Russia

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN FIDEL CASTRO AND THE SOVIET Union has been one of the continuing hot spots of the Cold War. Soviet support for Cuba permitted the latter country to carry out a program of subversion which, at one time or another, affected virtually every country in Latin America. In 1962 the alliance almost plunged the world into a nuclear conflagration.

The alliance, however, has not been a happy one. Born not of kinship and probably little conviction, the Havana‑Moscow axis grew out of necessity and adventurism ‑ Castro's necessity and Russia's adventurism. Faced with increasing United States resentment and resistance to his programs ‑ including mass executions, widespread expropriations, and grandiose aspirations to hemispheric leadership - Castro moved into the arms of the Russian bear. Then, when invasion ships were approaching Cuban shores in 1961, Castro declared, "The Revolution is socialist," and he hastily accepted comradeship with the Soviet Union.

When one dances with the bear, one finds that the embrace grows tighter. Castro chafed in the embrace and tried to maintain his independence. The Russians felt that since they were supporting him, he should be properly subservient. Castro resisted, and Moscow attempted to maneuver old‑line Cuban Communists into dominant positions, thus hoping to diminish and perhaps eventually destroy Castro's power. Castro, however, met the challenges head‑on, cracked down on the Moscow followers, even brought some to trial and sent them to prison.

In the Soviet Union Nikita Krushchev was thrown out of power, and the hard‑nosed bureaucrats who took over were not of the kind to tolerate indiscipline on the part of Castro, whom they viewed as a mere puppet, and a highly dependent one, at that.

Because Cuba was not capable of supporting itself economically, nor of obtaining in foreign trade all the goods it needed, a supply lifeline from the Soviet Union to the island had been established. Vital to Cuban existence was the petroleum that, Russia kept flowing aboard a steady stream of tankers. The Kremlin hardened its position toward Castro, and the flow of petroleum was slowed. The Cuban economy found itself in grievous trouble. There was not enough fuel to keep sugar mills, industries, and vehicles functioning. In a desperate move, military chief Raul Castro allocated about one-third of military fuel stockpiles to civilian use. Other supplies from Russia on which Cuba was dependent also failed to arrive, forcing closure of a number of factories. Their workers were sent to toil in the cane fields.

In February 1969, the chief of the Cuban Intelligence Center in Paris, Armando Lopez, summoned his officials to a meeting. He was just back from a trip to Havana, where he had conferred with D.G.I. chief Pineiro. (Lopez was a personal friend of Pineiro, and he had accompanied Pineiro and Raul Castro on a hunting trip. During this trip, Raul related how the decision was made for the Soviet Union to send nuclear missiles to Cuba. Raul had at the time been in Moscow conferring with Khrushchev, and had requested weapons assistance from the Soviet Union. During the conversation Khrushchev suddenly hit the table with his fist and declared, "What is more, 1 am going to give you offensive weapons also, because if you are attacked, then you have a right to attack and defend yourselves." Cuba, according to Raul had not requested offensive weapons. Khrushchev had offered them, stipulating only that they remain under Soviet control.) Lopez gravely announced, "Somos mas sovieticos" ("We are more Sovietic"). The Castro government had bowed under the Russian pressure, and a secret agreement had been reached between the two governments. Lopez, at this meeting and in subsequent conversations, revealed the general terms of the accord. He cautioned us that we were not to tell even our wives about the agreement.

A few years earlier, when the Castro star had been in the ascendancy in Latin America, the Soviet Union had had little choice but to go along with his plans, policies, and postures. A vast program of subversion and guerrilla warfare was prepared in Cuba and supported from there, causing considerable trouble for Latin America. The plans repeatedly failed, however, and as the years went by, it became evident that Castro's overall policy was a failure, too: not a single country fell to communism. Castro had lost his luster, his efforts had led to naught, and so Russia began to diverge from the Cuban line and to return to its old policy of the via pacifica. Respectability was to be the keynote: Moscow would seek friendly relations with the Latin American governments, and the Moscow‑dominated Communist parties would forsake subversion for old‑fashioned politicking.

Castro had been most unhappy about the Soviet attitude, and had expressed his displeasure publicly. Now, however, this outspokenness was over. As part of the Cuban‑Soviet agreement, Castro would refrain from criticizing the Soviet Union and its foreign policies. Castro would also cease attacking the old‑time Communist parties of Latin America that did not follow his subversive line. In effect, Moscow would pursue its own policies in Latin America, free of criticism or interference by Castro.

The Soviet Union, as its part of the agreement, would provide Cuba with the economic support that it needed. That assistance has been estimated at some $350,000,000 worth of petroleum and goods annually. Russia promised to increase the quantity of raw materials and agricultural machinery it was sending to Cuba, as well as to enlarge its purchases of Cuban products.

A significant part of the Cuban‑Soviet accord called for the sending of approximately 5,000 technicians to Cuba. There had been a substantial number of Soviet specialists in Cuba previously, but many of these had been withdrawn when relations between the two countries had deteriorated. Now the technicians would come back, and they would work in the agricultural, mining, fishing, and atomic energy fields, as well as with the Cuban military and intelligence services. The Soviets were particularly interested in expanding Cuban production of nickel, a raw material needed by the Soviets. In the atomic field, Russia would provide Cuba with an experimental nuclear power plant.

Whereas on the surface it appeared that the Soviet technicians would be serving only in advisory capacities, it was apparent, from their large number as well as from the circumstances of the Havana-Moscow agreement, that in many cases their role would shift from advisory to supervisory, semantically disguised as this might be. The Soviet Union had finally succeeded in tightening its hold on maverick Castro.

One payoff for the Russians came at the time of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Castro was one of the few Communist figures outside Russia who publicly supported the Soviet move.

In the intelligence field, new advisers would be assigned to the D.G.I. They would also serve as liaison officers between D.G.I. and the Soviet intelligence service, the K.G.B. (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti‑Committee for State Security). For, under terms of the agreement, the operations of the D.G.I. would thereafter be more closely coordinated with those of the K.G.B. D.G.I. virtually became an arm of Soviet Intelligence‑a fact of special value to Russia in regard to operations in the United States, where D.G.I. had been utilizing the stream of Cuban refugees as a cover for the infiltration of agents.

Over a period of years, the Soviet Union provided Cuba with most of its military equipment, and this had made the Cuban Army the most powerful in Latin America. As a result of the new Cuban-Soviet agreement, Russia began re‑equipping Castro's forces with everything from routine gear to new types of surface‑to‑air guided missiles. These latter were more accurate and had longer ranges than those previously emplaced on the island. The military importance of Cuba to the Soviet Union was made plain by the visit to Havana in July 1969 of a flotilla of Soviet warships, and the visit in November of the same year of Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko. Subsequently, additional Soviet warships have visited Cuban ports, and long‑range Soviet military aircraft have flown in and out of Cuban airfields.

The secret Soviet‑Cuban pact culminated in the construction of a base for Soviet nuclear submarines in the port of Cienfuegos. The use of this base would greatly increase the operational capabilities of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic.

In an interview published by the Soviet newspaper Isvestia early in 1970, Raul Castro was quoted as saying: "We have learned a lot in the past. We have matured. Therefore, we believe that the possibilities for friendship and cooperation between Cuba and the Soviet Union are now more positive."

It was another way of saying, We were wrong, they are right. The Soviet Union, clearly, was now the boss. Cuba was now indeed ominously more Soviet.