

“ YOUNG AMERICA ”

WHEN a slogan comes to be used commonly by politicians, editors, and diplomats it may be assumed that it expresses a set of ideals and emotions of some significance. “ Young America ” was such a slogan. Its adoption by an important group in the Democratic party during the election of 1852 was a political gesture that received serious attention at home as well as abroad. Since foreign powers are not always in a position to determine how deep the realities behind a gesture may be, it is the more important to evaluate the gesture and to determine its relation to the national psychology. The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe and evaluate the movement Young America, with special reference to its foreign policy and activities, and, secondly, to indicate the relation of the movement to national self-consciousness in the years following 1850.

The idea of a Young America seems first to have been formulated in a commencement address by Edwin de Leon at South Carolina College in 1845.¹ He observed that as there was a Young Germany, a Young Italy, a Young Ireland, so there might well be a Young America. For “ nations, like men, have their seasons of infancy, manly vigor, and decrepitude ”. The young giant of the West, America, was pictured as standing at the full flush of “ exulting manhood ”, and the worn-out powers of the Old World could not hope either to restrain or to impede his progress. If there was to be a Young America, then the new generation, the young men of America, would have to express their faith in the glorious destiny of the country, by seizing political power to hasten the fulfillment of that destiny.

Such ideas were not new. From the time of Benjamin Franklin and Philip Freneau,² Americans, for the most part, had been convinced that their country had a distinctive mission to perform—the introduction of a new and better political order in the world. If there was one idea to which Americans as such could subscribe, it was the conviction that their country, as the only large democracy in the world, had the best possible form of government. Philosophers like

¹ Edwin de Leon, *The Position and Duties of Young America* (Charleston, 1845).

² Benjamin Franklin, *Life and Writings* (Albert Smyth, N. Y., 1905), VIII. 416; *Poems of Philip Freneau* (ed. F. L. Pattee, Princeton, 1902), I. 66 *et seq.*

Emerson and poets like Whitman expressed this idea in terms only more refined than those of popular Fourth of July orators. Our republican and democratic institutions and ideas were held to be unique. The opportunities America afforded made her the symbol of the future and of progress, for she was free from the inequalities and handicaps of the Old World.³ The problem of determining how the historic mission of America might best be advanced occasioned multiple interpretations. This was natural, for a new country in which a national culture had not given unity to diverse regions rarely expresses a well-developed national self-consciousness.

To Young America direct and immediate participation in the affairs of the world was the indisputable formula of procedure. The time, in their eyes, was thoroughly ripe for the realization of the American mission. Success in the Mexican War, easy and cheap, had acted like an intoxicant. It engendered a jingoism which demanded even more grand accomplishments! This urge for participation in world affairs found little expression because the country was absorbed in internal problems growing out of the war.

When, however, the European revolutions of 1848 had been crushed by reactionary governments, there was occasion for action. How could Americans, conscious of their mission to advance their superior institutions, be content with mere example? Despotism needed an immediate lesson. Indeed, if the distinctive institutions of America were to be secure from the advancing menace of autocracy, the task was not only clear but demanded immediate performance.

The year 1852 offered an admirable opportunity for a discontented group of young men within the Democratic party to adopt this phrase “Young America” as a slogan and a rallying cry. The enthusiasm Kossuth was arousing indicated that the country might be ready to assume an active rôle in championing the revolution which that Hungarian declared must shortly break out. The New York *Herald* declared that the cause of Hungary was a trump card which, skillfully played, might win the White House.⁴ Webster, Whig Secretary of State, attended the Congressional banquet given Kossuth on January 7, 1852, being led in part by a desire to repeat the popular success of his Hülsemann letter.⁵ It seemed to Hülsemann, Austrian chargé, that Webster’s speech, candidly recognizing

³ R. W. Emerson, *Journals*, X. 84. See also *The Young American* (1844) and Walt Whitman, *Gathering of the Forces, 1846-1847* (New York, 1920), I. 28 (editorial in the *Brooklyn Eagle*, Nov. 24, 1846).

⁴ New York *Herald*, Jan. 15, 1852.

⁵ *Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster* (National Edition, Boston, 1903), XVI. 588, XVIII. 502.

the justice of Hungarian independence and expressing a wish to see that independence accomplished, signified an intention to quit the Cabinet and to found his candidacy for the Whig nomination on an alliance with Kossuth.⁶ This was likewise the opinion of the Prussian minister-resident, Baron von Gerolt.⁷

As early as December, 1851, it had been plain that the Senate would be the stage for discussions regarding the expediency of assuming a more vigorous position in the interest of European republicanism. Senator I. P. Walker of Wisconsin (Democrat) announced on December 16 of that year that "the country must interpose both her moral and her physical power" against the interference of one nation in the affairs of another in violation of public law and morality. He maintained that the country ought to be ready, if necessary, to fight for Hungarian freedom.⁸ On January 20, 1852, Cass of Michigan introduced into the Senate a resolution to the effect that the United States had not seen nor could they again see, without deep concern, the intervention of European powers to crush national independence.⁹ Cass, although repudiated by the leader of Young America as an "Old Fogy",¹⁰ could not have represented that group more effectively than by his earnest plea for the adoption of the resolution. The country, urged Cass, must not remain a "political cipher". The world must know that there are "twenty-five millions of people looking across the ocean at Europe, strong in power, acquainted with their rights, and determined to enforce them".¹¹

Although the support of the Cass resolution came chiefly from the Mississippi Valley, Stockton of New Jersey urged active, physical

⁶ Hülsemann to Schwarzenberg, no. 3, Letter A, Jan. 8, 1852, "Rapports de l'Amérique 1852", Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. Hülsemann was instructed that it was impossible for the Austrian government to maintain diplomatic relations with Webster (Schwarzenberg to Hülsemann, Feb. 4, 1852). The Cabinet in Vienna feared that the United States would be entrapped by Kossuth's schemes (Schwarzenberg to Hülsemann, Nov. 25, 1851). The temporary break in diplomatic relations occasioned by Hülsemann's quitting Washington was healed because of Austria's reluctance to antagonize a power whose desire for intervention in Europe was feared. Buol-Schauenstein to Hülsemann, May 11, 1852.

⁷ Gerolt to the King of Prussia, no. 13, I. 1, 132, Mar. 30, 1852, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, "Washington 1852", Berlin.

⁸ *Congressional Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., p. 105 *et seq.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

¹⁰ The *Lantern* (comic weekly, New York), vol. I., no. 6, Feb. 14, 1852, defined, with much humor and gusto, an "Old Fogy" as a superannuated officeholder.

¹¹ *Cong. Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., p. 310.

force in behalf of struggling republics.¹² Nor was the measure supported merely by members of the Democratic party. For example, while Seward urged that the moral argument was sufficient for a protest against Russia's intervention in Hungary, he seized the occasion to point out the commercial advantages to be derived from the triumph of the republican idea in that country.¹³

The chief opposition to the resolution came from the Whigs, but they were joined by every Southern Democrat with the exception of Soulé of Louisiana. The arguments advanced indicated that the Cass resolution aroused both sectional and class opposition. An interference with the affairs of Europe would furnish Europeans with an excuse to intervene in our domestic problems.¹⁴ An active foreign policy would necessitate an increased concentration of power in the federal government.¹⁵ The secret of our prosperity and greatness, it was held, lay in our policy of isolation. A departure from it would not unite the country, as certain younger Democrats maintained. Indeed, the sectional character of the debates was pointed to as evidence that the very discussion of a new foreign policy was weakening still further the bonds of union.¹⁶

This opposition plainly came from the more prosperous and conservative regions. Clemens of Alabama appealed to the established commercial interests, picturing a foreign war on "mistaken humanitarian grounds" as bringing disaster to the manufacturing interests of New England, the agriculture of the West, and the cotton plantations of the South, since markets would be closed, and our commerce subjected to seizure.¹⁷ A test vote indicated that the South, whether Whig or Democrat, opposed any change in our foreign policy, while Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana formed an almost solid block in favor.¹⁸

These discussions in Congress, together with the Kossuth excitement, furnished ample stimulus for the launching of the movement calling itself Young America. The greater part of the nerve and energy of the movement was supplied by George N. Sanders. This picturesque figure, a volatile Kentuckian, served from 1844 to the outbreak of the Civil War as a wire-puller and spokesman for the

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 438 *et seq.* Feb. 2, 1852.

¹³ *Ibid.*, appendix, pp. 787, 143. Mar. 1, 1852.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 551 *et seq.* Senator Cooper of Pennsylvania, Apr. 28, 1852.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 531-532. P. Ewing of Kentucky, Apr. 21, 1852.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, appendix, p. 551. Senator Cooper, Apr. 28, 1852.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 179. Feb. 7, 1852.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 186. Test vote, Jan. 2, 1852, to lay a memorial for intervention on the table.

group in the Democratic party whose battle cry was "expansion and progress".¹⁹ Sanders's rhetoric was that of the promoter of grandiose business projects to be realized by jingoism. At the same time his faith in the liberal institutions of his country and its mission to extend them was apparently genuine. His querulousness and dubious financial operations had alienated him from the older members of the party.

The personnel of the group associated with Sanders was not entirely definite, but it may be said that it represented, in general, frontier sections of the country.²⁰ Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois was popularly reputed to be the soul of the movement.²¹ His colleagues in Congress, James Shields and William Richardson of Illinois, were also leading spirits in the group. Others were William Corry of Cincinnati,²² Robert J. Walker, formerly of Mississippi,²³ William R. Smith of Alabama, William Polk of Tennessee, and E. C. Marshall of California.²⁴ But regardless of whether the particular members of the group came from frontier regions or not, it is clear that the group as a whole represented frontier ideals.²⁵ Among these

¹⁹ Sanders did not share Calhoun's opposition to the annexation of Oregon, Calhoun to Sanders, Feb. 3, 1844. *Political Papers of George N. Sanders* (New York, 1914), a sale catalogue presenting extracts from many letters that did not pass from the sale to the Library of Congress. The writer has recently found, in a little known biographical encyclopedia of Kentucky, evidence that Sanders may have played an important part in the agitation over the annexation of Texas, in being indirectly responsible for the famous letter which helped to lose Clay the presidency. According to William Corry, a friend of Sanders, he organized a meeting at Ghent, Ky., during the campaign of 1844, which passed resolutions favoring the annexation of Texas, and appointed him chairman of a committee to correspond with the candidates regarding their respective positions on that question. Clay's Raleigh Letter, Corry says, was in response to a query from Sanders's committee. *Biographical Encyclopedia of Kentucky of the Dead and Living Men of the Nineteenth Century* (Cincinnati, 1878), p. 538.

²⁰ John L. O'Sullivan, T. de Witt Reilly, and Tammany Hall represented an Eastern group closely associated with Young America.

²¹ In his speech at the Congressional banquet in Kossuth's honor Douglas made a pompous and bombastic speech defying the crowned heads of Europe, at the same time declaring himself willing, under certain circumstances, to use military force to secure Hungarian and Irish self-determination. *New York Herald*, Jan. 10, 1852.

²² In Cincinnati the *Nonpareil* represented Young American sentiment.

²³ Walker had suggested the possible desirability of an alliance of the United States and England against autocracy, at a Kossuth dinner at Southampton, England, which he attended as American consul. Hülsemann to Schwarzenberg, no. 31. Nov. 17, 1851.

²⁴ These men were spokesmen for Young America in the House of Representatives.

²⁵ The advocacy of homestead legislation was an example of this tendency. George Evans had named his paper devoted to furthering homestead legislation

was the typically frontier interest in the future development of capitalism. "Great, powerful and rich as are the United States", said Marshall, "they must become greater, more powerful, more rich."²⁶ The *Democratic Review*, which with Sanders as editor became the organ of Young America in January, 1852, argued that if republics were established in the heart of Europe, reciprocal free trade, which was assumed as an inevitable result, would enormously enhance our commerce and provide markets for surplus produce.²⁷ Naïve indeed were these candid admissions. At times, however, they were veiled with idealistic sentiments. The general American conviction of a mission to extend free institutions, and thus to promote a better world order, was remembered and appealed to. It is significant that these idealistic sentiments, bombastically and pompously expressed, were as genuine elements of American self-consciousness as the materialistic ones linked with them.

This materialistic aspect of Young America was most ably expressed by Pierre Soulé during the Senate debates on Cass's resolution criticizing Russian intervention in Hungary. "What, speak of isolation!" exclaimed Soulé. "Have you not markets to secure for the surplus of your future wealth?" It was therefore in Soulé's eyes "our own interest, and if not our interest our duty, to keep alive . . . that reverence for the institutions of our country, that devout faith in their efficacy, which looks to their promulgation throughout the world as to the great millennium which is to close the long chapter of their wrongs".²⁸ This vigorous plea indicated the sympathy of the southern Mississippi Valley with the programme of an active foreign policy in behalf of republican institutions abroad. Just as the established vested interests feared the disastrous effects of a policy of intervention, so interests capable of potential development demanded participation in world affairs to secure commercial advantages.

The appeal which Young America made to many Virginia Democrats may be explained by this emphasis on a future development of capital. Virginians, conscious of their agricultural decadence, were making efforts to stimulate industry and commerce as well as agri-

Young America! (New York, 1846-1849). The New York *Herald* warned Young America that it must be "up and doing" if it did not want the Free-Soilers to steal this part of its programme. Established capitalistic interests of the East were naturally opposed to "western railroad stock-jobbers" unless they themselves were in control. New York *Herald*, May 20, 1852.

²⁶ Mar. 19, 1852. *Cong. Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., p. 383 *et seq.*

²⁷ *Democratic Review*, XXXI. 40.

²⁸ Mar. 22, 1852. *Cong. Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., appendix, p. 349 *et seq.*

culture.²⁹ Hence such Virginians as R. M. T. Hunter, James A. Seddon, and John Daniel of the Richmond *Examiner* were favorably disposed toward Young America.³⁰ The old alignment with the complacent Calhoun Democrats was not an entirely desirable one. The projects of Maury³¹ and George Law's plans for the development of direct steamship lines from Norfolk to Europe might obtain substantial advantages from the programme of Young America. Indeed, Law was the chief financial support in the concrete efforts Young America was to make.

Still another factor in the force of Young America's appeal for intervention in behalf of European republicanism was the presence of large numbers of newly arrived immigrants in the United States, who, for the most part, were friends of republicanism at home. Tammany Hall, with its foreign complexion, ratified, as early as October, 1851, the Young American principle of "no more neutrality, active alliance with European republicanism throughout the world". William Corry, one of the most vehement partizans of Young America, addressed Tammany with a speech which might well be taken as the platform of Young America.³² The fact that large numbers of these newly arrived foreigners settled in the West was another reason why that section was the heart of Young America. The New York *Herald* professed to believe that the Young American crusade for intervention rested on a mere desire on the part of Western politicians to win votes.³³ Although it is difficult to evaluate the degree of truth in this charge, there is evidence that such ambitions influenced in part the behavior of the group adopting the slogan "Young America" as a battle cry.³⁴ But whatever part the

²⁹ See C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia*, *passim*.

³⁰ *Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter*, pp. 127, 136.

³¹ F. M. Maury, *The Amazon and Atlantic Slopes*. Virginia was expected to profit from newly opened-up commerce in South America (1853).

³² New York *Herald*, Oct. 23, 1851. Corry's correspondence with Joseph Holt (Papers of Joseph Holt, Library of Congress) indicates prodigious activity in behalf of Young America.

³³ New York *Herald*, Feb. 5, 1852.

³⁴ See, for example, Gustav Koerner, *Memoirs* (ed. Thomas McCormick, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1909), I. 591, 545, 577, 599, 588; T. C. Blegen, "The Competition of the Northwestern States for Immigrants", *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, III. 129; F. I. Herriot, in *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter*, XII. 404; William Hense-Jensen, *Wisconsin's Deutsch-Amerikaner* (Milwaukee, 1900-1902), I. 229-230; Morris Busch, *Wanderungen zwischen Hudson und Mississippi im Jahre 1851 und 1852*, p. 85; Ernst Bruncken, "Political Activity of the Wisconsin Germans", *Wisconsin Historical Society Proceedings*, 1901, p. 191; Kate A. Everest, "The Germans in Wisconsin", *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, XII. 300.

desire to win German votes played in shaping the interventionist politics of the Westerners in Congress, there was unquestionably a close relationship between the expansive, missionary republicanism of the German exiles and the philosophy of Young America.³⁵

Thus Young America as a recognized political group began its activities in 1852, with special interest in co-operation with European republican movements. Naturally individual members of the group had before that time been active in furthering similar ideas. The leader, George Sanders, had been personally concerned in certain dealings with European revolutionaries and had thus attracted the suspicious attention of representatives of the established governments. Sanders had associated himself with George Law in a notorious musket deal. By act of Congress the War Department offered for sale 144,000 muskets antiquated by the adoption of the new percussion lock. Sanders went to Europe to dispose of these arms to the revolutionary leaders, some of whom he must have met during his participation in the siege of Paris the previous year.³⁶ Before arrangements could be made the revolutions were crushed.³⁷ But the problem of disposing of the muskets continued to occupy Sanders's attention. He frankly admitted that the only possible purchasers were the European republicans, and he defended the right of private citizens in a neutral country to sell arms to belligerents.³⁸ Perhaps this vested interest whetted Sanders's enthusiasm for a new revolutionary outbreak in Europe. Hülsemann, the Austrian chargé, feared the influence which Law and Sanders exerted on Congress "through intrigues and bribery".³⁹ This uneasiness increased when the announcement was made that Kossuth had purchased part of the muskets.⁴⁰ Rumors indicated that, by his order, secret shipments of powder and arms were being prepared in New York.⁴¹ There seems to have been no more truth in these rumors than in those which had disturbed the Austrian representative during the spring of 1850.⁴²

³⁵ See, for example, T. S. Baker, "Young Germany in America", *Americana Germanica*, I. 86; Richard Rathmuller, *German-American Annals*, IV. 92; Julius Goebel, "A Political Prophecy of the Forty-Eighters", *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter*, XII. 462; Karl Heinzen, *Der Pionier* (Boston, 1853-1879).

³⁶ Henry Labouchere to Lord Northbrook, April 23 (no year). *Political Papers of George N. Sanders*.

³⁷ Letter from Sanders to the New York *Herald*, Feb. 12, 1852.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Hülsemann to Schwarzenberg, no. 20, Feb. 21, 1852.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 31, Letter A. Apr. 25, 1852.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Hülsemann caused some nervousness in the Austrian Imperial Cabinet by reports, in 1850, that expeditions were fitting out in New York for the Adriatic and

It is true, however, that Sanders was making rash promises to Kossuth. The Hungarian had urged that the aid of a Democratic government in the spring of 1853 would be too late. Thereupon Sanders vouchsafed his readiness and ability to purchase "the best and fastest going steamer in the United States mercantile marine" and to place it at Kossuth's disposal, armed, manned, and equipped. Kossuth observed that this offer was the most significant one which had been made and one which, if realized, would alone make his American visit entirely successful.⁴³ Kossuth was soon disillusioned since Sanders failed to secure financial support.⁴⁴

The world knew little of these projects, and Sanders's enthusiasm was too great to be limited to clandestine and uncertain channels. His zeal took the form of championing the nomination of Stephen A. Douglas as the Democratic candidate for the presidency. Douglas appealed to a group of younger men in the party who, like Sanders, had not enjoyed the spoils of office, and who were thoroughly discontented with the domination of the Old Fogies. The ritual of the Democratic party had come to be more important than its spirit.⁴⁵ There was need of an evangelistic revival. Hollow complacency was not enough to maintain the party machine intact. Leadership in the party had long enough been in the hands of the Old Fogies. This was the keynote of the articles which Sanders began to print in the *Democratic Review*, an organ long representing the more progressive wing of the party, and of which he became editor in January, 1852. He insisted that the party must have a man for the presidency who realized that our national integrity had long enough been prostituted to foreign governments, that our flag and our armaments must no longer subserve the whims of foreign tyrants.⁴⁶ The "Old Fogy" Democrats, J. C. Breckinridge and General W. O. Butler of Kentucky, and especially Marcy and Cass,⁴⁷ were "superannuated wire-

Naples, with the purpose of inciting the Hungarians and overthrowing the Hapsburg monarchy (Hülsemann to Schwarzenberg, no. 11, Mar. 15, 1850, Schwarzenberg to Hülsemann, Apr. 1 and 14, 1850). The intuitions of the Prussian minister resident, Baron von Gerolt, that these expeditions were intended for filibustering in Cuba, proved correct. Gerolt to the King of Prussia, no. 5, Mar. 18, 1852.

⁴³ Kossuth to Sanders, Jan. 27, 1852 (Pittsburgh). *Political Papers of George N. Sanders*.

⁴⁴ Kossuth to Sanders, July 11, 1852. Letter in private collection of Mr. John H. Gundlach, St. Louis.

⁴⁵ R. F. Nichols, *The Democratic Machine, 1852-1854*, pp. 223, 224.

⁴⁶ *Democratic Review*, January, 1852, XXXI. 2.

⁴⁷ Cass aroused the hostility of Sanders because of the nepotism which had kept the son of Cass at his post in Rome when his refusal to recognize the Roman Republic in 1848 had seemed a "betrayal" of republicanism. Sanders

pullers”, living in the shadows of great men, mimicking their gestures, words, bows. Without progressive ideas upon which to base its actions or to attract support, Old Fogysm had been forced to rely on subterfuges, corruptions, schemes in utter antagonism to democracy and the true national interests of the country. The programme of Young America was drawn with rhetorical splendor. Sectional and party discord were to be healed through a progressive foreign policy, which included the principle of American intervention on the side of the struggling republics in Europe.⁴⁸

Everyone knew that Sanders, in writings these articles, had Stephen A. Douglas in mind. Douglas's defiance of the crowned heads of Europe and his eloquent if vague declarations in favor of the self-determination of all oppressed nationalities, together with his liberal promises of patronage, marked him as the natural leader of Young America.⁴⁹ He had denounced the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as “ truckling to Great Britain ” and thus won the support of Tammany and the Irish vote. His advocacy of homestead legislation, western railway interests, the Oriental trade, and the acquisition of Cuba appealed to the frontier interest in an expectant development of capitalism.

The connection between Douglas and Sanders had begun in 1851. Douglas had at first great confidence in Sanders's judgment, and in April, 1851, wrote that he was glad his plans were approved by him.⁵⁰ “ I profit more by your letters than any I receive ”, wrote Douglas.⁵¹ In December, 1851, Sanders asked Douglas for money with which to purchase the *Democratic Review*. Therefore the later denials which Douglas made as to any knowledge of Sanders's plans were mere falsehoods. “ I appreciate the service you are rendering me and the importance of the movement, and will do all in my power ”, Douglas wrote on December 28, 1851, promising at the same time to try to raise the money if it were absolutely necessary.⁵²

also maintained that Cass had shown himself subservient to Louis Philippe in his *France, its King, Court and Government*. *Democratic Review*, XXX. 456.

⁴⁸ *Democratic Review*, January, February, March, 1852.

⁴⁹ *New York Herald*, Jan. 10, 1852; *Illinois State Register*, Feb. 5, 1852; *Cong. Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., p. 70; Nichols, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁵⁰ Douglas to Sanders, Washington, Apr. 11, 1851. *Political Papers of George N. Sanders*.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Chicago, July 12, 1851; also R. M. T. Hunter to Sanders, May 9, 1851, Sanders MSS. in the Library of Congress.

⁵² Douglas to Sanders, Dec. 28, 1851 (Washington), in collection of John H. Gundlach. J. Addison Thomas, a friend of Marcy, informed his chief on Jan. 27, 1852, that the *Review* had been bought by a friend of Douglas. Marcy Papers, 22, in Library of Congress.

Douglas soon discovered the danger in the course Sanders was pursuing in the *Democratic Review*. In a letter of February 10 he reminded Sanders that from the beginning he had opposed the policy of bitterly attacking other Democratic candidates.⁵³ But the March and April numbers of the *Democratic Review* bristled with denunciations of the "Old Fogies" and shouted the cry "Young America". On April 15 Douglas wrote another long letter to Sanders, begging him to give up the course he was following, and emphasizing the injury that had been done by the assaults on the candidates for the nomination. "If these attacks are repeated my chances are utterly hopeless, and I may be compelled to retire from the field and throw my influence in favor of one of those whom the *Review* strives to crush."⁵⁴

The course of Sanders in the *Democratic Review* unquestionably injured the cause of Douglas.⁵⁵ The affair was discussed in the House of Representatives, Richardson of Illinois attempting to prove that Douglas had had no connection with Sanders and the *Review*. But Breckinridge of Kentucky pointed out that Douglas had recommended the journal to the country after he had read its articles condemning the "Old Fogies".⁵⁶ The damaging effect of these discussions, together with other factors, made Douglas's hope for the nomination less buoyant. In the Baltimore convention his active supporters could not achieve the necessary majority, though his ninety-two votes showed that his strength lay in the Mississippi Valley and California.⁵⁷

Although Young America had occasioned alarm among the Whigs as well as among the Democrats,⁵⁸ the nomination of Pierce had a quieting effect. The New York *Herald* considered Pierce a "discreet representative of Young America".⁵⁹ The *Democratic Review* made the best of the situation by urging that since Pierce was a new man, he was quite capable of becoming all that the *Review* had urged.⁶⁰

⁵³ Douglas to Sanders, Washington, Feb. 10, 1852. Gundlach Collection.

⁵⁴ Douglas to Sanders, Washington, Apr. 15, 1852. Gundlach Collection. The *Lantern* cartooned Sanders with a *Democratic Review* banner slaying "Old Fogies", with the "Little Giant" in mortal terror, begging him to stop. I. 20, May 22, 1852.

⁵⁵ B. F. Angel to Marcy, Washington, Mar. 11, 1852; Thomas H. Hyatt to Marcy, Feb. 26, 1852; A. Campbell to Marcy, Mar. 12, 1852; L. Shephard to Marcy, Dec. 15, 1852; Thomas Carr to Marcy, Feb. 3, 1852. Marcy Papers, 22.

⁵⁶ *Cong. Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., appendix, pp. 299, 420, 711-714.

⁵⁷ Allen Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas*, p. 206.

⁵⁸ New York *Herald*, Mar. 25, 1852; Edward Stanley in the House of Representatives, June 14, 1852. *Cong. Globe*, 32d Cong., 1 sess., appendix, p. 707.

⁵⁹ New York *Herald*, June 10, 1852.

⁶⁰ *Democratic Review*, XXX. 491.

During the summer Douglas, in campaigning for Pierce, appealed to the Young American sentiment.⁶¹ Edmund Burke succeeded in persuading Dr. Hebbe and a Mr. Flinchmann, both influential among the German population, to campaign for Pierce. "The grand ideas which are the most potent in the election", Burke wrote to Pierce, "are sympathy for the liberals of Europe, the expansion of the American republic southward and westward, and the grasping of the magnificent purse of the commerce of the Pacific, in short, the ideas for which the term *Young America* is the symbol."⁶² Kossuth wrote a circular to the German clubs and societies virtually urging them to support Pierce.⁶³

Although Young America had not nominated its candidate, the party platform incorporated many "Young American" ideas. This platform advocated "the full expansion of the energies of this great and progressive people", and the *Democratic Review* interpreted the meaning to its own satisfaction.⁶⁴ The platform moreover resolved that "in view of the condition of popular institutions in the Old World, a high and sacred duty is devolved with increased responsibility upon the Democracy of this country". The *New York Herald* looked to the Pierce administration for the promotion of internal glory and prosperity and "the extension of our power and influence among the nations of the earth".⁶⁵ At the same time it observed that appointment of Young Americans to cabinet positions would mean an unsettlement of the financial world, the electrical vibrations of which would be felt even on the London exchange.⁶⁶

The election of Pierce was regarded with concern by those Europeans who feared the growing influence of the United States and the prominence which that influence was lending to republican and democratic ideas. The Prussian minister resident in Washington, Baron von Gerolt, informed his government that the peace policy of Fillmore had ended, and that a new era designed to show the influence of the United States in Europe as well as the New World was about to begin.⁶⁷ The Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Count Buol-Schauenstein, believed that the election would increase popular license

⁶¹ *New York Herald*, Sept. 11, 1852.

⁶² Edmund Burke to Franklin Pierce, June 14, 1852. Pierce Papers, III., in Library of Congress.

⁶³ *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter*, vols. XVII.-XIX. (1917-1919).

⁶⁴ *Democratic Review*, XXX. 491.

⁶⁵ *New York Herald*, Nov. 4, 1852.

⁶⁶ *New York Herald*, Nov. 18, 1852.

⁶⁷ Gerolt to the King of Prussia, no. 23, Dec. 13, 1852, "United States of America", Geheimes Staats-Archiv, Berlin.

in America, "so incompatible with the good faith of foreign relations". Apprehensive of the American movements against Cuba, he feared "a generally aggressive and annexing policy".⁶⁸ Hülsemann, the Austrian chargé in Washington, expected that while the new government would be sympathetic with the revolutionary party in Europe, it would be deterred for the moment from offering any assistance. This was ascribed to the fact that the relations of the United States with Spain were bound to be precarious because of a determination to secure Cuba, and further, that difficulties with Great Britain and Mexico were not unlikely to develop. A victorious revolution abroad, no matter how momentary, would, nevertheless, in Hülsemann's opinion, change the probable pacific policy of the government.⁶⁹ Yet Hülsemann clearly realized from the Kossuth excitement that the influence of the South would oppose measures which threatened their commercial and financial interests, as intervention in European affairs was bound to do.⁷⁰ Yet the uncertainty in regard to the turn which the expansionist and interventionist sentiment in the United States might take caused Austria to modify her attitude towards this country.⁷¹

In December, 1852, the *Siècle*, published in Paris as the organ of the republican party in Europe, represented the newly elected government as favorable to intervention in Europe. The English press, designating the *Siècle* as the organ of the American legation in Paris, regarded this announcement with concern.⁷² The conservative press in France was likewise nervous. The *Journal des Débats* believed the election of Pierce was a danger sign.⁷³ The *Revue des Deux Mondes* lamented that the death of Clay and Webster left the door open to "la jeune Amérique", and "a violent, perhaps bloody solution" of

⁶⁸ Foote to Everett, Dec. 15, 1852. Correspondence with the State Department, 4, United States Legation, Vienna.

⁶⁹ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 8, Apr. 10, 1853.

⁷⁰ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, Vienna, Nov. 21, 1852, no. 42.

⁷¹ The Austrian government sharply reversed its decision that, as a result of Secretary of State Webster's address at the Congressional banquet for Kossuth, official relations could not be maintained with Webster (Schwarzenberg to Hülsemann, Feb. 4, 1852). The instructions to Hülsemann to make some sort of a compromise did not reach him until after he had left Washington. The conciliatory attitude of the Austrian government was caused chiefly by the realization that "the political and economic importance of the United States are increasing each day, an importance which assures them an influence on the destiny of Europe". Buol-Schauenstein to Hülsemann, May 11, 1852. See also M. E. Curti, *Austria and the United States*, Smith College Studies in History, April, 1926.

⁷² J. Addison Thomas to Marcy, Paris, Dec. 26, 1852. Marcy Papers, 46.

⁷³ Nov. 11, 1852.

outstanding issues.⁷⁴ Young America was regarded as the most numerous and influential wing of the Democratic party, and its "voracious, insatiable" ambition for power and expansion was evidence that it possessed "les yeux plus gros que le ventre".⁷⁵ Émile Montégut observed that since Americans thought of themselves as "patrons of future peoples and the model of universal government", it was not surprising that they had insulted Austria and Russia, and menaced Spain. These were regarded as the advance signs of more grave attacks. The discourse of Cass on the French occupation of Samana was regarded as expressing the jealous anxiety of the United States, and, indeed, Pierce's election might be regarded as a triumph of aggressive passions.⁷⁶ Other French writers were also attacking the expansive tendencies in the United States. One, A. de Moges, believed that the system of American expansion ought to become thenceforward the chief preoccupation of the European cabinets.⁷⁷ It remained to be seen what influence Young America would actually have on the new administration.

The bitter fight between the "Old Fogies" and the representatives of Young America for spoils began almost immediately. George Sanders used every possible weapon to prevent the president-elect from offering to Marcy the chief office in the Cabinet.⁷⁸ Almost every day and night during the early months of 1853 he was to be seen at the Astor House, with various Douglas men, seizing each opportunity to talk with influential citizens and travellers. A political enemy of Sanders, Thomas N. Carr, had reason to believe that in all these efforts he was financially supported by George Law.⁷⁹ Despite everything, including interviews with Pierce,⁸⁰ Sanders failed. Marcy was announced as the new Secretary of State.⁸¹ But the leader of Young America was not discouraged. Sanders publicly declared his determination to obtain an office in spite of Marcy's opposition. A letter to this effect was read at Tammany Hall.⁸² George Law, it

⁷⁴ XVI. 792-793, November, 1852.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 606, January, 1853.

⁷⁷ A. de Moges, *Influence Prochaine des États-Unis sur la Politique de l'Europe* (Paris, 1855); M. H. du Pasquier de Dommartin, *L'Intérêt Européen dans l'Amérique du Nord*.

⁷⁸ J. Addison Thomas to Marcy, New York, Jan. 18, 1853. Marcy Papers, 28.

⁷⁹ Thomas N. Carr to Marcy, New York, Feb. 24, 1853. Marcy Papers, 28.

⁸⁰ Pierce to Sanders, Jan. 18, 1853. Sanders Papers.

⁸¹ This was regarded as a "death-blow" to "progress" by that ardent champion of Young America, William Corry. Corry to Holt, Washington, May 2, 1853. Joseph Holt Papers, Library of Congress.

⁸² Carr to Marcy, New York, Apr. 4, 1853. Marcy Papers, 33.

seems, had committed Pierce to Sanders's appointment. It was also believed that Douglas was among the some hundred friends who were aiding Sanders.⁸³ And so in the face of opposition of Marcy,⁸⁴ Sanders was appointed in June (1853) consul at London.⁸⁵

Hülsemann regarded this appointment as an indication that the government intended to maintain intimate relations with the revolutionary refugees in that capital.⁸⁶ The Austrian chargé assumed that Marcy had yielded in his opposition to Sanders because of the latter's influence with Pierce.

Sanders arrived in London in November. Although he was on good terms with Buchanan, the American minister,⁸⁷ it was Sickles, the secretary of legation, who proved the more valuable friend. This relationship enabled Sanders to make use of the legation seal and despatch-bag for sending personal communications and probably those of his exiled friends, the leaders of the revolutions of 1848. Buchanan was apparently ignorant of the use Sanders was making of the despatch-bags.⁸⁸

The exiles virtually made their headquarters at Sanders's London house. It was there that Kossuth met Garibaldi for the first time. It was there that Buchanan graced a dinner party whose guests included Kossuth, Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin, Garibaldi, Orsini, Arnold Ruge, and Herzen. "Sitting next to Mrs. Sanders at table", wrote Buchanan, "I asked her if she was not afraid the combustible materials about her would explode and blow us all up."⁸⁹ Buchanan was much impressed by the assembly. In reporting the affair to the Secretary of State, he observed that he had been very cautious in his remarks. "But", he added, "they were all evidently much pleased that I was neither ashamed nor afraid to meet them. However indiscreet it might be for me, as American minister, to invite any of them to my house, I should feel myself degraded as an American citizen to have refused the invitation of a friend, simply because men who have suffered in the cause of liberty were to be present."⁹⁰

⁸³ Carr to Marcy, New York, Apr. 4, 1853, Marcy Papers, 33.

⁸⁴ Marcy to Buchanan, Dec. 22, 1855. Private Letters of W. L. Marcy, Library of Congress. See also the *Lantern*, April, May, 1853, *passim*.

⁸⁵ The wrath of Marcy's friends ran high with the news of this appointment. By one correspondent Sanders was described as "too lazy to shave and clean himself and out and out a blackguard". W. W. Benson to Marcy, Albany, June 25, 1853. Marcy Papers, 34.

⁸⁶ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 19, Aug. 11, 1853.

⁸⁷ J. Addison Thomas to Marcy, London, Nov. 29, 1853. Marcy Papers, 45.

⁸⁸ Buchanan to Marcy, Dec. 22, 1854. Marcy Papers.

⁸⁹ Buchanan to Marcy, Feb. 24, 1854. Marcy Papers, 48.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Sanders was listening to the plans of the exiles and doing what he might to further them. Ledru-Rollin entertained the idea of using the United States as a lever to force the revolutionary movement in Europe. At the time of the *Black Warrior* and the Ostend Manifesto he wrote to Sanders, suggesting that the United States pledge its support to the Spanish republicans, braving even the risk of war with the European governments. The reward was to be the expectation that Cuba, out of gratitude and interest, would apply to the United States for annexation.⁹¹

With Kossuth the relations of the American consul were more intimate. On July 29, 1852, Kossuth had written from London asking Sanders whether anything was to be expected from the incoming Democratic administration.⁹² "The European movement", urged Kossuth, "is not only impending, but can by no means be delayed long any more. Not only is the organization entirely completed, but in consequence of this achievement the blow must be stricken." Kossuth insisted that after the great victory of the Democratic views signalized by Pierce's election, aid to the cause of European revolution became a matter of political dignity.⁹³ "To speak plainly, the nomination to Constantinople should tell all Europe explicitly, that it is meant to be energetically anti-Russian and anti-Austrian because American and Democratic."⁹⁴ Kossuth added that almost anything might be done at Constantinople by money. This suggestion clarifies the policy Kossuth was at this time pursuing in Washington. During March and April, 1853, Pulszky, his former secretary, was urging the administration to make the uprising in Milan the occasion for announcing its policy.⁹⁵ Pulszky wished the administration to declare that it would support Turkey in case it was attacked by Russia and aided by Austria. Such an event was expected, and was to be the signal for an Hungarian uprising. The

⁹¹ Ledru-Rollin to George N. Sanders, London, Aug. 1, 1854 (*Political Papers of George N. Sanders*); see also A. R. Calmin, *Ledru-Rollin et les Proscrits Français en Angleterre*. Sanders's coadjutor, Corry, states that "it is quite probable that it was the urgency of Mr. Sanders that pushed Mr. Buchanan and encouraged Mr. Soulé, at Ostend, to manifest the determination to appropriate Cuba at all hazards, and with no respect for national law as hitherto accepted". *Biographical Encyclopedia of Kentucky*, p. 539. The scattering of Sanders's papers would make it difficult to test this statement.

⁹² Kossuth to Sanders, London, July 29, 1852. *Political Papers of George Sanders*.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1852.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*; Corry was being pushed for this post. Corry to Holt, May 2, 1853. Joseph Holt Papers.

⁹⁵ Strangely, these activities did not get into the press. Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 6, Mar. 27, 1853.

prestige of the United States would be greatly enhanced by purchasing as naval bases Kleck and Sutorina. The influence of Kossuth's chargé at Constantinople was offered to achieve this end; it was expected in return that the moral influence of the presence of the United States in this region would aid the revolutionary outbreak in Hungary. Pulszky seems to have had long conversations with Cushing, the attorney general, well known for his sympathy with Young America, and with Soulé, Marcy, and President Pierce. Hülsemann scarcely expected that the United States would be led into such an extravagant project.⁹⁶ Though these schemes had in reality little chance of success, there was reason for the Austrian government, none the less, to feel considerable anxiety.⁹⁷

The spring and summer passed without definite results, but Kossuth's optimism was stimulated by the arrival of Sanders in London in November, 1853. In a letter dated London, November 15, 1853, and published in the New York *Herald*, Sanders announced to America that Kossuth's agent had been openly received in Constantinople. "The Porte made no secret of the fact", continued Sanders, "that unless Austria withdraws her armies from her frontiers, or England and France shall accede to his demand for his guaranty of the neutrality of Austria, that Kossuth will be invited to Constantinople and placed at the head of a strong division to march on Hungary."⁹⁸

But this was obviously mere talk. Two days later Kossuth requested Sanders to write a letter to the United States minister in Constantinople recommending to his good offices the Hungarian chargé, and further to use his influence to persuade the Porte not to delay longer in forcing Austria "peremptorily to assume a clear

⁹⁶ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 6, Mar. 27, 1853.

⁹⁷ At this very time, A. Dudley Mann, well known for his friendliness to European revolution, was appointed and confirmed in the newly created office of assistant secretary of state (Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 6, Mar. 27, 1853). This was generally regarded as a concession to Young America, and as such was disagreeable to Hülsemann and his colleagues (Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein. *Ibid.*). The presence of Cushing in the Cabinet was in itself reason to fear the influence of Young America (Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, Feb. 21, 1853). On the evening of April 10 it appeared that the Cabinet was to be radically reorganized, Cushing to become Secretary of State, Stockton, Secretary of the Navy, in which event "it is a complete victory for Young America" (Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, Apr. 11, 1853). While the rumor proved to be unfounded, it was clear to the Austrian chargé that there was cause to be nervous as long as Cushing, the representative of Young America, enjoyed the confidence of the President. Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 6, Mar. 27, 1853.

⁹⁸ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 37, Dec. 5, 1853, enclosure.

position".⁹⁹ Kossuth continued to urge that the United States minister in Constantinople should turn the scale in the diplomatic battle being waged between England and France for preponderance.¹⁰⁰ In spite of all these efforts, the representatives of the United States remained passive. Kossuth had complained that they were willing to allow the "Black Sea to become a Russian lake or leave it to England's protection".¹⁰¹

At the same time that Kossuth and Sanders were pursuing the uncertain paths of diplomacy, they were endeavoring to equip a vessel to transport the Hungarian leader with such followers as might be assembled to Constantinople. Sanders not only gave advice, but seems to have acted as a sort of purchasing agent.¹⁰² For lack of financial backing the negotiations came to nothing. "God knows", Kossuth wrote Sanders on December 13, 1853, "how anxiously I have awaited a letter from America. . . . I am sick with excitement and disappointment."¹⁰³

But there were other means of assisting the cause of European freedom. August 21, 1854, Sanders's letter to the President of the Swiss Confederation appeared in the London *Times*.¹⁰⁴ It protested against certain resolutions abridging the rights of asylum in that country. Sanders ventured to hope that the Swiss Confederation would not be influenced by Austrian diplomacy. Full of feeling for republicanism, the letter urged that Switzerland, "like our own America, is charged with certain solemn responsibilities". A few days later, August 24, the *Times* criticized Sanders's position in assuming that Switzerland was the sole abode of "true political faith", and that the duty of its people, therefore, was the conversion of Europe.¹⁰⁵

August Belmont, American minister at the Hague, wrote to Sanders that "the virulent manner with which the demolition has been attacked by the whole conservative press of England and the continent, is the most evident proof of its importance".¹⁰⁶ "The republican spirit in Europe is subdued but not crushed, and manifestos like yours can not fail to exercise the most beneficial influence

⁹⁹ Kossuth to Sanders, Nov. 17, 1853. Collection of John H. Gundlach.

¹⁰⁰ Kossuth to Sanders, Feb. 26, 1854. *Political Papers of G. N. Sanders*.

¹⁰¹ Kossuth to Sanders, Dec. 13, 1853. Collection of John H. Gundlach.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1853.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1853. Kossuth believed that if he could have entered the Bosphorus with a couple of vessels on the occasion of the catastrophe at Sinope his reception would have been both enthusiastic and significant.

¹⁰⁴ London *Times*, Aug. 21, 1854.

¹⁰⁵ London *Times*, Aug. 24, 1854.

¹⁰⁶ Belmont to Sanders, Sanders MSS., Library of Congress (no date).

on its dormant powers." Belmont asked for copies of the letter to be distributed in Germany and France.

Sanders had made many enemies before he assumed his position in London, and his open activities in behalf of the revolutionary cause did not diminish them. Hülsemann understood in January, 1854, that Sanders's letters to the New York *Herald* had so displeased the President that he hesitated to transmit the nomination to the Senate.¹⁰⁷ In February, 1854, Sanders's nomination as consul in London was refused confirmation in the Senate by a vote of 29 against 10.¹⁰⁸

Sanders was outraged at the rejection. Blaming Douglas for deserting him, he even intimated that the Little Giant was one of the conspirators against his character. Douglas was surprised at the direction his wrath had taken. "I am not in the habit of suspecting my friends", Douglas wrote, "much less of condemning them. . . . When, in the prosecution of your cherished revenge, you shall ascertain the true state of the facts, and shall know who stood by you, and defended you to the last, you will feel more mortification and chagrin at having written your unkind letter to me than I did in reading it."¹⁰⁹

The exiles in London were thoroughly disappointed at the recall of Sanders. On March 1, 1854, Kossuth, Ledru-Rollin, and Mazzini addressed a letter to him expressing "deep regret and mortification at this untoward occurrence". The rejection of his nomination by the Senate was "a hard and mischievous blow at the prospects" of democracy.¹¹⁰ Kossuth became furious when he thought of the way in which Sanders was treated by his government, and "sick at heart at considering what the cause of European democracy" lost by losing him.¹¹¹ Louis Blanc took occasion to express his appreciation for

¹⁰⁷ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 3, D., Jan. 15, 1854. Sanders continued this virulent letter-writing, publishing in several languages, according to Corry, an extraordinary assassination letter, which urged the murder of Louis Napoleon, "By any means, and in any way it could be done". William Corry, *op. cit.*, p. 539.

¹⁰⁸ Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 9, B., Mar. 9, 1854. Sanders's friends believed that Marcy's influence had secured the rejection. Marcy wrote to Buchanan that he had treated Sanders forbearingly, and had done nothing to influence the action of any senator adversely towards him. Marcy to Buchanan, Dec. 22, 1855. Private Letters of W. L. Marcy, Library of Congress. Even Sanders's enemies were surprised, despite Marcy's "conjecture and advice" on the subject, at the large vote against him. N. G. Upham to Marcy, Mar. 3, 1854, Marcy Papers, 48. Apparently Young America was not such a power in Congress as had been supposed.

¹⁰⁹ Douglas to Sanders, Mar. 27, 1854. *Political Papers of G. N. Sanders*.

¹¹⁰ Kossuth, Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin to Sanders, Mar. 1, 1854. *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Kossuth to Sanders, Sept. 1, 1854. *Ibid.* Kossuth addressed a letter to the Germans of America on the Senate's action. Hülsemann to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 17, Mar. 30, 1854. *National Intelligencer*, Mar. 27, 1854.

the articles which had appeared in the *Democratic Review*.¹¹² "My admiration rises to affection for you", wrote Victor Hugo. "When you write it is your soul that writes, a soul elevated and free."¹¹³ Campanella, the secretary of Mazzini, thanked Sanders for the favors he had received,¹¹⁴ and Garibaldi added to "a word of affection and gratitude" the comment that whatever it might be his fortune to accomplish for his country would be inaugurated "under the auspices of generous men (sympathizing in soul with my unhappy land) of whom you are the model".¹¹⁵

Sanders's consular colleague in Liverpool, Nathaniel Hawthorne, "hoped to Heaven" that Pierce would do the right thing in Sanders's case, and felt certain that he would "if he follows his nature".¹¹⁶ Soulé wrote from Madrid that "there will not be a true Democrat throughout the land who will not deplore and bitterly condemn that you were not returned to a post which you filled with so much distinction".¹¹⁷

Although Sanders's efforts in London were badly rewarded, slightly better success attended those of some other representatives of Young America. August Belmont, agent of the Rothschilds in New York, and sometime consul-general for Austria, was thoroughly sympathetic with the programme of American aid for European republicanism. Belmont owed his appointment as minister to the Hague very largely to Sanders's influence with Pierce.¹¹⁸ From the Hague, Belmont wrote Sanders that the Crimean War might very well make possible new and successful revolutions. "The day is not far distant, when self-preservation will dictate to the United States the necessity of throwing her moral and physical force into the scale of European republicanism. To prepare for such a day is the first sacred duty of our Government and Congress, and this can only

¹¹² Louis Blanc to Sanders, June 14, 1854. *Political Papers of George N. Sanders*.

¹¹³ Victor Hugo to Sanders, Oct. 31, 1854. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Campanella to Sanders, May 17, 1854. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Garibaldi to Sanders, Apr. 11, 1854. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Hawthorne to Sanders, June 2, 1854. *Ibid.* Corry says that the appointment was later confirmed as a result of the intercession of William H. Seward, Sanders's political enemy. Corry, *op. cit.*, p. 539. The writer has found no record of such action in the *Senate Journal* or in the *Executive Documents*.

¹¹⁷ Soulé to Sanders, Madrid, Aug. 21, 1854. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Belmont to Sanders, N. Y., Mar. 21, 1853. Sanders MSS., Library of Congress. Buchanan also recommended Belmont as a desirable minister if the administration desired to obtain Cuba in a peaceful way. Buchanan to Marcy, Mar. 8, 1853. Marcy Papers, 29.

be done effectively by reorganizing and increasing the navy.¹¹⁹ The sooner we prepare against the contingencies which our rapid growth and the jealousy of the European powers will bring about, the better it will be for us."¹²⁰ But apart from forwarding Sanders's letter to the President of the Swiss Confederation, Belmont's activities in behalf of Young America were confined to the despatch of high-sounding demands to the Dutch government for the release of one Walter Gibson who had been imprisoned in Batavia on the charge of exciting native chiefs to overthrow Dutch royal authority.¹²¹

To some extent Edwin de Leon, who as early as 1845 had defined the aims of Young America, executed some of its tenets in his official capacity of diplomatic agent in Egypt. His dealings with Mehemet Ali were high-handed,¹²² while his protection of American missionaries in Jaffa must have been applauded by Young America at home.

Although the Secretary of State, Marcy, was not a friend of Sanders, he was certainly somewhat influenced by the group to which Sanders belonged. His circular to the effect that no foreigners be employed in diplomatic chancelleries and advising diplomatic agents not to wear uniforms responded to a demand of Young America.¹²³ Marcy wrote to Buchanan that his course in dispensing with diplomatic uniform had gained him great popularity,¹²⁴ but the American representatives in Turin, Paris, and Vienna came out less gloriously,¹²⁵ and had either to compromise with or surrender to European and royal custom.

When Douglas had failed of nomination in 1852, Young America had been discouraged but not daunted. Now, however, with the return of Sanders from his consular post, and the failure of the group to exert any very important influence on the government, there was no longer any reason for making pretenses, and Young America as a movement died out. But Young America, as a slogan, meant something long after the movement, as such, was dead—its influence was registered in the national self-consciousness.

¹¹⁹ A strong navy was a favorite idea with Young America. See *Democratic Review*, July, 1852, "Our Mission—Diplomacy and Navy".

¹²⁰ Belmont to Sanders, August, 1854. Sanders MSS., Library of Congress.

¹²¹ See *Writings of August Belmont*, *passim*; Marcy to Belmont, Aug. 8, 1853. Marcy Papers, 41.

¹²² Edwin de Leon, *Thirty Years of My Life on Three Continents* (London, 1890), pp. 150, 193 *et seq.* De Leon was in close correspondence with Sanders in London.

¹²³ Hülseman to Buol-Schauenstein, no. 14, B., June 13, 1853.

¹²⁴ Marcy to Buchanan, Mar. 12, 1854. Private Correspondence of Marcy.

¹²⁵ John Y. Mason to Marcy, Paris, Jan. 26, 1854, Marcy Papers, 47; Wm. Jackson to Marcy, Vienna, Jan. 30, 1854, *ibid.*

We have seen that Young America had glorious ideals for the future of the country, and a very ambitious programme for realizing them. Yet the ideals were as vague as they were grand. Ways and means of applying the programme, of extending aid to the republican movements in Europe, were not definitely worked out, nor, apparently, were the serious practical problems that intervention would involve ever squarely faced. It would not be expected, then, that such a movement would meet with any great degree of practical success, partly because of its inherent weakness and partly because of sectional opposition and that of established economic interests.

Thus the movement itself was a failure. Yet the fact that it existed and flourished so strongly for a while is very significant. On the one hand it shows that Young America's grand ideals really expressed the feelings of many Americans. Idealists like Emerson and Whitman entertained the same essential ideals, though they expressed them less crudely. It was probably more true of the United States than of the European countries that its people tended, at that time, to have an exaggerated youthful faith in the glory of their institutions. Some wished to gain still further glory through territorial expansion and foreign trade. Others were especially interested in encouraging democracy abroad. How many of these latter were animated by commercial motives is a question. But such people, idealists and materialists alike, must have found their chief aspirations expressed in the programme of Young America. On the other hand, the fact that these already existing feelings found expression and some degree of organization and coherence in Young America could not but have helped to crystallize and still further develop them. Thus, this movement, though it failed of practical results, was significant, first, as a political gesture so vigorous as to arouse alarm in Europe, and, secondly, as a means of expressing and developing a certain type of national self-consciousness.

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