THE MAGNETISM OF MIAMI: SEGMENTED PATHS IN CUBAN MIGRATION*

KEVIN E. McHUGH, INES M. MIYARES, and EMILY H. SKOP

ABSTRACT. Miami is the primate city in a system of urban settlements that make up a Cuban ethnic archipelago in the United States. The city is also a national magnet, attracting Cuban migrants from metropolitan regions across the archipelago. Four large secondary cores of Cubans outside Florida serve as major “feeders” to the Miami enclave: northern New Jersey, New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Currents of migration to Miami are especially strong among older, foreign-born, and disadvantaged Cubans, an indication of segmented paths in Cuban assimilation. Although concentration in Metropolitan Miami has been the Cuban story over the past three decades, processes of deconcentration now may well be under way. Keywords: Cubans, ethnic archipelago, Miami, migration, segmented assimilation.

Here in Miami, Cuba both lives and is reborn every day, just like the sun, in its exiled children.

—René Silva, quoted in David Rieff, The Exile, 1993

The Cubanization of Miami is a dramatic contemporary story in metropolitan America. Cuban refugees have played a major role in transforming Miami from a medium-sized city dominated by tourism into a thriving, throbbing metropolis, the “Capital of the Caribbean” (Grenier and Stepick 1992; Portes and Stepich 1993; Boswell 1994a, 1994b). The economic potency of Miami Cubans and their political clout at the local and national levels have received considerable attention (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Portes and Bach 1985; Perez 1992; Portes and Stepich 1993; Masud-Piloto 1996). Although the literature on waves of Cuban exiles to South Florida is robust, Cuban migration within the United States has received scant attention, especially from a national, geographical perspective (Boswell 1984; Boswell and Curtis 1984).

Two key ideas inform our examination of Cuban migration in the United States. First, the Cuban settlement system should be viewed as an ethnic archipelago, a network of urban clusters anchored by Miami. The archipelago metaphor emphasizes ethnic concentrations connected by flows of information and people rather than functioning as isolated islands (Conzen 1990, 1993). In this article we focus on the geography of migration flows to Miami, the “Big Island” in the Cuban archipelago.

Second, we embrace the concept of segmented paths in the adaptation of immigrants (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). The segmented-assimilation framework of Alejandro Portes can be extended by isolating patterns in the geography and selectivity of Cuban migration. Accordingly, we assess the geographical currents of movement to Miami by birth-

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place, age, level of education, and poverty status. Complexities emerge in Cuban migration, settlement, and adaptation.

We begin by positing that the geography of migration represents a useful lens for exploring segmented paths of assimilation among Cubans. We then describe the Cuban ethnic archipelago and the magnetism of Miami, suggested by interregional migration flows and rates. Third, we reveal segmented paths in terms of selectivities in Cuban migration to Miami from elsewhere in the archipelago. We conclude with a discussion of migration and the evolution of the Cuban settlement system in the United States.

**Segmented-Assimilation Theory and Migration**

The historical view of assimilation in the United States as a linear process of conversion from foreigner to American has been under siege for three decades (Salvaterra 1994). Ambiguity is an apt descriptor for today’s writing and thinking about immigrants and ethnicity. Portes and his colleagues have successfully brought some order to this haze in the arena of economic adaptation of immigrants. Termed “segmented-assimilation theory,” this body of work accounts for diverse trajectories in “making it” in the United States (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Portes 1996).

A basic argument is that three major factors affect the economic incorporation of immigrants: the nature of the migration; the resources that immigrants bring with them; and the contexts of reception in the host country. The first factor involves whether immigrant flows are voluntary or forced; refugee groups, for example, often fall into the latter category. This influences policies and the degree of acceptance by receiving governments and shapes possibilities for return. The second deals with the kind and magnitude of immigrants’ capital endowments and skills. Policies of the receiving government, labor-market conditions, and solidarity of the ethnic community are three critical elements that define contexts of reception for immigrant groups.

This framework has been used to highlight differences in the economic fortunes and paths of immigrants who are defined by their national origin. The common approach has presented typologies that distinguish advantaged immigrant groups—Cuban and Vietnamese refugees—from groups that face greater obstacles and handicaps—Mexicans and Haitians (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). The framework is also used to explore paths of assimilation among children of immigrants who make up the “new” second generation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Portes 1996).

Variation within immigrant groups has received less attention from a segmented-assimilation perspective. Cubans as a whole have been shown to be an advantaged group, a success story in American immigration. Much has been written about the economic power of the Miami enclave, the result of an admixture of the entrepreneurial and professional skills of early Cuban émigrés, access to capital, hard work, and a positive reception and assistance by the U.S. government, owing
especially to the pivotal position of Cuban exiles during the cold war (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes 1987; Perez 1992; Portes and Stepick 1993). The first waves of Cuban refugees, the so-called Golden Exiles of the early 1960s, set a course for economic success based on serving their own ethnic community and, by extension, the larger population of Miami and beyond. This eased the absorption and accommodation of subsequent, less highly selected waves of Cuban refugees, including the large influx of émigrés during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift (Bach 1987; Larzelere 1988) and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE COHORT</th>
<th>IN MIAMI</th>
<th>OUTSIDE MIAMI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–19</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>20–29</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–69</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70–79</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993.*

flow of *balseros* (rafters) who fled to the United States in the early 1990s (Ackerman and Clark 1995).

Although hefty doses of economic, political, and social capital underlie the Cuban success story, Alex Stepick and Guillermo Grenier point out that “not all Cubans are rich and powerful businessmen” (1993, 82). In fact, a large proportion of Cubans are in the working class, and many within the Cuban community are poor. Poverty picks up among children and especially older Cubans, who post high poverty rates both in and outside Miami (Table I). Poverty among Cubans may be low overall, but not without paradoxical side effects: “Poverty within the Cuban community is less widespread than in other U.S. Latin communities because economic success is more common and because family networks are capable of assisting those in need. But when these resources are insufficient, those in need are less willing to seek assistance and the community is less willing to recognize and publicly address the problems of poverty within it” (Stepick and Grenier 1993, 94).

Segmented paths in assimilation are found in immigrant communities, including such successful groups as Cubans. Our central thesis is that the geography of migration and settlement is an especially refined lens for viewing pathways of adaptation and adjustment among Cubans. Drawing on this notion are six propositions regarding the Cuban migration system:

- Miami should dominate the system, attracting migrants from throughout the United States. Strong ethnic and familial networks act as “umbilical” connec-
tions, linking U.S. Cubans to Miami, the Cuban capital in the United States and now home to just over one-half of all U.S. Cubans. Cubans have become increasingly concentrated in Metropolitan Miami (Boswell 1994b, 14), yet neither the velocity nor the geography of Cuban migration to Miami from elsewhere in the United States has been examined.

- The volume and rate of migration to Miami should be especially high from secondary cores of Cuban settlement outside Florida. Four secondary urban cores stand out in terms of size: a northern New Jersey core centered in Hudson, Union, and Essex Counties; New York City; Los Angeles; and Chicago. These urban cores received Cuban refugees who were resettled under the auspices of the Cuban Refugee Program. Created in 1961 under the direction of President John F. Kennedy, the program included an ambitious effort to relocate Cuban refugees away from Miami and South Florida (Boswell and Curtis 1984; Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Perez 1992).

- Suburban flows should define the area surrounding Dade County and the largest secondary cores outside Florida (northern New Jersey, New York City, and Los Angeles). Young adults and children should be numerous in the suburban flows, representing the leading edge of Cubans who are dispersing away from core settlements.

- Nearly three-fourths (72.5 percent) of Cubans who were enumerated in the 1990 U.S. Census of Population were foreign-born, owing to the recency of large waves of refugees coupled with a low birthrate (Boswell 1994b, 16). We expect Miami, as the primate Cuban metropolis in America, to serve as a stronger lure for Cuban natives than for Cubans born in the United States. With hopes for return to Cuba repeatedly dashed over the years, Miami is the “homeland in absentia” among Cuban expatriates (Boswell 1993).

- Rates of migration to Miami are expected to vary by age and are likely to be greatest among older Cubans. Miami is an especially attractive retirement mecca for cultural and climatic reasons. Also, the higher incidence of poverty among older Cubans should feed Miami-bound flows. An elevated rate of migration among the elderly to Miami is expected to be most evident from northern urban centers.

- Currents of movement to Miami should be strongest among disadvantaged Cubans, as indicated by educational levels and poverty status. Thomas Boswell and Emily Skop argue that concentration in Miami provides a cushion for poorer Cubans who may otherwise have a difficult time adjusting to life in the United States (1995). This proposition for Cubans runs counter to conventional wisdom that people migrate from positions of economic strength, such that migration rates typically rise with levels of education and income (Long 1988).

**The Cuban Ethnic Archipelago**

The Cuban ethnic archipelago comprises sixteen regions, each with a Cuban population of more than 5,000 in 1990. These regions, built from an analysis of county-level
data, account for 93 percent of the Cuban population in the United States. The four most populous regions can be split into an urban core and a suburban periphery: South Florida is partitioned into Miami (Dade County) and the remainder of South Florida; New Jersey is subdivided into a northern urban core and a suburban portion; New York is separated into New York City and the surrounding suburban ring; and Southern California comprises Los Angeles County and the remainder of Southern California. The result is an archipelago of twenty geographical units (Figure 1).

The dominance of Miami in terms of Cuban population is evident on a graduated-circle map of the twenty regions that make up the archipelago (Figure 2). The 564,000 Cubans residing in Dade County in 1990 accounted for 53 percent of the total U.S. Cuban population, up from only 24 percent in 1960, 39 percent in 1970, and 50 percent in 1980 (Boswell 1994b, 14). Rather than showing the more characteristic pattern of migratory dispersal, Cubans have become increasingly concentrated in South Florida. Miami has captured the lion’s share of the 700,000-plus exiles who have flocked to the United States since Fidel Castro’s takeover in Cuba in 1959 (Masud-Piloto 1996). Surveys show that a large number of the Cuban refugees resettled outside South Florida under auspices of the Cuban Refugee Program later returned to the Miami enclave (Boswell and Curtis 1984; Perez 1992).

Outside South Florida, the largest numbers of Cubans are in Central Florida (especially Tampa), northern New Jersey (particularly the Cuban enclave in Union City
---West New York), New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Several urban centers in the United States with a Cuban presence today have a history of Cuban settlement that predates 1959. The New York region, Key West, New Orleans, and Ybor City (Tampa), in particular, had notable early Cuban communities (Perez 1992). Cuban émigrés came to the United States—at least in modest numbers—in response to numerous political upheavals and revolutionary movements in Cuba dating back to the mid-nineteenth century (Boswell and Curtis 1984; Perez 1992; Jordan 1993; Masud-Piloto 1996).

**Migration to Miami**

Patterns and rates of migration to Miami can be isolated using data from a special county-to-county migration tally prepared from the 1990 Census of Population. The count provides information on the resident population of each county in 1990, intracounty mobility, intercounty migration, and migration from abroad into each county between 1985 and 1990. Characteristics reported for the resident population and migrant types span race, Hispanic origin (including Cuban), gender, age, birthplace (U.S.-born and foreign-born), educational attainment, and poverty status.
Table II—Cuban Out-Migration Volumes and Rates by Region, Total and to Miami, 1985–1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>TOTAL OUT-MIGRATION</th>
<th>MIGRATION TO MIAMI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Rate*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey Urban Core</td>
<td>15,877</td>
<td>222.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey Suburban</td>
<td>3,888</td>
<td>225.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>12,211</td>
<td>193.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Suburban</td>
<td>3,934</td>
<td>217.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>224.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>217.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>184.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>197.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>9,066</td>
<td>182.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern California</td>
<td>2,462</td>
<td>197.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern California</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>169.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>108.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas–Fort Worth</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>196.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td>239.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>252.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>297.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Florida</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>368.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Florida</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>116.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Florida</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>123.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>21,231</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in the United States</td>
<td>12,491</td>
<td>202.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Per 1,000 Cubans living in the region in 1985 (surviving to 1990). See note 6 for an explanation of the methodology used in calculating the 1985 "at risk" population.

Two points stand out in the Cuban migration system within the United States. First, Cubans display an exceptionally high propensity to migrate (Table II). Rates of out-migration across the nineteen regions that constitute the Cuban archipelago (excluding Miami) average 207 per 1,000, ranging from a low of 108 for Las Vegas, Nevada, to 369 for North Florida. Out-migration rates are 41 percent higher for Cubans than for non-Cubans. Large waves of Cuban refugees to the United States since 1959, coupled with the resettlement efforts of the Cuban Refugee Program, have produced a highly fluid migration system.

Miami is an exception: It posts a low out-migration rate—43.6 per 1,000 (Table II). This, of course, stems from the huge Cuban presence in Dade County and is testimony to the holding power of the Cuban enclave in Miami. The tremendous disparity in migration propensity between Miami and other regions in the Cuban archipelago is reminder enough of the need to examine geographical variability in migration rates and patterns. Mary Kritz and June Noggle, for example, report overall national rates of interstate and intrastate migration between 1975 and 1980 for sixteen foreign-born groups in the United States (1994). They find that only three of the
sixteen groups post rates of migration that are lower than the rate for Cubans. But these aggregate national rates are misleading. Cubans in the huge Miami enclave rarely move elsewhere, whereas Cubans outside Miami are moving at high velocities.

A second point is that Miami does indeed command a large share of the interregional migration in the Cuban archipelago. Miami posted an in-migration of 35,776 Cubans from elsewhere in the United States between 1985 and 1990 and an out-migration of 21,231, mostly to elsewhere in Florida. Flows to and from Miami account for 52 percent of all interregional migration in the Cuban settlement system. South Florida (excluding Miami) ranks second in the archipelago, attracting 12,797 Cuban migrants and posting a comparatively low out-migration of 5,140. This reflects the growing Cuban population in Broward and Palm Beach Counties, north of Miami.

To capture the geographical variation in Miami's magnetism we present two measures for each region: The absolute number of Cubans migrating to Miami, and the migration rate to Miami per 1,000 Cubans in each region in 1985 (Table II). Also, we map the ten largest net Cuban migration streams, demonstrating the importance of the four urban concentrations of Cubans outside Florida (northern New Jersey, New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago) as source regions for Miami-bound Cubans (Figure 3). These four urban cores alone account for 55 percent of all migration to Miami. Northern New Jersey, centered in Union City—West New York, is second to Miami in size as a Cuban enclave and is especially noteworthy as a sending region.

Of the ten largest net migration streams in the system (Figure 3), five are interregional streams from outside Florida: urban and suburban New Jersey, New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. These net streams effectively redistribute Cubans; that is, the gross flows into Dade County greatly exceed the departing streams, ranging from a ratio of 5.1 (Chicago) to 10.1 (New Jersey urban core). Ten Cubans migrated from the New Jersey urban core to Miami for every one Cuban who moved in the opposite direction—undoubtedly one of the most lopsided net streams in the entire U.S. migration system.

Cubans do indeed display substantial suburban movement around the four major urban cores: Dade County to elsewhere in South Florida, the New Jersey urban core to suburban New Jersey, New York City to suburban New York, and Los Angeles County to surrounding counties in Southern California (Figure 3). Streams from Dade to Broward and Palm Beach Counties are especially large. The Cuban redistribution from Miami to surrounding counties in South Florida is most pronounced among young adults and children (Figure 4). These suburbanward streams are tantamount to a suburban geographical extension by Miami Cubans beyond Dade County (Boswell 1994a).

**Segmented Paths of Migration**

The sheer volume of migration to Dade County suggests that Miami’s magnetism extends across diverse groups of Cubans. Assessing absolute numbers of Cubans
heading to Miami, however, can be deceiving because they do not tell the story of varying migration propensities for subgroups of Cubans defined by socioeconomic characteristics. It is important to calculate rates of migration that take into account the varying sizes of subpopulations “at risk” to migrate (Rogers 1995).

In our work with segmented-paths propositions we developed rates of migration to Miami for Cuban subgroups according to birthplace, age, level of education, and poverty status. Nine regions (outside Miami) have more than 15,000 Cubans, which ensures substantial “at risk” populations for each subgroup examined. The rates indicate the number of Cuban migrants to Miami between 1985 and 1990 per 1,000 Cubans in the specific subgroup residing in the region of origin in 1985.6

Not surprisingly, migration rates to Miami are greater for Cuban natives than for U.S.-born Cubans (Figure 5). This holds for eight of the nine regions examined; only Southern California (outside Los Angeles) registers no difference by birthplace. The highest migration rates are for native-born Cubans in the northern regions (New Jersey, New York, and Chicago) and in Los Angeles.

Although native-born Cubans show greater connectedness to Miami, even among U.S.-born Cubans migration rates to Dade County are substantial (Figure 5). The draw of Miami, in other words, extends beyond Cuban émigrés who experienced exile firsthand. This is made clear in David Rieff’s study of Miami Cubans en-
Cuban Migration between Miami and the Remainder of South Florida by Age, 1985–1990

![Graph showing migration rates between Miami and South Florida by age group from 1985 to 1990.](image)

Fig. 4—Cuban migration between Miami and the remainder of South Florida, by age, 1985–1990. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993. (Drafted by Barbara Trapido-Lurie, Arizona State University Cartography Laboratory)

Cuban Migration Rates to Miami by Region and Birthplace, 1985–1990

![Bar graph showing migration rates to Miami by region and birthplace from 1985 to 1990.](image)

Fig. 5—Cuban migration rates to Miami, by region and birthplace, 1985–1990. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993. (Drafted by Barbara Trapido-Lurie, Arizona State University Cartography Laboratory)
Cuban Migration Rates to Miami by Region and Age, 1985–1990

Fig. 6—Cuban migration rates to Miami, by region and age, 1985–1990. *Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993. (Drafted by Barbara Trapido-Lurie, Arizona State University Cartography Laboratory)

Cuban Migration Rates to Miami by Region and Educational Attainment, 1985–1990*

Fig. 7—Cuban migration rates to Miami, by region and educational attainment, 1985–1990. *Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993. (Drafted by Barbara Trapido-Lurie, Arizona State University Cartography Laboratory)

* Among Cubans aged twenty-five and older in 1990.
titled *The Exile: Cuba in the Heart of Miami* (1993). Rieff profiles Cubans who moved to Miami from elsewhere in the United States, including U.S.-born Cubans. Dario Moreno, for example, explains to Rieff: “From the moment I arrived [in Miami], I knew I had returned to the Cuba my parents had always described to me as a kid growing up in Los Angeles…. Miami is the only place where the Cuba they loved and taught me to love still exists” (p. 134).

With Florida a mecca for retirees, the cultural tug of Miami is especially strong among older Cubans. This holds for the five northern regions (urban and suburban New Jersey, New York City, suburban New York, and Chicago), where the velocity of movement to Miami is greatest among Cubans aged sixty and over (Figure 6). The Florida and California regions do not exhibit a retirement peak. The two Florida regions (South and Central) show elevated rates among young adults (aged twenty to thirty-nine), a common cohort for voluntary migration. Los Angeles displays an interesting, flat age-migration profile, suggesting that the allure of Miami is operating about equally on younger and older Cubans in Los Angeles.

Resources and skills are central in defining segmented paths of assimilation (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). This segmentation is seen in migrant selectivity. Although Miami is attracting a wide range of Cubans, currents of movement are greatest among disadvantaged groups, with the vibrant Miami enclave offering the highest levels of economic, social, and cultural support. Rates of migration to Miami by level of education (Figure 7) and poverty status (Figure 8) are consistent with the segmented-paths expectations.

Cubans with less than a high-school education display the highest rate of migration to Miami for six of the nine regions: urban and suburban New Jersey, New York City, suburban New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles (Figure 7). The three largest urban concentrations of Cubans outside Florida—urban New Jersey, New York City, and Los Angeles—show a decline in migration with each rise in level of education. Nearby South Florida is the only region that shows an obvious rise in movement to Miami at higher levels of education. Central Florida and Southern California (excluding Los Angeles) show no clear trends; rates fluctuate modestly by level of education.

For all nine regions, the lure of Miami is greater for impoverished Cubans than for those who are better off (Figure 8). The group that posts the highest rate of movement to Miami in our study, an amazing 200 per 1,000, is Cubans living in poverty in the New Jersey urban core. Interestingly, we see that impoverished Cubans residing in suburban New Jersey are also moving to Miami at a very high velocity (162 per 1,000), followed by Los Angeles (147 per 1,000) and Chicago (127 per 1,000).

All ages are represented in these Miami-bound streams of poor Cubans, with older Cubans accounting for substantial proportions. More than one-third of the poor Cubans migrating to Miami from the large urban centers outside Florida are at least sixty years old. Also, we suspect that Mariel refugees who were resettled outside Florida are among disadvantaged Cubans heading to the Miami enclave. Some 7,600 Marielitos were resettled in New Jersey, with New York (5,970) and California
(4,920) also serving as primary resettlement regions. These numbers, however, pale in comparison with the 69,648 Mariel refugees who were resettled in Florida, including 46,224 in the City of Miami alone and 18,765 in neighboring Hialeah (McCoy and Gonzalez 1985, 26).

**Migration and the Evolving Cuban Settlement System**

Cubans are one of the most geographically concentrated immigrant ethnic groups in the United States. Rather than impeding adjustment and acculturation, concentra-

![Cuban Migration Rates to Miami by Region and Poverty Status, 1985–1990](image)

**Fig. 8**—Cuban migration rates to Miami, by region and poverty status, 1985–1990. *Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993. (Drafted by Barbara Trapido-Lurie, Arizona State University Cartography Laboratory)

tion in Miami has facilitated the success and influence of Cubans. Indeed, rather
than assimilating in the classic sense, Miami Cubans have remade the city in their own image (Portes and Stepick 1993).

Researchers who study Cubans in the United States are understandably preoccupied with Miami. Our focus on the city's magnetism in migration is one piece of the unfolding tale of Cuban Miami, yet we explicitly recognize that nearly half the Cuban population lives outside Dade County, a fact often overlooked. To make sense of Cuban migration requires a geographical lens, a view of Miami within the Cuban ethnic archipelago. If ever there was a formula for setting into motion a fluid migration system with directed flows, the case of Cuban exiles in America is it!

What does the future hold for Cuban migration and settlement in the United States? To proclaim that Miami will remain the economic, political, and cultural capital of Cuban America is hardly to go out on a limb. The four large secondary cores of Cubans—northern New Jersey, New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles—also figure
prominently in the Cuban settlement system. These are the primary feeders to the Miami enclave, but other metropolitan regions also contribute. Although Miami-bound Cubans are large in number and diverse in resources and skills, Miami exerts the greatest gravitational pull on foreign-born, older, and disadvantaged Cubans in these secondary cores. These patterns of segmentation counter the image of Cubans in America as an undifferentiated mass rushing pell-mell to the Miami enclave.

Increased concentration in Miami has been the Cuban story of the past three decades. We suspect that the script is changing in the 1990s, however. Cuban suburbanization in Dade County has been under way for some time, and our migration data for 1985–1990 reveal the beginnings of movement to Broward and Palm Beach Counties. We also suspect that the velocity of interregional migration to Miami is slowing as Cuban exiles who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s grow old and die. And the 125,000 Mariel refugees—including those who were relocated outside South Florida—are likely to be more settled now than they were during the tumultuous 1980s. In terms of its share of the U.S. Cuban population, then, we speculate that Metropolitan Miami may have reached its zenith in the mid-1990s.

We offer these prognostications with some trepidation. The wild card in all this is uncertainty regarding the future of Cuban refugee flows and United States–Cuba relations. Will new waves of Cuban exiles come to Miami and South Florida? The number of people who fled Cuba illegally on rafts rose through the early 1990s and then exploded in August and September 1994, as Castro temporarily relaxed enforcement of a closed-border policy. During this two-month period 32,385 balseros were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard (Ackerman and Clark 1995, 22). In May 1995 the Clinton administration reversed U.S. policy by declaring that balseros would be denied entry to the United States and would be repatriated to Cuba. Does this policy change mean that Cubans are now simply another immigrant group? What are the prospects for dialogue and improved relations between the United States and Cuba? For the emergence of a new regime after Castro dies? What will happen, and how will it affect the flows of people, capital, and ideas between Cuba and the United States? The Cuban Revolution has attenuated, but not severed, long-standing ties across the Straits of Florida (Arguelles 1982; Olson and Olson 1995). Any significant change in United States–Cuba relations or refugee flows will alter the situation in Miami and reverberate across the Cuban archipelago in America.

Notes

1. We use the terms Miami and Dade County interchangeably throughout the article in referring to the Miami Metropolitan Area.

2. In this article we assess segmented paths of migration to Miami by birthplace (U.S.-born versus Cuban-born), age, educational attainment, and poverty status. In other, ongoing research we also examine how the year of immigration (a reflection of the successive waves of Cuban refugees) and race (white Cubans versus Afro-Cubans) contribute to segmented paths of migration and settlement (Skop 1997). These latter two measures are not available for Cubans in the county-to-county migration file, the primary data source for this article.

3. A list of counties that make up each region in the Cuban archipelago is available from the authors on request.
4. The special county-to-county migration tally was derived from the 1990 Census of Population 5 percent public use microdata sample. The tally was prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993).

5. A net migration stream \((N_{ij})\) is the difference between the opposing gross migration flows between regions \(i\) and \(j\) \((M_{ij} - M_{ji})\).

6. To calculate these rates, we estimated the sizes of specific Cuban subpopulations who lived in each region in 1985 and were thus "at risk" to migrate to Miami (and be enumerated in the 1990 Census of Population), as follows: We took the 1990 population of each Cuban subgroup, subtracted the number of Cubans in that subgroup who migrated to the region between 1985 and 1990, either from within the United States or from abroad, and added the number of Cubans in that subgroup who moved away from the region to another place in the United States between 1985 and 1990. In other words, we reallocated Cubans who migrated between 1985 and 1990 in order to reconstruct the 1985 regional populations.

7. We cannot confirm the number of Mariel exiles who migrated to Miami between 1985 and 1990, because year of entry to the United States is not provided in the county-to-county migration file.

8. A total of 45,575 balseros were rescued between 1991 and 1994. Of these, 16,778 entered the United States directly, and the remainder were sent to safe-haven camps at U.S. military bases in Guantánamo or Panama. Nearly all of the latter Cubans were eventually assured admission to the United States (Ackerman and Clark 1995, 21).

References


