

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY SPRING TERM, 1974

CASE NO. 74-6113

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs.

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /

LUIS CRESPO, ET AL DEFENDANTS.

Explosive is defined by Chapter 552.081 of the Florida Statutes as being any chemical compound or mixture that has the property of yielding readily to combustion or oxidation upon the application of heat, flame, or shock, including but not limited to dynamite, nitroglycerin, trinitrotoluene, ammoniumnitrate when combined with other ingredients to form an explosive mixture, blasting caps and detonators. But not probably carbadages for freezewards and post probably freeworks.

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DENIED:				
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CIRCUIT	COURT	JUDGE)

- FILED -

SEP6 - 1974

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY SPRING TERM, RICHA

SPRING TERM, RICHTARD P. BRINKER
CLERK

CASE NO. 74-6113

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs.

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

LUIS CRESPO, ET AL DEFENDANTS.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I charge you that possession of explosives without a permit as required by Chapter 552 of the Florida Statutes shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to use the same for destruction of life, limb or property.

Chapter 552.22 Florida Statutes

DENIED:

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

- FILED .

SFP**6 -** 1974

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF BRINKER FLORIDA, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY SPRING TERM, 1974

CASE NO. 74-6113

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs.

LUIS CRESPO, ET AL DEFENDANTS.

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3

It is not the duty of the State Attorney to produce every person who might seem likely to have some knowledge about this case, and to have them testify on the witness stand. Such an undertaking would involve useless expense and waste of time in most instances. It is the State Attorney's duty to investigate and discover who actually has knowledge which is material to the determination of the issues and to produce at trial only such as are necessary and material, and any omission to produce other witnesses does not raise any presumption that they would, if produced, testify adversely to the prosecution.

It is not the duty of the prosecution nor of the defense to call as its own witnesses any and all persons who might appear to have some knowledge of the matters concerned in this case.

Selph v. State, 22 Fla. 537

Brown v. State, 180 So. 842

GIVEN:

DENIED:

CIRCUÍT COURT JUDGE

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA SPRING TERM 1974 CASE NO: 74-6113 CRIMINAL DIVISION RICHARD P. BRINKER CLERK STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS; LUIS ALBERTO -vs-) CRESPO and HUMBERTO LOPEZ, PRO-POSED AND REQUESTED SPECIAL JURY LUIS ALBERTO CRESPO, HUMBERTO INSTRUCTIONS LOPEZ and JUAQUIN MIRANDA,) Defendants,

The Defendants, LUIS ALBERTO CRESPO and HUMBERTO LOPEZ, pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, respectfully move the Court to give to the jury the requested instructions hereto annexed, and further requests that the Court indicate at the close of the evidence and prior to the argument which of the tendered instructions or parts thereof it will give and which it will refuse.

MELVYN GREENSPAHN, P.A. Suite 210-1150 Building 1150 S.W. 1st Street Miamû, Florida 33130

TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS,

and LOPEZ

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST GIVEN OF THE FOLLOWING NUMBERED INSTRUCTIONS AS MORE PARTICULARLY SET FORTH IN FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL CASES:

2.	01		Opening	Statement
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2.02 - Statement of Charges

2.03 - Plea of Not guilty - Burden of Proof

2.05 - Read the Statutes pursuant to which the offenses are charged.

2.06 - Essential Elements

possession w/o point prinafrica

2.08 - Date of Crime - Proof (Paragraph 1)


2.09 - Venue

- 2.11(a) Presumption of Innocence
- 2.11(b) Reasonable Doubt.
- 2.12 Weighing the evidence
 - (a) Conflicts
 - (b) Credibility of Witnesses

tot <u>accomplise</u> (e) - Impeachment

- 2.12(h) Defendants not testifying
- 2.13 Circumstantial Evidence
- 2.14 Matters to be disregarded (a) (c)
- 2.15 Verdict
- 2.16 Cautionary Conclusions
- 2.17 Deliberations

GRANTED)
DENIED	



You are instructed that it is a crime for any person to possess an explosive for which he has not obtained a permit.

The essential elements of this offense which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the Defendant can be found guilty are:

- 1. That the Defendants, LUIS ALBERTO CRESPO AND HUMBERTO LOPEZ, did willfully and knowingly possess an explosive as is hereafter further defined.
- 2. Which said destructive devise was not the subject of a lawful permit.

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DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

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SEP**5 -** 1974

RICHARD P. BRINKER

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM-PROOF OF NO REGISTRATION

The State has introduced in evidence State's Exhibit
No, which is a certificate of the custodian of the
to the effect
that he has made a diligent search and has found no record of
any explosive substance being registered to the defendants. He
makes up this certificate as evidence that the explosive substance
was not registered to the Defendants, but you are not obliged to
do so. It is up to you to determine what evidence you will accept
Lack of permit is an essential element which must be proved.
Otherwise, the State's case fails. <u>U.S. vs. Collier</u> , 281 F2d 616

GRANTED_______
DENIED______


(6th Cir., 1967).

The essential elements of this offense which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction in this case are that:

- 1. The Defendants did possess an explosive.
- 2. That the Defendants at the time of the alleged offense did not hold a license or permit for possession of such explosive.
- 3. That the Defendants were not under the immediate personal supervision or control of a person holding a blasters permit.
- 4. That the Defendants were not engaged in preparation for and in the detonating or otherwise effecting the explosion of an explosive. F.S. 552.101

An explosive is defined as "any chemical compound or mixture that has the property of yielding readily to combustion or oxidation upon the application of heat, flame or shock including but not limited to dynamite, nitroglycerin, trinitrotoluene, ammonium nitrate when combined with other ingredients to form an explosive mixture, blasting caps and detonators; but not including cartridges for firearms and not including fireworks." F.S. 552.081(1).

GRANTED	Withdraw
DENIED	



You are instructed that a defendant has the absolute right not to testify, and the jury must not draw a presumption of guilt or any inference against the defendant because he did not testify.

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GRANTED_	
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DENTED	

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

SEP**6 -** 19**74** RICHARD P. BRINKER

You are instructed that the indictment is not evidence of any kind against the defendant and does not create any presumption or permit any inference of guilt. It is merely the formal manner by which the government accuses a person of crime in order to bring him to trial. The defendant has answered the charges by pleading "not guilty," thus denying that he committed the crime charged. You must not be prejudiced against a defendant because an indictment has been returned against him.

Statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence.

They are only intended to assist the jury in understanding the evidence and the contentions of the parties. During the course of the trial it often becomes the duty of counsel to make objections, and for the court to rule on them in accordance with the law. The jury should not consider or be influenced by the fact that such objections have been made by either side.

Testimony and exhibits to which the court has sustained an objection, or which the court has ordered stricken from the record, do not constitute evidence, and must not be considered by the jury.

GRANTED DENIED

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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

RICHARD P. BRINKER

You are instructed that evidence that an act was done at one time, or on one occasion, is not any evidence or proof whatever that a similar act was done at another time, or on another occasion. That is to say, evidence that a defendant may have committed an earlier act of a like nature may not be considered by the jury, in determining whether the accused committed any act charged in the indictment.

Nor may evidence of an alleged earlier act of a like nature be considered for any other purpose whatever, unless the jury first find that the other evidence in the case, standing alone, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did the particular act charged in the particular county of the indictment then under deliberation.

If the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in the case that the accused did the act charged in the particular count under deliberation, then the jury may consider evidence as to an alleged earlier act of a like nature, in determining the state of mind or intent with which the accused did the act charged in the particular count. And where proof of an alleged earlier act of a like nature is established by evidence which is clear and conclusive, the jury may, but is not obliged to, draw the inference and find that, in doing the act charged in the particular count under deliberation, the accused acted willfully and with specific intent, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. withdraw

GRANTED_	
DENITED	
\mathtt{DENIED}_{-}	

State v. Caspo & Sope SEP6-1974

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D's proposed instruction: -

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