

COMPENDIUM OF MOST RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

PROBLEM OF THE PARTY

-YEAR 1984-

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PROLOGUE

DOCUMENT TO THE CC - PREPARED BY TNO.

THIS DOCUMENT, PREPARED BY TNO., ARISES AS THE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL AND PROBLEMS SET FORTH BY THE FIRST PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE CC.

IT WAS MADE CLEAR BY THE CC ITSELF THAT SOME OF THE CC'S PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS, WHICH ARE QUOTED IN THIS DOCUMENT, WERE ALTERED, IN RELATION TO THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENTS.

4-28-84

There exists in our party a problem that has to do with the correct methods of leadership and work in the party. It is caused by the different points of view that prevail between our 1st Person in Charge and comrade Junior and the rest of the members of the National Directive Committee. This problem was not solved, as was expected, after the Congress was held but, to the contrary, became even worse and, as a result of certain incidents that took place during the carrying out of an operative, the National Directive Committee, as a body, admonished the First Person in Charge and removed comrade Junior as a member of same. The Central Committee, in a subsequent meeting, found that the admonishment made to the First Person in Charge was not proper and ratified the removal of comrade Junior from the National Directive Committee.

This situation deteriorated even further the relations between the First Person in Charge and the rest of the members of the National Directive Committee and caused the latter to submit his resignation to the National Directive Committee. This situation was presented to the Central Committee during the meeting it held on 3-17-84. The Central Committee instructed the First Person in Charge to prepare a document wherein he would analyze the situation. Having said document, the Central Committee would then evaluate the situation and would determine what measures it would take in order to initiate the process of

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rectifying the problem. The document of the First Person in Charge was submitted to the CC during the meeting it held on 4-14-84, where same was discussed.

The first document contains the answers and the evaluation of the situation, from a point of view that differs from that of the First Person in Charge.

The reasons expounded in the document of the First Person in Charge are not presented here in the order in which they were presented by the First Person in Charge in his document, but in order of the importance we think they have for purposes of analysis. The first one is considered by us as the least important one and the last one as the one with the greatest importance.

The First Comrade in Charge gives the following reasons for the differences between him and the rest of the members of the National Directive Committee:

1- "The CD's internal campaign of depersonalization, a campaign which was not discussed in its merits, but on which the CD members took positions, and I am speaking in all honesty, which even appear to have been discussed, either bilaterally or in some subcommittee, if we analyze it in accordance with the different manifestations of the problem."

2-The formulation of charges against the First Person in Charge and Junior that were the result of animosity and a desire to "get even" and not from the desire to help solve or overcome deficiencies that were not only individual, but also organizational.

3-The way we handled "an interview of my person that had been agreed upon a long time ago as a propaganda campaign."

4-Absence of work plans that turn the CD meetings into "negative meetings having interpersonal conflicts, uneasiness and verbal aggression."

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5-"In the CD criticism and self criticism are negative..It has, even if the contrary is pretended, a repressive and depressing nature, in the way it is done as well as in its content."

The first matter set forth by the First Person in Charge, to wit, the depersonalization campaign, stems from our relations with the "Juanos." What the First Person in Charge characterizes as a campaign is in fact the problem existing between the CD members as to whether our relationship with said comrades is due to the growth achieved by our organization and the overall state of the struggle, or if it is due to the pre-existing relations between the First Person in Charge and them. The assessment made by the National Directive Committee, unanimous in criteria, is that our relation with the "Juanos" is due to two fundamental factors:

1-The general situation of the struggle and, in particular, the regional situation which makes the "Juanos" change their policy with regard to us and;

2-The extent of development shown by us in the "La Gaviota" (lit. The Seagull) operative which, on the basis of their policy change, makes us look like a feasible alternative for their plans.

Prior to "la Gaviota," (lit. The Seagull) we had tried to set up communications with the "Juanos" through the First Person in Charge, with negative results. On two prior occasions, the First Responsible was sent to have conversations with them and they refused to see him on both occasions. The representation made in the National Directive Committee is on the basis that our relations with the "Juanos" have to be carried out

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on the basis of mutual respect, which have to do with the motivations that led to the establishment of same. On many occasions the First Person in Charge tries to deny or tries to suggest that the relations are a consequence of the recognition that the "Juanos" give him due to his prior dealings with them. On other occasions, the comrade questions the capability or the way that other comrades work and suggests that, based on his knowledge and previous relations, he can do it better and asks that the task be assigned to him. When the comrade is told that care must be taken to not let the "Juanos" understand our relations on the basis of prior relations with him or positive dynamics (sic); which, in itself, is nothing negative; because it would be detrimental to the basis on which the relations were established, the First Person in Charge does not understand the position and reacts subjectively.

The position of the First Person in Charge regarding the dynamic with comrade Junior presents a problem that was solved after being thoroughly analyzed by the Central Committee. It is a dynamic that shows the degree of subjectivity of the First Person in Charge. The First Person in Charge describes Junior as a "comrade with great political capability... with a greater sense of commitment, intelligence and productive capacity" who only had to overcome certain deficiencies...that the system itself provokes a sense of individualism in all of us." He describes the dynamic that took place as one in which Jr. had to face formulations of charges that were provoked by comrades having "mistaken viewpoints distorted by prejudices

which are extremely damaging and alienating...which come from animosity and the desire to "get even" and not from the desire to help solve or overcome deficiencies that were not only individual, but also organizational." The Central Committee, which discussed the case, knows how impartially and fairly comrade Junior was treated. It also knows, through subsequent actions of indiscipline and misconduct by comrade Junior that their action (that of the Central Committee) was fair and that comrade Junior's subsequent behavior proved that he had not internalized the criticisms they made of him, which is what has kept the CC from reevaluating his case. The First Comrade in Charge, on his part, has sidestepped his responsibility, since instead of abiding by the decision of the Central Committee, he has dedicated himself to taking his personal position to several comrades of the base and questioning the position of the Central Committee, in violation of the standards of Democratic Centralism and the respect that the leadership bodies and their respective members deserve. There is no possible analogy between the case that the First Person in Charge makes reference to and the tasks that motivated the formulation of the charges mentioned above. We are all aware of the previous case whereas the case referred to by the First Person in Charge is the following:

The National Directive Committee discussed an operative involving the transportation of certain materials to "Chola", and, among other things, the following agreements were reached:

1-The operative shall be executed and supervised by Tino with Jumbo, Falcon and Frank, as a work team.

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2-Jumbo and Tino shall leave Monday afternoon to pick up the vehicle that will be used, locate a place where the vehicle can be prepared for the task and buy an additional vehicle. They would work on this on Tuesday and Wednesday.

3-Frank would arrive on Wednesday and would join Jumbo. Tino would go to "Chola" to contact the "Juanos," since it had been agreed upon with them that we would give them a three-day advance notice of our arrival so that they would be prepared to meet us and pick up the material.

4-Jumbo and Frank would work on Thursday and Friday preparing the vehicle so that the material could be picked up on Friday night or Saturday during the day and begin the trip.

5-Tino would return on Friday or Saturday from "Chola" and would advise Falcon to join the group and then everyone would leave on the trip together.

6-Comrade Greco would join the group when they got close to "Chola" and would substitute comrade Frank, who would have to return because of his work.

7-The trip to "Chola" would be begun after advising the "Juanos."

8-We would contact Jr., who would deliver the material to us, for purposes of setting up with him the date of the delivery.

All of the scheduled activities mentioned above fell behind schedule, except the pick-up date of the material which, per instructions of the National Directive Committee imparted over the telephone to Tino by Greco, was scheduled for Friday

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night. Also, on that same Friday night, at the moment when the material was being picked up, comrade Greco tells Tino that the NDC has decided that comrade Greco will not make the trip and that comrade Frank should continue on to "Chola." The trip is made without advising "Chola" and, upon the return, there was discussion of the delays and the changes that were made, the mistakes were analyzed and the criticism about why "Chola" was not advised beforehand was accepted. In this operative's planning, discussion and execution, there were not, at any of said stages, negative dynamics or any questioning of the differences of opinion over jurisdiction or method of work, as happened in the previous case.

Regarding the interview incident, it can be stated that this is another case caused by the First Person in Charge's perception of the tasks that were approved by the National Directive Committee. The comrade's argument is based on the false premise that there had been approval of "an interview of my person that had been agreed upon a long time ago, as a propaganda campaign." This is not correct. Neither in the case we are now discussing nor "a long time ago" was there agreement on an interview of the First Person in Charge. Each time that this issue has been raised, "La Gaviota" (lit. The Seagull) has taken precedence over it and, as a result of certain information coming to us that Carmen Jovet was interested in holding an interview of the organization, there has been discussion of the benefit of using the interview as a means of presenting the organization's postulates and positions. When this was originally discussed,

the First Person in Charge proposed that the interview would be useful for showing the people how he has been able to work clandestinely in Puerto Rico all these years without being detected. He said that this would be a big push forward for the struggle, for it would prove that you can work clandestinely and develop the armed struggle. This was not approved at that time and what was said was that the interview be held for the purpose of introducing the organization, its principles and its opinion on national and international events. The First Person in Charge would be responsible for representing the organization as its spokesperson, but not in his personal capacity. It was planned for the interview to be given in a compartmentalized fashion thus protecting the personal identification of all the participants which, on that occasion, were going to be three. The last time the interview was approved, it was approved for the purpose of presenting to the press the Program/Plan/Platform approved by the Congress and not the individual comrade himself due to his getting "burned" in "la Guillotina" (lit. the Guillotine). That was the proposal made by the First Person in Charge, but not the one that was approved. The First Person in Charge has always visualized the interview as an interview of him personally and has not dealt with what was approved. And even if it would have been a personal interview of him, the format and style as well as the content, due to its transcendental nature, had to be discussed in all of its political-ideological aspects and decided upon by the National Directive Committee.

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On the 4th point raised by the comrade, he recites a summary of the party's organizational and political involvement from its founding up to the present time. It must be made clear that what the comrade is presenting under this point is the development of our organizational policy from the time the group split up to the holding of our first congress. The analysis made by the comrade, though correct on the measures that were adopted, is superficial, inaccurate and totally subjective in that he claims to be the author of all the measures, projections and resolutions that were approved. The development of those policies pointed out by the First Person in Charge was the result of collective participation and discussion in the organization, in a process that started more than eight years ago, which still continues and will continue throughout our entire revolutionary growth, individually as well as collectively. Up to the present day, that process has included the participation of several central committees, several politburos, executive committees, directive committees, work areas, study groups, the entire base of the party and there have been many individual as well as collective contributions. The First Comrade in Charge is one of the comrades who has participated the most in this process; he prepared the drafts of most of the original documents and has actively participated in their final discussion and approval. Even so, that does not give him the right to say that the party's organizational vision at this time is the result of his own initiatives, overlooking what has previously been stated and forgetting that those measures embody the general consensus of the party, achieved through serious and collective discussions.

Going back now to the comrade's main argument regarding the absence of work plans, there are certain points that must be made clear.

The comrade brings up an experience set forth in a two-year work plan that was approved in "all of its mechanisms, even the area plans." Regarding this, the comrade says that we "were never ready or prepared to make the evaluation, for which reason the dates were postponed." Although these representations by the comrade are correct, they do not reflect the situation as it was then. Although it is true that the plans were not being submitted, this was due to certain evaluations that were being made in all of the work areas in preparation for the drawing up of the report on the party's situation to be presented to the Congress. On the other hand, all of we Central Committee members were working on some committees that were created for the drawing up and preparation of the party's platform, which was going to be submitted to the Congress. What could have been, at first, a delay, became a conscious policy, with the tacit approval of all of the NDC's members, because nobody wanted to come up with work plans that would later have to be revised based on what the congress would approve. Therefore, the agreement was that priority would be given to the preparation and discussion of the platform and other documents of the congress and then, after the congress, deal with the work plans. This decision was discussed in the National Directive Committee as well as in the Central Committee and, to our best understanding the First Person in Charge raised no objection, was in agreement, and there is no

indication that the comrade at that time was seeing the situation as he is now. The problems came up after the congress, due to the absence of the General Work Plan and to the First Person in Charge's reluctance to undertake the responsibility which was his for preparing same.

\*Is not true. (sic)

In accordance with the organizational vision now in force, which is partially set forth by the comrade in his document, the First Comrade in Charge must translate the policy approved by the Congress into a draft of the Work Plan. According to what the First Person in Charge says in his document, that draft of the Work Plan would "be submitted to the CD for its discussion in depth and, once amendments are made, a work plan proposal is approved. (d) This proposal is sent back to the CC for its discussion, amendments and approval as a Zeta Work Plan."

What was supposed to take place after the congress was the preparation of the work plan and this has not been done.

Is not  
true  
(sic)

This is the First Person in Charge's principal duty after the congress and this is the first step toward resolving the problems of the leadership, leaving for later the finalization of the work plans in the priority areas and then, as a third step, working on the implementation of same. It is fair to point out that the presentation of the areas' work plans cannot be made without previous approval of the General Work Plan. The comrade in charge of the Communications Area has told the National Directive Committee on more than one occasion that his area's work plan is ready for discussion at the appropriate time. The Comrade in charge of the Organization Area has stated that their work toward the preparation of a work plan has been paralyzed. They have

discussed the matter and have determined that they cannot prepare a work plan until the General Work Plan is prepared and the specific tasks are assigned, giving priority to the ones which are going to be handled by the party.

Since the congress was held, the functioning of the First Person in Charge has been disorganized and lacking in concrete orientation on the work to be done. The comrade does not prepare agendas, does not take the minutes in for their approval and never includes criticism and self criticism sessions on the agendas. The NDC meetings are, and we agree with the comrade on this, "Meetings having subjects which, in most cases, consist basically in resolving day-to-day problems and have very little to do with the CD's deep problems and tasks of a political, strategic and tactical nature." This deficiency is basically due to not having strictly adhered to the guidelines of the congress in the CD's work dynamic.

Is not  
true  
(sic)

The last reason set forth by the comrade for his differences with the other members of the National Directive Committee is his statement that "In the CD criticism and self criticism are negative...It has, even if the contrary is pretended, a repressive and depressing nature in the way it is done as well as in its content." This statement, along with the statement about the lack ~~statement about the lack~~ (sic) of work plans are the two essential statements and the root of the entire problem. The statement made regarding criticism and self criticism is the central problem, for it is the problem of substance. The statement about the absence of work plans can be

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resolved by determining who is responsible for their absence and starting to work on this particular problem in a revolutionary fashion. All of us agree with the formal provisions set forth in the regulations/bylaws, the established rules of procedure and the ideological formulas that led to their establishment. In the problem of criticism and self criticism there exists an ideological discrepancy regarding what this means and regarding the way in which same has been implemented. This clearly arises from the statement made in the document that the First Person in Charge submitted.

The way in which the First Person in Charge has understood and implemented criticism and self criticism in the past few years has, for all practical purposes, made it disappear from the party as a process having the main goal of pointing out the political and organizational mistakes in the midst of the party. The First Comrade in Charge, as he sets forth in his document, views criticism as a bilateral process and suggests there be clarification in the collectives that it is to be used as a last resort, because if it is "made the top priority in the collective it is going to become aggressive and will degenerate, just as has happened to us in the CD and also in the collectives of the base." See pg. 19, Proposal G.

Our organization's position on criticism and self criticism is that it is a dialectical process based on our Marxist-Leninist perception of the revolutionary party and is based on the organizational representations made of said perception.



In relation to criticism and self criticism, these organizational principles were discussed by Mao Tse Tung in practical terms, for which reason we will hereinafter quote from same as an illustration:

"REGARDING CONCEPTS FOREIGN TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION"

Concepts foreign to the principles of organization, existing within the party's organization, manifest themselves in:

A. Failure of the minority to submit to the majority. For example, when a minority finds its motion voted down, it does not sincerely carry out the Party's decision.

Methods of rectification:

1. During the meetings, motivate the participants to openly express their opinions. Point out the correct and the incorrect aspects of each controversial situation and do not tolerate either conciliation or negligence. If the issue is not resolved in a meeting, it can be discussed in another one (provided work is not effected) in order to arrive at a clear conclusion.

2. The party's discipline demands, among other things, that the minority subject itself to the majority. If the opinion of the minority has been turned down, it must then support the decision that has been approved by the majority. If it deems necessary, it may bring up the issue during the next meeting, for its consideration, but it may never act contrary to the determination that has already been adopted.

B. Criticisms made without regard to organizational discipline:

1. Inner-Party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity. In the Party organization of the Red Army, however, criticism is not always of this character, and sometimes turns into personal attack. As a result, it damages the Party organization as well as individuals. This is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois individualism. The method of correction is to help Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity in order to achieve victory in the class struggle and that it should not be used as a means of personal attack.

2. Many party members make their criticisms not inside, but outside, the Party. The reason is that the general membership has not yet grasped the importance of the Party organization (its meetings and so forth), and sees no difference between criticism inside and outside the organization. The method of correction is to educate Party members so that they understand the importance of Party organization and make their criticisms of Party committees or comrades at Party meetings.\*

This applies to T. (sic)

## REGARDING SUBJECTIVITY

There exists a large degree of subjectivity among a group of party members, which seriously harms the analysis of the political situation and the orientation toward work. So, then, a subjective analysis of the political situation and the subjective orientation toward work lead either to opportunism or to putschism. And subjective criticism, unfounded gossip and mutual suspiciousness within the party frequently engender disputes with no basis and undermine the organization.

Another point that should be mentioned in connection with inner-Party criticism is that some comrades ignore the major issues and confine their attention to minor points when they make their criticism. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As to personal shortcomings, unless they are related to political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be overcritical and to embarrass the comrades concerned. Moreover, once such criticism develops, there is the great danger that the Party members will concentrate entirely on minor faults, and everyone will become timid and overcautious and forget the Party's political tasks.

The main method of correction is to educate Party members so that a political and scientific spirit pervades their thinking and their Party life. To this end we must: 1) teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analyzing a political situation and appraising the class forces, instead of making a subjective analysis and appraisal; 2) direct the attention of Party members to social and economic investigation and study, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades to understand that without investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the pit of fantasy and putschism, and 3) in inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should center on politics.\*\*

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\* our underlining

\*\* Mao Tse Tung - On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Foreign Language Editions; Peking, 1971, Volume 1, pages 116-117 and 118-119.

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Criticism and self criticism is made up of two parts; the process of criticism and that of self criticism. The process of criticism and self criticism begins with the criticism being set forth in the corresponding collective in order to go from there and begin the process of analysis and rectifying the errors made. Self criticism cannot exist unless there is first a discussion of the mistakes and failures which were committed. Self criticism that is made in an evaluation meeting is part of the criticism and self criticism process and corresponds to the stage of criticism. Collective evaluation is the only correct mechanism for determining if a criticism is correct, just, and what corrective mechanisms and measures will be used to implement it. Only then can a comrade or body be asked to be self critical. This self criticism does not necessarily have to begin with the verbal expression of "mea culpa," even if this would be better in revolutionary terms. To determine whether or not a comrade or a body is self critical, you can look at the way in which they react to the corrective measures approved by the appropriate leadership collective. Acceptance or lack thereof of the criticism at the time when it is given has to do with the member's disposition and the frame of mind of the comrade involved and does not necessarily have anything to do with said comrade being self critical or not. A comrade might make statements of acceptance of the criticism at the moment it is made and then deal properly with the directives he is given proving that his previous attitude was in harmony with his disposition at the time the criticism was made. There can also

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be the case of comrades who will not accept the criticism at the time it is made but later implement it properly. The dispositions and attitudes in these two mentioned cases are the correct and normal attitudes that we should look at as solutions to the organizational deficiencies we now have. There are also two other attitudes which cause problems for the party and they are attitudes of arrogance which occur when the criticism and self criticism process is not adequately carried out. One is the willingness to accept the criticism at first, but then, unconsciously, not doing anything suggested by the collective to overcome the deficiencies. The other negative attitude is that of rejecting the criticism as well as the provisions approved in the collective as a solution to the problem. Both are manifestations of liberalism, which must be discussed constantly as part of our individual and collective growth.

"We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight. Every Communist and revolutionary should take up this weapon.

But liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, Philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration in certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organizations.

Liberalism is extremely harmful in a revolutionary collective. It is a corrosive which eats away unity, undermines cohesion, causes apathy, and creates dissension. It robs the revolutionary ranks of compact organization and strict discipline, prevents policies from being carried through, and alienates the Party organizations from the masses which the Party leads. It is an extremely bad tendency.

Liberalism stems from petty-bourgeois selfishness, it places personal interests first and the interests of the revolution second, and this gives rise to ideological, political, and organizational liberalism.

People who are liberals look upon the principles of Marxism as abstract dogma. They approve of Marxism, but are not prepared to practice it or to practice it in full; they are not prepared to replace their liberalism by Marxism. These people

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have their Marxism, but they have their liberalism as well-they talk Marxism but practice liberalism; they apply Marxism to others but liberalism to themselves. They keep both kinds of goods in stock and find a use for each. This is how the minds of certain people work.

We must use the active spirit of Marxism to overcome liberalism with its passivity. A Communist should be frank, faithful and active, looking upon the interests of the revolution as his very life and subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution; he should, always and everywhere, adhere to correct principles and wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and actions, so as to consolidate the collective life of the Party and strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses; and he should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about the individual, and more concerned about others than about himself. Only thus can he be considered a Communist.

All loyal, honest, active and staunch Communists must unite to oppose the liberal tendencies shown by certain people among us, and turn them in the right direction. This is one of the tasks on our ideological front.\*

The solution to the differences with the First Person in Charge is the solution of proper implementation of the process of criticism and self criticism, as well as the liberal positions in which this organization has been placed. This is the way to solve the other problems brought up by the First Person in Charge, such as:

- 1-the depersonalization campaign
- 2-the situation in relation to comrade Junior
- 3-the issue of the interview
- 4-the elimination of all of the elements of distrust
- 5-the establishment of positive communications
- 6-the evaluation of the present situation

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\* Mao Tse Tung - Combat Liberalism, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, Vol. II, pgs. 25-27, Foreign Language Editions, Peking 1968.

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no

With relation to the deficiency brought up by the First Person in Charge in regard to the work plans, this is in the process of being resolved. Several weeks ago the First Person in Charge submitted the Proposed Work Plan to the NDC and the NDC has already started to discuss it.

In no part of the First Person in Charge's document set forth problems or structural deficiencies that justify the representation that is made at the end of the comrade's document. Regarding the statements the First Person in Charge makes about the structural issue, it can be said, without going into the merits, that it involves a proposal that has already been discussed in the past and about which a position has been taken after the congress approved the existing structures. We just had a congress, with all the preparatory process of the evaluation and analysis of our platform, regulations/bylaws and structures; it ratified all our structures and imparted specific instructions regarding how to properly deal with them. Our actions must be geared toward implementing the agreements made by the congress. Anyway, we will set forth herein the operational rules and functions that were approved by the National Directive Committee so that the Central Committee can pass judgement on same and can clarify some of the differences set forth in this regard.

#### OPERATIONAL RULES FOR THE NATIONAL DIRECTIVE COMMITTEE

##### I. Meetings

1-The meetings shall be held once a week. The NDC may extend same to a second day of the same week, if deemed necessary

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and if the conditions so allow. The meetings shall be held at different locales. Attempts will be made to have one permanent locale and two alternate ones.

2-The First Person in Charge may convene extraordinary meetings to resolve any emergency that demands collective participation. He shall send out notices of the meeting to all of the members. For purposes of said emergencies, three members shall constitute a quorum.

3-The First Person in Charge may make emergency decisions regarding the work areas through bilateral meetings with the ones in charge of these areas. These decisions will be made only if procedures outlined in point number 2 cannot be followed, and any decision must be either ratified or reversed in the next regular meeting of the NDC.

## II. Agendas

1-The First Person in Charge must maintain on the agenda all those matters that must be brought up for discussion by nature of their being part of the work plan (reports, pending matters, etc.), as well as political issues that are raised for discussion in order to take a political position regarding them.

2-Any matter that is brought up for discussion at the outset of the meeting shall be included under General Matters and its importance must be discussed if there is a desire to discuss it as a central issue.

3-The central agenda shall be announced one week in advance. Any member who is absent from a meeting must take it

upon himself to become duly informed of the next agenda.

4-The first matter on the agenda shall be the reading and approval of the previous minutes.

(5) Criticism and self criticism shall be the first point on the agenda of all of the meetings immediately after the reading and approval of the previous minutes.

6-The First Person in Charge shall maintain on the agenda all of the decisions that the NDC finds it needs reports on in order to put into effect.

### III. Minutes

1-Attempts shall be made to assign the task of taking minutes to one of the members. If there is no such person, this duty shall be that of the First Person in Charge.

2-On a weekly basis, each topic that has been discussed shall be taken out of the minutes and a detailed filing system shall be set up using the subject matter and topics of importance. Said file is not to contain general matters, unless they are central in nature. The proper compartmentalization of information that is sensitive in nature will be utilized. While the filing system is in the process of being prepared, a card-filing system which is divided by subject matter, tasks, etc., will be prepared and will reflect the minutes that contain the decisions made on those matters.

### IV. Work Plans

1-The Party's Platform shall be discussed in order to establish the interpretation and order of priorities which will be used in the creation of the Work Plan.



2-The First Person in Charge shall submit to the "Cap." the plan for its approval and then it shall be taken to the CC. Any part of the plan which is not approved by the "Cap." May be taken to the CC for its discussion.

3-Once the General Plan is approved by the CC, it will be discussed by the "Cap." so that each of the Persons in Charge of Areas can clearly establish each point which they must address in their own particular work plans.

4-Each Person in Charge of an Area shall prepare his/her work plan, which he will first discuss with the First Person in Charge, before submitting it to the "Cap." for its approval.

5-The First Person in Charge shall be kept informed of the phase of implementation of the work plans by means of regular bilateral meetings.

6-The First Person in Charge shall keep the "Cap." informed on the development of the work plans.

7-All of the work plans must include the steps, dates and technical and human resources necessary for their execution.

8-Each Person in Charge shall keep a file on the tasks in the work plan which are being carried out.

9-The First Person in Charge should submit to the "Cap.," one week in advance, the report that the "Cap." will then submit to the CC. Every document to be discussed will be provided a week in advance.

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## V. OTHER PROVISIONS

1-The Person in Charge of Areas shall relay to their respective work collectives those agreements that relate to their area.

2-The "Cap." shall determine, in each meeting, which issues discussed should be reported to the party's membership, as well as how to do it.

3-In the event the First Person in Charge is not present, the "Cap." shall choose, from among its members, a comrade who will carry out his functions when he is absent.

4-Issues regarding national relations shall be determined by the "Cap." and the spokesperson shall be the First Person in Charge.

5-The First Person in Charge will be the first to see to it that the "Cap." complies with its duties, as established by the Regulations/Bylaws.

## VI. SUPERVISION

1-The First Person in Charge shall carry out his supervision duties in accordance with the established target dates in the work plans.

2-Initially, the supervision will be implemented by the First Person in Charge; thereafter, the matter will be put on the agenda in order to make a more thorough evaluation.

3-The implementation and supervision of specific tasks in the different work areas shall exclusively be the responsibility of the respective persons in charge. In the event of a discrepancy between the First Person in Charge and any other

Person in Charge of an Area, the former may stop the execution of the task until the matter is discussed in the "Cap."

These rules were approved by the NDC in July, 1983.

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- VII -

PROLOGUE

NECESSARY RESPONSE - PREPARED BY RNO. -

THIS DOCUMENT WAS INCLUDED IN THE SET OF DOCUMENTS OF THE  
CC THAT WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THE BASE FOR DISCUSSION PRIOR  
TO THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES, CONVOKED BY THE CC IN JULY/84.

JUNE OF 1984

NECESSARY RESPONSE

As part of the debate that was begun in the CC, the First Person in Charge submitted a document for its discussion that surprised the remaining members of the CD because of its style and contents. This document came about as a result of the CD making a request of the First Person in Charge after the latter threatened to resign from his post. The comrade's threats to resign and his emotional behavior had become a habit. The CD told the First Person in Charge in March of 1984 that all the comrades were extremely upset due to the situation the body was facing due to the comrade's conduct when he reacted to the natural differences of opinion and debates over the body's decisions. He was told that the body felt that the proper procedure to follow in order to settle the situation was for the comrade to present a document containing what he felt his differences with the CD were, so the CC could decide who was responsible. The remaining CD members would respond and would explain their positions to the CC.

Instead of presenting an in-depth analysis of what he thought our problem was, the First Person in Charge presented a document that reflected his subjective analysis, characterized by arrogance and deficient in its twisted view of the facts and incidents that have occurred in the Party and its leadership bodies. Even though we knew that for a year and a half we had been having differences with the First Person in Charge over

countless decisions and analyses, we expected him to make an analysis from a perspective that could be answered with the same objectivity.

Regardless of the CC's position, we feel that it is indispensable that the base have, for its own consideration, a detailed response to the "comrade's impressions."

The comrade who reads that document could arrive at countless mistaken impressions since the comrade's style gives the feeling that the Party has been created by just one person and that that person has also been the one to point out the ills and apply the corrective measures. This individualistic style of analysis hinders the development of the processes and leaves out the contributions made by each one of the Party's founders and other leaders. On the other hand, its style doesn't surprise us, since in his political practice, the comrade has found it difficult to conjugate verbs in the plural. It appears to us to be quite paternal and arrogant, besides being disrespectful to dozens of comrades (including those who are now going along with him in his cause) who with their experience, analysis and proposals, helped to form this Party. The distortion is reflected in the historical account the comrade gives in the first seven pages of his document. The comrade arrogantly attributes to himself the process of developing the party, of shaping methodology and analysis. We would like to know where the remaining comrades who have been a part of this Party since 1976 have been up to now. Are we, by any chance, strictly complying with directives and orders from some comrade, (its top

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leader)? We address this question to all the active members of this Party, especially its leaders, so they will analyze same within the context of the first seven pages of the document presented by the First Person in Charge.

We will now go on to analyze the comrade's "impressions" beginning on page 8. The comrade speaks of a work plan of the CD. According to the comrade, this was discussed and adopted; the responsibilities, goals, personnel and evaluation dates were assigned. The plan contained projections up to 1984 and was adopted during the second quarter of 1982.

The product of the work plan was the object of analysis on several occasions and it was found that different goals and projections were being met, while others were not being done, including some that were assigned to the comrade and whose completion were being required of him.

Deficiencies were found in all the comrades. Did this mean that the work areas were disorganized, not having guidelines for their work? Anyone who says a thing like that must have been a member of another party. The work areas had their own guidelines or internal work plans. As part of the process of implementing the party's political work plan, the CC determines that the Party needs to establish more precisely its entire policy, its Regulations/Bylaws and the holding of a party Congress.

In the summer of 1982, the CD determined that in terms of the projections contained in the work plan of three months ago, same would be left without specific, evaluative projections, since the Congress would probably dictate the political/policy position that would affect it.

The CC goes on to point out that each political effort had to be aimed at resolving the situation of the congress. To all this add the situation of the financial crises the Party is going through which brings many political and military tasks to a complete standstill. This went on for the period of one year and forced us to evaluate the entire military area and the methods utilized up to that time. The Party was put on alert and started working to resolve the situation. During this period, was there perhaps a paradise within the CD? Definitely not. There had been a whole series of analysis, decision making, confrontation of ideas, in which the First Person in Charge was alone, in the minority. During that period, we started noticing resistance, on the part of the First Person in Charge, to accepting the procedures which had been established through the experience of previous years and were based on the fact that the decisions and determinations made by the leadership bodies were collective in nature and had to be abided by and carried out by their members. Furthermore, these processes have been effected by the First Person in Charge's reactions, upsets, anger and temper tantrums because of the criticism of his political performance.

In summary, that work plan was partially carried out in a period of 3 to 4 months and it was agreed to do away with the rest of it because of the situation of a future Congress and the financial crisis, which affected other tasks and work areas.

As of that historic time (summer of 1982), the leadership body has had to face personal decisions made by the First Person in Charge regarding his life, which affect his functioning and

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that of the leadership, due to his emotional state as well as the personal and political consequences. That period was a time of waiting and patience, to see if the comrade would stabilize. The leadership body had been through situations like this before. After two months, criticisms were made of the body as well as the comrade so the situation would be corrected. It was agreed, through discussion, to establish written rules to regulate the functioning of the leadership. There was total absence of leadership in the CD during those two months.

It should be pointed out that, up to January 1982, our Regulations/Bylaws did not include the post of First Person in Charge. It was created by the CC and ratified by the Congress two months later.

The comrade criticized himself and requested a few weeks in order to stabilize the situation, formalize the presentation of agendas and continue the work of the body.

After extensive discussion, a series of procedures that had to be included in that administrative document was put together and the First Person in Charge was entrusted with covering said discussion in a draft. After same was presented, it was amended and adopted in its entirety, with the First Person in Charge expressing reservations in the sense that there was no trust in his person.

The discussion of the draft of the document on rules for the CD raised differences of opinion in regard to the functions of the First Person in Charge. This was due to the fact that amendments were made to the draft, wherein the role of the First

Person in Charge was classified (not as overall person in charge), according to our Regulations/Bylaws and the governing function of the CD. These differences with the comrade cannot be seen as he "feels they are," in terms of lack of confidence in his person, or something "repressive." The document was a step forward in internal mechanics.

The final months of 1982 and the beginning ones of 1983 were months of arduous work for the preparation of the Congress and tasks to resolve the finances.

After the Congress was held, the First Person in Charge was supposed to prepare a rough draft of a work plan for the CD to approve and send up to the CC. The CD resolved that, in view of the serious financial crisis, the best thing would be to continue concentrating the leadership and the best cadres on the priority task of finances and recovery. That task takes us from mid-July of 1983 up to the end of November.

Beginning with the first week of August, the CD assigns tasks to the First Person in Charge in the exterior. After that, he is placed in charge of a "fiesta" (lit. party). The comrade remains abroad until the end of September. Upon his return, he is told to prepare the work plan document, to which he answered that the Program/Plan/Platform had not been finished. He is told that what is missing is the last part and that since the first part was already done, it was this last part that the project was relying on. The First Person in Charge insists that the CD give in. The month of October was concentrated on taking security measures for the Party and for comrades involved in a deficient "fiesta" (lit. party).

What have the work areas been doing all this time? They have continued giving direction and orientation to the problems and work outlined (logistics, seminars, infrastructures, etc.), in addition to the continuation of the September "fiesta" (lit. party).

November comes, plagued with the problems set forth in the CC's report. It is agreed to concentrate on the next CC and postpone the work plan since the First Person in Charge had to travel to represent the Party. The proposal would be looked at after the trip.

It was not until February, 1984, that the comrade reads a document that contained the proposal of organizing his work with a type of secretary, material and human resources. Even though the procedure was improper since each document should be turned in a week before its discussion, the document was approved after a process in which the comrade from Organization questioned the procedure and its timing and said he would abstain, after setting forth his objections in a serious and objective manner. With this comrade's objection, the CD approved measures for implementing it, ignoring what is supposedly the decision-making process.

The controversy between the CD and the First Person in Charge became worse when it came time to pass judgment on the desirability of the Organization having to use computers (in plural), because aside from having to pass judgment on the incorrect action of the Person in Charge of the Training Commission spending \$3,500 on one without consulting first, we

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now had the First Person in Charge asking for a computer that cost \$6,000, and the Finance Area recommending that we buy another one. The CD decides that we must seek advice in order to determine how beneficial this is and if one or several would be possible, after having the information. A seminar is prepared, to which the First Person in Charge is invited, who answers that he was already convinced, that he had already received sufficient information, and that the ones who were not knowledgeable were the ones who should go. That seminar had to be postponed due to the problems of the resource to be utilized.

During the third week of February, the CD receives the work plan project. The body tells the comrade that it feels he should make certain changes in the presentation of goals, objectives and activities. He is asked to do it. He refuses to do it and the comrade from Organization is put in charge of doing it. The change is turned in two weeks later.

It is at this point that the First Person in Charge expresses his desire to resign. He is told that that should not be the procedure, that the revolutionary thing to do would be to have an in-depth discussion of the differences in the CC and that the parties be willing to assume responsibility, even if the CC were to adjudge that the other one be corrected. After lengthy discussion, the comrade agreed to prepare his position in writing. It was not until the very last minute that the comrade prepared the document that he presented at the CC meeting, and time had to be allowed for reading it. The CD felt that this proceeding was not proper in the CC. Nevertheless, for the first time his view of the problem was discussed.

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The alleged "isolation"

On page 12 of his document, the First Person in Charge says that he and the CD are misinformed of what takes place in the Organization. This is a total misunderstanding on the part of the comrade, since there was time on the CD's agendas for the work areas to bring up all the problems that the CD should pass judgment on. The minutes of the Organization Area prove this, and every issue or situation that the CD had responsibility for was resolved and the comrades from Organization were advised. If the comrade feels he was isolated because the comrades in charge of each area were not providing him with day-to-day information on every detail, then he is right. On this particular subject, the CC felt that after the Congress there was no general report by area in writing. It was acknowledged that, even though there were adverse circumstances, some type of report could have been done. It should be noted that the First Person in Charge was not in the CD during August, September, and half of October.

The comrade brings up an example that is totally false in the procedure that is pointed out and the "analysis." The comrade had the same information that the person in charge of Organization had, since that same comrade relayed to the First Person in Charge what was being said about that trip and how things were proceeding so the only thing left to do was to consult regarding the advantage/benefit of doing it.

The comrade complains of being physically isolated from the CD and the rest of the Organization. The truth of the matter is that the CD, after countless violations of the directives given

to the comrade regarding his security and due to the increased harassment, visits are curtailed and it has to reduce the self-legality that the comrade had created. We are not discarding the importance of this human factor in the life of a revolutionary. However, the comrade always managed to contact the comrades who he wanted to contact.

The depersonalization campaign

The CD has always reserved for itself the prerogative of determining the time and manner in which political relations between the Party and other organizations will be established. The representation was chosen from among its members and this has been the practice with few exceptions. It was when the time came to send a delegation to formalize certain conversations that we had differences with the First Person in Charge, who argued in favor of having only one person, but later gave in to the position. Then he suggested that one more comrade be added, and there was no opposition. The delegation carried out its tasks efficiently. The most problematic situations have been when the comrade has suggested that he be sent to resolve particular problems in which there is a need to transmit some answer and the CD has felt that the situation does not justify the First Person in Charge going. The comrade has taken this as a lack of trust. As a matter of fact, it is the First Person in Charge who has acquired the least experience in terms of our official representations. In past situations and delegations, the comrade never raised the kinds of arguments and accusations which question the honesty of the CD members in the performance of

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their duties within the structures and accuse them of having bodies outside the Party. (See pg. 13, paragraph 3 of the First Person in Charge's document)

The "additional aggravating factor"

The "additional aggravating factor" is the case which has manifested the biggest difference between the First Person in Charge and the CD, where the comrade lost all his capacity for objectivity. Let us make a brief summary of what happened: J. is assigned a task, which is carried out. The second phase is taken by the person in charge of the area. The confrontation between the comrades was clear and revolved around the individual understandings of how to perform certain aspects of the project. Comrade J. refused to accept the decisions of the person in charge and the latter did not know how to properly proceed with the situation. J. acknowledged that he was the one who handled things the most improperly and that he was offensive toward the comrade in charge; that he was to criticize himself, but he refused to do the task if the person in charge of the area was in it. Both were criticized and they were required to keep working until the First Person in Charge took charge of the task. The First Comrade in Charge would make decisions without considering the opinions of the comrades, if they had differences. The task was done but was full of confrontations and differences, including with the CD.

The analysis made by the CD found sufficient grounds for recommending charges against J. and censure of the First Person in Charge for making disrespectful/contemptuous statements to the CD.

The CC passed judgment and dismissed the censure against the First Person in Charge and the charges against J. for their conduct in the "fiesta" (lit. party). Nevertheless, it found that the emotionally-charged conduct of the latter in the CD was grounds for removing him from this body. This decision was made in mid-November and caused the First Person in Charge to have more bad feelings against the CD and the CC.

In two subsequent meetings of the CC, the First Person in Charge tried to bring up the sanction again and the CC felt that the conduct of the comrade confirmed that the measure was correct. The comrade had begun to take the discussion outside the channels as well as problems that corresponded to the CC and questioned the integrity and his confidence in the leadership. He said there was a campaign to "cut the wings" of the First Person in Charge. This statement was rejected as false, a product of the comrade's subjective understandings.

The incidents that happened from December to April, having to do with comrade J., are contained in the CC's report.

#### The interview

The CD discussed the need to hold an interview of the Party. The First Person in Charge argued about the benefit of identifying the spokesperson. It was analyzed and concluded that there would be two male comrades and one female comrade and that, due to reasons of security, the suggestion made by the First Person in Charge would not be followed. The CC was informed of the decision and ratified same. When he was abroad, the comrade was told that "PF" had previously suggested an interview and that

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the opportunity could be taken to discuss with them the willingness to publish the interview. The comrades expressed their willingness to do it however we wanted to. One of the comrades travels to PR and suggests holding a live interview, to which there was resistance due to our lack of experience. He spoke of urgency. The First Person in Charge consults with Rno. and the latter tells him that if they could handle the editing within the time given by the comrade, that the decision be made. The interview was held. Only a few members of the CD did not have the opportunity to read it. The comrade edits it and gives instructions that it be turned over. The CD felt that the final draft of the interview should be processed and stopped the decision made by the First Person in Charge. All the comrades of the CD felt that this measure was correct, because even after being edited, it contained aspects that had to be rewritten in order for it to fulfill the purpose for which it had been established and to faithfully and accurately reflect the party's positions and analysis. Even the comrade in charge of Propaganda, who was going to carry out the directive, felt that this decision was correct. The First Person in Charge did not recognize the body's prerogative, reaffirmed his attitude of resigning and refused to work on the interview in any way. To us it was and would be strange/unusual for someone to question the CD's prerogative in passing judgment on work, revolutionary conduct, actions or determinations made by one or several of its components. No one escapes the decisions of the body, since the body is above each one individually, including the First Person

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in Charge, who has his own set of prerogatives, but this does not mean that his practices, suggestions, proposals, alternatives do not have to be ratified by the CD. This is the essence of the famous interview of the Party. You be the judges.

The First Person in Charge's impression of the criticism in the CD.

In his document, the comrade describes criticism as negative, repressive, depressing, accusatorial, aggressive, retaliatory, and that it was having shattering effects on morale and was causing division. Why is the comrade the one who perceives it that way? Were the other members of the CD perhaps feeling that way too when they were criticized? There have been no such allegations by the other members about this. None about the comrade's criticisms nor about those made by others. Where, then, is the explanation for this clear contradiction? Out of all the comrades, the one who always reacted to criticism, using the same words contained in the document of the First Person in Charge, was the latter. What happens is that the members who have responsibilities cannot be exempt from profound and analytical criticism. Criticism means that it must be explained that someone acted improperly, point out what was violated and make recommendations for improvement.

Criticism made of incorrect procedure on the part of leaders of the body should be processed and analyzed by the collective in order to have the greatest margin of certainty in what is pointed out. Collective criticism allows for the qualitative growth of those who participate in this fraternal process, which does not

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mean that it should not be done energetically, because otherwise, we would fall into liberalism, as we did at one point. Such liberalism, which the comrade has, is what brings about functioning on the basis of favoritism and the buddy system, bilaterally hiding the wrong actions taken against the Party and its members. Why is it that the comrade construed criticism in this way? The explanation is that the comrade does not understand the process of criticism as a collective one. That type of individualistic, personal view of the criticism made of the comrade is what led him to view it negatively and with distrust, to the point of limiting/restraining frankness and spontaneity in making criticism of the other comrades. When this point is reached, the conditions are created for falling into liberalism with the leaders. The fact that a comrade has assumed greater responsibilities in the Party does not remove him from the level of exposure to which every member of the party is subject.

When the CC started evaluating this particular situation in the CD, it properly agreed to initiate an internal discussion of the party's criticism and self criticism. This process should yield positive results in terms of understanding this kind of tool.

On pg. 20, the document sets forth what the comrade understands as "corrective measures" and enumerates several of them. Just as we told the comrade in the CC, there were no differences over whether these elements were necessary for the Party or not, but I feel that it must be the basis for him as

well as the comrades who have joined him to work together in order to improve the Party. What does need to be discussed is the difference over the proceedings of the CD. We do not feel it is necessary to enter into discussions of the reorganizational proposal presented by the comrade, because this will be analyzed and debated in the CC.

PERSON IN CHARGE OF ORGANIZATION

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PROLOGUE

DOCUMENT PREPARED BY JR. -

THIS DOCUMENT WAS WRITTEN BY JR., ADDRESSED TO THE PARTY'S  
GENERAL BASE, AS PART OF THE POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND ANSWER  
FROM THE DISSIDENT GROUP AND AS A COMRADE WHO HAS BEEN  
POINTED OUT BY THE CC AS ONE OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE  
PARTY'S PROBLEMS.

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7-5-84

Dear comrades:

I am writing these observations as a self criticism, in view of the demand made by some comrades that I not only verbally express my own perspective of the facts and analysis of same, but that I put it in writing. I will try to be faithful to what my positions were at the time the facts occurred and will do a separate part on the subsequent analysis I have made.

I am totally willing to clarify any doubt that might arise from what I am setting forth herein, or any other matters that the comrades would like explained.

I visualize three aspects of the problem we are now experiencing:

1. Power struggle
2. Grave operational mistakes/deficiencies
3. General, underlying political problems/deficiencies, which we have been burdened with for quite some time.

On the other hand, I feel that we are being confronted with a tough test that represents a challenge and a great opportunity for our organization to demonstrate a maturity and excellence that is unique in our country. If, in view of this situation of conflict, the membership of the organization is able to impose its criteria on the leadership, and lay the foundation for overcoming the underlying deficiencies, we will have a very powerful reason to feel proud of ourselves and certain that we are not just one more organization existing within the colony. If we are able to come out stronger from this abyss of division and mediocrity, we will have transformed this entire process from something negative into something positive, and to me this is the essence of the revolution, to seize victory from the claws of defeat.

My statement about the power struggle will fundamentally be based on my intervention in the CC when I was expelled from the CC and on the events that led up to that, although I will also make a couple of additional statements which I made in other subsequent CC meetings. The statement regarding operations will be the same one I made in the CC meeting, when I was expelled from same.

I will deal separately with the analysis of what I feel are some of the underlying political problems that we have been burdened with and that I feel are fundamental. I would like to be more capable so I could contribute to finding revolutionary

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solutions, but that is not the case. This notwithstanding, I feel an obligation to point out my understanding of this aspect, which, after all, is the main thing.

I will divide my presentation into two parts. The first: Power Struggle and Grave Operational Mistakes/Deficiencies. The second: Political Problems and Possible Alternatives.

### Power Struggle

At this point, after reading the documents by Romano, Tino and Roberto; after comparing the sanctions taken against Greco and against me, in relation to those that were not taken against Romano, Tino or Roberto; and after having witnessed the dynamic of the last meetings of the CC in which I participated (if the minutes were not taken/seized, they could perhaps illustrate this to the membership); one cannot conceal what is overwhelmingly evident and deny that there was and still is a power struggle.

I started becoming aware of this when I lived through and analyzed what happened in relation to the A.B. operative. In that operative, which was a success under conditions that were extremely different if not outright difficult, it turns out that part of the CD (Romano, Tino, Roberto and Johnny) brings charges against Greco and me, without even speaking to us about it. Where was the principle of criticism and self criticism at that time? Why, for the first time in the history of the organization, were charges brought without even talking to the people so the facts could be evaluated? Why didn't the CD, particularly Romano, who was temporarily in charge, wait, as he later told me to wait when I questioned him about Roberto and his incident with Yayi? Why, when Romano and the CD already knew that Tino and I were having problems and that I had asked them to send only one of us in order to avoid problems, did they not accept part of the responsibility for the conflict, and then allow themselves to be used in the bringing of charges in order to resolve a personal grudge of Tino?

To this I must add that at the time I asked what criteria they had (Romano, Roberto and Johnny) to pretend to direct over the telephone from San Juan, a phase of the operative that was more than a thousand miles away, especially when none of them had planned an operative in the past six years (at least) and, in the case of Roberto, he had not even participated in one single operative of the organization, when, furthermore, none of them had ever lived in the US and those of us who were in the operative had lived there at least twelve years, and when they had no other source of intelligence, whereas we did, and up to this day they have not been able to answer this question. Even so, they violated the rule that says that the one who makes decisions is the one who has the assignment of carrying out the operative, and they proceeded to bring charges. What they were

also not able to explain, were the reasons why, if they wanted / insisted on imposing their opinion that we wait a month before moving, did they send the comrades requested for the move, instead of sending word for us not to do it? And why did they wait until we were 1,400 miles from where they wanted us to stay and a little over a hundred miles from the final objective, before telling us that we were supposed to have stayed?

None of this had a reasonable explanation, because it was not correct, either in administrative or military terms, nor in terms of common sense.

The CC could not see what was involved in this and my behavior had a lot to do with this happening the way it did. They focused on my having insulted Tino and did not look at the process, which even with a different outcome would have been turned around.

I should point out, however, that I submitted my resignation to the CC as a self criticism for my lack of respect, which broke the confidence in the group. Although I did state that I was not the only one responsible for the incident leading to the loss of confidence, I submitted my resignation due to my responsibility in it. My resignation was not accepted because they felt it was the easy way out for me and that I had to face up to the sanctions I deserved.

In my opinion, from that moment on, the usual conflicts that any organization or body can have went through a significant change, entering openly now into a power struggle, with its personal alliances that are outside the sound, revolutionary principles of the organization. This became evident in the subsequent alliances that took place in the operational cases and in the blackmail/negotiations in which they became involved in the case of Roberto.

It should be pointed out that this power struggle was being manifested in subsequent meetings, but nothing was done about it and it all led to nothing, except for Romano's statement to the effect that he "had nothing to criticize himself for."

After that I analyzed the reason why the struggle came about and, apart from the personal factors, I believe I have found others that are very common, are organizational in nature, and have contributed to this struggle coming about.

In the first place, the functional structure (divided into work areas based on their respective functions) tends, in all organizations, to foment a spirit of individual power and, in the leadership, this is not conducive to an adequate spirit of working together as a team.

In the second place, every organization/group goes through different stages in its internal growth which can be



characterized as, first of all, "getting to know each other," then the "honeymoon" stage (if you are able to overcome the "conflict" stage). The "conflict" stage is usually characterized not only by differences of criteria, but also by conflicts over prerogatives and organizational responsibilities.

Thirdly, the absence of well-defined goals, as well as the assigning of responsibilities to be carried out, impedes objective evaluation and encourages the development of subjectivity and self-serving alliances.

### Grave Operational Errors and Deficiencies

The criticism that I made of the lack of operational professionalism, the grave political error of underestimating the importance of integrity as a revolutionary quality, and the resulting distrust in the leadership that it caused is what has led the CC to expel me from said body.

Even before that, including the time when I was still in the US, I had pointed out that Tino was not competent to be the person in charge of the military. My first statement in that regard was an individualistic one, when I said in the CD that I would rather resign than have to work with him. However, I did follow the directive and went to carry out the task. Upon returning, I brought before the CD the fact that I wanted to propose that he be removed from his position for being incompetent, because I felt responsible for his having been named to the position and I did not want to be liberal, nor carry the burden of being responsible for a complete standstill (in the best of cases) or a total loss (in the worst of cases), which would be taking place.

When I brought this up to the CC (I brought it up because the CD did not put it on the agenda), the first damage had already been done, due to Tino's incompetence and lack of paying attention to security. The CC appointed a commission led by Roberto and made up by Mayra and Martin, which investigated (although they did not interview any of his previous subordinates - Paloma, Bruno, Yayi, Nora and Moncho - or even Falcon) and determined that Tino was deficient in terms of planning operatives but was a magnificent leader. The only dissident vote to the report was mine.

At the meeting during which I was expelled from the CC, I pointed out that two of the three who comprised the area's work team had resigned because of Tino's bad dealings and the third one had decided to give him an ultimatum to either change or he would also refuse to work with him.

With respect to the other mistakes that caused my distrust in the CC's professionalism and capacity for self-criticism, I pointed out that, in addition to the robbery of the \$370 thousand for which I blamed Romano (since the answer to my previous request for a report had been the nebulous statement that it was

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"under investigation"), were now added the locale that had fallen and "Bebe" (lit. Baby). My position in relation to the 370 has always been unequivocal - that it was negligence and a gross error to keep that in one place: 1) next to a hot public housing project, (2) surrounded by a mountain (3) that had been broken into in the past, (4) had no hiding place, and (5) where a third person, who was not part of or even a collaborator of the organization, lived. Furthermore, I have always held that Romano's insinuation that it was an inside job did not free him of the responsibility and/or was one of his smoke screens.

In relation to the locale, I pointed out the elements that I had, so I could receive clarification about whether they were true or not. First, that Indo had told me there was an internal rule prohibiting weapons in the locale; second, that that weapon had been taken there no less than two months prior to the incident; third, that it was taken there by Romano/Mayra and that he (Indo) had told Romano on more than one occasion to take it out; forth, that Romano did not delegate or authorize anyone to take it out and that it could not be done without his authorization; fifth, that Romano himself had said that two weeks before that they detected an attempted break-in on the same floor (although not in the locale) and sixth, that the time for the commission that had been assigned (under the leadership of Romano himself) to make the report had elapsed.

I also pointed out that what concerned me the most was the total lack of a self critical attitude and of learning from mistakes on the part of Romano, for it was not even two weeks after the incident at the locale that his attitude regarding "Bebe" (lit. Baby) (and I know about it because I heard him and Tino saying it) was that he would not have to be under custody at all times because he was allegedly not going to leave. I then went to the CC, saying that we had to offer greater guarantees and a better example than that to the membership and to the people, that not doing it would mean succumbing to the essence of colonialism - mediocrity - and that our duty was to struggle for excellence and professionalism in our operations.

I further said that it seemed strange to me that the rules for determining responsibility were being inverted in different cases; when evaluating the vehicle that was seized in the "Guillotina" (lit. Guillotine), it is the person in charge of the operative who is held responsible for the mistake and, in the case of the 370, the person in charge of the operative is not held responsible for the mistake and in both cases the one who escaped responsibility by inverting the rule was Romano. I gave other examples of inconsistency in the administrative measures.

Finally, I touched on what I found was a grave error of the CC in relation to the position of women in the organization and the CC's underestimation of integrity as a fundamental value in revolutionary morality. I stated that the position that had been taken in Roberto's case was telling all the women comrades that

they better keep their mouths shut if a male comrade tried to get fresh with them in the performance of their revolutionary tasks, that its message to the men was that all they had to do was allege they had been "provoked" (even when turned down by the women comrade) in order to be cleared of responsibility and that this was a serious mistake. I analyzed the situation in more depth to show that Roberto had lied and pointed out that this was a grave mistake that showed lack of integrity and reflected his willingness to do anything to keep his position. Then I expressed my concern that if Roberto was willing to do this to keep his position, what would he be capable of doing to keep from doing 40 years. Furthermore, I asked on three occasions why the CC had abstained. (I already knew that it was because Roberto had "blackmailed," in Romano's words, the CD, except for Greco, who was giving the rest of them the opportunity to correct themselves, since he had already said in private that they had made a mistake).

I said that I would not resign from the CC or from the orga. because of my experience in the "Caviota" (lit. Sea Gull) where I had gotten lost and the other comrades waited for me; one of them even risked his own life and went back to look for me/pick me up, which led me to not abandon my fellow comrades at times when they were lost and did not know what was going on. I warned them that I had no confidence in their judgment and that I would stay until I could take it before a congress.

Naturally, Roberto, Tino, Romano, Lisa and Martin opted to expel me from the CC, with Greco and Mayra's opposition, and imposed a gag order.

I acknowledge that to have said that I doubted Roberto's ability to stand firm if faced with 40 years was incorrect, but I reaffirm what I said about integrity and honesty being the most important qualities of a leader and that Roberto has neither, which is a real shame for the revolution because he is a gifted person, but is not qualified to be a leader and/or a member of the Party.

The analysis of why, after years of success, we committed a rash of mistakes in a period of a few months, cannot remain on a personal basis. Although each person has to assume his own degree of responsibility, especially when it is required of everyone else, we must analyze the causes that go beyond this. My opinion in this respect is the following:

As you know, in the Congress certain organizational changes that involved the military structure are agreed upon. Furthermore, there are certain changes or rotations made in the personnel at the leadership level. Before, almost all matters related to security or military work were the responsibility of the comrades belonging to the military area, which meant that those of us who did that work were the most experienced and knowledgeable. When the changes were made, the new comrades did

not have the experience because they had not participated in that type of work before and were, therefore, more prone to making mistakes that beginners make.

This, of course, became more complicated due to two factors of a personal/personalized nature - the power struggle and the know-it-all attitude, but in the end we learned an organizational lesson.

### Political Problems

Now I will touch on some of the main political problems that I feel we have been having and that we must resolve in order to keep our commitment and complete our mission.

First, I would have to say that we have placed undue emphasis on the financial problem. It seems to me that due to the total lack of sufficient resources to implement tasks or projects for a long time; that is, out of necessity and for reasons of ideological and organizational deficiencies, we placed too much importance on the financial situation, in detriment to other elements and problems. In other words, we thought that the key to our problems was to have economic resources in order to resolve the other problems, and this was not right.

In my opinion, this is due to a bourgeois concept of making material resources more important than the political problems and the organizational development of cadres. This concept of placing greater emphasis on the infrastructure than on human resources and their political, technical and military development still persists. This could be evidenced by an analysis of the areas' expenses (if the figures exist).

To a certain degree, and fundamentally due to the pressure exerted by the members of the base, we realized that this approach was not right. Shortly before the Congress, we had analyzed in the military area that training would be the key, the missing link in the chain. It was for this reason that I told the CC that I did not want to continue to be in charge of the military area and that I wanted to dedicate myself to the training area, within the military area, because I had realized there was a contradiction between the emphasis on the operations (and, as a part of that, emphasis on the financial ones) and the organizational development of the entire body and of the organization in general.

However, up to this time, although in theory there has been recognition of the importance of training in the organization's development, this has not been put into practice.

The following is the chronology of my responsibilities in the Training Area:

1- During the CC's meeting in June of 1983, I requested and was assigned the responsibility of Training which is a sub-area under "ANDO." My priority assignments were the transition of "Andres" and the carrying out of "el Santo" (lit the Saint); (which was done at the end of June).

2- I was assigned the planning and organization of AB and I leave on August 3, 1983. After doing the task, I return on September 30.

3- I am in PR during the entire month of October. I asked for a meeting with Reymundo to integrate him into the work. They took more than 3 weeks to set up the meeting. We met and agreed on certain jobs/tasks.

4- In November I was assigned to travel to the US to organize a job/task related to AB. I returned on December 12 and asked for a meeting with Reymundo in order to follow up on his work. The comrade could not be contacted until April of 1984 (a meeting which I did not attend).

5- In January I submit a proposal to "ANDO" regarding how to implement the Training Plan. It was not answered until April 3, on which date they tell me that the proposal was not accepted.

6- During the months of February and March I was summarily suspended from all work of the Party because I gave Roberto a well-deserved beating.

7- On April 3, during an "ANDO" meeting, I submitted my resignation as the person in charge of the Training Area and gave the following reasons:

a- The proposed plan that was submitted by the Training Area was not answered for more than three months.

b- Not one single cent was allotted to the area's budget.

c- The contacts with Reymundo were not made with even a minimum of promptness and, furthermore, I was later told that he was not available.

d- I could not accept responsibility for something that I had no power to implement. Besides, I was afraid that that was the intention, to hold me responsible for a failure that was guaranteed by organizational obstacles.

Anyway, during said meeting in which I submitted my resignation, I clarified for the comrades of "ANDO" that I was willing to serve as a resource for the Area and I offered alternatives.

When I asked for \$300 to have certain materials translated, I was told that said materials would have to be submitted to "ANDO" first, to test their usefulness. When I went to the meeting to deliver them, same had been called off and I was never notified of another meeting.

I must clarify that during the second meeting that I attended after AB, in October, Romano told me that the CD had relieved me from the training area of "Andres," regardless of whether or not the charges brought against me prospered or not.

In terms of identifying political problems, the little importance given to training, education and development of the most important resource, the cadres, has been one of our greatest deficiencies and, let it be clear that I feel just as responsible for this as anyone else (I say this because it has been said that I try to get out of responsibility).

In my judgment, a third problem is and has been an incorrect view of what democratic centralism is in practical, operational terms. Here we have (and I don't exclude myself, because as a result of AB I began to see it and understand it little by little) interpreted and applied the aspect of centralism in an authoritarian and elitist fashion, instead of using it as a guiding policy, and the democratic aspect as a representative democracy instead of a participative democracy.

This political error has generated many of the operational mistakes, and, in turn, has obstructed the possibility of finding their solutions. The underestimation of the base and the refusal to submit the problem for its consideration stem from elitism.

From authoritarianism comes repressive conduct in confronting differences and the stifling of initiative, as well as other errors.

It is from the concept of "representative" democracy that they claim the right to make decisions without allowing participation until the next elections.

All these are petit bourgeoisie deviations that harm the principle of democratic centralism. They are petit bourgeoisie deviations because they view the leader as "owner" and "employer" and the membership as employees.

Another serious problem that we had and still have is what I have interpreted as "practicalism:" absence of an operational plan that puts all of the organizational resources to work (people, time, money) in the most effective way possible, in accordance with strategic criteria. The absence of this strategic plan has led, in turn, to some additional dealings that are incorrect. For example, the leadership dedicates itself to supervising the day-to-day work, which in addition to being an abdication of its fundamental responsibility, increases its

authoritarianism and stifles the initiative and growth of the cadres. Another negative result of the lack of a plan and definite, specific goals that are based on that plan, is that there are no objective criteria for evaluating or measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the work and then we fall into the habit of making subjective, personal judgments that lead to and encourage conflicts and power alliances. It also stands in the way of following up on the comrades' tasks and development.

An additional negative result of this lack of defining operational strategy (not philosophical or political in broad terms), can be summed up in the saying "you can spread yourself too thin." The resources have not been concentrated on strategical-organizational criteria.

Lastly, I am convinced that we have been negligent in elevating the class level of the Party. We have not given proper attention to the struggle for establishing proletariat hegemony within the Party, both on the ideological as well as the organizational level. We have not given enough emphasis to the principle of quality over quantity, to the proletarianization of the practice and ideology (not just the theory) of the cadres, and especially the leaders.

#### ALTERNATIVES I SUGGEST

I want to point out, in the first place, that I participated in all the errors and deviations I have pointed out, that only recently (9 months ago) have I become aware of them and being aware of something and being able to propose an alternative are not the same thing.

"Every cloud has a silver lining" and to a certain extent I feel very fortunate that I was expelled from the CD, because the expulsion forced me to introspection and reflection, took me away from the day-to-day work, gave me time to think and study and placed me in a position which allowed me to see things from another perspective. I understand that my process of re-education has just started and I want to continue it. To all the present members of the leadership, I tell you in all sincerity that it is a very positive process and instead of rejecting it, they should seek it.

I believe that the most I can contribute in the search for solutions to our deficiencies and problems are several suggestions regarding the methodology or criteria so we may all contribute to the development of the process of improvement.

The main principle of rectification and the definition of solutions should be the participation of the entire Party and its bodies in the process. I specifically suggest the following rules:

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1- Participation by the persons who are affected or called upon to make a decision as part of the decision making process, as well as in the phase of defining the situation/problem/goal (and subsequent evaluation of the results or the progress).

2- Establish the principle of decision making at the level of execution or the level closest to that of execution where the elements of judgement exist.

3- Redefine the role of the leader, basing his role on an example and on the contribution to comrades with whom he works, not on his "authority" over them. Demand relationships of professional to professional and of "he who orders, goes" and not supervisor-employee relationships.

In the rectification and edification of the Party, I think we should struggle to develop the hegemony of the proletariat within the Party to make it deserving of the name Party of the Workers.

For this, I suggest certain practical measures:

a - Raise the level of class conscienceness of all the comrades through ideological education (not only theory).

b - Emphasize and display particular interest in the recruitment of workers and the election of comrades from among these workers to positions within the leadership.

c - Work to edify and consolidate the Party through participation in organizations of the masses and popular movements.

To insure the vanguard nature and the combativeness of the Party and to make it deserving of the name revolutionary, I suggest the following measures:

a - Emphasize evaluation, work among the masses, but demand a practical demonstration of effectiveness and professionalism in the clandestine and armed struggle. Not simply accept an alleged "willingness" or an undemonstrated capability.

b - Analyze and evaluate the work among the masses with a view toward elaborating a more precise definition of the political work among them. Touching, for example, upon what sectors to prioritize, what organizational position to follow, what styles of work to promote, etc. All of this for the purpose of dissolving the relative isolation and weighing the work styles.

To guarantee a good organizational operation, I suggest the following measures be taken:

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a- That all the members prepare an analysis to identify the achievements and failures, the strengths and weaknesses, the moving forces and the obstacles, and from there begin to synthesize and establish the plan for rectification on the organizational plane.

b- Emphasize the development of the human resources instead of the infrastructure resources. For example, instead of having spent \$75,000 on an apartment for meetings, if that amount would have been spent on training for the members of the organization, the results in productivity for the orga would be much more positive.

c- Adopt rules and budget and investment measures with strategic criteria to avoid wasting financial resources, without even knowing how much has been spent, as is the present situation. We should remember that our income is the result of great risks and sacrifices by some of our comrades, and that our revolutionary obligation is to guarantee the best use of it, for the benefit of the revolution.

The fact that we have failed to earn between \$500,000.00 and \$700,000.00 in interest, in addition to wasting other resources is totally unacceptable and irresponsible on our part.

A financial and economic policy is indispensable as well as adequate controls.

- What is going to be the relation between expenditures and income?

- Are we going to maintain the expenditures within the income or are we going to operate with a deficit?

- Do we wish to have the income surpass the expenditures in order to be able to help the organization grow?

- If we are going to operate with a deficit, how large are we going to allow it to be?

- How are we going to generate more income?

- Are we going to limit ourselves to the traditional methods or are we going to look for investments?

- How much do we aspire to generate through traditional means?

- How much are we going to invest in productive businesses?

- What will be the criteria for the investments?

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- How much do we aspire the ROI to be?
- How much will be liquid? What degree of liquidity, 30, 90 days, one day, one year?
- How much will be in an emergency fund?
- How much will be invested long term/short term?
- How much in human resources, how much in material resources? in real estate?
- What will be the rules for the budget? Zero-base budget or some other type?
- Fixed budget or flexible budget?
- What will be the impact of inflation on the interest?
- Are we falling into the trap of financing long term investments with short term funds?
- Will the political work represent expenditures exclusively or will it be able to support itself?
- Should we aspire to a self-supporting front? Completely? Partially, what percent?
- Will the responsibility for providing financially fall exclusively on the central level?
- How will the laundering of the money be planned?

In order to resolve these and many other urgent questions of a financial nature, I suggest we recruit a work team and provide it with the means to be able to do this job. It is an indispensable investment since we have already wasted more than half a million due to incompetence in this aspect. We visualize investment as a way of saving ourselves from losing another half a million due to ignorance.

I suggest the following criteria should be used to select the people to make up this work team:

- a - That they be of proletarian origin.
- b - That none be from the present CC, since they have already demonstrated that they are uninterested and incapable.
- c - That they have experience or knowledge which would serve as a background or basis (accounting, finances, computers, filing, business experience).

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ch - That they be interested.

d - That they submit in a month's time a plan as to how they are going to organize themselves, their goals and activities.

4- Report on and evaluate the expenditures that have been made to date. I suggest the following procedure:

5- Establish goals and objectives that are clear, ambitious, but realistic and quantifiable (for each body and comrade) which serve the purposes of the operational strategic plan so that each one knows where he is headed, why and how he will know his degree of success.

That every six months, each cadre put in writing what his goals are and those of his person in charge, as he sees them, in addition to the standards for fulfilling them which they believe are demanded of them or against which they are measured. To this they should add the things they should do to achieve these goals and the obstacles within their area/work group. Finally, they should enumerate the things that their leader and the orga do to make the work easier and the ways in which they are obstacles and make an outline of what they propose to do during the coming year to reach these goals. After this report is accepted by the leader, it will become the "commitment" of the comrade.

6. Establish for each goal/objective the controls/indicators that will allow each body/cadre to know if there are weaknesses/deficiencies in time to take corrective action. That these have the basic purpose of making self-control possible rather than control from the top or outside of the body.

7. Establish for each goal/objective the principle of responsibility, that there not be any task that has no one responsible for it and that the person knows what his responsibility is. When you cannot evaluate, you cannot correct and you cannot feel that you have achieved something.

Finally, comrades, I believe we have to be true to the reason behind the existence of Marxism and its essence. It is not enough to make an analysis of the reality or the situation. Our purpose is not to understand the situation in Puerto Rico, but rather to transform it. But neither will we be able to transform it if we do not apply a strategic plan based on the correct political, organizational and military principles.

The drafting of an operational plan based on strategic criteria and the adherence to that plan by everyone, is an indispensable minimum requirement to achieve the goals we propose.

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The drafting of this plan has to be done with the participation of as many as possible so that we will all be in agreement and will all understand where we are headed and why. This is the only way which will guarantee the adherence of the entire Party to the plan and at the same time allow freedom for all the creative capacity and productive energy of each one of the members in a coherent manner, a case in which the whole is a much much more than the sum of its parts and the parts reach their maximum potential.

War is politics through other means and the laws of dialectics are the same as those of politics. Sun Tse said "Know your enemy and you will know yourself and in 100 battles you will win 100 victories." I believe that strategic principle is the basic point, in politics as well as in war.

Based on that analysis and with a clear mind regarding the final objective, we should draft the strategy and operational plan to transform reality and move from one point to another.

The existence of an operational plan is absolutely indispensable in order to take the initiative, a basic aspect for success. Without a plan we will always be reacting to the conditions imposed on us, which is extremely disadvantageous.

I think the following criteria and techniques can be useful to us in the drafting of the strategy and the operational plan.

The principle of concentration of forces. "One should not bite off more than one can chew." We have to concentrate sufficient resources on the issues, sectors or places where they will be most effective. To determine which ones these are, we should analyze and weigh the following criteria:

- The most revolutionary reservoir/source.
- The most conscientious sector.
- The most organized and active sector.
- The sector with the greatest possibility for growth.
- The sector with the greatest political influence.
- The sector in which we have the greatest possibility of doing an effective job.
- The sector with the greatest importance from a military standpoint.
- The sector needing the least investment of resources to do an effective job.

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- The sector in which there may be a void of organizational work which we can fill.
- The sector with the greatest possibility of cooperation.
- The sector which offers the greatest security.

In conjunction with the principle of concentration of forces, we should bear in mind the principle of mobility and security. In other words--"Let's not put all our eggs in one basket." We should concentrate efforts, yes, but not on one single issue, sector and/or place.

We should bear in mind at all times the principle of economizing of efforts. Although we have to concentrate sufficient resources, because otherwise they are being wasted too; we should guard against gigantism and wasting effort on projects or resources which produce very little. Bear in mind always that a resource that is not utilized or is underutilized is a bad use of this resource.

All of the above demands a unity of purpose and command, and for this, democratic centralism is one of the fundamental contributions to the success of the revolution. However, as all principles, it does not exist in the abstract, rather it is developed through practice. Under the guise of democratic centralism, the CC of the "Partido Nueva Joya" (lit. New Jewel Party) in Grenada committed the greatest injustices and facilitated the destruction of the process by imperialism. We have to guarantee the application of democratic centralism within the proletariat ideology.

The ideological hegemony between the petite-bourgeoisie and the colonial mentality weighs on all of us and constitutes a greater obstacle to our progress. All the leaders of this organization, regardless of how Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary we aspire to be, have demonstrated in practice, which is the only objective measure, our ideological deficiencies. It behooves us all to be self-critical on the same plane--practice. To have deficiencies and commit errors is natural and common, what makes us different as revolutionaries and as serious and honest people and validates our commitment of class, is the attitude we assume when faced with errors in practice, which is the only way to rectify and demonstrate that we have corrected ourselves. In that spirit, I reiterate my previous expressions to the effect that I understand I am not qualified for any leadership position, until I have undergone a process of re-education which I estimate will take not less than three years. I pledge before the members of the organization to serve where they believe best, to accept additional sanctions if they believe I should have them.

contribute to the utmost of my capabilities and efforts to the rectification and edification of the Party, to fight for the ideology of the proletariat and for national liberation.

LET THE CONTRIBUTION AND NOT THE POSITION  
BE THE MOTIVATION FOR PRIDE

LET THOSE WHO ARE DOWN MOVE UP

Jr.

6/22/82  
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PROLOGUE

POLITICAL ANALYSIS - DISSIDENT GROUP

PREPARED BY GR.

THIS DOCUMENT WAS ASSIGNED TO GR. BY THE DISSIDENT  
GROUP, AS THIS SECTOR'S POLITICAL DOCUMENT ADDRESSED TO  
THE GENERAL BASE OF THE PARTY.

To all comrades, sympathizers and militants in the reorganizational process of the Party:

For several months we have been making numerous efforts to bring all the problems of our Party to the attention of the militants, efforts which were at first hindered by the "official body" of the Party.

As a result of the initiative of comrades who believed that maintaining the integrity of the Party was vital, agreements were reached to establish a commission representing the "official" opinion, and another one representing the dissenting opinion, in order to find a way to plan and implement certain debates.

The intolerance of the "official" position did not permit such an initiative to be carried out since they felt we were violating Democratic Centralism, and communications were severed. Afterwards, and as a result of the first assembly which 24 comrades participated in and was demanded by the base itself, orders were given to resume the conversations, this time changing the composition of the "official" commission and adding to it two members from the base and one from the Leadership. The first session, although arduous, was promising. Nevertheless, the "official body" decided to suspend the conversations. At the same time, new events take place regarding the security and persecution of leading comrades of our sector.

In spite of the fact that we were waiting for the conversations to resume with a commission that we considered positive, a new Assembly is held in which several comrades of the "official body" participate, comrade , and a total of twelve comrades. Resolutions are approved at the assembly which were completely opposite to the resolutions of the first assembly and which break the spirit of unity. ] ?

\* [ For security reasons and due to our responsibility towards all the comrades, we are forced to suspend the conversations and to plan a reorganizational process, now outside of the "official body." We feel that the comrades in the "official body" did not have the serious intention of achieving the discussion of the problems at all levels and have impeded the development of the process, as was the majority's wish. In addition to this, continuing the process the way we had visualized it would be irresponsible and would place all the comrades in danger. In light of this situation, and to fulfill our commitment to reorganize the party, we have made the decision to:

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1. Contest and no longer recognize the "official body's" right to speak in the name of the Party, to organize party "assemblies" and to be the party's representatives.
2. Send our document and a letter from comrade Jr. to all the comrades.
3. Discuss the problem in its entirety with all those who so require.
4. Request from all the comrades who feel they are able to do it, their position concerning the matter.
5. Begin a reorganizational process for the entire party.

We know that these are drastic measures. Nevertheless, it is the only way possible given the circumstances. We hope all the comrades will understand and participate in the process. In the name of the Party Reorganization Committee,

Greco

PS: We urge all the comrades to whom we have given copies of the documents to take the following measures:

1. Take their notes separately
2. Burn the document
3. Send their position with the same comrade who brought same to them

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POLITICAL - IDEOLOGICAL DOCUMENT REGARDING  
THE ORGANIZATION'S PROBLEM

I. Introduction

For many months now, perhaps even years, we have seen in our organization several contradictions whose causes, initially, we did not have the ability to identify. These contradictions have not been related to the political, strategic aspect. In other words, they have manifested themselves separately from certain analyses of the national reality and strategic concepts of struggle. Ex: (colonial crisis, imperialist strategy, annexation offensive and factors of the concept of struggle; ex. (armed struggle, struggle of the masses, the policy on age, etc.) have not been factors in which one could say there are contradictions that cannot be overcome.

However, there are certain marked differences between the view that is held of the party, of its internal relations, its structures, the interpretations with respect to the operational rules, the training and utilization of its political cadres, and the concrete implementation of those theoretical-practical instruments and mechanisms which serve the purpose of making the party function properly.

These factors, which cover in an analytical manner both our Plan For The Struggle and our Plan for National Unity, do not constitute the essence of the problem. We can state that, from that point of view, there are no political or analytical differences. To this effect, the organizational and administrative concept suffered certain maladjustments, particularly after the first Congress of our party, although

those differences had been presented and emphasized considerably several months prior to the approval for and holding of the Congress.

- These contradictions began to evidence themselves, from the practical point of view, as contradictions in the midst of the Directive Committee. Therefore, it was the Directive Committee body itself that was assailed by these same contradictions and within which certain struggles came about which were no longer part of a process to analyze, evaluate and synthesize the true and central aspect of the situation, but were rather certain Directive Committee members launching personal offenses with no logical explanation for the purpose of eliminating the "source" of the problem. For these comrades, the problem was the Party's First Person in Charge. The First Person in Charge, who did not yet know the true nature of the problem, tried to resolve the contradictions at that time, seeing them as negligence and lack of feeling of belonging on the part of the organization's members, proposing a Congress that would be capable of integrating, into one current coherent body, all the Party's members, regardless of their specific level of participation.

The holding of the Congress created new expectations and, for the first time, offered a type of participation to the base which, in turn, opened up possibilities for a greater degree of participation, in keeping with the proposals which were made and the desires of the base itself. In the meantime, the problem in the midst of the CD quickly intensified. Nevertheless, it was

not until the carrying out of the "Aguila Blanca" (lit. White Eagle) Project, with which we wished to acquire absolute independence and economic stability, that the contradictions reached their highest levels. It is then that very definite offensives begin within the CD, offensives aimed at the comrades who are considered obstacles, according to the view that was being promoted. The aggressiveness that resulted forced an analysis of the problem, definitions, and efforts to resolve them on the part of the First Person in Charge.

Those efforts were worked on through repeated representations made in the CD and the CC, all of which, in the First Person in Charge's judgment, go into a document for the CC which denounces the problem the Party and the leading cadres at the CD level have experienced. The things that were pointed out have very limited results, for which reason the First Person in Charge claims the right, as one inherent to his position, to take the problem to the level of the base.

The problem, which at first was organizational in nature, (although the differences of opinion take on an ideological nature) becomes worse due to numerous events which have been taking place ever since the last few months of last year (after the economic operative). These events underscore the contradictions and expand their limits, from the moral/morale point of view, to the aspects of security and competence of leaders in fundamental aspects which characterize our organization: clandestine operations and the military operative capacity. To this effect, the additional, highly conflictive

problems which affect us are: the robbery of a considerable sum of money, the mistakes committed in the planning and execution of "La Guillotina" (lit. The Guillotine); the moral deviation of a high-ranking leader of the Party; the search of our central files locale; the problem resulting from Bebe's arrest and our responsibility in the events, all of which is aggravated by a profound incapacity for self criticism in order to resolve the entire problem.

There is no doubt that the Party was headed toward a split in its forces. The attitude assumed by the faction that claims the "legality" and "structural power" was, even before the emergence of the "organized dissident faction", one of intolerance, subjugation of the dissident faction in the name of "Democratic Centralism", and consistent reluctance to accept the faction's demand to "go to the base" in search of unifying solutions to the differences. This situation was topped off by the "suspension" of the First Person in Charge from the CC and from the Party, as well as other members, alleging absolute legality.

Now, along with this, comes the attempt to transform the underlying problem into an artificial one, such as the "violation of democratic centralism", etc. However, thanks to the efforts on the part of sectors of the base itself, the accelerated move toward a split was held up and positive communication between the two factions was established for the purpose of "saving the unity of the Party". (See Note 1)

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## ONE CENTRAL PROBLEM AND TWO DEVIATIONS

If we analyze our problem in its entirety, with subjective detachment and scientific precision, we will be able to see that same has three aspects which are markedly different from each other, for one is the underlying problem, another one is formative and ideological in nature on the part of the cadres in central leadership positions and the third one is that of the deviation to find the solution.

The complexity of this lies in the fact that if we do not analyze the situation dialectically, we could easily confuse the cause with the effect. This, in short, is what has happened in our organization. On one hand, seeing the power struggle, or the First Person in Charge's deficiencies, as causes when they are really deviations of the underlying problem. Also, to try to summarize the problem and say it is a violation of democratic centralism or the structures, etc., is equivalent to confusing the law of cause and effect even further. All of this is equivalent to assuming a defensive role and perennially maintaining the "status quo" which has proven, in practice, to be inefficient and, as in every inefficient system when it reaches a peak period, negative if the possibility of change is denied. In the following pages we present an assessment of three aspects because, in spite of the fact that the last two can be considered more like effects than causes, they have also caused problems which, in addition to having deviated from the central problem, have created other problems thus affecting the sound process of analysis and synthesis of the contradictions.

## II. CENTRAL PROBLEM

### 1. BACKGROUND

Our organization emerged and grew, in its first years of life, as a formal organization with criteria of intelligence techniques. The fact that we received hard blows in our beginnings, in addition to the fundamental factor of having a powerful enemy that is technically advanced, and a divided country with a considerable number of people who are willing to collaborate with the enemy, leads to the establishment of certain organizational mechanisms of a high degree of compartmentalization, profound centralization and an almost absolute discipline of subordination. This organizational view had certain positive effects while the number of comrades was small and while the objectives and projections were within the realm of real and limited possibilities. The clarification and adoption of certain political positions in keeping with the ideological and political growth of our organization (reaching the masses, fronts, unity, etc.) and the adoption of a party line, did not correspond with the necessary changes at the organizational, structural and formative levels to keep up with the new challenges. The concept of a clandestine party, different in terms of quality and quantity from the concept of a clandestine political-military group, did not receive, therefore, from the organizational standpoint, certain adaptations in the totality of what represents our organizational and operational rules in keeping with this new reality or adopted concept. The deeply internalized work styles, plus the negative attitudes

assumed when confronting the change, constituted the objective basis of the problem, the results of which are known by everyone.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AND WORK STYLES

To be burdened with structures, work styles and previous organizational concepts, in addition to being very negligent in specific planning for the carrying out of organizational tasks, and all of this when we are trying to increase the organizational quality, can be nothing more than limiting and contradictory factors. The most contradictory organizational aspects of the problem, having disastrous effects on the entire organization, have been the following:

A) CENTRALIZATION

Just as the concept of centralization can be correct under certain specific conditions (intelligence network, small organization, strict compartmentalization, etc.) it has an adverse effect when the position is one of reaching the masses, of expanding the radius of revolutionary action and the scope of the Party's objectives. We are not referring to a spectacular outreach that is achieved through actions of great importance, but rather the capacity to mobilize the masses, politically directed by the Party, using certain organizational and political mechanisms.

Extreme centralization - which has nothing to do with democratic centralism - has been a factor in continuing with the current organizational structure, in which day-to-day leadership is the responsibility of certain national leaders from each work area who, as a rule, imposed a system of leadership that impeded



evaluations and decisions on aspects that were very basic to the lower levels, in accordance with the order of organizational hierarchy. In this manner, in addition to causing a concentration of power in a few comrades, a great number of problems of lesser importance, from a responsibility standpoint, would become part of the central leadership's agenda, thus weakening the latter with this kind of work style. At the same time, the discussion of said problems eliminated, in practice, the individual's responsibility as the person in charge of different work areas, giving that responsibility to the collective as a whole.

On the other hand, and as a direct result of the element of "Centralization", the way in which compartmentalization - which is a factor of fundamental importance in our revolutionary work - was handled in a negative way.

We must all be fully aware that it is vital to maintain strict compartmentalization of a considerable amount of party information. Said information has to do with: the identity of individuals, the location of safehouses, materials being hidden, workshops and even commitments made in the carrying out of our foreign policies. However, to extend compartmentalization of the Party's different problems or, in other words, aspects which relate to the development of all the party's mechanisms, or to differences of opinion, attitudes, negative styles, or general problems of the organization, is a negative compartmentalization that will only allow the ills to take root and cause greater

damage. To try to keep "the problems from being discussed" at all levels of the organization is to deny the right of participation to all the members and to stand in the way of finding solutions to these problems.

Yet another factor that emerges as a direct result of extreme centralization is the fact that that kind of centralization impedes in every way the capacity for initiative and creativity on the part of the bodies and sectors of the base. Although on the one hand we have been critical and have demanded a greater degree of participation and creative initiative on the part of the sectors of the base, on the other hand we have established limiting procedures which in fact have eliminated the possibility of that kind of initiative being taken without seeing oneself as adversely effected if a mistake is made. These limiting procedures are related to the style of extreme centralization itself, with the type of organizational structure and rules governing compartmentalization and operations which make initiative and creativity more like a formal procedure than a practical one. The negative effect is doubled because, besides standing in the way of greater participation in the organization's work (unequal and practical), it has the effect of creating on one hand frustration and insecurity with respect to their own abilities and normal ambition for individual revolutionary growth and, on the other hand, keeps the organization from making full use of all its cadres' abilities and carrying out the correct policy of organizational expansion of the base and growth which relies, precisely, on the cadres that make up the Party's base.

There is another negative factor that has seriously affected our Party and it also has to do with an ill conceived concept of centralization and compartmentalization. This is the fact that, in addition to compartmentalizing organizational aspects and organizational problems, there is also compartmentalization of serious errors committed by comrades which affect the entire Party, a practice which prevents a determination of who is responsible.

#### B) ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING

Having "planning" become an important organizational aspect has been an uphill battle for many years and, in this sense, some advances have been made, particularly in the area of central planning at the political level. However, we have not been able to develop planning to a greater degree of scientific precision, removing fundamental aspects in order to achieve the goals which have been established. Aspects such as: planning the political work of the base with certain objectives; which are clearly established; overall planning of the Party's human resources in order to assign work to everyone; planning of training materials which are needed in order to carry out the tasks that are assigned to prepare evaluations, reports, etc., which will allow for improvement and a greater awareness of reality.

In essence, these are problems which denote serious deficiencies in the political-administrative concepts and which, in the long run, not only impede the proper execution of the policies, but also result in under-utilizing the majority of the Party's cadres and giving all the tasks to a select few.

As a result of this kind of vision, we can see how on numerous occasions we assigned duties and responsibilities to a small group of comrades, while on the other hand we failed to evaluate beforehand to see what training was necessary to allow the cadres to successfully carry out their assigned tasks. By failing to do so, we place the comrades in difficult and extremely frustrating situations. The net result has been, on various occasions, the alienation and withdrawal of good comrades from the organization. The training plans that have been made, besides not going any further than what has been written down on paper, have not been truly useful in practice because they have not been the result of a perspective of strategic planning, which includes the party's objectives, the assigning of specific responsibilities, the necessary training for carrying them out, the available resources and the rules and methods for evaluating and supervising.

C) POLITICAL WORK

In our Party, the organizational position which has been established through the fronts, has been incorrectly implemented. Although the political and strategic concept has been accurate and is projected toward the masses, it has lacked an organizational focus on the masses which corresponds to strategic guidelines.

The fronts are set up and fundamentally utilized for three purposes or main objectives: 1) to elevate the issues to massive levels, to agitate and mobilize broad based popular sectors around demands, protests, etc.; 2) to encourage unity

and 3) to attract to the organization those people who demonstrate a greater degree of consciousness.

This last political priority demands precise organizational planning that defines the methods for attracting, recruiting, educating and training, etc., all those who show positive possibilities, all for the purpose of being able to expand the base and place our party in all those centers, communities or populations which are the reason for each particular front.

In putting our policy of fronts into effect, our participation has been limited and without specific guidelines or organized preparation along party lines. The effect of this has been the creation of fronts which in themselves lack possibilities of being expanded to include the base and whose members and participants are basically limited to sectors of the intellectual elite.

The contradiction exists due to the lack of planning with projections which are primarily organizational and with projections which are primarily organizational in nature and which take advantage of an "issue", thereby preventing the party from growing with a base that is mostly proletariat and, in turn, encourages growth that is characterized by comrades coming from the professional sector and the intellectual elite. This, in itself, is not negative. To the contrary, it could be extremely positive if it goes hand in hand with the growth of a base that is now not only a proletariat one, but a popular one, in the revolutionary sense of the word.

If to this we add that in our country the professionals who are identified with the revolutionary cause are, to a greater or lesser degree, identified by the enemy and that, this same group also becomes the majority of the organization's base, we can see how, besides having a very limited growth, their usefulness to the revolution from the point of view of armed struggle and clandestine work, is limited, not because of individual willingness, but because of security.

D) DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

The perception that many comrades have of democratic centralism is comparable to the dogmas of a church. It is a tendency to convert the organization's structures into something that is sacred and untouchable, something that must be revered with submissive idolatry. The bureaucratic perception sees the structures as being above those who have created them and those they were intended to serve. These comrades cannot understand that the words democratic centralism do not just mean that the minority submits to the majority whenever there are ideological conflicts, and the opposition is treated as a minority when it could very well be representative of the majority of the party. They also fail to understand that the central committees which are small and heterogeneous, (like ours), in terms of the individual interests of the components, have the propensity for manipulation and giving up revolutionary interests for their own particular interests or needs-whether these be political or of another type - and enter into alliances for different reasons.

However, regardless of this, the "democratic" factor of what Democratic Centralism is cannot be reduced to establishing "elective" legitimacy every four years. The democratic aspect must establish, with precision, that the rules for electing a Central Committee must eliminate even the smallest possibility that the Central Committee is being influenced in a premeditated manner. Likewise, the democratic aspect imposes the obligation to keep the entire base of the party informed of problems - negative and positive - and to facilitate channeling the feelings of the party's masses, through adequate operational rules.

The view the "official group" has held of Democratic Centralism is one that is defensive and reactionary, which opposes any possibility of radical change and attempts to impose, relying on a false sense of power, certain criteria which are not explained to the party in its entirety.

E) WORK STYLES

The work styles developed by our party are related not only to the rules - or absence of same - which have been adopted, but also to the individual personality traits of comrades in the leadership who must implement the policies. Therefore, each person in charge places his/her particular stamp on the performance of his/her duties. However, from this practice, styles start emerging and tend to become the style of the party. The lack of a self critical spirit, arrogance and a lack of humility as well as authoritarianism are factors which adversely affect the revolutionary work and have a tendency to develop an employer-like nature instead of a revolutionary friendship.

All of this takes place in a setting of clandestine "secrecy" which allows the deficiencies to be hidden, since in the style that has been developed, questioning becomes something that is impracticable.

The attitude toward criticism and self criticism in our Party is extremely negative. Fundamentally, it is negative because it is applied incorrectly and has nothing to do with the theories of the classics (such as Mao Tse Tung), theories which we have not only accepted, but which have been a basic part of our education. However, there are two fundamentally important factors which deal with the proper application of criticism and self criticism.

The first of these is that, in the absence of a self critical conscious which is an element having more importance than the capacity to be critical, the value of the method of criticism and self criticism is reduced to zero. The second one has to do with the way in which the criticism is made. Criticism cannot become a weapon for attacking someone or for going around creating cases against comrades with a destructive and repressive mentality. Both of these elements are embedded in our Party, as a fundamental deviation of comrades with great responsibilities in the party.

We also feel that criticism must be made in a proper way and that this proper way must fall within the framework of our people's psychological tendencies and idiosyncrasies, as well as within the particular traits of our training. In a revolutionary process, the objective of criticism must be identical: the same



in China as it is in Puerto Rico; that is, to help us to grow, overcome deficiencies and be more efficient in the performance of our revolutionary responsibilities.

- If the criticism takes on a humiliating nature toward the recipient, without there first having been efforts to eliminate this possibility, the effect will never be a positive one. This, in essence, does not mean being dogmatic in the application of the policy of criticism and self criticism, or doing it as it was done in China or in Russia. To the contrary, we must be as creative in this as we must be in other revolutionary policies. The aspect of criticism and self criticism must be resolved in keeping with the Puerto Rican nature.

Another negative aspect that has taken on the nature of a work style has been that of authoritarianism. This tendency becomes evident mainly through the manner in which certain comrades in central leadership positions direct their work. The authoritarian style, besides being an individual one, has become a style of the party, with even worse effects. This is reflected by the fact that everything coming down from the Directive Committee, or the great majority of the problems, are discussed and decided upon in that body.

When the "directives" are handed down, they might be lacking in objectivity for those who must carry them out. However, the discipline of a compartmentalized, clandestine party, etc., precludes questioning. This style keeps the members from participating in the analysis of the different

problems and agreeing upon answers to things which are really up to them to resolve.

The chain leading to authoritarianism starts with a concentration of powers, with decisions being made "up there" on just about everything, by handing down "instructions" without any in-depth discussion and resolving problems without the participation of the corresponding levels of the groups/bodies from the base.

### III. PETITE BOURGEOIS ATTITUDES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE PROBLEM

Throughout our party's history, even from its very beginnings, we were always concerned enough to see to it that negative attitudes of a petite bourgeois nature did not become obstacles to the process. We have repeatedly said that all of us are, to a greater or lesser degree, victims of a capitalist and colonial social system which establishes the individual as the supreme being of the society and one that is way above the society itself. The individual ego is one of the ideological strongholds of the system we are combatting. Our society is being bombarded by this bourgeois concept in a thousand and one ways, resulting in an alienation of the individual, to a lesser or greater degree, from the very essence of his/her being, his/her collective sense of belonging, and his/her social responsibilities.

The most damaging vices of the petite-bourgeoisie which affect the revolutionary movement - including our party - are the traits of individualism, arrogance, authoritarianism,

egocentrism, absence of a self-critical spirit, all of which have knocked at the doors of our party on several occasions. We cannot categorically say that any of us is "free of sin" in one or any of the above manifestations. This notwithstanding, the party had always been able to combat that kind of influence and avoid irreparable harm in the past.

In spite of the efforts made, these deviations were able to penetrate the party mainly through the leadership bodies which is where they are most damaging. Arrogance became excessive. This was felt when directives were given, at times when the right of criticism was exercised, when policies had to be defined, even in our foreign relations. The net result of this was that our party, which in the past projected itself as a humble party of and for humble people, began to assume a traditional style of alienating arrogance, a reflection of the attitudes of many of its leaders.

The absence of a self critical spirit is extremely obvious. Certain negative incidents which required a humble and self critical attitude only ended up with an arrogant response, with no self criticism and, furthermore, with manipulation in order to prevent a thorough investigation of the facts for the purpose of holding people responsible.

To this effect, the offensive and negative attitude on the part of the military person in charge (Tino) in view of his work area's problems, his responsibility for the sloppiness of the "Guillotina" (lit. Guillotine), his responsibility for the resignations of all the members of his area, for the

irresponsibility in the evaluations and the negative manner of making criticism, plus his total inability to adopt a self-critical attitude, clearly prove the comrade's great inability to overcome his deficiencies.

- In "ANDO" (Romano), we can see how the comrade in charge was incapable of assuming a positive attitude in light of the facts which point to him as the person responsible. The loss of the documents, as well as the robbery of the 370 thousand, warrant an investigation, which had to be done with a profound sense of self criticism. This, so as not to go into concrete examples of the erroneous view being implemented in "ANDO" which impeded the participation and maximum utilization of all the party's problem with the Party's First Person in Charge. This comrade's attitude of total contempt for a self critical spirit has been detrimental to the process, although the comrade in charge of "ANDO" has deserved respect for certain important and fundamental qualities, such as being consistent in the struggle and his ability to analyze situations of the national reality.

As to the comrade in charge of Communications (Roberto), we feel that if there is anyone who has had a tendency to handle things according to his own interests, it has been this comrade. The comrade's inability to be self critical is evidenced clearly by his moral conduct. This is not true just by virtue of the fact itself, which could very well be characterized as a human flaw given a society in which male chauvinism is predominant, but instead by his negative attitude which distorts the truth and is extremely manipulative and blackmailing. This deviation of moral

character, and the subsequent defamatory attitude toward innocent people reveal a condition of immorality which a revolutionary organization has no room for.

- If we add to these facts the bureaucratic attitudes of other leaders who, although well-intentioned, do not fulfill their roles as leaders by confining themselves, for the solution of the problem, to certain written rules that can be manipulated according to the interests and tactical alliances between leaders who are directly affected, we are able to see why the dissident movement cannot submit to the structures which these comrades handle at their whim.

The vital factors which will mobilize the people around a revolutionary organization are: that this organization faithfully reflects their needs and that its plan of action makes their participation its central point; that the value of morality is one that is permanent and unbreakable and that integrity, honesty and humility are seen as characteristics inherent to all those who have responsibility for developing the process.

As we have seen, the individual attitudes having a high degree of petite bourgeois qualities, have adversely affected certain solutions which could guarantee the party's unity within its present structure. In order to be able to eradicate said attitudes, it is necessary to have a revolution within the revolution; that is, to destroy the roots which allow these petite-bourgeois styles to flourish, and establishing solid foundations which are capable of placing revolutionary power where it rightfully belongs; in the base.

### DEVIATION TO FIND THE SOLUTION

On previous pages we have pointed out that the mistake has been made of confusing, to a considerable degree, certain effects of the problem, which in turn are generating their own contradictions, with the fundamental cause. If it is true that this happened in this way, it is no less true that the new contradictions which were generated aggravated the ills, making them practically irreconcilable and expanding the overall limits of the problem.

The main problem is one that is political and organizational in nature; one of erroneous or insufficient administrative rules; of incorrect focusing or carrying out of supervision, reports, etc.; and the absence of clear methods in terms of organizational objectives. The problems which have been pointed out are caused by structural deficiencies as well as by the inability to develop a good system of communication for the party at the formative level. These, along with the others pointed out previously, are those which make up the underlying problem.

The deviation to find the solution resides in the fact that, due to problems unrelated to the true problem which deal more with individual aspirations generated by a power struggle, a process of campaigns begins with vestiges of personal attacks. In this way, certain attitudes were adopted and offensives were launched against comrades, with those adopting said attitude feeling that said comrades were the ones who had caused the problems. Thus, for many months an attack was launched against

the Person in Charge of Training, in order to remove him from the party's structures, if possible, as well as the First Person in Charge from his leadership position.

- All of the above generated a struggle within the CD, which led to the denouncing document prepared by the First Person in Charge to be discussed by the CC. Said document defines and basically denounces the power struggle in the CD, the policy of isolation which was planned a long time ago; some of the organizational problems of the party and then presents some alternatives.

The personal type offensive increases through all the documents produced by different comrades and by the CC, and the very attitude of wanting to place blame for the document as well as the reaction to it worsened both the interpersonal conflicts as well as the political-ideological ones even more. The answers offered by different comrades made the personal aspect even more evident.

The confusion generated by the deviation from the true problem has become, to some comrades, a tactical objective to strengthen their hegemonic position over the party's structure. Instead of facilitating discussion by the entire base of the party, there were obstacles after obstacles placed in the way. It was nothing but the firm and determined pressure coming from the open challenge made by the opposing comrades that provoked, in the long run, the acceptance of "going to the base". That acceptance, in reality, is nothing more than accepting something which had already partially occurred. By then, certain sectors

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of the base were already aware of the situation and the pressure coming from the base was starting to be felt.

V. SOME CONCEPTS OF CLASSIC THEORY

The alternatives which we are offering for the entire problem must be the result of three fundamental aspects:

a - analysis of reality and the problem we want to resolve

b - the clear definition of our objectives

c - the study and assimilation of analogous revolutionary experience.

It is important to recognize that, from the political-strategical standpoint, the platform that was adopted as the party's platform by the Party's First Congress should be left in force. The goals of a political nature which are determined for the party must stem from that Platform.

However it is necessary to establish certain fundamental changes, from the point of view of short and medium-term goals, as well as the activities to be carried out to achieve those goals. To this effect, we believe it is necessary to evaluate certain experiences regarding three specific problems which were analyzed in the past by Mao Tse Tung. These experiences are related to:

1-fundamental aspects of the revolutionary organization

2-formative and administrative aspects

3-aspects of criticism and self criticism



### REGARDING ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS

With regard to the fundamental aspects of a revolutionary organization, the ones that stand out are those of a structural nature which have a good deal of autonomy and allow directives and particular work plans to be implemented.

One of the most important criteria set forth in revolutionary theory, in the classic Marxist sense, is contained in the following Marxist statement:

"In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily 'from the masses.' This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are preserved in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital, and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge."

Further on Mao states that:

"To gather and synthesize the ideas of the masses and then take them back to the masses so they can persistently follow them and, in this way, develop correct ideas of leadership: this is the proper method of leadership."

(Mao Tse Tung: "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership", June 1943)

This statement can and should be taken into consideration when we plan our political work in the future. The experience we have gone through proves that, although we have had a correct political line throughout our armed propaganda phase, and this, in turn, conveys the feeling of a considerable portion

of our country's masses, our political-organizational position has not been tied to those masses. This means, in essence, that all the members (party cadres) of our organization must be placed and given orientation in order to carry out the arduous task of doing carefully defined work with the masses for which it is necessary to assume the role of a "researcher" and collect data from as many local popular levels as possible and convert said information into orientation and political work that conforms to the established central directives.

#### REGARDING CRITICISM AND SELF CRITICISM

Another Marxist statement of great importance is the one related to the aspect of criticism and self criticism. Mao states that:

"Inner-Party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity. In the Party organization of the Red Army, however, criticism is not always of this character, and sometimes turns into personal attack. As a result, it damages the Party organization as well as individuals. This is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois individualism. The method of correction is to help Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity in order to achieve victory in the class struggle and that it should not be used as a means of personal attack."

(Mao Tse Tung: "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party.")

Criticism and self criticism is an important tool for improving politically and as a human being. Without a correct criticism and self criticism procedure, a party will find it very difficult to have the ability to move forward. The cadres cannot do it either. All of us, absolutely all of us, make mistakes in the carrying out of our responsibilities. This means that,

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something that is even more important than criticism and a factor that is indispensable in seeing that a properly implemented criticism is effective, is a spirit of self criticism; that is, the necessary humility to acknowledge the mistakes we make, much more so when these mistakes are major ones.

There are two styles which are extremely negative in criticism, both of which have been manifested time and time again in our party. The first consists of "keeping a record" of the comrades' mistakes so that whenever they feel like it they can "take out the list" and throw it at them for the purpose of destroying someone for personal reasons. The other one consists of encouraging comments being made behind the back of the person who, in the judgment of some, has made a mistake. This second one is very damaging, for it undermines trust, creates confusion and furthermore, does not help the person who is wrong to correct his error.

Critical comments made about minor personality clashes, or "mistakes" which are blown out of proportion, have a negative effect of a political nature. These mistakes can be easily corrected by applying fraternal criticism to avoid demoralization and, when the political effect has no major political importance, it can even be done bilaterally, through a simple conversation among comrades. Should it be found that it has an important political effect, it should then be put on the agenda in order to vent whatever collective discussion the case warrants.

This can be summarized in the Marxist statement that whenever mistakes have been made, it is necessary: "to generally

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use the method of persuasion with the cadres who have committed mistakes and help them to correct them. You can resort to the method of struggle only with those who have made serious mistakes and reject all guidance. Patience is indispensable throughout all this. It is not correct to hastily characterize people as "opportunists" or to hastily "start fights with them".

The preceding is the Marxist view on criticism and self criticism and as such should be implemented in our party.

#### DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

All the comrades know that the bureaucratic group we are struggling against has consistently been referring to us as those who are violating the principle of democratic centralism, repeatedly citing the phrase that covers the aspect of "subordination". At no time have they ever defined the "democratic" aspect of the policy on Democratic Centralism. We have considered it important, at the risk of resting a little, to put an end to the Leninist view of Democratic Centralism, once again through the eyes of Mao. The following is the full text of this vision, as it appeared in Mao's writing entitled "The Role of the Communist Party in the National War":

#### DEMOCRACY IN THE PARTY

From the book: Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung

Pages: 211 to 212

In the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all its leading bodies and all its members and cadres should give the fullest expression to their initiative, which alone can ensure victory. This initiative must be demonstrated concretely in the ability of the leading bodies, the cadres, and the Party rank and file to work creatively, in their readiness to assume responsibility, in the exuberant

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vigor they show in their work, in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions, and criticize defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading bodies and the leading cadres. Otherwise, "initiative" will be an empty thing. But the exercise of such initiative depends on the spread of democracy in Party life. It cannot be brought into play if there is not enough democracy in Party life. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able people be brought forward. Ours is a country in which small-scale production and the patriarchal system prevail, and taking the country as a whole there is as yet no democratic life; consequently, this state of affairs is reflected in our Party by insufficient democracy in the united front and in the mass movements. For these reasons, education in democracy must be carried on within the Party so that members can understand the meaning of democratic life, the meaning of the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party and at the same time avoid ultrademocracy and the laissez faire which destroys discipline.

It is also essential to extend democracy in our Party organizations in the army to the degree necessary to stimulate the initiative of the Party members and increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. However, there cannot be as much democracy in the Party organizations in the army as in the local Party organizations. Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.

The extension of democracy in the Party should be seen as an essential step in its consolidation and development, and as an important weapon enabling it to be most active in the great struggle, to prove equal to its tasks, create fresh strength, and surmount the difficulties of the war."

#### OTHER EXPERIENCES AND IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES

The structural change that we have presented, calling for decentralization, caused deep resentment. Our proposal was interpreted not as a way to resolve two problems (the security problem and the organizational and internal problem we are having), but as an attempt to eliminate the ranks of the

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established hierarchy. This kept the process from being discussed in depth and with a sense of urgency. The comments made by members of the CD and the CC were, for example: "It is an anarchist project"; "It is an anti-Marxist project"; "In times of danger what is needed is the greatest degree of centralization not the proposed decentralization"; "Its content is militaristic and narrow minded", etc., all of this for purposes of preventing its discussion.

Said vision is totally mistaken and stems from a legalistic view when analyzing the problem of security which we are all familiar with and which has placed our Party in a serious situation that is threatening its very survival. In virtue thereof, it is necessary to analyze certain fundamental aspects of the Leninist organization of a clandestine party and, furthermore, the organization of revolutionary movements which have been capable of successfully leading the revolutionary struggle in their respective countries. Likewise, it is necessary to understand the essence of the problem when it deals with a security problem as big as the one that now affects us.

Every Marxist party must adopt certain organizational structures which provide a good deal of autonomy in local, regional, or zone decision-making. This does not mean that it functions as an anarchy. The central work plans and the general directives must be carried out diligently. However, the work plans which are drafted at the local, regional or zone levels in order to implement the general directives must be based on the local, regional, or zone reality, as the case may be, and must

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take into consideration, as a preponderant factor, the evaluation of their own strength.

If we take as an example the July 26th revolutionary movement in Cuba, although it was not a communist party in the classic sense, it adopted certain structures which were capable of bringing about participation and involvement of the masses in the process, we will see that the conception of autonomy and the positive aspect of centralization went hand in hand. The struggle of the Vietnamese people is a similar one, headed by the communists through the Front. The centralized coordination of the struggle of the masses and military tactic and strategy were implemented by means of the autonomy that existed in the different regions. That autonomy never implied working independently to the point of making policy, as if it were a separate organization.

What we propose in our structural outline may have different flaws which warrant in-depth discussion. However, to brand them with labels of "narrow minded", "anti-Marxist", "anarchist" and "militaristic" lacks total revolutionary seriousness.

The legalistic view the comrades have of the security problem is justified in theory, to oppose our proposal with statements like "greater centralization in time of danger". This, actually, implies no change in revolutionary life, a view which is evidenced even more by their feeling that, in spite of the problem, the enemy has no evidence to make arrests or send anyone to jail.

This has been the view the comrades of the bureaucratic sector have chosen to guide the future of our Party.

## VI. ALTERNATIVES

The document submitted by the First Comrade in Charge presents some alternatives whose purpose is to begin a process toward a solution to the security problem as well as the organizational aspect. It also touched upon certain attitudes and operational procedures. Lastly, it presented a structural proposal whose purpose was to decentralize the Party on the basis of geographical areas. As a result of the existing problem, whose solution was seen in terms of a split, it became necessary to establish a series of variables to be applied to the proposal we had submitted. Nevertheless, we feel that the project is applicable in its fundamental aspects of decentralization and in the concept of Geographical Areas.

The implementation of this proposal demands, first of all, establishing certain criteria to be determined on the basis of choosing the areas. Secondly, it requires that research be done on the areas chosen and thirdly, that the evaluation and determination of the willingness of the Party's cadres to be placed be done on an objective basis.

We have expressed that the reasons for the change are two: security and the solution to the organizational deficiencies, with which we hope to take a big step in terms of quality. It is necessary for all of us to have ample knowledge not only of the purposes set forth, but of fundamental aspects -

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of the reasons as well as the methodology - which demands a lot of patience, discipline and dedication. It is likewise necessary to discuss and internalize each step we take so that this will become a political and organizational goal for a one-year period. We will first look at the security aspect.

### Security

We are all aware that, at the present time, the enemy has in its hands a vast amount of information about our Party. Among the things in the enemy's hand, we know they have:

1. All of the party's files, including Minutes of the CC.
2. Thorough knowledge of the party's structures.
3. Knowledge of the leading cadres.
4. The party's projects related to the struggle, methodology and organizational matters
5. Propaganda files and mailing lists for sending out propaganda.
6. Fingerprints of numerous comrades.
7. Names of some participants in military actions.

(Information provided by Bebe)

This information becomes very strategic for the enemy and puts him in a position to not only strike immediately, but also to plan large scale operatives whose effect could paralyze or destroy the Party. On the other hand, the enemy has more than sufficient reasons to attack the Party and the ability to set up its operative conditions from a tactical advantage point, something which puts the Party on the defensive and under their

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control. The objective elements of the enemy consist in the fact that our party became a big threat to their interests, as well as having projected itself as an organization with good possibilities in terms of popular support. In addition to these factors, we must add that the policy of war, particularly in Central America (sic) They know that our Party supports the cause of Central America, for which it becomes necessary for them to eliminate us, as part of their counter-revolutionary plan.

In order to be able to counteract this situation, we have considered it necessary to take the following steps:

1. Change the party's structures.
2. Change the organizational policies and the focus of certain political-organizational priorities.
3. Decentralize our human and logistical resources.
4. Separate to the extent it is possible, the burned cadres from those who are not burned.
5. Guarantee the functioning of the military.
6. Guarantee the security of our political-military cadres.
7. Guarantee that our struggle reaches the masses under new organizational concepts.
8. Guarantee continuity through the training of numerous leading cadres.
9. Diversify the struggle by opening new fronts.

In order to achieve these objectives within a security framework, we have proposed a structural change, from the centralized structure to a decentralized one. Going from the

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system we had to the one we propose requires a lot of effort and coherent dedication. Furthermore, it requires great strength and revolutionary conviction for, in essence, it has a bearing on the lives of all the cadres who participate in the process.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT

In our document we have made an analysis of the organizational problems. We could summarize them as follows:

1. Incorrect centralization that impedes:
  - a) the training of leading cadres
  - b) the active participation of all the cadres in the execution and development of party positions
  - c) the thorough knowledge on the part of all cadres of the party's problems.
2. Certain deficiencies in terms of the training of all the cadres.
3. The absence of assigning specific responsibilities to all cadres of the party.
4. Deficiencies in the implementation of the policy on criticism and self criticism.
5. Deficiencies in administrative, leadership, execution, supervision and investigative rules.
6. Petite-bourgeois individualistic attitudes which have a negative effect on the party's cohesion.

7. Lack of balance between the responsibilities assigned to comrades and the knowledge they have to carry these tasks out.

8. Limitations on the possibilities for creativity and initiative as a result of centralization and incorrect rules of operation.

These problems, which we feel are due to the structures, can and should be resolved by means of the changes we are proposing. However, it is necessary that we understand that not all the problems will be resolved immediately, although we are convinced that within a more or less short period of time, we will start perfecting ourselves and will create new styles which we feel are vital. As a starting point, we would have to establish some basic rules, which we have included in our original proposal. These rules would open the door to finding a solution to the problems and to establishing operational and reglamentary rules whih will, in turn, be able to be institutionalized and internalized by the Party's members. Let us look now at some of the fundamental aspects of the procedure: First Phase:

1. Establish and discuss the criteria for determining what each geographical area consists of.
2. Establish the criteria for determining how many cadres will be sent to these geographical areas.
3. Clearly establish the organizational methodology to be adopted by the cadres assigned to the geographical areas.

4. Clearly establish the criteria to be used for transferring cadres to the areas, resolving basic survival problems in keeping with the type of life they live, work problems, etc., for each cadre in his/her area.
5. Establish the strategic placement of the leadership cadres, the strategy of the cadres in central leadership, their fronts, and communications.

Second Phase:

1. Implement the investigative, analytical and procedural phase.
2. Implement the phase of transfer and consolidation of placement.
3. Implement the first political phase.

Third Phase:

1. Evaluate the entire process carried out.
2. Synthesize the experience.
3. Draw the strategic line in order to begin new stages.

Their entire process consisting of three phases, in our judgment, can be done in one year. As a result of same, the growth during the first year will be limited, since the fruit of this effort, from the standpoint of political growth, cannot be materialized until there is a consolidation with respect to the location and establishment of initial ties.

## PARTY'S STRUCTURAL PLAN

Whatever structural plan we adopt must be capable of guaranteeing, among other things, the application of party positions, the proper application of democratic centralism, the rules of operation at all the levels, the correct rules of leadership, of executive supervision, of coherent political work, of national policies, of organized growth, etc. As a basis for said functioning, we want to set forth the mechanisms, leadership systems and the appropriate rules of discipline.

It is for this reason that we have proposed that:

1. Once the areas have been established and the human resources for same have been chosen, each sector is to hold a meeting of an assembly with all of its members for the purpose of determining:
  - a) Who their leaders will be
  - b) Who the Person in Charge of the area will be
  - c) Who will be chosen to form part of the  
Provisional CC
2. That the areas be headed by an Executive Committee comprised by the persons in charge of the work areas.
3. That each Executive Committee consist of one person in charge of organization who, in turn, will be the person in charge of the area and a member of the National Committee; one person in charge of the military and one person in charge of training.  
Furthermore, a comrade will be chosen from among the

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persons in charge of areas to be in charge of finances.

4. The organizational concepts of each area will be implemented in keeping with the cellular concept that has been known up to now, seeing to it that there is compartmentalization and applying the new criteria of discussion and participation which we will be developing as we go along.

#### BASIC PROPOSAL FOR INITIAL OPERATION

The initial tasks, in addition to those enumerated previously which are already part of the procedure, will be the following:

1. The National Committee will prepare the Work Plan, defining the central strategic aspects, as well as the objectives.
2. The Area Committees will analyze the strategic aspects and the objectives and, on this basis as well as that of the particular reality, will prepare their particular plans. Once discussed and approved, they will then define their activities and how they will be carried out in an autonomous manner following the established rules.
3. A constant and permanent flow of information will be maintained with the National Committee, which will synthesize the experience and utilize it for improving the functioning of each area. For this, a precise policy on reports will be established

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allowing an appropriate period of time for carrying out the specialized tasks.

## VII. WHERE TO START

To determine where to start, from the organizational standpoint, it is necessary:

1. To end the separation process. This requires that:
  - a) We be able to have the broadest possible identification of all the Party's cadres.
  - b) That we have a complete picture of all the comrades who are going to form part of the process.
2. That we organize provisional collectives for the purpose of:
  - a) Discussing organizational projects, the strategic aspects and short-term objectives.
3. To hold the Second Congress of the Party, with which:
  - a) We will formalize the structure
  - b) We will adopt the party's strategies and objectives.
  - c) We will elect a provisional leadership, whose function will end when we have implemented all the structural aspects already defined. Once this function has been performed, the National Committee will be established as well as the provisional CC; the cadres will assume leadership positions for the period of one year.

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