REPORT OF THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE TO THE CONGRESS

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The fundamental purpose of this report will be to put together a summary for you of what, in our understanding, are the main concerns and problems with which we are confronted at this stage of our development.

All of the documents which present the Party's position and minimal program for the next few years will be under consideration by the Congress. In them, we, along with all of you, hope to find solutions to many of the existing problems.

Our organization begins its organization work by the year 1976, after having carried out an intense political ideological struggle since 1972 with what was an incorporation of various revolutionary groups. After several meetings, we were able to establish a new Central Committee, which dedicated itself to the preparation of documents which served as the foundation for the development of the Party. The result of this work was the preparation of approximately 10 documents which contained general positions on political and organizational aspects. These were the documents that guided our work until the meeting of the new Central Committee was held in December, 1981, in which we sought the consolidation of all the documents into one single document.

In general organizational terms, we can conclude that the first Central Committee gave directives aimed at: developing the Party structures in order to bring the militants together under our influence in an organized manner; consolidating the existing resources; analyzing the situation of the organized

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labor movement, and getting involved in that process in order to develop the level of the base and that of the labor leaders connected to the Party.

At the same time, that Central Committee set out 10 objectives for which it should work in order to attain the three above-mentioned goals. These objectives were:

- 1- The creation of Committees In Support of Vieques.
- 2- To make it a priority to organize the unionized sector on the basis of CTE and "Monjitas" (lit. Little Nuns).
- 3- To participate in committees against repression or in the creation of same.
- 4- Participation in committees in defense of natural resources and against pollution.
- 5- Participation in committees dealing with women's issues.

6 to 10 (sic) The establishment, consolidation and institutionalization of a policy on training, one on reports, and one on finances, and one on means of communication and effective liaison within the Party structures.

The aim of these organizational guidelines was to work toward what the Central Committee felt the Party's national political priorities should be. The Party's understanding was that the political-organizational work would be centered around the aspects of class struggle and national struggle. Reality pointed us toward the national aspects of the anti-annexation struggle (primaries and presidential vote); the natural resources; the

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problem of Vieques and the military bases, and repression against

the Left; aspects of class struggle such as the high cost of living; unionization oriented toward dealing with the public and strategic sectors, as well as taking up slogans "against corruption" and in favor of an organized labor movement with a democratic basis; and repression at national levels.

Why? (sic) Afterwards, that Central Committee decided to disband itself, returning the leadership to the Directive Committee, and leaving the selection of a new Central Committee for later on in the process.

This is the opportune time to point out that the Central Committee which disbanded itself left specific political directives which the body substituting it had to work with.

These included several guiding postulates, from which we will quote. Toward the end of 1978, the past Central Committee stated that:

"In our country there exists an imperialistic penetration which is a result of the North American military invasion of our native land. The Central Committee resolves that our struggle is fundamentally anti-imperialistic, and that our main enemy is North American imperialism".

"The fundamental conflict is the empire-colony relationship, and acknowledging the historical role of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie as an instrument of North American imperialism, we declare that the anti-colonial struggle is closely tied to the class struggle, therefore making it necessary to evaluate the historical role of said Puerto Rican bourgeoisie, and to combat

2/3/87 100 it in accordance with its utilization by imperialism, concentrating our campaigns on the colonialist groups currently headed by the annexation faction".

"Our international policy takes on more importance in relation to its application to the North American working class, and we acknowledge the fact that the interests of the North American working class are in conflict with the imperialist policy applied in Puerto Rico; that there exists a particular feature of importance in the fact that there is a national Puerto Rican minority within the North American working class, and therefore, we resolve to make special efforts to obtain support from North American workers and particularly from the Puerto Rican minority".

"We believe that North American imperialism seeks the solution to Puerto Rico's colonial status by means of two alternatives, annexation through statehood, and free association/commonwealth status. We believe that at this time the annexation offensive is on the rise, and that free association/commonwealth status is a contingency plan; we believe that the spearhead of the annexation offensive is getting the Puerto Rican masses involved in the politics of the empire, and we resolve to combat the annexation offensive both politically and militarily, paying special attention to the holding of Yankee presidential primaries".

"We acknowledge the present state of crisis in Puerto
Rico's economy, and of the worsening of the crisis of
imperialism, the results of which will be the worsening of Puerto

Rico's social-economic and political situation; and knowing that imperialism and its lackeys in Puerto Rico are attempting to put all of the burden of said crisis on the working class and other popular sectors, we therefore resolve to consolidate the Party's structure, to consolidate the armed groups, to strengthen the labor organizations and syndicates, and to implement our policy of front and unity".

During the month of December 1981, the sixth meeting of our Central Committee was held, which was the first one after the disbandment of the previous Central Committee. Participating in it were a large group of comrades who were selected by the Directive Committee in compliance with the mandate given by the previous Central Committee, which disbanded itself at its last meeting in August 1979, to allow for restructuring through the participation of comrades who were outstanding in organizational work as well as in their individual development, in accordance with our organization's rules. The work agenda was developed based on the following:

- 1- Presentation of a comprehensive political report by the Directive Committee to the Central Committee. Same included an evaluation of all our organizational structures, of the tasks carried out within all fronts of the struggle, and the proposals serving to overcome deficiencies and directed toward a better utilization of our organization's resources.
- 2- Discussion of documents. Presented were several analytical documents referring to the restructuring of all the party documents into one central Party document; our concept of the Party; and an analysis of our national reality.

- 3- Organizational matters. Included under this subject was a discussion of the amendments to the regulations/bylaws; the institutionalization of the Central Committee; and the election of the next Directive Committee.
- 4- Discussion of the political and organizational situation.
 - 5- General matters and resolutions.

The meeting was held with a great feeling of camaraderie and with a good critical and self-critical spirit. Different measures were taken to correct, within the shortest possible period of time, the organizational deficiencies which have "enquilosado" (sic) our development. Also, the foundation was laid for the projection of a new general work plan based on the analysis of our organizational reality and on our conclusions regarding national reality.

As follows we present to all our comrades the organizational report on the discussions and resolutions regarding each of the aspects investigated and analyzed.

GENERAL REPORT

The Central Committee passed judgement on the positions and projections set out in our political documents and presented the critical evaluation of the party's political organizational structures and work projections in the different fronts of the struggle. In that respect, the structures, commissions and work

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areas were evaluated in the following order: Central Committee;
Directive Committee, National Organization Area, Communications;
Work Commissions; Foreign Policy; Military Policy.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

After making a historical review with regard to the policy of self-disbandment adopted by the previous Central

Expand Committee, we proceeded to discuss the criteria to become a on f of member of the Central Committee from now on. Ten criteria were meetings formulated, all of which will be included in the Party's etc.(sic)Regulations/Bylaws, a task which was assigned to the Directive Committee. The present Central Committee was approved with the addition of two more members. Because the regulations/bylaws state that the Central Committee must be elected by the Party Congress, it was decided that one of the fundamental duties of the present Central Committee was to hold a Party Congress during the present year. This Congress, in accordance with its obligations, will proceed to elect a new Central Committee as deemed necessary.

DIRECTIVE COMMITTEE

The work done by the Directive Committee was evaluated and its achievements and deficiencies were established. It was found-that-the-Directive Committee, in general terms, had been able to function correctly in terms of the party's work. However, it had shown an inability in the preparation of theoretical documents and analysis for the Party cadres. It was

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also stated that it did not deal correctly with the supervision of some commissions, particularly with the women's commission and the training commission.

Expand In addition to this, it was found that the Directive on dates Committee was overburdened with too many functions and so this (sic) structure, which by decision of the previous Central Committee was temporary in nature, was then analyzed. As a leadership body, it had been carrying out the functions of a Politburo and an Executive National Committee, as these bodies appear in our Regulations/Bylaws. To that effect, an amendment to the Regulations/Bylaws was approved so that both the Politburo and the National Executive Committee would be eliminated as party structures and in its place the National Directive Committee would be institutionalized.

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AREA

Our Party made a general evaluation of the organizational situation around the middle of 1981. What this evaluation attempted to do was solidify our spheres of political influence, identify those aspects which hindered a greater organizational development, and search for solutions which would create a new trend toward quantitative and qualitative growth of the Party. Doing this evaluation gave us an indication of the

level of development we had reached, since it took 6 months to complete.

Brought up were a great number of political and organizational deficiencies within the Party that prevented it from functioning and developing properly. Among others, it pointed out that there was inadequate and deficient implementation of the Party's political tasks, as well as not enough use of human resources; that there was a lack of political and organizational training for the base, central and "Andres" collectives; that there was a limited general coordination, as well as limited coordination in the central work areas; and that generally there was duplicity in the members' duties and a failure to implement the policy on reports.

For each of these deficiencies, specific recommendations were made to correct them, which were presented to this Central Committee, and were approved. On the other hand, the which report found that there was a sense of lack of integration, full ones? identification and party consciousness/conscientiousness in some (sic) collectives; the absence of a clear perspective regarding the ways to achieve quantitative growth; and the need to generate more political and organizational work in work centers.

The investigation and evaluation reflected, as we already stated, numerous internal deficiencies, not only in the functioning of the leadership bodies of the Organization Area, but in all the existing organizational structures and mechanisms.

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Subsequently, the Central Committee looked into/inspected the National Organization Area. It was confirmed that there was a deficiency in the policy on recruitment, and we criticized the fact that the document defining this policy, as well as the designated procedures for guaranteeing security, expanding the proletarian base and expanding the Party's outreach, were still not finished. It was felt that the growth of the Party during the past few years had been slow, and that internal mechanisms for adequately channeling the Party's political positions had not yet been institutionalized.

The development of the organizational tasks by the "ANDO" has been extremely difficult due to the very fact that the organizational methodology has not been precisely articulated, and due to other reasons which we will see further on. However, despite these deficiencies, there have been organizational achievements at different levels. The evaluation showed numerous facts, both of a quantitative as well as qualitative nature. Some of these are:

At present, the area is composed of several geographical sectors with an unequal numerical composition.

The total number of people included in the organization at its different levels and in terms of percentages is:



11 Party N	lembers
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32%

22 Candidates for Membership

40%

67 Collaborators

28%

Our Party shows that up to the present we still have not been able to effectively implement the processes of selection and integration into the Party structures. It is significant to note that since 1978, out of the total number of comrades under our influence and direction, 37% of comrades did not actually join. However, we can say that our Party has had a positive growth, even though during the last year we had a decrease due to resignations at the membership level. The outgoing Central Committee felt that the political conditions exist to bring about growth in the Party if each member is willing to work and at least each one proposes to recruit two comrades. For that purpose, our policy of recruitment was placed in one single document so that each collective could work with that objective in mind.

After the evaluation of the recruitment process, it was found that the application of the organizational policy, included in what used to be our document # 8, was not interpreted or followed to the letter, especially in the metropolitan area, since the "gafas" (lit. sunglasses) were not used as a means of expanding the organizational base.

The solutions to organizational problems are being taken into consideration in the evaluations and work plans

0/3/80 Md established by the "ANDO". The projections specified in the work plans of the "ANDO" were approved and it was ordered that they be implemented immediately. The area still has to comply with the last directives of said plan. Likewise, there was approval for the Directive Committee's suggestion that the "ANDO" establish a system by which cadres working full-time for the organization could be investigated.

WORK COMMISSIONS

1. Women's Issues Commission

The work done by the commission was evaluated, and it was felt that the Directive Committee should have guaranteed the continuity of same by making a greater effort in the area of supervision. The Directive Committee is asked to get all the materials and work done by the commission together and reorganize it, after conducting a more in-depth evaluation of the work that was done. In that respect, an ad hoc commission was reorganized to make an evaluation and provide recommendations on the Women's Commission to the Directive Committee. The assignment was completed and we believe that it is now the new Central Committee's job to take measures to ensure maximum compliance with the recommendations presented in that report which are based on the need to continue the work.



2. "El Sombrero" (lit. The Hat) Commission

The functioning of this commission was subject to the specific work developed by the national front which was the reason for its existence. The commission as such, worked according to the situation of the front, although internally there were coordination problems. In terms of recruitments, the organizational achievements were minimal although contacts were made and there were lists of people who supported said front for propaganda purposes.

This commission is organized to provide better direction to the organizational policy regarding the problem of V. V.'s struggle allowed our organization to prove that from a clandestine position you can direct the struggle of the masses. Our participation and political and organizational orientation was vital, and we were also successful in getting clandestine revolutionary groups involved. The most important lesson that was learned from the experience of V. was that when it comes to policies dealing with the masses, our organization should be more strict in its compartmentalization of the established political-organizational position. The narrow vision of a revolutionary group, added to the vision of the others which is no less sectarian and legalistic, has in fact paralyzed the work of massive support of Isla Grande, and caused a decline in the activity of the citizens of Vieques. Today there is nothing

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situation of this front and agreed to continue implementing the

The National Directive Committee discussed the political

line of resistance fundamentally with the "Malanga" since we cannot forget that here is a prime example of the occupation of our territory by Yankee military forces.

3. "El Foro" (lit. The Forum) Commission

This commission was made up by seven comrades, including the liaison with the Directive Committee. The process showed that several of the original members did not give this task the necessary priority, which made their participation ineffective. The meetings were always very irregular, and were disjointed for some time. A document was developed which was sufficiently profound in its analysis to enable us to prepare an initial work plan for the group. Those projects could never be implemented properly, and we had to reduce the composition of the collective, mainly due to the lack of discipline of several comrades who participated in it. The collective continued functioning actively, implementing different positions according to its own projections and knowledge of the material. However, in general terms, there was coordination between some aspects of its particular branch and the Directive Committee. The Directive Committee's liaison with the "Foro" (lit. Forum) was changed several times. Last year a reorganizational process was begun, and the "ANDO" prepared a document in which the organizational projections were made for "El Foro" (lit. The Forum).

For a period of 3 years, the Party worked to unite organizationally the cadres who were associated with different

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labor unions. During this period, different labor unions set out to achieve different objectives but, however, their efforts lacked scientific and detailed planning for each group. The objectives of the Central Committee to get us involved in recruitment and the struggle for democratization of the labor unions were developed but at a slow pace. It was not until the last quarter that the composition and meetings of the "Foro" (lit. Forum) were stabilized. The preparation of specific work plans for the labor unions was begun and we included militants as well as the Party's institutionalized resources in order to plan ahead.

It was within the time frame of this planning that we received the resignation of most of the "Foro" (lit. Forum) members, due to differences of opinion with the National Directive Committee over the sanctioning of a comrade in the labor union for improper conduct for which the comrades demanded his expulsion or resignation from all responsibilities both within and outside the organization. Even though the Party is left without leading cadres at the labor union level, the Party needs to create mechanisms for communication and orientation with the organized labor movement through its members, and at the same time seek to recruit from the working class. The trust that remains between the Party and the comrades who resigned is a

sufficient basis for promoting the policy of "gatos" (lit. cats) as formulated up to now.

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(sic)

The social, political and economic crisis our country is going through gets worse and is deeply affecting the working class, with the unemployment figures reaching to over 30% of that class. The National Directive Committee set as its goal for the year 1984 "to work for the creation of a wide massive front, which would be representative of those groups affected by the different social problems". Even with the absence of active participation by our main labor leaders, the Party must work hard to comply with the 10 activities aimed at attaining this goal. These activities include everything from propaganda to the "Malanga" activity. "El Foro" (lit. The Forum) was one of the pillars for achieving this goal. Today we do not have it. However, the work must be continued.

Expand (sic)

4. Training Commission

The political-organizational and theoretical training is an aspect that the Party has had the greatest difficulty implementing since the Party's very beginnings. Because it is one of the central ideas for the development of any political organization, since there can be no cadres without training, its absence or deficiency causes adverse consequences for the internal and external work. We cannot look for the causes of this problem in lack of planning, because there have been plans since 1976. Several plans have been prepared for implementation. The absence (sic) failure to implement a politicalorganizational training plan allowing for the adequate
integration of our members as well as developing that sense of
belonging that is so necessary, began to be felt at the level of
the militants. We will soon begin developing seminars which
will allow us to prepare comrades to lead in the rapid
implementation of a political-organizational training plan.

Seeking to resolve the different obstacles which confront us, the Directive Committee resolves to create a commission in 1980 that will submit a proposal regarding what political-organizational training should be. The training commission was made part of the organization area. Although the task which was assigned to the comrades was carried out appropriately, there was no continuity in their work, neither by the "ANDO", nor by the Directive Committee. In addition to the training program dealing with theory, said commission prepared the basic materials and their guides. Said materials included subject-matter such as philosophy and basic Marxist economy; history of Puerto Rico; and materials regarding different revolutionary experiences in the world. The Central Committee, in its meeting toward the end of 1981, felt that it was necessary to give greater attention to this aspect of party development and approved the following corrective measures: the placement of training at the area level in the Directive Committee; the creation of a collective in charge of assuming responsibility for the implementation of training under a program covering all

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aspects of our party's policy; the development of an implementation plan, in addition to a systematic plan covering the subject matter; and the election of a person in charge of the area by the Directive Committee.

There were several reasons why these directives could not be complied with. Among them we can mention the lack of appropriate resources to make up the leadership, and the political-personal situation of the comrade in charge. The Party will have to look at the alternative of completing the organizational resources of the "ANDO" for the purpose of implementing training. Today we cannot say that training is a work area.

COMMUNICATIONS

The communications area was analyzed on the basis of three things: its internal organizational aspects; its theoretical and propaganda productivity; and its organizational effects, in addition to going over a review of the area's specific achievements.

The fundamental work of the Communications Area du-(sic)

(Translator's Note: Pages 15 and 16 of the original document are missing).

The resolutions of the Central Committee regarding this were:

a) To analyze whether it is possible to convert "las gafas" (lit. the sunglasses) into the Party's newsletter, a decision it delegated to the Directive Committee. After a study

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and analysis it was decided to eliminate them and to create "las plumas" (lit. the feathers or the pens).

- b) To establish scientifically, and in accordance with party policies, the use of propaganda for organizational purposes, increasing the publication of legal, semi-legal and clandestine propaganda in those places where the Party has organizational objectives.
- c) To regulate the publication of the theory magazine and its distribution among all leftist sectors. For that, the Directive Committee must guarantee a basic article covering the latest issues, and containing the organization's position.

THE MILITARY

Taking the frame of reference of class struggle and anticolonial struggle, established by the Central Committee since 1978 as being vital strategical fronts, our military cadres began to prepare their work plans for developing the armed aspect of our struggle, as well as carefully implementing the structured concept of our beginning army; a document which was developed in 1978. It was urgent to finish the details of the project. Our army had begun to be heard after the carrying out of "Alicia I". In view of that, and in accordance with the political-organizational priority established by the approved resolutions, the military area establishes the policy of armed propaganda as

the central operational aspect of our army. The approved Military Plan defined the phase of armed propaganda as:
"...certain weak revolutionary forces taking the greatest



possible advantage of the most notable aspects of the enemy's policy (repressive, exploitive, annexationist, etc.) in armed terms, whose projections deal solely with propaganda and are to serve the Party's organizational development and its military forces. It is, in other words, the application of a defensive armed policy geared toward the publication of certain concepts of struggle and the strengthening and growth of certain political and military structures. This projection complies with consciousness-raising purposes, telling the people not only about the nature of the exploitation, but also about the effective and consistent alternative for defeating them and achieving the objectives of liberation and socialism".

After three years, our Central Committee made an evaluation of the work of this area, both in the phase of implementation of the policy by the Directive Committee as well as in the development of the internal tasks for the growth of the base structure. Our leadership correctly complied with the assignment, linking each operative to the predominant "issues" of national reality, thus guaranteeing success both in terms of time and in the evaluation of the political climate for taking action. The receptive attitude of our people towards our activities shows that this is true. It would be correct to say that originally the political circumstances after "Alicia I" forced "Malanga" to make itself known and to continue identifying itself. This reality in terms of publicity has not obligated our organization to propose activities that are done for the mere purpose of making it known that it exists and is working, because the groups



we want to reach feel that we should continue to work quietly. Each activity is exhaustively analyzed within each particular circumstance in order to foresee the consequences among the people and to be able to determine its scope.

Extreme and misinformed criticisms have been clarified

Correct by reality, and the groups who have made them have had to take

style, their problems elsewhere. In that sense, the political document

Roberto explaining "La Gaviota" (lit. The Seagull) that was published,

amend— clearly established our political-military concept of party work

under the present circumstances.

The report presented to the Central Committee for

December 1981 touched upon all the deficiencies of which "Andres"

is aware in relation to its area. No emphasis is given to the

positive things, which are accepted as a given, and emphasis is

given to what needs to be improved. However, to evaluate

everything more fairly, without the purpose of looking critically

at the deficiencies, it is necessary to measure the balance of

what has been achieved.

Today, our military actions have made our organization known both nationally and internationally. Actions such as "La Gaviota" (lit. The Seagull), "La Zafra" (lit. The Sugar Cane Crop), the "Dry Cleaning" and "El Quinque", have given our organization the political projection it presently has, which is qualified as considerably positive. Politically, these activities have opened numerous doors which have not yet been used by our organization because we had placed all of that within a propaganda plan. Furthermore, it has facilitated a lot of



(sic)

communication with the exterior, all of which seems to be very promising for our people's struggle.

With the "Dry Cleaning", we did away with a myth, as did Urayoan when he drowned Diego Salcedo. With "La Gaviota" (lit. The Seagull) we were able to revive the spirit of our people regarding the revolutionary struggle, particularly among the patriotic and socialist sectors, since this was the most overwhelming blow given to the Yankees in "North American territory" since Pearl Harbor and outside its territory since the TET offensive in Vietnam. Our organization's prestige was greatly increased and this has opened great organizational perspectives. The news agencies are attentive to our communiques and demonstrate a tendency to publish them, even though they might be edited. Furthermore, it made us known all around the world, facilitating international work.

Our military actions have provided the funds for the operation of the entire organization, the full-time cadres, their equipment, etc. Even with all the deficiencies we have to overcome, we have achieved a good beginning in the building of an adequate infrastructure. We can say that our organization, at this point in time, is the best equipped of all of the revolutionary organizations in the country. (sic).

Our military cadres have been able to excel and become considerably stronger, achieving a greater operating capacity and military effectiveness. The assimilated experience has been very valuable, particularly if we consider the fact that we have not yet suffered any casualties during our operations, and it has

also been proven that we have some human resources we can rely upon. There have been no indications of infiltration at any time, all of which increases our capacity to function successfully.

The Party must direct its efforts toward resolving some of the conflicts or deficiencies which have developed from our experiences during the last few years (4) upon trying to implement our structural and specialized concept of the army. After the evaluation in '81 we found it necessary for the specialized army cadres to have greater involvement in party work. More than that, we believe that in this stage of party consolidation it is imperative that we implement the work in such a way that we avoid a separation between political and military duties in the collectives and work groups. In other words, more political duties for the military cadres, and more military duties for the Party members.

Despite the achievements indicated above, our Central Committee evaluated all structures of the "malangota", and after a profound analysis of same, it made the necessary determinations to rectify them. In addition to making all the resolutions regarding the "malangota", and which, due to security reasons, we will not report, the Central Committee resolved to request the preparation of Military Regulations which explain the organizational concept of the "malangota" in all its facets and the disciplinary rules for the army; and the preparation of a document which fully defines the concept of the development of war and governs the actions of the "malangota". This duty was assigned to the Directive Committee. It is still pending.



FOREIGN RELATIONS:

In accordance with the policy established by the Party that work with other countries would be secondary, contacts with other countries were made part of an effort to lay the foundation for establishing channels to serve our purpose of developing certain work in the future.

Since 1978, tasks have been accomplished which have led to breaking the barriers that have traditionally existed for the Left in Puerto Rico, barriers which grew due to the PSP and the PIP expressing the idea that they were the only ones on the panorama of the Puerto Rican struggle. Our organization has achieved initial contacts with six political organizations, each representing the revolutionary struggle in their respective countries. At the same time, we have awakened the interest of people who represent revolutionary governments who previously showed very little interest in receiving us.

The fact that we have established an order of priorities in our political work, has made our international activity of secondary importance and dependent on the national political situation. As a concept, our Party correctly understands that international support has to emanate mainly (although not exclusively) from the level of development of the national struggle. The national struggle gives form and content to international solidarity and is what prevents the capacity for imperialistic maneuvers at those levels.



when you go beyond the purely legal aspect of International Law and solidarity is translated into moral and political support.

We have felt that support within the framework of International Law has been achieved with great efficiency. Through the legal parties of our country, both the international socialist sector as well as the so-called "third world" composed of countries who are members of the African-Asian and Tricontinental organizations and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, have been covered. Likewise, we have obtained the support for our country's proindependence cause from the nations with social-democratic governments, from both the old and the new continent. U.S. (sic)

The development of our relations has been the direct result of our organizational, political and military activity. Our organization's decision to apply the policy of "support our own efforts" has had an influence on our present-day international relations. These relations have been on the rise, with a future possibility that our people will achieve, through these relations, a more committed support than that given within the framework of International Law.

Along with our work program, which is based on national reality as the primary factor in the development of the struggle of our people, and in accordance with international reality, the Party must continue its policy on foreign relations/foreign



policy. The (principles) positions which have guided us have been:

- 1. The development of friendly relations with struggling leftist organizations, based on the principles of solidarity, mutual assistance and independence.
- 2. Giving priority to our region of America and concentrating on the Caribbean Basin.
- 3. Viewing the internalization of the Puerto Rican colonial situation in international forums as positive for the process, but not diverting resources in that direction.

(illegible) (sic)

OUR POLICY OF UNITY

In the reorganization of 1976, despite the unsuccessful experience in trying to obtain permanent agreements on unity with different revolutionary groups, and seeing the totally unavoidable result of fragmentation of the unifying movement, we decided to continue the efforts to improve communication among clandestine comrades; and between these and the non-clandestine sector.

For the clandestine sector, experience led us to conclude that at this stage of the struggle there were not enough political elements for us to search for ways to unite said forces. We lived the reality of seeing how the organizational framework was split up into 6 different pieces. We understood that we were beginning a new era and reality forced us to reinitiate the process of communication with both sectors.



The truth is that today, after 5 more years of working to seek open communications and coordination, the result is not too different from the results of 1976. Our Party's record shows that it was the organization that initiated each political approach with each one of the sectors. The efforts that have been made so that the revolutionary forces may someday strike in unison have not been few.

Political, conceptual and operational differences are currently affecting the progress of that vital communication with certain organizations. Neither should we forget the mistakes made by the Party in our relationships.

We cannot classify the standing of progressive forces in our country as being at high levels, and the more uncoordinated and out of communication we are, the more forcibly, rapidly and effectively will the enemy strike.

The Party must continue its efforts to improve that communication with all the sectors it can deal with on a basis of equality, mutual respect, solidarity and independence.

Thus we sustain the principles presented in the document "Reality and National Struggle" and the document regarding "Tactical Unity and Strategical Unity" given out to you around the middle of 1981.

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(sic)

Our relationships with the Puerto Rican Left, then, have been developed on three levels: with the clandestine movement; with the legal movement; and with the semi-clandestine movement. In this sense, we have developed our relationships with all political sectors within the framework of organizational concepts. With its ups and downs, we have opened channels of communication and maintained the possibility for agreement and coordination with the components of the three sectors and the movement.

The Central Committee has approved the work done by the comrades who have worked in the development of this struggle front and feels that the projections should continue, although this time within the framework of the recommendations made in the document on national reality which refers to the aspect of national and international relations.

FINANCIAL SITUATION OF "ZETA"

The financial matters of the Party date back to its very inception. Being a fundamental aspect for the development and maintenance of the structures and their cadres, the highest level of Leadership, in its different stages, has had the heavy responsibility of seeing that our funds are correctly invested. The task has been completed correctly in our judgment, but,

however, the minutes of our Central Committee contain very little information about the directives.



Fix

(sic)

At the beginning of the organization, what was fundamental and a top priority was getting the areas of organization, propaganda, "Andres" and basic training on their feet. The quantity of available resources and the process of evaluating the past organizational experience with other comrades forced us to concentrate our resources in those areas. Finances, as a specialized task, were never the object of priority attention. The Directive Committee was creating the policies from day to day, supervising budgets and investments and sometimes delegating certain duties which had to do with the preparation of budgets to the organization area.

At present, our files do not contain records that clarify the entire history of incoming and outgoing funds. Different circumstances have forced us to discard/get rid of some of them, and furthermore, we lacked proper accounting methods. Even under these conditions, you should be aware of how the Party funds have been spent. Our organization has areas of expenses which are more or less fixed. Like, for example:

Organization Area:

- 1. Full-time cadres
- 2. Organization's cars and their repairs
- 3. Rental of permanent safehouses
- 4. Rental of temporary locales
- 5. Gasoline



Communications Area:

- 1. locales, businesses
- 2. machinery
- 3. printing materials
- 4. legal publications

"Andres" Area:

- 1. Investment in "fiestas" (lit. parties)
- 2. Locales (meetings, workshops, businesses)
- Safehouses, storage, etc.
- 4. Purchase of "guitarras" (lit. guitars)

National Directive Committee

- Locales for meetings
- 2. Political trips abroad
- Collaboration agreements (sister organizations)

The Party established as its main source of funding the carrying out of "fiestas" (lit. parties) which made enough money so that the militants were not overworked by that task. Our same concept of the dynamics of struggle and of organizational processes and of a clandestine Party in struggle drives us to utilize this source of income. The result is the rapid creation of structures but no less true is the fact that these structures can be built on shaky foundations because if they later depend on the same source of income for their support, and expropriation



activities are paralyzed, then we are either immobilized, or destroyed little by little. That is the main financial problem to be solved by our leadership: A percentage of our investment must generate sufficient income to support the Party during the times of paralyzation or decrease in expropriation activity. The Party must work toward developing the mechanisms for obtaining financial contributions until a network of contributors is created that can cover a percentage of our minor expenses. We will always continue having party dues as a matter of discipline. The Party must ask all of its militant members to seek alternatives for secure investments which will generate income. Meanwhile, the policy must be that of not creating any front which cannot return its investment and later be self-supporting; and maintaining tight control over the resources already obtained.

In December 1981, the Central Committee analyzed the entire economic situation and created the Finance Commission, aimed at creating an appropriate accounting system, supervision of expenses, custody of funds and the search for financial alternatives for the Party. The Commission already has comrades who fully understand how to handle accounting, and who are working on the preparation of a plan which will unify the accounting system for expenses and will centralize it in reports to the Central Committee and finally, to the Party.



1969 - Romano

1975 - Greco - Italy

1977 - Diana

1978 - Romano - Tino

1981 - " , "Juano" and Mexico

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"Santos" (lit. Saints)

"Andres"

"Yiye"

Position in CD

33

42

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