1963 CIA report on Cuba has familiar ring

             DON BOHNING
             Herald Staff Writer

             A secret Central Intelligence Agency ``status report'' on Cuba concludes that the
             Castro government's position is eroding, leading it to the imposition of
             ``increasingly harsh measures to maintain control.''

             At the same time, says the CIA memorandum, the ``situation in Cuba is
             characterized by economic stagnation, depressed living conditions, the loss of
             revolutionary impetus, and the disillusionment of an increasingly large majority of
             the population.''

             It ascribes Cuba's problems to ``innate economic deficiencies,'' a hurricane, the
             government's own ineptitude and ``the U.S. policy of economic and political
             isolation, and other harassment and sabotage.''

             The date: Dec. 12, 1963, nearly 35 years ago. The hurricane: Flora, not Georges.

             The eight-page memorandum -- apparently prepared for a possible statement on
             Cuba by President Lyndon Johnson in the weeks following President Kennedy's
             Nov. 22, 1963, assassination -- was among more than a 1,000 pages of
             declassified Cuba-related documents released by the Kennedy Assassinations
             Review Board as it went out of business Sept. 30.

             Excepting the fact there is no current indication of officially directed U.S. sabotage
             directed at Cuba as there was then, the memorandum reflects little change in either
             the assessments of the situation on the island or U.S. policy toward it more than
             three decades later.

             `Low risk, low return'

             The stated objective of U.S. policy then was ``to isolate Cuba from the Western
             Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World and to exert maximum possible
             pressures, short of open and direct U.S. military intervention, to prevent the
             consolidation and stabilization of the Castro-Communist regime.''

             ``We believe that apathy and resentment are now widespread in Cuba,'' says the
             report, adding that ``while they might complicate Castro's problems, they do not
             represent a serious threat to him or his regime.''

             ``In sum,'' adds the CIA assessment, ``our present policy can be characterized as
             one of low risk and low return: We are unlikely to experience a direct
             confrontation with the U.S.S.R. or to engender political strains with allied or
             neutral nations. On the other hand, we are still far from accomplishing our
             objectives of toppling the Castro regime.''

             The document acknowledges that ``current U.S. programs at their present levels
             are not likely, barring unforeseen events such as the sudden death of Castro, to
             result in the early overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime . . .''

             Avoiding confrontation

             To achieve that, says the memo, ``it would seem timely to examine what additional
             covert and overt measures can be taken to quicken the pace of events.''

             At the same time, the memo warns, while any such actions would be less risky than
             either an invasion or a blockade of the island, they would involve ``a substantially
             higher `noise level' and risk of confrontation with the Soviets than those presently in
             effect.''

             The agency's existing covert action program, said the paper, ``was close to making
             maximum use of CIA's resourses and policy authorization''; it then recommended
             that ``consideration should be given to expanding and intensifying the category of
             sabotage and harassment at least for the next year.''

             It suggested two possibilities:
               ``Relaxation of the present policy banning all independent [non-CIA controlled
             or sponsored] Cuban exile maritime raids and airstrikes against targets in Cuba
             from U.S. and urge the British to do likewise for Bahamian territory.''

               ``Authorization to conduct CIA or autonomous group controlled airstrikes
             against selected major economic targets such as the power plants and oil
             refineries.''

             Isolating the island

             On the overt side, the memo notes that the ``main emphasis of U.S. programs
             against Castro is to complete the economic, political and psychological isolation of
             Cuba from Latin America and the free world and to build defenses against
             Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America.''

             The paper credits such measures as being ``largely responsible for Castro's current
             economic distress'' and suggests ``additional effective economic warfare measures
             could be taken.''

             After citing the advantages and disadvantages of both stepped-up overt and covert
             programs, the paper concludes that ``the courses of action suggested . . . will
             increase Castro's problems and might thereby hasten his downfall.''

             But it acknowledges that ``in the last analysis, however, there are only two courses
             which would eliminate the Castro regime at an early date: an invasion or a
             complete blockade. Both of these actions would result in a major crisis between
             the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (in Cuba and/or Berlin) and would produce substantial
             strains in the fabric of U.S. relations with others countries -- allied as well as
             neutral.''