdrew to become an independent. He is being held without bail in Santiago de Cuba on sedition charges. Reportedly through an evasion of censorship control, El Grisol published on August 3 a claimed interview with Castro. El Grisol reported that Castro assumed full responsibility for leadership of the attacks on July 26 and that he said that the attacks had no connection with the Auténtico-Ortodoxo Montreal pact; that the participants in the attacks were independent Ortodoxo followers of the Chibás program; that the arms used were acquired in Cuba; and that finances had not come from ex-President PRIO but had been raised by the attackers themselves. He was also quoted as saying that 120 had taken part in the attack in Santiago de Cuba and 28 in the uprising at Bayamo. In connection with finances, the Ministry of Information claimed on August 3 that employees of a company in Matanzas who were involved in the uprising, had forged checks on their employers for "several thousand pesos" to help finance the undertaking.

There is available no information regarding the total number of arrests in Cuba of persons who may have actually been implicated in the attacks or who were merely suspected on some ground of conceivable complicity. It is certain that there have been many arrests throughout the country but frequently the prisoner has been quickly released. Definite evidence of the continued detention of certain political figures was the denial on August 1 by a Habana court of habeas corpus writs in favor of Aracelio AZCUY, Emilio OCHOA, Manual BISBE, Sergio MEJIAS, José Manuel GUTIERREZ, Eduardo SUAREZ Rivas, Lomberto DÍAZ, Oscar ALVARADO, Lazaro Peña (Communist), Joaquin ORDOQUI (Communist), Carlos HERNANDEZ, and Aramis TABOADA. This was the first indication that Lazaro Peña was under arrest. It is not known whether other prominent Communists are being held by the authorities. Minor Communist leaders in various localities are reported to have been picked up, although not always retained in custody. It is possible that well-known Communists such as Juan MARINELLO and Blas ROCA, as well as non-Communists such as José PARDO Llada, have gone into hiding. The Ambassador was told by another member of the diplomatic
corps that a number of political figures had taken refuge in the Brazilian and Mexican Embassies, although this report has not been officially confirmed.

Reports made to the Santiago de Cuba Urgency Court by Col. Del Rio Chaviano have just been published. The highlights of these reports are: the attacks were made by "elements directed" by leaders of the Prio Auténtico, Ochoa Ortodoxo and Communist parties; they were carried out with modern weapons, almost all coming from Montreal, Canada, by "Cubans-and foreigners" numbering between 400 and 500; and that there had been seized 31 rifles, shotguns and carbines, a machine gun, hand grenades, and a quantity of ammunition, including explosive bullets.

An official of the Ministry of Information was assigned to write a story on the attacks for release to all newspapers. He gathered information on the ground at Santiago de Cuba and upon his return supplied the Embassy confidentially with his findings and observations. He said that five days before the attacks the Ministry of Information security officer had gone to Santiago de Cuba with a tip that attacks were to be made. He could attribute the surprise achieved by the attackers only to laxity or a "desire to have things happen as they did". This information is in line with a statement by Ambassador CONCHESO to Ambassador BEAULAC that the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) had known beforehand that the attacks were being planned (see despatch No. 191 of July 31, 1953). Despite the statements of Cuban officials the Embassy finds it hard to believe that the attack did not achieve complete surprise.

The Ministry of Information official also said that the weapons of the attackers could have been obtained in Cuba, that some of them were reconditioned, that the hand grenades were all old and some of them failed to explode, that only the explosive bullets would have had to be imported, and that he believed that all of the attackers were Cubans. He also expressed the opinion that the attackers in Santiago de Cuba could not have numbered more than 100.

On August 3 President BATISTA awarded the Cross of Honor, the highest Cuban military decoration, to the regiment stationed at Santiago de Cuba for its defense of its barracks there on July 26. In his speech to the regiment praising its action, condemning the attacks, and promising assistance to the widows and orphans of the killed soldiers, Batista revealed that representatives of ex-President Prio had approached him to arrange conditions for the latter's return to Cuba at a time before Texas, Mamaroneck and other discoveries proved the "worthlessness of Prio's word".

Stolen from the Archive of Dr. Antonio R. de la Cova http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba-books.htm
Habana, August 3, 1953

To: The Ambassador
From: JCanter
Subject: Abortive Revolt in Santiago

My personal experience of the July 26 abortive revolt in Santiago de Cuba was as follows:

I took the Santiago-Habana bus for Santiago at Cabaiguán, Las Villas, at 12:15 p.m. on Sunday, July 26. There was no indication that any trouble was brewing until the bus had gone a few miles beyond Victoria de las Tunas, province of Oriente, when soldiers stopped and boarded the bus and scanned the passengers. This occurred around 5:00 p.m. Around 5:45 p.m. at the military barracks near Holguin three soldiers stopped the bus, ordered all passengers to disembark, and searched the baggage. At Bayamo, Baíre and Contramaestre the bus was again boarded by soldiers and another search of the baggage was undertaken. At Palma Soriano, El Cobre, and at the entrance to Santiago all male passengers were ordered to disembark and they were searched for the possession of firearms. At the bus station in Santiago de Cuba the baggage was again searched. At all places where the bus was halted, I noted that a search was being made of private automobiles also.

I arrived in Santiago about 9:20 p.m. The city was quiet, and few people were in the streets. At the Hotel Casa Granda, where I stayed, there was no specific information as to exactly what had happened, but it was only there that I learned that an armed assault on the Moncada Barracks had taken place and that approximately fifty persons had been killed in the affair.

On Monday, July 27, there was no apparent disturbance in the city and I proceeded to the University of Oriente without hindrance. However, there were a number of soldiers stationed at various street intersections, as well as police dressed in civilian clothes carrying rifles. At the University, professors told me that they had received reports from persons living near the Barracks to the effect that the captured assailants had been shot down in cold blood and that the wounded assailants had also been liquidated. The story went that cries of "Don't kill me!" came from the Barracks. These were followed by commands to run and the firing of shots. After that, complete silence. Dr. Felipe MARTINEZ ARANGO, Director of Cultural Relations of the University and a member of the Ortodoxo Party, informed me that he had been picked up around noon on Sunday, detained at the
Barracks, and then released about ten o'clock Monday morning. He said he saw bloodstains everywhere. The University professors also informed me that there had been gunfire at various parts of the city that same morning. Except for the sight of soldiers and police who remained at various intersections in the city, there was during that day or the next no sign of the disturbance. The park outside the hotel which is usually filled with people until 2 a.m. was deserted by 9 p.m. It was reported that the Army had ordered a ten o'clock curfew.

On Wednesday I went to Guantánamo by train. En route to el Manguito, where I was to take the train, the car in which I was riding was stopped near the town of Altosongo and at La Maya by members of the Rural Guard, who searched the baggage of the passengers. En route to the Naval Base from Guantánamo the car was stopped by members of the Naval Post at-Caimanera and again the baggage was searched. A similar search was made at the same places on the trip back to Santiago on Thursday, July 29.

On Friday, July 30, while I was at the University, the Rector, Dr. Felipe SALCINES Morlote, told me that the day before he had gone to see the Commander of the Moncada Barracks, Colonel Río Chaviano, and requested that the Army allow fugitive assailants to give themselves up. It was known, Salcines said, that fugitives caught, instead of being allowed to surrender, were being shot down. Dr. Salcines stated that Colonel Río Chaviano had given him permission to contact the fugitives and to turn them over directly to the civilian authorities. Dr. Salcines told me that he had seen a dead fugitive dressed in army trousers who had received a bullet in the abdomen but the trousers showed no bullet holes. There were other cases of fugitives who had been killed, but no bloodstains were visible in the places where they were found. The assumption was that they had been killed elsewhere and their bodies moved.

I took the train from Santiago at 2:15 p.m. on Friday, July 31, and arrived in Habana at 7:30 a.m. Saturday, August 1. The train was not stopped at any point, nor searched by the military.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

NO.: A-116 September 16, 1953

SUBJECT: Arms for Cuba.

TO: The American Embassy, HABANA.

Reference: Embassy's despatch No. 223, dated August 6, 1953, Subject: Aftermath of Attacks on Armed Forces in Oriente Province.

Embassy is requested to furnish the Department with a description of the weapons seized by the Cuban police in the Oriente case as well as in similar recent cases.

LOURIE
ACTING
From G2,

Reported Cuban consular official Miami states armed revolt to take place 12 Aug 53. Also reported another source in Miami states discussion of possible arms purchase from Colt Arms Comapny. These arms to be loaded on ships at Miami and New Orleans. Ships to rendezvous with third ship in Gulf carrying Mexican troops picked up at Merilo rpt Merilo Mexico. Ships to proceed against Isle of Pines or Santiago.

G2 Comment: No confirmation here. Merilo possibly refers Merida rpt Merida.
August 10, 1953

Mr. John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The government of General Fulgencio Batista has initiated a fascist reign of terror in Cuba. Democratic liberties have been suppressed. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly has been abolished. Menton beatings, killings and jailings are taking place daily. The political opposition parties of all shades of political opinion are being persecuted. Hundreds of persons are in jail. The right to strike has been abolished.

Considering the tremendous influence of the United States Government in Cuba, we do not believe that the Batista government would dare to carry out the present un-democratic measures without the approval of the United States Government and State Department.

As a time when the United States Government declares it is so concerned with world "freedom" we ask why it has done nothing about stopping fascist persecution in Cuba.

We demand therefore that the United States government make strong protests to the Cuban government concerning its brutal suppression of democracy, instigation, and restoration of democracy in Cuba.

Yours truly,

[Signature]

William L. Patterson
National Executive Secretary
In reply refer to
ARA:MID 737.00/8-1053

My dear Mr. Patterson:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 10, 1953 in which you comment on conditions alleged by you to exist in Cuba and make certain suggestions as to the course of action you feel the United States Government should take with respect to this situation.

The United States has a long-standing and well-defined policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, which has been advocated at numerous international conferences. So far as the other American Republics are concerned, the commitment of this Government to follow that policy as most recently stated is contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at the Bogota Conference of 1948, and ratified by the United States on June 19, 1951, consent having been given by the Senate on August 28, 1950. Articles 15, 16, and 17 of that document are as follows:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

"The

Mr. William L. Patterson,
National Executive Secretary,
Civil Rights Congress,
6 East 17th Street,
New York 3, New York."
"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Robert F. Woodward
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs
Office Memorandum

TO ARA/HID - Mr. J. L. Topping
FROM SCA - Scott Airwood

DATE: August 19, 1953

SUBJECT: Attached letter to Mr. William L. Patterson, Civil Rights Congress

General Smith has a philosophy, with which I agree, and which you no doubt have heard him cite. It concerns the time when the Russians made some charge against him while he was in Moscow and at which time Vishinsky told him, "since you have not denied it, it is true."

Applying this philosophy, it would appear to me the fact that your letter acknowledging receipt of Mr. Patterson's letter in which you say, "The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 10, 1953 in which you comment on the present situation in Cuba" amounts to tacit agreement that the situation is as Patterson describes it. I have no way of knowing whether it is or is not, but it appears to me that if we want to get along with Batista's government we should not tacitly agree that there is a fascist reign of terror in Cuba. If you feel that an outright denial of the statements made by Patterson is (a) not consistent with the facts, or (b) not good political judgment, I would suggest that you amend the letter by using language similar to the following:

"The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 10 in which you comment on conditions alleged by you to exist in Cuba",

making it clear that the situation Patterson describes is that which represents his view and not that necessarily of the Department.

Attachments:

1. Proposed letter to Mr. Patterson
drafted by Mr. Topping, 8/14/53.
2. Mr. Patterson's Letter to the Secretary dated 8/10/53.
Subject: Alleged Cuban Revolutionary Activities in Yucatan

An American source whose reliability is not questioned and whose information is usually accurate has stated that about one month ago it was rumored that activities connected with the Cuban revolutionary attempt had occurred in northeastern Yucatan, but that he did not consider them worthy of credence.

It is reported that neither Mario ANCONA Ponce, who was formerly head of the press and publicity section of Henequeneros de Yucatan and who resigned when Governor Tomas MARENTES was granted an indefinite leave of absence, nor his father Mario ANCONA CIREROL, has any lands of his own. At one time Ancona Cirerol managed a huge tract of land (reputedly some 500,000 hectares) known as the Colonia de Yucatan, situated south of Mottezuma (87° 42' N; 21° 23' W; approximately, and about 125 or 130 miles from Merida) and which extended as far as the Caribbean Sea on the east. It was in this area that activity was rumored.

Mario Ancona Ponce was born in Merida on May 5, 1924. He is a cripple whose right arm and leg are atrophied. He studied in Habana and lived there for a while. On May 17, 1948 he applied for and was granted a 3(2) nonimmigrant visa by this Consulate. At that time he gave as his permanent address 12 Calle 2 Miramar, Marianao, Habana, Cuba. His lameness has given him an inferiority complex which has made him dangerous and untrustworthy. He is the author of "Un Libro de Comunistas Para Anticomunistas" published in 1952 in Merida by the Editorial Yucatanense "Club del Libro." Several months ago he was implicated in the kidnapping of a child, but apparently charges against him were dropped.

Mario Ancona Cirerol has been inactive for the past twenty years or so. He is not favorably regarded in the community.

During the latter part of July and early in August it is known that several planes of the Cuban air force passed through Merida. It is reputed that they came from Habana and that they departed for Guatemala. It is believed that their flights here were made in connection with patrolling activities designed to prevent any attempts that might be made to overthrow the Cuban government.
The customs service, whose local headquarters are in Progreso, have alerted the twelve sub-stations, which lie between Celestun, on the Gulf of Campeche, and El Cuyo, north and somewhat to the east of Nootzuma, mentioned above. Officials of this service have stated that no Cuban revolutionary activities occurred in the area.

Further attempts to locate the airstrip supposedly located about midway between Merida and San Bruno, and mentioned in the Department's A-11, of July 7, 1953 to Embassy Mexico, have proven unsuccessful. American pilots, however, who fly over the area regularly, have been asked to continue their observations and inform the Consulate of anything they may discover.

Arthur V. Metcalfe
American Vice Consul

2 copies to Embassy, Mexico, D.F.
On August 6, 1953, President BATISTA held a press conference for correspondents of international press services and United States, Latin American and other foreign newspapers. According to an Embassy officer who attended the conference, the President was expansive in replying to questions regarding economic matters but was briefer in his statements on political questions, particularly when referring to the revolutionary outbreak of July 26 in Oriente Province. A copy of the Ministry of Information release regarding the conference, as it was published in El Crisol, is enclosed.

After speaking of the economic prospects of Cuba during the next two years, the President was asked whether plans covering such a period meant that the Government intended to remain unchanged for two years. Batista denied any such intention and said that "whatever the government might be that succeeds" him, it ought to continue constructive plans already made.

Touching on alleged Communist complicity in the Oriente uprisings, the President declared that "the Communist participation is demonstrated by the fact that red propaganda was found in the possession of those arrested and in addition by the Communist affiliation of some of them." He considered ex-President FALO the person principally responsible for the uprisings.

Questioned regarding the attitude toward conspiratorial activities that should be adopted by countries where his political enemies are in exile, Batista said that he was satisfied with the attitude assumed by all friendly governments, since not only Mexico but also the United States, Guatemala, etc., have at all times showed respect" for Cuba's government and sovereignty. He added that it was a pity that the Cuban exiles did not respect the countries that gave them asylum.
The President declared that he had been "forced" by developments to suspend constitutional guarantees, much against his deep-rooted feelings of democracy and tolerance, but that he did not believe that the situation would have to be maintained for 90 days, as the suspending decree provided. He also said that censorship was not intended "to silence truths that can be expressed by all but once and for all to put into effect a correct understanding of the exercise of freedom of the press, such as is practiced in such democratic nations as the United States, France, England, Mexico, etc., avoiding the propagation of insidious reports, slander and insults".

Regarding the general political situation, President Batista affirmed that "although the electoral process is in abeyance because of the suspension of (constititutional) guarantees, the date of the elections has not been postponed" and that he is "as he always has been, disposed to enter into conversations with the opposition in order to arrive at a national solution". This did not mean, he continued, that he was willing to accept such conditions as the restoration of the 1940 Constitution, the restoration of the 1943 Electoral Code, or his "retirement from the presidency which is equivalent to delivering the Republic into the arms of chaos".

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.:

Earl T. Crain
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

\(^{\text{Press clipping}}\)
El Presidente de la República contestó las preguntas que le fueron formuladas por la representación periodística del exterior.

El Ministerio de Información remitió anoche la siguiente nota oficial:

"Ministerio de Información
Agosto 6, 1953. Dirección General de Publicidad y Prensa
Escriuta, Nota No. 8. Entrevista de Prensa Concedida por el Honorable Señor Presidente de la República General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, a los Corresponsales de la Prensa Extranjera Acreditados en Cuba.

En las últimas horas de la tarde de ayer, en el Palacio Presidencial, tuvo lugar la entrevista de prensa, en la que el Honorable Señor Presidente de la República, General Fulgencio Batista, respondiendo a preguntas de corresponsales de las distintas agencias de noticias, y de periódicos y revistas de varias capitales, formuló interesantes y trascendentales declaraciones.

Sobre muy variados tópicos fue interrogado el Jefe del Estado, y entre las muchas preguntas que le fueron formuladas destacan por su importancia en materia económica la del corresponsal de La Nación de Santiago de Chile, acerca del futuro económico de Cuba en los próximos dos años.

Sobre esto dijo el Presidente que..."
Entrevistan diaristas de prensa en la cumbre del Partido Revolucionario Sauces.

La cumbre del Partido Revolucionario Sauces, el grupo político más influyente en Cuba, fue entrevistado recientemente por varios medios de comunicación. Durante la entrevista, los diaristas plantearon preguntas sobre la situación política actual en Cuba y los planes futuros del partido. Los dirigentes del Partido Revolucionario Sauces respondieron a estas preguntas de manera calmada y confiada, expresando su compromiso con la continuidad del proceso de cambios que se están produciendo en el país.

En la entrevista, los diaristas también abordaron temas relacionados con la economía, la educación y la salud pública. Los dirigentes del Partido Revolucionario Sauces destacaron su compromiso con la mejora de estas áreas y con el desarrollo sostenible de Cuba.

En resumen, la entrevista con los diaristas de prensa en la cumbre del Partido Revolucionario Sauces fue una oportunidad para que el público cubano y el mundo entero comprendieran mejor el enfoque político y social de este importante grupo político en Cuba.
The enclosed report dated August 10 from the Naval Attache\textsuperscript{1} states that the Cuban Navy is alerted for a possible attack (landing) in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana Province, during the period August 15-20, the date considered most probable being August 15.

The Army Attache\textsuperscript{2} reports that the Cuban Army was on a full-scale alert the week-end of August 8-9 and will be confined to barracks tomorrow, August 12, in spite of the fact that it has been declared an official holiday.

An American source (A-2) who recently made a short round trip to the United States, found himself on the same plane leaving Havana with an ex-Orthodox Congresswoman who informed him that he expected serious trouble in Cuba within the next twenty days. He believed that this time the trouble would be in Havana and the western part of the island. The Orthodox told source that he had nothing to do with any conspiratorial activity but he was sure that if anything happened he would be arrested and his family molested. He stated he planned to be out of Cuba several weeks to escape any trouble that might arise. He further stated that others were leaving Cuba for the same reason.

Reference is made in this connection to a message (DA-945672) received by the Army Attache\textsuperscript{2} at Havana (Deptel 45, August 11).

Comment. The Embassy has received no information from other sources regarding the subject matter of the message received by the Army Attache\textsuperscript{2}. As previously reported, very few people, if any, in Cuba expect the July 26 attack against the Santiago garrison to be the last.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:  

Earl T. Grain  
Acting Counselor of Embassy

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.
10 August 1953

Subj: Possible Landing at or Near Mariel

1. This office has obtained information that the Cuban Navy is alerted for an attack in the vicinity of Mariel from 15 to 20 August with the most probable date as 15 August. Captain Guillermo Driggs, Director of the Cuban Naval Academy, has been given the coast line from Mulata to Banes (Central Habana) as his area of responsibility and has prepared a communications plan covering this area.

2. It is known that the Naval Air Station, Mariel, is on a special alert; guns and search lights have been mounted especially against a landing of troops and arms.

3. Guajaibon, which is east of Mariel, is considered an excellent place for landing. A small pier exists there and road communications to the central highway are not too bad. It is known that there are many Auténticos living in this general area.

4. Although it is known that the Naval Air Station, Mariel, has been especially alerted, the Cuban Navy sent a general message to units west of Havana indicating that no special alert conditions exist.

5. This communication comes from two (2) different sources, both of which have been usually reliable in the past.

Respectfully,

W. H. RAKOW
Captain, U.S. Navy
In the course of a recent conversation, Senor Rupo, the Cuban ambassador, stated that the Cuban Government had abandoned its original thought that the munitions captured from the rebels at Santiago and Bayamo might be of Canadian origin and was now inclined to think that Mexico was the more probable source. In this connection the ambassador expressed appreciation of the correct attitude of the present Mexican government, but added that in spite of the improvement in government in Mexico in recent years, there were still undoubtedly to be found in Mexico, as in other countries, unsavory private individuals who engaged in arms smuggling.

External affairs officials have informed this embassy that in spite of press reports that officials in Cuba had announced that ammunition captured from the Cuban rebels was made in Montreal, no representations to this effect had been received from the Cuban government. External affairs' own check had produced no evidence of any suspicious arms shipments in recent months.

With regard to Guatemala, Senor Rupo took a considerably less cordial view than in the case of the government of Mexico. Guatemala, he considered, needed correction by some outside power, possibly Cuba, since Cuba could speak sharply to Guatemala without running the risk, as would the United States, of being charged with imperialism. Senor Rupo did not indicate whether this remark was based on any specific Cuban differences with Guatemala or only on distaste for Guatemala as a center of Communist activity. Senor Rupo stated that Cuba had fortunately ceased to be a Communist center, but that Communists formerly active in Cuba were undoubtedly still active in the Caribbean area.

In regard to the situation in Cuba, Senor Rupo stated that General Batista was undoubtedly meeting with some political difficulties at the present time. He ascribed these difficulties, however, to adverse economic conditions, remarking that it was an unfortunate coincidence that each time Batista had assumed power, sugar prices had declined.
Senior Rupo professed to believe that the General was essentially a democratic and non-military minded man, who had reassumed power only with the greatest reluctance. According to Rupo, Batista had three times refused to head a military revolt against Alio, and had finally yielded to Army pressure only because the leaders of the Army had told him that they were determined to overthrow Alio with or without Batista. Batista had then accepted leadership in order to be able to exercise a moderating influence.

The Ambassador greeted with pleasure the Liberal Government's victory in the Canadian elections of August 10 since it ensured the continuance in office of Trade and Commerce Minister Howe who, in spite of agitation by Canadian beet sugar interests, had shown an appreciation of the importance to Cuba of maintaining a reasonable volume of unrefined cane sugar exports to Canada.

For the Ambassador:

John Morgan
Counselor of Embassy

Copy to SIA
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation: 737, 008-1559

Date: 16 Aug, 1983

From: [Redacted]

To: [Redacted]

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- [ ] Security-Classified Information
- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

State: [Redacted]

Authority: [Redacted]

Date: 28 Oct. 82
The Embassy has been informed that several well-known journalists have left Cuba for an indefinite period, reportedly because of fear of imprisonment in the event of further revolutionary outbreaks or severe application of the new Public Order Law. According to this information, those who have left the country include Sergio CARBO, director of Prensa Libre, Mario KUCHILAN, columnist for Prensa Libre, Pedro MARTINEZ Fraga, writer for Prensa Libre, and Luis ORTEGA, director of Pueblo.

Others who have been reported to be preparing to leave Cuba are Jorge QUINTANA, president of the newspapermen’s association of Habana Province, and Manuel RAY Araque, radio station owner.

It is now fairly definitely established that to date José PARDO Llada has not left Cuba, as was originally reported. His present whereabouts seems to be unknown, although the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) appears to be trying hard to locate him.

It has been verified that Rafael ("Pilín") MENDOZA, friend and confidant of ex-President Carlos PHILO, left the country on August 9, 1953.

The departure of Juan BOSCH, the Dominican exile, for Costa Rica is being reported separately in despatch No. 288 of August 19, 1953.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Earl T. Crain
Acting Counselor of Embassy
according to Prensa Libre, the five individuals were:

LOPEZ Fernandez
LOPEZ Garcia
MARIO BALMA
Alicante ARENCIBIA Garcia
Beaum de Yurre
TO: S/S - Mr. Scott  
FROM: ARA - Mr. Carpaz  
SUBJECT: Cuban Armed Forces and the Political Situation

August 27, 1953

I think General Smith will be interested in reading the attached memorandum from Mr. Topping of my office on the Cuban political situation (TAB A).

ARA: JMCabot:mk
FROM: MID - Mr. Topping

SUBJECT: Cuban Armed Forces and the Political Situation

Background

Batista came to power with the support of the armed forces. His regime is unpopular with the people, and depends on continued loyalty of the military. Any revolutionary attempt could probably not succeed without the support of at least a portion of the armed forces.

Discussion

Until recently available evidence indicated that the armed forces continued loyal; that there was some dissatisfaction and disaffection, due to personal rivalries and jealousies and uneven promotions; that in time of crisis differences would be submerged and a united front presented. Reports are now being received, however, which indicate that disaffection is deeper, and cast doubt on continued unity of the armed forces. Report No. R-89-53 from the United States Military Attaché at Habana, evaluated B-2, contains interesting information on this situation. It states that the heads of National Police and of the Military Intelligence Service are bitter rivals in a struggle for power. They are young and extremely ambitious. Neither would voluntarily relinquish the power they now have. The report continues that a group of young but high-ranking military men have on occasion blocked Batista, and sometimes use him as a front-man because of his prestige. They will never allow elections to be held under conditions unfavorable to the present administration, and if necessary will get rid of Batista and take over the government. There are other military men who apparently desire reform, but who are also personally ambitious.

Conclusions

The present situation in Cuba may well terminate in violence. To date Batista has the loyalty of the armed forces. However, personal interests and ambitions are rendering continued loyalty of important military figures problematic. Batista may be caught between the necessity to negotiate with the opposition in order to avoid revolution and the determination to retain power of certain military figures surrounding him. His position is approaching a critical stage both with relation to his civilian opposition and to certain elements in the armed forces.
Possibility of Request for Extradition of Former Cuban Officials Indicted for Alleged Currency Frauds.

On August 24, 1953, Dr. Andres de Jesus PEREZ Bustamante, Special Judge of Instruction in Cause No. 131 of the year 1953, Court of Instruction, First Section, of the City of Habana, returned a criminal indictment against eight former officials of the Cuban Government who served in the administration of Dr. Carlos PRIETO Socarras. The eight officials, accused of a complex of acts involving malfeasance, falsification of official documents and malversation in the custody and administration of public funds and records, are Ramiro HERNANDEZ Bofill, Antonio ANTON Bianchi, Manuel GARCIA Martinez, Jose Martin GUTIERREZ Fernandez, Benito BATET Camps, Pablo GUTIERREZ Fernandez, Pedro QUIROS Fernandez and Antonio PRIETO Socarras. The indictment followed discovery in circulation of condemned currency (silver certificates) which had been listed as burned.

Of the eight accused officials, only Benito Batet Camps is in Cuba to answer the charges and bail for his provisional liberty has been fixed at 25,000 pesos. No bail is authorized in the cases of the other seven officials. Bond in the amount of 22,000,000 pesos is required of each accused official to cover pecuniary responsibility and an embargo of personal assets is ordered in each case in an amount sufficient to cover the bond if not posted.

It is possible that the Cuban Government may seek extradition of the seven officials now living in exile.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Earl T. Crain
Acting Counselor of Embassy
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: MID - Mr. Burrows
    Mr. Topping

FROM: MID - Mr. Wellman

DATE: August 28, 1953

SUBJECT: Further Letter from Eliseo Riera-Gomez to Congressman Lantaff regarding Conditions in Cuba (TAB A)

This letter and the effect of the release by Congressman Lantaff of the Department's reply to his letter indicate to me that it is desirable for the Department to avoid if possible further argument with the opposition to Batista with respect to the anti-communist position of the Batista Government or conditions in Cuba.

It was probably necessary to give Senator Hickenlooper an extensive answer to the allegations he had received from Carlos Hevia that the Batista Government is pro-communist (TAB B). It would have been preferable, however, if we could have avoided writing so fully to Congressman Lantaff (TAB C), who has so many Cubans in his district, many of whom are vigorously opposed to Batista. We must anticipate that a Congressman may make available to his constituents any letter or statement we send to the Congressman. I do not recall, however, that we knew that Congressman Lantaff intended to make public (as opposed to making available to interested constituents) our letter to him or that we agreed to that action.

If Congressman Lantaff should refer Riera-Gomez' further letter to the Department for comment, I think we should not endeavor to reply to the allegations, unless the Congressman's letter requires it or the Congressman insists upon it. If we have to make a substantive reply, I suggest that we do so orally by calling upon the Congressman at his convenience and discussing the situation. If this is not feasible and a written reply is necessary, I suggest that we emphasize in our reply that our comments are for the Congressman's information only and request that he not make them public or transmit them to his constituents.

I think the Congressman will agree that it is not desirable for the United States Government to engage in any argument with the opposition to Batista regarding the merits or nature of the Batista administration. The opposition has already construed our statement of evidence that the Batista Government is now anti-communist as an indication of United States Government support for Batista.
Ambassador Conchesco stated that the attempted revolution at Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1963 had strengthened the Government's position since it had shown that the armed forces are solidly behind the Government, which would handle promptly and efficiently any attempted revolution. He said that a portion of the opposition to the present Government was prepared to participate in elections, but that another portion, headed by deposed Carlos Prío and his adherents, had thus far preferred to undertake insurrectionary activities. He added that the attempt at Santiago de Cuba had not been directly connected with the Prío group, but that Prío had supplied money for the arms used in that effort.

In response to an inquiry from General Smith whether the Cuban Government now felt sufficiently secure to undertake a return to constitutional government, the Ambassador stated that constitutional guarantees would be restored in about four weeks and that the Government would proceed with its plans to hold elections for Congress in June 1964.
To: The Under Secretary

Through: S/S

From: ARA - Mr. Woodward

Subject: Appointment with Ambassador Concheso of Cuba

Discussion:

Ambassador Concheso has just returned from an extended visit to Cuba. He will probably mention the situation in Cuba and the recently concluded international sugar conference. The United States and Cuba were among 35 nations attending the International Sugar Conference in London from July 13 to August 21. An International Sugar Agreement was signed tending to stabilize the world sugar market. Cuba had financed surplus sugar and restricted production, and is appreciative of our material help in getting the agreement.

General Fulgencio Batista seized power by a garrison revolt on March 10, 1952. His regime is unpopular, and depends on continued loyalty of the armed forces. Deposed President Carlos Prío, and other exiles, plot revolutionary activity in collaboration with elements inside Cuba, and endeavor to obtain arms for that purpose. Batista is not considered pro-communist, but there are indications that his followers are collaborating with communists in the labor field.

There was an unsuccessful revolutionary attempt at Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, causing around 100 deaths. Many opposition leaders have been imprisoned, constitutional guarantees suspended, censorship imposed, the communist newspaper, Hoy, closed, and a Law of Public Order decreed giving the Government broad powers to suppress opposition and criticism.

Apprehension is now lessening, and the Government feels that the possibility of insurrection has subsided. Ambassador Concheso told our Charge in Habana in great confidence that he will discuss with Prío in Miami a plan developed by Batista for a return to constitutional government. He feels it would be acceptable to the opposition, but might not be liked by the armed forces.

Recommendation:

If Ambassador Concheso brings up the subject of arrangements with the opposition, it is recommended that he be told, with suitable expressions recognizing that it is an internal Cuban question, in which the United States does not desire to intervene, that this Government would be pleased to see the return of constitutional government in Cuba, the removal of censorship and the restoration of constitutional guarantees. Should a suitable opportunity arise, you might also indicate our concern over the increasing influence of communists in the Cuban labor movement.

ARA:MID:JLTopping:dwm
Dear Sir:

I am taking the liberty of sending to you the following article which appeared in the Cuban newspaper, "El Mundo", written by the Cuban journalist and historian, Herminio Portell-Vilá, and entitled "Diplomacy and Government". This article deals with the "13 points" issued by our State Department in Washington over the signature of Thurston E. Morton, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, exonerating Dictator Fulgencio Batista of Cuba from charges of having helped the Communist Party.

The above-mentioned "13 points" were given to Representative Lantaff after he had sent a series of articles, written by me, to the State Department. It should be made clear that the State Department issued this report without asking the writer of the articles which accused Batista, among other things, of being pro-Communist, for proof of his statements. The author of these articles has prepared supporting material, accompanied by documentary evidence, which has been forwarded to Congressman Lantaff.

Following is the article mentioned above.

DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNMENT

I do not know which North American diplomatic official informed a certain Florida Congressman about the assurances that the government in Washington has that Batista is anti-Communist. I imagine, however, that he is someone new and obviously not acquainted with the recent history of Communism in Cuba, unless facts and data to the contrary are being deliberately ignored.

In my opinion, it would have been better if the above-mentioned diplomat and his Florida correspondent had kept the communication which passed between them to themselves. Thus, they could have continued living with their "official and diplomatic truths" without provoking us historians to the point where we have to present the "real truth", which is completely different and follows facts.

Three or four days ago, while appearing on "El Mundo on Television", the present Secretary of Labor reminded the workers that it was Batista who in 1938 secured recognition of the CTC, at that time Communist dominated. Batista's co-worker, well informed on what he was saying, boasted to his then friends of the first step taken by Batista towards his "understanding" with the Communists, which was eventually to end with his having them in his cabinet as governmental Secretaries on various occasions; to backing Lázaro Peña's domination of the Cuban workers; to tolerating Communist activities in our country, including those of Pablo Grobart; to looking with favor on the workers' parades on May First, which in reality were propaganda demonstrations and exhibitions of Communist influence; to establishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and granting conspicuous privileges to men like André Simon, the leading Czech Communist who last year was executed in his own country after having been at one time an outstanding figure in international Communism.

The political coalition which put Batista in the President's Palace in 1940 had the specific backing of the Communist Party, disguised as the Partido Socialista Popular. As recently as June 1950 the few Batista followers who formed the Partido Acción Popular, together with the Partido Nacional Cubano of Nicolás Castellanos and the Partido Socialista Cubano, were united in...
the elections in which Castellanos was elected Mayor of Havana. As a recognition of Communist support, Mr. César Escalante of the Partido Socialista Popular was elected Vice President of the Municipal Council of Havana, together with Mr. Félix Ayón of the Partido Acción Unitaria who served in the capacity of Secretary.

Is it possible that, taking into consideration everything that has happened in the State Department in Washington during these last few years, it is not even aware of these antecedents which are common knowledge in Cuba? But let them bring on their "13 points", issued by the State Department exonerating Batista, as though they were an incontrovertible expression of truth. It is true that Batista put an end to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Legation after March 10th, but there is no overlooking the fact that it was he who established a Soviet Legation in Cuba in the first place.

Day by day, in spite of all the official boasting about anti-Communism, it is easier for Cuban Communists to travel from their own country to the Soviet Union and its puppet states, and return to continue their propaganda, than it is for a politician of the "bourgeois" opposition to make a round trip to the United States. The only difficulties are in the method of transportation and the stop in the United States; but if these obstacles could be removed, Cuban Communists would be free to move about the entire world at will.

If the McCarran Act were to be complied with to the letter, more than one member of the Cuban government who was at one time or another a candidate on the Communist ticket - including Fulgencio Batista - would, like Blás Roca, a Communist leader himself, have to get to Europe and Asia via Canada or Bermuda.

This article is to serve as proof of Batista's background in Cuban politics insofar as Communism is concerned and which I submit to you for your information and files.

Respectfully yours,

Eliseo Riera-Gómez
2521 N. Greenway Dr.
Coral Gables, Florida
Mr. Hiera-Gomez, a naturalized American citizen of Cuban birth, resident in Miami, has sent a number of communications to various persons, including the President, members of Congress, the Secretary and other officers of the Department, concerning the situation in Cuba. His communications express opposition to Batista and his regime, make various allegations about them, and generally urge that the United States take action, indicating disapproval of the present situation in Cuba. His appointment with officers of the Department was arranged through the office of Representative Lantaff of Florida, after he had handed the representative an undated communication in Miami, a few days before September 2, 1953, alleging that Batista supports and is supported by Communists in Cuba and stating that the report given Mr. Lantaff by the Department, and subsequently released for publication, by him, concerning Batista and Communism is "far from being completely ignored as the complete ignorance of recent Communist history in Cuba, unless facts and data to the contrary are being completely ignored".

The commitment of the United States to follow a policy of non-intervention, as set forth in Articles 15, 16 and 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as well as the great interest of the Latin American states, including the United States, in promoting that policy, were explained to Mr. Hiera-Gomez.
The significance of the continuance of diplomatic relations with foreign governments in the light of Resolution 35 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference, was also discussed. The statements made in the Department's letter of June 29, 1953 to Mr. Lantaff were gone over with him, and it was pointed out that they were factual. He felt that there were other facts which the Department had not brought out, which would have established that Batista is pro-Communist, evidence in support of some of which he had submitted in his recent communication to Representative Lantaff. There was some discussion of the nature and pertinence of the data he had submitted, and of other reports and allegations which have come to the Department's attention, concerning the Communist sympathies of certain members of the Batista administration, Communist attempts at infiltration of other Cuban political parties, and the significance of recent Communist advances in the Cuban labor movement.

Mr. Hiera-Gomez said that his activities against Batista were causing him personal difficulties. He felt that he had been investigated in Miami by agencies of this government, and said that when he and his wife (an American citizen) recently visited Cuba he was questioned and searched by Cuban authorities, and that his wife was taken into a separate room, stripped and searched by a matron. He said that he was sure that he and his wife would not be permitted to enter Cuba again so long as the present Cuban administration was in power.

Mr. Hiera-Gomez gave it as his personal opinion that elections held by Batista would not be honest, and that no prominent politician except possibly Grau San Martin would participate in them. He also felt that Batista would not agree to surrender power to a caretaker government which was the only arrangement for elections which would be satisfactory to the opposition. He said that the unsuccessful revolutionary attempt in July, 1953, and its prompt and bloody suppression by the Army, had aroused the Cuban people, who were now ready to revolt. He said that many military officers were disgusted with the situation, and would join a movement against Batista.

Mr. Hiera-Gomez said that he had met Carlos Prío Socarrás, the new President of Cuba, a few times in Miami. There was no indication that he knew other members of the Prío family. He said he had been most anxious to step down as President of the government, especially of his brothers, and make him popular with the people. Those excesses had also greatly
disturbed him, and he had planned to leave Cuba and Cuban politics after the election. For that reason, Mr. Hiera-Gomez said, Batista's allegation that he had staged his own revolt in order to forestall one by Prío was absurd. He added that Prío was now determined to overthrow Batista, and that he was willing to expend his entire fortune to that end. He added that the Cuban people looked to Prío to lead the movement against Batista, and to furnish the funds for that movement. He displayed no knowledge of Prío's plans or activities, though he appeared confident of their successful outcome. His final comment was that Batista would be overthrown and that there would be a new government in Cuba within ninety days.

Mr. Hiera-Gomez requested authorization from the Department to make public the information contained in his recent undated communication to Representative Lantaff, a copy of which he had sent the Department. He was told that the communication originated with him, was not addressed to the Department, was not in response to any indication from the Department, and that consequently the Department was not in a position to express any opinion in connection with his request. He inquired whether the Department would object to a future Cuban government headed by Carlos Prío Socarrás, and was informed that the answer to his question was inherent in the policy of non-intervention. He asked what the United States would do in the event there were two warring governments in Cuba, and was told that the question was hypothetical and no definite answer could be given in advance of the event. The general criteria for the continuance of relations with foreign governments were explained to him.

Mr. Hiera-Gomez stated a number of times during the interview that he was not acting as an agent or representative of any Cuban group or individual, but rather that he was completely independent and was engaged in what he described as a "one man crusade". He stated that he hoped to interest the American press and Congress in the Cuban situation, and left a copy of an article by Ralph Royle, date unknown, which he said he had recently clipped from the Atlanta "Constitution", entitled "Return of the monster". He stated he was spending a few days in Washington, and was then returning to New York. He was accompanied to the Department by the editor of the Washington "Daily News", who waited for him and was not present during the interview.

Mr. Hiera-Gomez offered no corroborative evidence for any of his statements. It did not appear to have a knowledge of the issues deeper than that to be gained by a cursory perusal of the periodicals. He is, by his own statement deeply and emotionally...
emotionally concerned over the present Cuban situation, and
resolved to do all in his power to change it. His emotional
involvement with affairs in his mother country has confused
his sense of loyalty. He repeatedly used "we" to refer
indiscriminately to Americans and Cubans, employing such
phrases as "We are determined to get rid of Batista".
REstricted

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

E1MBASSY, HABANA

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF

SEP 16, 1953

ACTION

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DEPT.

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INFO

REC'D

SEP 17

OTHER

NAVY CIA PSB

SUBJECT:

PRESIDENT BATISTA'S SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1953

On September 4, 1953, the 20th anniversary of his first assumption of power in 1933, President BATISTA delivered a speech at Camp Columbia which was the highlight of the program of ceremonies and social events that marked the event. A copy of the speech is enclosed.

The speech had been awaited with great expectation, especially since it was anticipated that the President would take advantage of the occasion to announce the lifting of censorship of information media, some move toward restoring constitutional guarantees, and possibly a government plan regarding elections that would lead to a compromise solution of political problems. The speech was a disappointment in this respect since the President touched on these subjects only in generalities and said nothing that differed very much from his previous public statements on these matters.

It is evident that the speech was changed just before it was delivered to include the quotation (see below) from the issue of Time magazine that had appeared just before September 4. However, there is evidence that revisions other than this obvious one may have been made at the last minute. The Ministry of Information had given definite indications that important statements regarding censorship and constitutional guarantees could be expected, while such a close mirror of government opinion as Alerta had commented on the probable encouraging effect of the speech on election prospects. Hence, there is reason to believe that Batista had intended to be more specific on the subjects of censorship, constitutional guarantees and the elections, but had changed his mind at the last moment, possibly under pressure from the armed forces which may have felt that the time was not ripe for relaxation of strict measures to control the situation.

The speech in general was a kind of "state of the nation" address covering the political and economic situations. Batista reviewed the May 13 coup and his regime in much the same fashion as he had done before and emphasized the recent court decision that upheld the validity of his regime as a de facto government.
He devoted considerable space to an enumeration of the achievements and programs of his Government in connection with economic matters.

In touching on the political situation, Batista said that he preferred periods of the most complete liberties to those in which liberties were restricted. "The restrictions that exist today," he continued, "were set up to protect ... society ..." and when the peace of the country and its economic structure are endangered, there is no alternative but to combat the "treacherous campaign that has already cost the loss of precious lives." He said that Cubans must "trust that when constitutional guarantees are restored excesses will not again disturb the clear road to elections." Commentators have deduced an intent to seek a solution to the election problem from the following words used by Batista in his speech: "The political parties of the opposition and of the Government must lead the citizenry to the goal of constitutional normality." He closed this part of his address by affirming that he reiterated "the most sincere intent of continuing to fight for the reestablishment of democratic traditions" bequeathed by Cuban forebears.

As a further indication of Batista's public attitude at this time toward Communism, that part of his speech dealing with this subject warrants translation in full:

"We must watch out for widely differing angles of opposition policy. There are important groups lying in ambush. Among them is Communism which is an enemy of constant danger. And it is such not only because of the ideas it defends but also because of facility of adaptation and lack of scruples in the means used to achieve the end set before it. It is rejected by public opinion and the opinion of the working classes in general, but nonetheless it succeeds in slyly infiltrating even institutions and groups of conservative ideas. Wherever there may be a reason for economic or social disturbance there Communism will be with a demagogical demand or deceptive request. Its principal tactic consists in sowing seeds of discord. The police organizations have proof of agreements reached by the directors of Cuban Communism regarding assistance to certain campaigns of hostility to the regime begun by some groups that might be supposed to be in the opposite extreme, such as the Catholic Action groups. Even there the fifth column of the party entered, taking advantage of the agitation promoted by other partisan elements in isolated cases."
Comments on Communism were interrupted by a denunciation of "insidious propaganda" of which the President cited as an example an article in the September 7 issue of Time magazine regarding the head injury suffered by the Cardinal Archbishop of Habana, which article he quoted in part. He also quoted an editorial by Ramón VASCONCELOS, director of Alerta, in which Vasconcelos ascribed indirectly to the Communists the rumors to the effect that the police were responsible for the Cardinal's injury. Vasconcelos called these rumors an attempt to create dissension between the Catholic government and the Catholic people of Cuba. After these two quotations, Batista concluded his remarks on Communism as follows:

"These (referring to Vasconcelos' statement of the objective of the rumors in the case of the Cardinal) are, among others, the immediate objectives of Communism in Cuba. The Communists always reckon with a plan previously drawn up; with the iron discipline of their organization; and with the cooperation of the groups in opposition to our regime which in such sense serve them as a pretext and a support."

Batista ended his speech on the note that the Government should not go to excesses in exercising power but had to maintain its authority and that the interpreters of public opinion and sentiment should not abuse the rights conferred upon them by law.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

Earl T. Crain
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure

Copy of speech
MINISTERIO DE INFORMACIÓN.
DIRECCIÓN DE PUBLICIDAD DEL PALACIO PRESIDENCIAL.

4 DE SEPTIEMBRE, 1953.

DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL HONORABLE SEÑOR PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA, MAYOR GENERAL FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDIVAR, EN COLUMBIA, CON MOTIVO DEL 4 DE SEPTIEMBRE.

Compatriotas, compañeros:

RECUENTO Y PLEGARIA

En estos 20 años he tenido el honor de celebrar aquí, con ustedes, trece aniversarios gloriosos; y desde esta misma tribuna me dirigí siempre a nuestro pueblo para hacer recuento y enfocar el porvenir.

El 4 de Septiembre es un día jubiloso para la gran familia militar. Siempre lo hemos esperado con alegría rebozante, como deben esperarse las faustas fechas de la Patria. Pero este año hay un pesar que agobia al corazón, y en nuestros labios una tierna, una profunda, una devota plegaria que se eleva al cielo conmovido y se traslada, a través de las heróicas y legendarias montañas orientales, a los silenciosos panteones en donde reposan los restos gloriosos de los valientes compañeros que resultaron víctimas de la alevosa agresión de que fueron objeto en Santiago de Cuba y Bayamo.

LA AGRESION A LOS CUARTELES.

Aquel ataque por sorpresa a los cuarteles el día de San Juan, el pasado 26 de Julio —incalificable por su crueldad y deshumanidad— fue una dura experiencia para los que creían en el arreglo amistoso de los resentidos. Apuñalar a centinelas, asaltar a internos, ensañarse con heridos moribundos, indefensos, es una obra de manos criminales obedientes a un odio insulso y enemistado y al puro saqueo al pueblo que salió de Cuba este año.

El cruel ataque a los cuarteles fue una obra de alien...
ta para todos. Dio la medida de la crueldad y de lo que son ca-
paces nuestros enemigos; pero a tan grande mal siguió el alto
ejemplo de abnegación, de valor y de unidad en nuestros hombres
murallas inexpugnables de patriotismo y de entereza- puestos
al servicio de Cuba, del decoro ciudadano y de la causa que en
favor de nuestro pueblo defendemos.

Aquel Regimiento consagrado en la gran prueba de comb-ate, ganó la Cruz de Honor, condecoración la más alta y la me-
nos prodigada en las Fuerzas Armadas. Los bravos que sobresa-
lieron en la acción y su bizarro Jefe, lucirán en sus viriles
pechos la Cruz Maceo, nombre glorioso que ostenta con legítimo
orgullo aquel mando. Cuba entera, estremecida de espanto, ha
podido percatase de los excesos a que podrían haber llegado
con ese odio revanchista, si sólo por unas horas hubieran logra-
do enseñorearse de la ciudad o de otras ciudades en el país.

UNA MIRADA ATRAS.

A veinte años de distancia podemos situarnos para ana-
lizar el dramático proceso que nuestro pueblo ha vivido; el
trayecto nos es suficientemente conocido. Como cubanos, hicimos
muestra la lucha que la Nación sostenía contra el gobierno que
fue derrocado el 12 de Agosto. Queriamos empujar hacia adelante
la causa popular, porque nos dolía, como una herida en el pecho,
detrás de la nacionalidad en frustración. Transcurridas
asignaturas del día, desde las once de la mañana, hora en que pro-
clamamos la revolución en este Campamento, y constituída la
constituyente y clases y soldados bajo mi jefatura, distribuidos
a los estados en toda la República, pasadas las diez de la no-
nia, representantes de sectores diversos participaron en aquel
acto declarando revolucionaria indivisible. Todos, militares y ci-
viles, representantes de la nación cubana, todos nos conside-
ramos militantes de la revolución cubana. Pasé horas del
6 de septiembre, location...
RESTRICTED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 22, 1953

SUBJECT: Political Situation in Cuba; Opposition to Batista; Desire for United States Intervention

PARTICIPANTS: Eliseo Riera-Gomez
               MID - Mr. Topping
               AR - Mr. Jamison

COPIES TO: AR - Mr. Jamison
           AR - Ambassador Dreier
           AR/I
           SY
           H
           Embassy Habana (informally)

This second meeting with Mr. Riera-Gomez was also arranged through the office of Representative Lantaff of Florida. At the same time that office inquired whether an interview could be arranged between Mr. Riera-Gomez and Ambassador Gardner, and was informed that this office was not prepared to do so.

Mr. Riera-Gomez stated that he had seen a number of newspapermen during his visit to New York, including Herbert Matthews of the New York Times. He hoped to develop an interest in the press and among the American people concerning the situation in Cuba, feeling that if the people were aware of true conditions in that country public clamor would be sufficient to oust Batista promptly. He also stated that he hoped to interest members of Congress in his "crusade", which he stated was personally most inconvenient and expensive for him, since he had no assistance whatever.

Mr. Riera-Gomez again asked whether this Government could not make some official statement to the effect it was looked with disfavor upon dictatorships, and that present Cuban government was a dictatorship, and was not, that such action did not appear to be possible. He pleaded with him that the non-intervention policy adopted by this Government after long experience, the condition was expressed that if it could be lightly s
Mr. Riera-Gomez again requested "permission" from the Department to release the information contained in his undated communication to Representative Lantaff and was again told that the Department had no control whatever over communications prepared by himself. He requested my approval of a press release he had prepared covering his conversations in the Department and was told that the Department could express no opinion on such a document. (The release appeared well-prepared and non-committal.)

Mr. Riera-Gomez appeared to be friendly and honest, and upon departure reiterated his determination to continue his campaign against Batista.

The following day Mr. Roscoe Snipes of UP called to inquire whether I had spoken with Riera-Gomez, who had called on him that morning. I explained to him the background of the conversations, and in general terms the subjects discussed. Mr. Snipes expressed the opinion that the matter was not newsworthy.
**TRANSMITTING REPORT FROM CONSULATE AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN ORIENTE PROVINCE**

The enclosed report, dated October 5, 1953, from the American Consulate at Santiago de Cuba is devoted principally to an account of a conversation between Vice Consul Arthur W. Feldman and Sr. Luis Casero, ex-Mayor of Santiago de Cuba and former Minister of Public Works in the Prio Government. Sr. Casero discussed at length the attack on the Moncada Barracks. His version of the attack is believed to be fairly, though probably not completely, accurate. However, the Embassy is not prepared to go along with Sr. Casero's opinion that the leader of the attack, Fidel Castro, is strictly an idealist. The Embassy's impression of Fidel Castro is that he is an extremely ambitious and ruthless opportunist, obviously not adverse to violence when it serves his purpose.

It will be noted that Sr. Casero stated that he is trying to obtain permission to leave Cuba and if this is granted, he will go with his family to the United States and remain there "until the next change of Government which should not be too far off in the future." Plot rumors have died down in the past few days and the Embassy has no information as to the basis for Casero's prediction.

For the Ambassador:

[Signature]

Earl T. Crane

Acting Counselor of Embassy

**EXPOSURE**

Copy of report dated 10/5/53
AMERICAN CONSULATE
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, October 5, 1953.

Harold M. Randall, Esquire
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
American Embassy
Habana.

Sir:

I have the honor to report on a conversation held this afternoon with Mr. Luis Cas xo y Guillén concerning the attack on Moncada Cuartel. Mr. Cas xo was Minister of Public Works in the Prio Government and after March 10, 1952 returned to Santiago to become an insurance agent.

He was one of those arrested after July 26, and, along with seventy others, was found not guilty today of having participated in the assault.

He has had long conversations with Mr. Fidel Castro in jail and has come away with the impression that Mr. Castro is an idealist and an intellectual. Mr. Castro informed him that he represented the youth of Cuba and would have nothing to do with the existing politicians whose moral values are not high enough to serve Cuba. That is the reason why in organizing the revolt, he enrolled only young persons. He claims that he gave them no information concerning the real reason for gathering in Santiago outside of the fact that they would make a demonstration against the Government. It was only before starting out on the attack that the plan was exposed and there was opposition from about five of the men. This delayed the attack about one hour which was to have taken place at 6:30 A.M. when all the soldiers would be sure to be asleep. The intention was to drive the cars (about sixteen) into the cuartel, form a barricade and call upon the soldiers to surrender peacefully. The attackers, it is claimed, did not have the intention of engaging in warfare but hoped to take the cuartel by a show of force.

The first car, in attempting to enter the cuartel, stalled and threw the plan askew. The soldiers, being alerted, began to shoot and the men took refuge in the nearest buildings, which were the military hospital and the homes of the military. Since they were strangers to the city, he claimed that they had no knowledge of the layout of the cuartel and the surrounding area. It was brought out in the trial that none of the attackers were killed by shooting, as first reported, but by the
shooting between the attackers and the attacked. Mr. Casero informed me that Castro accounted for every cent collected for this attack and that this money, $16,480, came from the group themselves who raised it by loans and from their meager savings to buy the guns used, which were all purchased in Habana from stores and which consisted of: 36 Remington Automatic 22 calibre and 22 Savage 22 calibre rifles, 60 pistols, one Winchester and one machine gun. Mr. Casero asserted that all of the participants were Cubans and that the evidence failed to show any Communist or other political group's participation. He stated that the Government tried to show that Communists as well as Prio's followers had had a hand in the attack but neither of these claims have as yet been proven in the trial and practically all of the evidence has been submitted to date.

Mr. Casero stated that the rebels were in the main members of the Orthodox Party and that there were a few from the Autentico Party. He also reported that from his conversations with Mr. Castro he learned that the plan was to take the cuartels at Santiago and Bayamo, to set up a constitutional government in Oriente and call upon President Batista to return constitutional controls to the government with guaranteed free elections. They were not afraid of being counter-attacked from the air since the cuartels are centrally located in the cities and are near hospitals and homes and it was known to them that the air force did not have the know how for pinpoint bombing and would not risk it. Mr. Castro made a very favorable impression on Mr. Casero.

Some of the above facts are at variance with information given me by Major Andrés Pérez Chaumont, who claimed that there were about eight unidentified slain men who were not Cubans and who were short, dark and hairy. He also stated that Communist literature had been found on some of the attackers and that Prio and his group were backers of the assault. None of the Major's information was substantiated at the trial and in fact Lázaro Peña was found to be not guilty of any participation.

Mr. Casero informed me that the court has been requested to give each of the guilty prison sentences of 27 years but it is believed that the court will attempt to assign sentences in accordance with and proportionate to the responsibility held by each of the accused.

The Court House is guarded during the trial sessions both by soldiers and by police, the former armed with rifles and sub-machine guns. There have been no public demonstrations in favor of the accused and the sentiment which immediately after July 26 was in favor of the Army has veered to the opposite, what with the reported initial killing in cold blood of those captured and
the subsequent arrests of persons who were supposedly innocent of collaboration with the rebels but who were outspoken against the Government and its practices. Most recently at the reception given in honor of Congressman Jackson, it was quite evident that the presence of the military chiefs was not welcomed by many of the Cubans present and the contacts between both groups were coolish and few. The Americans present acted as a buffer between both groups.

Mr. Casero is trying to obtain permission to leave Cuba and if this is granted, he will go with his family to the United States and remain there until the next change of government which should not be too far off in the future, he claims. He informed me that he felt the Government could not remain long in power since a recent poll showed that only 7% of the people were in favor of it. He expressed the hope that he would be able to take a part in the next government and that he would advocate reorganizing the Army for which there is no great need and bring into it youth from the middle class who are educated and have some realization of moral ethics and responsibilities.

The city has returned somewhat to a normal outward appearance with few soldiers and police seen about.

The local economic situation has shown no improvement and many concerns have reported the month of September as being one of their worst. Bank collections and collections in general are very poor with demands for extensions and protests everyday events. Some credit has recently been requested to purchase Christmas stock and rice. It is anticipated that the coffee crop will get good prices since this year it is expected to be less than the demand. One bank has reported that for the first time in years it has earned less than its current expenses. The Electric Light Company has also reported that last month was the first time in many years that they had, not only no increase in customers but had a loss of four.

Further information will be transmitted concerning developments as they occur.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur W. Feldman,
American Vice Consul
Ambassador Arthur GARDNER presented his credentials to President BATISTA on October 17. In the exchange of speeches at that ceremony pledges of cooperation were exchanged. On the same day, the Cuban Minister of State released the following statement to the Cuban press:

"First: That the Government of the Republic--as is well-known--maintains its firm position of opposition to Communism and its penetration in this hemisphere.

"Second: That it fulfills all the Inter-American resolutions against such penetration.

"Third: That it has just declared itself in favor of the inclusion in the agenda for the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, of the theme: 'The Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics.'

"Fourth: That it is opposed, naturally, to any communist action in this continent."

Press clippings of the statement as published on October 18 are enclosed.

The English language Habana Post, in an editorial published October 18, referred to the release of the statement as "the magic of coincidence" which "on infrequent occasions ... occurs, and gently arranges the pieces on the chess board so that they make a great deal of sense ...."
(copies of which are enclosed) concluded by stating:

"It is one thing to pay lip service to anti-Communism and quite a different matter to take effective steps to combat this evil, such as has been done by the Cuban government. Ambassador Gardner undoubtedly is well aware of this but we are sure that it must be a matter of considerable satisfaction to him to see that the friendship and cooperation of which he and President Batista spoke has a real and practical meaning in the Republic of Cuba."

An editorial published October 17 by Información (copies enclosed) stated that Cuba's "firm and rotund ratification of Cuba's anti-Communist policy" will surely be applauded without reservation not only by all Cubans, but by all peoples in the Americas.

The timing of the statement was considered opportune "because already there is noted throughout the Continent a reaction to work for the elimination of all possibility of Communist penetration in the western hemisphere."—Its particular virtue was considered to be the fact that the declaration "does not limit itself to proclaiming opposition to the Communist penetration, but asks that action be taken against it . . . concerted action by all the nations of the Continent in an inter-American agreement that would commit all of them to that action."

Comment

Coinciding with the commencement of Ambassador Gardner's mission to Cuba, the Minister of State's declaration of policy supports the anti-Communist item proposed by the United States on the agenda of the Tenth Inter-American Conference as well as the United Kingdom's anti-Communist action in British Guiana. It ties in closely (and helpfully) with the statement of U.S. policy as expressed in the October 14 speech of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. John W. Hauser. The General Federation of Women's Clubs. It places the Cuban Government squarely on the side of the United States in its dispute with the communist-ridden regime in Guatemala.
The Cuban statement, used in connection with the enclosed USIA commentary on Mr. Cabot's speech, appeared in six newspapers in Habana and the interior and will be broadcast by perhaps thirty radio stations throughout the country.

For the Ambassador:

Earl T. Crain
Acting Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures

Newspaper clippings
USIA commentary

cc: Amembassy, Guatemala.
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM
AMEMBASSY, HABANA

TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF
Embassy Despatch No. 548, October 19, 1953.

SUBJECT
Draft Law-Decree Against Communism.

The Cuban Minister of Information announced to the press that in its night session beginning late on October 30, 1953, the Council of Ministers approved a draft law-decree against Communism. The Minister's announcement read as follows:

"There was approved a draft law-decree of the Ministry of the Interior complementing agreements of the IX Inter-American Conference at Bogotá in 1948 and the 8th resolution regarding strengthening of internal security adopted by the fourth consultative conference of Foreign Ministers held in Washington in 1951, and declaring the meddling political action of international Communism prohibited and contrary to the full exercise of national sovereignty."

The text of this law-decree will be transmitted to the Department when it is published in the Official Gazette. The Minister of Information's report of the draft indicates that the Cuban Government is formalizing in legislation the anti-communist statement issued by the Minister of State on October 16, 1953 (see despatch under reference).

For the Ambassador:

Earl T. Crain
Acting Counselor of Embassy
TRANSMITTING CLANDESTINE RESISTANCE PAPER.

Many officers of the Embassy have received through the mail copies of a clandestine anti-BATISTA and anti-government publication called "Liberation, Organ of the Cuban Revolution" (Liberación, Organo de la Revolución Cubana). The issue now being circulated is No. 4 of Volume I for August-September 1953, and is accompanied by a supplement dated October 1953, copies of both of which are enclosed. Nothing is known to the Embassy regarding the persons responsible for its publication and distribution.

The following are articles of particular interest that appear in the attached copy of "Liberación". Under the headline on Page 1 of "Massacre in Orient" (Masacre en Oriente), there appears an account alleging that many of the attackers of the army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26 were murdered after they surrendered. Also on Page 1 appears an article headed "The Truth About the Arteaga Case" (La Verdad Sobre el Caso de Arteaga). In this story it is claimed that the head injury suffered in August by Cardinal-Archbishop Arteaga occurred when he opposed efforts of agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) and the Bureau of Investigations to obtain from him a report and evidence submitted by the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba regarding the killing of July 26 revolutionaries who had surrendered.

In a box on Page 5 under the heading "Political Kidnappings" (Secuestros Políticos), the Government is accused of kidnapping and torturing for such purposes not only the SIM and the Bureau of Investigations, but also "known gangsters hired by those specialists in blackmail, attack and torture, Rolando MASFERRER and Ernesto DEL RÍO."

Also on the inside pages is a representation of a disguised pro-Communist (Batista: Un Pro-Comunista Disfrazado).

For the Ambassador

Earl T. Crane
Acting Counselor of the Embassy
"El Regimen de Batista es de Estilo Soviético" dice el Dr. Carlos Prío en carta al New York Times

LIBERACIÓN abre sus páginas para insertar la carta que el Presidente Constitucional de Cuba, Dr. Carlos Prío Socarrás, remitió al editor del diario norteamericano "New York Times", describiendo el régimen dictatorial cubano en su traducción publicada en nuestra edición número 4.

Dice así la carta:

Al editor del New York Times:

El pueblo cubano debe al New York Times un tributo de gratitud por su acierto y magnánimo editorial sobre "El régimen de Batista". El editorial des- cribe con exactitud las condiciones trágicas en las que el pueblo, bajo la dictadura que hoy controla nuestros principales demócratas, está sometido. Esta sombra de la España fascista y la brutalidad de la política oficial, y el terrorismo que está en su editorial, todo ello sería necesario para trazar, con el menor su- frimiento y calamidad posible, el restablecimiento de Cuba en los países democráticos.

Indiferencia por parte de este país a los apuros de la nación cubana, resultan en un abandono de la herencia histórica que envió a sus hijos a Cuba a luchar y morir hace 55 años ahí donde ahora Cuba está. En el mismo lugar donde se encuentran ahora los niños que eran enviados a Cuba para luchar y morir hace 55 años.

Los valientes jóvenes que sacrificaron su vida en ese día fatal —muchos después de ser sometidos a muerte— serán torturados por el pueblo cubano. Ellos son los que corren el peligro de ser traídos y torturados salvajemente —están tratando de seguir los pasos de los demás, a los que invasiones de la Loma de San Juan y El Caney en otra mañana de julio con Teodoro Roosevelt y Calixto García.

La tiranía que todos los cubanos deben estar resolviendo, es más y más peligrosa para la seguridad americana que la soberanía de España en Cuba porque por medio de la injusticia, el régimen de Batista en el embate de los Estados Unidos, las condiciones que la tira- nía soviética está ahora tratando de fomentar en el mundo libre para poder implantar sus ideas de la lucha de cla-

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"Hay hombres que viven condenos aunque vivan sin secreto. Hay otros que pade- cen como en agonía cuando ven que los hombres viven sin secreto alrededor de. En el mundo, hay hombres sin secreto, hay siempre otros que tienen en el secreto de muchos hombres". José Martí.

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FRAÇASA...

—Conclusión de la pág. 3—

hecha mientras permanecen injustamente detenidos o procesados varios líderes opositores, mientras se viola la autonomía universitaria y mientras son torturados los presos políticos, como en el caso de Armando J. Her- nández.

En tanto se ciñan las condiciones exigidas por la oposición en otras ocasiones—resistencia de las garantías, reinstalación de la Constitución de 1940, derogación de la llama- da Ley de Orden Público; suspensión de la denuncia periodística; libertad de los presos políticos, etc.—no será posible hablar de elecciones. Hacerlo, sería trascender la Revolución y burlarse del pueblo.

Sea discreto en su trabajo: en cual- quier parte puede hacer un espía.
BATISTA: UN PRO-CO

Procuró siempre el apoyo del comunismo y fue el candidato presidencial de los stalinistas

La campaña de prensa pagada por la dictadura —en la que se emplean miles de pesos de los que paga el contribuyente cubano— trata de demostrar que Batista es un furibundo anticomunista.

En julio, un cable de la "United Press" informaba que el Departamento de Estado americano había llegado a la conclusión de que el dictador no simpatizaba con los comunistas. Trece puntos de la llamada "doctrina roja" se relacionaban en ese cable con los contenidos de la campaña de Batista, a fin de confundir a la opinión pública americana, intentando demostrar que el dictador apoyaba al comunismo.

Sin embargo, documentos y hechos irrefutables comprueban que Batista es un firme defensor del comunismo.

Independientemente de que ha mantenido al frente de un importante ministerio a un conocido comunista, las pruebas fotográficas que presentamos en esta página deben dejar convencidos a los lectores de los enemigos políticos comunistas del expansionista de Cuba.

El mismo FULCENIO BATISTA Y ZALDIVAR, fue candidato a la presidencia de la República en la boleta del Partido Unión Revolucionaria "COMUNISTA", como puede apreciarse en la foto.

Todo el mundo sabe que durante la primera etapa del batista, los comunistas recibieron innumerables indulgencias y legalizaciones para legitimar su partido y se les entregó el control del movimiento obrero organizado.

La historia demuestra la publicidad interesada y la propaganda pagada.

LOBOS DE LA MISMA CAMADA

Fulgenicio Batista y su régimen dictatorial se preocupan diligentemente por proteger a sus amigos servidores. Acaba de publicarse en la Gaceta el Decreto No. 2116 por el que se designa Agregado Comercial al tenedor roso excomandante MARIANO FAGET, uno de los favoritos del régimen usurpador, al que se le gratifica con este nombramiento, sus valiosos servicios como alcalde del batista. Son lobos de la misma camada.

Comité Nacional por la Paz
INDUSTRIA 452 - LA HABANA

Devaluación de la Moneda

El ministro de Hacienda, Gustavo Gutiérrez, está dando los últimos toques a un proyecto para devaluar la moneda nacional.

Cuando se convierta en ley, dicho proyecto —que es un verdadero peligro para la economía del país—, el gobierno usurpador percibirá cuantiosos beneficios para reforzar sus extenuados fondos.

Se tratará de una verdadera expropiación, pues al deponer Cuba del extranjero en muchos artículos de primera necesidad, incluyendo los alimentos, se producirá un sube y baja de los precios de estos artículos, lo que redundará en perjuicio de la economía del país, ya que el peso cubano valdrá mucho menos que en la actualidad.

Cuando un cubano tenga en su haber un peso, en realidad tendrá noventa y seis de centavos o menos, lo que rebajaría su capacidad adquisitiva y su standard de vida.

"ENTREGA SOMOZA A SU HIJO LA PRESIDENCIA".

¡Ojo con Batista! A lo mejor quiere iniciar también en esta época de Nicargua y segundos el espectáculo de 'papi' entregándole la silla a "Papa"
MASACRE EN ORIENTE

- LOS BRAVOS DEL CUARTEL MONCADA FUERON ASESINADOS DESPUÉS DE LA
- RENDICIÓN.—CINCO HORAS DE LUCHA DESIGUAL.—HUBO SOLDADOS AL LADO
- DE LOS MUCHACHOS DESESP ERADOS POR LA LIBERACIÓN DE SU PUEBLO.

MILITARES CRIMINALES
RECUERdan LOS PEDRES
DIAS DE LOS ASESINATOS
EN MASA DEL NAZISMO

AQUella madrugada, por la
amplia avenida de Garzón, todo era
silencio. Algun que otro noc-
tambulo carnavalés se reponía al
hogar. Sobre las 5 de la mañana en el
centro del campamento—polígono,
cuerpo de guardia—nada indicaba el
asalto a la madrugada de los
traidores marxistas de Santiago de Cu-
ba. Por la posta 3, dos jóvenes de unifor-
me, con paso firme y ademanes con-
fiados, se detuvieron ante los que,
armados por el maíz, pedían una muerte
y se esperaban a la rendición. Aquellos
sí eran hombres. Se presentaban ante la posta sin el salvo-
conducto de los traidores; no como los
de la posta 6 de Colón. La brecha
se abrió. En menos de 10 minutos

Horrípilante Siega de Vidas

Desde los primeros momentos, los valientes insurgentes del "Moncada" se
hicieron fuertes, llegando a dominar casi por entero la madrugada de Río
Chaviano. Pero sobre ellos se concentró todo el fuego mortífero de las
ametralladoras del siniestro Teniente Rico, sorbiendo el grito de paro-
damento de quienes faltaron a su deber, no tenían otro saldo que la rendición. Ca-
yeron como buenos soldados en defensa de las libertades públicas ultrajadas.

"Batista se encamina a la Tiranía"

dice The New York Times

El periódico norteamericano "The
New York Times", el de mayor circu-
lación en los Estados Unidos, publicó el 25 de Agosto un editorial titulado
"El dique de Batista", que copiamos a continuación literalmente, y cuyas
consideraciones dejan a la perspicacia e inteligencia del lector:

—Continúa en la página 7—

LA VERDAD
sobre el caso de
ARTEAGA

El "accidente" sufrido por el Cardenal
Arteaga el miércoles 12 de agosto,
resultaba sumamente sospechoso. Mu-
chos recordaban la "calda" en las esca-
leras del SIM del profesor García Bár-
cena. En efecto, la cortina de hierro
echada por el gobierno usurpador sobre
este caso, despertó la suspicacia de
pueblo. Por muy eminente que fuera
la jerarquía eclesiástica del Arzobispo

—Continúa en la página 2—
ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation  737.05/11.65.3

Date  6 Nov 1957
From  State SY-Flinn
To  State Mr. Elliott

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☐ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority  26 Oct 82  Date  1/10/82
LAW-DEGREE NO. 1170 PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1953

INTERIOR

I, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, President of the Republic of Cuba, proclaim: That the Council of Ministers has approved and I have sanctioned the following:

WHEREAS, At the Ninth International Conference of American States held at Bogotá in 1948, the Republics therein represented agreed to the adoption within their respective territories and in accordance with the constitutional precepts of each State, of the measures necessary to impede the intervening political action of international communism which, assisted and incited by foreign governments, organizations or individuals, tends to subvert the politico-social order and to break the solidarity of the people of America;

WHEREAS, The Eighth Resolution, regarding the strengthening of internal security, adopted by the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Washington in 1951, declared that to supplement the measures of mutual cooperation which assure collective defense as well as the social and economic well-being of the people, upon which the vitality of political institutions depends to such a high degree, it is necessary to adopt internal security measures which check the interfering and subversive action of international communism;

WHEREAS, The second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitutional Statute of the Republic declares unlawful the formation and existence of organizations contrary to the regime of democratic government of the Republic or subversive of the full exercise of national sovereignty, and in this respect there are conferred upon the Minister of the Interior the powers set forth in the Fourth Transitory Disposition of Title Four of the said Constitutional Statute;

THEREFORE, Exercising the powers conferred on it by the Constitutional Statute of the Republic, the Council of Ministers resolves to dictate the following:

Law Decree No. 1170

Article I. The interfering political action of international communism is declared unlawful as contrary to the regime of democratic government of the Republic and the full
exercise of national sovereignty and, in consequence thereof and in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitutional Statute of the Republic, there are declared prohibited organizations, whether or not constituted as juridical persons and whatever may be the nature of their constitution in case they are such, that aid or facilitate or have aided or facilitated in Cuba the said intermeddling political action of international communism.

Article II. The Minister of the Interior, exercising the powers conferred on him by the Fourth Transitory Disposition of Title Four of the Constitutional Statute of the Republic and other laws in force, shall dictate the measures that may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the preceding Article, and in any case shall decree the suspension of all activities of the organizations to which this Law-Decree refers or shall provide for their intervention through a delegate of the Ministry.

Article III. Such laws and measures as are opposed to the fulfillment of this Law-Decree are annulled and it shall become effective from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic.

THEREFORE, I order that the present Law-Decree be complied with and executed in its entirety.

GIVEN at the Presidential Palace, in Habana, on the 30th of October 1953.
Batista Set To Halt Red Activities
Cuba May Propose Anti-Red Measures

By Ben F. Meyer

President Batista yesterday declared that he is determined to put a stop to Communist activities in Cuba, "from whatever quarter they may appear."

The President added that Cuba will continue to cooperate a hundred per cent with the other American nations to that end. "We are studying the possibility," he added, "of presenting to the Inter-American Conference which will meet next March in Caracas measures to fortify the anti-communist front."

In an interview granted to the Associated Press, the President of Cuba also said:
1. That Cuba will propose at Caracas the "strengthening of the Inter-American position against the interference of any government in the affairs of other countries. We all have our own problems to solve and it would be much better to mind our own business," he said, adding that he did not refer to any country in particular, but only to a principle.
2. The much-attacked Public Order Law is going to be modified "to prevent any restriction of freedom of the press, radio and television. Those organs are cooperating with us in the modifications. All we want is to put an end to abuses, and nobody who knows Cuba can deny that there excesses have been committed."
3. Cuba "will continue its great progress in the coming years. It will do so with the cooperation of labor, of capital, of the nation, of foreign nations, especially the United States, and of the government. The labor unions already recognize that it is against their interests to continue doing things which kill the desire to invest capital to help develop the country."
4. Cuba "is going to hold real elections in November 1954. All the political parties (the Communist Party does not exist in Cuba) will have full guarantees to participate. This, of course, includes the sympathizers of ex-president Carlos Prio Socarras, the various groups of the opposition party known as the Cuban People's Party and any others. But if they do not conduct any electoral campaign, that will be their fault, not ours."
5. "Very shortly" the situation of the public treasury will be remedied. "Nobody could imagine the disorder which reigned in the treasury when our revolutionary government assumed power on March 10th, 1952. The previous regime had stolen the money — dozens of millions of dollars."

The President said that his campaign against the communists is "aimed mainly at preventing the propagandas of Moscow, breaking up any Communist organization and keeping communism out of the schools and dependencies of the government."

"It is easy to condemn the Communists but it is not easy to make laws against them. That is because we do not which to restrict in any way the freedom of other people, as individuals or as political groups. Any political organization which works for what it considers of benefit to the country is worthy of protection; Communism, under the orders of Moscow, should be rooted out."

"Communism is humiliating. It made me ashamed to see photographs of Cubans proudly parading with the Cuban flag beside the Red banner of Communism in Moscow at the beginning of this year."

The President said that the two latest meetings of the American nations had adopted measure against Communism; the Inter-American Conference of Bogota in 1948 and the Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Washington in 1951. "If we can reinforce those measures we want to do so," he concluded.

(Continued on Page 2)
Honorable John Moors Cabot,
Under-Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The report submitted to the President of the United States by Mr. Milton Eisenhower on his return from a trip throughout part of Latin-America, is a document without equal in the history of foreign relations of this Hemisphere. It shows a great understanding of the position which your country occupies within the continent and its responsibilities towards the neighboring countries.

Mr. Eisenhower has clearly understood that the United States cannot live in harmony with the other countries of the Continent unless it treats them - economically, politically and culturally - as nations that have their own personality, with whom it should deal without discrimination and with a full understanding of their specific creative virtues, different perhaps, but not inferior, to those of the United States.

However we must not take too literally all the opinions expressed by Mr. Eisenhower regarding the Latin-American countries. We believe that the best compliment that can be added to his report is an opinion such as the one we are sending you; underscoring, from our own point of view, observations which we believe opportune and healthy, for the mutual benefit of both parties.

Mr. Eisenhower stresses economic problems and he has tried to find means of harmonizing the interests of his country with those of our countries. His painstaking comprehension of the specific interests of these countries, however, could never be complete, because it is an outsiders' point of view, no matter how friendly. Besides, Mr. Eisenhower has apparently interviewed only officials of the respective governments. It is a well known fact that, unfortunately, the majority of our nations are governed by oligarchies who have taken over the governments by the force of arms, replacing democratic regimes.
It is not our desire, Mr. Moors Cabot, that the principle of non-intervention, won by our republics in Montevideo as a protection against the dollar diplomacy, (which has fortunately disappeared), will work, at this time, against our economic progress and democratic faith. That is more, we maintain that if the ideals that govern the human spirit have value, the aid given to dictators constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention, as it helps keep in power governments that do not represent the true desires, sentiments and necessities of our countries. It supposes, in conclusion, an intervention against the democratic ideals that have been and will always be cherished by America, justly called the Continent of Democracy.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

ACCIÓN LIBERTADORA

-SECRETARIO GENERAL-
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: MID - Mr. Burrows (Attention: Mr. Welln) DATE: DEC 8 1953

FROM: SY - Mr. Flinn

SUBJECT: Reports on Preparations for Revolutionary Activity Against Cuban Government

Reference is made to your memorandum of December 1, 1953 in the above-entitled matter.

The suggestions contained in your memorandum relative to the dissemination of information furnished by the FBI were discussed with Mr. Bartlett, FBI liaison officer.

Mr. Bartlett stated that in his opinion information obtained within Cuba and in the possession of the Legal Attache of the Embassy was being turned over by the Legal Attache to the Ambassador.

Mr. Bartlett also advised that the Bureau had no objection to the Department's forwarding to the American Embassy, Habana, information contained in the Bureau's reports.

SY has been handling on a priority basis all FBI reports concerning activities against the Batista Government. There is no objection to your forwarding the information contained in the reports to the American Embassy at Habana. In your transmittals to the Embassy please indicate that the information has been furnished for the confidential use of the Department only.
Batista Set To Halt Red Activities

Cuba May Propose Anti-Red Measures

By BEN F. MEYER

President Batista yesterday declared that he is determined to put a stop to Communist activities in Cuba, "from whatever quarter they may appear."

The President added that Cuba will continue to cooperate a hundred per cent with the other American nations to that end. "We are studying the possibility," he added, "of presenting the Inter-American Conference which will meet next March in Caracas measures to fortify the anti-communist front."

In an interview granted to the Associated Press, the President of Cuba also said:

1. That Cuba will propose at Caracas the "strengthening of the Inter-American position against the interference of any government in the affairs of other countries. "We all have our own problems to solve and it would be much better to mind our own business," he said, adding that he did not refer to any country in particular, but only to a principle.

2. The much-attacked Public Order Law is going to be modified "to prevent any restriction of freedom of the press, radio and television. Those organs are cooperating with us in the modifications. All we want is to put an end to abuses, and nobody who knows Cuba can deny that there excesses have been committed."

3. Cuba "will continue its great progress in the coming years. It will do so with the cooperation of labor, of capital, of the nation, of foreign nations, especially the United States, and of the government. The labor unions already recognize that it is against their interests to continue doing things which kill the desire to invest capital to help develop the country."

4. Cuba, "is going to hold real elections in November 1954. All the political parties (the Communist Party does not exist in Cuba) will have full guarantees to participate. This, of course, includes the sympathizers of ex-President Carlos Prío Socarras, the various groups of the opposition party known as the Cuban People's Party and any others. If they do not conduct any electoral campaign, that will be their fault, not ours."

5. "Very shortly" the situation of the public treasury will be remedied. "Nobody could imagine the disorder which reigned in the treasury when our revolutionary government assumed power on March 10th, 1953. The previous regime had stolen the money - dozens of millions of dollars."

The President said that his campaign against the communists is "aimed mainly at preventing the propaganda of Moscow, breaking up any Communist organization and keeping communism out of the schools and dependencies of the government."

"It is easy to condemn the Communists but it is not easy to make laws against them. That is because we do not which to restrict in any way the freedom of other people, as individuals or as political groups. Any political organization which works for what it considers of benefit to the country is worthy of protection; Communism, under the orders of Moscow, should be rooted out."

"Communism is humiliating. It made me ashamed to see photographs of Cubans proudly parading with the Cuban flag beside the Red banner of Communism in Moscow at the beginning of this year."

The President said that the two latest meetings of the American nations had adopted measures against Communism: the Inter-American Conference of Bogota in 1948 and the Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Washington in 1951. "If we can reinforce these measures, we want to do so," he concluded.

(Continued from Page 1)

(Continued on Page 2)
Havana, December 4, 1953.

Honorable John Moors Cabot,
Under-Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The report submitted to the President of the United States by Mr. Milton Eisenhower on his return from a trip throughout part of Latin-America, is a document without equal in the history of foreign relations of this Hemisphere. It shows a great understanding of the position which your country occupies within the continent and its responsibilities towards the neighboring countries.

Mr. Eisenhower has clearly understood that the United States cannot live in harmony with the other countries of the Continent unless it treats them - economically, politically and culturally - as nations that have their own personality, with whom it should deal without discrimination and with a full understanding of their specific creative virtues, different perhaps, but not inferior, to those of the United States.

However we must not take too literally all the opinions expressed by Mr. Eisenhower regarding the Latin-American countries. We believe that the best compliment that can be added to his report is an opinion such as the one we are sending you; underscoring, from our own point of view, observations which we believe opportune and healthy, for the mutual benefit of both parties.

Mr. Eisenhower stresses economic problems and he has tried to find means of harmonizing the interests of his country with those of our countries. His painstaking comprehension of the specific interests of these countries, however, could never be complete, because it is an outsiders' point of view, no matter how friendly. Besides, Mr. Eisenhower has apparently interviewed only officials of the respective governments. It is a well known fact that, unfortunately, the majority of our nations are governed by oligarchies who have taken over the governments by the force of arms, replacing democratic regimes.
Information from those sources is necessarily biased. It does not come from people who are close to the economic and political life of those nations, endeavoring to improve them for the common good, but from a bold minority who are in power for their exclusive gain. It represents, at best, the interests, necessarily transitory, uncertain and illegitimate, of a very questionable alliance between political adventurers - sometimes of a military origin - and businessmen who hope to progress by favors granted by the people in power, rather than by keeping their roots in the national economy.

Once this exception is made clear, we will go into the economic sphere on which Mr. Eisenhower's report is based. On the question of the increase in production of the Latin-
Report of revolutionary preparations in Central America against Cuban Government

TO: GUATEMALA, HABANA, SAN JOSÉ

There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum on the above subject received from another agency within the Government. A photostat of the memorandum was given to the agency by an informant of unknown reliability who stated that the memorandum was obtained by him from an American businessman in Latin America who in turn had received it from another source. It is alleged that the author of the memorandum is a Cuban, a former communist who had abandoned communism and who was allowed to return to Cuba after furnishing the information to the Cuban Government.

The Department would appreciate any comments the missions may have on the basis of information in their possession and of such investigations as are practicable of the reported concentration of military forces and equipment in Guatemala and Costa Rica.

SMITH, ACTING

Enclosure
Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: MID: HR Wellman: mal 12/4/53
APPROVED BY: MID: HR Wellman

CLEARANCES:
MID
DRA

DEC 15 1953 P.M.
interest of their country in promoting the economic development of our nations. Unfortunately, this understanding has not brought about enough tangible practical results. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that these ideas are not fully accepted and, above all, put into practice by the major part of the officials of your country. It is not unusual therefore, that these public statements are considered, for the most part, propaganda.

The international organizations - where the United States exercises such a decisive influence - have not made available to Latin-America their financial facilities, technical assistance and commercial expansion on the same scale as that granted other countries, especially in Europe. Your legislators have not established legal procedures that would facilitate and stimulate, through tax exemptions, the exportation of private North American capital for economic investment; on the other hand, and equally detrimental to us, you have maintained laws that obstruct or completely hinder an increase in our exportations to the United States.

It is true that our political and economic relations have improved substantially since 1933, especially during the years immediately following the Second World War. It would be unjust on our part not to recognize the goodwill of your country towards Latin-America and not to value the advantage for us that the most powerful nation of America, and of the world, is a country so democratic and with no desire for territorial expansion.

But, in very recent times a policy has become apparent in this relationship which impairs and even threatens to destroy our common purpose of economic, social and political benefits for Latin-America. This practice, which we see reflected in many actions of the North American foreign policy, considers all Latin-American governments as legitimate representatives of their respective countries. With all sincerity, we wish to point out that this policy is, in our opinion, harmful both to your country and to the legitimate rights of the people of the unfortunate neighboring countries who have dictatorships.

The democratic minds of our countries are alarmed by the fact that statesmen of the prestige of Milton-Eisenhower and you, have publicly expressed themselves in favor of that policy. Frankly, we regret having seen in the United States press, - interpreting the policy of the State Department, phrases such as:

"As for other governments in Latin America - even
Early in April of 1952, about a month after the ouster of General Fulgencio Batista, the deposed president, Fidel \textit{Prio} \\ Scarrá\~nas entrusted to his ex-minister of Education Dr. Aureliano \textit{Sanchez Arango} the responsibility of sustaining the \textit{Prio} subversive movement, created to depose in turn Batista and return to power the Cuban Revolutionary Party (\textit{Partido Revolucionario Cubano}) if this were at all possible. The first step taken by Dr. \textit{Sanchez Arango} were to give a political form to the movement, and to create favorable conditions for an uprising (\textit{putsch}) at the precisely opportune moment, to be called "the zero hour". 

Immediately after Batista took over the PRC found itself destitute of any kind of influence, since all former officials were dismissed by Batista. Hence Dr. \textit{Sanchez Arango} began to reconstruct the PRC, placing in the positions of command some of the most sincere members of the party, most of whom had formerly been in secondary status in party affairs, and in Government affairs.

While Dr. \textit{Antonio de Varona} was again made president, men such as Dr. \textit{Arecelio Acu\~n}, Dr. \textit{Armando Hernandez} and a few others became the most prominent figures of the Party. Immediately the PRC began a campaign of passive legal opposition to the administration of the Batista Government, whose every step was met with the condemnation and adverse criticism of the Propaganda Committee of the Party. In addition, three times a week in the Newspaper, \textit{Free Press (Prensa Libre)}, articles by Dr. \textit{Arecelio Acu\~n} and Dr. \textit{Ren\~e Fiallo} pictured the present Government as a "do nothing" one, with policies, or lack of policies, contrary to the public interest. At the same time the articles were designed to restore to the party the faith which formerly it had enjoyed from the Cuban masses.

In the meantime, Dr. \textit{Sanchez Arango} initiated the opposition by force in the Central American Countries. Almost immediately he found out that the reconstructed PRC was gaining no ground with the people and that he would have to create a new political formula to draw to the side of the opposition of insurrection, the general populace, by now disgusted not only with the Batista Government, but with the PRC as well. It was proposed that Dr. \textit{Roberto Agramonte}, head of the Peoples Party (\textit{Partido del Pueblo Cubano}) have an interview with Dr. \textit{Prio} in Miami, but the former declined on the ground that his party wanted to remain neutral in the whole affair. However, \textit{Emilio M. Ochoa} opposed openly the ideas of his chief (Dr. \textit{Agramonte}) advocating an alliance of the two parties to make the opposition more effective. To this end he went to Guatemala to see Dr. \textit{Sanchez Arango}. While there, conferences were held in

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\textit{(Security Classification)}
the home of Dr. Raul Osegueda, then Ambassador of Cuba and now Foreign Minister of the Government of Guatemala. There warlike aspects of the movement were discussed. A merging of the two parties. On the return of Dr. Osegueda, eventually the amalgamation was effected with equal honor on the part of both of the parties. This ended with a surreptitious visit of Dr. Arango (Sanchez) to his native (he was then a political refugee in Guatemala).

From the moment Batista took over the power in Cuba, the movement placed itself unconditionally on the side of Dr. Fico and set up a base for the military preparation of the conspiracy. Immediately the Caribbean League (Legion) at the time reduced to impotence, began to function again, to take a preponderant part in Latin American relations. In the latter part of 1952, the military plan was drawn up by Sanchez Arango with the aid of Foreign Minister Raul Osegueda and, often in the conferences the presidential candidate (Costa Rica) Jose Figueres took an active part, promising the support of Costa Rica, should he be elected president. Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo participated as well, to the extent of using his influence with the Guatemalan Army officials that they might join the movement later. On the Caribbean coast of Guatemala is a place called Livingston. To the west, there is a road which leads to a little native village (indigena) name for the moment forgotten by this agent. To the southwest of this place there is a very bad road which ends in a little valley at the end of which there is a series of low hills. Back of these hills is situated a camp of the Caribbean Legion. There is established the General Headquarters of Aureliano Sanchez Arango. There exists here a force of 1000 men regularly trained, quartered and fed. War practice is held daily under the direction of General Abelardo Cuadra, veteran of the Spanish Civil War and one of the organizers of the movement of Cayo Confites.

The force situated here is divided into two battalions, one named Battalion #4, PABLO DE LA TORRIENTE BRAU; the other Battalion #5, IGNACIO AGRAMONTE. The force is divided into small groups and taught to use machine guns (tripod type) also hand type Carand rifles, automatic repeating rifles M1. Nearly all the officers are veterans of the Spanish Civil War. In addition to the military practice the officers get together once a week for conferences over historical and political matters as expounded by Juan Jose Arevalo, Romulo Betancourt, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, etc.

Near Livingston there is a little gulf on which is situated Puerto Barrios. South of this port there is a tiny port not marked on the map named Montagua. In this place with landing craft practice is held.
is held with the idea of disembarking in Cuba. From here several shipments of arms have been made to Cuba. The concentration of men and arms is in Costa Rica.

Northwest of Puerto Limon on the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica there is a place known as La Virgen. Back of this reached small country road, back of some low hills is found the camp, are 2,000 men or more divided into three Battalions, #1 Anastasio, Cesar Sandino, 2, Morezan, 3, Antonio Maeso. A little not far from this camp there is a kind of landing field which contains four (English) Lancaster Bombers, acquired from Canada by Ingeniero Carlos Hevia in Canada. The men in this camp carry English Repeating rifles but they also have Thompson machine guns and Mendez machine guns with plenty of ammunition. The men in Guatemala also have this additional arm.

The plan is that on landing in Cuba of the "patriots" these arms will be given to all the civilians who are sympathetic with the cause. Cubans generally are more familiar with this type of arm than the English repeating rifle, whose use is not easy to learn in a few minutes. The crews of the planes are English. The leader of the outfit is a Canadian named Chrisholm who was a Captain RAFC during the war, flying Lancaster Bombers. He is a personal friend of Carlos Rios Moneroro. This camp did not amount to much when Otilio Ulate was president of Costa Rica, but the minute Figueres came to power, the arms and men began to flow in in quantity, from Guatemala, which has been the great center for the accumulation of arms. From a place in British Honduras named Middlesex, many rifles were secured with the connivance of British officers stationed there, then passed across the border.

The plan of invasion is as follows: When the zero hour comes planes from Costa Rica and Guatemala will arrive at Habana prepared to drop bombs over the most important military posts in Cuba. As stated before the crews of these planes are English "mercenaries" who, for money have agreed to take part in this adventure, regardless of their politics. Coincidentally the men from the camps in Central America will be landed in various parts of the Island. At the same time there will appear in the streets members of both parties, well armed, to battle the local police, capture them, take over the civilian authority. While all this fighting is going on, leaders of the political parties under the direction of Eufemio Fernandez and Jesus Gonzales Cartas will capture the personages most prominent of the actual administration, who, once the revolution is successful will be put in jail under the charge of murder. With this action, it is expected that most of the citizens will come over to the side of the conspirators. Judging from things heard by this agent in an interview held in a Mexico Hotel between Juan Jose Arevalo and Ex-Colonel

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(Security Classification)
Ex-Colonel Martín Elena, the battle is set to take place. the general sale of the next sugar crop, about January of the year. While not within the province of this agency, it is known that General Perón is favorable to the conspiracy, and that Argentine manufacture to the Central American Camps.

On various occasions cargoes of arms of different kinds have been introduced into the island, a procedure not very difficult because of the vigilance of the Cuban air force constantly patrol the seas between Cuba and Central America. An agent knows about the following concentrations: In the hands of the "Cuban orthodox youth" headed by José Iglesias, Max Levin, and Bernardo Blanco Goudin, there are more than 500 machine guns, Mendoza, 10,000 grenades (hand type) all of Mexican manufacture. The arms are hidden in the "finca" of the son of José Manuel Cortina, in Pino del Río. In the hands of Pedro Guzmán head of the youth movement in Marianna, are about 100 machine guns, 50 grenades and 10 or 12 rifles M-1. The arms are hidden in a house situated near the "Central Toledo" property of the secretary general of the workers of that central.
Air pouch

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: AMBASSADOR, HABANA

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF: 2

ACTION

DC/R-2

DEP.

OTHER

DO NO. TYPE IN THIS SPACE

787.00/12-1653

XR 110.15 CA

December 16, 1953

SUBJECT:

Letter to Assistant Secretary of State Cabot from Cuban Opposition "Acción Libertadora"

The Embassy today received a copy of a letter dated December 4, 1953 addressed to Mr. Cabot and signed (illegibly) by the "Secretary General" of "Acción Libertadora", a Cuban clandestine opposition group (Embassy despatch 665 of November 17, 1953). The letter is written on an "Acción Libertadora" letterhead and was delivered in an official Ministry of State penalty envelope addressed to Mr. Crain.

The letter compliments Dr. Milton Eisenhower on his report on Latin America which it describes as "a document without equal in the history of foreign relations of this Hemisphere". It also criticizes the U.S. for its alleged support of Latin American dictatorships.

A copy of the letter will be transmitted to the Department in the event the original, addressed to Mr. Cabot, was not received.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Earl T. Crain
First Secretary of Embassy
CUBAN POLITICAL EXILES ARRIVE IN GUATEMALA.

The government-owned Diario de Centro América of December 18 reported that Lincoln Díaz Béjar, Lt. Col. Vincente León y León and Dr. Salvador Vilaseca y Porré, Cubans who had sought asylum in the Guatemalan Embassy in Havana, arrived by air in Guatemala City on that date.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

William L. Krieg
Counselor of Embassy

cc: Havana
The memorandum enclosed with the above-reference Circular Airgram has been read with interest. That part which refers to a camp at La Virgen, northwest of Puerto Limon, Costa Rica, with 2,000 men in training and four Lancaster bombers at a nearby airfield, seems far-fetched. In a country the size of Costa Rica such a concentration would not go unnoticed.

There is a place known as La Virgen, some 80 miles as the crow flies northwest of Puerto Limon. It is situated on the Sarapiqui river and can be reached by a bad road from San Jose. The country around La Virgen is well-dotted with cattle ranches and it is certain that such a concentration could not be kept from the public for long. Also, it would be next to impossible to place the men on the Caribbean coast unless they were flown in.

The Embassy is investigating the possibilities, however, of such a concentration.

For the Ambassador,

[Signature]

G. Allan Stewart
First Secretary of Embassy

CC: Guatemala
Habana
Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am sending you by hand a letter which will serve two purposes. Mr. Terrell will explain in further detail the matter you and I discussed. Your thought in the matter seems doubly important now that I have returned to Cuba and checked such information as we have. There is little doubt in my mind that we are going to have an election, the results of which will unquestionably be of far-reaching effect. There appears to be only one man qualified as a true administrator, but there is considerable doubt as to whether he can be elected. I am referring to Batista. Suggestions such as you made will go a long way toward answering this question.

There is another matter which I want to bring up. We have been overrun with official visits, military and otherwise, and my feeling is that the Cubans are going a little sour on the procedure. Normally, the military men who come are the finest kind of Ambassador; but too many of them, with the consequent cost to the Cuban Government, is not very popular. Informal visits are of great help, but the official type is a strain on everybody. Would it be possible in the future to have proposed trips discussed with us before the decision is made?

It will be nice to see Frank Nash and his group of officers, but their visit will come within a short time of sixteen jets, a hundred private planes, a Navy show, and some helicopters.

The Honorable
Walter Bedell Smith
Under Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Please be assured this is in no way a criticism. It is simply that it would be helpful to us to have advance consultation, in adjusting our schedule and in trying to work out what is best for Cuba and ourselves.

With warm personal regards,

Cordially,

Arthur Gardner
The Embassy has no information in the possession of either the Embassy or its service Attachés that would tend to confirm the information contained in the report transmitted by the reference instruction. From time to time in the past rumors and reports of invasion attempts based on Guatemala have circulated locally (see Embassy despatches Nos. 38, July 7, 1953, and 98, July 14, 1953). In the Embassy's opinion it would be extremely difficult for 4,000 anti-Batista men to be training in Guatemala and 2,000 in Costa Rica without such activity becoming generally known. The mere feeding of such numbers of men concentrated in or near small communities in countries the size of Guatemala and Costa Rica would seem certain to result in widespread knowledge of their presence. The Embassy therefore doubts the truth of these statements. It would evaluate other statements appearing in the report no higher than "possibly true".

In connection with the clandestine introduction of arms into Cuba, reference is made to the Embassy's despatches Nos. 788 of December 22, 1953, and 825 of January 6, 1954, as well as previous despatches on seizures by the authorities of alleged contraband arms. The Embassy believes it quite likely that here and there in the Island there are concentrations of arms, such as described in the report under consideration, that have been collected for revolutionary purposes.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall
Counselor of Embassy

cc: AmEmbassy, Guatemala City.
    AmEmbassy, San José (Costa Rica).
The Cuban political panorama as the elections of June 1, 1952, approached.

In accordance with the Electoral Code, in force since 1943, the term of organization and reorganization of the political parties was opened in the last months of 1951.

In March 1952, the Cuban political parties, to the number of EIGHT, were arrayed, with a view to the elections called for June 1 that year, as follows:

GOVERNMENT COALITION: Composed of the Cuban Revolutionary (Authentic) Party, Democratic Party, Liberal Party and Cuban National Party, with over a million and a half members. It nominated Carlos Hevia as candidate for the Presidency.

THE CUBAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (ORTHODOX): Founded by the deceased leader Eduardo Chibás and responsible for the principal opposition to the government of Prio Socarrás. It had approximately 400,000 members, but the great popularity of this party made it the logical rival of the government coalition. It nominated Dr. Roberto Agramonte, professor of the University of Havana, for President.

UNITARY ACTION PARTY: Founded and presided over by Senator Batista, boasted some 200,000 members and nominated Batista as its candidate.

PARTIDO DE LA CUBANIDAD: Founded and presided over by Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, ex-president of the Republic. It had less than 100,000 members and nominated Dr. Grau San Martín as its candidate.

POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY: Official members of the Comintern, with less than 100,000 members, which nominated its visible leader, Dr. Juan Marinello Vidaurreta.

Peaceful and legal progress of the electoral campaign.

Up to the 10th of March, 1952, the political campaign, intense and impassioned, as always, proceeded in an atmosphere of peace, order and guarantees. There was not a single protest from the opposition nor did they point to one single abuse or coercion on the part of the government.

Batista himself carried out his political activities not only freely but OFFICIALLY PROTECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, to the extreme that on the very night of March 9 to 10 he held a public meeting in the city of Havana, under the protection and guarantees of the government. Shortly after his return from that meeting he went secretly to Camp Columbia and carried out the Army "coup"
Department's CA-3201, December 15, 1953

February 10, 1954

The memorandum enclosed with the above-reference Circular Airgram has been studied with interest. Concerning that portion which refers to the General Headquarters of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango in the area of Livingston, Guatemala, it is noted that the source states a force of 4000 men are quartered there and that they are given daily training and practice in war tactics. It is noted the source further states the men are trained in the use of machine guns and rifles.

Discreet questioning of an individual who ordinarily would be aware of such a concentration of arms and men in the area mentioned in the airgram has met with negative results. The person to whom the Embassy directed its questions is reliable and has lived in Guatemala for many years. His reaction was to scoff at the idea that 4000 men could be concealed for even a few days in the area of Livingston.

The Embassy is following up this matter and any information which comes to its attention will be forwarded to the Department.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Krieg
Counselor of Embassy

cc: San José
Habana
HGJ

ACTION COPY - DEPARTMENT OF STATE
This action order must return this permanent record copy to HC/STS files with an endorsement of date that taken.
STANDARD FORM NO. 34

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: ARA - Mr. Cabot

FROM: MID - Mr. Wellman

DATE: February 23, 1954


Attached is the monthly summary for Caribbean Affairs for the month of February, 1954.
CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Political Situation in Cuba at end of 1953 - The following is a brief summary of a useful commentary received from the Havana Embassy:

The Batista government which came to power by military coup in March 1952 has after two postponements announced general elections for November 1954 and the electoral preliminaries have begun. Further revolutionary attempts, boycott of the elections by major opposition groups, and opposition of the armed forces are all possible obstacles to an electoral solution. The opposition is divided into factions on the issues of participation in the scheduled elections and passive resistance or violence, and is ineffective. No opposition party has been registered by the principal party leader. Batista, who is probably unpopular with a majority of voters, has not announced whether he will be a candidate but obviously is planning through a flexible political coalition of doubtful strength, a public works program and concessions to labor to maintain himself or his government in power. Although the loyalty of the armed forces, which maintains a continuous semi-alert, seems to insure the continuing stability of the Batista regime, delay or suspension of elections would result in further disorders, while evidence of intention to hold fair elections would promote stability. Organized Cuban labor which has taken no important action not approved by Batista, may exact a price for its continued collaboration. The anti-communist measures of the Batista Government—diplomatic break with Russia, prohibition of communist organizations and publications, and harassment of communists—outweigh its toleration of some probable communists in government, army and labor. It has cooperated closely with the United States in a bilateral military program, the Nicaro nickel project, the UN and the ILO. It has improved relations with all its neighbors except Guatemala with which relations have deteriorated.

Election machinery began for General Elections in November - On March 20, 1953, the period terminated for applications to be made to the Superior Electoral Tribunal for registration as parties. From February 14-28, 1954, affiliates of each party were registered, and about the end of March, the Tribunal will examine certificates of party affiliates and the registration of any party not having
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- 2 -

an affiliation equal to at least 4 percent of the total registered and photographed voters at the end of the affiliation period. On April 15 the parties elect their executive committees and delegates to municipal assemblies, which elect delegates to the provincial assemblies, which in turn elect delegates to the national assemblies. On May 5 the electoral tribunal calls for elections to federal positions and subsequently for elections to provincial and municipal offices. The electoral period begins May 15 after which public officials are prohibited from taking action to coerce or influence an elector. Between August 3 and 30 certificates of candidacy are submitted to the appropriate electoral control body. August 20 is the latest date upon which President Batista if he should accept a coalition nomination would have to certify he had left the presidential office. On October 25 all party electioneering must cease, and on November 1 the elections are scheduled.

Old Constitution restored when elected officials take over - The Electoral Code provides that elected municipal aldermen and mayors will take office on January 3, 1945, provincial governors on January 15, senators and representatives on January 28, and the president and vice-president on February 24, the anniversary of the Grito de Baire, the beginning of the war of 1895-98 for Cuban independence. On January 28 when the Congress takes office, the President's Constitutional statutes providing for the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council will be annulled and these bodies will cease to exist. On February 24, when the President-elect takes office the 1940 Constitution will be re-established in its entirety. Only at this point however will the provision of the 1940 Constitution return to effect, which bans an ex-president from occupying the office for eight years after he has left it. Thus Batista is not prohibited from being a candidate.

Government Coalition and two Opposition Parties Registered - On December 14, six pro-government and two opposition national parties were registered, subject to organization and qualification by the resolution of sufficient voters. The pro-government parties are the Partido Acción Propulsora (PAP), of President Batista; the Partido Acción Nacionalista (PAN), headed by three then cabinet members; the Partido Acción Unitaria (PAU), the Liberal, the National Democratic, and Labor parties. The PAU will not be organized, its members joining the PAP, and the Labor Party of Batista. Secretary General of the Confederation of Cuban Teachers, also not be organized. The coalition is of unknown strength. The strongest element is the PAP; the PAU is designed to attract and other elements more to the left; the two largest parties are splinter groups opposed by the political forces that refuse to cooperate with Batista.
registered Opposition Not Registered - The two registered opposition parties are the PRC (Auténtico) and the PCC (Ortodoxo). The former was registered by ex-President Grau over the opposition of the party leaders both in Cuba and in exile. By this action Grau took the Auténtico name away from Prio and his followers who, whether or not devoted to a revolutionary solution, unite in refusing to participate in elections under Batista. It remains to be seen how many voters will register Auténtico under Grau's program to participate in any elections with himself as a candidate. Batista is reportedly so eager to have Grau qualify as an opposition candidate that he is prepared to "lend" him some affiliates if necessary.

The Ortodoxo party name was registered by ex-Senator Fernández Casset, an Ortodoxo of little previous importance, without the agreement of the leader of either of the two principal groups of the splintered party, Arranque, apostle of passive resistance to Batista and Millio Ochoa, advocate of collaboration with Prio and other opposition groups, possibly in revolutionary plans. The three Ortodoxo groups which have been discussing bases for unity and participation in elections, recently announced agreement on a new party president, the termination of electoral activity, and conditions for elections which Batista is not likely to grant.

Communist Party Not Registered - The Partido Socialista Popular (Communist) did not register, doubtless would have had its registration cancelled under the anti-communist law of November 1952 had it applied, and probably could not have secured sufficient affiliates to qualify under the new electoral law in any event. Reportedly its members were infiltrating the PAU (soon to be organized) and may attempt the same tactics with the

Communists may not bring about Stability - At present Grau is the only named opposition candidate and his party the only opposition group able to participate if sufficient affiliates are secured. In addition to the Prio Auténticos, the Ortodoxos should also participate in the elections, the electoral result would hardly represent a candidate, although there should be an honest vote for him. In such case the election would not be likely to bring about high degree of political stability.

Imposition of Public Order Law - The public order law decreed in 1952, resulting at Santiago in July 1952, which provided for maximum criticism of the government and its agencies and immediately caused much resentment in Cuba and effectively limited a democratic movement. Some opposition groups demanded its suspension as one condition for participation in the November elections.
elections, and the press called for its abrogation. By a law decree published on February 4, the Batista Government amended the law to repeal the provisions which penalized illicit propaganda and which permitted courts to grant provisional liberty to accused persons only if so requested by the prosecutor, and to make other changes in the law and the Social Defense Code. Although reaction to the modifications has been limited, the Habana Embassy perceives indications that additions made to the Social Defense Code restore to some extent the broad objectionable powers which had been conferred on the government by the provisions of the law which have been repealed. On February 17 the Ortodoxo Party listed among "basic demands for a national election" complete repeal of the Public Order Law as amended.
Air Priority
SECRET
(Security Classification)
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM
AMCONSULATE, MERIDA

TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF
CA-5885, dated April 16, 1954

ON APRIL 22, 1954, the Principal Officer of this post went to Campeche and talked to three American sources, all believed to be reliable, concerning Carlos Gacel Castro.

Gacel is described as a Cuban negro who has been in the state of Campeche for about one year. Part of this time he lived in the city of Campeche, and for the past several months has lived on a farm near Champoton (about 40 miles south of Campeche, on the coast) working for Javier Cabazas, a buyer of rice, corn, and beans. He is supposed to have entered the Yucatan peninsula from Belize, and to have gone to Merida before going to Campeche.

He is said to have admitted to being a former Communist (CP of Cuba) but claims that he is no longer one of them. He is a political refugee who is opposed to the Batista regime. He is believed to be legally in Mexico and is not known to have had any trouble with any authority here. As far as is known he is not taking part in any political activities of any kind. He has alleged that he knows where guns and munitions are stored in various parts of Central American countries (and perhaps Cuba) and that he has been promised a pardon if he would divulge this information to the Cuban authorities. He is described as a former Cuban newspaper reporter. Informants have no confidence in his veracity.

On two occasions Gacel's parents have come to visit the Subject. Each time they have stayed at the Castelmar Hotel. It appears that sometime ago one of the owners of the hotel went to Cuba with colored tiles of the hotel and the surrounding country side for advertising purposes and that the parents were of material help in arranging exhibitions for them. The parents seem to have money and it is probable that they get reduced rates when they come to Campeche. Gacel stays at the Castelmar Hotel (the best in Campeche with rates at present about $1.25 a day, U.S. currency). It is doubtful if he could afford to do this on his estimated farm labor income of ten to twelve pesos a day (12.50 pesos equal $1.00), and that he too receives an additional free room from the management (the Castelmar is operated by Carlos Frans and his two sons, Jose Maria Sanores and Jose Luis Sanores). Gacel's father is said to be a lawyer and to have
source to be a Communist as well.

It was learned yesterday that for a considerable period of time Gacel lived in the Campeche apartment of Peter and Jean Crown and their three children. The Crowns are white and believed to be Americans from New Jersey. He was a builder of boats but apparently could not make a living - she was a housewife who was reported to have worked for a time at least in the Cocoteros Hotel bar (at Progreso, 20 miles north of Mérida) as a "B" girl. Of the Crowns little is known except that they were in Mexico illegally, that they had no funds, and that they owed many people. Unable to buy passage back to the United States it is reported that they arranged a rendezvous with a shrimp boat, the MILDRED K (illegally in Mexican waters) off shore near Seibaplaya and left the country during the night of April 21, 1954. Informants do not know from what port the Mildred K operates but most of the shrimpers who come to this area are from Florida, principally Tampa. If the Mildred K can be reached when it arrives in port it is possible that the Crowns can provide items of interest. It was reported by one source that a full report of GACEL'S activities had been submitted to the FBI by a third party.

Arthur V. Metcalfe
American Vice Consul

cc: Embassy, Mexico
in duplicate
Air pouch

CONFIDENTIAL

(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AM EMBASSY, HABANA

AM 1303

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, W. C.

DATE

April 28, 1954

APR 28 1954

DESP. NO.

AID

Letter from Charles R. Burrows to Carlos C. Hall of

Feb. 15, 1954

 ACTION COPY

DEP.

O F

OTHER

CIA-7

ACTION COPY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1954

FOURTH IN-TRANSMITTAL

SECRET

FAX

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

737.00/4-2754

xR 911.12

SUBJECT

Apparent Breach of U.S. Laws

U.S. -1

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

There is enclosed in single copy a leaflet bearing the
titles "Instructions to the Civil Population in Case of Air
Raids" and "General Instructions specially useful to civilian
personnel lacking knowledge of military tactics." These were
air mailed April 23, 1954 from Miami, Florida in separate
envelopes to some 500 addressees apparently selected at random
from the telephone book (one was sent to this Embassy at its
old address). All were confiscated by the Cuban authorities--an
easy task since all the leaflets were inserted in identical,
semi-transparent envelopes.

These leaflets, inciting to revolution, bear the name of
"Savior" (Salvador) CANCIO Peña, the American citizen who on
January 12, 1954 wrote an anti-Batista letter to the President,
sending copies to the Secretary and to the Attorney General
(Department's transmittal slip of January 27, 1954). At that
time he gave his address as 6991 Yumuri Street, Coral Gables,
Florida. The sketches appearing thereon were evidently lifted
from current U.S. Army training manuals.

On April 24, 1954 the Naval Attaché received word from
Naval Intelligence, based on an FBI report, that the printing
of 1,000 of the leaflets would be completed "by the group
around Ervio Socarras" in Miami that day. The Cuban police
must have received a similar warning from their own sources
since they seized the first 500 immediately upon their arrival.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall

Counselor of Embassy
INSTRUCCIONES PARA LA POBLACIÓN CIVIL EN CASO DE RAID AÉREO.

LAS NECESIDADES TÁCTICAS DE LAS FUERZAS DE LIBERACIÓN PUEDE TRAER CONSIGO EL EMPLEO DE AVIONES EN DETERMINADAS SECTORES DE LA REPÚBLICA ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES DEBEN OBSERVARSE Estrictamente por los CIVILES ESPECIALMENTE LAS FAMILIAS QUE VIVEN CERCA DE CuARTELLES, ESTACIONES DE POLICÍA, CENTROS TERRORISTAS O CUALQUIER LUGAR DONDE SE ENCUENTREN ESTACIONADAS, CUARTELADAS LAS TRUPAS DE GOBIERNO DEL DICTADOR, QUE PUEDE SER ATACADA DESDE EL AIRE POR NUESTROS AVIONES, QUE ATACARAN SIN AVISO.

SIEMPRE SE LANZAN VARIAS AL MISMO TIEMPO. OTRO TIPO DE BOMBA ES LA DE FOSFORO VINO - DE 10 O 20 LIBRAS. SI PARTÍCULAS DE ESTA BOMBA ALCANZAN ALGÚN PERSONA PRODUCEN QUEMADURAS DOLOROSAS Y PROFUNDAS. TENGA CUBOS CON AGUA LISTOS Y ARENA EN ABUNDANCIA. TENGA A MANO EXTINTORES DE TRENDO Y USOLOS SOBRE LA BOMBA EN SEGUNDA, Y BANE LOS ALREDEDORES. LAS BOMBAS DE DEMOLICION SON DE VARIOS TIPOS Y PESOS. SE UTILIZAN CONTRA LOS CUARTELLES, INSTALACIONES MILITARES, POBI- TOS, ETC., AL EXPLOTAR PRODUCEN UNA CORRIENTE DE AIRE TAN FUERTE QUE ROMPE CRISTALES, VISI- NERAS, ETC., EN DETERMINADA DISTANCIA, Y PUEDE SER FATAL PARA LOS PERSONAS.

A LA PRIMERA EVIDENCIA DE UN ATAQUE AÉREO, NO PERMANEZCA EN LAS CALLES, NI EN LAS CERCANÍAS DE CUARTEL, ESTACIONES DE POLICÍA, ETC., ÚNICAMENTE DENTRO DE LAS BOMBAS SE EXPLONE AL FUEGO DE LAS AMETRALLADORAS DE LOS AVIONES. NO PERMANEZCA EN LAS CALLES!

EL ATAQUE AÉREO SE HACE, GENERALMENTE, CON BOMBAS DE DEMOLICION DE ALTO EXPLOSION, CON BOMBAS INCENDIADAS (QUE PRODUCEN INCENDIOS), ETC., PROBABILMENTE AL TIPO QUE SE OBTENGO AL COBRE DE HARDO, QUE GENERA UNA Onda DE CALOR QUE SE PROPAGA DE FUEGOS A FUEGOS A LOS ALREDEDORES. AGUA EN FORMA DE CHOSQUITA DE AGUA O CHISPAS DE METAL ES DE extremadamente SÓLIDAS PARA ESCAPE DE LAS LLANAS, EN LOS PRÓXIMOS.
SI ENCUENTRA UNA BOMBA SIN EXPLOTAR, NO LA TOQUE, LÁMASE A UN EXPERTO SOBRE EXPOSICIONES O DISPARO DE ARMAS DE FUEGO, ELLA SE PUEDE EXPLODIR. SI EXISTEN PERSONAS APROXIMADAMENTE O PRÓXIMAS, EVITE LA ARENA Y BUSQUE UNA SALIDA LARGA DISTANCIA.

SI EL LUGAR ES SEGUNO PARA PROTEGERSE DENTRO DE LA CASA, CONTRA EL FUEGO DE AMETE, LLÁMENLE AL PUBLICO CON VIVOS, SI LO ES POSIBLE, ANULANDO DESCARGO Y OTROS NUEBES SOBRE LA CASA, LOS PROYECTE ATACANDO LA TEJANOS, MADERA Y GUAYO, FÁCILMENTE.

EL MAYOR DÉCIMO EN UN BOMBARDEO AEREO ES LA POSIBILIDAD QUE LAS BOMBAS NO SE PRECISAMBEN EN EL BARRIO Y SE PUEDAN EXPLODIR EN LOS ALREDEDORES DE LA POSICION ATACADA, CAER, ESPECIALMENTE SI EL RAID ES NOCTURNO. SI UNA BOMBA CAE EN UNA CASA, ESTÁ DEBE ABANDONARSE INMEDIATEMENTE, AUN CUANDO APARENTEMENTE ALGUNAS DE SUS PAREDES PARZIENTRAS INTACTAS. NUNCA DESCONE LA Aire sobre una bomba incendiaria, PORQUE EXPLOTANDO LAS BOMBAS, INCONFULLANTEN Y ACTUALIZANDO A LA ACTIVIDAD. A LOS COCOS MOVIMIENTO EN EL PRIMER MOMENTO ES ECHAR ARENA HASTA CUBRIR LA PONERLA UN COCO Y LLEVAR LA DE LA CASA, O ALEJARLA DEL LUGAR DONDE ESTÁ.

EL MODO DE SACAR UNA BOMBA INCENDIARIA.

ACTUE RÁPIDAMENTE ANTES QUE DESCUBRA EL COMBUSTIBLE FLAMABLE DE LA BOMBA. NO USE EXTINGUIDORES A BASE DE TETRACLORURÍO DE CARBONO, SOLO USE LOS DE SODIO, UME, USE ARENA EN ABUNDANCIA.

LA ÚNICA FORMA DE ACABAR CON LA DICTADURA BATISTIANA ES LA REVOLUCION.

PRESTENSE A LA COME DEL DICTADOR: ES UNA TRAFICACIÓN A CUBA.
### Observaciones

1. **Forma Incorrecta**: Se debe curvar la hoja con las cuatro esquinas para que quede suave y limpio.

2. **Forma Correcta**: Se debe doblar la hoja con las cuatro esquinas para que quede suave y limpio.

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### Instrucciones

- **Generalidades**
  - El plan de ataque debe estar en la observación de los enemigos para dar cuenta de su ubicación de la lucha y observar sus movimientos.
  - Si no hay enemigos, se debe observar la vez de actuación para que sea efectivo.

- **Cubierta de arena**
  - Se debe procurar con el suelo que no se vea la arena.

- **Uso de estaquina**
  - No se debe ver el papel de estaquinilla.

---

### Observación

- **Forma incorrecta**: Se debe curvar la hoja con las cuatro esquinas para que quede suave y limpio.

- **Forma correcta**: Se debe doblar la hoja con las cuatro esquinas para que quede suave y limpio.

---

### Cómo hacer el carretazo

1. **Forma incorrecta**: Se debe cubrir la hoja con hojas de manzana.

2. **Forma correcta**: Se debe cubrir la hoja con una capa de hojas de manzana para que no se vea el papel.
Honorable Sherman Adams,  
The Assistant to The President,  
The White House,  
Washington 25, D.C.  

Dear Sherman:  

Only 90 miles away from our shores the threat of Communism is rearing its ugly head.  

On behalf of my client, former President of Cuba, Dr. Carlos Prio Socorrolas, whom I represent in Washington as public relations counsel, via the New York public relations firm of John David Griffin, I am taking the liberty of presenting a memorandum which shows the growing threat of Communism in the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  

The attached memorandum has been prepared by my associate, Eligio Riera-Gomez, a United States citizen of Cuban ancestry and a World War II veteran of the United States 31st Infantry Division.  

The aforementioned memorandum will show Dictator Batista's growing intimacy with Communist leaders of Cuba which he has been developing since he first overthrew the Constitutional Cuban Government in the 1930's and which he has expanded since his Coup d'Etat in 1952.  

Cuba, due its strategic location to our shores, offers considerable threat to our national security should Communism be able to secure control of the Cuban Government and Institutions.  

It is hoped that the attached memorandum will prove of interest and value to you and it is being presented with this in mind.  

Your comments and suggestions will be greatly appreciated.  

With every good wish, I am,  

Sincerely,  

[Signature]

P.S.  

KROCK-ERWIN ASSOCIATES, INC.
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 10571
Rec'd: May 22, 1954
8:15 p.m.

FROM: Habana

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 239, May 22, 5 p.m.

NIACI

Prompted by studies Embassy indications and recent Central American developments Batista is prepared take vigorous action against Cuban Communists. Thursday his police took up Mantello's passport, latter planning to fly to next day to Europe. Campa, Godoy and Saladrigas meeting Monday noon to frame anti-Communist law expected to be approved by full Cabinet Friday. This would deprive and forbid members Popular Socialist and Communist Parties all positions municipal provincial and national governments as well as posts as officers of all syndicates.

Batista instructed Saladrigas confidentially consult Embassy re expediency this measure since they under impression Beaulac opposed similar proposal last year, recommending as preferable use of judicial procedures against subversion and not action on basis political affiliation. Batista believes Cuban judicial machinery uncertain and too slow also subsersive intent too difficult to prove in court of law. He feels procedure he proposes take only feasible one.

Saladrigas last night suggested Batista receive Ambassador confidentially in order discuss growing influence local Communists. President agreed but said he would prefer first be able show Ambassador he taken some concrete measures against them.

Gardner feels Batista should be encouraged in his endeavor. Try to possible Monday morning.
This Government sees no reason why Cuban Government should not take such action as it considers practicable and effective against Cuban communists to meet threat of international communist intervention confronting Cuba and hemisphere, including measures described EMBTEL 239, May 22. We view with satisfaction withdrawal Marinello's passport and hope Cuban Government will institute further measures in accordance with inter-American commitments to control movements of persons travelling in service of international communist conspiracy.

Dulles (2.24)
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Habana
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 245, May 25, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

By pure coincidence member SIM* 11 a.m. today recognized occupant of station wagon parked in country club area near residence as "Pincho" Gutierrez and gave alarm. Later pursuit involving gunfire resulted in capture of former and Cesar Lanelis. Accompanying automobile too speedy for capture believed to be occupied by Aureliano Sanchez Arango.

Search of station wagon's chauffeur's house revealed three hand grenades, Lanelis carried pistol with two extra magazines. Suitcase ditched nearby said to contain extensive subversive documentation not (repeat not) yet well analyzed but mentioning Sanchez contacts throughout the island. Interesting document contained complaint that Batista's movements were unpredictable, that he invariably chose different routes when making announced visits, different methods of transportation, varying ways of announcing to his staff time of departure etc. One source carefully studying and reporting Batista's habits was found to be palace newspaper reporter. General Cantillo admits President well aware possibility assassination hence takes every possible precaution.

Country club area and beyond still blocked off with slight hope of locating car which escaped.

GARDNER

As received, will be serviced upon request.

Note: Mr. Wellman (MID) notified 5/25/54 10:40 p.m. EMB(CWO).
When the Ministers of State, Justice and Labor met on May 24 to discuss measures to be taken in order to curb Communist activities in Cuba, the question of denying passport facilities to members of the PSP and other Communists came up. Minister Campa pleaded that the Government has no way to determine who are Communists and who are not, without assistance from the American Embassy. (NOTE: Sr. Campa's Ministry issued a passport last March to Juan MANZANIELLO about whom Communist even the least informed cannot doubt.) Minister Benedetti has now made the suggestion that the Embassy lend this cooperation to the Cuban Government.

It is realized that effective passport control cannot be expected from the Cubans operating alone, yet the aid requested would offer certain perils to our interests. It could well endanger our sources of information, and sooner or later it would inevitably become known that the issuance of a Cuban passport was subject to the will of the American Embassy, leading to charges of undue influence in internal affairs and even of usurpation of sovereignty. Instructions in this regard are requested.

Later on Monday Busebio Mujal was called in by President Batista and told, in the presence of Saladrigas, that the Government intended to issue a law barring Communists from holding office in the syndicates. Mujal had learned this fact from the Spanish newspapers and was very much upset thereby. He insisted that the CTC be allowed to clean its own house of Communists, without legal compulsion. The President temporized to the extent of telling Mujal one or two weeks to effect this change, after which the proposed law would be issued in any case. Mujal called the directorate of the CTC to apprise them of the

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall
Counselor of Embassy
THE CASE OF THE CUBAN DICTATOR BATISTA AND THE COMMUNISTS

by

Carlos Hevia
Former President and former Minister of State of Cuba

At 2:00 A.M., the 10th of March, 1952, former Dictator Batista entered Camp Columbia, and by offering to double the pay of soldiers, sailors and policemen, established himself again as a dictator, supported exclusively by the army. In so doing he discarded the Cuban Constitution and assumed the powers of Congress. He knew the pattern (it was Lenin's), when by a mutiny of the Russian Army the way was paved for the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. And Batista had already practiced it in 1933 when he helped to organize a mutiny of soldiers, sailors and policemen against their officers; and the Communists, informed beforehand, attempted to use the mutiny to Sovietize Cuba. Only through the strong opposition of democratic, nationalist and anti-Communist Cubans - I was one of those who fought against Dictator Machado - was this Communist attempt foiled, yet Batista remained at the head of the mutinous army and ruled Cuba from Camp Columbia as a dictator until elected President in 1940.

In 1937 Batista established formal and important contacts with the Communist Party, and during the early days of September, 1938, (about the time of the Munich Pact) he ordered the Governor of Havana to recognize the Communist Party of Cuba as a legal entity and organization, which in its first by-laws registered itself as a subsidiary of the International Communists. The recording of the Communist Party as a legal organization was made the 13th of September, 1938, in the Revolutionary Government of Havana.

Already in an intimate union with the Communists, Batista immediately seized control of the whole labor movement of Cuba in the hands of the Communists, and after several interviews with Communists, Blas Roca, Lazaro Peña and Juan Marinello, the General Federation of Labor was placed under the absolute control of Lazaro Peña on January 22, 1938, in a gathering which took place under threats and violence supported by Dictator Batista.
After the recognition of the Communist Party as a legal entity, and with its absolute control of the labor movement of Cuba, Batista planned also to bring Communists into the government of Cuba, and to that end united, in March, 1939, the Communist Party and a small political party called "Unión Revolucionaria" and together they made "Unión Revolucionaria Comunista" which took part in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 1939. As he was already an aspirant for the presidency of the Republic, Batista utilized the Communist Party as shock troops in his political campaign. He gave them arms, money and authority to act in the whole country. And with their help he was elected President in 1940.

Batista ran for President on the "Socialist-Democratic Coalition", and a member of that coalition was the "Unión Revolucionaria Comunista" mentioned above. He, Batista, adopted in his program many basic ideas for which the Communist Party stood, including their famous motto "Cuba, Out of the Imperialist War". At this time Hitler and Stalin were allies.

One of the most important Russian Communist agents in Latin America, well known to those who had to fight Communist activity in this area, has been a man who has used the names of Otto Modley, Aaron Sinckowitz, José Michelon, Abraham Grobar, and lately Pavel Grobar. He was finally chased out of Cuba in 1950 by actions of the Cuban government when the overthrown constitutional President Prio was in power. However, he was able to escape from the Cuban police with the aid and assistance of Mr. Fonin, Charge d'Affaires of Russia at the time, who in an official automobile of that legation took Grobar and placed him aboard the Russian ship "Demetri Petrovich", which entered the Cuban port of Manati the 23rd of June, 1950, to load cargo and left that port July 4th the same year for England. In April, 1951, the construction of the Cuban police was that Grobar was in Paris, France, on his way to the Middle East.

Pavel entered Cuba for the first time in 1924. He was a graduate of the Fabrika, University of Moscow and came to Cuba to organize the Communist Party of Cuba. In 1930 he registered as José Michelon, a native of Poland, son of Mr. and Mrs. Michelon, with identity number 58232 of the Centre de Desempleado of Havana. In 1931 he legally used the name Aaron Sinckowitz to act as delegate of the International Communist in the Western Region. He was captured by the police and was dismissed October 1, 1932 on the accusation "White Russia" under the name of...
Stolen from the Archive of Dr. Antonio R. de la Cova
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba-books.htm

Snickowitz, stating then he was a native of Roumania, sailing for Rotterdam. In March, 1933, with false passports, he entered Cuba again.

He was in Cuba as a delegate of the Communists, and during the Cuban Revolution of 1933 he attempted to convert it to a Communist Revolution, using banners with the Hammer and Sickle in some sugar mills and inciting the army to rebel in favor of Soviet Russia. However, this attempt was put down by the then President of Cuba, Grau San Martín.

In January, 1935, he was registered in the Alien Registration Bureau under the name of Jose Michelon, with card number 153297. He was captured by the police the 23rd of November, 1935, in a secret Communist meeting and was sentenced to six months in prison by the courts, and to be deported, but on the 28th of April, 1936, when Batista was ruling Cuba as a dictator from the Cuban Army's Headquarters at Columbia, by Decree Number 1095, published in the Official Gazette (equivalent to the Congressional Record) of the 28th of April, 1936, the deportation order was revoked.

On the 27th of July, 1936, under the name of Abraham Grobar, this same person requested the Department of State of Cuba to issue him citizenship papers, submitting affidavits that appeared to be issued at the municipal court of the township of Batabanó, stating that Grobar had renounced his Polish citizenship and requested the Cuban. Citizenship papers were issued in November, 1936, under the name of Abraham Grobar. However, as these affidavits were false, criminal proceedings were instituted for falsification of official documents (No. 244 of 1938, Cuban Criminal Courts, First Section), but the so-called Grobar was included in the amnesty law of 1938. At this time Batista was ruling Cuba as a dictator.

During this period this person had variously been known as Jose Michelon, Jake Snikowicz, Fumi Snickowitz and Abraham Grobar, but after September 13, 1938, when Batista legalized the Communist Party, he adopted the name of Fumio Grobar. He was the Executive Officer of Russian Communism in Cuba, he helped organize Marxist schools, and headed the Cuban union at the head of the Confederation of Labor of Cuba. In 1940, orders from Moscow designated him as instructor for Latin America, and a number of meetings were held under his leadership in various countries.
In January, 1922, Batista being President, the Russian Pavlo Grobar, Delegate in Cuba of the Caribbean Soviet Secretariat, called a meeting of all Communists in Santiago de Cuba in which he read instructions that he had received, stating that the entrance of the United States in the war had destroyed the campaign against that nation made by Russia and had increased the moral influence of the United States over the peoples of Latin America; and that it was necessary to start a campaign of defamation against Great Britain and the United States with the objective of keeping the mentality of the people of Latin America favorable to Russia, so as to have a prepared field when in the post war commotions Sovietization of Latin America would be attempted. After this gathering, the Central Committee of the Communist Party met in Havanna and designated the Communist leader Blas Roca to tour Latin America to the end above mentioned. In the Official Gazette of June 18th, Batista, as President, signed the Decree Number 1625, designating Blas Roca as an official delegate of the Minister of Labor assigned to visit Latin American countries.

It has been shown that Grobar was permitted by Batista to remain in Cuba when he was Dictator by cancelling his deportation order; second, by letting him receive Cuban citizenship papers and applying to him the Amnesty Law of 1938; and third, when the Communist Party was legalized, permitting him to act freely in Cuba, organizing the Communists and helping them to control Cuban labor. Also, during Batista's presidency, he sent Blas Roca to visit Latin America in 1942 to prepare the minds of the people against the United States and in favor of FDR's plans during the expected post war commotions.

Batista, as President, elected in 1940, designated Juan Marinello, Delegate of the Communist Party, as Minister Without Portfolio in his cabinet, and appointed a Minister-leader, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, became a member of the cabinet. Then Marinello was nominated Senator. Batista helped Communists obtain favor also in the Cuban Senate and several in the House of Representatives and management of radio. The Senators were Marinello, Cesar Vilari and Garcia Aguilar. In the Senate, the two to the Communists one of the most important international were radio for their radio broadcasting station, called "1010". Also, Juan was President, as designated as head of the Defense to Vincente Martinez (military), one of the builders of the Cuban revolution.
Batista had many meetings with Communist leaders Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (former member of Batista's cabinet) before the 10th of March, 1952, possibly when he was preparing the coup d'état, on the farm of his former Minister of War, Sosa de Quesada (now a general in the Cuban army and head of legal matters for the Army). After the coup d'état, the Communists adopted a very peculiar attitude of protest, declaring that they were against any revolutionary or violent attitude directed against Batista; and working for the formation of a popular front, including themselves and other political parties to work out a peaceful solution; by that action fomenting discord in the opposition to Batista.

During the presidency of Batista, 1940-44, the corporation "Noticias de Hoy, S. A.", owner of the Communist newspaper "Hoy", was organized in Havana the 9th of February, 1943, and registered in the General Registrations of Corporations the 2nd of April, 1943, Page 1965, Folio 179, Book 25. During Batista's term as President, this newspaper "Hoy" had a large circulation and government support.

When the overthrown constitutional President of Cuba, Carlos Prio, was Minister of Labor in 1946 he undid Batista's work of handing over to the Communists the labor movement of Cuba, and after a tough struggle broke their power and placed Cuban anti-Communist labor leaders at the head of the labor movement.

Carlos Prio, as President, also attempted to stop the anti-democratic and anti-American campaign carried in the newspaper "Hoy" by the Communists. When the Communists lost control of the Cuban labor organization C. T. C., as the newspaper "Hoy" was established with money paid by the Cuban workers, the全日商日本會 had demanded C. T. C. claimed ownership of the newspaper. Then the Cuban government closed it, declaring that ownership was in dispute. The Communists made a counter-action, stating that the corporation "Noticias de Hoy, S. A." owned and controlled the newspaper "Hoy", not the Cuban labor organization C. T. C., and sent a letter to President Prio that a group of prominent Communists were the owners of the corporation. In a civil suit the courts declared that corporation the legal owner of the newspaper. Then President Prio again ordered, in July, 1951, the occupation of the paper by the police, treating it as if it was owned by
a group of Communists it was an illicit organization and it was again closed. To this action of the Cuban government, Batista made a strong public protest in defense of the Communist newspaper "Hoy".

From these facts it is shown that when Prio was President the Communist newspaper "Hoy" was interrupted in its campaign against the democracies. And in so doing, the government of Prio undid another pro-Communist work of Batista.

Since Batista staged his coup d'etat of March 10, 1952, the Communist newspaper "Hoy" has had free circulation in Cuba, and big trucks carry the newspaper throughout the Island. And he is, in an undercover way, helping the Communists to gain again control of the labor movement of Cuba. At the same time, democratic radio commentators are silenced, broadcasting stations closed, newspaper commentators and writers jailed and brutally beaten.

While Batista has forbidden public gatherings yet the Communists have been permitted to have large meetings in the National Theater in Havana, on October 10, 1952, as well as the 7th of December the same year. All Communist leaders are in Cuba without the government harrassing them in the least; most of them recently returned from Russia, arriving freely by plane at the Rancho Boyeros Airport. The so-called Batista's break of relations with Russia, as published in the American Magazine "Time" is just the opposite, for Russia broke relations with Cuba, possibly as it had a friend in power it did not need at any longer. And we must remember that May 1, 1952 there were two labor parades, one of the Cuban democratic workers in front of the Presidential palace of Cuba; and the Communists and the labor section of Batista's Party, C.U.N.A., marched together in the Havana Stadium.

Batista has been in conversations with the Communists so that the so-called break of relations that he has claimed to be preparing will finally be drafted in such a way that it could be used against those who oppose him and favor democracy, but used against the Communists.

The Communist organized anti-government party, P.A.U., about 1949, the Communists have left the leadership of them, including some of their best organizers, joined the new party; and those same Communists and their bosses are again putting instead of important positions in the government in the labor government of Cuba.
after the coup of March 10, 1952; Raúl Lorenzo, Minister of Commerce in Batista's present cabinet, was a member of the Communist Secretariat in the Province of Las Villas, 1936-37, using the pseudonym "Lauro".

Arsenio González, Undersecretary of Labor, is a former Communist, and as late as the 18th of February, 1952, he was legal advisor for Lázaro Peña (the prominent Communist leader in whose hands Batista and the Communists put all Cuban workers from 1939 until 1946. Peña, who had been in Russia several times, together with Blás Roca and the above named Grobar, have been the three key men of Communism in Cuba), in a legal suit to regain the position of Secretary-General for the Communists, as is shown in the judgment of the Cuban high court "Tribunal de Garantías Constitutionales y Sociales" of the Supreme Court of Cuba, signed on the 18th of February, 1952, under the number 503-951.

A large number of Communists, some of whom are related below, are now working with Batista's Party in the government, or as members of that Party's labor organization, for example:

Several members of the labor section of Batista's Party in Havana Province are Communists, among them are José Pérez González, Gilberto Galán, Galo Guerra Santana and Julio Grass.

Communists also are Manolo Alonso, Secretario Federación de Lícoreros y Refrescos (union of workers in the liquor and beverage industries), and María Luísita Pedro, who wishes to become Secretary-General to the Union of Women Workers (Gremio Despalilladoras de la Habana).

Vidal Madero, former Councilman for the Communist Party in the City of Havana, is working with the F. A. U. (Batista's Party).

The election in the cigar makers' industry after Batista's coup d'état, where the Communist labor leaders were defeated, and Communist Mario Valdés was named as Secretary-General, together with ten other Communists, to the Nomination Board.

A former official of the Central Committee of the Communist labor organization for the Havana Province, who recently is now helping the labor committee of Batista's Party in the same province.
Astor Guzmán, who led a committee in the Cuban Communist Party in the 1940s, has been a prominent Communist leader in the Province of Camaguey until 1950 at least, and is now supporting Batista.

Raúl Ortiz, President of the Municipal Assembly for the Communist Party and Councilman in the City of Florida, Province of Camaguey, is now working with Batista's Party.

Batista's insidiousness is magnified by his pose against Communism, when he knows that he is actually using large numbers of Communists in important positions, especially in workers' organizations. And what makes Cuba one of the most hazardous places now is that in other countries the attitude of the government is usually well known, while here we have Dictator Batista allied to the Communists yet posing to the contrary.

The Communist inclinations and indoctrination of Batista has been recently shown in his totalitarian actions as Dictator; attacks on the freedom of the press; discarding the Cuban Constitution; assuming the powers of Congress; modifying by ukase the laws regulating the judiciary power by retiring four justices of the Supreme Court; killing, beating and torturing many persons; creating insecurity that has caused an economic collapse; modifying Articles of the Constitution by placing the police and the soldiers out of the jurisdiction of the Courts of the land; establishing twenty new taxes without the approval of Congress. Hatred anti-Communist feeling and love for liberty and democracy of the Cuban people will win in the end.
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

Control: 2474
Rec’d: June 4, 1954
8:50 p.m.

FROM: Habana

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 264, June 4.

SENT DEPARTMENT 264, REPEATED INFORMATION PANAMA UNNUMBERED.

Aureliano Sanchez Arango and six other persons involved
Country Club area plot leaving this afternoon for Panama
with safe conduct Cuban Government. Remainder persons who sought
asylum local Embassies last week have departed for Mexico.

GARDNER

737. 00/6-454
Air Pouch

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AMERICAN HABANA

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF

Department's A-480 of June 2, 1954

ACTION

ARA-4

DEPT.

OCR/R-2 SY-2 MC-2

June 4, 1954

The Embassy has read with interest the

The Embassy has read with interest the

The Embassy has read with interest the

The Embassy has read with interest the instruction
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cited and cannot understand how an American citizen,
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directed against a friendly nation. Reference is
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made to the Embassy's despatch No. 1303 of April 27,
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made to the Embassy's despatch No. 1303 of April 27,
made to the Embassy's despatch No. 1303 of April 27,
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For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall
Counselor of Embassy
As of possible interest there follows below the text of an unsolicited letter received by this Consulate from Carlos Gacel on June 14, 1954.

Mr. Attht Metcalff,
USA Vice Consul,
Hérida, Yucatán.

Mr. Metcalff:

I am the friend of Mr. Ed. Alkman from Campeche.

I now that you want information from me and I have interest en to have one conversation with you because I have in my powder important information for the Government of The United States of America.

Maybe in two or four days I will send you another letter.

I am in condition of cooperate with you and your government.

Sincerely,

Carlos Gacel

There nothing further has been heard from Mr. Gacel.
Accusation of Prio That Blacks Favors Reds Refuted by De la Cuva

Statement by Ernesto de la Fe, member of the Cabinet and authorized spokesman for the government of President Fulgencio Batista—June 4, 1954.

Each new public statement by Carlos Prio seems to be more asinine than the previous one, and there is no doubt in my mind but that he makes his statements for just two reasons. One, he wants to divert the attention of the North American public from the fact that he is now being tried for violating the laws of the friendly nation, which gives him asylum. Two, he wants to take advantage of the anti-Communist feeling in the United States—a feeling with which I am in complete accord—to establish himself as the one and only champion of democracy among the statement of Cuba.

Prio knows very well that the people of Cuba laugh at his statements that President Batista and his government are in sympathy with anything resembling communism, but, as I say, he is talking for the people of the United States, where he stands indicted for crimes against the laws of the country, and not for the people of Cuba. Apparently, he thinks that the people of the United States are more gullible than the people of Cuba. The Cuban people gave up on Prio and his band of peculators and plunderers some years ago, and he is thoroughly regarded as a discredit in his own country. I refer to the Soviet propaganda and which, even in Habana, under the Batista government, during the election...

(Continued on Page 10)
ACCUSATION OF...

(Continued from Page 1)

period he served as the nation's chief executive. Here in Havana, during the Prio regime, hundreds of communist agents were housed, trained, exchanged, assigned and reassigned without one word of protest from Prio or any member of his government. Here in Havana, communist agents falsified passports and other documents, paid off their spies and openly abused diplomatic privileges, and there is no record of Prio ever having moved to destroy the nefarious system. It is illogical to think that some of these communist agents, who have caused so much trouble recently in some of our neighboring countries obtained part, if not all, of their training here in Havana, during the years Carlos Prio was president.

The whole communist setup was destroyed by law enforcement agents of the Batista government within weeks after it came into power in the spring of 1953, and Cuba and Soviet Russia broke all diplomatic relations. Nor have the people of Cuba forgotten that the golden era of communism in Cuba—the period of communism in Cuba—the period of communism in Cuba—was precisely during the time Carlos Prio was serving as Minister of Labor in the administration of President Ramon Grau San Martin.

Prio is fully aware of the fact that Batista's government has passed laws which bar communists from employment in the federal, the provincial and the municipal governments of Cuba. He knows that the same government has outlawed the distribution of communist literature through the mail or by any other means of communication, and that it has enacted a law providing for the deportation of foreigners who engage in the dissemination of communist propaganda.

I do not think any intelligent measures Batista's government has taken as an indication that we are anti-communists. Contrarily, our actions show very clearly that we are one hundred percent against communism in all its forms.

Prio's statements seem to be the statements of a desperate man. And Prio certainly has a right to be desperate. He has been thoroughly disgraced in his own country and he is in serious trouble with the laws of the United States. Perhaps we should be consistent and consider his predicament when we read his new pronouncements, and we are sure he will not win the battle with the winds of fortune.
Activities of Salvador Cancio Peña.

As further evidence of the subversive activities against the Government of Cuba by Salvador CANCIO Peña, there are enclosed two copies of the violently anti-Batista, clandestine publication called "Liberation - Organ of the Cuban Revolution". On page six appears a reproduction of a cartoon signed "Saviour Cancio Peña". This issue dated May 1954 was distributed among the persons attending a pro-Guatemala meeting held by the University Student Federation (PDU) in the University on June 22, 1954. This meeting is reported in the Embassy's despatch under reference.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. 2 copies of pamphlet as stated.
On the night of July 12, 1954, Gustavo ARCOS Vernés, who had been condemned to 20 years' imprisonment for participation in the uprising at Santiago de Cuba in July 1953, was "rescued" from a local hospital. He had been transferred from the prison on the Isle of Pines to the Habana hospital for treatment of a spinal wound received in the uprising. In true gangster fashion four men disguised as hospital attendants penetrated to Arcos' room; intimidated with pistols, bound and gagged his guard; and made off with the patient. A person suspected of being one of the "rescuers" and several hospital employees suspected of complicity have been arrested. The police have so far failed to locate Arcos.

It was immediately rumored that Arcos had or would seek asylum in a foreign diplomatic mission. The press reported that the Ministry of State had declared that "this was absurd since there is involved a condemned person who cannot have recourse to the provisions of international agreements on the right of asylum."

(Official Use Only) Comment. The Embassy has confirmed that, in spite of some question as to the support afforded such an interpretation by the Habana Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the present thinking in the Ministry of State is that Arcos was convicted of a common crime and asylum that might have aided him should not be recognized.

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall
Counselor of Embassy
The reporting officer received from the Venezuelan exile, Romulo BETANCOURT, a personal letter dated August 6, to which was attached a memorandum in which he seeks information about having the time of his visitor's visa extended; asking for prompt notification when his status as a defector is decided upon and asking about securing a gun permit during his visit to New York and presumably in any other state or the District. In connection with the gun permit, Betancourt stated that "I have the reasoned conviction that my life is menaced by agents of the government of my country". He included a photostatic copy of the alleged Cuban secret police report entitled "Frustrated Attack on Romulo BETANCOURT", dated November 1951. The attack was widely publicized at the time.

Betancourt says in his memorandum that two Cuban agents were sent to do away with him about the middle of last year. It will be recalled that two Cubans were found slain in the month of September on a lonely hillside outside San José. The murders have never been solved.

Betancourt has the idea that he should not be required to appear before the immigration authorities in event he seeks an extension of his time in the U. S. The Embassy assumes that the Department, after reading the enclosed memorandum, will communicate with him regarding the points raised.

In his personal letter to the writer, Betancourt stated he was unable to see Assistant Secretary Holland because of his plane connections and added that Governor MUNOZ and "speaks in high terms of the Assistant Secretary". He and his wife and his family were leaving soon for the mountains (in Puerto Rico) because of the heat.

For the Ambassador:

C. Allan Stewart
First Secretary

ACTION COPY. - DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(Additional comments or actions can be added here.)
TRANSLATION

MIL GRANDUM

1. Mr. Walter N. Walters extended attentions to me in Miami which I appreciate and value.

2. I was informed in the U. S. Consulate in San José, Costa Rica, that I had authorization to remain 90 days in this country. This period, he added, could be extended while the existing situation was being carried through and resolved. On arriving in Miami, I gave as the time of staying in the U. S. as 90 days. I hope that the extension referred to is being carried through and I would like to be duly advised at my address here what has been done on the matter. I wish to go to the continent at the end of September and take the time necessary to renew old friendships and see at first hand how some institutions in which I am interested are functioning. But it is obvious that for reasons of proper respect, referring to my title as an ex-Chief of State and as president of a democratic party in my country, it is not for me to take the initiative before the immigration authorities. I must make my personal and family plans and decide beforehand whether I am going to remain for some time (algun tiempo) in the United States or return to Costa Rica, country from which I departed, against the wishes of its government and even against my own convenience, and as a demonstration of the proposition of not serving as a pretext for foreign hostilities against a democratic government, which is so being disagreeably to dictatorships.

3. I have the reasoned conviction that my life is menaced by agents of the government of my country. It is a calculated risk which I accept as a part of my patriotic responsibilities. A text of the Habana police report, which is included in this document, speaks for itself. Two Cuban mercenaries travelled to Costa Rica the middle of last year with the mission of carrying the attempt which failed in Habana in 1951. Under these conditions, it seems reasonable that I should be permitted to carry a firearm for my personal defense. I have already obtained authorization in this respect in Puerto Rico from the police. It would interest me to know if there exists a procedure which would make possible obtaining a similar permit.

Address in Puerto Rico is: Calle Dos Hermanos, No. 257, San Juan. Telephone 26422.

Rómulo Betancourt
ASUNTO: Párrafos del informe sobre las investigaciones practicadas por la Policía Secreta Nacional, en relación con el frustrado asesinato del ex-Presidente de Venezuela, señor Rómulo Betancourt; hecho ocurrido en la ciudad de La Habana el pasado 11 de abril de 1952.

Como ya se ha dicho, el 11 de abril del año en curso, en torno de las 11 a.m. de la tarde, el señor Rómulo Betancourt fue asesinado por la policía por un sujeto que trató de inyectarle una sustancia tóxica con una jeringuilla elaborada ad hoc.

Las averiguaciones practicadas por este Cuerpo para esclarecer el hecho, merece atención especial una confidencia recibida por esta Jefatura.

De acuerdo con esa confidencia, el asesinato fue perpetrado por tres individuos que se trasladaron desde TAMPA, FLORIDA, contratados para ejecutar el asesinato del ex- Presidente de Venezuela, a esta ciudad de La Habana. Según el informe obtenido, fue un dominicano de nombre CACHACION, residente en TAMPA, quien hizo el trato con la banda de malhechores que operan en la mencionada ciudad y TAMPA, para su traslado a La Habana y ejecución del plan señalado, mediante el pago de una suma que al parecer ascendió a 150.000, facilitado, según la misma fuente de información, por la Junta de Gobierno de Venezuela.

Al decir del confiante, los componentes del "gang" que vinieron a La Habana con el propósito de asesinar al señor Rómulo Betancourt, contratados por el TAMPA, fueron:

JOE JILSON, quien fuera el ejecutor directo del frustrado asesinato. Este sujeto, cuatro meses después del hecho, partió para Venezuela. Se ignora si aún permanece allí.

JOE CACHADOR, quien hace poco tiempo fue condenado por las autoridades judiciales de FLORIDA a 30 años de prisión y debe encontrarse cumpliendo condena en el correspondiente presidio norteamericano.

UN OTRO INDIVIDO que vino a La Habana junto con JILSON Y CACHADOR, fue asesinado por este último en TAMPA.

LUISE PIETR, quien, aunque no vino a La Habana, forma parte de la banda y tuvo que ver en el asunto. Posee una finta en las afueras de TAMPA y se dedica al tráfico de billetes falsificados.

Estos individuos habían estado en La Habana en oportunidad anterior organizando un asalto al Tren Central. Plan que les fracasó al ser conocido por la Policía Secreta Nacional y puesto en conocimiento del Sr. Jefe del Ejército Oral, Ruperto Cabraza y del entonces Jefe del S.A.E.S. Coronel Martínez-Martorell, quienes tomaron las medidas que, si no lograron el apresamiento de la banda, impli-
dieron el asalto.

Agrega la confidencia que los mencionados sujetos regresaron a Tampa en el vapor Florida, tres días después del malogrado intento de asesinato, temerosos de que fuese descubierta su presencia en la ciudad. Asimismo, asevera, que la sustancia contenida en la jarra no era "Yerita", como lo informara el Doctor-Jefe del Laboratorio de Toxicología del Gabinete Nacional de Identificación, sino VENENO DEL CÓRBA traído, a ese efecto, por los componentes de la banda de malhechores.

La Habana, noviembre de 1951.

ERUNDINO VILETA PERA
Jefe de la Policía Secreta Nacional.
(BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED) On October 12, 1954, the police arrested eight persons in Habana and charged them with complicity in a terroristic plot designed to interfere with the elections. All eight were accused of membership in the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by Rafael GARCIA Bárcena who had been sentenced to two years in jail in connection with the 1953 Easter Sunday plot but who was amnestied and released in June of this year.

The police claimed to have seized in two places in downtown Habana (one the headquarters of a normal school teachers' association and the other the medical office of one of the persons arrested) a quantity of explosives including 32 hand grenades, 18 pipe bombs, dynamite and dynamite caps, material for making bombs, and a few army uniforms. The first press reports of the alleged seizure exaggerated the quantity of explosives involved. The medical office is located in a building also occupied by a kindergarten, a point that was made much of by the chief of the National Police and aroused some indignant editorial comment. At a third address a large quantity of MNR leaflets were claimed to have been found; five copies of this leaflet are enclosed.

The Bureau of Investigations of the National Police was the organization chiefly responsible for the raids and arrests.

It was reported that under orders of the Bureau of Investigations four persons in Santa Clara in the Province of Las-Villas and five persons in Santiago in the Province of Oriente were arrested under charges of being local leaders of the MNR and sent to Habana. The latter five were later reported to have been released by the Bureau.

The eight persons arrested in Habana, mostly in their twenties, and the four from Santa Clara were promptly brought before the Urgency Court of Habana which ratified their arrest and set trial for October 20th.

FCEornes, Jr., mgw

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.
Rafael García Bárcena is said to have left the country but at present it is uncertain whether this is correct or whether he has gone into hiding in Cuba.

The police case is indicated by the report of the chief of the Bureau of Investigations to the Urgency Court in which he is said to have declared that "all the persons arrested ... belong to the illegal National Revolutionary Movement and agreed, following the instructions of its head, Dr. Rafael García Bárcena, to carry out a plan of dynamite and personal attempts to create alarm throughout the Republic and impede the elections". This report was also said to contain the following charge:

"Rafael García Bárcena held an interview with the personal delegates of ex-President Carlos PRISO Socarrás (Menelao MORA, Fernando NOEL del Pino, Cándido DE LA TORRE and José DUARTE Oropesa), reaching an agreement to join together to carry out the plans in question, with the members of the MNR and the abstentionist elements of the PRC, the latter under the direction of the ex-President himself and Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango, acting without distinction under a single command."

Cándido de la Torre and José Duarte, both involved in the arms cases in the United States, have been reliably reported to have recently come surreptitiously to Cuba to engage in revolutionary or terroristic activities.

Three of those arrested in Habana, including the doctor in whose office some of the explosives were alleged to have been found, were said by the police to have admitted membership in the MNR but to have claimed that they were gathered together at the time when arrested solely to discuss politics. The doctor was reported to have declared that the explosives in his office had been delivered to him in March 1953 (just before the Easter Sunday affar) by a person unknown acting on orders from Rafael García Bárcena. He reportedly alleged that the explosives had since then remained in his office and had been made available to no one. (END UNCLASSIFIED)
rumors that some such attempt would be made. This may therefore be the breaking up of an amateurish attempt by García Bárceña whose talents as a revolutionary leader were demonstrated by the Easter Sunday affair to be on the meager side. It is also possible that the police seized upon the MNR as a convenient and perhaps innocent (the leaflet of the MNR "repudiates any intent to use ... any form of terrorism") vehicle to impress others of the vigilance and alertness of the government to suppress violence designed to interfere with the elections.

Carlos C. Hall
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

Enclosures
El Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario

(M. N. R.) hace públicas las siguientes manifestaciones:

1—El M. N. R. se mantiene en plena actividad luchando por la libertad de Cuba y por el triunfo definitivo de la Revolución Nacional, cuyo líder en la presente etapa histórica es RAFAEL GARCIA BARCENA.

2—El M. N. R. repudia todo intento de emplear como método de lucha cualquiera forma de terrorismo.

3—El M. N. R. no admite contribuciones forzadas o no voluntarias ni aporte económico que no provenga del sacrificio de sus militantes o de la donación de sus simpatizantes.

4—El M. N. R. no considera como enemigos a las Fuerzas Armadas de la República, ni identifica a la totalidad de sus miembros con los que mantienen ahorrojadas y pretenden responsabilizarlas con todos los hechos cometidos a partir del 10 de Marzo de 1952.

5—El M. N. R. se mantiene dentro de la LÍNEA DE INDEPENDENCIA REVOLUCIONARIA que señalara su fundador, y a tal virtud mantiene abiertas sus filas a los luchadores honestos de todas procedencias políticas que acepten sus bases, se adapte sólo a su disciplina y se adhiera sinceramente a su orientación revolucionaria.

6—El M. N. R. rechaza todo intento de concurrir a los falsos comicios, por la tiranía, y afirma que el derrumbe de ésta no podrá lograrse realmente más que a través de la acción de las vanguardías revolucionarias, apoyadas por los elementos sanos de las Fuerzas Armadas del país.

7—El M. N. R. no considera el derrumbe la actual tiranía como un fin en sí mismo, sino como un medio de lograr que se abra ante nuestra colectividad un ancho camino de progreso y felicidad pública, y que se liquiden para siempre los conflictos nacionales que han generado las diversas fracturaciones cubanas. El M. N. R. ha hecho suyo y se mantendrá fiel al mismo desde el Poder el lema de combate de Antonio Maceo: “Mientras quede una injusticia que reparar, la revolución redentora no habrá terminado”.

8—El M. N. R. dado que sus finalidades no son egoístas ni sectarias, sino patrióticas y de naturaleza nacional, declara que al asumir el Poder no dilapidará en inútiles venganzas ni en estériles persecuciones las energías revolucionarias que sólo deben emplearse en la tarea de convertir en realidad nuestro indeclinable e histórico propósito de hacer de Cuba una gran nación.

EL M. N. R. HARÁ DE CUBA UNA GRAN NACIÓN
ROMULO BETANCOURT  
Dos Hermanos, 257.  

San Juan, P.R. 11, oct. 1954

Sr. Thomas Mann,  
a/c Embajada de EE. UU.,  
Guatemala.

Estimado amigo:

Ha sido para mí una noticia grata, trasmitida por Morales Carrión, la de saberlo a Ud. en América Latina. Es de obvia utilidad que personas realmente conocedoras de nuestros problemas y de sus hombres públicos, sean destacados por su gobierno a puestos diplomáticos más allá del Río Grande. Conocí también a su Embajador allí, señor Armour, en la Conferencia de Bogotá y conservó un buen recuerdo suyo.

Aquí estoy, no se hasta cuando. Salí de Costa Rica, por propia decisión y en contra del deseo del Presidente Figueres y de sus colaboradores. Era mucha la presión que ejercían los dictadores del Caribe sobre el pequeño país, por mi presencia allí. Me vine a Puerto Rico, porque aquí tengo estudiando en la Universidad a mi única hija. Se casará en diciembre y mi deseo sería estar aquí para el matrimonio. Pero no se aún si será posible. El lobby de los dictadores se ha trasalado de San Jose a Washington, y a esta fecha no se si será prorrogada mi Visa de visitante, que termina a fines de este mes. No estoy haciendo esfuerzo alguno directo en ese sentido. Ud. me ha visto actuar, como gobernante y como exiliado. No precipito los acontecimientos, y y esperar. Es que me anima una total confianza en la causa que represento y se, sin lugar a dudas, que terminará por imponerse. En Venezuela, la democracia volverá.

Nada más por el momento, sino un saludo cordial de quien le estima y aprecia sinceramente,

/s/ Romulo Betancourt
FROM: Habana

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 132, October 31, noon

PRIORITY

An hour after broadcast last night urging his followers not (repeat not) to vote Grau made further statement saying he would take part in elections if these postponed for week or ten days "in order give time his people to get back retained cedulas". Comment: At any time during past weeks duplicates and even triplicates of cedulas could have been obtained.

Electoral tribunal now in session to consider further guarantees demanded by Grau adherents. At two this morning Batista remained firm his intent proceed elections and they will probably take place tomorrow with or without Grau.

Survey by Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones SA (probably financed by Batista) published today following figures for Batista 43 percent, for Grau 34, undecided or will not (repeat not) vote for various reasons 23. According this survey Batista led Grau in all provinces except Oriente where Grau ahead 40 to 37.

Small bomb exploded in old Habana last night causing slight damage. City otherwise quiet. Search for Millo Ochoa continues.

HALL

NOTE: Mr. McGinnis (ARA) notified 10/31/54 9:10 p.m. EMB (CWO).
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

To:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

From:

AMBASSY, HABANA

RE:

Embassy's Telegram No. 124, Oct. 27, 1954

ACTION

MC-2

ACTION

RECP-2 CIR/R-2 AR A-4 E-4 F-1 02

ACTION

DEP. 2

ACTION

STAR CONTROL

ACTION

OTHER

ACTION

CIA-7 03D-4 AR A-4

ACTION

Subject:

Inventory of Arms Cache Seized on October 26, 1954.

The Cuban Military Intelligence Service (SIM) has supplied the Embassy with an inventory of the arms seized by the authorities on October 26, 1954, in a concealed cellar in the home of ex-Representative Francisco CAIROL Garrido (a Prio Auténtico). A copy of the SIM inventory is enclosed for the Department's use in investigating possible American sources of the arms.

The inventory covers the following equipment:

2 Johnson 30 cal. automatic rifles.
2 Johnson 30.06 cal. light machine guns with bipods.
5 Remington model 74 rifles.
2 Remington model 14 rifles.
10 New Springfield 30 cal. (1903) rifles.
10 Springfield 30 cal. (1906) rifles.
5 Remington 12 gauge, model 870 shotguns.
2 Mexican 30 cal. rifles (marked Fábrica Nacional de Armas de Guerra).
2 Mexican rifles, .30 caliber.
5 assorted Winchester rifles.
2 barrels for Mendoza 7.20 machine guns.
2 German carbines.
3 English Lewis machine guns (incomplete).
Assorted miscellaneous, including ammunition, clips, detonators, and 242 hand grenades.

The finding from the cache were of the ordinary fragmentation type, according to the Embassy's Army Attaché, were definitely of American manufacture. He was told that they were believed to have been made by the American Arms Company, and were intended "to defend the Constitution", and that only he,
Sanchez Arango, and an unnamed "informer" knew of their existence in his home. Cairrol admitted that there had been a conspiracy headed by Sanchez Arango but asserted that it had been broken up by his own arrest in connection with the shooting in the Country Club residential area in May 1954, which subsequently also forced Sanchez Arango to take asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. Cairrol is currently serving a four-year prison sentence imposed after conviction on charges growing out of the Country Club shooting.

ACTION: READ. The Embassy would appreciate being informed of the results of any investigation of possible American sources of the arms identified in the enclosed inventory.

For the ambassador,

[Signature]
Carlos G. Hall, Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:
Inventory, as stated.
Carlos GACEL Castro

A reliable source in Campeche has informed the Consulate that Carlos Gacel is reported to have definitely left Campeche and to have established himself in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, where he is working (activities unknown) and that on at least one occasion he was in touch with former president Lázaro Cárdenas.

Gacel did not write to the Consulate again after his letter of May 9, 1954 (the date as written on the letter itself was May 9, 1945 which was quoted in the despatch under reference.

Arthur V. Metcalfe
American Consul
# RELACIÓN DEL MATERIAL ELÉCTRICO OCUPADO EN EL SOTANO DE LA RESIDENCIA DEL EX-REPRESENTANTE FRANCISCO CARROL.

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A. MARADON LEGIÓN JUANFRE CAL. 30.06 C. DIPOLES

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B. PANAMÁ RAILWAY MODELO 4.4

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C. PANAMÁ RAILWAY MODELO 14

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D. SPRINGFIELD CAL. 30 (1903)

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E. SPRINGFIELD CAL. 30 (1896)

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F. SPRINGFIELD CAL. 12 MODELO 870

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<td>142290-V</td>
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</table>
FUSILES MEXICANOS CAL 30 (FABRICA RACIONAL DE ARMAS DE MEXICO)
(The serial numbers of these 62 Rendoza Mexican-made rifles are not
copied herein since it is believed that they would serve no purpose
in the Department's efforts to trace the arms).

2. FUSILES MEXICANOS SYSTEM FRANK SIN NUMERO

RIFLES WINCHESTER
1.- 23323136 Cal 3035 40 94 2.- 76516 Cal 44 40 92 3.- Sin Nro.
Cal 38 4.- Sin Nro Cal 44 40 92 5.- 1676 Cal 401 de repetición

47 CARTUCHOS PARA AUTOMATIZADORAS RENDOZA CAL 7.62
CARABINAS ALEMANNAS --- 1.- 3550 2.- 32458
AUTOMATIZADORAS INES LOPEZ (1800 FUNDAD) --- 1.- 8062 2.- 32458

- Capsulas Cal 30 para fusiles 45 22,085
- Capsulas Cal 30-30 para fusiles 2,700
- Capsulas Cal 351 para fusiles 11,300
- Capsulas Cal 45 para pistolas 29,003
- Capsulas para Carabinas .1 7,100
- Capsulas Cal 38 para revolvers 1,000
- Magazines para carabines 1,460
- Magazines para automatizadoras Thompson 19
- Magazines para automatizadoras Luger Johnson 75
- Magazines espiral para pistola Luger 1
- Carabios Cal 12 de peraigones 700
- Cuchillos para automatizadoras Rendoza 40
- Cuchillos para magazines de carabinas .1 381
- Reliches para campana 2
- Transcivers 2
- Transcribers de lona 7
- Bolsas de lona 14
- Tuches de pasta 3
- Tuches de Lena 3
- Recintes para fusiles automaticos Johnson 8
- Recintes para automatizadoras Johnson 125
- Recintes para Carabinas de fusiles automaticos Johnson 135
- Recintes para pistolas 3
- Granadas de fragmentacion (de mano) 285
- Granadoras tipo 8 1,000
- Granadoras tipo 6 100
- Granadoras tipo 4 150
- Granadoras tipo 1 11
- Granadoras (Desconocidos) 50
- Granadoras para granadas de mano 7
As additional evidence of the subversive activities against the Government of Cuba by Salvador (Saviur) CaNCio Peña there are enclosed ten copies of issues of a "Panleto" (Pamphlet) dated November 15 and December 1, 1954. Saviur CaNCio Peña is described in the "Panleto" as its "Editor, Director and Solely Responsible." The leaflet openly advocates armed revolution. It will be noted that the November 15 issue of "Panleto" prominently displays a cartoon calculated to arouse anti-American sentiments and states that "this "Panleto! has been distributed among members of the Congress of the United States."

For the Ambassador:

Carlos C. Hall,
Counselor of Embassy.
ENCLOSED FOR DESPATCH 589 FROM HABANA.

¿QUE HACER?

DICTADURA RECONOCIDA, DEMOCRACIA DESTRUIDA!

LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO

CUANDO la Vida, la Libertad y el derecho a la Felicidad se ven amena- zados por cualquier forma de gobierno, el pueblo tiene el derecho de de- mirse y, si es necesario, tomar medidas en defensa de sus derechos y principios. Es necesario que el pueblo se orguleza de sus facultades en la forma que crea más indicada para lograr su Seguridad y Felicidad.

CONSIDERANDO QUE

La Vida, la Libertad y el Derecho a la Felicidad del hombre se ven amenazados por la forma de gobierno dictatorial actual. El pueblo de Cuba tiene el inexcusable derecho de expulsar ese gobierno y sustituirlo por otro que reconozca el rito constitucional y democrático, que respeta el derecho del pueblo para gobernar y tomar decisiones para su bienestar.

CARLOS PRIO Y LA REVOLUCIÓN

A domingo revolucionario, Síndícato de Trabajadores de Cuba. Sólo en el rito constitucional y democrático, el pueblo de Cuba tiene el derecho de elegir su propio gobierno y de participar en la toma de decisiones importantes para el país. Carlos Prio es un líder revolucionario que ha luchado por el cambio en Cuba.

MILLO OCIOJA ES LA FIGURA!

Estado de Cuba, el 1 de octubre, la reforma, esta firme en nuestro pacto de paz, es el paso inicial, es el millo ocioja. La paz no se logra simplemente con palabras, sino que requiere una constante lucha por el bienestar del pueblo.

LO PRIMERO QUE HAY QUE HACER ES LIQUIDAR AL DICTADOR

ENorme demagogia, este pacto de paz, no es más que un pretexto para seguir con la misma tiranía. El primer paso hacia la paz es el desacuerdo about the dictador, este es el camino hacia la libertad.
PANFLETO

CARLOS PRIO

PANLADAS DE UNA REVOLUCION

El Lado Temible de una Revolucion

LA VIOLENCIA ES EL MOTOR
DE LAS REVOLUCIONES

SIEMPRE LA VENDEZAN EN CUBA SOLO
SE HARA JUSTICIA

Diciembre 1, 1951
Terror Año de Oprobio
Num. 3

Editorial: Don José E. Atenas

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

EL GRAN ARRASTRE

Tiene el compromiso de honrar con el pueblo de Cuba el honor de todos los sufrimientos de la Revolución, en consecuencia no ha de permitirse a la dictadura el poder al pueblo.

EL VIOLENCIA ES EL MOTOR
DE LAS REVOLUCIONES

CARLOS PRIO

EL GRAN ARRASTRE

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

MAXIMAS REVOLUCIONARIAS

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

PANTHEON DE LA LIBERACION
PRIMAVERA DE LA REVOLUCION CUBANA

XX

El Cubano por toda su historia ha sido un pueblo pacífico, y su voluntad ha sido la resistencia no violenta.
FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECURITY: SECRET

PRIORITY: AIR

TO: Department of State

FROM: HABANA 110 January 16 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: WEEKA NO. 2 FOR STATE, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR DEPARTMENTS FROM SANA

POLITICAL

Although there is still no outward sign of Government instability in Cuba, the Embassy has received a third report (originating with a Cuban Army officer /Weeka No. 1, JAN 6/) that a widespread group of Cuban Army officers plan a bloodless coup at the first propitious moment to set up a Military Junta for the purpose of "eliminating corruption". Although it lacks any tangible evidence that an attempt will be made to put the alleged plot into effect, the Embassy must take cognizance of these reports. As previously indicated, conditions in Cuba appear normal at this time.

The American Ambassadors' Conference to be held at Habana JAN 18-20 is receiving extensive favorable attention in the local press. The Cuban GOVT has expressed its pleasure that Habana was chosen as the seat of the Conference. Minister of State HEVIA will hold a reception for the Delegation and other attentions are planned.

José M. BOSCH on 9 JAN took oath of office as Minister of Finance replacing Antonio PRILO (Weeka No.1 JAN 6). Four other Ministers also seeking elective office must resign or request leave of absence on official acceptance of nominations as party candidates. The Ministers affected are Virgilio PÉREZ of Agriculture, Segundo GUTIÉRREZ of Defense, Edgardo BUTTARE of Labor and Primitivo RODRÍGUEZ who is a Minister without Portfolio. Cuban Ambassador to the United States, Sr. Oscar GANS, continues to be mentioned as the probable next Foreign Minister.

The President's Auténtico Party is preparing a "gigantic" celebration on 15 JAN on which date his brother Antonio PRILO is scheduled to accept the Auténtico Party nomination for the office of Mayor of Habana in the June 1, 1950 elections.

It has been semi-officially announced through the President's other brother, Senator Francisco PRILO (representing Gran Habana Province), that the President favors Cuba's continue...
SECRET

3 Habana 110

Lawrence AYERS, Head USDA Sugar Branch, has again been in Habana conversing with Cuban sugar officials regarding prospective United States Government purchases of 1950-crop sugar for ECA.

Intervention of the Havana Electric Railways has been extended 45 days from January 15, 1950 (Weeka No. 41 Sept 9, 1949).

MILITARY

Major General CABRERA, Cuban Army Chief of Staff, has postponed his proposed visit to the United States to a later date (Weeka No. 1 Jan 6).

AIR

The Chief of the Cuban Air Force disclosed to the Air Attaché that they were interested in the purchase of two B-17 type heavy bombardment aircraft plus some fighters. They would prefer to purchase new North American T-28's in place of obsolete P-51's or P-47's if same are procurable.

Mr. WILBUR, President of Aerovias Cubanac Internationalis, advised this date that his line would discontinue its European run for the next 30 days or more and that a consolidation was being effected with Trans-Ocean's European run emanating from Venezuela. The new consolidation will place Habana as the second stop from Caracas thence Bermuda-Azores-Lisbon-Madrid-Barcelona and Paris.

SUBVERSIVE

Communist newspaper Hoy in its issues of Jan 12 and 13 has featured stories regarding the alleged "insubordination of Yankee military chiefs", naming General McArthur specifically, in connection with the United States Government's policy relative to Formosa.

C. Burke Elbrick
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Participants: CEBElbrick, HTStewell, ETCrane, RHCrane, CNMoore, Glenn (MA), Schaefer (NA), Duke (NA).

Delegations to Ambassadors: Ciudad Trujillo, Port-au-Prince, Sanagua, Tegucigalpa.

(3) for CONGUSARCAV and CBUSARANT.

(3) for CONGELAIRC and Ramey Field

Puerto Rico.
SECRET

2 Habana 110

U.N. Ambassador, Sr. Inocente ALVAREZ, as the Autentico Party's candidate to fill the Pinar del Rio senatorship vacated through the death of Senator CASANOVA. Alvarez himself has also announced his availability for the post. The Republican Party may throw its support to ex-PRES GRAU to fill this vacancy. During the week the Autentico group in Oriente Province named GRAU as its delegate to the Party's National Assembly. This is another indication of GRAU's persisting political influence.

The University of Habana resumed classes on 9 JAN without disturbances. Plans for any further student elections have not been announced.

The local press reported 13 JAN that the Cuban Red Cross Chief, Rodolfo HERNÁNDEZ, has telegraphed to the Dominican Red Cross Chief urging him to agree to a joint request to the International Red Cross for a probe of Dominican charges that the Cuban Red Cross has been involved in preparations for an attack against the Dominican Republic.

The local press of 10 JAN reported the transfer of the Papal Nuncio, Mgr. Antonio TAFFI, from Habana, where he was Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, to the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua. It is not stated in which country Mgr. Toffi will establish residence. The Nuncio is Titular Archbishop of Sergiopolis and was assigned to Habana in 1947.

ECONOMIC

Although 23 of Cuba's 161 sugar mills are now grinding, normal development of the season was further impeded this week by sugar workers, who threateningly presented 8 demands to President Frio including the demands that (1) all 1950 wages be paid at decree 1947 peak level; (2) workers be paid back sums due them on basis of 48 hours pay per week for 44 hours work; and that (3) Government enforce the existing "legal" limitation against the use of bags containing over 200 pounds. Statements credited to the Minister of Labor appeared in the 12 JAN morning press, saying a solution to the problem had been found, but high Federation officials flatly denied the statements. No solution of crisis has yet been announced ( WEEKS No. 1 JAN 6).

Following large reported sales of world market sugar, the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute agreed yesterday to increase by 200,000 tons (long Spanish) the 1950 Free World Export Quota.