

of my reach. I know that it is generally thought in Costa Rica that this campaign is a mere piffling, and that it is nearly concluded. I have had neither a moment of rest, nor have we been free from continual dangers. I have been occupied not only in keeping up the long and tedious line of defenses, but I have also united and organized once more the already disbanded army of the allies, and induced them to attack Walker again. If in Costa Rica they cannot be dissuaded from their error, it is my duty to deplore by and by a bitter disappointment. If 500 men had been given to me in time, everything would have been finished. If now strong reinforcements are not sent to me, our triumph will serve only to bring us new dangers, and make our defeat more shameful.

Your most obedient servant,
JOSE J. MORA.

[No. III.]

HEADQUARTERS, FORT SAN CARLOS, Feb. 8, 1857,
TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER OF WAR: I have given you Excellency information, by way of Tortuga, of the last events. The steamer Virgin, conveying the same correspondence, returned last night. The exploration of the port of Tortuga has proved satisfactory. The steamer can go near enough to the village to embark troops, provisions, &c. After having made this exploration, and received your official correspondence of Jan. 26, of which I acknowledge the receipt, the steamer put ashore Col. Don Manuel G. del Borge and Capt. Spencer, and went on to Ometepe for wood. On their return to this fort, they passed near St. George, and heard a heavy cannonading in the direction of Rivas. They went along to Virgin Bay, and arriving opposite the place, fired a blank cartridge, to oblige them to show their colors, which was immediately followed by their raising a white flag. At sight of this, they sent an officer ashore, who returned a short time after with the news that the allies had been attacked in St. George on the 4th, by Walker; that they repulsed him as far as Rivas, where he is surrounded with his whole force.

At 2 o'clock this morning I received news from the river and Castillo, by the steamer Bulwer. On the 25th ult. the bow of a filibuster steamer hailing from San Juan del Norte, made its appearance at the taram of the river nearest to Trinidad. They fired a shot, were answered by three shots, and retired. By the last report, bearing date that I believe must be the 7th, Don Francisco Alvarado speaks about a new and violent attack, which was gloriously met by our men without any casualties. I flatter myself with the hope that this would be sufficient for these vagabonds. I have sent Mariano Hincapié a supply of provisions. I have also sent to the fort a quantity of cartridges for any event. I expect to-night Don Francisco Alvarado with the details of what has happened. In any event, Sir, although I have been weakening myself by re-enforcements which I gave to Gen. Castes, I have not lost sight of the fort, and I have sent a patrol of the lake. Your Excellency must, nevertheless, be continually active in sending me men, as sickness has reduced my effective force one-third. The same has to do with respecting the post at Trinidad, where those reductions are more sensibly felt, because the fewer there are the more they are needed.

I have given orders to Col. Boaque to recruit two or three hundred men in Liberia (Guancastote), and detain them exclusively for the occupation of San Juan del Sur; but I do not think that such recruiting will be effected, nor will it ever serve me to guard this line.

The three hundred men whom, according to report, you sent of sending me by Tortuga, will cause it good time.

Respecting the seizure of Punta de Castillo (Punta Arenas), I have told your Excellency of the difficulties to which the English commanders (Erskine) has subjected us. It appears to me that the said gentleman is not at all uniform in his conduct, because at the same time that he impedes a Republic faithfully by his action in this affair, in a parcel of vagabonds he permits these vagabonds to organize regular expeditious.

I address a note to him to day, complaining respectfully to him, a copy of which I inclose to your Excellency.

In regard to the expedition of Boaque and Spencer against the filibusters at San Juan del Sur, they were to take the 300 men from Trinidad for that purpose; but by chance they did not determine so, of which I am very glad, as it does not appear well to me to take away the garrison from a fortified post for the sake of trying our fortune in a neutral Territory and of leaving the defense, running at the same time the risk of having our return cut off, and of finding perhaps an important position occupied. Those same gentlemen came to ask me for men for this injudicious attack. It was impossible for me to consent to take away the garrison from this fort, our last and secure resource, the success of our enterprise, now garrisoned with only 200 men, and which must always be guarded by picked men from the interior of Costa Rica.

Spencer not having gained his object, demanded that the steamer should be shut up in the river San Carlos, the mouth of which would soon be dry.

This operation would not only deprive us of their use for our service, but also would give them into the hands of the enemy, in the unfortunate case of losing Trinidad (Sarapiquí). Consequently I oppose the operation. He goes to Costa Rica to see what success he may have with his Excellency the President.

There is no doubt that Spencer has served us well, but I want your Excellency to observe that he is a detestable man, and suspect him of having assisted to liberate us from Walker for the purpose of selling us to others. This is probably unjust, and I know well that it is necessary to treat him with gratitude and politeness, not only as an acknowledgment of his services, but to oblige him to continue to serve us. I therefore beg your Excellency to see that he takes a course of poste to that of the army, because as a military man he can be of no use to us; and during the days that he was in the fort, when I was engaged in the second expedition of St. George, he committed outrages upon sentinels, insulted chiefs and officers, and introduced, in fact, such disorders that had I not returned soon some accident might have happened.

I desire that the military operations should be left entirely in my charge, because, being at the scene of action I can judge exactly of the opportunity to act and the fitness of operations.

Your Excellency suggests many things to me which a knowledge of the relative positions of places, their resources and the distance between them will justify me in declaring impracticable and ruinous.

No one feels more the want of communication than myself, and I have proceeded to overcome this difficulty, to clear the Tortuga road, leading from Tortuga on the south shore of the lake to the interior of Costa Rica.

Your Excellency knows already that the attack on Punta de Castillo (Punta Arenas), without counting beforehand on the good-will of England (*beneficencia de Inglaterra*) and without sending a force independent of that which garrisons our military posts, is impossible.

No steamer can be kept stationed at Sarapiquí, because the Morgan, the only one left fit for use, is in continual movement between this point and Castillo. I would hold Trinidad with supplies wherever it is in my power but it is very difficult. I think great efforts ought to be made to repair the road to Trinidad. The best route during the summer is that of Tortuga, and the best way to finish all these difficulties is to send me at once 600 or 800 picked men and plenty of ammunition. Your obedient servant,
JOSE J. MORA.

[No. IV.]

LETTER TO CAPT. ERSKINE, OF H. B. M. SHIP ORION
(REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION TO THE MINISTER OF WAR)

HEADQUARTERS FORT SAN CARLOS, Feb. 8, 1857.
TO THE CHIEF OFFICER OF HER BRITISH MAJESTY'S SQUADRON, PORT OF GREYTOWN.—My Dear Sir: I have just learned with much surprise that the fortified post of Trinidad, at the junction of Sarapiquí and San Juan, has been attacked by a strong party of filibusters on a steamer fitted out at Greytown, and that they have been driven back with loss, doing no damage to the Costa Rican forces. I cannot but express my surprise that a band of pirates could have been fitted out and organized, under the very eyes of her British Majesty's squadron, when by your recent communication you manifested to me your determination to interfere, so as to avoid a conflict in those waters; for which reason I did not proceed to destroy the steamer, and drew off the force that had been detailed for this object.

The desire of the Government of Costa Rica—being the same with that of your Government—is that the question of territorial rights may be amicably settled, and in a diplomatic way; but I shall find myself under the necessity of carrying the war even to that point, if in future it be permitted that a neutral or disputed territory should continue to be the place at which our enemies assemble and enlist; and I beg to announce to you that those individuals (referring to Walker's officers and others who were taken on the steamer San Carlos on the 31 of January), who on a former occasion received every consideration, and who have now again taken up arms against us, shall be treated in future in a manner quite different.

I have the honor to inform you that I have under my command on the river a sufficient force to take the offensive, and I am very well furnished at various points; consequently, under no pretence whatsoever will I lose any one of them nor can I consent that a band of pirates shall exist in the vicinity of Greytown. I am therefore obliged to blockade the river indefinitely, to the prejudice of commercial interests.

I have received communication from my Government, offering a free pass to the officers of your squadron to navigate the river, either for amusement or business purposes; and I have given orders to this effect to the commanders of the military posts.

JOSE J. MORA.

INVENTORY OF WALKER'S ARMY.

Gen. Walker has officially set forth the following statement of his force:

Original number enlisted—men	2,777
Total officers and men	2,778
Deaths—men	238
Total officers and men	2,540
Killed in action—men	115
Total officers and men	2,425
Discharged—men	2
Total officers and men	2,423
Dropped as sick from the rolls	181
Total officers and men	2,242
Remains—men	253
Total officers and men	741
Unaccounted for	141

To the number listed, as herein stated, are to be added about 100, who joined singly, recruited, and others employed in the different departments of the army.

Of the 141 unaccounted for, about 70 should be added to the killed.

PRESENT FORCE OF COLONEL LOCKRIDGE.

A letter dated March 7, says:

"The Tennessee has not brought any filibusters. They must have found out that such a course here from New-York is not worth the trouble of bringing. Since the river was shut up, in three trips the Tennessee has brought fifty men for Walker. The Texas has brought four hundred and fifty in the same time. Five hundred and forty, then, are all that have been under Lockridge's command. It is a matter's estimate that one hundred and fifty have deserted, perhaps twenty five have been killed, and we have three hundred and sixty-five men, his whole present force."

CHARACTER OF THE MEN.

Most of the men attached to Col. Lockridge's command are men of drunken and dissolute habits. Whenever they come down the river the peace of Greytown is disturbed by them. Punta Arenas has no liquor for them; therefore Greytown always has the benefit of their presence. As they all swear-drivers and knaves, they are by no means agreeable visitors when drunk. Human life is always held cheap in their estimation, and when deprived of reason they are very dangerous neighbors. Had their habits been different, they would undoubtedly have effected much more than they have upon the river; but their drunkenness and want of character have evaded constant insubordination. Little work is accomplished—the men openly refusing to labor when they feel disinclined—and desertions are taking place almost daily. These the English are always ready to encourage. Capt. Coburn, of the Gosack, never fails to board Lockridge's steamer when she comes down the river, and repeat his offer of protection to any who wish to leave Walker's service. The deserters are boarded at this place until the next English mail steamer comes, when they are taken off. The steamer Clyde, which sails for Aspinwall the day after to-morrow has 23 of them to carry away.

NEW-YORK FILLIBUSTERS IN A ROW.

Capt. Farum and Col. Hall came down on the 3d in the steamer with Col. Lockridge and Col. Titus. Farum and Hall have been at Greytown ever since. Their conduct has been outrageous. On the first day they were in the streets in a state of intoxication. Farum with a club attempted to prevent any one from passing, and very soon there was a general melee in which three excellent gentlemen (I) were engaged with Jamaica negroes and natives of the place. There were a few foreign heads, but nothing more serious. Mr. Martin, the Mayor of Greytown, hearing the noise, came out; and thrust himself into the affray, he was knocked down. Finding it would be difficult to restore quiet with any force at his command, he sent a request to one of the English vessels for a file of marines to restore order. The marines were promptly sent, and remained at Greytown till all was quiet and everybody had gone to bed, when they returned on board their ship.

NICARAGUA.

Correspondence of THE N. Y. TRIBUNE.

ASPINWALL, March 9, 1857.

The arrival of the Tennessee from Greytown, and of the Sierra Nevada at Panama from San Juan del Sur, has brought further intelligence of the operations of the filibusters on either side of the lake. Among the passengers by the Tennessee was Col. Titus, and a number of deserters from the filibuster ranks on the San Juan River.

The statements in relation to the progress of the filibusters on the San Juan are conflicting; but I have sufficient reliable information to justify the following: About the time that the little steamer Bulwer was fitted up by Morgan's agents at Punta Arenas, to convey the recruits up the San Juan, a strong feeling of jealousy arose between the three leading officers, Col. Frank Anderson, Col. Lockridge and Col. George B. Hall, as to which of the three should have command, and Titus also considered he had an equal right to the position of commanding officer.

The first accounts of the capture of Sarapiquí enlarged upon as a great victory. It seems that the Costa Ricans had suffered much from the yellow fever and cholera at Sarapiquí, so that their number at the time of the attack was much reduced. Finding that the force of the filibusters was much larger than their own, the Costa Ricans dismantled their cannon and threw them into the river at night, and retreated in a perfectly orderly manner, leaving behind them, instead of 350 milder muskets, only a dozen or so of old English muskets, of no value whatever. Titus was then detailed to make the attack on Castillo, taking with him 300 men. From all I can learn, the attack on Castillo was invited, and though there was only a force of 150 men in the fort, yet Gen. Mora was at hand with several hundred troops, and when Titus began the attack he found himself encountering a superior force.

His own statement is that after making three unsuccessful attempts to take the fort he found that to continue the attack was only to recklessly sacrifice his men—thirty of whom were already killed and twenty wounded—one-sixth of his force. The gunnery of the Costa Ricans was skillful and expert. But the capture of Castillo would have given the filibusters no practical advantage; indeed it would have drawn off a hundred or two of their force from active service in the field to garrison the fort. The only possible means of reaching Fort San Carlos, should they capture Castillo, is by the river, and as the Costa Ricans have possession of all the steamers above the rapids they have no possible means of going above that point—the only line in the year when a vessel drawing eighteen inches of water can ascend the rapids, being during the July freshet; but with San Carlos in their power, the filibusters are still 80 miles from Walker, across the lake, with no means of reaching him; and then to retain possession of the river will require at least a thousand men, which is more than double the number of Walker's entire force on the Isthmus; so far as I can learn, only seventy-five men came in the Sierra Nevada from San Francisco, six of whom concealed themselves in the hold of the vessel at San Juan del Sur, and did not come ashore. The sixty-nine were received by forty of Walker's Rangers, and the whole body marched off immediately toward Rivas with sixty mules, but falling in with a foraging party of Costa Ricans, they were dispersed, and a portion of them came back to San Juan del Sur before the Sierra Nevada left. Several of the passengers on the Sierra Nevada had made statements of a battle at Rivas the day before the steamer left. On inquiry I learned that the only foundation for the story was the alleged arrival of a native boy at San Juan del Sur on the morning of the 6th with that intelligence. No one else credits the information in the least. At the time the steamer left, the firing of cannon was distinctly heard in the direction of Rivas, and it is quite probable that a decisive battle was being fought at that time.