

some days, and lulling his friends into a fatal sense of security, suddenly seized him with a rigour so intense, that neither the patient's strength could resist it, nor mortal skill successfully oppose it, and before the hot fit could come on, he was dead. Another case, of a similar character, occurred, and the people gratefully welcomed the benignant frost, which stopped the progress of the fever, and opened the doors of their prison-house. The next summer, 1834, the fever returned; and, in that and the two succeeding summers, it continued its ravages, until the most sanguine became desponding, and the village was almost totally deserted.

And, as no cause could be assigned for the fearful visitation, so health again mysteriously returned to its ancient abode. By slow degrees, the deserted houses again received their tenants. Men began to forget their former terrors, and returned; and Pineville is again the abode of a number of planters. The prestige of its ancient fame still remains, to give it a sort of metropolitan character over the neighbouring villages of Pinopolis, Eutawville, New Hope, and others, which have sprung up, like ancient colonies, cherishing the sacred fires from the hearth of the maternal state. It justly boasts of its delicious shades, of its clear, cool and refreshing water, but it no longer claims a monopoly of health. And, while other villages flourish in its neighbourhood, and the communication with Charleston has become more easy, the sense of isolation, which once gave its people a peculiar characteristic, no longer is felt, and they have become cosmopolitan. The old times have gone, never to return; and, it is to call back the memory of the first fifteen years of our life, and of the two which followed our accession to manhood, that we have made this humble attempt to depict scenes which, though perhaps faded, can never be forgotten.

F. A. P

ART. VI.—MR. EVERETT AND THE CUBAN QUESTION.

Correspondence on the Proposed Tripartite Convention relative to Cuba. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1853.

WHEN, at intervals too short for the sorrowing calculation of a bereaved nation, Calhoun, and Clay, and Webster, were withdrawn forever from the public councils, the heart of the whole country testified the sincerity of a genuine sorrow. And well it might, for God had rarely endowed those three minds to whose influence he had for near half a century committed the fortunes of the continent. Their opinions had been the creeds of great parties—their decisions had become the enacted law of a vast empire—every exercise of their intellects was claimed as a proud illustration of the national mind, and their words have passed as a rich inheritance to the people. For of their eloquence, exerted as it was in support of the highest political truths, and in defence of the gravest political interests, it may be truly, and for the country happily said, that

“When the stream

Which overflowed the soul was passed away,
A consciousness remained that it had left
Deposited upon the silent shore
Of memory, images and precious thoughts
That shall not die and cannot be destroyed.”

BUT, in the first outburst of the national grief, a feeling was expressed not only unmanly in itself, but unjust to the real greatness of the very men whose loss it deplored. Men spoke as if the mind of the country was diminished—as if accustomed to lean on such strong arms for support, the unsustained step of the nation must be henceforth faltering and unequal. But surely if these great men acted out fully the purpose of their lives this could not be; for it is the chiefest privilege of real greatness, that it lives neither in itself nor for itself. And the benefit of its great men to any nation, particularly to a nation governed by popular sympathies and expressing itself in popular action, is that the intellects of such men become in time so popularly diffused as to be new elements of strength in the national character; so that

even after the perishable body has been removed from its seat of glory and honour, the mind still lives enduringly, and speaks in the maturer wisdom and loftier purpose, and intenser activity of succeeding generations; like some great tree, whose falling leaves have annually returned rich nourishment to the field it beautifies, and which, in the fullness of its age, falls back into the earth only to reinvigorate the soil for a fresher and stronger growth. The highest evidence then that our great men have not lived in vain, is the manner in which we meet those questions of national concern which they have left to us for settlement, and the character of those successors whom the nation may select to guide their actions to wise and just conclusions. This test can be applied, even at present, to some of the most important events in our national history. Mr. Webster, the last of the great triumvirate, died in the midst of difficult and unsettled questions. During the last months of his natural and official life, the foreign relations of the U. States had become very complicated. We had made a rash and unjust issue with Peru in reference to the Lobos Islands—the irritating differences between England and ourselves as to the fisheries, had been again excited into vexatious activity; and the Cuban question, perplexed and delicate in its simplest relations, was seriously complicated by Spanish folly, and the impertinent interference of France and England. In this vexed condition of our affairs—with but a few months of remaining and decreasing power—and in the presence of passionate domestic differences hardly composed, Mr. Everett was called to the Secretaryship of State. To accept it at all required courage and sacrifice, for where was the apparent opportunity for either large usefulness or lasting fame? And, if accepted, the safest and easiest course of administration would have naturally been a close devotion to the large arrears of the office business of the department—a worthy and commendable task, but one little calculated to repay hard labour with high reward.

Under that sense of duty which is, after all, the safest and highest motive for public action, Mr. Everett accepted the invitation;—and although much of the history of his short

administration must remain for years buried in the archives of the government, yet enough was transacted in the popular eye to secure him the lasting gratitude of the republic, and an honourable place in his country's history. The Peruvian question, which at one time seriously compromised the character of the government, was settled with justice to others and a sound regard to our own interests. The controversy with Spain, springing out of the ill-judged conduct of the Cuban Captain-General in relation to Purser Smith, of the Crescent City, was honourably and promptly adjusted. And both of these questions, which at one time so angrily excited the public mind, passed quietly out of popular sight; and confident of their wise solution, Congress never even called for the papers recording their settlement. Other matters of scarcely less importance—such as the difficulty in Greece—were put in train for fair and easy arrangement, and the business of the department was relieved from its troublesome accumulations, and improved in its details. The difficulties of the fishery question were not finally settled, nor the provisions of a reciprocal treaty definitely determined, but we may fairly add, only for want of time; for it must be recollected that the only point which has been hitherto gained in this protracted and tedious negotiation, was gained by Mr. Everett during his mission to England. The opening of the Bay of Fundy, conceded by Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett, in 1845, was a decided diplomatic advantage, for our fishermen obtained the benefit of the bay, while, as the representative of the government, Mr. Everett avoided the recognition of the principle on which rested the British claim to close it. And but for the miserable fickleness of our diplomatic system, there is very little doubt that the same point might have been obtained with regard to all the other outer bays; for Sir Robert Peel's ministry were ready to concede it, and had so communicated to the colonial governments, when Mr. Everett was recalled and the matter dropped. And it most fortunately happened that this very important fact was denied in a despatch of Lord Malmesbury, of Aug. 10, 1852, a copy of which had been furnished Mr. Webster, but left unanswered up to Mr. Everett's entrance into office.

Availing himself of this opportunity, Mr. Everett, in his despatch to Mr. Ingersoll, of December 4, 1852, (a copy of which was left with Lord John Russell, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs,) reviewed the whole state of the fishery question, and proved conclusively the disposition of the British ministry of that date to concede, as to the outer bays, the same rights admitted in the waters of the Bay of Fundy, thus materially strengthening the position of his government for the consequent negotiations. If the record of Mr. Everett's services as Secretary of State closed here, his brief term of office would have been honourably and usefully employed; for the questions referred to above, required in their settlement tact, knowledge, ability and energy; and, together with the ordinary and harassing routine of daily office business, would have tasked the mind and strained the effort of any statesman, with ampler time and more confirmed power. But it was Mr. Everett's good fortune to have a higher duty imposed upon him. He was called on peremptorily to defend the principle of the country's past growth, and indicate the scope and tendency of its future policy. For the first time in our history, the great rival empires of Europe formally demanded an explanation of our conduct—threatened to coerce our action, and called upon us to modify our policy with a view to their interests and in deference to their jealousy.

The signal ability with which he discharged this duty, and the great importance of the subjects which entered into the discussion, have given more than ordinary significance to "the correspondence on the proposed tripartite convention, relative to Cuba;" and Mr. Everett's famous letter may justly be considered as the starting point of a new chapter in our diplomatic history. To understand, thoroughly, Mr. Everett's position, a brief sketch of our foreign policy is necessary.

In reviewing the foreign policy of the United States, it is natural to divide our diplomatic history into three periods—from Washington to Jefferson, from Jefferson to the declaration of Mr. Monroe, and from that declaration to the present day. This division is, of course, to some extent, arbitrary; but still, correct enough for the purposes of a general, and

rather desultory, discussion. But, when it is borne in mind, that of the great practical questions of our early history—the North-eastern boundary, the Fisheries, and the Rights of Neutrals—only one has been settled, and that very recently, while the two others are now, in the seventy-eighth year of our independence, still open, it will be evident, that such a discussion should be considered merely the convenient chapters of a long history. When we say, however, that the differences as to neutral rights are still unreconciled, we must not be considered as meaning, that the positions of the parties to that controversy remain as they were. For, while there is no formal diplomatic record of a decision, the final result cannot now be varied, by any ordinary human contingency. The uniform language of every administration, the immense development of the national resources, and, above all, the temper of the people—jealous in watching, and prompt in maintaining, their rights—will never again admit, even the implied doubt of a discussion on our maritime rights.

Each of the periods above referred to, may yet fairly be considered as the illustration of a special condition of public necessities, and as the natural manifestation of an independent principle of our foreign policy.

The condition of the country, at the inauguration of Gen. Washington's administration, was, in many respects, anomalous. It was a transition leading to a great change, and required an activity of diplomatic life, that has not since been either necessary or possible. In the first place, the independence of the colonies had not, abruptly, cut all connection with Europe, and, as the colonial policy of the great maritime states had always been considered questions of European concern, the powers of the old world did not, at first, recognize the extent of that independence. They still fancied themselves directly interested in the politics of the United States, and were anxious, therefore, to establish a more direct communication with the government, than they have since maintained. And, it is safe to say, that the admission of an American minister, into an European congress, would have appeared a more natural diplomatic proceeding in 1788 than it would in 1820.

Again : There existed, at that time, in Europe, an exaggerated idea of the *immediate* importance of American commerce. It was a time when great interests were about to take the place of great men, but while they were still felt through the action of governments, rather than in their own strength. Governments, therefore, everywhere strove, by treaties, to secure commercial advantages, and the correspondence of Franklin, Adams and Jefferson, then representing the country abroad, from the peace of 1783 to the formation of the constitution, bears testimony to the anxiety of many maritime powers to conciliate and secure these supposed advantages. The indissoluble commercial connection between England and the United States, had not then established itself, and the general idea was, that the independence of the colonies had broken up an old and rich commerce, the fragments of which were to be obtained by early and liberal conventions.

In the third place, the treaty with France was one of mutual guarantees, and many of its clauses were open to interpretations, involving the United States in the stormy and changeful politics of that unhappy empire. The circumstances of France soon, indeed, compelled her to insist upon that construction of the treaty most favourable to her belligerent interests, and General Washington was plunged into a harassing controversy, both with England and France. The task of General Washington was, in negotiating commercial treaties, to avoid political engagements ; and in carrying out faithfully such treaties as had already been negotiated, to shun all action that might compromise the neutrality of the country. In other words, his object was, to establish, by his diplomacy, what he had already achieved by his arms—the perfect independence of the United States : not their isolation from the great affairs of the world, but the right to determine for themselves, how far their interests were compromised by European politics, and how far they would permit themselves to be made parties to any European agitation. Situated as were the European states, they were not always arbiters of their own interests, and there existed a strong disposition to apply the rule of their conduct to the new repub-

lie, and compel a participation in a common fate. To resist this pretension, and thus perfect the work of the revolution, was neither an easy nor safe achievement. But, had the United States then succumbed to France, the real independence of the country would have been long postponed. Without a fixed policy, with a limited and enemy-bounded territory, and enfeebled by radical political dissension at home, it is almost impossible now to realize the extent of our peril. And had foreign powers been allowed to obtain commanding influence in the national counsels, the character of the country would have been diminished—its interests mutilated, and our national existence must have dragged its slow way, from a sickly and crippled infancy, to a maimed and dependent manhood. Fortunately for us, however, sustained by wise, informed and firm counsellors, Washington succeeded, even against a strongly excited popular prejudice, in establishing the perfect national independence of the country. And to have effected this, as they did, without war, and in face of the domestic difficulties of the new government, is the crowning glory of those great men, whose arms enfranchised an empire, whose wisdom created a constitution, and whose steadfast sagacity inaugurated a national life of unbroken, and almost fabulous prosperity. Honoured be their memories. The severe simplicity of Jay's antique virtue—the subtle and eloquent reasoning of Jefferson's wonderful intellect—the broad and ample sweep of Hamilton's national pride—the impetuous and abounding patriotism of the elder Adams—but, above all, the calm, sure judgment of him, in whose majestic presence even these men bowed. In death, as in life, apart from the rude tumult of popular passion, and yet the centre of a nation's love and hope, close to the heart of that great State, the inspiration of whose high renown nourished his youth and nerved his manhood, He lies, whose dust makes holy ground. His monument, have

“ No human hands with pious reverence reared.”

But as the student of the world's fortunes looks down upon this mighty empire, with its tributary oceans, and sees its vast extent gemmed with the civilized beauty of a thousand

cities, and peopled with untiring millions, under whose energy its rivers roll down gold—its forests vanish, and its fields burst into luxuriant harvests, while art and science, laws and commerce, protect, direct, refine the aims and objects of their unstinted labour—history exclaims, "*Quæris monumentum? circumspice.*"

With the accession of Mr. Jefferson, opened a new state of affairs. The commerce of the country, in its gradual increase, had demonstrated that its natural channels could neither be created nor changed by treaty stipulations, and the idea of the importance of treaty connections with America had lost, in Europe, much of its original force. The progress, too, of the great revolution which convulsed the old world, until 1815, was fast absorbing the attention of the European powers. And during this period of unequalled importance and excitement, it became very clear, that the interests of the new republic were, and for some time must be, entirely disconnected from the ruling interests of the European confederacy. The revolution having given us an independent national existence, and the administrations of Washington and Adams having vindicated our perfect independence of national action, it remained for Mr. Jefferson and his successors to complete this work. So long as the United States were bounded by the territories of France and Spain, they were, at any time, subject to foreign and extrinsic influences, and liable to be drawn into the consequences of political action, not always proceeding from their own interests. And the full independence of no maritime country, could be considered established in face of the belligerent pretensions of the European nations, during this period, most extravagantly pressed, and, so far as force went, most powerfully supported. The two leading ideas, therefore, of this second stage of our foreign policy, were, first, the necessary territorial extension of the United States, which would leave their independence of action uninfluenced by the neighbourhood of European colonies; and next, the recognition of their equal right to the great maritime prerogatives of an independent and commercial people. As far as circumstances permitted, the first was carried out in the purchase

of Louisiana and the Floridas, and the second developed in the long controversy, terminating in the war of 1812. And though this war did not effect a technical solution of the vexed question of neutral rights, yet it was a declaration that no infringement upon our full equality of maritime privileges could be ventured, without instant war with a nation that, by a brilliant series of naval achievements, had manifested, at least, its ability to hold its own. With this period, the minority of the United States terminated. The necessary conditions of an active and healthy life were fulfilled, and the United States stood before the world with their territories compact—their national interests clearly defined, and their political intelligence alert, practised, and ready for the exigency of any future question. During the period of their probation they had, more than once, been forced to submit, without being convinced. The two chief conventions of our early history—the treaty of Jay, and that of Ghent—were necessary, but undeniable compromises of our rights. For, though ably negotiated, and under the circumstances, wise in their conclusions, they did not put at rest the questions they were intended to settle, and they did without disguise, abandon, in their progress, the *ultima* upon which their transaction was originally based. They must be considered rather as saving protests in a time of weakness, in behalf of principles reserved for future application, in a time of coming strength. With this period, also, the founders of the republic withdrew from participation in the daily life of the nation. They had laboured fearlessly and faithfully, through the dangers of the war—through the darkness and despondency of the confederation—through the perplexed and hazardous discussions of the convention. With rare courage, and temper and wisdom, they had laid broad the foundations of a great country, and with singular good fortune, had been permitted to perfect the government which they had initiated. For more than a quarter of a century, the men who framed the constitution were allowed to administer it; and having thus created its infancy, and moulded its youth, they retired, one after another, from the scenes of their great achievements, leaving to a new gene-

ration the responsibility of its mature manhood. But, as if to consecrate with the grace of their final benediction, its foremost step, it was granted to Mr. Monroe, the last of the venerable company, by his famous declaration, to inaugurate the real and vigorous commencement of our national life. From the date of this declaration, our foreign policy has taken a higher tone, and expressed itself in a more systematic development. To this period belong the settlement of the French claims, so vigorously negotiated by Mr. Rives—the North-western treaty, so admirably conducted by Mr. Webster—the Oregon question, adjusted by Mr. McLane, and the annexation of Texas, in great measure due to the active resolution of Mr. Calhoun. But the most striking example of the growth and spirit of our foreign policy, is the progress of the Cuban question, from its first inception to that stage in its history in which it was placed by Mr Everett's letter to Lord John Russell. For, parallel with the development of our national policy, as just sketched, and illustrating its progressive changes, from the period of our earliest history, our relations with Spain have grown in importance and difficulty.

From the time of the revolution onward, our relations with Spain, although never actually hostile, have always been uneasy. The Spanish government never really sympathised with the spirit of the war of independence, and was governed in its conduct, during the whole struggle, by a selfish and cautious policy. When independence was achieved, Spain's great anxiety was to limit our territorial pretensions, and close the waters of the Mississippi against the enterprising invasion of our western commerce. Directly and indirectly, her interests crossed ours, and her diplomacy, on more than one occasion, interfered vexatiously against our purposes. The feeling was natural. Mr. Adams, early in his mission to England, pointed out the necessary consequences to Spain, of what must be our West Indian policy. Turgot had placed on record his opinion, that the complete abandonment of Spanish colonial empire, was the inevitable consequence of our independence. And D'Aranda had suggested to the Spanish court, as the only means of prevention, the very

scheme which, nearly a half century after, when these prophecies were fulfilled, Chateaubriand endeavoured to execute, as a remedy for the evil. Gradually, but surely, however, the work of time was done. First, the Mississippi was opened, after a long and fruitless resistance; then the United States absorbed Louisiana, against the wishes and interests of Spain; and, finally, Florida rounded the territory of the republic, and carried its power to the shores of the Mexican sea. While her colonial territory was thus falling away, the domestic affairs of Spain were confused beyond her own control. Acting as the instrument of the holy alliance, and as representative of its principles, France invaded Spain, subdued a people who made no resistance, and re-established the royal authority of Ferdinand, in the palace of the Escorial. It would be irrelevant here, to discuss the facts or principles of the French invasion of Spain. Once achieved, however, there sprung from the European question, in which the United States had no concern, another, in which they, of necessity, felt a deep interest. During the confusion of all authority in Spain, her South American colonies, left to themselves, and forced to contrive governments in self-defence, had become, what Chateaubriand aptly called, republics in spite of themselves—(*republiques malgré elles*). Satisfied with their experience, they resolved to maintain the independence into which they had been accidentally driven. Spain, however, even in her weakness, refused to recognise their existence, and strove feebly, but resolutely, to force them back under the old rule. When, therefore, by the arms of France, and the attendant counsels of the holy alliance, the crown of Spain was relieved from its constitutional distress, and its policy made to harmonise with the European sense of right and justice, one of the most important questions, resulting from the condition of Spanish affairs, was: What must be done to the colonies? The only course consistent with the political theories of the holy alliance, as practically illustrated by the invasions of Naples, Piedmont and Spain, was to bring back the colonies, by force, under the Spanish authority. And this would seem, from the proclamation of the Duc d'Angouleme, and the language of

Count Pozzo de Borgo, to have been the original intention. It was, however, soon abandoned by France, at least, as impracticable. The policy of France, as represented by Viscomte de Chateaubriand, was subtle and ingenious. An European congress was to be summoned, colonial deputies invited to attend, and France, acting as mediator, would present a plan of independence, based on the old relations existing between Spain and her colonies. The mediator would have said to the colonies: You desire that Spain should recognise your independence. Well, Spain and Europe will recognise it, when you have established yourselves under constitutional monarchies, with Bourbon cadets as kings, a form of government which suits your climate, your habits, your scattered population, and your extended territory. The advantages of such a compromise would have been urged, the example of Holland quoted, as it had been quoted to the United States, early in the revolutionary war, and the difference between a doubtful existence and a recognised nationality, eloquently amplified. To Spain, the mediator would submit the utter impossibility of a forcible recovery of the colonies—the real independence they had achieved—and the increased strength of a family compact, sustained by the Bourbon majesties of Mexico and Peru. While the opposition of England was to be overcome by the combined strength of European opinion, and her own jealousy of the commercial aggrandisement of the United States. To carry out this scheme, Spain was to address to the European powers, most especially including England, an invitation to form a congress on her affairs, and, should England still refuse to meet the congress on a question, not essentially European, and affecting her more directly commercially than politically, then Chateaubriand determined to complicate the European and colonial questions, by holding Cadiz in permanent possession as a set-off to Gibraltar, and thus compel England to meet a congress, to settle one class of questions, and take this opportunity to force on the consideration of the other.* This

* The language used here, is the language of Chateaubriand himself, in his various despatches, scarcely altered, in order to condense and connect the separate passages. As to Cadiz, see despatches to M.M. Jalura and Polignac, pp. 272, 275, 309, vol. 1, *Congres de Verone*.

scheme of Bourbon monarchies was, as we have said, only a reproduction, under altered and unfavourable circumstances, of Count D'Aranda's plan, suggested as early as 1776. A new element was now introduced into political history, which disturbed this clever calculation. In all this policy, neither France nor her allies seem to have regarded the United States. Indeed, Chateaubriand expressly rejected their interference, because, having already recognised the independence of the colonies, they had no further interest therein. And, in 1824, in a letter to Prince Polignac, their minister to England, he said, in relation to a discussion in the House of Commons: "I have seen the debates on the slave trade. It is ridiculous enough to say, that the United States are the second, or one of the first, maritime powers of the world. They have four ships of the line, and a dozen brigs and frigates. A fig for such gasconade." In case, however, of the complete failure of this scheme, and a necessary abandonment of the Spanish colonies, France reserved to herself the right to consult her own interests, by a full recognition of their independence and commercial treaties.

On the other hand, England, from the session of the congress of Verona, had manifested great and growing uneasiness at the prospect of the French invasion of Spain. She considered its principle false, its consequences dangerous; but, as according to Mr. Canning, peace was the great object of her policy, she merely stood aloof in manifest, but inactive discontent. But whatever necessity might prevent her interference in Spain, she was determined that if Spain must be conquered, it should be "Spain without the Indies." The colonies belonged to England's commerce, and there, at least, she could intervene with power—and profit. Before, therefore, the French army had crossed the Bidassoa, on 31st March, 1823, Mr. Canning addressed to Sir Charles Stewart, in Paris, a despatch, in which he says—

"With respect to the South American provinces, which had thrown off their allegiance to the crown of Spain, time and the course of events appeared substantially to have decided their separation from the mother country, although the formal recognition by his majesty of those pro-

vinces as independent states, might be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress in each state towards a regular and settled form of government. Spain had long been apprised of the king's opinions on this subject. Disclaiming, in the most solemn manner, any intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, his majesty was satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring under her dominion any of these possessions, either by conquest or cession from Spain."*

This despatch has, by the historian of Mr. Canning's political life, been interpreted as an intimation, "that if England abstained from opposing by hostilities the invasion of Spain by French troops, she would not allow of any foreign force being employed to re-subjugate the Spanish colonies." This is certainly not the necessary construction of the despatch, and its plainest meaning is simply a protest, in advance, against the colonial aggrandisement of France. There is room enough, in the phraseology, for more than one "mutual arrangement" of the Spanish colonial question. The French invasion, however, proceeded, and every thing indicated success. Once triumphantly achieved, and the difficulties in the way of the English settlement of the colonial question became threatening—Spain subjugated—and the continental alliance firm, to carry out the English policy would, in all probability, cost a war. Now Mr. Canning's objects had been two—the one, to avoid the necessity on the part of England of war, and the other to obtain, in the recognition of the Spanish colonies, an indemnification for the French occupation of Spain. If, therefore, the only result he obtained was war, just when French success had consolidated and strengthened the continental alliance, and when it would deprive the recognition of the Spanish colonies of all its commercial value and consequent political importance, Mr. Canning's policy would have been a palpable and mortifying failure. With this progress of French arms and uncertainty of French policy before him, Mr. Canning turned to the United States. In August and Sep-

* Stapleton's Canning, vol. 11, pp. 18, 19. Lesur's Annuaire Historique. 1823.

tember, of 1823, he requested several interviews with Mr. Rush, then Minister from the United States, in London. Explaining the views of England to be—1. That she considered the recovery of the colonies to be hopeless. 2. That the recognition of their independence was a question of time and circumstances. 3. That England was not disposed to throw any impediment in the way of arrangement between the colonies and mother country by amicable negotiation. 4. That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for herself. 5. That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power with indifference, he suggested—

"That if the United States acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect, on their part, concurrently with England, would be the most effectual and least offensive mode of making known their joint disapprobation of existing projects; that it would, at the same time, put an end to all the jealousies of Spain with respect to her remaining colonies, and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies themselves, by showing that England and the United States were determined not to profit by encouraging it."*

Mr. Canning enforced the propriety of this just policy by arguments which, perhaps, are worth repeating at this day.

"The question was a new and complicated one in modern affairs. It was also full as much American as European, *to say no more*. It concerned the United States under aspects and interests as immediate and commanding as it did, or could any of the states of Europe. They were the first independent power established on that continent, and *now confessedly the leading power*. They were connected with Spanish America by their position as with Europe by their relations, and they also stood connected with these new states by political relations. * *

* Were the great political and commercial interests which hung upon the destinies of the new continent to be canvassed and adjusted, in this hemisphere, without the co operation or even knowledge of the United States? Were they to be canvassed and adjusted, he would even add, without some proper understanding between the United States and Great Britain, as the two chief commercial and maritime states of both worlds?"†

* Rush's Residence, 412.

† Rush, 432.

And proceeding further, he added that—

"If a congress be in fact assembled on the affairs of Spanish America, I shall ask that you, as the representative of the United States at this court, be invited to attend it; and if you should not be invited, I shall reserve to myself the option of determining whether or not Great Britain will send a representative to it. * * * Should you be invited and refuse to go, I shall still reserve to myself the same option; so you see how essential it is, in the opinion of Great Britain, that the United States should not be left out of view, if Europe should determine to take cognisance of the subject."*

This policy was ingenious, but scarcely ingenuous. The reciprocity of political action was delusive, and under the appearance of great frankness and disinterestedness, were concealed important diplomatic advantages. The United States, it must be remembered, had already recognised the independence of the new republic. That independence was, indeed, but a fresh application of the principle of the revolution, namely—that whenever a colony had so far developed a national life, as to act upon the commercial or political interests of the world, it was entitled to its independence, and other nations had a right to negotiate with it and it alone, concerning their mutual interests. And having thus acknowledged their independence upon a recognised principle of international law, the United States could make no compensating arrangements as the reward of that recognition. The position of England was different. She had not recognised the Spanish colonies—she was at liberty, under a changed attitude of the continental powers, to refuse their recognition, and could at any time use them as elements in a new arrangement, either with Spain or the continental alliance. Not only so, but she could sell her recognition for certain commercial advantages, which would counterbalance French influence in the mother country itself. The fear of Mr. Canning was, that France and her allies should make recognition of the colonies a cause of war. If, therefore, he could induce the United States to join him in a declara-

* Idem, 455.

tion that no interference would be permitted on the part of the holy alliance between Spain and her colonies, he would have guarded against the possibility of war, and still be at liberty to drive, both with Europe and the colonies, his own bargain, for either recognition or rejection of the colonial pretensions. Although Mr. Rush seems to have put more faith in the honesty of Mr. Canning's intentions than they deserved, he acted with prudence and skill. He declined acceding to any such joint declaration, unless Mr. Canning would prepare its publication by a formal recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies. Such a proposition, which only would have been real reciprocity of action, disturbed Mr. Canning's policy; for a *joint* recognition would have been no indemnification to England for the French influence in Spain, and would have rendered impossible the vain-glorious boast in which he afterwards summed up his Spanish policy, that "he had called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." This recognition Mr. Canning refused, not only because it ran counter to the object he hoped to attain, but because, while these conferences between himself and Mr. Rush were in progress, a change in the policy of France relieved his just apprehensions, and left him free to regulate his own course as to the colonies. These conferences, which commenced in August, were "substantially terminated," as Mr. Rush says, in November.

In August and September, Mr. Canning was anxious and pressing. Not satisfied with the reception of his proposition, or properly speaking, not at all relishing the equivalent which Mr. Rush so wisely attached to his consent, Mr. Canning had come to a new and fuller understanding with France. Whether the fact of the proposed joint action of England and the United States, had been discreetly intimated to France, or whether, if communicated, it had any influence, it is impossible to say. But this is certain, that on the 9th of October, 1823, a conference was had between Mr. Canning and Prince Polignac. In that conference, Prince Polignac declared explicitly, that his government thought that the reduction of Spanish America, to its old condition

of subjection to Spain, was hopeless—that it disavowed all disposition to use the unsettled state of affairs in the colonies, or the present influence of France with Spain, to appropriate any portion of the Spanish colonies, or to obtain any exclusive advantage for itself—that France, like England, would be glad to see an amicable arrangement between Spain and the colonies, and would be content to be placed with England, on the footing of the most favoured nation; and that she renounced all idea of acting, by force, against the colonies—(*Lesur's Annuaire Historique*. 1824.) With the communication of this memorandum, ended the conferences between Mr. Rush and Mr. Canning. This memorandum, as published,* does not contain the passage to which Mr. Rush refers, in his dispatch to Mr. Adams, in the following language:

"In the course of the paper, on the British side, there is a notice taken of the interest which the United States have in the question. This is met on the part of France, by a declaration, that she does not profess to be acquainted with our views on the subject. The notice of the United States, is in that part of the British paper, which relates to the assembly of a congress in Europe."

Why it should be omitted, it is, perhaps, not difficult to say. That it was a subject of discussion, appears, not only from Mr. Rush's despatches, but from the following letter of Chateaubriand to Prince Polignac, 6th November, 1823:

"It is impossible for me to understand how that minister (Mr. Canning) could talk about the United States. Has he forgotten that they recognised last year, by act of Congress, the independence of certain Spanish colonies, and that they are, in consequence, no further interested, and altogether aside of this question (*par consequent desintéressés et tout à fait hors de la question*.)"—*Congres de Verone*. tome 11, p. 309.

It is not, however, necessary for our present purpose, to follow out the details of this negotiation. At the conference

* Stapleton's Canning—*Lesur's Annuaire Historique*.

referred to, Mr. Canning, (whether strengthened or not, by the consciousness of the inevitable support of the United States, will be a matter of opinion,) used language far stronger than the despatch to Sir Charles Stuart. He found that the views of France were not so contrariant to British policy, as might have been supposed; and differing merely as to the propriety and policy of an European congress on colonial affairs, the United States were not further necessary to *his* scheme, and the American ambassador was no more consulted.* Mr. Rush, however, had communicated freely with his government; and in December, 1823, the President, in his message, made what is now known as the famous Monroe declaration. Historians may differ as to its influence, but the following strong language of Vicomte de Chateau, is on record. On Feb 17, 1824, in a letter to Mons. de Rayneval, he says:

"Mr. Canning has declared, as *the President of the United States has done*, that he denies the right of foreign powers to interfere with armed hands in the affairs of the colonies. Whether this declaration is founded in right or not—whether it be rash or not—war is the result if Europe intervenes."

And he thus proceeds to deduce a policy of peace. The Spanish colonies were finally recognised by both England and France, but there are one or two facts established in this history, important to the United States, as elements in their future policy.

And, first, England did not "call into existence the new world to redress the balance of the old." For, in the first place, had the independence of the Spanish colonies been solely the work of English diplomacy, it would have weighed nothing in the adjustment of the European balance of power. How was the balance disturbed by the French invasion of Spain? Not by any territorial aggrandisement, or by any

* It is somewhat singular that Mr. Stapleton, who gives in his political life of Mr. Canning, an elaborate account of Mr. Canning's Spanish American Policy, and who refers in very complimentary language to Mr. Rush, should have carefully omitted Mr. Rush's proposition to Mr. Canning, for the recognition of the colonies.

monopolizing extension of commercial influence. It consisted in the fact that, by an armed intervention, one of the powers of Europe was submitted to the influence of a continental alliance, to which England was not a party;—that English interests and opinions were put aside, in a question of general European concern; and that the power which had subdued Europe against Napoleon, and reconquered France for the Bourbons, at the expense of the Peninsula and Waterloo, was no longer allowed to predominate in European counsels. And this not a threatened consequence, but a positive, practical result. Now, such a policy might be retaliated or punished, if England should hold the adequate power in the future. The predominance of England might be recovered, but the loss was a political loss, and the gain by a recognition of the colonies, was a commercial gain. The results of the two policies were too different in kind, to be set off against each other, as compensating equivalents. For, against the known sentiments of England, Naples, Piedmont and Spain had been invaded and subjected, while all that England did was, to recognise, after these successes on the other side, the independence of colonies who had achieved their own freedom, and had been already recognised by the leading power of that system, into which their future national life entered. And England had not even the satisfaction of doing this in face of a violent or steady opposition. For, in the second place, while France was anxious to negotiate a modified independence for the Spanish colonies, and preferred that the whole subject should be arranged with the mother country, she never made the independence of the colonies an indispensable or essential part of her European policy. Chateaubriand would have desired, as a completer triumph, to have adjusted this question on his own principles, and, up to a certain point, was willing to diplomatize for victory. But he never intended to press the point to an open conflict, and his language to M. de Serre, describes the whole scope of his policy as finally developed:

“You are right about the colonies. (16 Nov. 1824.) They will bring on no war, for the reason that we do not wish it, and that

the continent which makes so much noise about theories, would not second us, even if we wished to support them by force against England. The colonies then will be separated, and our declaration at Verona has put us in the best position to profit by this separation. We foresaw the event, and have made it understood, that we will not sacrifice our interests to our political theories. The only point is, that the recognition be not too prompt, and that it be well ascertained that there exist, in America, governments capable of making and keeping treaties. On this subject, England is perfectly reasonable, and our relations, on both sides, are most amicable.”—*Congres de Verone*, ii, 352.

If this be true, and there is ample corroborative evidence, where is either England's single action, or indemnifying success? Against the wish and policy of England, France invades and subdues Spain; and, if not in strict concert, certainly under the influence of a mutual policy, France and England recognise the independence of the colonies. But, in the third place, the independence of the colonies was the work neither of France and England jointly, nor of England alone. For, while we will not undertake to maintain so rash an opinion as that the recognition of the United States alone, would have established the independence of Spanish America, it is clear that the presence and power (count that at whatever degree you please) of the United States did enter, as a deciding element, into the determination of European policy towards the new republics. It stands confessed on the record of both parties; for Mr. Canning, while he was uncertain what would be the course of French policy, appealed to the United States for joint action, declaring that he believed it would be efficient; and Chateaubriand distinctly proposes the alliance between England and the United States, as an obstacle in the way of his favourite scheme. If, says he, in March, 1824, after detailing a course of policy, “if she (England) is not stopped by this threat; if, on the contrary, she declares the colonies independent, and *allies herself to the United States*, will all the continental powers draw the sword?” and he answers his question in the negative. The truth is, the independence of the South American States was necessary to the completion of that system which the inde-

pendence of the United States had founded, and their recognition, by the United States, gave them their true political value, as component parts of that system, without reference to the action of Europe. As parts of the western system of free States, supported by the United States, and resolved to maintain their peace, the constant jealousy of each other existing between the European powers, and the consequent changes in their political connection, would have prevented any combined effort for their reduction, while the commercial interests they controlled would have forced the maritime powers of Europe into political relations towards them. And this brings us to the second and most important fact established by the history of this negotiation. From what has been said, it will be seen that France, England and the United States, represented, in regard to the South American States three distinct principles. The principle at the basis of England's policy, was, it has always been, her commercial interest. This power has, immemorially, connected her political position and her commercial influence. She has made the first useful in extending the latter, and the latter subservient in strengthening the first. She looked, therefore, at the South American question in the same light. It was her commercial interest to recognise the new republics, but she intended that recognition to contribute to her political strength as an European power, and so far, therefore, wished to make it an *European question*, but not solely. She was willing, therefore, for her own purposes, to admit and manage the interest of the United States to a certain point—but no further. She was uneasy at the future influence that the United States would probably possess, and seems to have felt the truth, that Chateaubriand expressed so prophetically :

"If there is in the world a power which ought to fear an independent maritime strength, it is Great Britain. Her true rivals are the nations placed between the two oceans, offering to Europe new alliances, disquieting London on the British seas and on the Indian ocean. In a half century, when Great Britain shall have nourished under her protection the new republics : when she shall have guided other nations to Spanish America : when she shall have shown other nations how to make treaties with these Americans : *when she shall have seen the United States sup-*

port or subjugate the Mexican democracy, either through friendship or enmity, springing from the soil, Great Britain will regret," &c.—Congres de Verone, ii, page 252.

And her policy was, therefore, never cordially concerted with the United States.

France, on the other hand, looking at the question in a light almost entirely political, would have preferred, had she the power, to make it entirely an European question. She would have placed the United States aside, recognised no precedent in their independence, and settled the whole matter in a congress of crowned heads, deriving from their arrangement, and her European influence, any commercial advantages she might desire. Both of these schemes, it will be seen, made American politics dependent on European interests, and, of course, included Spanish America, whether as colony or free state, within the European system. Any relations, therefore, of the United States with these countries, would have been, finally, relations with Europe. Fortunately, however, the United States were neither weak nor timid. Their policy was their own, and their prompt recognition of the new republics was independent of all concert with, or influence from, the European powers. The refusal of Mr. Canning, therefore, to meet Mr. Rush's proposal of recognition, as an equivalent for joint action, was most fortunate. It left the United States perfectly free. The principle on which they recognised the South American States, was a policy in itself. The right of colonial independence, whenever a colony attained political maturity, had been first declared to the world by the American revolution, and the independence of the South American States was only the application of a principle recognised by Europe itself, in the admission of the United States into the community of nations. But, the application of this principle by the United States, independent of any reference to the political convenience of Europe, may fairly be considered as the announcement of another, and, in its practical results, perhaps even more important principle, viz: that the political relations of the powers of the new world, were to be adjusted among themselves—in reference

to a system of their own. In other words, that the colonial possessions of European powers, in America, did not introduce England, or France, or Spain, into the American system, as elements, to be estimated by their European importance; but, that such possessions were subject, in the hands of their owners, to the interests and influences of the system of which they formed an integral and territorial part. For instance, that Cuba, as a European colony in this American system, should not be governed, in case of an European conflict, simply by the interests of England and Spain, in their European relation to each other, but that the policy of Spain, England, or any other power, whatever their interests might be, must, of necessity, be modified by the wants and wishes of that system of nations in which the God of nature and nations had placed Cuba. Nor was this a theory merely. For, when the South American States had been recognised by Europe, there remained large colonial possessions in the western hemisphere. Omitting, for the present, the Canadas, there lay, between North and South America, commercially and politically connected with both, the West Indies. These islands, necessary portions of the western system, were parcelled out between Spain, France and England—a few, unimportant in size or commerce, St. Eustatius excepted—belonging to Sweden, Denmark and Holland. The independence of the Spanish South American colonies, naturally called up the question: What will be the policy of America towards these remaining colonies? The most influential of the American powers was, of course, the United States, and the only colonies whose possession was endangered, were the remaining colonies of Spain, Cuba and Porto Rico. These colonies, although they had not thrown off the Spanish authority, were unsettled and dissatisfied. As strong military points, they were capable, under Spanish rule, of infinite mischief to the new republics; and the first question was, would these states rest quiet with this dangerous neighbourhood? had they the ability and the wish to conquer Cuba? On this subject, the United States spoke promptly. On March 15, 1826, in his message concerning the congress at Panama, the President said:

"The condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, is of deeper import and more immediate bearing upon the present interests and future prospects of our Union. The correspondence herewith transmitted will show how earnestly it has engaged the attention of this government. The invasion of both these islands, by the united forces of Mexico and Colombia, is avowedly among the objects to be matured by the belligerent states at Panama. The convulsions to which, from the peculiar composition of their population, they would be liable, in the event of such an invasion, and the danger therefrom resulting, of their falling ultimately in the hands of some European power other than Spain, will not admit of our looking at the consequences, to which the congress at Panama may lead, with indifference. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this topic, or to say more than that all our efforts in reference to this interest, will be to preserve the existing state of things, the tranquillity of the islands, and the peace and security of their inhabitants."

And, in the elaborate and able instructions to the United States ministers at the congress of Panama, the question is thoroughly viewed under three aspects: 1. The independence of Cuba, which is considered, *at that time, and under those circumstances*, impossible. 2. The independence of Cuba, guaranteed by the powers of Europe or America, or both, which is pronounced dangerous and impracticable. 3. The conquest of Cuba by Mexico or Colombia, a solution rejected as inadmissible in any point of view.

Putting aside, then, the wishes and impossible intentions of the new republics, in what relation would the great maritime powers, England, France and the United States, stand towards Cuba? Mr. Canning seems to have, at first, settled this question very satisfactorily to himself, at least. For we are told by Mr. Stapleton:

"Of the importance of this object, the preservation of Cuba to Spain, England and the United States thought alike for the very same reason, viz: that neither of the two could suffer the other to possess it; nor could either of them permit it to fall into the hands of France." Mr. Canning, "for these reasons, wishes to bring about the *signature by the three powers, either of these ministerial notes, one between France and the United States, and one between France and Great Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaiming, each for themselves, any inten-*

*tion to occupy Cuba, and protesting, each, against such occupation by either of the others.**

This language, which we quote as quoted by Mr. Stapleton, Mr. Canning's private secretary and his historian, appears to be an extract from some despatch or memorandum, but to whom addressed, we are not told. We are told, that Mr. Canning made known these views, generally, to France and the United States; how, we know not. We are also told :

"Circumstances occurred, which prevented the completion of the design, but the disclosure of the sentiments of Great Britain was not, by any means, unproductive of advantage."†

As to what is meant by "circumstances," whether the refusal of France or the United States, or both, or a change of policy in the British minister, we are left in ignorance. This proposal does not appear in any of the papers relating to Cuba, published by the government, in 1852, and yet that publication was unreserved to a blamable extent: nor is any reference made to it by Mr. Everett, in his Tripartite correspondence, and it may fairly be inferred, that it was never formally made or suggested. As this proposition is identical, or nearly so, with that which Mr. Everett was called on to consider a quarter of a century afterwards, we will postpone its discussion until we reach that period. From the date of the message, quoted above, until the present day, the solution of what is known as the Cuban question, has remained unsettled. For while Spain has retained her possession, there has been an uneasiness in the political world, which indicates that such possession has never been considered the final term of this difficult problem. Europe has always manifested its suspicion that, sooner or later, a change in the condition of Cuba was inevitable, and in the United States, there has been a quiet confidence in the truth so well expressed by Mr. Adams, as far back as 1823:—

* Life of Canning, vol. iii, pp. 154-5. † Idem, 166.

"But there are laws of political, as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple severed by the tempest, from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connexion with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom."—(*Despatch to Mr. Nelson.*)

During this period, not only has Spain grown weaker, but all Europe has passed through more than one terrible convulsion, and the political system with which this century opened, has been shaken to its centre—its principles, in many cases, abandoned, and its relations, in most important points, completely altered. The development of the United States, as a maritime power, second to none, with an immense territory, a rapidly increasing population, a firm, free government, and a vast commerce linking its interests with every power in Christendom, has, of necessity, enlarged, beyond the reach of ancient precedents, the sphere of international relations. It has done more; and notwithstanding the condensing power of steam and telegraph, its existence, in another hemisphere, has resulted in the creation of two great national systems—the one European, the other American—so that, in future, the relations of states and kingdoms, however powerful, must be regulated, not merely between themselves, but in relation to the great interests of these two systems. Now these systems are brought into the closest contact by commercial necessities, and the future policy of the world will, hereafter, be wise or foolish, as it is regulated by the broad interests of the two systems, or subordinated to the smaller and more selfish aims of individual states. In the meantime, Cuba has grown stronger and richer—its wealth and commerce have brought it into relation directly with the great maritime nations, and their interest require that it should have the freedom and responsibility, as it has the maturity, of independent individual action. Europe, unfortunately, does not hold the same theory; and in the present unsettled condition of the relations between Spain and the United States, resulting, necessarily,

from the anomalous position of Cuba, England and France have demanded that the whole question should be adjusted solely in relation to the requirements of the European political system. The misunderstandings between Spain and the United States have arisen from the fact, that the territorial position and commercial interests of Cuba require a direct adjustment between the United States and herself, while her vice-royal connection subjects these relations to the European policy of Spain. In other words, Cuba has, by the natural progress of the last half century, grown from a colony into a state, and Spain refuses to recognise her majority; and, we may add, that just as in the case of individuals in civil life, majority is determined by law, independent of parental control and caprice, because the interests of society require the free responsibility of the citizens of the state, so the majority of nations must be recognised by international law, because the interests of the world require the free responsibility of its component nations. In such a state of affairs, therefore, as exists between Spain and Cuba, it will be impossible for neighbouring nations to avoid offences, and the most far-seeing prudence cannot entirely deaden the shock of contending interests. Cuba, as we all know, has been disturbed by internal disorders, and in conformity with the experience of the world, the prospect of revolution drew within her borders, from the United States, many of those adventurous and reckless spirits that every society holds in its bosom. Taking advantage of an occurrence, the precedent for which every European disturbance, for the last half century, has furnished, France and England, (23d April, 1853,) through their ministers in Washington, addressed Mr. Webster, the Secretary of State, a joint representation, on the state of Cuba. After stating their uneasiness at the internal disorders in Cuba, referred by them entirely to the attacks "lately made on the Island of Cuba, by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, with the avowed design of taking possession of that Island," they propose a joint convention of renunciation, based on three principles.

1. The indefeasibility of the Spanish title.

2. The right of England and France to keep open and neutral the highways of the world's commerce.

3. The impossibility of allowing such a variation in the balance of power, between the great maritime states, as would result from the occupation of Cuba by the United States. We may remark, in passing, that this correspondence itself furnished a striking argument against the futility of these regulations of the future; for the convention proposed by the prince-president of the republic would have been ratified, if adopted, by the emperor of France, and the Secretary of State might have well declined so nice a calculation as would be required, to determine why the signature of a treaty should bind an ambition uncontrolled by the sanctity of a constitutional oath. By the proposed convention—

"The high contracting parties hereby severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the Island of Cuba, and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempt to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever.

"The high contracting powers declare severally and collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the said Island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same."

Now, before entering into the special merits or elements of such a proposition, there is a broad, and not unimportant objection, in the simple fact—that this is the identical proposition suggested by Mr. Canning quarter of a century ago. Admitting, for the moment, that it was then an equitable political arrangement, is it possible that twenty-five years of the most rapid national progress on record, had brought no increased strength to the United States—that what in 1828 was the "leading power" of the western continent, had not, by 1853, so enlarged their interests, extended their territory, and systematised their policy, that the political equivalents of the first period had ceased to be the expression of the political values of the last? To make, then, such an identical proposal in 1853, carried with it *prima facie* evidence of a disregard of the appreciating importance of the United States in the

political scale, and was clear evidence that the powers of Europe still held their old desire, to interfere in the relations of the western system, with the influence and importance belonging to their European position; that they claimed the right through their colonial possessions to control or modify the interests and relations of our political system.

But the principle of this convention was in perfect antagonism to that on which the policy of the U. States had been based. For it claimed the right, on the part of the contracting powers, to interfere against the national development of Cuba, out of her colonial dependence, simply on the principle that their interests might be disturbed by such a change, while the principle of universal, but gradual colonial independence, was initiated by the war of the revolution. Looked at, therefore, from the European point of view, the independence, or annexation of Cuba, was the diminution of an European power, and might, by its subsequent relations, be a disturbance of the existing balance of power. From the American point of view, it was simply another result of an inevitable principle—another step in the progress to completion of the western system of nations. We speak of this convention as a guarantee against the independence of Cuba, because such is its natural and necessary result, although not its explicit language: inasmuch as the independence of that island would, of necessity, give to American interests a preponderating influence over its fortunes, and it was this increased American influence against which the convention was directed. But while a premature pledge not to recognise the independence of Cuba was an impossible policy for the United States, it did not follow that independence was the only solution of the question. It ought, however, to be remarked, that Mr. Webster, in his reply to the proposition of England and France, used language which would almost warrant those powers in supposing the government pledged against the independence of Cuba. For, on April 29, 1852, in addressing Count Sartiges, he says—

“It has been stated, and often repeated to the government of Spain by this government, under various administrations, not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba themselves, but that if *Spain should*

refrain from a voluntary cession of the island to any other European power, she might rely on the countenance and friendship of the United States, to assist her in the defence and preservation of that island.”

And he adds—

“The undersigned is happy in being able to say that the present executive of the United States entirely approves of *this* past policy of the government, and fully concurs in the sentiments expressed by M. De Turgot,” &c.

Those sentiments being embodied in a very explicit declaration, that neither France nor England could permit the possession of Cuba by the United States. Now, according to this declaration of Mr. Webster, if Cuba should attempt a revolution against Spanish rule, as there would be in such case no “voluntary cession of the island to any other European power,” Spain would, unquestionably, have a right to “rely on the countenance and friendship of the United States to assist her in the defence and preservation of that island.” That such is the fair interpretation of his language seems clear—that such was his meaning is scarcely credible—although Count Sartiges and Mr. Crampton do, in their consequent letter to Mr. Webster of the 5th July, 1852, refer to an event in our history which strengthens this interpretation.

“Decisive measures, indeed, for the preservation of the sovereignty of Cuba to Spain, have been contemplated by the government of the United States on several occasions. Among others, at the time when a report was in circulation, (although without foundation,) that a Spanish general intended retiring to Cuba, and there declaring himself independent of Spain *under the protection of one of the great maritime powers*, the government of the United States did not hesitate to offer to the Spanish government the assistance of their forces, both naval and military, in resisting any such attempt.”—*Correspondence, &c., p. 67.*

It is, however, very fortunately unnecessary to discuss it, for at this juncture the negotiations fell from his hands.

When Mr. Everett resumed the correspondence which the death of Mr. Webster had interrupted, he was more unfavourably situated for negotiation than, perhaps, has ever been a secretary of state. Public opinion was justly irritated, and the condition of Cuba itself was such, that a revolution in that island, successful or not, would have embroiled

the United States, beyond all hope of a pacific solution. Nor could he announce, whatever might have been his own opinion, any plan of practical policy. For he was the organ of an administration whose days were numbered, and whose power was employed solely in managing the business of its various departments, for transmission to its successors. It would have been both unwise and improper to have anticipated action, which he could scarcely initiate, and certainly could not control. But, while he was not allowed to do anything decided, it would have been unworthy, both of the country and himself, again to postpone the consideration of so important a proposition. On the other hand, although the circumstances of his position were embarrassing, there was in the country no statesman so admirably fitted for the duty as himself. If the question itself excited the most susceptible of sectional sympathies, no one had evidenced, in his past career, a more just and constitutional impartiality between the contending interests of those very sections. If the question was not entirely free from party character, and yet rose into the importance of a great national issue, in the ranks of neither party could be found a man who, while true, as every honourable man must be, to the creed and policy of his party, had maintained a wider national reputation, and had more consistently subordinated, as every true statesman must, the temporary triumphs of party to the lasting interests of the whole country. If the question had, for a quarter of a century, been of constant recurrence in the policy of the nation, until its principles had become fixed, and its solution almost a tradition, no one had been, during that period, more cognizant of, if not identified with, its history; and it was peculiarly fitting that the same pen which, in 1827, in the report of the House of Representatives on the Panama congress, had indicated the policy which, on this very subject, was wisest for the future, should, in 1853, sum up the results of our progress, and mark the final and anticipated goal at which the country had arrived. With a mind eminently calm and conservative, Mr. Everett was yet an enthusiast, where the interest and honour of his country were concerned. With a student's knowledge of the past,

a long and practical acquaintance with the present, Mr. Everett realised the future of the great republic, with all the hopeful energy of a citizen, and the calmer but higher faith of a philosophical statesman. Add to all this—and it is no trivial qualification for the representative of a great nation, in its affairs with the world—a style of singular purity, clearness and force, a habit of comprehensive and elevated reflection, and a justness of thought, business-like in its logic; and surely, in such a combination, the country had all it needed, for the expression of its highest policy, in its most fitting language.

When Mr. Everett undertook his reply to the joint proposal of France and England, the United States had already declared:

1. That they recognised the *right* in every colony, upon its political maturity, to declare itself an independent state, and regulate its own relations with other nations.

2. That as regarded the states and colonies of this western hemisphere, their relations formed an entire system, to be regulated by its own necessities and interests, independent of European control. And they had further indicated *their opinion*, that the annexation of Cuba would be a political advantage. They had, consequently, offered to purchase this colony from Spain. But this proposition having been rejected, the Cuban question was still left to be solved by circumstances. Responding, therefore, both to the popular sense and the logical necessity of the position, Mr. Everett boldly took the final step, and completed our system, by declaring that if, in regulating the relations of the western hemisphere, the annexation of Cuba to the United States was required by our balance, that the United States would act, in that regard, according to *their* judgment, and supported by their own strength. And he then proceeded—in one of the most masterly state papers of any age or country—to demonstrate the principles on which the territorial growth of the United States had proceeded. This declaration has put a final stop to any further discussion of the Cuban question—it has placed the United States on the highest and

strongest ground. At the same time that it makes it what it is, an American question, it does not bind the United States to any one solution. If the United States think it wisest not to annex Cuba, but to sustain her as an independent centre for other island colonies, in fulness of time, to concentrate around, they can do so. The point put in controversy by the proposed convention was, whether France and England had the right to claim an equal influence with the United States, in determining the future of Cuba. Mr. Everett's reply is, no. The law of our growth, the necessities of our position, the preponderance of our relations in this hemisphere, make us the leading power of this western world. We will assign Cuba her place. All that you have a right to demand is, that whatever position Cuba occupies, you shall be as free to arrange equitably with her your mutual interests, as you now are with any power of this system. That you shall have; but how Cuba is to modify the respective proportions of the American powers—what she shall count for in our political geography—is our business, not yours. She is our Belgium—we will see that she is placed in the proper scale. As for the claim that she is on the great highway of a future gigantic commerce, if it be true, it must be considered by a wider circle of consenting nations than your tripartite convention embraces. And if you intend, in a congress of the world, to argue such a claim, then we must re-adjust the vast balance of commercial power by more equitable rules, and India, and the Cape, and Gibraltar, and Algiers, and Australia, and the rich islands of your scattered archipelagoes, must be all re-valued and re-apportioned. You cannot hold what you have, and yet claim a portion of the rest.

There were other and minor objections to the proposed convention, upon which Mr. Everett dwelt with due emphasis—the invalidity of so permanent an obligation—the general impolicy of foreign alliances, and the inequality of the special provisions under discussion. But the true issue was that stated above. In fact, this convention was another attempt, parallel to that of Mr. Canning, on the part of Europe, to use the position of the United States to effect their own policy on the American continents. It was not only

again defeated, but the principles declared by the government, repel the possibility of any such proposition for the future. It is almost impossible to detach any part of the despatch comprising so extensive, continuous and important an argument, but the history of the territorial growth of the United States and its principle is, in itself, so pointed a summary of the whole argument, that we transcribe it in full.

"That a convention, such as is proposed, would be a transitory arrangement, sure to be swept away by the irresistible tide of affairs in a new country, is, to the apprehension of the President, too obvious to require a laboured argument. The project rests on principles applicable, if at all, to Europe, where international relations are, in their basis, of great antiquity, slowly modified, for the most part, in the progress of time and events; and not applicable to America, which, but lately a waste, is filling up with intense rapidity, and adjusting on natural principles, those territorial relations which, on the first discovery of the continent, were, in a good degree, fortuitous.

"The comparative history of Europe and America, even for a single century, shows this. In 1752, France, England and Spain were not materially different in their political position in Europe from what they now are. They were ancient, mature, consolidated states, established in their relations with each other, and the rest of the world—the leading powers of western and southern Europe. Totally different was the state of things in America. The United States had no existence as a people; a line of English colonies, not numbering much over a million of inhabitants, stretched along the coast. France extended from the Bay of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi; beyond which, westward, the continent was a wilderness, occupied by wandering savages, and subject to a conflicting and nominal claim on the part of France and Spain. Everything in Europe was comparatively fixed; everything in America, provisional, incipient, and temporary, except the law of progress, which is as organic and vital in the youth of states as of individual men. A struggle between the provincial authorities of France and England for the possession of a petty stockade at the confluence of the Monongahela and Alleghany, kindled the seven years' war; at the close of which, the great European powers, not materially affected in their relations at home, had undergone aston-

ishing changes on this continent. France had disappeared from the map of America, whose inmost recesses had been penetrated by her zealous missionaries and her resolute and gallant adventurers; England had added the Canadas to her trans-Atlantic dominions; Spain had become the mistress of Louisiana, so that, in the language of the arch-bishop of Mexico, in 1770, she claimed Siberia as the northern boundary of New Spain.

"Twelve years only from the treaty of Paris elapsed, and another great change took place, fruitful of still greater changes to come. The American revolution broke out. It involved France, England and Spain in a tremendous struggle; and at its close, the United States of America had taken their place in the family of nations. In Europe, the ancient states were restored substantially to their former equilibrium; but a new element, of incalculable importance in reference to territorial arrangements, is henceforth to be recognised in America.

"Just twenty years from the close of the war of the American revolution, France, by a treaty with Spain—of which the provisions have never been disclosed—possessed herself of Louisiana, but did so only to cede it to the United States; and in the same year, Lewis and Clark started on their expedition to plant the flag of the United States on the shores of the Pacific. In 1819, Florida was sold by Spain to the United States, whose territorial possessions in this way had been increased threefold in half a century. This last acquisition was so much a matter of course, that it had been distinctly foreseen by the Count Aranda, then prime minister of Spain, as long ago as 1783.

"But even these momentous events were but the forerunners of new territorial revolutions still more stupendous. A dynastic struggle between the Emperor Napoleon and Spain, commencing in 1808, convulsed the Peninsula. The vast possessions of the Spanish crown on this continent—vice-royalties and captain-generalships, filling the space between California and Cape Horn—one after another, asserted their independence. No friendly power in Europe, at that time, was able, or if able, was willing, to succor Spain, or aid her to prop the crumbling buttresses of her colonial empire. So far from it, when France, in 1823, threw an army of one hundred thousand men into Spain, to control her domestic politics, England thought it necessary to counteract the movement by recognising the independence of the Spanish provinces in America. In the remarkable language of the distinguished minister of the day, in order to redress the balance of power in Europe, he called into existence a new world in the west—somewhat overrating, perhaps, the extent of the derangement in the old world, and not doing full justice to

the position of the United States in America, or their influence on the fortunes of their sister republics on this continent.

"Thus, in sixty years from the close of the seven years' war, Spain, like France, had lost the last remains of her once imperial possessions on this continent. The United States, meantime, were, by the arts of peace and the healthful progress of things, rapidly enlarging their dimensions and consolidating their power.

"The great march of events still went on. Some of the new republics, from the effect of a mixture of races, or the want of training in liberal institutions, showed themselves incapable of self-government. The province of Texas revolted from Mexico by the same right by which Mexico revolted from Spain. At the memorable battle of San Jacinto, in 1836, she passed the great ordeal of nascent states, and her independence was recognized by this government, by France, by England, and other European powers. Mainly peopled from the United States, she sought naturally to be incorporated into the Union. The offer was repeatedly rejected by Presidents Jackson and Van Buren, to avoid a collision with Mexico. At last, the annexation took place. As a domestic question, it is no fit subject for comment in a communication to a foreign minister; as a question of public law, there never was an extension of territory more naturally or justifiably made.

"It produced a disturbed relation with the government of Mexico; war ensued, and in its results other extensive territories were, for a large pecuniary compensation, on the part of the United States, added to the Union. Without adverting to the divisions of opinion which arose in reference to this war, as must always happen in free countries in reference to great measures, no person, surveying these events with the eye of a comprehensive statesmanship, can fail to trace in the main result, the undoubted operation of the law of our political existence. The consequences are before the world. Vast provinces, which had languished for three centuries, under the leaden sway of a stationary system, are coming under the influences of an active civilization. Freedom of speech and the press, the trial by jury, religious equality, and representative government, have been carried, by the Constitution of the United States, into extensive regions, in which they were unknown before. By the settlement of California, the great circuit of intelligence round the globe is completed. The discovery of the gold of that region—leading, as it did, to the same discovery in Australia—has touched the nerves of industry throughout the world. Every addition to the territory of the American Union has given homes to European destitution and gardens to European want. From every part of the United

Kingdom, from France, from Switzerland and Germany, and from the extreme north of Europe, a march of immigration has been taken up, such as the world has never seen before. Into the United States—grown to their present extent in the manner described—but little less than half a million of the population of the old world, is annually pouring, to be immediately incorporated into an industrious and prosperous community, in the bosom of which they find political and religious liberty, social position, employment, and bread. It is a fact which would defy belief, were it not the result of official inquiry, that the immigrants to the United States, from Ireland alone, besides having subsisted themselves, have sent back to their kindred, for the three last years, nearly five millions of dollars annually; thus doubling, in three years, the purchase-money of Louisiana.

“Such is the territorial development of the United States in the past century.”

In this whole correspondence, there are two things specially worthy of observation and commendation. The first, is the absence of all sectional spirit in a question which, in some aspects, presented great sectional difficulties. With the experience of the last few years still fresh in memory, no critical question of national policy can be approached without fear and trembling. Not only in the eyes of bad men, eager for power, and unscrupulous of means, does every such question present opportunity for mischief, but even to sober-minded patriots, every grave question presents possibilities of sectional evil, which it would be criminal to disregard, and yet difficult to control for the general good. And of all questions, this seemed to teem with elements of domestic trouble. Most admirably, indeed, has Mr. Everett raised it above the troubles of even honest party differences. By being true to the past, he has elevated and guarded the present. He has treated the policy of Cuban annexation, as part of that great system of foreign relations, the foundations of which were laid in the early days of the republic—which has developed the wisdom of its principles, and the fitness of its deeds, in near a century of honourable and successful history; and he has thus gone far to prove what many an honest heart has felt sad in doubting, that a ques-

tion, characteristically southern, may yet be essentially national. The other point worthy of attention in this correspondence, is the entire absence of that reckless spirit of propaganda, that fierce, unnatural, and it may, with the highest truth, be added, that unnational hate of England, which is professed by some politicians in this country, and which this very Cuban question has provoked into extravagant expression. Mr. Everett recognises in England an avowed rival, and does not shun the consequences of such rivalry. He admits, as every one must do, that, as a great maritime power, England must feel a deep interest in the fate of Cuba, but he claims that superior interest for his own country, which situation, power and a sentiment of political freedom, natural and necessary to the whole system, gives her. He admits the character of England's claim, but pleads successfully our own claim, similar in kind, but infinitely stronger in degree. His language is not of insolent strength, but conscious right. He recognises the system of the old world as the basis of his demonstration of the system of the new, and boldly and unanswerably claims that, as the political circumstances of the past made the one, so the political circumstances of the present must make the other. He rejects the mischievous philosophy that *we* are bound by no precedent to the past, that the old and halloved principles of international life, under whose beneficent action this many-peopled world has striven on from system to system, can no longer guide us to the fuller and more perfect day. But he has proven, that though under more favouring circumstances, the same great principles of right are at work now as ever, and that as we are true to the past which God has permitted us to achieve, so will we more surely fulfil that future, which spreads before us the glory of a national life, such as history has not yet recorded.

In summing up, then, the merits of this most able state paper, and in view of the past history of our foreign policy, it may be claimed, without exaggeration—

1. That it is the most perfect and legitimate consequence of the Monroe doctrine, properly understood, that has been practically announced by the government.

2. That not defining a positive course of action, it relieved the question of all embarrassment, placing its new situation in harmony with our past history, but leaving it, as a matter of home policy, open to any solution the country might desire.

3. That it placed the country in its true position, generally, in regard to foreign powers, and may, therefore, be considered the first distinct assertion of our position as the leading power of the western world.

It is not necessary to examine, critically, the reply of Lord John Russell to this despatch, for that reply assumed that the policy of the United States was distinctly declared, and contented itself with making a rather epigrammatic, but superficial retort, and announcing that the British government held itself free for the future to do as it pleased—to which nobody has the slightest objection, as every power has the final right to do what it will and what *it can*. Lord John does, however, make one remark, to which we cannot refuse to append a parallel as instructive as it is pointed.

"Nor let it be said," writes his lordship, "that such a convention would have prevented the inhabitants of Cuba from asserting their independence. With regard to internal troubles the proposed convention was altogether silent. But a pretended declaration of independence, with a view of immediately seeking refuge from revolts, on the part of the blacks, under the shelter of the United States, would justly be looked upon as the same as formal annexation."

In 1827, at the very time that the English government was manifesting its anxiety to preserve the *statu quo* of Cuba, the Conde de la Alcudia, then Spanish Minister in London, writes to the Spanish Secretary of State, giving an account of what we suppose it would be fair, in the language of the despatch of M.M. Crampton and Sartiges, to call "attacks made on the Island of Cuba, by lawless bands of adventurers, with the avowed design of taking possession of that island," and which seem, though in a reverse sense, "to have engaged the attention of her majesty's government." Quoting the Duke of Wellington as his authority, the Spanish Minister says—

"I deem it my duty to give you notice, for the information of the king our lord, that *this government* despatched a frigate, some time ago, to the Canary Islands, with commissioners on board, &c. * *
* The frigate then proceeded to Havana, where the commissioners found many persons disposed to revolt, but in consequence of the large military force stationed there, and the strength of the fortifications, they considered it impossible to take possession of the island without the co-operation of the authorities and the army. In consequence of the information thus obtained, measures have been taken in both these islands, to prepare the public opinion, by means of emissaries, in favour of England, to the end, that the inhabitants *may be brought to declare themselves independent, and to solicit the protection of the British. The latter are prepared to assist them, and will, in this way, avoid any collision with the United States.* The whole operation has been undertaken, and is to be conducted in concert with the revolutionists resident here (at London) and in the islands, who have designated a Spanish general, now at this place, to take the command of the Havana when the occasion shall require it."—*Official papers transmitted to the Senate, &c.*

Verily, Lopez appears to have been better read in British history than the world believed.

It is not our intention to notice the very admirable reply of Mr. Everett to Lord John Russell, after he had left the department of state, for we are concerned with his language only as it is the language of the government. But we may remark, in passing, that this second letter was published with the knowledge and approval of Mr. Marcy, and this confidence, honourable alike to both distinguished men, is the best reply to the small criticism with which its publication was in some quarters received. What the policy of the United States ought now to be, in what way it would be most wisely and efficiently executed—whether it is best to maintain Cuba as she is, to annex her as part of the territory of the republic, or to support her during the perilous youth of her independence—it is for those in authority to decide. The interests and honour of the country are in the hands of those who will not, we may believe, let either willingly suffer. With them we leave it. Our present object has been simply to sketch the out-

line of one interesting chapter in our diplomatic history—to show that our policy towards Spain and her colonies has been independent, consistent, and founded on the very principles to which we owe our own existence. We have desired, further, to point out how completely Mr. Everett fulfilled the requirements of the national position, and took the necessary step forwards in strict connection with the progress of the past. In doing so, we have endeavoured to do justice to the signal ability with which a great living statesman has performed a difficult but honourable duty. Honour to the dead is but the cold expression of a feeble gratitude. It is better, and honester, and wiser, that a nation should speak from the fulness of a warm and instant joy. Whenever our public men rise beyond the mere adroitness of party tactics—whenever, as rulers of the nation, they speak the right word, or do the brave deed—then should be heard the loud and popular amen—then let the people consecrate a living fame for a future immortality. For with an honest, unreserved and sympathising spirit to applaud a high and earnest thought, an unselfish and heroic action, is to make it ours.

W. H. T.

ART. VII.—COMMON SCHOOLS IN SOUTH-CAROLINA.

1. *Essentials of a Republic*; an Address delivered before the Class of 1848, at their Quinquennial Meeting, in Columbia. By W. R. TABER.
2. *Letter to his Excellency Governor Manning, on Public Instruction in South-Carolina*. By J. H. THORNWELL. Columbia: R. W. Gibbes & Co. 1853.

THE schools of our state again claim our attention, and we avail ourselves of the essays named in our rubric to devote a few more words to this important subject.

Mr. Taber's speech forms an epoch in the history of our city and state. It was delivered, as we all know, in the College chapel, in Columbia, by appointment of the class of which the orator was a member. It was, therefore, so far

as the public was concerned, a private affair; merely an essay, read before a class meeting for the gratification of the class, and strangers were courteously invited to attend and be pleased. The speech itself falls under that class of oratory known as the demonstrative. It was got up to order, with the laudable motive of gratifying old friends; certainly with no design of upsetting the constitution of the state, nor of deranging the order of society. The orator receives the usual meed of applause, and is satisfied with having pleasantly and gracefully acquitted himself before his old friends. All seems fair, and the oration (be it said, without any disparagement) bids fair to travel the way of all orations, when, lo! a journal from the mountains denounces it as advocating aristocratic tyranny; the orator is burnt in effigy in Columbia, his house in Charleston visited by an insulting mob, and his family outraged by persons calling themselves Carolinians, and a public meeting is held, at which (without a single passage from his speech being read or quoted, to give a shade of colour to their outrageous and atrocious proceedings) the speech and its author are solemnly held up to the public as objects of scorn and denunciation, and the proceedings duly recorded in the city journals of the following day.

The citizen of Charleston feels his brow suffused with the blush of shame whilst he thus records the conduct of his townsmen. He has not hesitated to call their proceedings outrageous and atrocious. It is a deadly blow aimed, not at the liberty of speech alone, but even of opinion. Mr. Taber's speech was one in which the public had no concern. It was prepared for the entertainment of his classmates. It was not even printed. If his sentiments had been those of a noble of the age of Froissart, had they even exceeded in aristocratic malignity all that the fertile imagination of his Greenville commentator could conceive, still the speech was but the private, nay, in some sort, the confidential expression of his views. He appeared in no public capacity. He carried no pretensions beyond those of a very clever young man. The country was in a state of profound repose. No interest was under discussion which could elicit the slightest