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ART. I.—CUBA AND THE TRIPARTITE TREATY.

1. *Letter of Mr. EDWARD EVERETT, of Massachusetts, to Lord JOHN RUSSELL, Peer of England.* Boston Advertiser. Sept. 21, 1853.
2. *Letter of JOHN C. CALHOUN, Secretary of State of the United States, to WILLIAM R. KING, Minister of the United States at the Court of LOUIS PHILIPPE, King of the French.* Washington, August 12, 1844.

ONE comprehensive glance at the horizon of international politics, is sufficient to satisfy the political reasoner, that he lives at a period in the world's history which has, indeed, no real prototype. Upon the old continent, a peace of two hundred years' duration, as profound as the eminently tame and tranquil disposition of the Chinese character could render it, pervading, too, the oldest and largest empire on earth, has been suddenly terminated by the outbreak of a revolution which promises to effect an abiding and a radical change in the relation subsisting between the Asiatic powers, and in the whole progress of Asiatic events—a result as uncertain in its extent as momentous in its consequences, but which cannot fail to make a deep impression upon human affairs. In the same quarter it seems manifest that the keys which are to unlock the gates of the Japanese empire are nearly forged, and that the ships which are to lead the world's commerce to those shores, will soon be launched. Already have startling fears sprung up in Europe, and the cry will soon

resound there for a balance of power in *Asia*. The Ottoman and Russian empires are, at this moment, on the eve of volcanic eruption. The subterranean flames are fanned and fed by the whirlwinds of religious fanaticism: the Mussulmans of Persia and Egypt, as well as Turkey, are impatient to redden the waters of the Danube with the blood of the Greek Church, while the Russian Czar is ready, with an eagle's swoop, to fall upon Constantinople, and lay both Mahomedanism and the Turkish empire prostrate and dismembered at his feet. The flag of Austria flutters most fretfully in this troubled atmosphere, while that of Spain is but the shred of an ancient banner surmounting the Pyrenees, only as a sad token of fallen greatness. France and Great Britain remain! Great powers, which never lose sight of each other; constantly peering and spying across the British channel, devouring, with eager appetite, all that transpires at their respective courts. Between them there is a natural and ancient jealousy; there is little which is congenial either in language, race, tradition, manners, or institutions; yet, at this precise juncture, two overwhelming causes operate to draw them together, and to give zest to the idea of their genuine friendship, or, at least, mutual good will. It is the desideratum with both that they should remain at peace, and, above all, that they should not be at war with each other. Apart from this, each has its own peculiar interest in some of the leading events of the day, touching, particularly, the fate of Turkey; interests, not only peculiar to themselves, individually, but quite different from those of any other European State. The one has its East Indian and Burman possessions, the other, its African conquests. One looks with anxious eye to, at least, the certain privilege, if not the right of way through Turkish domain; while the other broods gloomily over the actual, if not nominal possession of all the southern coast of the Mediterranean and of the Isthmus of Suez. Both see from their watch-towers at London and Paris, the bold Czar folding himself up for the fearful swoop; both would gladly forestal their Russian competitor, but they know well the cost. They look wistfully in each other's eye, and while they see deep anxiety expanding each

other's lids, they see the image of their own mistrust far back upon the retina.

Such is the present state of things on the old continent; turn now to the new.

Within the compass of three-quarters of a century, the bulk of the American Continent has achieved for itself what never could have entered into the heart of man to conceive; England, France, Spain, and Portugal have been divested of colonies which stretch over nearly one fourth of the landed surface of the earth. A narrow strip of settlements along the Atlantic coast has become an immense federal republic, such as the world has never looked upon. Turn to the west, and she is the opposite neighbour of Asia; to the east, and she is confronted with Europe. Another string of settlements, once dependent on the little corner of Europe, called Portugal, has become, in point of territory, one of the largest empires on earth. The face of the whole continent is so vastly different from that of the old, as to preclude an attempt at comparison; neither is there a similitude in the political condition of the two continents. We have no China, no Japan, no Russia, Austria, France or England here. Never has a "holy alliance" been made here. There is no international balance of power to be preserved; no Bourbon family, no Spain, no principalities, no Turkey, to be propped up by the unwilling support of allied powers or even Vienna conferences. Correctly viewed, there is one power on this continent, against which *all the rest combined*, if unaided by Europe, would contend in vain. That power is the republic of the United States. In extent of territory it nearly equals all Europe. In population, it is competent and increasing at an incalculable rate, and in resources, exhaustless. Our policy has been peace, neutrality and commerce as to other powers; but progress, expansion, power and wealth at home, on *this* continent. We wanted Florida to complete our "natural boundary;" it was obtained honestly, fairly, and well paid for. We needed Louisiana; it was got upon similar fair terms, and no one dared say nay. The great Mississippi rolled through foreign dominions; we needed them, and they were ours. Our eastern and southern bounda-

ries were thus established to suit our wishes and our wants. No government in Europe took upon itself to question our course. It was even from Europe the territory was gotten. Our north-eastern and north-western boundaries were undetermined; they were peaceably and satisfactorily adjusted. Up to this time, the Government at Washington, and the people of the United States entertained the belief that they had neither transcended the limits of propriety nor honesty.

Unfortunately, however, for the peace of mind of the diplomatic profession of Europe, the hardy and spirited sons of Texas, who derived, by the by, not only their existence but their notions of government from the people of the United States, erected themselves into an independent State. In due course of time, they fulfilled their destiny, and became one of the States of this growing Union. Strenuous exertions were made in Europe to prevent the consummation of this happy end, and sincerely may we thank the wise men of our own land for their efforts. It was only by dint of their uncommon energy and care that the entire scheme of annexation was rescued from destruction, and the deceitful assurances of wily ministers detected. Vexed, and possibly mortified at the disappointment, the British government, and—shall we say the French? recoiled to a more secure, and, perhaps, a more promising position. The former sees well into the future, and has not been idle in preparing for it.

But scarcely has Texas been annexed, when, in rapid succession, came the immense regions of New Mexico and California; acquired in a most unmistakable manner, and never questioned even by Great Britain. This was, indeed, a sorry supplement to the annexation of Texas, calculated in no degree to heal the wound occasioned thereby; but how could it be avoided?

Such is a brief recapitulation of those circumstances which occupy public attention in Europe and America at the present time. Those connected with the old continent are surely of more importance *there* than here, and upon the same principle, those so closely touching *us*, must be uppermost in our consideration. In the fate of Turkey, the United States can entertain no other than a general interest; and

upon the same ground, it would seem, the fate of Cuba ought not to be the especial concern of Great Britain and France, the two powers which are certainly more deeply interested in the result of the Turkish controversy than any other save the parties themselves. But it turns out otherwise. Spain is entirely superseded; a band of bold adventurers have landed on Cuba, been taken, and have paid for their audacity with their lives; and, in consequence of this, it devolves on Great Britain and France (as they claim) to entwine their loving arms around the island, and shield her from the world.

It is vain for men to reason upon public matters, particularly those of eminently international character, if they throw out of view the physical and the material circumstances connected therewith; but with a statesman in office, having his country's good at stake, such a course is not only folly, but reprehensible neglect. Now, it has been the choice of nature, to put two separate and distinct continents upon the earth, and to divide them by immense, fathomless oceans; this is the first great classification. These Continents are, in their turn, subdivided by great gulfs and seas, forming the second classification—Europe and Asia, Africa, North America and South America. A third classification is the consequence of the mountains and rivers, which are scattered throughout, forming boundaries for States and Empires; these again are subdivided, till we descend to the humble farm of a few acres. Is it necessary to add that, from this natural physical cause, the division of earth into continents particularly, there must ever be interests peculiar to each particular division, which it would be altogether out of the province of any other to interfere with or attempt to control? Can anything be more evident than that there must always be matters of grave import to Europe which are of little consequence in America, or that events must transpire which deeply interest America, but can be of little real concern in Europe? There always will be, in consequence of these natural subdivisions of the earth, questions of public concern peculiarly American, peculiarly European, and even particularly *Cuban*, as we may live to see exemplified.

That the "Cuba question," so called, is, in the language of

Mr. Everett, "mainly an American question," is a fact which can never be disputed in a fairer manner than it has been by Lord John Russell; neither can any government strive to "*beg the question*" more earnestly than that of Great Britain. The British Lord has made the most of it, by catching up the fag end of Jamaica, and dropping it "somewhat nearer to Cuba than the nearest part of the United States," and deducing, as the legitimate consequence, that it is not a jot further from the United States than from England. Now, the United States are in America, England is in Europe; hence, Lord Russell's final geographical conclusions must be, that Cuba is "somewhat nearer" Europe than America; or, in other words, since the mad expedition of Lopez, the Island of Cuba has moved off in disgust from the American coast, and plumped itself down in the middle of the Atlantic ocean, in a pet, we suppose, with the whole world, and as President Taylor so knowingly added, "the rest of mankind."

It is not only in geography, however, that the noble Lord has established a new school; the department of logic has been highly favoured, to say nothing of the principle of proximity upon which so many great public doctrines are founded, but which it remained for him, at one ruthless blow, entirely to demolish. The fact of distance we will grant. Cuba is, we will say, in the middle of the Atlantic, and "somewhat nearer" England than America. Lord J. Russell has not separated Jamaica from Cuba; we are left to infer, then, that Jamaica is in mid ocean, too. But it so happens that there are other islands which formerly were near to Cuba, and since no mention has been made of their departure, we are at liberty to reason upon the supposition that they still occupy their relative position.

Now, prominent among these islands, is HAYTI, and the nearest point of this island is, not only "somewhat," but over forty per cent. nearer to Cuba than the said nearest point of Jamaica is.* But this is not all. The Haytian territory is

* Note.—The shortest distance from the Florida Reefs and the Tortugas to Cuba, is about 110 English miles; from *Cape Cruz*, in Cuba, to Jamaica, the nearest point, about 90 miles, and from *Point de la Maysi*, the eastern extremity of Cuba, to *Cape St. Nicholas*, the north-western extremity of Hayti, the distance is but 50 miles.

29,000 square miles, that of Jamaica is but 5,468. The Haytian population was, in 1846, 900,000, while that of Jamaica, about the same time, was but 377,433. If, then, the proximity of Jamaica to Cuba is such as to give England as much interest in the fate of this island as the United States, it may reasonably be asked whether Hayti also has not fully as much right to claim the benefit of this equality. Great Britain and Hayti are upon excellent terms, and the real wonder is, how the empire of Hayti was excluded from a prominent place in the picture—why the proposed treaty was not *quartopartite* instead of *tripartite*. Possibly there may be a lurking desire somewhere to see Cuba become another Hayti; and since it is well known that his imperial Haytian Majesty has no diplomatic intercourse with the United States, it may have been thought advisable to conceal the ultimate intention; Hayti, meantime, being snugly ensconced between Great Britain and France. This is no conjecture; there is strong confirmatory evidence not only that the British government has conceived the design, but, with better success than in the case of Texas, has already made considerable advances in execution of it.

Neither the government nor the people of the United States can shut their eyes to the fact that the fate of Cuba is soon to be consummated. Spain cannot long retain the island; and, upon this conviction, the British minister, at the Court of Madrid, has been cautiously, steadily, and, it would seem, successfully acting. Already has the British Government acquired, by treaty, the right not only to land troops upon the island, but to search the plantations for contraband slaves. And, if we are correctly informed, the crowning scheme of emancipation is either already devised, or is in progress and near its completion. The importation of slaves, to be liberated at the end of ten years, and the entire abolition of slavery at the end of fifty, the island thenceforth to be under the protection of the British flag. Add to this, the recent withdrawal of the British cruisers, the appointment of a new captain-general for Cuba, and the rumoured proceedings of the British consul at Havana, in seeking to make the scheme popular, and we have, at least, enough to satisfy

the public mind on the score of the *hidden* design of the proposed tripartite treaty.

But, leaving this for a moment out of view, let the relative merits of Lord John Russell's and Mr. Everett's position, as to the principle upon which the one claims, and the other denies, the right of England to an equal participation with the United States in the disposition of the Cuban question.

Lord John Russell maintains that Great Britain is entitled to be placed on a footing of perfect equality with the United States in this matter, on the ground of geographical proximity. The plea of commercial interest seems to have been altogether disregarded except as the consequence of this proximity. Mr. Everett admits that Great Britain has some interest in the affair on account of her West India possessions, and even acknowledges that if Jamaica bore the same proportion, in population and territory, to the rest of the British dominions, that the States of this Union, bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and on the Atlantic near Cuba, bear to the rest of the federal republic, the two governments would fairly be reduced to an equality, so far, at least, as the doctrine of geographical proximity bears upon the question. But since this is not the case, he denies the claim, and reiterates his language of December, 1852, in which it was declared that the condition of Cuba is mainly an American question, in which the United States have a very deep interest and the United Kingdom a very limited one.

This is a simple statement of the case; a few words will decide the merits of it. It has already been stated that the population of Jamaica does not number four hundred thousand, and the territory does not reach five thousand five hundred square miles; it, therefore, simply remains to be added, what is published to the world upon British authority—Jamaica is a burden on the British treasury. But how stands the case on the part of the United States? The commerce of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and part of Florida, must pass between Cuba and the Florida reefs. All the States on the Mississippi river and its tributaries might well be added, for the outlet of that mighty stream is practically off the coast of Cuba; but since commercial interests have

not been taken as the ground of the claim, we will confine our present remark to geographical proximity alone. The population of the five Gulf States is two million one hundred and forty thousand and sixty-nine, and the territory over three hundred thousand square miles; and so far from their being burdens either on their own or the federal treasury, they produce a large proportion of the cotton, and all the sugar exported from the United States. If to these are added the States on the Mississippi and its tributaries, and Georgia and South Carolina, two of the Atlantic States deeply interested in the condition of Cuba, we have a proportion both of population and territory calculated to drive even Lord John Russell from his argument of proximity.

It is needless to add, in an article like this, designed for the perusal of American citizens, that, on the score of commercial and political interest, this federal republic neither has, nor ever will have, any rightful competitor for the claim of pre-eminency in relation to this Cuban question.

But Mr. Everett's letter is confined to Lord Russell's despatch, a document which he disposes of with his usual ability, and creditably enough. He adverts to the *simplicity* which Lord Russell attaches to the proposal of a tripartite convention, in a proper way, and with a degree of moderation induced probably by his peculiar position. The people of the United States should be deeply impressed with the truth of this single sentence:

“The proposal to which I was returning an answer, jointly made by two of the leading powers of Europe, related to the most important subject in the circle of our foreign relations.” It is a significant circumstance, that the proposition deemed so important by Mr. Everett, should be regarded by Lord Russell as “a question of a simple nature.” The people of this country, if they have not yet discovered it, will soon perceive that this same “simple” question is not only the most important in the circle of our foreign, but, may be, of our *domestic* relations also.

The “melancholy avowal for the chief of a free State” is happily retorted, and the “utility” of the law of nations no less so. But the parts of Mr. Everett's letter to which par-

ticular attention should be had, as not only rendering ridiculous the idea of the treaty, but confirming the suspicion of a hidden motive on the part of the British and French governments, are the two following paragraphs :

“ Consider, too, the recent antecedents of the powers that *invite* us to disable ourselves, to the end of time, from the acquisition, in any way, of this natural appendage to our continent. France within the present century, to say nothing of the acquisition of Louisiana, has wrested a moiety of Europe from its native sovereigns ; has possessed herself by force of arms, and at the time greatly to the discontent of England, of six hundred miles of the northern coast of Africa, with an indefinite extension into the interior ; and has appropriated to herself one of the most important insular groups of the Pacific. England, not to mention her other numerous acquisitions in every part of the globe, has, even since your despatch of the 16th February was written, annexed half of the Burman empire to her overgrown Indian possessions—on grounds, if the statements in Mr. Cobden’s pamphlet are to be relied upon—compared with which the reasons assigned by Russia for invading Turkey are respectable.”

And at the conclusion of the letter :

“ When I cast my thoughts back upon our brief history as a nation, I certainly am not led to think that the United States have reached the final limits of their growth, or what comes to very much the same thing, that representative government, religious equality, the trial by jury, the freedom of the press, and the other great attributes of our Anglo-Norman civilization, are never to gain a further extension on this continent. I regard the inquiry under what political organization this extension is to take place, as a vain attempt to penetrate the inscrutable mysteries of the future. It will, if we are wise, be under the guidance of our example ; I hope it will be in virtue of the peaceful arts, by which well-governed states extend themselves over unsettled or partially settled continents. My voice was heard at the first opportunity, in the senate of the United States, in favour of developing the utmost boundless resources of the territory already in our possession, rather than seeking to enlarge it by aggressive wars. Still, I cannot think it reasonable—hardly respectful—on the part of England and France, while they are daily extending themselves on every shore and in every sea, and pushing their dominions, by new conquests, to the uttermost ends of the earth, to call upon the United States to bind themselves by a perpetual

compact, never, under any circumstances, to admit into the Union an island which lies at their doors, and commands the entrance into the interior of their continent.”

It is indeed “hardly respectful” in these powers to make such a proposal ; and it would be ridiculous were it not for the foothold which the British government already has in Cuba. According to the principle propounded by Lord John Russell, there is not a quarter of the globe from which his government could be excluded in determining questions of a similar “simple nature.” British colonies are to be found all over the earth, and she has not *one* but a hundred Jamaicas. Let the government of the United States once sanction Lord Russell’s claim and approve his principle, and the British government at once becomes the domineering arbiter in every sea, upon every shore, and on every continent. To this it is plain the American government can never submit. And this is the upshot of the correspondence between Mr. Everett and Lord Russell.

But there are other and more important views of this “simple” question ; and it seems a matter of regret that they have not been promptly taken by the government at Washington. Probably they have been discussed in Cabinet council, and if so, we have every confidence in the result.

In a military point of view, this island is the strategic point of the United States on the Atlantic side. This surely has not escaped the notice either of the people or government of the United States. Invaluable to us on this account, if no other, what would it be in the hands of such a nation as Great Britain ? General Jackson in 1844, when the annexation of Texas was pending, lifted up his warning voice in these words : “Texas, therefore, in hostile hands, could feed and sustain an army that could act not only against Oregon, but, at the same time, against Louisiana and Arkansas, and by conjunction with the Indians could make inroads on every western state to the lakes. An army thus employed, seconded by a proper organization of force on the lakes, would put the whole West in a blaze, and cause us more injury in blood and money, in six months, than years of peace could

atone for. The sagacious statesmen of England understand much better than we do the force of the military considerations I am here suggesting; and hence you will find that no pecuniary obligation will be deemed by them too great to prevent the annexation to this country. Every mind conversant with the operations of war, and with the causes which give military ascendancy, must see, from a glance at our map, that such a genius as Wellington's, or Napoleon's, sustained by naval armaments on the Gulf of Mexico and on the lakes, and in possession of Texas, with a very small force on land, could, in one campaign, paralyze one half of the Union, deprive us of Oregon, and produce scenes of servile insurrection and massacre that humanity would shudder to describe. This is no fancy sketch—it is the natural operation of cause and effect, inevitable and irresistible." What would he say of the possession of *Cuba* by Great Britain? What would he say of such a genius as *Nelson's*, flanked by Canada at the north, a strong foothold on Central America at the south, and sustained in the rear by the rest of the West India Islands, to say nothing of the support of European allies? What would the people of the United States say and feel to see an army of ten thousand African troops landed at St. Augustine, Mobile, New Orleans, Savannah or Charleston, upon the very first outbreak of hostilities between this country and Great Britain? The mere mention of these things is sufficient; but they are not all. In one sense, and that a very important one, Cuba is to the Gulf of Mexico what Gibraltar is to the Mediterranean. This island is in fact the Gibraltar of America. The British government has long experienced the advantage of holding that barren rock, and we may rest fully assured it will not be without a struggle that this lovely island is rescued from the same possession and use. In this view of the "simple" question, then, the proposition before the people and government of the United States is: shall the strategic point of this republic, the Gibraltar of this continent, change hands and not fall into our own?

In a commercial point of view this island is the key which unlocks the floodgate that gives vent to the Gulf of Mexico.

The exports and imports of no less than *fourteen* states, to say nothing of others hereafter to be organized and settled, pass under her shores, and could with ease be suspended by a hostile power having not only this island but Jamaica and the bulk of the West India Islands in possession, as also a portion of Central America. It is a question, then, of grave import to the people, at least of these fourteen states, whether this immense commercial interest shall quietly be left to the mercy of such European power as may be successful in jockeying Spain out of Cuba, and subsequently picking a quarrel with the government of the United States upon some unimportant question of salvage to our Key West wreckers, or, may be, the elopement of a Florida slave.

But it is in a political sense that the Cuba question is most seriously and, we may well add, *anxiously* to be viewed. The principles of geographical proximity, military importance, and commercial interest, each, in itself, pressing heavily upon the public mind, are all merged in the one all-important consideration of the political results to be expected in consequence of the alienation of Cuba from Spain, either in name or in fact, and the possession of the island in that event by any other power than the United States. This, after all, is the true ground upon which the people of this country must base their action, if they would secure the approbation, or, at least, avoid the censure of disinterested parties. This is the field which our statesmen must thoroughly explore ere they make up their decision, and before the world is called to witness an event which, sooner or later, must transpire: the absorption of Cuba either by the United States or Great Britain!

Some doubt may indeed exist whether the British government would desire to hold Cuba as one of her colonies, or whether it would not be preferable merely to have it under British *protection*. In either case the consequence would be the same; Cuba would become another Hayti, if not in form, at least in point of fact. The ultimate question, then, to be laid before the American people is, are you prepared to see another Hayti spring up at your doors and command the entrance into the interior of your continent?

The evident reason why Cuba could not fail to become another Hayti—a very different spectacle from Jamaica—and the fair presumption why Great Britain seeks to bring this state of things about, are clearly set down in Mr. Calhoun's letter; a paper written, it is true, in relation to Texas, but in every particular applicable to Cuba.

After proving it to be adverse to the continental powers of Europe to forward the designs of England against our American institution of slavery, in hopes of some day obtaining a monopoly of the tropical products of the earth, and after citing the great cost of the British experiment of emancipation, its utter failure, and the terrible depreciation of property in consequence of it—all of which is contrasted with the “vast increase of the capital and production on the part of those nations who have continued their former policy towards the negro race”—Mr. Calhoun observes:

“This is seen and felt by British statesmen, and has opened their eyes to the errors which they have committed. The question now with them is, how shall it be counteracted? What has been done cannot be undone. The question is, by what means can Great Britain regain and keep a superiority in tropical cultivation, commerce, and influence? Or shall that be abandoned, and other nations be suffered to acquire the supremacy, even to the extent of supplying British markets, to the obstruction of the capital already vested in their production? These are the questions which now profoundly occupy the attention of her statesmen, and have the greatest influence over her councils.

“In order to regain her superiority, she not only seeks to revive and increase her own capacity to produce tropical productions, but to diminish and destroy the capacity of those who have so far outstripped her in consequence of her error. In the pursuit of the former she has cast her eyes to her East India possessions, to Central and Eastern Africa, with the view of establishing colonies there, and even to restore, substantially, the slave trade itself, under the specious name of transporting free laborers from Africa to her West India possessions, in order, if possible, to compete successfully with those who have refused to follow her suicidal policy. But these all afford but uncertain and distant hopes of recovering her lost superiority. Her main reliance is on the other alternative—to cripple or destroy the productions of her more successful rivals. There is but one way by which it can be done, and that is by

abolishing African slavery throughout this continent; and that she openly avows to be the constant object of her policy and exertions. It matters not how or from what motive it may be done; whether it be by diplomacy, influence or force; by secret or open means; and whether the motive be humane or selfish, without regard to manner, means or motive. The thing itself, should it be accomplished, would put down all rivalry, and give her the undisputed supremacy in supplying her own wants and those of the rest of the world, and thereby more than fully retrieve what she has lost by her errors. It would give her the monopoly of tropical productions, which I shall next proceed to show.

“What would be the consequence if this object of her unceasing solicitude and exertions should be effected by the abolition of negro slavery throughout this continent, some idea may be formed from the immense diminution of productions, as has been shown, which has followed abolition in her West India possessions. But, as great as that has been, it is nothing compared to what would be the effect if she should succeed in abolishing slavery in the United States, Cuba, Brazil, and throughout this continent. The experiment in her own colonies was made under the most favourable circumstances. It was brought about gradually and peaceably, by the steady and firm operation of the parent country, armed with complete power to prevent or crush at once all insurrectionary movements on the part of the negroes, and able and disposed to maintain to the full, the political and social ascendancy of the former masters over their former slaves. It is not at all wonderful that the change of the relation between master and slave took place, under such circumstances, without violence and bloodshed, and that order and peace should have been since preserved. Very different would be the result of abolition should it be effected by her influence and exertions in the possessions of other countries on this continent, and especially in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil, the great cultivators of the principal tropical products of America. To form a correct conception of what would be the result with them, we must look, not to Jamaica, but to St. Domingo, for example. The change would be followed by unforgiving hate between the two races, and end in a bloody and deadly struggle between them for the superiority. One or the other would have to be subjugated, extirpated, or expelled; and desolation would overspread their territories, as in St. Domingo, from which it would take centuries to recover. The end would be, that the superiority in cultivating the great tropical staples would be transferred from them to the British tropical possessions.”

Here we must pause for a season. With these views has-

tily and imperfectly thrown together, we leave the subject with the reader for his own mature judgment. Let us remind him, however, that the question is not so much one of the annexation of Cuba, as the prevention of emancipation on that island. To prevent another Hayti from springing up on our coast is the *end*; the purchase of the island may become the *means*. And this leads to the enquiry, *can* this end be attained by these means?

One thing is certain, the object would forever be frustrated by the tripartite convention. Another fact is equally true: if *money* can purchase the island, the United States are able to pay more than either Great Britain or France. Their immense debts and their heavy annual expenditures preclude the idea of *their* ever becoming *purchasers*. Our debt is literally nothing; our income may be suited to any occasion.

But on another score we must beg not to be misunderstood. Lord John Russell cannot more honestly and sincerely condemn filibustering than we do, nor than, as we believe, the mass of the American people do. Those rules, known in Europe as the law of nations, are probably even more venerated here than there. Another thing we deprecate: it is intervention in European affairs; and, for this good and sufficient reason, we highly deprecate, on the part of European powers, any intervention in American affairs. We—at the south at least—are not political propagandists, and we hope there are many like us at the north. We cannot but lay much of the excitement and sympathy there, with foreign adventurers, to the same door with the hearty welcome afforded to southern fugitives from labour. And, even were the people disposed, the government of the United States has but limited means of taking part in European politics. *But* when two of the leading nations of Europe take the pains to cross the Atlantic and put their protest on record against so “simple” a matter as the acquisition of Cuba by the United States; when, not content with this, either one or both of them, beset a weak and declining nation—using no doubt a species of persuasion which it would be dangerous to resist—undertake, through the inevitable and unavoidable means of

servile war, and the almost certain destruction of the white race, to set up a barbarous negro government on the very suburbs of our slave territory and at the most critical point on the coast of the whole continent—this too in compliance with no pressing exigency of state, nor in keeping with any principle of national amity, but rather with the apparent motive of injuring, embarrassing, and perhaps destroying our institutions and government—it becomes the people of this free country to see that they have nothing but their trouble for their pains, even though the consequence be an appeal to those great first principles of national existence which have stood us in stead since the fourth day of July, 1776.

E. B. B.

EDWARD B. BRYAN

ART. II.—“MY NOVEL,” BY BULWER.

My Novel; or, Varieties in English Life; by Sir E. BULWER LYTTON, author of “The Caxtons,” “Pelham,” “Harold,” &c. New-York: Harper & Brothers, 329 and 331 Pearl-street, Franklin Square. 1852.

WHEN books were published at long intervals, and sold at high prices, it was the office of the reviewer to examine their contents, and anticipate the judgment of the public; but since Solomon’s declaration has become fully realized, that “of making many books there is no end,” and their general diffusion, by the cheapness and rapidity of their publication, has put all classes of readers on the same footing with the reviewer, his office has materially changed. If, sometimes, as before, he has a foretaste of a new publication, and prepares the public mind for its examination, he often uses it but as the text for an independent essay, and not unfrequently, by a sober second-thought, sums up the result of conflicting opinions, reverses a judgment too hastily formed, or qualifies praise when too indiscriminately bestowed. In