Intelligence

 

SECTION III WAS THE "ILLEGAL SECTION" OF D.G.I. ITS basic duty was to carry out espionage and counterespionage in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. A major function was spying on the C.I.A. and Cuban exile organizations engaged in anti‑Castro activi­ties. The offices of Section III were located in a gray, three‑story house on Linea Street in the Vedado suburb of Havana. Nothing indicated the nature of the work conducted inside the building. In order to camouflage its activities, the section had a sign across the front of the building which proclaimed, Prevencion de Incendios (Prevention of Fires). There was no fire‑fighting equipment to be seen, however.

 

The subsection located in the upper portion of the building was in charge of operations at the Intelligence centers in Mexico, Canada, and the United Nations. It also handled the training of officials assigned to serve at these centers. The grounds and first floors were occupied by the Buro C.I.A. y Contrarevolucion. Technically one bureau, in actuality there were two separate units, and eventually D.G.I. did split them into two distinct bureaus. The Buro CLA. y Contrarevolucion was headed by "Demetrio," a onetime teacher, who had formerly worked in a section of G‑2 which kept watch on the foreign embassies in Havana. Under him was "Menendez," who also acted as chief of the counter‑C.I.A. section. Another official, "Candido," headed the contrarevolucion section, which spied on the activities of Cuban exiles.

 

The work within the various sections often overlapped, and at times there was also involvement with G‑2, whose task was to un­cover and eliminate anti‑regime activities inside Cuba. Liaison was maintained with G‑2, and when G‑2 caught someone who had been infiltrated into Cuba, or had knowledge of infiltrations, copies of the tapes and transcripts of the interrogations carried out by G‑2 were tuned over to D.G.I. If D.G.I. wanted particular information from a prisoner, a request was made to G‑2, which would then try to elicit the data required. Of special interest were details about the opera­tions of a vessel named the Rex, which was known to bring infiltra­tors to Cuba. Through information that had been gathered, D.G.I. had been able to build up a description of this vessel, which during the daytime appeared to be a commercial ship, but at night became a well‑armed warship. Small, fast boats were believed used to carry infiltrators from the Rex to the Cuban shore.

 

D.G.I. also on occasion sought the cooperation of the Comites de Defensa de la Revolucion, neighborhood vigilance committees which keep watch on the citizenry. If D.G.I. needed information about a certain person ‑ perhaps someone who had lived in Cuba but was now involved in exile activities in the States ‑ an official would ques­tion members of the C.D.R. in the place where that person had resided. A small problem was presented by the fact the D.G.I. was­ - and still is ‑ virtually unknown in Cuba, and the security‑conscious C.D.R. members cooperated only with G‑2. C.D.R. offices had lists of G‑2 agents to whom they were authorized to facilitate any re­quested information. When D.G.I. needed data, the tactic was adopted, therefore, of having an official go to the C.D.R., tell them he was new at G‑2, and ask them to check with G‑2 headquarters. G‑2 would already have been advised by D.G.I. that one of its men was going to see the C.D.R., and so when the check was made, G‑2 would vouch for the individual. The committees did not know that in reality they were dealing with the Intelligence service.

 

Upon leaving the D.G.I. school, I was assigned to work in the contrarevolucion unit of Section III. My tasks amounted to counter­espionage by remote control. The unit was concerned with infiltrating and spying on exile organizations operating out of Miami. I was given the expedientes (dossiers) of a number of key exile figures, and my task was to build up information about these persons with the view of finding a way to place a D.G.I. informer close to them. As a case officer, I had to delve into the background and relationships of not only the target individual, but also his relatives, friends, co­workers, and acquaintances. As this detailed information was gath­ered, I watched for possible opportunities which D.G.I. could ex­ploit (a friend of the target individual known to be in need of funds and perhaps susceptible to bribery, a co‑worker with a relative still in Cuba and therefore subject to coercion, and so on).

 

The most important of my expedientes was that of Eloy Gutie­rrez Menoyo. Menoyo had been one of the leaders of a sizable guer­rilla organization that had fought the Batista regime during the Revolution. Once the rebels had won, the organization was dis­solved. Subsequently, Menoyo assisted in uncovering a major con­spiracy aimed at toppling Castro, but later turned against Castro and fled to the United States. He helped set up an exile organization named Alpha 66, which became known for its raids against shipping off Cuba.

 

D.G.I. believed that Menoyo was in the process of bringing weap­ons to isolated spots on the Cuban coast and concealing them there, to be picked up and used at a future date. Reports received from Miami indicated that Menoyo himself planned to infiltrate into Cuba, and therefore D.G.I. and G‑2 were conducting an investigation to ascertain which of Menoyo's friends in Cuba might be making preparations to assist his eventual arrival. It was felt that Menoyo would need the help of a "reception team" of local fishermen in order to be able to come ashore without being detected by the authorities, and likely fishermen were also being investigated.

 

I did not work in this section of D.G.I. long enough to see com­pletion of the Menoyo expediente. Menoyo did infiltrate into Cuba in an effort to launch a new guerrilla campaign, and he was captured and imprisoned. By this time, however, I had been transferred to another department.

 

Another file which I handled was that of Andres Nazario Sargen, also a top figure in Alpha 66. The Sargen family was from Matanzas Province, and an investigation was under way to determine whether a connection could be found with any fishermen in that area. D.G.I. and G‑2 were seeking to ascertain who might be serving, or might in the future serve, on "reception teams" for Alpha infiltrators or for weapons that were being buried on bays and near beaches. The inves­tigators were also trying to find out whether Sargen was in contact with any friends inside Cuba. The file was being built up, and even­tually a plan would be prepared for consideration by the chief of D.G.I., Manuel Pineiro. This plan would suggest methods by which it might be possible to penetrate Alpha, perhaps to place a spy or informer close to Sargen.

 

A third case on which I worked was that of a doctor, an ortho­pedist, who had participated in anti‑Castro activities in Cuba and had been found out, but had managed to escape to the United States. In Miami the doctor was again active in the anti‑Castro movement. As was the usual procedure, a detailed study was undertaken of relatives and friends of the doctor who were still in Cuba, and out of this study two possible approaches were being developed. A brother of the doctor was serving a prison term, and consideration was given to offering his release in return for cooperation by the doctor with D.G.I. If he would secretly supply Intelligence with information about exile activities, his brother would eventually be released ‑ or so he would be told. The second approach would involve another rela­tive who had applied for permission to leave Cuba. The permission would be granted ‑ provided the man agreed to spy on the doctor for D.G.I. What if the man acceded and then reneged once he was in the States? This presented no problem: D.G.I. would simply keep his wife and children in Cuba as hostages. And if the man were to decide that, under the circumstances, he did not wish to go to the States, after all? That was no problem, either: he would be confronted with evidence that he had been involved in clandestine activities and told that he would be brought to trial unless he did cooperate. Thus does a police state "recruit" unwilling agents.

 

I handled four cases in the short time I served in Section III. The fourth file was that of Miguel Diaz Isalgue, a veritable Scarlet Pim­pernel who was believed to have made numerous secret trips in and out of Cuba. Isalgue was well‑experienced in this type of work: while in exile in Miami during the Batista dictatorship he had run weapons into Cuba for the Castro rebels. Later he had turned against Castro, as had Menoyo, and begun working against Castro's regime. Isalgue had succeeded in setting up a clandestine network in Cuba, and had even recruited an Army comandante as a member. D.G.I. and G‑2 knew that Isalgue had reception teams composed of fisher­men in Matanzas Province, and possibly Las Villas Province also. An effort was under way to infiltrate agents into these teams.

 

It was learned that Isalgue had utilized his mother's home in Havana as a secret meeting place with his contacts in the area. The home was placed under close surveillance: all correspondence was opened and checked, the telephone was tapped, phone calls to and from the States were tape‑recorded. Isalgue's friends were being in­vestigated to see whether any were working with him. Despite the extensive effort made by the authorities, however, they did not succeed in capturing the elusive Isalgue.

 

In the course of gathering information for my various files, I had occasion to talk with a Cuban woman who had worked as a spy in Miami for the Cuban government. Marta A. Gonzalez, a divorcee with a fair face and figure, in her thirties, had been trained by "Menendez" in intelligence work and had been sent to the States. She had entered the country as a refugee in April of 1962. Becoming a part of the exile milieu, she presumably dispatched such informa­tion as she could gather about the activities of anti‑Castro organiza­tions. About a year and a half after her arrival, she returned to Cuba. There she published a book, Bajo Palabra (Under Oath), a caustic account of the life of Cuban exiles in the States. The book said nothing about the authoress being an Intelligence agent.

 

In her book, Marta Gonzalez indicated that disillusionment with the United States was the cause of her return to Cuba. She told me a different story, however. She had been working under orders from Chafik Homero Saker Zenni, chief of the Intelligence Center within the Cuban delegation to the United Nations. Although travel of Cuban diplomats was restricted by the U.S. government to New York, Saker came to her one day and told her she had to leave, evidently because he suspected that the U.S. authorities were on to her activities and might be about to arrest her. He took her in his car and drove to Texas, where, posing as an American, she crossed into Mexico, from there to return to Cuba. (In her book, Mrs. Gonzalez said that she went from the United States to Canada, and from there returned to Cuba.)

 

I was in Section III for three months. Subsequently I was trans­ferred to the personnel selection department, where my work was not much different than it had been in the C.I.A. and counterrevolu­tion bureau. My function was to put together reports of men who had been chosen as possible members of D.G.I. The selection was made by party and governmental organizations which had been re­quested to submit the names of their best men. All the information that could be obtained about these candidates was put together, and this was studied to see whether the men were suitable material for D.G.I.  My job was to gather the various reports on each individual, and then to write an account summarizing what I had found regard­ing the individual's good and bad points. Final selection was made by the departmental chief.

 

I worked in the personnel section for only two and a half months. I was then transferred to Section II‑2. My chief had asked me if I would like to change positions, and I had replied, yes, I would prefer to be engaged in intelligence work rather than the desk job I was now doing. Section II‑2 had been set up as a result of the breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by all of the Latin American coun­tries except Mexico. Cuba then established Intelligence centers in France, Spain, England, and Italy whose function was not only to handle espionage activities in Europe, but also to serve as a liaison between Havana and its agents in Latin America.

 

At Section II‑2 I learned that I was to be sent to Paris, a fact which thoroughly delighted both my wife and me.

 

Headquarters for Section II‑2 was located in what had once been the large, two‑story home of a private family in the city of Marianao, adjoining Havana. The building was also where oficiales received their final training before being sent to European posts. By having headquarters and school in the same building, students were enabled to study the actual operations of the centers to which they were being assigned. Thus, I had access to messages sent to and from the Paris Center, and in this way became acquainted with the work carried out there.

 

Chief of Section II‑2 at this time was Alberto Boza‑Hidalgo Gato, an affable individual whom I had first met when Boza‑Hidalgo had made occasional trips to the Intelligence school. Boza‑Hidalgo's ca­reer in D.G.I. followed a rocky road. After I went abroad to serve in France, I heard that Boza‑Hidalgo had suffered disciplinary action, evidently because of a lack of sufficient enthusiasm for his work, and perhaps also because he was not as ideologically militant as was deemed desirable. Despite these failings, Boza‑Hidalgo managed to reinstate himself in the good graces of his superiors and was sent to serve in the Intelligence Center within Cuba's United Nations delega­tion. There he became involved in espionage against the United States, and as a result, upon taking a trip to Cuba, he was barred by the U.S. government from reentering this country.

 

Part of the training I underwent in Section II‑2 amounted to a refresher course on what I had learned at the Intelligence school. Studied again were such matters as how to arrange a clandestine meeting with another person, how to pass messages from one person to another, how to spot and evade anyone who might be following you. A large portion of my instruction, however, was directly related to the position and work I would assume in Paris. I was briefed on diplomatic rules, behavior, and protocol, and I delved into the French language, French politics, French economy, and information in general about Paris and the country. At night I attended classes on the arts at the National Council of Culture. Since I could not identi­fy myself as being with the Intelligence service, my "cover" was that I belonged to the Foreign Commission of the Communist Party.

 

I was told that all friendships I might make in Paris had to be reported to the jefe of the Centro. In the Intelligence viewpoint, one did not have private friends abroad: acquaintanceships were sup­posed to have some bearing on the Intelligence work one was doing. Conversely, people who approached Intelligence personnel with a view to establishing a relationship were open to suspicion: they might be planted by the local counterintelligence service. The jefe had to be informed of any approach that was made, who had made it, how it was made, and the apparent intentions of the person involved.

 

The trainees were warned to beware constantly of counterintelli­gence services. We were told that every diplomat was an object of interest to counterintelligence, and for an Intelligence official every­thing outside of the Centro was a potential threat, a possible trap. We were especially warned about relationships with women, no mat­ter how casual these associations might be, since the women might be working for counterintelligence.

 

Practical training at II‑2 consisted mainly of planning and carry­ing out contact work on the streets of Havana. Two students would prepare a plan for meeting at a specified place at a certain hour.  They were supposed to do this without being seen by anyone who might be following either of them. To make this practice highly realistic, actual surveillance was carried out by agents of G‑2. We would work up a contact plan and then submit it to our chief, who would usually inform G‑2. G‑2 was not always told, but we did not know when it was or wasn't. As part of the exercise, we were re­quired to report later whether we had been under surveillance, and if so, to provide details about the men and the vehicles that had fol­lowed us. On one occasion a trainee reported that he had spotted five G‑2 cars. Later, to his chagrin, he learned that that day G‑2 had not followed him at all.

 

Ordinarily, an official had to undergo about one year's practical training before being sent abroad, but in my case this was cut to three months. The Paris Centro was shorthanded and in need of a new official. One phase of my training that was eliminated was a period of work at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, where I would have learned at firsthand the functioning of Cuban diplomacy. The purpose would have been to enable me to pose more knowledgeably as a diplomat while abroad.

 

Before leaving for Paris, I went before the Party Commission with­in D.G.I., composed of Communist Party members in D.G.I. All officials going abroad had to be investigated ‑ "processed" was the preferred word ‑ by the commission. Approval by this group amoun­ted to granting membership in the Communist Party. It was felt that only persons acceptable for Party membership were fit to serve Cuba abroad. I was subjected to several days of interrogation. Questions ranged from my knowledge of Marxism and views on Viet Nam to my role in the Revolution and the political positions of my relatives and friends. I was asked about my wife's opinions regarding the Revolution. I was careful not to reveal that a few years earlier, be­fore we were married, she had applied for permission to leave Cuba and go to the United States. Although this was an official record, apparently no one in D.G.I. had checked back and discovered this.

 

I won approval from the commission. Actually, this "processing" was little more than a formality, since the commission members knew that for a person to have come this far, he must already have been well‑investigated and able to prove his worth. I was further aided by the presence on the commission of two men who had studied with me at Intelligence school.

 

Official papers from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, a last chat with the section chief, and a farewell dinner at the Mandarin Chinese Restaurant (which served Cuban food; Chinese food, like many other things, was lacking in Cuba), and I was ready to take up my post in Paris.