SANDINO: PATRIOT OR BANDIT?

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After a long journey from Mexico, in May, 1926, Augusto César Sandino wearily approached his native Niquinihomo and shed his cloak with these words: "I wish to enter my town as I left, without a coat." It was the return of the native whose fanatical zeal was to bring hope and despair to his divided countrymen and embarrassment to their well-intentioned North-American mentor.

Born on May 18, 1895, in the village of Niquinihomo in the department of Masaya, Sandino inherited his mestizo complexion from his mother, Doña Margarita Calderón. His father, Don Gregorio, was an ardent Liberal político, and a small coffee planter and cattleman. Augusto César received the benefits of a primary school education and became, in his teens, a produce merchant and landowner.

In 1921, following a personal quarrel with the village cacique, Sandino abruptly abandoned his business career and left Niquinihomo for exile in Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. With a brother, Santiago, he went to the Honduran port of La Ceiba with a letter recommending him as a competent mechanic. Sandino found employment with a sugar plantation, but after a short stay was forced in 1922 to leave the country following a fight and trouble with the local authorities. In Guatemala, the itinerant mechanic found temporary employment with the United Fruit.

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1 G. Alemán Bolaños, Sandino. Estudio completo del hero de las Segovias (Mexico and Buenos Aires, 1932), p. 3. This study is a valuable source because it contains much of Sandino’s personal reminiscences as dictated to Bolaños, and many important letters concerning the guerrilla’s activities.

2 Ibid., Carleton Beals lists May 19, 1893, as Sandino’s date of birth ("With Sandino in Nicaragua. Part IV, Sandino Himself," The Nation, CXXVI [March 14, 1928], 289).

3 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 3. One of Sandino’s most ardent publicists suggests that he was illegitimate, but explains that it “was not considered shameful in Nicaragua” (Salomón de la Selva, “Sandino,” The Nation, CXXVI [January 18, 1928], 63).

4 Ramón de Belausteguigoitia, Con Sandino en Nicaragua, la hora de la paz (Madrid, 1934), pp. 86-87. Hereinafter cited as Con Sandino.

5 De la Selva, op. cit., p. 63; Bolaños, op. cit., p. 3.

6 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 6.

7 Sandino, in relating these events to Bolaños, declared that he had been assaulted while defending the plantation’s gasoline supplies and had avenged the wrong by capturing his principal assailant (Bolaños, op. cit., pp. 6-7).
Company where for the first time he became acquainted with "yangui" imperialism." But Mexico, the symbol of renascent nationalism and revolt against North-American dominance, attracted the restless wanderer.

Upon arrival in Mexico early in 1923, Sandino was employed as a skilled laborer by the American-owned Huasteca Petroleum Company in Tampico. During his residence in Mexico, he was stimulated by his association with Mexican nationalists and ultranationalistic Central-American political exiles. They taunted him with the "subservience of Nicaraguans to American imperialism," and, as he later declared: "I began to reflect and realize they were right. I had the right to protest. . . ." Under the influence of his more intellectual associates, Sandino read widely on social problems and theology and closely studied the techniques of labor leaders. Gradually, he evolved a political and social philosophy which was a combination of nationalism and messianic mysticism. He had found his purpose in the conviction that it was his destiny to resurrect and defend a concept of sovereignty and social justice in Nicaragua where "honor had completely disappeared . . ." under the rule of selfish políticos and American imperialism. He abandoned the leadership of the effete Liberals and Conservatives and took "the workers and peasants" as his "directors." The outbreak of a civil war and the renewed threat of American intervention convinced Sandino that the time had come to act. Thus on May 15, 1926, he left.


9 Con Sandino, p. 89.

10 Ibid., p. 88.

11 The fact that Sandino arrived in Mexico in 1923, and remained in Tampico, does not substantiate the assertion of certain Sandinista sympathizers and the charge of the State Department that he had received his training and experience as a "bandit" serving with "Pancho" Villa. See F. R. 1927, III, 441. Colonel Henry L. Stimson, after his mission to Nicaragua, reported that he had "heard" of Sandino's service under Villa (American Policy in Nicaragua [New York, 1927], p. 85. Hereinafter cited as Stimson, Nicaragua). Stimson later reiterated that Sandino had "a long record" as a bandit in Mexico (Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War [New York, 1948], p. 115. Hereinafter cited as Stimson, On Active Service).


13 Sandino to Bolaños, August 4, 1929, Bolaños, op. cit., p. 5.

14 Ibid., p. 4n.
his American employers in Tampico and set forth to Nicaragua to carry out his “purpose.”

During the three years of Sandino’s absence, Nicaragua had experienced freedom from American occupation and a return to chaos. The death of President Diego Chamorro in October, 1923, increased the intensity of the struggle for power between the Liberals and Conservatives. Both factions were restrained in their violence only by the presence of the United States marines. The crucial issue was the presidential election of 1924.

The relatively “fair” election of October, 1924, resulted in a victory for the government-sponsored coalition of left-wing Conservatives and Liberals led by Carlos Solórzano and Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa, and the inevitable accusation of fraud by the losing candidate, General Emiliano Chamorro. Solórzano’s weakness was quickly exhibited by his ineptness and the rapid disintegration of the unnatural coalition which had elected him. He was doomed when the marines were withdrawn on August 3, 1925. Within two months, Chamorro and the reunited Conservative party engineered a coup which finally led to the resignation of Solórzano on January 16, 1926. While Chamorro was elected president by a rump Congress, Sacasa fled to Washington and denounced this usurpation of power. Chamorro, meanwhile, sought American recognition with the conviction that the United States in its determination to maintain its non-intervention policy would ignore the fact that his coup was a violation of the Treaty of Washington of 1923. Chamorro’s miscalculation was evident when on January 22, 1926, the State Department bluntly informed him that it would not recognize his administration until he resigned.

16 Ibid., p. 3n; Con Sandino, p. 89.
19 For a detailed account of the events following Chamorro’s coup, see Denny, op. cit., pp. 210-216; Jones, op. cit., pp. 384-385.
While the negative attitude of the State Department encouraged a Liberal revolt, Sacasa's appeals in Washington did not move the secretary of state to sponsor the efforts of the Liberal government-in-exile.\textsuperscript{22} The State Department's coolness to the Liberals was further emphasized when Sacasa's lieutenants were disarmed by forces from an American cruiser after capturing Bluefields and its customs house and bank during the month of August.\textsuperscript{23} Chamorro seemed to have the revolt under control when the United States navy withdrew its landing parties from the east coast.\textsuperscript{24}

Following his rebuff in Washington, Sacasa journeyed in June to Mexico where he enlisted Mexican aid in inspiring a more successful uprising which resulted in the capture of Puerto Cabezas and seriously threatened Bluefields.\textsuperscript{25} American warships were again dispatched to the Mosquito coast, and an embargo imposed in the United States on the sale of munitions to both factions.\textsuperscript{26} To counter Mexican intervention, the State Department demanded that Chamorro and Sacasa submit to American mediation.\textsuperscript{27} Although both General Chamorro and General Moncada, who was the leading Liberal in the absence of Sacasa, accepted the American ultimatum and agreed to an armistice, the ensuing peace talks failed because of the refusal of the Liberals to accept a compromise government. The resignation of Chamorro in favor of a puppet designate did not placate the State Department which insisted upon the selection of its favorite, Adolfo Díaz, as provisional president.\textsuperscript{28} The Conservatives capitulated, and within a week their government was duly recognized by the United States.\textsuperscript{29}

Moncada, however, refused to recognize the new government without the approval of Sacasa. With the arrival of Sacasa at Puerto Cabezas, on December 1, 1926, the Liberals began their

\textsuperscript{22} Denny, \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 225-226.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 223; Jones, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 386.
\textsuperscript{24} Denny, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{25} Stimson, \emph{Nicaragua}, p. 33. Some of the Liberal casualties were identified as Mexican officers, and munitions were captured which orginated in Mexican arsenals (Denny, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 227).
\textsuperscript{26} Jones, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 386.
\textsuperscript{27} Sec. of State to Dennis, chargé (Tel.), Aug. 27, 1926, \emph{F. R. 1926}, II, 788-789.
\textsuperscript{28} Denny, \emph{op. cit.}, pp. 233-234; Perkins, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 337.
\textsuperscript{29} The Department of State, "The United States and Nicaragua. A survey of the relations from 1909 to 1932," \emph{Latin American Series}, No. 6 (Washington, D. C., 1932), p. 64. Chamorro was tactfully removed from the scene by his appointment as minister to Great Britain, France, Spain and Italy (Denny, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 235).
offensive. The United States responded by creating six neutral zones along the east coast, the expulsion of the Liberal government from Puerto Cabezas, and the dumping of Liberal munitions into the harbor.

Sandino had returned to Nicaragua in May, 1926, during the first flush of the Liberals' success. After a short stay in Niquinhomo, he took employment as a timekeeper with the American-owned San Albino gold mine. Here the aspiring revolutionist began his agitation among the miners to awaken them to the need for social and political reform. He vividly portrayed the revolution in Mexico and the social legislation designed to prevent the exploitation of the working class and urged the miners to follow him in a fight for social justice and political power. Unlike the ambitious políticos and generals, who forcibly impressed men, Sandino organized a following with a purpose and a promise.

Sandino, at first, appears to have envisioned the creation of a popular movement which would act independently of the Liberals against the Díaz government. With his entire savings of three hundred dollars, he brought in arms from Honduras to equip a band of twenty-nine men and in October began the Sandinista "Independent" revolution. A sharp defeat at the hands of the government, early in November, convinced the leader that he could not succeed alone. He therefore journeyed from the mountains of Nueva Segovia to Puerto Cabezas to offer the services of his band to the Liberals with the hope of receiving arms to equip a strong revolutionary force in the northern mountain departments. While the rank and file among the Liberals were sympathetic, Sandino impressed neither the urbane Sacasa nor his minister of war, José María Moncada. "It was difficult," Sandino later remarked, "to make myself understood to the políticos...." Moncada was especially reluctant to turn over

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20 Denny, op. cit., p. 237.
22 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 7.
23 Con Sandino, p. 89. Sandino's American employer later described him as a "forceful character" (New York Times, January 11, 1931).
24 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 7.
26 Con Sandino, p. 88; Bolaños, op. cit., pp. 8-9. One source mentions that Sandino embarked upon his career after being turned out of his job due to the closing of the San Albino mine (New York Times, January 8, 1928).
27 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 9.
precious arms and munitions to this unknown guerrilla. He suggested that Sandino merge his band with an expedition which was being dispatched to the Segovias. Moncada irritated the sensitive Sandino, and this was the beginning of a relationship between the two men which was marked by mutual suspicion, hostility, and, finally, bitter hatred.

Sandino’s view of American intervention was no less bitter, especially since the expulsion of the Liberals from Puerto Cabezas and the destruction of their stores of arms had dimmed his hopes of securing the matériel to increase his following. When the Liberals removed their headquarters to nearby Prinzapolka, Sandino remained behind and, with the aid of certain prostitutes (mujeres públicas who were allowed to remain in Puerto Cabezas by Sacasa “at the request of the marines . . .”), salvaged from the harbor thirty rifles and 6,000 rounds of ammunition. He persisted, however, in his appeal for aid by following the Liberals to Prinzapolka where, as in Puerto Cabezas, he was appalled by the ambition and confusion surrounding Sacasa. “It was then,” Sandino later wrote, “that I realized that the [revolution] . . . needed new leaders.” Yet necessity prevented him from divorcing himself from the Liberals.

At Prinzapolka, Moncada ordered Sandino to surrender what rifles he had retrieved and to return to the Segovias. The more tactful counsels of other Liberal leaders, however, prevailed, and the minister of war was persuaded to allow the aspiring revolutionist to return to his band with a token grant of arms.

By early February, 1927, Sandino had returned to San Rafael del Norte in the Department of Jinotega with a few new recruits, a profound dislike for Moncada, and very little respect for the intentions of the Liberal políticos. Writing to a friend, Sandino declared: “Moncada will at the very first opportunity sell out to the Americans. We must . . . save [the revolution] . . . from Moncada.” The subsequent relationship between Moncada and San-

39 Ibid.
42 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 9.
43 Ibid.; De la Selva, op. cit., p. 64.
45 De la Selva, op. cit., p. 63.
dino is of major importance for an understanding of one of the principal causes for Sandino’s prolonged resistance after the Tipitapa agreement.

Moncada, encouraged by his successes against the Conservatives on the east coast during the closing days of 1926, began an invasion of the interior in January, 1927. Since both Díaz and Sacasa had indicated their willingness to retire in favor of a third man,\(^{45}\) Moncada prepared to use his position to secure for himself the presidential chair.\(^{46}\) Thus, when a Liberal force in the west under General Francisco Parajón captured Chinandega, Moncada saw his chance to force a decision and enhance his position. But as he threatened Matagalpa in February, the Conservatives recaptured Chinandega and routed Parajón while the United States declared Matagalpa a neutral zone.\(^{47}\) The defeat of another Liberal force under General López Irías left Sandino leading the only organized force in north-central Nicaragua.\(^{48}\) As Moncada sought to avoid Matagalpa and turned in a desperate strike at Managua in early April, he appealed to Sandino for support.

Sandino dispatched aid to Moncada and captured and thoroughly looted Jinotega.\(^{49}\) Joined by Parajón and Irías, Sandino then marched to the aid of Moncada at Las Mercedes where the Liberals were defeated by the Conservatives.\(^{50}\) Although Moncada welcomed Sandino, he appears to have failed to inform the chieftain of the beginning of peace negotiations with the Díaz government.\(^{51}\) He even exhibited a desire to rid himself of Sandino by quickly ordering him to occupy Boaco with the assurance of aid. When Sandino, finding the Conservatives strongly entrenched at Boaco, called upon Moncada for support, he was informed that the Liberal generalissimo had abandoned Las Mercedes for Boaquito.\(^{52}\) In spite of his irritation with Moncada’s perfidy, Sandino followed Moncada to Boaquito.\(^{53}\) Upon his ar-

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\(^{45}\) Denny, op. cit., pp. 267-268.
\(^{46}\) Nogales, op. cit., p. 136; Denny, op. cit., p. 292.
\(^{47}\) Denny, op. cit., p. 278.
\(^{48}\) Bolaños, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 11. On Sandino’s tactics, see New York Times, January 8, 1928.
\(^{50}\) Bolaños, op. cit., p. 11. Parajón was the leader of the Nicaraguan Federation of Labor and brought Sandino into contact with the only organized labor movement in Nicaragua. De la Selva, op. cit., p. 64.
\(^{51}\) As early as April 26, 1927, Moncada assured Admiral Latimer that he had no intention of “fighting” the United States (Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), April 26, 1927, F.R. 1927, III, 330).
\(^{52}\) Bolaños, op. cit., p. 14.
\(^{53}\) Ibid.
rival, Sandino was ordered by Moncada to occupy the hill of El Común while the minister of war, with Managua at his feet, negotiated with the Conservatives and awaited the arrival of the American mediator, Colonel Henry L. Stimson.

Sandino viewed the beginning of Moncada’s parleys with Stimson on May 3, with suspicion, but cautiously awaited the outcome. Moncada, meanwhile, was forced to take his generals into his confidence, and found that there was opposition to any peace which would involve the retention of Díaz until the next election in 1928. With an eye on the coming presidential election, Moncada was personally willing to accept even the retention of Díaz in order to enlist American support for his own candidacy. However, the presence of Sandino and his colleagues at Tipitapa compelled Moncada to inform Stimson that while the Liberals were willing to submit to American supervision of the coming elections, he could not ask his men to yield on the question of Díaz’ status. He suggested that both Díaz and Sacasa should be promptly dropped and a new election immediately held under the supervision of an American “military governor.” Moncada’s scheming was now flagrantly exposed to Sandino, who saw that the minister of war, like Díaz, actually desired the prolongation of American intervention. Sandino now felt that Moncada had deliberately maneuvered the Liberal army into confusion in order to make its surrender inevitable, and was betraying the revolution to further his own ambition.

Stimson, although “particularly impressed by the manner and bearing of General Moncada,” insisted that Díaz must be allowed to remain until the forthcoming election in 1928. He was well aware of the fact that Moncada’s position was made difficult by the opposition of such “Leaders like . . . Sandino” who, Stimson believed, were opposing peace because they considered themselves “far better off as insurgents.” When Moncada yielded and secretly suggested to Stimson that he give him a letter showing that he, Moncada, was compelled to accept Díaz under a threat of force, Stimson exceeded his authority and willingly complied with the generalissimo’s request. In a letter addressed to

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56 Cox, op. cit., p. 806; Denny, op. cit., p. 300; Nogales, op. cit., p. 136.
57 Denny, op. cit., p. 299. 58 Ibid., p. 292.
62 Stimson later declared that “it was a method of assisting the statesmanlike labors of Moncada” (On Active Service, p. 114).
Moncada, dated May 4, Stimson announced that if the Liberal army did not yield, the United States would "forcibly support the Díaz government."  

On the same day, Moncada left Tipitapa to discuss the proposals with his chieftains at Boaco. In the war council which followed Sandino vehemently opposed the Tipitapa agreement, even to the point of defying the power of the United States.  
The other generals, however, capitulated after Moncada assured them that he was prepared to resist, if the majority desired, but that the agreement was really a triumph since it assured the Liberals the legalization of their victory in the coming elections. To win over Sandino, Moncada offered him the position of jefe político in Jinotega with the promise that he would be amply compensated for his past services. While his colleagues agreed to disarm, Sandino moodily considered his position until he had once more convinced himself that he was "the one called to defend the ideals of [his] country."  

On May 9, he secured permission from Moncada to assemble his men and disarm at Jinotega. In this way Sandino slipped out of Moncada's area to a place well removed from the marines where he could prepare for the struggle with Moncada and the United States. He perhaps hoped what Stimson feared most: that in the face of continued unrest, the State Department would not enforce the Tipitapa agreement on the grounds that Stimson "had no authority to pledge his government to a virtual war in Nicaragua."  

Moncada, meanwhile, acting on the assumption that the peace and disarmament were unanimously approved, publicly announced on May 5 that the Liberals would disarm and cooperate in the restoration and maintenance of order in Nicaragua. In the hope that Sandino would finally accept the attractive bribe,

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63 Ibid.  
65 José María Moncada, "Nicaragua and American Intervention," Outlook, CXLVII (December 14, 1927), 461.  
66 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 16.  
67 Ibid.; Con Sandino, p. 92. Sandino was also offered a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, and funds to recover his "lost" farm (De la Selva, op. cit., p. 63).  
68 Con Sandino, pp. 91-92. Italics are mine.  
69 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 16. Also see Sandino's letter to Moncada, May 9, 1927 (F. R. 1927, III, 344).  
70 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 16; Nogales, op. cit., p. 243; Cox, op. cit., pp. 804-805.  
72 Moncada, op. cit., p. 461.
Moncada did not inform Stimson that he had allowed the recalcitrant chieftain to withdraw to Jinotega fully armed. On May 12 Moncada finally informed the Americans that every one of his twelve generals, except Sandino, had signed the Tipitapa agreement and had begun to disarm.73 This was accompanied by a statement denouncing Sandino for having "secretly" reneged on his promise to abide by the agreement.74 Stimson, nevertheless, declared the revolution "definitely" at an end and prepared to return to the United States.

While Stimson was preparing to embark, Sandino, in an effort to prevent the desertion of those tempted by Díaz's offer to pay ten dollars for every rifle surrendered, retired with three hundred men to San Rafael del Norte in the mountains of the Segovias.75 Moncada quickly realized the full import of Sandino's move. He enlisted the aid of Sandino's father, and personally journeyed with the marines to Jinotega to negotiate with the rebel. Upon arriving in Jinotega on May 21, Moncada and the marines called upon Sandino to disarm.

The peaceful summons to disarm provoked a division of opinion among Sandino's followers and increased the number of desertions to the point where he found himself with only thirty men.76 To strengthen the resolve of his men and to recruit men and supplies among the numerous bandit groups and gun-runners who infested the Honduran border, Sandino retreated to the border town of Yalí.77 It was to Yalí that Moncada dispatched Don Gregorio to attempt to dissuade his son from further resistance, allegedly with the advice that "the redeemers in this world emerge [sic] sacrificed [since] the people never appreciate anything."78

The conference with his father at Yalí, on May 23, did not shake Sandino's stubborn resolve and actually resulted in the conversion of Don Gregorio to his son's cause. Sandino had no confidence in Moncada's proposals since he had already determined that Moncada was as great an enemy to his cause as the Yankees who supported him.79 But the mere repudiation of Moncada was not enough to rally the disaffected elements and Central-

73 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), May 12, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 347.
74 Stimson, Nicaragua, p. 85.
75 Con Sandino, pp. 92-93. Soon after his arrival in San Rafael, Sandino married the local telegraph operator, Señorita Blanca Aráuz (Bolaños, op. cit., p. 16).
76 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 18.
77 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), May 26, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 350.
78 Con Sandino, pp. 93-94; Bolaños, op. cit., p. 18; Cf. New York Times, January 8, 1928.
American adventurers to his banner. Sandino shrewdly discerned that the popular cry to expel the North-American invader had more appeal, and now sought to identify Moncada with American interference in Nicaraguan affairs. The events that followed have obscured the fact that Sandino’s stubborn resistance until 1933 was motivated not only by his active defiance of the United States, but also by his personal vendetta with Moncada.

Sandino’s activities in June, 1927, enabled Moncada and the United States government to class him variously as a bandit, outlaw, and communist. When, on June 24, he was accused of “audacious and vicious acts of banditry” by the American legation in Managua, Sandino replied in an exchange of letters with the marine commander at Ocotal in which he sought to pose as the Latin-American David challenging the North-American Goliath. In late June he followed up his challenge by raiding his former employer’s mine, and he unsuccessfully attacked the marine garrison at Ocotal on July 16. In spite of his losses, these audacious attacks were Sandino’s recruiting device: disarmed conscripts and adventurers flocked to his stronghold at El Chipote. But, by attacking American property and adhering to the traditional revolutionary practice of looting, Sandino gave substance to the charges of banditry.

From July 2, 1927, until February 3, 1933, when he ceased resistance following the departure of Moncada from office and the withdrawal of American marines, Sandino was officially but not consistently considered a “bandit” by the Moncada administration and the American State Department. The credibility of this charge must be considered in the light of Sandino’s uncompromising feud with Moncada and the motives of the United States as revealed in United States documents published during the last eight years.

Moncada feared Sandino as the only remaining threat to his ambition of becoming president. His career as a renegade Conservative and his subservience to American imperialism put him

79 El Comercio (Managua), June 8, 1927.
80 Cf. La Prensa (Managua), November 8, 1932.
81 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), June 24, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 464.
82 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 22. He emblazoned on his letters a drawing of a Sandinista beheading a marine (Denny, op. cit., p. 313).
83 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), June 30, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 439-440.
84 Stimson, Nicaragua, p. 85; Con Sandino, pp. 95-96.
85 Cf. F. R. 1927, III, 440; Bolaños, op. cit., p. 18.
86 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 19.
at a disadvantage in competition with Sandino’s uncompromising political position and his appeal to Nicaraguan nationalism. Thus, Moncada eagerly seized upon the American formula to denounce Sandino as an “outlaw,” and as an unprincipled “mercenary . . . lacking in ideals.” He sought to use the power of the United States to destroy his most dangerous rival by openly declaring that his North-American allies were under obligation to restore order in Nicaragua.

The State Department’s denunciation of Sandino as a “bandit” had been motivated by its desire to convince the American public and the world that the United States was not intervening in Nicaragua to suppress a revolutionary movement, but merely to save that unhappy nation from a vicious outlaw. Yet it had become increasingly apparent that the charge of “banditry” was an attempt to avoid recognition of Sandino as a revolutionary leader. With the Conservatives and Liberals at peace, the United States had refused to recognize the existence of a third party in Nicaragua, and had paid the consequence of finding itself engulfed in a tragic and embarrassing war with the Sandinistas.

Misled by its representatives, the United States government had at first underestimated the strength of Sandino’s resistance. American naval authorities dismissed him as an adventurer from the backwash of the Mexican revolution. The Americanlegation in Managua, while admitting in July, 1927, that Sandino showed “unexpected strength,” predicted that he would be quickly “annihilated.” The seriousness of the sandinista revolt was minimized until August 20 when the marine commander, General Logan Feland, publicly denounced Sandino as a dangerous “bandit,” and called for more marines to cope with the insurgent.

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88 New York Times, October 26, 1927. See also Sec. of State to César, Nicaraguan Minister in Washington, November 17, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 377; Stimson, Nicaragua, p. 87.

89 L. Dennis, “Nicaragua: In Again, Out Again,” Foreign Affairs, IX (April, 1931), 499.

90 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tels.), July 17, 20, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 440-442. Ocotal was reported as the “final defeat of Sandino” (New York Times, July 19, 1927).


92 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), July 30, 1927, F. R. 1927, III, 444. On August 3, Sandino’s forces were reported in “full flight,” (New York Times, August 4, 1927).


That General Feland was at this time reflecting the State Department’s attitude, by using a convenient adjective to avoid the recognition of Sandino as a political threat, was revealed in his later admission that he considered Sandino a “bandit” only in the sense that he was the chieftain of a small band.96 But neither Feland nor the State Department could convince a hostile section of the American press which hailed Sandino as a harassed patriot,97 or the American public, that Sandino was a treacherous “bandit”. The New York Times reflected this scepticism by soberly questioning the “epithets” which the State Department applied to Sandino’s adherence to the “customary” guerrilla practice of looting and pointedly commented that leaders of Chinese rebel armies who indulge in the same custom are not declared beyond “the pale of the law” by our government.98 Even Stimson, who vehemently denounced the revolutionist as an “outlaw,”99 later referred to Sandino as a “skillful guerrilla.”100

By mid-October, 1927, American officials had been forced to confess to Washington that the “bandits” controlled the countryside of northern Nicaragua and that “recent events have increased [Sandino’s] prestige.”101 They promised “energetic steps” and called for more marines. It was thus becoming very difficult to maintain the fiction of “banditry” in the light of the increasing popularity of the sandinista movement.102 The reports of casualties suffered by the marines at Quilali,103 and their failure to crush the Sandinistas after the capture of Sandino’s stronghold at El Chipote in January, 1928, seriously compromised the American stand. Sandino’s proficiency in outmaneuvering the marines was due to the geography of the region and the excellent intelligence which the native population willingly supplied regarding the movements of the Americans.104 It was becoming evident that if Sandino was really the ruthless outlaw that Stimson described,105 public opinion in Nicaragua would be more hostile to the “ban-

96 Con Sandino, pp. 218-229. See also New York Times, January 11, 1931, F. R. 1927, III, 446.
97 De la Selva, op. cit., p. 64.
99 Stimson, Nicaragua, pp. 103-104.
100 Stimson, On Active Service, p. 183.
104 Bolaños, op. cit., p. 21; F. R. 1929, III, 533.
dits” than to the United States marines. Thus the American legation complained in vain that local authorities “appear unable or unwilling to punish the roving bands of Sandino.”106

By January, 1928, Sandino controlled three northern departments and threatened a fourth. The State Department found itself under fire in Congress by the anti-imperialists, and at the Pan-American Conference in Havana by Mexico and El Salvador for intervention against a “bandit.”107 Thus, when the American legation urged that Moncada be permitted to issue a declaration of a state of war against Sandino, the State Department quickly vetoed the suggestion with the confession that it would convert his status “of a mere bandit” to that of “a leader of an organized rebellion with the possibilities of a recognition of his belligerency by any nation.”108 To forestall any further criticism Admiral David Foote Sellers, the commander of naval forces, attempted on January 20 to negotiate with the “outlaw” and to persuade him to accept a “peaceful” settlement.109 Sandino was, meanwhile, officially raised to the position of a “guerrilla” in Washington.110

Sandino’s answer was defiant. Addressing himself to Sellers, as the “Representative of Imperialism in Nicaragua,” Sandino declared that peace could be achieved only by the withdrawal of the marines, the “replacement” of Díaz by any neutral candidate except Moncada, and the supervision of the coming presidential election by the representatives of the Latin-American republics.111

To emphasize his defiance, Sandino raided and destroyed an American-owned mine, and left a letter criticizing the American people for “upholding” their government’s policy in Nicaragua. He threatened further destruction of American property unless the marines were withdrawn,112 and maneuvered his forces into a position menacing American interests in the vital east-coast ports.

Losing hope of a quick decision, the marines announced the beginning of a “war of attrition” against Sandino, but carefully

107 Sandino had his representative in Havana (Bolaños, op. cit., p. 50; Denny, op. cit., pp. 324-327; Perkins, op. cit., p. 339).
108 Sec. of State to Munro (Tel.), Jan. 13, 1928, F. R. 1928, III, 561.
avoided referring to him as a "bandit." From the beginning of March until November 5,480 marines and the marine-sponsored Guardia Nacional doggedly pursued the guerrilla chieftain through hundreds of miles of jungle with little success. Sandino, operating in an impassable terrain and with the sympathy of the populace, not only evaded the marines but attacked American plantations and mines, and ambushed the marines almost at will. Attempts by the marines in June to secure the surrender of Sandino by generous offers of peace and an amnesty met with an ominous silence. With the advent of the rainy season in June and July, Sandino suddenly disappeared and there were fewer contacts with his group. Since the pursuit of war was impossible, the "surrenders" of Sandinistas without arms were numerous. The American legation now confidently assured itself that the sandinista movement was dead.

The ambush of a marine patrol in August was stark evidence that Sandino was very much alive. It was, however, difficult for American representatives in Nicaragua to convince the State Department or the American public in September, that "the Sandinista movement [had] lost practically all of its significance," especially since Sandino had, during the last six months, gained access to an American audience through the journalist, Carleton Beals. In a series of dispatches from Sandino’s camp, Beals not only portrayed the difficulties of the marines, but also publicized Sandino’s determination to continue his stubborn resistance until the marines were withdrawn and Moncada abandoned his candidacy. Through Beals, the American public was informed by Sandino that the "bandits in Nicaragua were not necessarily Nicaraguans." Beals strengthened Sandino’s assertion with the

118 Cf. F. R. 1928, III, 582.
119 Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), Aug. 9, 1928, ibid., p. 585.
120 Eberhardt to Sec. of State, September 20, 1928, ibid., p. 588. Italics are mine.
121 Beals, op. cit., IV, 280.
122 Carleton Beals, "With Sandino in Nicaragua. Part I, To the Nicaraguan Border," The Nation, CXXVI (February 22, 1928), 204.
charge that “streams of refugees” were fleeing from the severity of the marines rather than from Sandino.\textsuperscript{123}

While the American legation, after Moncada’s election to the presidency in November, 1928, was trying to believe that Sandino was crushed,\textsuperscript{124} Admiral Sellers again attempted to induce the guerrilla chieftain to cease his resistance.\textsuperscript{125} In late January Sandino replied by an attack on Yalí, in which three marines were killed,\textsuperscript{126} and by numerous clashes during February, 1929.\textsuperscript{127} Sandino’s absence in Mexico from February, 1929 to May, 1930 neither decreased the concern of the marines and the State Department, nor weakened the sandinista movement now led by the fierce Pedro Altamirano.\textsuperscript{128} But the Hoover administration, reacting to the increasing criticism of its intervention policy, had now determined to retreat gracefully from Nicaragua and to leave the work of pacification to the “non-partisan” Guardia. This decision prompted Stimson to announce in May, 1929, that “the original Sandino situation . . . [had] ceased to exist.”\textsuperscript{129} While Stimson was thus seeking to convince the American public of Sandino’s defeat, the legation in Managua counselled in July against a reduction in marine strength and reported with alarm that “the influence of Sandino [was] greater . . . than it was prior to his leaving Nicaragua.”\textsuperscript{130} It supported Moncada’s warning that the mere knowledge of American withdrawal “would have serious consequences.”\textsuperscript{131} The situation was far more grave than it was in late 1927.

\textsuperscript{123} Carleton Beals, “This is War, Gentlemen!” *The Nation*, CXXVI (April 11, 1928), 404-406. On the activities of Sandino’s brother, Sócrates, and the sympathetic All-American Anti-Imperialist League, see *New York Times*, January 4, 1928-June 6, 1928; and *F. R. 1928*, III, 573-574, 578.

\textsuperscript{124} Immediately after his election, Moncada asked the United States to stop the withdrawal of marines, for enlargement of the Guardia Nacional, and permission to create an irregular force to deal with his rival (Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), January 3, 1929. *F. R. 1929*, III, 549.

\textsuperscript{125} *New York Times*, December 9, 1928.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., January 23, 1929-January 25, 1929.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., February 2, 1929-February 19, 1929.

\textsuperscript{128} See *F. R. 1929*, III, 581-590; *New York Times*, February 10, 1929-May 30, 1930. On Sandino’s stay in Mexico, see Bolaños, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-63; *Con Sandino*, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{129} Sec. of State to Eberhardt (Tel.), May 6, 1929, *F. R. 1929*, III, 562-563, my italics.

\textsuperscript{130} Hanna, chargé, to Sec. of State, July 17, 1929, *ibid.*, p. 578. When Moncada proceeded to organize “volunteer” groups with the blessings of American military authorities, the State Department ordered the legation to disclaim any responsibility for the activities of the “volunteers” and warned Moncada that their functions must be taken over by the marine-trained Guardia “as soon as practicable,” (Sec. of State to Hanna [Tel.], June 10, 1929, *ibid.*, p. 574).

\textsuperscript{131} Hanna to Sec. of State, July 17, 1929, *ibid.*, p. 577.
It was futile, however, for the State Department to assure the American people and the world that the marines had achieved a victory over Sandino and could now complacently withdraw. Sandino’s publicity had made him a much more important figure in the United States and Latin America than in his homeland. While Beals’ publicity had cast Sandino as a patriot of sincerity and conviction, other Anglo-Saxons and Latin publicists, and Sandino’s personal agents portrayed him as a pacific man goaded to revolt against the tyranny of corrupt politicians and brutal foreign invasion. Sandino shrewdly played upon the sentimental sympathy of the American public for the oppressed by appeals to judge whether he was a bandit or patriot. To justify his looting of the properties of foreigners, he solemnly vowed that it was a device to compel American capitalists to treat Nicaraguans as equals. He became the center of “as much legend as though he had been buried for a century,” and deliberately maintained himself in the pose of “a kind of good devil or perverse god.” But above all, Sandino prevented the American public from becoming convinced that he was an “outlaw” or a “bandit.” There was an ever increasing feeling that “for Sandino

135 Salomón de la Selva, Froylén Turcios, Pedro José Zepeda, Gustavo Machado, and Sócrates Sandino were Sandino’s personal representatives and propagandists in the United States and Mexico (New York Times, January 16, 1928-April 5, 1934). On the aid solicited by these agents, see F. R. 1928, III, 567-570, 578, 580, 584.
138 Valle, op. cit., p. 246.
139 “Taps for Sandino—Patriot, Bandit, or Both,” Literary Digest, CXVII (March 3, 1934), 7; “Nicaragua: Murder at the Crossroads,” Time, XXIII (March 5, 1934), 16-17; “I’m the Champ,” ibid., LII (November 15, 1948), 38-43.
to have accomplished all the black deeds laid at his door . . .
would require more than [his alleged] . . . life of crime.\textsuperscript{140}

The unofficial moral and material support that he received
from Mexico,\textsuperscript{141} Central America, and the leftist All-American
Anti-Imperialist League in the United States,\textsuperscript{142} enabled Sandino
to renew the struggle against Moncada and the United States
with increased vigor after his return to Nicaragua in June, 1930.\textsuperscript{143}
He welcomed the aid of all parties and organizations opposed to
\textit{imperialismo Yanqui}, but carefully disassociated himself from the
communists.

The early attempts of the State Department to depict San-
dino’s identification with the cause of “the rabble” of northern
Nicaragua, as evidence of his “wild Communist ideas acquired
in Mexico . . . ,”\textsuperscript{144} at first led the communists to support his
cause.\textsuperscript{145} Both the communists and the State Department real-
ized that \textit{Sandinismo} was as much a manifestation of the sick
economy of Nicaragua and labor unrest as a result of political
instability.\textsuperscript{146} The fact that Sandino espoused social reform, and
was popular with the lower classes contributed to the belief that
he was really a Marxist.\textsuperscript{147} A leading Salvadoran communist,
José Martí, visited Sandino and unsuccessfully attempted to con-
vert him to Marxism and rally Latin-American communists in a
class war against American imperialism.\textsuperscript{148} But Sandino’s visit
to Mexico convinced the communists that his movement was

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{New York Times}, January 11, 1931; Raymond Leslie Buell, “Changes in our Latin
American Policy,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, CLVI
(July, 1931), 131.

\textsuperscript{141} On Sandino’s appeal to the Mexicans see Spence, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 338. The Mexican
government did not conceal its belief that the policy of the United States against Sandino
was a “mistaken one . . . ,” but did not send men and munitions to aid Sandino (Morrow,
ambassador in Mexico to Sec. of State, \textit{F. R. 1928}, III, 571); Harold Nicolson, \textit{Dwight

\textsuperscript{142} See n. 136.

\textsuperscript{143} While in Mexico, Sandino particularly emphasized his determination to fight as long

\textsuperscript{144} Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), July 20, 1927. \textit{F. R. 1927}, III, 441; Bolaños,
\textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{146} Stimson, \textit{Nicaragua}, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{147} Eberhardt to Sec. of State (Tel.), May 31, 1928, \textit{F. R. 1928}, III, 577; Talbott, Consul
at Bluefields to the Acting Sec. of State (Tel.), undated, U. S. Department of State,
\textit{Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931} (Washington, D. C.,
1946), II, 822-823, hereinafter cited as \textit{F. R. 1931}. Valle, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 248; \textit{Con Sandino},
pp. 112, 183, 184-185.

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Con Sandino}, pp. 111-112; Bolaños, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 43.
nationalist and anti-imperialist,\textsuperscript{149} and that he was not their man. While he was in Mexico, the Mexican Marxists circulated rumors that Sandino had accepted $60,000 as a bribe for leaving Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{150} When he returned to resume command of the insurrection, the Mexican communists charged that after accepting their funds and agreeing to tour the world in a crusade against American imperialism, he had returned "to sell out to the highest bidder." The United States, declared the Mexican Marxists, had now permitted Sandino to return in order to use him as a weapon to guarantee Moncada's obedience.\textsuperscript{151} Sandino, however, used the attacks of the communists to discredit the charges of the State Department, and strengthen his position with the American public.

Sandino's presence in Nicaragua was not officially confirmed until mid-June, 1930.\textsuperscript{152} The northern departments were by this time aflame and the Sandinistas continued seriously to threaten the position of the Guardia and the reduced marine garrison throughout the months of July and August.\textsuperscript{153} While the marines and the Guardia began another offensive against Sandino, the Hoover administration continued with its plans for withdrawal. Moncada was bluntly informed that his government must prepare to assume the sole responsibility of dealing with Sandino.\textsuperscript{154} In spite of his previous pronouncements, Stimson bitterly admitted on November 24, 1930, that "the . . . population is . . . the [source] of additional banditry," and "the situation seems as unsettled as it was three years ago."\textsuperscript{155} He thereby notified Moncada and the owners of American property in Nicaragua that American forces must be entirely withdrawn by November, 1932, since "Public opinion in the [United States] will hardly support [the] . . . continuance of [a] situation"\textsuperscript{156} in which each intervention undermines the capacity of the Nicaraguan government to maintain order.\textsuperscript{157} It was an admission of defeat.

\textsuperscript{149} Con Sandino, pp. 180, 193. See Sandino's statement of his principles in a letter to the President of Argentina published in El Dictamen (Veracruz), July 1, 1929.
\textsuperscript{150} New York Times, December 26, 1929.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., May 30, 1930.
\textsuperscript{154} Sec. of State to Moncada, Nov. 24, 1930, F. R. 1930, III, 684-685.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 686.
\textsuperscript{156} Stimson, On Active Service, p. 182; See also Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I, 309.
By January, 1931, it was apparent that the offensive of the marines and Guardia had again failed. ¹⁵⁸ The Guardia, which had gradually begun to assume the responsibility for subduing Sandino, made a poor showing. Sandino appeared stronger and bolder than he had ever been before. Yet he was more conciliatory and in a letter to Senator Borah promised to cease his resistance when the marines left Nicaragua. ¹⁵⁹ In answer to the official American announcement, on February 13, of plans to end the occupation of Nicaragua, ¹⁶⁰ Sandino offered an armistice through his agent in Mexico City. The State Department, although avoiding any reference to Sandino as a “bandit,” replied that no truce would be forthcoming until “the rebels laid down their arms.” ¹⁶¹ Sandino’s reply to this rebuff was the announcement, in late March, of plans for another attack on the ports of the Mosquito coast.

Taking advantage of the earthquake in Managua and labor unrest on the east coast, Sandino advanced in mid-April on Puerto Cabezas and Cape Gracias a Dios. The navy rushed warships to the scene, but it was too late to prevent the sack of Cape Gracias a Dios on April 15, with the loss of some American lives. ¹⁶² In spite of this show of strength, the State Department informed the American legation that the United States could not guarantee protection to American citizens against Sandino and urged their evacuation. ¹⁶³ To the public, Stimson explained that the temporary reversal of the announced policy was occasioned by the activities of “small groups . . . treated as outlaws” by their government. ¹⁶⁴ He declared that Sandino, by seeking to profit from his nation’s disaster, was at last unmasked as a “mythical patriot.” Once more the charge of “bandit” was resurrected when President Hoover joined Moncada in denouncing Sandino as a “cold-blooded bandit” who would be brought to justice. ¹⁶⁵ Lest Moncada be encouraged by these expressions, Stimson again notified the Nicaraguan government that the Guardia must take over the entire responsibility for subduing

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., January 7, 1931.
¹⁶⁰ Ibid., February 14, 1931; Stimson, Nicaragua, p. 107.
¹⁶³ Rowe, V. Cons., Bluefields, to Sec. of State (Tel.), April 7, 1931, F. R. 1931, II, 808-809.
¹⁶⁵ New York Times, April 22, 1931.
Sandino "as quickly as possible," in order to permit the speedy withdrawal of the marines.  

Stimson's assertion was supported by the assurance of American military authorities that the Guardia was now strong enough to maintain law and order.  

While Sandino withdrew as quickly as he had come, the marines began, on April 28, 1931, to transfer the northern provinces to the care of the Guardia. With feints toward the east coast, designed to demoralize American firms, Sandino engaged in sporadic clashes with the marine-supported Guardia until late October, when he marshaled his forces for a drive into north-central and western Nicaragua. Although Sandino's action was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to capitalize on the growing opposition among the Liberals to Moncada and the reduction of marine strength, it was also apparently prompted by the desire to isolate the marines through the seizure of their single railway connection to the west coast. The American legation, while rejecting Moncada's demand for a declaration of martial law, effectively countered Sandino's offensive by utilizing the remaining marines to protect the vital railway. The end of 1931 thus found Sandino so strong that the American authorities were forced to report that his movement had "assumed a revolutionary character." This, however, did not deter President Hoover from announcing to Congress on December 10, 1931, that the marines would be completely withdrawn after the presidential election in Nicaragua in November, 1932. 

Meanwhile, Sandino had become more aggressive. In an open letter to Hoover, he demanded nothing less than the immediate withdrawal of the marines, and warned that he would not recognize the validity of any marine-supervised elections. The heady spirits of success seem to have convinced Sandino that fate had destined him to play the part of a new Bolivar. In an effort to force the United States to abandon supervision of the

166 Sec. of State to Rowe, Bluefields (Tel.), April 18, 1931, \emph{F. R. 1931}, II, 812.  
167 Sec. of State to Hanna (Tel.), May 15, 1931, \emph{ibid.}, p. 819; \emph{New York Times}, April 19, 1931.  
170 Beaulac, chargé in Nicaragua, to the Sec. of State (Tel.), November 25, 1931, \emph{F. R. 1931}, II, 827-828; Munro, op. cit., p. 701.  
171 \emph{F. R. 1931}, II, 826-829.  
172 Beaulac to Sec. of State (Tel.), Nov. 24, 1931, \emph{ibid.}, p. 826.  
173 William Starr Myers, ed., \emph{The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover} (New York, 1934), I, 78.  
174 \emph{New York Times}, April 12, 1932.  
175 Con Sandino, pp. 136-137, 173.
forthcoming presidential elections and to insure the defeat of Moncada, Sandino began a well-publicized "victory" drive in mid-April toward the major cities of central Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{176} From late April until the end of June, 1932, the fight with the marine-led Guardia continued with some losses in American lives.\textsuperscript{177} The Guardia, in the final state of its organization as a "non-partisan" force, was only able to stop Sandino with great difficulty.\textsuperscript{178} Although he did not force the Americans from their purpose, Sandino succeeded in discrediting Moncada by unmasking the latter's attempts to detain the marines through willful obstruction of the Guardia.\textsuperscript{179}

Though with distaste, American representatives were fast becoming aware that there was substance in Sandino's charges against Moncada. They had "strong reasons" to believe that Moncada feared the pacification of Nicaragua because he wished to perpetuate himself in power after 1932, with the help of the marines and a private "volunteer" army.\textsuperscript{180} More important was the realization of the Americans that "the mass of the Liberal Party declined to associate itself with him."\textsuperscript{181} Thus, even before Moncada's retirement, the United States gave its blessings to a coalition of both parties seeking an agreement with Sandino to end the disastrous conflict.\textsuperscript{182}

An agreement on June 30 sponsored by the progressive Grupo Patriótico pledged both the Conservatives and Liberals to seek a political settlement with Sandino by "pacific and conciliatory" means.\textsuperscript{183} To facilitate negotiations with Sandino, Stimson publicly announced that the United States would not participate in the peace parleys with the chieftain.\textsuperscript{184} Rumors of a peace conference with Sandino\textsuperscript{185} were finally confirmed on July 6 by his agent in Mexico. Sandino proposed to cease resistance if a

\textsuperscript{176} New York Times, April 18, 1932.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., April 18, 1932-June 28, 1932.
\textsuperscript{179} Gen. Mathews, jefe director Guardia Nacional, to Hanna, Aug. 8, 1932, F. R. 1932, V, 899.
\textsuperscript{180} Hanna to Sec. of State, Oct. 8, 1932, ibid., pp. 833-834.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., p. 834.
\textsuperscript{182} Hanna, to the Sec. of State, letters and telegrams regarding bi-partisan plans for peace with Sandino, October 8, 1932 to November 17, 1932, ibid., pp. 833-850, 937.
\textsuperscript{183} Hanna, to the Sec. of State, October 20, 1932, ibid., pp. 838-839. See also La Prensa (Managua), October 9, 1932; Munro, op. cit., pp. 702-703.
\textsuperscript{184} New York Times, June 30, 1932.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., June 29, 1932-June 30, 1932.
neutral presidential candidate were selected by both parties and if the United States were to withdraw the marines before the presidential election. When it became apparent that both parties could not yield on the principle of American supervision of the forthcoming elections, Sandino announced the nomination of his lieutenant, Horacio Portocarrero, as the neutral presidential candidate. Sandino, however, continued the negotiations with the representatives of both parties in spite of his vow to resist "any attempt to hold farcical elections under... foreign troops." To emphasize his strength, he continued his attacks on Guardia patrols and foreign holdings throughout the months of July and September. Moncada was even forced to call out the young cadets of the military academy when the Sandinistas sacked a village within twenty miles of Managua.

Sandino's demonstration seems to have had its desired effect. On October 3 the Grupo Patriótico succeeded in securing the consent of the candidates of both parties, Sacasa and Chamorro, to a concrete plan of coöperation based on the "pacification" of Nicaragua and the proportional representation of minority parties in the government after the election. The plan pledged both parties to seek "the best solution" to Sandino's "rebellion" which they now recognized as having existed for more than four years. They thus repudiated the charges of banditry that Moncada and the Americans had leveled at Sandino and admitted that the sandinista revolution was "a sad reality." Peace with Sandino was declared "to be the prime objective" of whatever party was elected, while the minority group agreed to coöperate in the maintenance of such a settlement.

To implement the "pacification" program, the Grupo had dispatched to Honduras an avowed anti-interventionist, Dr. Escollástico Lara, to establish contact with Sandino from "neutral" soil. Dr. Lara was to pave the way for the representatives of both parties who were to meet with Sandino "to negotiate [a] national peace." The details of the pacification plan, however,
were kept "strictly confidential" because of the fear that it might prejudice the position of the presidential candidates and further excite the unrelenting opposition of the Moncada faction.\textsuperscript{196}

In spite of the privately voiced objections of the presidential candidates and the even more vocally expressed disapproval of Moncada's foreign minister, Anastacio Somoza, the United States persisted in its plan to withdraw the remaining marines by early January, 1933.\textsuperscript{197} To soothe the fears of the políticos the American chargé informed Somoza "that the possibility of conciliating Sandino will be greater if no marines remain in Nicaragua..."\textsuperscript{198} The withdrawal of the marines, he declared, would deprive Sandino of "his principal excuse for... belligerency" and enable a "united Nicaragua" to deal more effectively with him if he continued his resistance.\textsuperscript{199} The United States was finally and affirmatively washing its hands of what had been "a futile and needless business."\textsuperscript{200} More important, however, was the tacit admission that American intervention "tended to foment the evil which it was intended to cure."\textsuperscript{201}

Sandino, meanwhile, continued his annoying raids throughout the months of October and November, 1932.\textsuperscript{202} In answer to Sandino's precipitate repudiation of Sacasa's election of November 6,\textsuperscript{203} the new president credited the revolutionist with "good intentions," but pointedly remarked that any further resistance lacked justification.\textsuperscript{204} What probably brought Sandino closer to Sacasa was a mutual, growing fear of Moncada's kinsman, Somoza, the newly designated commandant of the Guardia,\textsuperscript{205} the personnel of which had already shown evidence of being more bi-partisan than "non-partisan."\textsuperscript{206} On December 4, a sandinista spokesman, Salomón de la Selva, warned that an agreement between Sacasa and Sandino was the only way to prevent the chief of the only legal armed force in Nicaragua from assuming power.\textsuperscript{207} De la

\textsuperscript{196} The plan was not revealed until after the election of Sacasa, on November 6 (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 840, 842).

\textsuperscript{197} Hanna to Sec of State, Nov. 4, 1932, \textit{F. R. 1932}, V, 876-877; Hull, \textit{op. cit.}, I, 309.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{F. R. 1932}, V, 878.

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Ibid.} My italics. Munro, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 701.

\textsuperscript{200} Denny, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{201} Thompson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 144.


\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid.}, November 8, 1932.

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Ibid.}, November 9, 1932.


\textsuperscript{206} Thompson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 144; Sec. of State to Hanna, Nicaragua, December 1, 1932, \textit{F. R. 1932}, V, 900.

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{New York Times}, December 4, 1932.
Selva announced Sandino’s nine-point program for Nicaragua which called not only for the elimination of American interference, but also for a reorganization of the Guardia.\textsuperscript{208} Sandino had serious misgivings regarding the American choice of General Somoza, as jefe director of the Guardia.\textsuperscript{209}

Negotiations with Sandino began in earnest after the presidential elections. Reassured by the withdrawal of marines during the first half of December and the American announcement that they would be completely evacuated by January 2, 1933, Sandino became more tractable.\textsuperscript{210} Sacasa, however, was somewhat pessimistic regarding the prospects of a settlement with Sandino, but nevertheless sincerely pressed the negotiations.\textsuperscript{211} Less than a week after the inauguration of Sacasa on January 1 and the complete evacuation of the marines on the next day, Sandino dispatched his wife, Blanca, to Managua with word that he was prepared to cease resistance.\textsuperscript{212} The “bandit” was fulfilling his promise and giving credence to his persistent claim that “he was fighting . . . to end foreign intervention.”\textsuperscript{213}

Although the talks progressed throughout January, there was still a feeling that Sandino’s terms would be unacceptable.\textsuperscript{214} Somoza and the Guardia were openly hostile. But Sandino and the government persisted in their efforts to affect a peaceful settlement until, on January 25, the chieftain publicly announced that he desired peace and was prepared to come to Managua to prove his sincerity.\textsuperscript{215} He flew to the capital and, on February 2, amidst the rejoicing of the people, signed a truce. The Sandinistas were granted an amnesty, land in Coco river valley for a communal project, and the assurance that they would be given preference in employment in public works projects. Sandino agreed immediately to surrender one-fourth of his arms in return for the right to retain a personal guard of 100 men as government “auxil-
liaries.” He refused to accept any financial or material pre-
ferment for himself, except to represent temporarily the govern-
ment as the jefe político in San Rafael del Norte.217

True to his word, Sandino disarmed his 1,800 men.218 To his
erstwhile American adversaries he declared: “I have nothing
against North Americans. Let them come to Nicaragua—as
workers, not as bosses. I salute the American people.”219 The
American public accepted this magnanimous gesture with the
conviction that history would judge Sandino “a hero to the Nica-
raguans of his class.”220

Sandino, with a vague premonition of impending doom, be-
lieved that he was “morally invincible.”221 A year later he suffered
the martyrdom which he had always sought when shot down by
General Somoza and the Guardia. Somoza, by engineering the
assassination of Sandino on February 21, 1934, succeeded where
hiskinsman had failed.222 The vengeful Moncada rejoiced with
the prosaic assertion that “It was pure patriotism to kill Sandino,
as it will always be ... to put an end to those monstrous beings
who voluntarily exclude themselves from civilized society.”223
But in death, Sandino became the San Digno (Worthy Saint)
which his men reverently believed him to be even in life.

214 New York Times, February 3, 1933; Munro, op. cit., p. 704.
217 New York Times, February 8, 1933; Con Sandino, pp. 139, 185; “Sandino Calls Off
His Gaddfly War,” Literary Digest, CXV (February 18, 1933), 8.
218 Con Sandino, pp. 73-74; New York Times, February 8, 1933-February 24, 1933.
221 Con Sandino, pp. 11, 89, 139.
222 Less than three months before the assassination, Somoza and Sandino jointly issued
a manifesto “striking the friendship ... and brotherhood of the two and their loyalty
to the republic ...” (New York Times, December 6, 1933). For the details of the assassi-
nation of Sandino, see Carlos Castillo Ibarra, Los Judas de Sandino, 11º aniversario del
asesinato del libertador gral. Augusto César Sandino (Mexico, D. F., 1945), passim. See
also General Somoza’s apologia and account of his relations with Sandino in Anastacio
Somoza, El verdadero Sandino o el calvario de las Segovias (Managua, 1936), passim; El Diario Nicarauguense (Granada), June 19, 1934; La Prensa (Managua), March 11, 1934.
223 El Diario Nicarauguense (Granada), June 19, 1934. Moncada’s vindictive statement
was undoubtedly provoked by Sandino’s well publicized declaration that the only place
for Moncada and his kind was “under ground” (La Prensa (Managua), August 21 (?),
1932).