NELSON A. MILES AS COMMANDING GENERAL, 1895-1903

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THE military career of Nelson Appleton Miles spanned the years 1861-1903, but while the period before 1895 has recorded in some detail,¹ his term as Commanding General of the Army from 1895 to 1903 has been strangely neglected. These years are worthy of further investigation, however, as they witnessed the Spanish-American War and the era of military reorganization that followed, and were punctuated by a series of clashes between Miles on the one hand, and the White House and the War Department on the other.

Miles was born at Westminster, Worcester County, Massachusetts, on August 8, 1839, but when he was sixteen he moved to Boston where he worked as a clerk in Collo- marse's Crockery Store. In the summer of 1861 Miles plunged his own savings of $1,000 plus $2,500 that he had borrowed into raising a volunteer company to fight in the Civil War. He was duly elected Captain, and commissioned as such by the Governor, but political pressures led to this commission being withdrawn, and he was forced to accept the lower rank of First Lieutenant in the 22d Massachusetts Volunteers. Nevertheless, Miles' advancement was to prove rapid. During the Peninsula Campaign, where he suffered his first wound, he served on the staff of General O. O. Howard, and attracted the attention of his superiors by his conduct.² Later in 1862 he returned to the line as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 61st New York, and after Antietam was promoted to full colonel, and formally assumed command of the regiment on September 30, 1862. He was wounded again at both Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and in May, 1864, became a Brigadier-General of Volunteers after the Battle of the Wilderness. He took part in the actions at Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, and on this last occasion he commanded a division and received his fourth wound. On August 25, 1864, less than three weeks after his twenty-fifth birthday, he was made a brevet Major-General, and on one occasion in February, 1865, actually commanded a full army corps of 25,000 men.³

After the war Miles joined in the rush for commissions in the reorganized Regular Army, making use of the political and military connections he had acquired. While his application was still pending he became involved in an affair which threatened to ruin his whole career. Miles had been assigned as commander of Fortress Monroe, and was

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³ For Miles' Civil War adventures see the works cited in note 1, plus the *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Vols. 3 and 4; and the memoirs of Generals U. S. Grant, P. H. Sheridan, J. H. Schofield, J. H. Wilson, and O. O. Howard.

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responsible, therefore, for the security and welfare of its most famous inmate, Jefferson Davis. Although Miles tried to be considerate, (he had the hall outside Davis’ door covered with matting to deaden the sound of the sentry’s tread), it was considered necessary for a time to manacle the ex-President of the Confederacy. When lurid accounts of the episode became public Miles protested vigorously that the accusations against him were inaccurate, and that he was acting under orders, but the Administration found it convenient to replace him at Fortress Monroe. As it happened the incident did not prevent Miles being granted a regular commission, but the affair was periodically resurrected in later years to cause him embarrassment.  

Miles had hoped to become a brigadier in the Regular Army, but he had to be satisfied with the rank of colonel of the 40th U.S. Infantry, as from October, 1866, and an assignment to command of the District of North Carolina. While holding this post he visited Washington periodically, and on one such visit he met Miss Mary Hoyt Sherman, the daughter of Judge Charles Sherman of Ohio, and the niece of Senator John Sherman and General William T. Sherman. Their attachment grew, and on June 30th, 1868, they were married at Cleveland, Ohio.

In March, 1869, following a reduction in the already small Regular Army, and the decrease in the number of infantry regiments from 45 to 25, Miles was transferred to the command of the 5th U.S. Infantry stationed in Kansas and Colorado. Thus began his career as an Indian fighter, and he made a new name for himself in the 1874-75 Kiowa-Comanche campaign, in the 1876-77 campaign against the Sioux, and in the 1877 Nez Perce outbreak which culminated in the capture of Chief Joseph. Miles City, Montana, settled and incorporated 1876-78, was named for Miles by the grateful inhabitants as a token of their esteem, but a less happy event was the rupture between Miles and Howard over the distribution of credit in the Nez Perce campaign.  

In 1880, Miles was promoted to Brigadier and detailed to command the Department of the Columbia. In 1885-86 he commanded the Department of the Missouri, and 1886-88 the Department of Arizona, where he was involved in operations against the Apaches. From 1888 to 1890 he commanded the Division of the Pacific, until his promotion to the rank of Major-General and his transfer to command of the Division of the Missouri with headquarters in Chicago. This move came in time to involve him in the 1890-91 Sioux uprising or "Ghost Dance" War, and he also commanded the Federal troops in Chicago during the 1894 Pullman Strike. In October, 1894, he was transferred once more, this time to the Department of the East, with headquarters in New York, and in September, 1895, he succeeded Schofield as Commanding General of the Army of the United States.

By any standard Miles had enjoyed a successful, even a brilliant, career, and his achievements were the more impressive considering he lacked a university education and had not been to West Point. He had won prominence through determination, self-confidence, and personal bravery. On the other hand his spectacular rise had led to the development of other and less desirable traits—consuming ambition, over-aggressiveness, impatience, and self-opinionation. In addition his advancement, some said his preferment, had created jealousies within the service.

The American habit of nominating military figures as presidential candidates meant that

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4 It is noteworthy that in Serving The Republic Miles makes no reference to the episode.

Miles' name was the subject of political rumour and speculation from time to time. With the example of Washington, Jackson, Wm. H. Harrison, Taylor, and Grant before him, (and those lesser military lights Pierce, Hayes, Garfield, and Wm. Harrison), and with his connections with the influential Sherman family, Miles was not unresponsive to the idea. Moreover, he looked the part, with his upright carriage, strong features, and graying hair and moustaches. His great weakness was his pride, perhaps one might say his vanity, which was easily touched, and his penchant for gaudy uniforms, which led some people to dismiss him as an arrogant coxcomb. The *Army and Navy Register* reported on January 22, 1898:

General Miles had adopted for his own uniform some new devices which add to the attractiveness of his official apparel. He had added gold embroidery to the sleeves and collar of the full-dress coat. The design is a delicate tracery of oak leaves in gold. The familiar epaulets have been abandoned in favor of the flat Russian shoulder knot, without fringe, bearing the coat of arms of the United States and the two stars indicative of the rank of major general. To this is added a belt of Russian leather piped with gold bullion and embroidered in oak leaves to match the design on the collar and cuffs of the coat. The new features of the uniform are completed by a sash of alternate stripes of yellow and gold, which extends from the right shoulder to the left side.6

On one occasion the inimitable Mr. Dooley was led to remark, "Seize Gin’ral Miles’ uniform. We must strengthen th’ gold reserve," and Theodore Roosevelt referred to Miles as a "brave peacock."7

It would have been difficult for anyone to succeed the illustrious line of Grant, Sher-

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6 *Army and Navy Register*, Vol. XXIII, p. 50, January 22, 1898.
to him, a proposition disputed by both the bureaus and the Secretary. The result of this triangular struggle for power was administrative chaos. The chain of command that had actually grown up simply by-passed the Commanding Generals. The staff departments worked together only to foil the plans of anyone who sought to reform the situation, and they firmly opposed any ideas of imposed co-ordination, especially at the hands of the Commanding General. What little co-ordination existed was exercised by The Adjutant General almost by default. Since all correspondence to and from the War Department passed through his office, he was the only official with a comprehensive view of affairs.

A long line of Commanding Generals had fought tooth and nail with the Secretary and the staff bureaus over prerogatives, so much so that before the Civil War Gen. Winfield Scott had removed his headquarters to New York to escape the irritation of contact with Secretaries Marcy and Davis, and in 1874 Sherman had removed to St. Louis, virtually handing over all control to Secretary Belknap. Miles' immediate predecessor, Gen. Schofield, recognized the fruitlessness of continuing the struggle and made no effort to enforce his will. Schofield believed that whatever his title, the Commanding General could at most be a "chief of staff" and he resigned himself to this position, claiming that perfect harmony was established thereby between the War Department and Army Headquarters throughout his period of command, 1888-95.11

When Miles became Commanding General in 1895, it was inevitable that this harmony would break down, for Miles simply was not the type to voluntarily subordinate himself. He rejected the view that the role of the Commanding General was ceremonial rather than functional, and as a result his first three years in command, 1895-98, were a period of frustration as he sought in vain to exert influence.12

One of Miles' great ambitions was to get the size of the Army increased. Appeals for more troops had been a regular feature of the annual reports of the Commanding General and the Secretary of War practically every year since the Civil War, but it was Miles' suggestion that the size of the Regular Army should be made proportional to the total population. In his annual report for 1895, Miles noted that the 25,000 limit on army strength had existed for 21 years, whereas the population had increased immensely. He stated "There is no more significance in the number '25,000' than in any other number that might by chance be selected. The Army should grow as the nation grows."13 He went on to recommend the ratio of one soldier per thousand population as the maximum and one per two thousand as the minimum. This would have given a regular force of between 70,000 and 35,000, a minimum immediate increase of 10,000. This recommendation had little support and no result.14


12 "General Miles, coming to Washington as commanding general, energetic, conscious of his powers and eager to do, had, like most of his predecessors, felt the hypnotic influence of ancient liturgies and tinkling bells. He found that in that hierarchy he counted as little as a Moravian bishop in the College of Cardinals. He might or might not have great plans of reform; in either case it did not matter. The adjutant-general was the real power; the arch-bureaucrat was pope." Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, A Biography, (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1931), Vol. I, pp. 140-1.

13 See Report of the Major-General Commanding The Army, (Nelson A. Miles), November 5, 1895, War Department Reports, Vol. I, pp. 63-71, (Washington, GPO, 1895), p. 69. See also his reports for 1896 and 1897. Miles' continued adherence to this suggestion led to the remark being passed that he was as wedded to his figures as was Bryan to 16 to 1.

14 The Literary Digest, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (345), Nov.
In his reports for 1895-96-97 he also commented on the deplorable condition of the coast defenses and suggested improvements; he recommended the rotation of duties between staff and line; and he supported increased pay for N.C.O.'s. He favored the three battalion infantry regiment in 1895, though he was less enthusiastic in 1896. He showed that his mind was not closed to fresh ideas when in 1895, he recommended that one regiment be equipped with bicycles and motor wagons. From May to October 1897, he made a tour of observation in Europe, and he was therefore familiar with contemporary European military theory and practice.

Miles might well have passed into history as an unexceptional and non-controversial Commanding General had not the quiet peace of the War Department been shattered by the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in April, 1898. Although this conflict had been foreseen for some time the formal declaration of war found the United States woefully unprepared for military action, a state of affairs in no way due to Miles' neglect of duty, but rather to the dilatoriness and parsimony of Congress in the preceding years. The appropriation of $50,000,000 for "National Defense," voted on March 9, 1898, did not galvanize the War Department, and the Army's share of the fund was devoted almost exclusively to a belated attempt to improve the coastal defenses. The only sign of activity was when the Regular troops were mobilized in mid-April.17 Even at this stage Miles' desire for publicity did not go unnoted, Ellen Maury Slayden recorded in her diary for April 20, 1898:

... Miles is accused of being strongest on millinery. The Post hurls squibs at him every day: "The situation is serious enough to warrant General Miles in getting a new uniform" and "When in doubt, Miles has his photograph taken."18

The lead in planning possible campaigns was taken by the Naval War Board, an advisory group within the Navy Department, which recommended an attack on the exposed Spanish colonies. A blockade of Cuba was instituted as it was expected that the "Ever Faithful Isle," the cause of the breach between the United States and Spain, would become the main theatre of operations, with Puerto Rico as a secondary and incidental objective. The simultaneous attack on the Spanish Squadron in the Philippines was primarily designed to provide the Asiatic Squadron with a base in the Far East, and to protect American shipping in the Pacific. This naval strategy assumed that the Army would be prompt in co-operating in a joint operation against Cuba, probably aimed at Havana. This assumption was encouraged by the attitude of the Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger, a lumber millionaire from Michigan, who had frequently stated that on ten days notice he could place 40,000 men in the field.19

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Miles, however, was opposed to any attack on Havana. He was against an invasion of Cuba during the rainy season, and to sending a small force against prepared positions at any time. He proposed that the first object should be the capture of Puerto Rico, and annoyed Alger by using every delay as an excuse to advise the cancellation of the Cuban venture in favour of his own plan. Havana, Miles felt, should be invested in the autumn when the danger of disease was at its lowest, and after a strong invasion force had been properly trained and equipped.

The Administration’s manpower policy also encountered Miles’ opposition. He delivered it to be a mistake to mobilize large numbers of volunteers who would be more of an asset while they were being trained and equipped, draining away valuable officers and supplies. On April 9, he recommended the equipment of 50,000 volunteers, and on April 15, he advised that an additional 40,000 men be provided for coastal defense and as a reserve. With the increase in the Regular Army to 60,000 men, and the enlistment of 10,000 "immunes," this would have furnished an effective force of 160,000. Miles considered such a force adequate, bearing in mind that the Cuban and Filipino insurgents were expected to provide extra strength. He believed it better to equip such a force, than to partially train and equip a much larger body. President McKinley actually called for 278,000 men, "upward of 100,000 more . . . than were required or could be properly equipped," Miles complained. He pointed out that the delays caused by the attempt to organize such a large body only allowed Spain time to concentrate troops and to collect supplies and ammunition. He did, however, recommend that Admiral Dewey’s estimate of 5,000 American troops as necessary to take and hold Manila, be tripled.

It was Miles’ belief that it “was utterly impossible” to organize and equip an army before the rainy season, and impracticable for health and transport reasons to engage in field operations during that season. Nor, he felt, was the Spanish army to be completely despised. Long campaigns against the insurgents had seasoned the men and improved the organization. Despite these objections Miles was ordered on May 9 to lead an expedition of 70,000 men against Cuba at once, and in compliance with these instructions he issued orders to gather men and supplies at Tampa. Still convinced of the folly of this movement, Miles called personally upon McKinley to get his instructions countermanded. He later wrote, “I considered it my duty not only to the troops, whose lives must necessarily be sacrificed, but to the country, to explain fully to the highest authority the serious objections to such a movement at that time, and also to express my regret that I felt called upon to state such objections.”

The most serious objection was that after assembling the ammunition required by the force going to Manila to reinforce Admiral Dewey who had already defeated the Span-

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24 Miles to the Secretary of War, May 16, 1898, and endorsements, Correspondence Relating To The War With Spain, (Washington, GPO, 1902), Vol. II, pp. 647-9. See also Margaret Leech, op. cit., pp. 210-211.
26 Ibid., p. 523.
lish fleet there, and after deducting a small amount for the troops detailed to guard the Atlantic coast and support the batteries, "there was not ammunition enough left in the United States to last an army of 70,000 men in one hour's battle," and the factories could not manufacture an adequate amount in less than eight weeks. Although the country was impatient for action and ringing with the cry of "On to Havana" as once it had with "On to Richmond," McKinley had no alternative but to cancel, or at least indefinitely postpone, the project. Undoubtedly Miles' action prevented a possible disaster, and for this he should be given every credit.

The move against Havana having been shelved, a decision was made to mount a much smaller expedition against Santiago to aid the Navy in the destruction of the elusive Spanish fleet which had finally been located there. The question of who was to command this new expedition immediately became the cause of renewed friction between Alger and Miles. The senior officer at Tampa to whom command was actually given was Gen. W. R. Shafter who came from the same state as Alger. Shafter who was 60 and weighed 300 pounds was hardly the ideal leader for an expedition which was to operate in a tropical climate, and Miles' appearance at Tampa immediately raised speculation that he intended to supersede Shafter. The Commanding General's own explanation was that he originally left Washington with only the object of clearing up the confusion attending the embarkation at Tampa in mind. He wrote:

The reports of the condition of affairs at Tampa, Florida, became such that I determined to take the field in person. I found great confusion, and the place crowded with an indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and war materials. The confusion was occasioned partly by the want of rail facilities and partly by the system of loading and invoicing war materials. The sidetracks of the railroads from the port of Tampa to Columbia, South Carolina, were blocked with cars and trains, and this resulted in great difficulty in properly equipping an expedition for effective war service.

Once he was at Tampa, however, Miles claims that he began to experience serious doubts as to Shafter's suitability as commander, for the latter was already seriously affected by the intense heat. In view of the importance of the expedition Miles telegraphed Alger on June 5 for authority to go with it to Cuba. This request remained unanswered, and when the expedition finally sailed on June 14, it was commanded by Shafter. It was Miles' contention that by failing to answer his telegraph Alger denied him the authority to lead the Santiago

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27 Ibid., p. 534. See also Miles, "America's War for Humanity," loc. cit., p. 638.
28 Obviously embarrassed at having to explain delays, and unwilling to admit personal or departmental deficiencies, Alger later claimed that the expedition was "abandoned on account of the reported movements of the enemy's fleet," without mentioning Miles' intervention. Annual Report of the Secretary of War, (R. A. Alger), November 29, 1898, War Department Reports, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 3-229, (Washington, GPO, 1898), p. 82. See also Alger, The Spanish-American War, pp. 46-8.
expedition. The Secretary, however, argued that no such specific authority was needed:

No answer was sent to this telegram, as General Miles had been explicitly informed by the President, as well as by myself, before he went to Tampa, that he was at liberty to go in command of the Santiago expedition, or to organize the force for the invasion of Puerto Rico. Because of these instructions and the intention intimated in this despatch to accompany the 5th Corps, General Miles's instructions to organize and command the Puerto Rican expedition were purposely withheld until after Shafter or Miles should sail. General Miles did not command the Santiago expedition, and that he did not was his own mistake or misfortune. He lost the opportunity to command in the greatest land battle of the war.31

The weakness of Miles' case was that his original telegraph of June 5 was not so phrased as to demand an answer, and he did not repeat this request in his telegraphic exchanges with Alger in the period June 5-14.32 On the other hand one reputable and independent witness then serving in Washington, later wrote:

After two weeks of this I began to see that the President and General Corbin were only playing with General Miles and did not intend to let him go (to Cuba) at all, probably on account of his political tendencies. They did not propose that he should go and come back a successful general, lest the slate be broken.33

Corbin, the Adjutant General, denied that any plot existed to prevent Miles going to Santiago.34

After the expedition had sailed, and in response to a summons from Alger, Miles returned to Washington to organize reinforcements for Shafter which could later be used in the movement against Puerto Rico that was so dear to his heart. Most of the regulars and the best of the state troops having gone with Shafter, and others been diverted to the Philippine expedition, it was with difficulty that Miles assembled some 3,500 militia, but he 'left Washington July 7th, reached Columbia, South Carolina, on the 8th, there took a special train to Charleston, arriving in time to board the fast steamer Yale, already loaded with 1,500 troops, and with the steamer Columbia accompanying, arrived opposite the entrance to Santiago harbor on the morning of July 11th.35

When Miles arrived he found the city already invested by Shafter's force, and the Spanish Commander, General Toral, prepared to surrender if a suitable face-saving formula could be agreed. Miles, who did not succeed Shafter in command,36 joined in the negotiations already initiated by Shafter, and the formal ceremonies took place on July 17th, though not before Miles and Alger had crossed swords once more over the terms to be offered.37 No doubt the arrival of reinforcements and the presence of the Commanding General helped to convince the Spaniards of American determination, but the troops who accompanied Miles did not actually see any action in Cuba.

The Santiago campaign having been successful, Miles was able to proceed against Puerto Rico, and his force of 3,415 infantry and artillery, plus two companies of engineers and one company of the Signal Corps sailed from Guantánamo on July 21st. The

31 Alger, op. cit., p. 69.
34 Both Alger and Corbin protested in public and in private that Miles had endorsed the choice of Shafter for the Santiago expedition, and after hesitation had decided not to go himself. They maintained that there had been no "conspiracy against Miles." See Corbin to Alger, November 16, 1900, and Alger to Corbin, November 19, 1900, Papers of Henry C. Corbin, (Library of Congress). See also Representative Chas. H. Grosvenor to Elisha Root, January 16, 1902, Papers of Elisha Root, (Library of Congress).
36 Miles was later to complain that a secret despatch had been sent by Corbin to Shafter stating that Miles did not succeed Shafter. See infra.
original plan for a landing on the northeast coast was abandoned at the last moment on account of advanced publicity, and the first troops went ashore at Guanica on the southwest coast of the island, on July 25th. This change caused temporary consternation in the War Department, but the transports bringing additional men and supplies were successfully redirected and all went well. Even Alger admitted that "The change in destination was undoubtedly warranted by the circumstances and subsequent events, and General Miles' action in the matter was both wise and commendable. It probably saved a battle."^38 Miles conducted a skillful and a successful campaign, and a steady advance was made upon the city of San Juan which again won the Secretary of War's commendation. ^39 Yet the whole affair resembled a military picnic. When the cease fire was proclaimed on August 13, six engagements had taken place, but the seriousness of the proceedings may be judged from the fact that in nearly three weeks campaigning the total American casualties were three enlisted men killed and four officers and thirty-six enlisted men wounded. ^40

In contrast, great bitterness accompanied the battles which were fought in the offices and corridors of the War Department in the months after the cease fire. In fact Miles made the preliminary move in his battles with the War Department by giving interviews, while still in Puerto Rico, to J. D. Whelpley, the representative of the Kansas City Star, containing statements highly critical of the War Department. Miles accused Adjutant General Corbin of sending a secret dispatch to Shafer to say that Miles did not succeed him in command at Santiago; he claimed that dispatches to and from Santiago regarding the question of command "were much mutilated and garbled in Washington when given to the public;" he accused the Department of suppressing his recommendations that the troops in Cuba be moved to healthy camps or evacuated before disease struck; he complained that lighters and tugs promised for the Puerto Rican invasion never materialised; and said that Washington endangered the safety of the troops by exposing all his plans in advance. Naturally these allegations created a sensation, and there was widespread belief that if the interviews were not repudiated by Miles a court martial must follow. ^41 When he landed in New York on September 7th, however, Miles did not deny the statements attributed to him, but reiterated and elaborated upon his criticisms of the War Department. ^42

As the War Department was already under heavy fire Miles' action may be seen as both unsoldierly and as a deliberate attempt to play to the galleries. If his objects were cheap publicity and the forcing of an investigation then they were successful, though some of his critics felt that a court martial for insubordination more fitting. Though his conduct was irregular Miles was backed by powerful press support and he was lavishly praised for forcing McKinley to act. A com-

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^38 Ibid., p. 307.
^39 Ibid., pp. 316-317.
^40 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, (R. A. Alger), November 29, 1898, War Department Reports, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 3-229, (Washington, GPO, 1898), p. 7. See also Annual Report Of The Major General Commanding The Army, (N. A. Miles), November 3, 1898, War Department Reports, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 3-38, (Washington, GPO, 1898), pp. 29-36. Alger, op. cit., p. 316, raised the death roll by one. He wrote: "Our total loss was four killed and forty wounded, of which latter four were officers."

^41 See Chicago Daily Tribune, August 26, 1898; August 27, 1898; and also The Literary Digest, Vol. XVII, No. II (438), p. 302, September 10, 1898, where the articles in the Star were summarized.

^42 See Chicago Daily Tribune, September 8, 1898; also Margaret Leech, op. cit., p. 314. The relationship between Alger and Miles deteriorated as a result to the stage where the Boston Home Journal could say, Vol. 42, No. 37, p. 2, September 10, 1898: "If Miles and Alger were Frenchmen we all know what they would be doing at sunrise some of these fine mornings. It would be a case of 'coffee and pistols for two,' and the seconds, if well advised, would have a surgeon close at hand."
mission to investigate the conduct of the war was assembled and began its task during the last week in September.

Miles' conduct immediately raises the question of his motives, especially of his political ambitions. It has been suggested that he was the more or less innocent tool of political forces hostile to the Administration who encouraged him in his criticisms in order to embarrass McKinley. This theory assumes that Miles was too naive to realize how he was being used, or too intoxicated with the popular applause to care. It is also suggested that Miles recalled the case of his uncle-in-law, General Wm. T. Sherman, who had clashed so violently with Secretary Belknap, but had been vindicated when the venality and corruption of Belknap were exposed.

"With the cheers of the people of New York ringing in his ears, Miles was certain the public would support him. A presidential election was to be held before long. It is likely that Miles saw himself as St. George slaying the dragon of incompetence and corruption." Though Miles later disclaimed any such inclination, it was widely believed that he did have presidential ambitions, which he had been nursing for some time. Theodore Roosevelt claimed that Miles had tried to enlist him as a running mate to contest the election of 1900.45

The hearings of the Board of Enquiry, which began on September 24, 1898, droned on for several weeks without any sensational disclosures, but the tranquillity of the proceedings was shattered when Miles appeared to give evidence on December 21. By this time public adulation and social lionization had reached such a pitch that Miles' own judgment had become impaired, and he was apparently infatuated with his own ambitions to the extent of being prepared to make rash and extravagant statements. On the witness stand he refused to be sworn, stating that he was responsible for what he said. This attitude did not recommend him to the Board who were already put out somewhat by Miles' earlier refusal to attend.

Miles volunteered no testimony, but only answered questions. In so doing he carefully avoided any harping on personal grievances, concentrating instead on the accusation that food furnished by the Subsistence Department, particularly the beef, had been a serious cause of sickness among the troops. He incorrectly stated that canned beef was not part of the legal ration and hinted at corrupt dealings with the packing companies. Miles claimed that the refrigerated beef had been chemically treated, and referred to it continually as "embalmed beef." 46

The yellow press revelled in fresh exposures, and even the more conservative papers praised Miles' courage as it was expected that McKinley would be forced to relieve him from command and order a court martial or

44 In January, 1902, Miles released the following letter addressed to The Hon. George F. Washburn, President, Commonwealth Club, Boston, and dated January 23, to the press:

"My Dear Mr. Washburn: Your favor of the 18th inst. reached me to-day. You desire information as to the truth or falsity of the newspaper reports from Washington making me an active candidate for the Presidency. I deeply regret these reports. Like many others in the past, they are absolutely unauthorized. They do not emanate from myself, nor from my friends, and I trust that the public will not be misled by them. I have not been, and am not now a seeker for Presidential honors. My ambition has ever been faithfully to serve my country in whatever sphere duty may have dictated, and this will be my sole purpose in the future."


court of inquiry. General Eagan, head of the Subsistence Department, at whom the charges were indirectly directed was outraged, announcing "General Miles has crucified me upon a cross of falsehood and misrepresentation." Eagan considered a libel action against Miles, but was regretfully advised by Alger that the Commanding General was covered by the immunity that the President had promised all witnesses. Eagan therefore applied to the Board for the opportunity to appear in his own defense, having already given evidence earlier on December 12, 1898, and he took the stand again on January 12, 1899. Reading from a prepared statement Eagan shocked those present, who included Miles, by interlacing the defense of his department with a vituperative personal attack on the Commanding General. The Chicago Daily Tribune for January 13, 1899, headed its article on Eagan's evidence with a "Comparison Of Fighting Qualities" giving the height, weight, chest, arm, and leg measurements of Miles and Eagan as it would for a championship boxing match. The Tribune stated:

Commissary General Eagan made a violent attack on General Miles today before the Army Investigating Commission. He denounced the General in the most inflammatory language as a willful and malicious liar and slanderer, and said he should be drummed out of the service and imprisoned with other libelers.

General Eagan made this attack on General Miles with the greatest deliberation in answer to the latter's allegations that much of the beef furnished to the army during the war was unfit for use owing to the embalming process, and that it was supplied "under the pretense of an experiment."

Eagan's action is alleged to have the cognizance, if not the approval, of the Secretary of War and Adjutant General Corbin, but both officials today denied any knowledge of the statement.48

The incident was regarded as "the most remarkable in recent military history," and the Tribune commented editorially that Eagan's "conduct had been a scandalous breach of military etiquette and discipline, and has reached a degree of insubordination that should be severely rebuked." The Board itself had been stunned into silence by the outburst, but the next day it informed Eagan that his testimony would not be received until it had been revised. Public opinion was largely pro-Miles and there was a demand by the press, by Congressmen, and by many army officers, that the Commissary General be court-martialed. Eagan contended that he was covered by the immunity promised to witnesses, but the general feeling was that the personal nature of his remarks did not entitle him to this protection. Alger was therefore forced to issue the necessary orders, though there is little doubt that he heartily agreed with Eagan's description of the Commanding General. Subsequently Eagan was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and with conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. The sentence of dismissal from the service was commuted by McKinley to suspension from duty for six years, the term remaining before Eagan's retirement.

49 Ibid., p. 6.
50 The Chicago Daily Tribune reported on January 14, 1899, p. 3:

The War Inquiry Commission rebuked General Eagan today by returning his written statement as being improper and unfit testimony. This letter by the board to General Eagan stated in part:

"Having now considered the questions involved we have determined that in many instances the vituperative language used by you was not such as ought to have been addressed as a witness to this board. We think that the personal attacks and irrelevant statements contained in the papers submitted should be eliminated, and before receiving it as testimony we request that you will revise its language, and, if you choose, resubmit it for our consideration. We herewith return your papers."

While the Miles-Eagan controversy made good newspaper copy it left unanswered Miles’ original accusations about the army beef. The Board of Enquiry therefore undertook a thorough investigation of this topic, and it formed an important part of their final report. Miles’ charges were dismissed and his conduct censured, but these findings were widely viewed as biased and as only a part of the Board’s general whitewash policy. The press demanded a special tribunal to settle the question, and McKinley agreed to the setting up of such a body. Although Miles’ allegations and conduct were now under scrutiny McKinley did not relieve the Commanding General from command, even temporarily. The country as a whole was still convinced that Miles’ charges were justified, but after three months of exhaustive investigation the new court found insufficient grounds for his allegations. His accusations that the fresh beef was chemically treated and unfit for consumption was not upheld, and as regards the canned beef, Eagan was criticised for buying so much, but otherwise the Commissary General’s conduct was approved. Miles was again censured, especially for his tardiness in reporting his suspicions concerning the beef, but the court recommended that in the best interests of the army no further actions be taken.\(^{52}\) McKinley formally approved these findings, and here the beef controversy officially ended, though there remained some skepticism in the press and a feeling in some quarters that Miles had been denied a fair hearing.\(^{53}\)

If the Great Beef Scandal was designed to catapult Miles into the White House, then it failed. In fact by mid 1899, there was growing public disenchantment with Miles as it became clear that his charges could not be substantiated. Although the Republicans found it convenient to strengthen their national ticket in 1900 by the addition of a military hero, they turned to ex-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and not to Miles.

The Commanding General in fact can be deemed fortunate to have escaped so lightly from his clashes with Alger and McKinley, a more resolute attitude by either might have forced a court martial. There was, however, a very definite stiffening of the official attitude to Miles in the following months. In August, 1899, Alger was replaced as Secretary of War by Elihu Root, a man of outstanding administrative talent and mental abilities, who would not tolerate insubordination. When Root took over he was warned that Miles would be difficult to work with,\(^{54}\) but despite this the new Secretary tried at first to cooperate with him. Root made a point of asking Miles’ advice on the appointment of officers for the new volunteer regiments to be raised for service in the Philippines, stressing the need to pick young, efficient, and energetic regular officers for these posts, and requesting absolute secrecy to prevent an avalanche of applications. Miles’ reply was to recommend selection on the basis of seniority, without regard to ability, and the next morning the whole matter came out in the newspapers. Root was convinced that Miles was responsible for the leak, and concluded that cooperation with the Commanding General was impossible as Miles was not to be trusted.\(^{55}\) Miles was unrepentent, however, and continued to play politics and oppose the plans of the Secretary, though this did not prevent his advancement to the rank of Lieutenant General on February 11, 1901.


\(^{55}\) Philip C. Jessup, op. cit., p. 244.
In September that year Root wrote to a sympathetic McKinley that Miles was still trying "to promote his own views and undo my plans. It acts on the department very much like mixing Seidlitz powder."56

Only a few days after this complaint came the assassination of McKinley and the succession to the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. The former Rough Rider had little regard for the professional abilities of the Commanding General whom he had characterized as "merely a brave peacock" at the time of the Spanish-American War. Moreover, from Roosevelt's viewpoint Miles had committed an unforgivable sin when he publicly intimated that Roosevelt had not been present during the fighting at San Juan Hill outside Santiago.57 During the early days of his presidency, however, Roosevelt subordinated his personal feelings.58 He accepted the loan of one of Miles' horses pending the arrival of his own, and even invited the Commanding General to ride with him.59

This honeymoon period proved to be of short duration, for it was quickly followed by an episode which attracted widespread public interest. Ever since July, 1898, the country had witnessed the spectacle of a controversy between Admirals William T. Sampson and Winfield S. Schley arising out of the conduct of operations and the movement of ships during the Battle of Santiago. Finally a court of inquiry had been convened, and its decision, announced in December, 1901, found Schley guilty of errors in judgment. Admiral Dewey, the hero of Manila Bay, filed a dissenting opinion. Miles was injudicious enough to make a statement in Cincinnati on December 16th relating to the verdict. It appeared in the press the next day in the following form:

I am willing to take the judgment of Admiral Dewey in the matter. He has been a commander of a fleet, and as such has known the anxieties and responsibilities which rest on men under these circumstances. He was instrumental in the destruction of one Spanish fleet and knows and realizes the feelings that encompass an officer under such conditions. . . .

I have no sympathy with the efforts which have been made to destroy the honor of an officer under such circumstances.60

Miles' indiscretion was perhaps not very serious in itself, but it marked the culmination of a number of instances where the Commanding General had allowed his activities to stray outside his official domain. On December 19, Root wrote to Miles enquiring if the reported interview was authentic and demanding an explanation. The next day Miles replied that the newspaper reports were true, but explained that he was merely expressing a personal view as a private citizen, and had not intended that his remarks be taken as a criticism of the Navy. Sensing the storm about to break over his head Miles sought to lessen its effect by writing to Root again on December 21 to explain that he had only wanted to explain that he had no sympathy for the extremists who had called Schley a coward, and whose charges had been refuted by the court. Miles' efforts were to no avail, for there was no doubt that he had contravened Army Regulations in making a public statement on a matter of military or naval discipline, and Root and Roosevelt seized upon the opportunity to administer the public rebuke which they felt he had long deserved. This was included in Root's letter

56 Ibid., p. 244.
57 See Roosevelt to George Hinckley Lyman, June 18, 1901, and June 22, 1901, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 3, pp. 95-6 and 98-9. In this second letter he referred to Miles as "a scoundrelly hypocrite."
59 Pringle, op. cit., p. 447.
to Miles of December 21, which the Administration, taking a leaf from Miles’ own book, hastened to release to the press together with the other correspondence. It read in part:

At this point you, the Lieutenant General of the Army, saw fit to make a public expression of your opinion as between the majority and the minority of the court, accompanied by a criticism of the most severe character, which could not fail to be applied by the generality of readers to the naval officers against whose view your opinion was expressed. It is of no consequence on whose side your opinion was, or what it was. You had no business in the controversy and no right, holding the office which you did, to express any opinion. Your conduct was in violation of the regulations above cited and of the rules of official propriety; and you are justly liable to censure which I now express.  

Miles sought a personal interview with the Secretary and then with Roosevelt, but only succeeded in gaining an additional public reprimand at a White House reception. First reports indicated that the meeting of the two men had been a tempestuous affair, but later accounts indicated that a certain decorum prevailed. The Chicago Daily Tribune for December 26, 1901, noted that its rival, the anti-Administration Chicago American, had “undertaken to sift out the truth of this famous oral reprimand and it has discovered that the President behaved with his usual composure and dignity and only perhaps imparted to his language a little more than his usual earnestness.” The Tribune considered the American account sufficiently interesting and important to reprint, as follows:

General Miles called in the afternoon and, entering the reception room, took position near the fireplace, where he stood alone, there being from eight to ten other persons in the room. The President came out of the Cabinet room, and his eye first fell on General Miles. He advanced rapidly towards the General, saying:

“Good afternoon, General Miles,” adding, “I will see you in a moment in the Cabinet room.”

The President intended this as an invitation to General Miles to retire at once to the Cabinet room. It is admitted that the President knew precisely why General Miles had called. General Miles did not retire, but again addressed the President and started to tell him why he had come. The President again said:

“I would like to talk this over and will see you in the Cabinet room.”

Up to this the President’s manner was not severe, but was described as “only the President’s usual earnestness of style and address.” The President and General Miles were close together all the time, which was, however, brief, and the conversation was not loud enough to be heard by many of the people in the room.

The President was again addressed by General Miles on the subject of his interview about Schley, and the President replied in a voice that was heard by nearly everybody in the room. The President said:

“Well, I do not approve of the interview. It is subversive to discipline. I cannot imagine how you could expect to maintain discipline among your subalterns if you yourself disregard the army regulations. I disapprove of your act, General Miles.”

General Miles made no reply, but bowed. The President shook hands with General Miles as if in termination of the interview, and the General retired.

The American informant says that the President did not shake his finger at General Miles, and was as courteous as he could be while earnestly and forcibly expressing a rebuke.  

Some sections of the press and public thought the official reaction to Miles’ misdeemeanor unnecessarily severe, but there was applause from other quarters, and Root


63 “Resentment in the Army over the Censure of General Miles,” loc. cit., p. 38.
received at least one letter expressing satisfaction that Miles' political ambitions had received a body blow. By this time in fact the Commanding General's position was one of considerable isolation. He had little support within the War Department, or the Army as a whole, except amongst those, particularly within the staff bureaus, who shared his opinion of the need to retain the rule of promotion by seniority alone. He had succeeded in antagonising the three most influential men in Washington regarding Army affairs—the President, the Secretary of War, and Adjutant General Corbin. Harper's Weekly commented at this time that "Since his advent to nominal command, on account of his estrangement from Secretaries of War, he has been so wholly out of touch with the War Department authorities that now he is hardly ever consulted."

Early in 1902, Miles clashed yet again with Roosevelt and Root. On February 17, 1902, he made formal application to be sent to the Philippines to put into effect a proposed plan for ending the war in the islands. His suggestion was that a delegation of Cubans and Puerto Ricans should be sent to tell the Filipinos about the benefits of American aid and sovereignty, and to persuade a Filipino delegation to visit Washington to discuss peace terms. Miles, who was anti-imperialist, though whether from conviction or political expediency is uncertain, also charged American troops with cruelty. The same day Miles called at the White House and explained his scheme, but Roosevelt's reaction was hostile. The President resented Miles' charges of brutality against American troops, and reminded the Commanding General "that when he was in command against the Sioux at the time of the Pine Ridge outbreak, a dozen years ago, the troops under his command had at Wounded Knee committed a massacre, as a sequel to a fight, in which massacre squaws, children, unarmed Indians, and armed Indians who had surrendered were killed, sometimes cold-bloodedly and with circumstances of marked brutality." Nothing like this had happened in the islands.

On March 5 Root formally disapproved Miles' plan, noting that negotiations were already pending between America and the Filipinos, and that General Chaffee and Governor William Howard Taft and the other members on the Philippine Commission were doing a good job, and there was no reason to replace them. This reply was countersigned by Roosevelt on March 6th. By this time the President was so exasperated with Miles than on March 7, he wrote to Root "with a view to making a permanent record of certain facts," and stated his frank opinion of the Commanding General. Roosevelt wrote in part:

During the six months that I have been President, General Miles has made it abundantly evident by his actions that he has not the slightest desire to improve or benefit the army, and to my mind his actions can bear only the construction that his desire is purely to gratify his selfish ambition, his vanity, or his spite. His conduct is certainly entirely incompatible, not merely with intelligent devotion to the interests of the service, but even with unintelligent devotion to the interests of the service. President McKinley and you yourself have repeatedly told me that such was the case during the period before I became President.

Roosevelt concluded, "In view of these facts, I think that General Miles ought only to be employed when we are certain that

64 J. C. Delaney, Pennsylvania state senator, to Root, December 23, 1901; "Please accept the warmest thanks of an old soldier for the solar plexus blow you dealt Lieutenant General Miles. I believe you have punctured beyond repair that Presidential boom he has been hugging for at least twelve years." Papers of Elihu Root, (Library of Congress).
whatever talents he may possess will be used under conditions which make his own interests and the interests of the country identical."

The Philippines episode did not end here, but for the moment it gave way to yet another collision between Miles and the Secretary of War. On February 14, 1902, a bill was introduced in both house of Congress embodying Root’s recommendation for the creation of a General Staff. The need for such a coordinating and planning body had long been felt, as the chaos of the Spanish-American War attested, and Root made the plea for a General Staff a main feature of his annual report in November, 1901, and this was repeated in Roosevelt’s message to Congress at the beginning of December. The original draft of the bill proposed to consolidate the supply departments, and to organize and prescribe the duties of a General Staff, with Miles as first Chief of Staff. For a variety of reasons the Senate Committee on Military Affairs was not at that moment sympathetic to any proposals emanating from the War Department, and it began to sap the vitality of the bill by adding numerous petty and technical amendments. Root appeared in person before the committee on March 12, 1902, to defend the bill, and made a favourable impression. This was entirely spoiled the following week, when, on March 20th, Miles gave evidence to the same committee.

To understand the strength and effect of Miles’ speech in which he appealed to the prejudices of the Senate Committee it is necessary to note that every member of that committee had served on one or other side during the Civil War, and were easy victims of any emotional play on the glories of the past. Miles quoted at length from past authorities to support his contention that the chief of staff should be subordinate to the commanding general. He criticised the whole idea of a General Staff, and claimed that the decision to consolidate the supply departments would only complicate the situation. In short, he claimed that the principal features of the bill were all objectionable and would result in serious injury to the army. All the past defects of the supply system he attributed to his old enemy, General Eagan. An extract from his testimony suffices to illustrate its tone. Speaking of the General Staff he said:

Instead of simplifying routine it tends to complicate. It is centralization of the most pronounced type, augments the power of the staff, and in effect removes it further from touch with the fighting force of the Army. The scheme is revolutionary, casts to the winds the lessons of experience, and abandons methods which successfully carried us through the most memorable war epochs of our history.

Miles’ action in opposing the Department sponsored bill was reported to have “caused a sensation in Washington and may lead to the retirement of the General from active serv-

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70 On the Committee were eight Republicans who had served in the Union Army, and four Democrats who had served in the Confederate Army.

71 “The Senate and House of Representatives (after the Civil War) soon became filled with ex-volunteers, and from that time to the present day, it has always been more or less difficult to convince committees composed of gentlemen who have seen service in the Civil War that the methods in vogue during that war can be improved upon.” Wm. H. Carter, Brig. Gen. U.S.A., “The Evolution Of Army Reforms,” The United Service, 3rd Series, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 1190-8, (May, 1903), p. 1192.
72 Miles also claimed that a General Staff would “Germanize and Russianize the small Army of the United States,” and that “the proposed scheme appears to revolutionize our American system, that has been more than a century in perfecting. . . .” For Miles’ testimony see the Army and Navy Journal, Vol. XXXIX, No. 30 (2014), pp. 757-760, Saturday, March 29, 1902; or the Army and Navy Register, Vol. XXXI, No. 1162, pp. 9-11, March 29, 1902. See also Miles to William Conant Church, editor of the Army and Navy Journal, March 26, 1902, Papers of W. G. Church, (Library of Congress).
ice.” He had actually gone to the length of threatening to resign his commission rather than submit to the provisions of the bill if it became law. Roosevelt, indeed, was much inclined to order Miles’ retirement, and on March 22, two days after the General’s speech, he wrote to Oswald Garrison Villard:

. . . Please treat what I am going to say now as in the strictest confidence. I have not even said as much to Root; but of course General Miles’ usefulness is at an end and he must go. It is a great question, upon which I must consult two or three of the leading members of the Senate and House, as to whether it will not be well to avoid complicating the passage of the Army bill, to which Root has given such thought and effort, by refraining from acting in the Miles business until that is out of the way. Roosevelt later wrote that “the only matter of importance in which I have sacrificed principle to policy has been that of Miles.”

Root was forced to accept the fact that Miles had temporarily killed any General Staff bill, for his opposition had impressed the Senate Committee. Nevertheless the Secretary sought to counter the effect by summoning expert testimony to refute that of Miles. An early hearing was therefore arranged for two retired officers then in Washington, General John M. Schofield and General Wesley M. Merritt, to appear before the Committee. While they did much to offset the impression made by Miles it was obvious that no legislation providing for a General Staff would be forthcoming at that session of Congress.

Miles has left no first-hand explanation of his motives in opposing the General Staff bill, though it may possibly be that he sincerely the President and urged him to refrain from the proposed action in the interest of peace and harmony, saying that it would cause another bitter controversy, stir up bad feeling in Congress, and be injurious to the Republican party in the coming Congressional campaign. The President consented to defer action until the return of Secretary Root from Cuba, but he asked, it is said that General Miles should carefully guard his conduct in the meantime. It is alleged that the General has been assisting the Democrats in the Senate committee’s inquiry about the war in the Philippine.” Vol. LIV, (Part II), No. 2786, pp. 993-4, Thursday, April 24, 1902.


74 Letters, Vol. 3, p. 247. To Hermann Henry Kohlsaat on March 24, 1902, Roosevelt wrote, Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 248: “It is getting to be a case as to whether I can longer permit great damage to be done to the army for the sake of avoiding trouble to myself.”


76 The Independent, Vol. LIV, No. 2782, p. 716, Thursday, March 27, 1902. This same magazine later reported:

“Preparation had been made for the compulsory retirement of Lieutenant-General Miles last week, when the intercession of several Senators procured for him a reprieve. The orders retiring him and appointing General Brooke in his place were ready for signatures. Senators Hale, Hoar, Allison and McComas called upon
cerely believed such a body to be unnecessary or unsuited to American conditions. If so, then his opinion was at variance with that of most other informed military sources, and he must have chosen to ignore the virtual collapse of the service and supply departments during the Spanish American War and the recommendations of the Dodge Commission.\textsuperscript{81} The opposition of some of the staff bureaus to the change can be easily identified as narrow self interest, but it would appear to have been to Miles' advantage to promote this reform, since he could then have exchanged the role of a virtually powerless Commanding General for that of an important and precedent setting Chief of Staff.

The only other explanation unfortunately sheds no credit on Miles, for it would indicate that the Commanding General was acting from personal pique. There is little doubt that Miles felt both his public and his private reprimands deeply, and by early 1902, he bore considerable ill-will toward the Administration. His public humiliation over the Schley verdict still rankled, and his recent scheme for promoting peace in the Philippines had been rejected in a manner that cast doubts on both his ability and his motives. Undoubtedly he would have welcomed any opportunity to score off the Administration, and the General Staff bill provided the chance.

At the same time that he was opposing the General Staff bill Miles was also seeking to revive his Philippine project. Roosevelt complained to Root on March 19 that:

The substance of General Miles' request to you has been made public. The fact has furthermore been made public that he made a preliminary call upon me to submit a similar paper to me. The

\textsuperscript{81} He must also have undergone a personal change of heart sometime in the previous three years, since in an appearance before the Senate Military Committee in February, 1899, he was reported to have recommended a general staff on the German plan. \textit{Army and Navy Journal}, Vol. XXXVI, No. 24 (1891), p. 350, Saturday, February 11, 1899.

originals of his letter and of your endorsement thereon are still in his hands. The only person who could possibly have made public these facts, aside from you and myself, is General Miles. Neither you nor I have done so. It seems evident that General Miles is responsible for the publication.\textsuperscript{82}

As a result of this publicity a resolution was introduced in Congress calling on the President for a copy of Miles' plan. This resolution was formally adopted on March 26, but while it was still pending Miles wrote a second letter to Root on March 24 seeking to reopen the question, and presumably in the knowledge that it would be made public. The \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune} described it as "an argumentative, controversial letter. It was uncalled for. It was indiscreet. It was additional evidence of General Miles' inability to control his temper."\textsuperscript{83}

Secretary Root was more than a match for Miles, however, for in response to the Congressional resolution he not only made the recent exchanges public, but in a letter of March 27, 1902, disclosed the hitherto unknown fact that on July 18, 1900, Miles had asked for 15,000 troops to go to China. It was made clear that Miles' ambition had been to lead the international expedition against the Chinese Boxers, and that his recommendation that they be provided from the Philippines would have endangered the security of those islands.\textsuperscript{84} This disclosure certainly helped to turn public opinion against Miles, and the \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune} again noted that "Secretary of War Root is not a person with whom General Miles can safely enter into an epistolary controversy. The Lieutenant General has had much the worst of the encounter."\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{82} Letters, Vol. 3, pp. 244-7.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, March 31, 1902. According to Bishop, \textit{Theodore Roosevelt And His Time}, Vol. I, p. 174, "General Miles brought it about that this correspondence was made known to members of Congress, and its publication was called for and procured."
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Chicago Sunday Tribune}, March 30, 1902.
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, March 31, 1902.
Having won this round Root and the War Department pressed ahead with a policy of publicity and education in the matter of the General Staff in the following months, so that members of the Senate Committee were "rapidly disabused of the idea that the Commanding General of the Army represented the advanced views of the Army on the subject of our military administration and command." Meantime strong pressure was put upon committee members of both Houses, and the General Staff bill redrafted to exclude the consolidation of the staff departments that had aroused so much opposition. In August, 1902, Miles renewed his request to be allowed to visit the Philippines, and Roosevelt and Root who had so firmly opposed this in March now leapt to give consent. Indeed it appears that the Secretary suggested that Miles might like to take an extended trip. After his visit to the Philippines, which was to be merely in the form of an inspection trip so that the Commanding General should not interfere in military or civil affairs, Miles was to travel on to Japan and China. He was then to take the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Russia, and Europe, making a confidential report on the military capacity of the railroad and of military conditions in Manchuria.

The information that Miles was to collect would, of course, be of value to the War Department, but there was little doubt that the chief benefit of the trip for the Administration was that it would keep Miles out of Washington during the Second Session of the Fifty-Seventh Congress which was to open in December. The absence of Miles removed the prime obstacle to the General Staff bill, and after passing both houses the measure received Roosevelt's approval on February 14, 1903. Root admitted that Miles was still opposed to the concept, and out of respect suggested that a clause be included delaying the effect of the bill until after August 8, 1903, when Miles retired, and this was agreed.

Sending Miles on a world trip thus accomplished its main objective, but it created fresh, though relatively minor, complications. On reaching Guam, Miles protested violently about the treatment of Apolinario Mabine, the former Secretary of State of the Philippine Republic, and when he reached the Philippines he caused further concern by exceeding his authority in issuing orders forbidding the coercion of prisoners. As was not unusual when Miles and the Administration clashed, the whole affair was soon in the newspaper headlines, but in this instance Miles' actions did have the salutary effect of forcing an investigation of the treatment of prisoners and the exposure of certain excesses. Miles had in fact been campaigning

86 Carter, Creation of The American General Staff, p. 43.
87 Ibid., p. 43. Army and Navy Register, Vol. XXXII, No. 1196, November 22, 1902.
89 "An Act To increase the efficiency of the Army," Approved, February 14, 1903, United States Statutes At Large, Vol. XXXII, Part 1, pp. 830-1, (Washington, GPO, 1903). In his annual report, written before he left for the Philippines, Miles avoided an outright condemnation of the General Staff conception, but he attacked it indirectly by frequent references to the desirability of adhering to traditional methods. See Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, (Nelson A. Miles), September 23, 1902, War Department Reports, Vol. IX, pp. 1-4, (Washington, GPO, 1902).
92 Johnson, op. cit., pp. 356-7; and Miles, Serving The Republic, p. 307. Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol. I, p. 249, recorded: "When Miles was allowed to make an inspection trip through the Philippines, he did not make a favorable impression on Taft who wrote to Roosevelt on December 30th, 1902: 'Miles has left his trail through the islands in his effort to besmirch his own cloth and I doubt not our anti-imperialists will enjoy a new feast of blood and brutality on his return. He is a curiously constituted man. I don't understand him.'"
93 See also Roosevelt to Oswald Garrison Villard, March 31, 1903, Letters, Vol. 3, p. 460.
against alleged brutality in the islands ever since February, 1902, and there was more than an inkling of suspicion that he had been supplying information on this topic to opposition Senators, and in May, 1903, after his return to the United States, his published report on the Philippines created fresh excitement. The Literary Digest reported that his report changed few peoples' opinions, but "The anti-imperialist papers commend the general and condemn, for the thousandth time, the war on the Filipinos; some of the expansionist papers assure the general that he is mistaken, and inform him that he is a disgrace to the uniform he wears."

By this time the Administration was looking forward with considerable relief to Miles' retirement in August, 1903. Yet, even this was not to pass without incident. It had been the practice for the President to issue, through the Adjutant General, a commendation of the past services of retiring senior officers. In Miles' case, however, the War Department simply issued an order officially announcing the change in command. This action, which was correctly interpreted by the press as a deliberate snub, did nothing to heal the breach between Miles and the War Department. The Army and Navy Register, a service weekly which on occasion had championed Miles, remarked that it was "the last official act in a very bitter fight, and it accomplishes nothing except to excite remark." The fact that Root failed to make a courtesy call on Miles although he spent the day only 200 yards away did not go unnoticed either. Roosevelt was furious at what he considered to be Miles' manipulation of editorial comment, and his attempt to pose as a martyr in the furtherance of his political ambitions. He wrote to Root, "I think that Miles must be given credit for more low cunning than we thought. What an irredeemable blackguard and scoundrel he is, and how the jacks and fools do take to him!" To Senator Lodge the President wrote, "Miles has for the two years of my presidency, and of course for some years before that, shown himself the most dangerous foe and slanderer of the army which he was supposed to command. Nothing will hire me to praise him."

For a short spell it seemed possible that the public sympathy for Miles evoked by Roosevelt's attitude might lead to a resurrection of the idea of Miles as a political figure. It was rumored that he was to be a candidate for the post of Commander of that powerful pressure group, the Grand Army of the Republic, as a stepping stone to political office. Miles did not in fact allow his name to go forward for this post, but he attended the G.A.R. encampment at San Francisco in Au-

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96 According to the Chicago Daily Tribune, August 8, 1903, the order retiring Miles read: "Washington, D. C., Aug. 8, 1903.—The retirement from active service by the president on Aug. 8, 1903, of Lieut. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, U.S.A., by operation of law, under the provisions of the act of congress approved on June 30, 1882, is announced. Lieut. Gen. Miles will proceed to his home. The travel enjoined is necessary for the public service."
97 Army and Navy Register, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1233, p. 3, August 8, 1903; also No. 1234, p. 12, August 15, 1903. See also The Independent, Vol. LV, (Part III), No. 2854, p. 1893 and p. 1944, Thursday, August 13, 1903; and No. 2855, p. 1951, Thursday, August 20, 1903.
98 Chicago Sunday Tribune, August 9, 1903.
100 Roosevelt to Lodge, September 3, 1903, Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 52. See also Roosevelt to Lodge, August 6, 1903, and Lodge to Roosevelt, August 20 and August 23, 1903, ibid., Vol. II, pp. 43-50. (The two letters from Roosevelt are also published in Letters, Vol. 3, pp. 585-8, and p. 542).
gust, 1903, and received a very warm re-
ception.\footnote{101 The Chicago Daily Tribune, reported on August 11, 1903, that there was some evidence of an organized move to make Miles commander of the G.A.R., but the General repeatedly denied any intention of being a candidate—Chicago Sunday Tribune, August 9, 1903, and Chicago Daily Tribune, August 15, 17, and 18, 1903. In fact the new commander was Gen. John C. Black of Illinois. Before the San Francisco national en-
campment adjourned, however, a resolution was adopted warmly praising Miles.}

The furor soon died, however, and Miles spent the remainder of his life in relative ob-
scurity. In an effort to remain active after the death of his wife in 1904, he became In-
spector General of the Massachusetts Militia, and made several trips to Europe. When the United States entered the First World War he was seventy-seven, but nevertheless he tendered his services to his country and followed the conflict closely. He died, aged 85, on May 15, 1925, while attending a performance of the Barnum & Bailey and Ringling Broth-
ers Circus, and was interred alongside his wife in Arlington National Cemetery.

Miles’ military reputation stood high in 1895. His ability had won him a meteoric rise during the Civil War, and he later earned distinction in the West. His advance-
ment within the Regular Army had not been by favouritism, but by seniority—he waited fourteen years for promotion to brigadier-
general. After 1895, however, he became yet another victim of the traditional struggle between the Commanding General and the Secretary of War. Had any other officer held the post during these years there is no reason to suppose that the relationship with the War Department would have been very much better.\footnote{102 Army and Navy Journal, Vol. XXXIX, No. 31 (2015), p. 778, Saturday, April 5, 1902.} In the case of Miles the situa-
tion was rendered the more difficult by his egotism and his naive political sense. His reported Presidential ambitions, whether real or imaginary, proved a constant source of embarrassment to the Administration, and no doubt influenced the severity of the repri-
mands he received. Miles escaped fairly lightly from his encounters with the easy going McKinley and incompetent Alger, but he was quite out of his depth, both intel-
lectually and politically, when faced with the powerful combination of Roosevelt and Root. Typically, Roosevelt treated his clashes with Miles as a personal feud, whereas Root had the lawyer’s dispassionate approach, but they were both ruthless in their handling of the Commanding General. Only the General’s connection with the powerful Sherman family and his links with influential Senators saved him from a forced retirement on more than one occasion.

The involvement of Miles in so many con-
troversies, and the demonstration of his per-
sonal weaknesses, should not entirely eclipse the services he performed as Commanding General during the Spanish-American War. He prevented the hasty despatch of a large but ill-prepared expedition against Havana; he wisely recommended a three-fold increase in the number of troops requested by Dewey at Manila; he attempted to clear up some of the confusion at Tampa during the organi-
zation of the Santiago expedition; and he conducted a model campaign in Puerto Rico. Nor was his constant advice that the initial effort be directed against Puerto Rico rather than Cuba as misplaced as many, including Alger, tried to imply.

Constant clashes with authority earned Miles the reputation of a troublemaker. While it is difficult to deny this characteris-
tic, it ought to be said in mitigation that many of his actions stemmed from the in-
tense frustration which engulfed most Com-
manding Generals. Miles was simply not suited for a role which denied him both pow-
er and influence, and since his official duties were so light he turned naturally to political intrigues.

The experience of at least two Presidents
and their Secretaries with Miles,\(^{103}\) under.

retirement, but he could be replaced at any
time by the President if an impasse arose. No
longer would a man like Miles be able to re-
tain office after he had not only lost the con-

\(^{103}\) The Chicago Daily Tribune, March 24, 1902,
noted that "Two Presidents and two Secretaries of War
have been extremely forbearing and generous in their
attitude to him." The Washington Post in August,
1903, recalled that Miles had also fallen foul of Presi-
dent Cleveland and Secretary Lamont, saying "Possibly
Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, and Roosevelt, and

\[\text{fidence of his civilian superiors, but was ac-
\text{tually engaged in unseemly feuds with them.}
\text{scored the need for the creation of the office}
\text{of Chief of Staff in 1903. Under the new}
\text{arrangement the Chief of Staff would serve}
\text{a four year term, unless this was cut short by}
\]

Secretaries Lamont, Alger, and Root have all been
jealous, intractable, prejudiced, unkind. Possibly the
fault lies with General Miles. Who shall say?" Cited in "The Treatment of General Miles," The Literary
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