Embassy

 

PARIS ‑ CITY OF GAIETY AND COLOR, CITY OF ROMANCE, city of the world. We had thought a great deal about Paris in the past months; now our dreams were reality. We settled into our new apart­ment, went sightseeing, took long walks, and savored delightful foods and beautiful wines. Paris is a worthy goal for a diplomat from any nation, and for a young couple who had never traveled abroad to be given their first foreign post in Paris was wish fulfillment to the highest degree.

 

This trip was to be our second honeymoon. It would end in a nightmare.

 

I became acquainted with the staff of the Cuban Embassy and learned the operations of the Intelligence section and the diplomatic mission. Virtually the entire staff ‑ except the ambassador and the counselor ‑ were Intelligence personnel. They doubled as "diplo­mats." I was an official of D.G.I.; at the same time I held the post of tercer secretario and was the embassy's protocol officer. Paychecks were issued by the Ministry of Foreign Relations; I earned $600 per month, considerably more than the $200 the D.G.I. had been paying me in Havana.

 

The Cuban mission maintained its chancellery on the fourth floor of a building at 3 Rue Scribe. Here the routine matters of diplomacy were handled. The officials issued visas, dealt with trade matters, and assisted visitors not concerned with intelligence operations.

 

The ambassador, Baudilio Castellanos, had his residence in a building at 60 Avenue Foch, and this was officially known as the Embajada de Cuba. The Intelligence section maintained its offices here ‑ an indication of the importance attached to this operation. The only other office, other than the ambassador's own, was the code room.

 

The building at 60 Avenue Foch was typical of those in this area near the Arch of Triumph. It was an edifice of unpainted blocks, maintained near‑white through the assiduous use of sand and hot water. The avenue was wide and amply shaded by luxuriant trees; the grass was well tended. This was an aristocratic neighborhood, aristocratic in lineage as well as in appearance, for it had more than its share of princes, dukes, and counts living there. The Cuban Em­bassy enjoyed the comforts of high‑ceilinged rooms and wide corri­dors.

 

The residence was reached by an elevator. On the third floor, two small vestibules led from the elevator to two apartments. The apart­ment on the left was occupied by private individuals. The one on the right bore a metal plaque which identified this as the Embajada de Cuba. Visitors rang a bell; this sounded in the kitchen, and someone would open the large, heavy, wooden front door. This door opened onto a corridor. To the left were the kitchen, the code room, the code official's quarters, and the bedrooms of the ambassador's chil­dren, as well as a conference room. To the right was a large ballroom where receptions and cocktail parties were held, then a small sitting room and the quarters of the ambassador and his wife.

 

Toward the middle of the apartment were the servants' quarters and the Centro, the Intelligence center. This occupied two rooms. One of these, equipped with desks and typewriters, was the office where paper work was done by the D.G.I. staff, the writing of re­ports and messages. On the walls were photographs of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos, heroes of Cuba's Revolution. Fidel Castro has, in unusual modesty, never encouraged the display of his own picture, and there was none in this room. The second room, smaller than the office, contained photographic equipment and a large, old‑fashioned safe, about four feet high. When necessary, this room served as a darkroom for developing photographs. Within the safe each official kept a metal box containing copies of his re­ports, as well as any other documents or private papers that he wanted to store.

 

No guard was maintained at the Embassy because the code officer was always on duty, and usually servants and one or more mem­bers of the staff were also on the premises. On Sundays, when the code official took time off and left the Embassy, the Intelligence personnel rotated turns on duty.

 

For communications with Havana and with other Cuban diplo­matic missions, the Embassy relied on various methods. The tele­phone could be used for nonconfidential messages. A Teletype was utilized for coded messages, especially to Havana and to the Cuban Embassy in London. Particularly sensitive messages were coded and dispatched by diplomatic couriers, who came to the Embassy every fifteen days. There were two codes: one utilized by the code offi­cer, and one known only to and used by the Intelligence chief and his second in command. As an additional precaution, names and addresses in Intelligence reports were excised and dispatched sepa­rately.

 

The jefe de la Inteligencia in Paris was Armando Lopez Orta, about 32 years old, a lawyer. Lopez's revolutionary credentials con­sisted in having participated to a small extent in clandestine activities at the University of Havana. He had been at his post in Paris a year and a half when I arrived, and he would remain until three days after I left. His code name was "Arquimides." He was not a member of the Party, having been assigned to Paris before membership became a requirement for overseas duty. Lopez was affable, liked a good joke, and treated his co‑workers well. He worked hard himself, and he expected his staff to do likewise. His was a tight ship, but not an unhappy one.

 

Although he spent most of his time working, Lopez was not resistant to the delights of Paris. He agilely managed to combine work and pleasure, undeterred by a pretty and charming wife, jeal­ous though she was, and by two children. While carrying out routine tasks in his capacity as First Secretary, Lopez often had occasion to converse with visitors to the chancellery. If the visitor was female, he would invariably speak with her, provided she was young and pretty, and as invariably would shunt her off to an aide if she were neither.

 

He always had time for the attractive, always had something "impor­tant" to do when the unattractive came. "You take care of that woman," he would direct a lesser official.

 

In his intelligence work, Lopez was adept at seeking out contacts of the feminine variety. He made up in good looks what he lacked in French language ability, and he was especially effective at cocktail parties. In one case that became famous in the annals of the Paris Centro, he cast his eye on a good‑looking lady member of the Argen­tine diplomatic corps in Paris. Lopez's wife was not present at the party, and Lopez succeeded in approaching the Argentinean and opening a conversation, and later they left together. All this in the interest of intelligence operations ‑ or so Lopez would claim. He sent to Havana a detailed report on the encounter, telling how he had caught the eye of the woman, how he had deftly handled a cigarette to make himself interesting to her, how she had watched him. The report went on for sixteen pages.

 

The official chief of the Cuban mission was Ambassador Cas­tellanos. Castellanos' role in the Cuban revolutionary process had been limited to lending Fidel Castro a copy of the Civil Defense Code which Castro had utilized in arguing his own defense at his 1953 trial, following an abortive attempt he and his followers made to capture the military barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Castellanos assisted in defending other participants in the ill‑fated assault. His personal friendship with Castro dated from those days, and with Castro in power, Castellanos was rewarded with the diplomatic plum, the ambassadorship to France. Because of his personal ties with Castro, Castellanos was more freewheeling than most Cuban envoys. He returned to Havana whenever he wished, not bothering to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Raul Roa would first learn of his trip when Castellanos would show up at the ministry.

 

The ambassador's friendship with Castro stood him in good stead in another way as well: Havana maintained an ample and steady flow of rum, lobsters, and cigars to the Embassy. While Cubans at home endured a severe austerity program, their ambassador in Paris was host at parties that became renowned even in that city, splendorous affairs with an abundance of good food, good liquors, and good smokes. A typical Cuban atmosphere was maintained, and the am­bassador was not above taking up a pair of maracas or beating on the bongo drums. Formal receptions that were scheduled to end at ten in the evening often went on gaily until three in the morning.

 

The Habana‑Paris Restaurant opened in the Quartier Latin, and the ambassador was a major participant in furnishing the financing for the place. The restaurant offered Cuban music and Cuban food. Certainly the latter was of the best ‑ the ambassador provided a por­tion of it from the Embassy's stocks. Castellanos was the restaurant's main patron in more ways then one‑almost nightly he frequented the spot until the early morning hours.

 

If the ambassador was not austerely revolutionary in his behavior and attitude, his wife was even less so. Blonde, good‑looking, the daughter of English parents, Doris Simons Castellanos was highly intelligent and had been a professor at the University of Havana. She had little sympathy with the Cuban Revolution, and hardly bothered to display her disdain. She dressed well and enjoyed Parisian night life ‑ and not solely with the ambassador. She made no effort to conceal her friendship with a Frenchman, a thin, myopic, balding doctor who had spent some time in Cuba and spoke Spanish well. When the ambassador was out of town, the Frenchman moved freely about the Embassy. Doris went out with him at night, returning in the early hours. When the ambassador was in residence, the trio made up an odd threesome in their outings. The ambassador and Doris were in their late forties, the French doctor about ten years younger.

 

Perhaps the reason the ambassador was not too concerned about his wife's doings was that he himself maintained a mistress in Ha­vana, a woman by whom he had had one or two children. Because there frequently was friction between Castellanos and the Intelli­gence section, the mistress was a boon to the D.G.I. It alone knew about the ambassador's relations with her ‑ even his wife was unaware ‑ and D.G.I. used her as a subtle weapon of blackmail to keep Castellanos in line. The woman was virtually in the charge of D.G.I., which saw to her wants and kept the ambassador informed about her. Even if blackmail was unnecessary, the ambassador was indebted to Intelligence for keeping his secret and watching over his mistress. An official in Havana who had the code name "Janio" had responsibility for handling this matter.

 

Difficulties existed between Ambassador Castellanos and Intelli­gence because of their differing views as to the primary function of the Cuban mission. Castellanos saw the purpose of the mission to be the maintenance of good Cuban relations with France and the en­couragement of trade between the two countries. Lopez believed that the basic object of the Embassy was to carry out Intelligence operations. Castellanos feared that at some point one of these opera­tions might cause difficulties with the French government, and this would disrupt the commerce which Cuba badly needed. One project in which he was particularly interested was the purchase of French motors which Cuba sought for cane‑cutting machinery.

 

The Cuban mission was, in effect, a dual structure, an organiza­tion within an organization. The diplomatic functions were a shell over the intelligence operations. The chief of Intelligence reported directly to Havana; he was not accountable to the ambassador. Lopez neither had to report to, nor take orders from, Castellanos. With the Embassy staff composed of Intelligence personnel, includ­ing the code officer and even the accountant, the control exercised by the ambassador was only nominal. (Eventually the counselor, too, was recruited by the D.G.I.) The staff did routine diplomatic work, but dropped this when intelligence tasks were pending because these always had priority. The ambassador might request a "subor­dinate" to do something for him, but if for any reason the official did not wish to do it, he would simply tell Castellanos, "I'll check this with Lopez." Lopez would decide whether the matter warranted doing. An unofficial ‑ and only partially humorous ‑ watchword at the Embassy was, "The illegal has precedence over the legal."

 

Intelligence kept a close watch on the ambassador. This was ac­complished partially by means of his chauffeur, who was an auxiliar de inteligencia. Originally, the ambassador had a Spanish chauffeur, but he was dismissed in fear that he might be working for Spanish Intelligence or the service of another country. A new chauffeur was sent from Cuba, and it was my task to give him basic intelligence training when he arrived in Paris. Subsequently, the chauffeur kept the Intelligence section posted on the ambassador's activities. Al­most daily the chauffeur provided me with a report on what Cas­tellanos had done and where he had been the previous day: whom he had seen, what women he had been with, whether he had slept in the residence or elsewhere, whether he had been drinking heavily. I would turn the report over to Lopez.

 

Later it was learned that Castellanos had fallen into disfavor with Fidel Castro, and Intelligence learned that he waited for months for Castro to see him. It was not known whether his difficulties stemmed from his social life, his wife's activities, suspicions regarding his political reliability, or the friction with the Intelligence section.

 

A fundamental task with which Intelligence concerned itself was the building of a network of agents and useful contacts in Paris. The Centro de Inteligencia itself consisted of the jefe, the segundo jefe (Alberto Diaz Vigo, who used the code name "Duarte"), and the various oficiales. Everyone on the staff had outside contacts to whom he had been assigned or whom he had himself developed. All contacts had to be reported to the Centro Principal in Havana, and each one was placed in a category in accordance with a classification system that D.G.I. had devised for foreigners that it recruited.

 

The classification system had categories in ascending order of importance:

 

Persona de interes, person of interest: This is someone whom the Intelligence official is cultivating, with the expectation of securing a service from him later.

 

Vinculo util, useful link: This is a person with whom the official is well acquainted and who has cooperated in a matter not related to intelligence.

 

Persona de confianza, confidential relation: A person who has displayed the proper ideological viewpoint and proved his willingness to cooperate with the Intelligence official. This person is now ready to become an

 

Agente, agent: An agente actively works with Cuban Intelligence, for pay or for ideological reasons, or perhaps as a result of a personal relationship with an official. Agents perform various functions, such as:

 

Agente buzon, mail drop: Receives messages from or for outside sources with whom it is inadvisable for Intelligence to be in direct communication. Sometimes this agent's house serves as a meeting place for oficiales and other contacts.

 

Agente reclutador, recruiter: Seeks contacts and agents who will be useful to Intelligence.

 

Agente viajero, traveler: Travels ostensibly for legitimate reasons (say as a writer or a businessman), but actually serves as a secret courier, carrying messages for Intelligence. If this traveler has to make a trip to Cuba, he is provided with false documents so that his real passport and papers will show noth­ing to indicate that he has been there.

 

Agente informativo, spy: Provides Intelligence with mili­tary, diplomatic, or other governmental information.

Agente director, chief: Controls one or more other agents; in effect, he is the liaison between Intelligence and these agents. If he has several agents under him, he is the head of an espionage network.

 

Although these agents and contacts are neatly categorized in the­ory, in actuality there was, at least in Paris, rarely a clear delineation between their various activities. Their work often overlapped, as when an agente buzon might carry out recruiting among his ac­quaintances. Even espionage officials can be empire‑builders, and the chief of the Centro in Paris, in his reports to Havana, was as likely as not to exaggerate the worth of his contacts by arbitrarily elevating their categories. This would presumably raise the importance of the chief in the eyes of Havana. In one report that he sent, Lopez boasted of how extensively he had succeeded in penetrating the Latin American embassies in Paris. He provided the names of sup­posed agents he had working for him in these embassies, claiming, for example, that "for penetration at the such and such embassy we now have XXX." The fact was that XXX was nothing more than a minor secretary who was being dated by a friend of a Cuban Intelli­gence official. Out of this vague relationship Lopez manufactured, for purposes of his report, a full‑fledged "agente."