Political practice and the rise of an ethnic enclave

The Cuban American case, 1959–1979

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To the memory of Juan de Armendi and César V. Cauce

The field of ethnic studies is undergoing an intellectual shift: from analyzing “disadvantaged minorities” in terms of their failure to develop entrepreneurial capitalism and to become “modern” in psychological orientation, toward the study of “successful enclaves” and the manner in which “traditional” norms and practices contribute to these economically vibrant, institutionally vigorous, and identity resilient communities. Enclaves share a number of economic and cultural traits that, when taken together, distinguish them from disadvantaged minority communities.¹ Enclaves turn inward for their investment capital, entrepreneurial talent, and low wage-workers rather than relying on outside sources for them. These same communities are also unique in generating within their boundaries multiple economic sectors (commercial, service, productive), and in tapping ethnic as well as non-ethnic markets. As a consequence of their spatial concentration and stability, the residents of these communities tend to build dense and durable networks that, in turn, condition their ethnic identity and solidaristic bonds. Finally, the responsiveness of enclave institutions to the needs of their local residents produces a level of self-reliance and public trust seldom found among other minority communities.² Much work remains to be done on the structural and historical formation of enclaves, but it’s clear already that these communities improve the life chances of their residents when compared to disadvantaged communities whose economic potential and cultural vitality have been sapped by dominant institutions.

One of the most animated recent debates on enclave communities has been waged over the Cuban American community and its specific mode of insertion into the United States.³ Two rival views predom-
inate. Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach, in *Latin Journey*, adopt a modified world-system perspective by claiming that Cuban migration to the United States originated as part of an international system of unequal exchange between core and periphery, and that the subsequent success of these migrants in the United States can be traced to their capacity to establish a niche outside the boundaries of the primary and secondary sectors of the U.S. economy. Cuban American entry into the U.S. economy was conditioned favorably by three factors. The first had to do with the investment capital and entrepreneurial skills brought over by the emigres from Cuba. Second, and more important, was the role of newly activated networks: “Their achievement of independent economic status was significantly determined by the early support of family and friends and by employment in Cuban-owned firms.” The third component to the insertion, what Portes and Bach call the enclave’s “organizing principle,” is ethnic solidarity that, according to them, has a narrowly self-interested, rational, and market basis: “Employers can profit from the willing self-exploitation of fellow immigrants, (but) they are also obliged to reserve for them those supervisory positions that open in their firms, to train them in trade skills, and to support their eventual move into self-employment.” The success of enclaves, according to this framework, was the result of autonomy and distance from dominant economic institutions.

Silvia Pedraza-Bailey’s *Political and Economic Migrants in America*, the other interpretation under review, also situates the rise of the Cuban American community within a global, international context although in this version inter-state, not market, rivalry plays a crucial role in the community’s subsequent success. The Cuban emigres, according to Pedraza-Bailey, fled from the island at a time when Cold War ideological struggles were at a peak, and this had profound consequences for their successful entry into the United States. Disaffected Cubans who emigrated from the island were, through their own spontaneous actions, casting a vote for the “Free World” and against the “Iron Curtain” bloc. Given the emigre’s symbolic importance, the Cuban Refugee Center, a federally subsidized assistance program, pumped 957 million dollars into the community between the years 1960 and 1975, providing the emigres with the type of cultural, human, technical, and financial capital they would later need to succeed in their new country. State managers subsequently put on display the relatively prosperous emigre community to an ideologically polarized world as a way of undermining Soviet-backed Cuba. In this account, the defiant
and symbolically charged emigres became in the United States passive beneficiaries of the East-West rivalry. According to Pedraza-Bailey, the future success of ethnic enclaves will depend partly on the state's capacity to capture and assist these communities. Minority communities, following the policy implications of Pedraza-Bailey's work, will thrive and become enclaves through insertion into the state apparatus.

The Cuban Americans, according to these rival interpretations, became incorporated into the United States either through socio-economic or statist channels. In conceptual terms, Portes and Bach attribute the success of the emigres to the centrality of economic "exploitation"; Pedraza-Bailey to the importance of state "domination." These interpretations, in spite of their fundamental theoretical divergences, converge in several important ways. First: neither author succeeds in integrating the framework's macro-context with the micro-internal developments taking place within the community. Portes and Bach's analysis of communal networks is not analytically linked to the world system, while Pedraza-Bailey's emphasis on inter-state rivalry is made at the expense of the community's internal developments. Any convincing account of the Cuban American enclave needs to integrate the macro and micro realms. Second: the interpretations under review account for the relative success of the Cuban American enclave in either strictly societal or statist terms, without ever integrating both of these important factors into a single framework. Portes and Bach focus on the societal by emphasizing solidaristic networks, while Pedraza-Bailey attributes everything to federal policy. The time has come to break with this uni-directional logic and to adopt a more relational approach, one that combines societal with state factors. Third: both authors assign "norms-ideology" a pivotal place in their explanation, but neither one succeeds in putting forth a genuinely political-discursive argument. Portes and Bach reduce the normative to the societal realm by claiming that ethnic solidarity is a reflection of narrow economic interests; Pedraza-Bailey commits the same error by making ideology an extension of the state and imbuing it with totalistic qualities. These authors, by reducing politics to either economistic calculation or state policies, fail to explore how political practice is a negotiated process among rival groups. Fourth and finally: both authors downplay the formative phase of the community, preferring, instead, to focus on the enclave's subsequent development when many of the structures were already in place and regulating the community's everyday life. Investigating the early phase of the community will enable us
to understand how politics became infused and congealed in the socioeconomic structures that today serve to organize the public life of the Cuban-American community.

My aim is to put forth a politically centered account of the rise of the Cuban-American community. In my view, the emigres entered the United States through political channels, a mode of insertion distinct from the other two (societal and statist), and fundamental for understanding Cuban-American group and identity formation.\textsuperscript{8} The rise of the Cuban-American enclave is best understood within the regional context of Caribbean geopolitics, not the world market and international superpower rivalry, and as the interplay of states and movements, not the uni-directional impact of solidaristic networks and the Cuban Refugee Center. My analyses focus on the way Caribbean Basin states contributed to the formation of a series of emigre-led militant movements but how, once established, these movements maneuvered around and through the state apparatus. The state-backed movements under review were two-sided: one turned outward toward the Caribbean Basin, the other inward toward the emerging emigre community in Miami. While these state-affiliated movements failed in their external tasks, overthrowing the Cuban revolutionary regime, they did succeed, nevertheless, at establishing, as an unintentional byproduct of their militancy, the material and ideational preconditions that gave rise to the enclave. Political practice bridged the external and internal to each other. Politics enabled state managers and movement militants to strike alliances across their respective organizations throughout the entire Caribbean Basin, and it also enabled each movement to lay the foundations for the community's subsequent success. Political practice, in short, arose from two places: between states and movements, and between movements and the emerging community.

A brief conceptual discussion of political practice, the interplay of discourse and power, may clarify matters.\textsuperscript{9} The discursive or, to use plain English, the circulation of words, brings together persons occupying multiple and disparate sites in the socio-institutional structure and organizes them into cohesive, stable groups, by infusing them with a common vocabulary, a unified set of interests, and a collective identity. Power, on the other hand, flows from different places and takes on varying characteristics – economic, coercive, and organizational, to mention three common ones. Discourses become credible only to the extent that they have been infused with power. And yet, the control over power resources is by itself inadequate. Access to power, after all,
does not lead automatically to the formation of collective interests and identities, nor to the creation of institutions and structures. Power will remain impotent unless it is also infused with discourse. The discursive is both what organizes the various lateral struggles underway for different sources of power and, as well, is itself a source of power. For example, within the geopolitical region and the city of Miami there circulated various discourses—centrist, leftist, and rightist. There existed, as well, multiple sources of power—coercive, economic, and organizational. But in the end, the discourses that shaped the community's structures were those that interlocked with power. Undergirding this alternate framework, then, is my single-minded concern with "contested representation," the central problem of politics. The veil of political practice drapes over the Cuban American enclave, exerting on it as much influence as visible networks and state aid do.

Data for my essay came from primary sources, including interviews with ex-militants and ex-terrorists, declassified government documents, unpublished material from the personal archives of emigres, and newspaper articles from the Cuban and Anglo press. This article has three parts: Activation—1959 to 1964: Deactivation—1965 to 1979, and a Summary. The first two sections review the changing conditions within the geopolitical region, the socio-historical developments within the community, and the links between the two. The Summary brings together my findings, and puts forth some claims about the primacy of politics in the construction of the Cuban enclave.

**Activation: 1959—1964**

*Caribbean geopolitics*

Leading scholars of Caribbean geopolitics, the global context for this case study, have argued that the region's "Post-Colonial Order" represents "a return to what were in the earlier centuries of colonial rule the two hallmarks of Caribbean history: social revolt from within and sustained international competition from without." The Post-Colonial Order came into existence soon after World War II at the height of the Cold War. The United States and, to a much lesser extent, England, the dominant powers in the region, disbanded any locally organized attempt in the direction of nationalism, populism, or socialism, which could serve their state-socialist adversaries as entry points into the region.
The Post-Colonial Order left the Caribbean island-states with two sources of power capability: geopolitical and domestic. Prior to the Cuban revolution, power resided mostly in the geopolitical arena. Authoritarian regimes, for example, because they guaranteed domestic security and excluded non-western powers from the region, enjoyed the support of the geopolitical system while lacking it from their own citizenry. In contrast, nationalist and populist regimes, in spite of their widely acclaimed redistributive policies, were sometimes unable to muster domestic support. The middle and underclasses of these countries, when confronted with the prospect of disturbing the regional balance of power, remained relatively quiescent for fear of punitive economic measures, political reprisals, or military invasions. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 cracked the Post-Colonial Order, signalling the resurgence of radical nationalism and the Caribbean's reintegration into world politics. The revolution, because of its nationalist and populist orientation, had the support of broad sectors of the Cuban population; but the new regime demanded from them an acceptance of political centralization and social reform. Between 1959 and 1964, the Cuban people, when confronted with this choice, expressed their position, to paraphrase President John F. Kennedy, with their feet: some stayed as citizens and others left to become emigres.

Disaffected emigres underwent a series of changes in their identity: from citizens to exiles, and from exiles to militants. The emigres became exiles when they were made part of the symbolic struggle between the "Iron Curtain" countries and the Western "Free World." The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States, having recently processed Eastern European political exiles, came to regard disaffected Cubans as part of the Cold War migrations and granted them preferential status as political exiles. The ease with which they entered the United States influenced, in turn, the decision of many other anti-revolutionaries to leave their homeland. Once abroad, the Cubans experienced a second identity change. Anti-revolutionary Cubans who had remained in their homeland as citizens were stripped of their power and rendered relatively helpless in their antagonism toward the new regime. Those who left, however, became empowered and were transformed into militants. Contact with Caribbean Basin States hostile to Cuba's radical regime transformed the emigres into armed militants. The United States, along with various other countries from the region, having lost access to the Cuban state, activated the exiles into a series of militant movements aimed at overthrowing the radical regime and restoring the Post-Colonial Order. The
formation of these state-sponsored movements had been made possible, in part, by altering the collective identity of disaffected Cubans.

This survey has focused on the Cuban emigre’s common, collective identity, but underneath this uniformity were profound political differences. These divergences are best brought out by reviewing Table 1. The table is divided into two parts. The right portion of the table lists the three political tendencies within the exile community: Batistianist, Conservative, and Liberal.14 On the left, under the heading, “Issue,” is a list of eleven themes drawn from pre- and post-revolutionary political debates; these issues defined the parameters of political discourse within the community. A simple dichotomous response has been

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Batistianist</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Pre-Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Revolution as political reform</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Revolution as social reform</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Evaluation of the 1940 Constitution</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Assert that Castro and the 26 July movement were radical socialists and pro-Soviet from the outset</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. In favor of establishing a nationalist and populist regime after the downfall of the Revolution</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Post-Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Overthrow of the Revolution through an invasionary force</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Overthrow of the Revolution through an insurrectionary movement</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Exile army ranks to be purged of batistianos</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Exile army ranks to be purged of ex-Castroites</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Exile army ranks to be opened to all anti-Revolutionaries</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Against subordinating exile politics and militancy to U.S. foreign policy objectives</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>+</td>
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assigned to each cell as a way of indicating the movement's affirmative (+) or negative (−) position toward the issue under review.

The supporters of these political tendencies arrived in Miami at differently different times. The Batistianists fled to the United States immediately after the revolution triumphed; Cuban emigration to the United States during the latter part of 1959 is estimated at 26,000. The Conservative emigrants soon followed, entering the United States between 1960 and 1961; emigration for these years is estimated at 110,000. Most of the Liberals who left the island did so relatively late, from 1962 to 1964; emigration for these years was about 137,000. The staggered departure of these politically dissimilar groups accounts, in part, for the rise and fall of each state-sponsored movement.

*Geopolitics and state-sponsored movements*

From 1959 to 1964 the Cuban exiles, together with various Caribbean Basin states, organized a series of movements aimed at overthrowing the Cuban Revolution and reestablishing the Post-Colonial Order. In 1959, the Batistianists interlocked with the Dominican Republic; together they organized an air-borne assault on Trinidad, a city in southern Cuba. The second effort, under the joint leadership of Conservative militants and the United States, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, culminated in the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. The exile Liberals, the third movement under review, fused with the United States, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela, and tried unsuccessfully to infiltrate and lead an insurrection within Cuba in 1963. In the analysis that follows, the states and exile movements under review are decomposed into dual chambered organizations consisting of a civil wing in charge of generating political discourse, and a military wing responsible for producing coercive might. This approach will later enable me to establish which of the various bureaucratic fractions were most influential in shaping the rise of the Cuban American enclave.

The Dominican Republic, under the authoritarian rule of Rafael Trujillo, was highly centralized, with the executive-dictator controlling the state's military and civil wing. Trujillo authorized the Armed Forces of his country to collaborate with the Batistianists in undermining the Cuban Revolution and in restoring Caribbean stability. The Batistianists' military and civil wing had, in the meantime, drifted apart. The military wing advocated an invasion of Cuba, the civil wing pro-
posed a "wait and see" approach until more Caribbean states had decided in their favor. The Batista's military wing forged ties with the Dominican state and distanced themselves, for the moment, from their Miami-based civil wing.18

The pro-belligerent Batistians rallied many ex-members of Cuba's Navy and Air Force to their training camps in the western part of the Dominican Republic. By mid-1959, they had assembled a force of 2,000 men all of whom were paid by the Dominican Army.19 In the next few weeks, the "Caribbean Anti-Communist Legion," as the Dominican-backed Batistianist strike force came to be known, began mobilizing its contacts in Cuba. Between August 1959 and November 1960, the high point of Batistianist activism, there were 49 guerrilla bands engaged in sabotage in 30 municipalities in the northeastern and southwestern coastal provinces of Matanzas and Las Villas in Cuba.20 But the Batistians failed in their single-most important operation, an airborne assault of the port-city of Trinidad in the province of Las Villas. The aim of this assault was to create a provisional government in the region, enabling the Batistians then to call on the Dominican Republic for diplomatic recognition and further military support. The Cuban Armed Forces moved swiftly into these restless provinces, unearthed the Batistianist plan and captured the first planeload of men sent to "liberate" Trinidad.21 After the defeat of the Batistians, Trujillo shifted his efforts away from regional subversion in the Caribbean toward the internal unrest in his own island.

The withdrawal of Trujillo's aid shifted the focus of Batistianist activity from the Dominican Republic to Miami, signalling the decline of the military and the resurgence of the movement's civil wing. The U.S. state contributed to this shift by arresting, dispersing, and denying entry permits to some of the most visible Batistianist leaders.22 At the time, the United States was clearing the way for the Conservative exile movement already under formation in Miami. The civil wing of the Batistianist movement, the "White Rose," an association registered in the State of Florida, worked to rebuild their movement in Miami.23 They did this by unleashing a massive ideological campaign persuading local emigres of their commitment to a restoration of constitutional and civilian rule in post-revolutionary Cuba. This campaign was redefining the political practices of the Cuban exile community (see next part).

The second attempt to overthrow the Cuban Revolution was sponsored by Conservative exiles with the assistance of the United States
and, to a lesser extent, the dictatorships of Guatemala and Nicaragua. The analysis that follows will focus exclusively on the links between the U.S. state and the Conservatives. U.S. collaboration with the Conservatives began under President Dwight D. Eisenhower at a time when the C.I.A. assumed near-total responsibility for foreign policy toward the Caribbean Basin. The C.I.A. and Defense Department created a "Cuba Task Force" and began planning for a military invasion of Cuba. When President Kennedy took office, he and his New Frontier advisors rejected this plan and proposed, instead, a Cuban-led insurrection to be organized from within the island.\textsuperscript{24}

An "intense debate, ... a sharp policy dispute ... (over issues of) policy and morality..." took place within the U.S. state apparatus between Eisenhower's Old Guard in control of the military wing (Defense Department, Joints Chief of Staff, C.I.A.), and Kennedy's New Frontier staff in control of the civil wing (White House, State Department, Justice Department).\textsuperscript{25} The military justified its plans for invading Cuba in terms of hemispheric security and defense of the "Free World," while the civil wing affirmed its option for an insurrection within the island by invoking international law and the self-determination of nations. President Kennedy, unable to persuade the military wing, tried neutralizing them through an organizational maneuver. The President dissolved the "Cuba Task Force," the military wing's advisory group, and replaced it with the "Interdepartmental Task Force," an agency under the control of the civil wing.\textsuperscript{26}

The New Frontier centralized the state's administrative structure but Eisenhower's Old Guard still retained some of its power. The Old Guard continued to control the flow of military information into the state apparatus; they now insisted that the insurrectionary option could only succeed if it was fundamentally altered to incorporate their own invasionary plans.\textsuperscript{27} The Old Guard also remained strategically situated, serving as gatekeepers between the U.S. state and the exile militants. The C.I.A. field operatives in Central America continued training the militant exiles in invasionary, not insurrectionary, tactics.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, the operatives, upon hearing of the New Frontier's opposition to an invasion of the island, instructed the exile officers, in the event of a military reorganization of the state, to arrest the C.I.A. camp advisors and to proceed as planned. When the United States's civil wing expressed support for the "Cuban Revolutionary Council," the civil wing of the Conservative movement, it was doing so with the understanding that it was backing like-minded Liberals, not extreme
conservatives. In the words of Arthur M. Schlesinger, advisor to the President, “It would be foolish if the Cuban Revolutionary Council turns out to be to the right of the New Frontier.” But foolish it was. The C.I.A., entrusted by the civil wing with the task of organizing anti-revolutionary militancy, excluded the Liberals. Mr. McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to the President, in his report to the Taylor Commission, an investigation into the causes for the failed invasion, stated:

The military planners who had been given instructions by an earlier administration, became advocates, rather than impartial evaluators of problem. [sic] Moreover, I believe that many people were reticent in their representation to the President.... Mistakes were made in this operation by a lot of people whom the President had every right to trust.30

U.S. state capacity had been undermined from within.

The unified Conservative movement established its ties to the military, not civil, wing of the U.S. state. The movement's military wing was based in Guatemala and Nicaragua, countries with an interest in overthrowing the Cuban Revolution and restoring the Post-Colonial Order. In the training camps, the Conservative-C.I.A. alliance had shaped the political composition of the exile army by purging its forces. On one occasion, two hundred Liberal militants that had filtered into the camps were arrested and flown to a prison in the middle of the jungle near Petén, Guatemala. On another, Conservatives, after having gained control of most of the recruiting offices in Miami, misdirected an entire plane-load of Liberal volunteers that had slipped past them, to a farm house deep in South Florida where they were placed under house arrest.31 In the camps, the members of Operation 40, a death squad of Conservative intelligence officers, were assigned the task of executing Cuban radicals and Liberals in post-revolutionary Cuba, and organizing the island's transition to authoritarian capitalism.32 The Council's political outlook was well matched to those of its army. The head of the Council, when asked by the C.I.A. to assess the leadership of the Liberal Movement in formation, remarked, they are “too marxist ... bitterly anti-american ... totalitarian in thinking ....”33 When the council drafted its “Minimum Program” to be released immediately prior to the Bay of Pigs, Schlesinger advised them to be less pro-American and pro-business, and more nationalist and populist in their orientation.34 The Council's journal, New Cuba, during its two years of existence, expressed this same brand of extreme Conservatism that, recall, was so congruent with the views of the U.S.'s military wing.35
The high period of Conservative militancy stretched from December 1960 to May 1961. During this time, there were 74 guerrilla units engaged in sabotage activity in 37 municipalities in the provinces of Matanzas and Las Villas, the same areas of Batistiano activity. The political geography of anti-revolutionary activity in Cuba had not changed. The Conservative and Batistianist controlled areas of unrest in Cuba were identical, suggesting similar bases of support among the populace. But the single-most important Conservative-led military operation took place in April, 1961 in Girón, a strip of beach in the southwestern coastal province of Matanzas. The Conservatives' fighting force included a six-vessel navy, an air force with about an equal number of planes and an invasionary troop 2,000 strong. After two days of fierce fighting, the Cuban Armed Forces routed the exile militants. The aim of this invasionary force, as with the previous one, was to secure a beach-head in Cuba, declare a provisional government and, later, request diplomatic recognition and military aid from the United States. The Conservative movement failed in overthrowing the Cuban Revolution, but they had a profound impact on the formation of the emigre community (see next part).

In July 1962, the Liberal militant exiles came together to form the "Cuban Revolutionary Board," a unified force. The military wing (Defense Dept., C.I.A., Joint Chiefs of Staff) of the United States concurred with the Conservative movement's assessment of the "Board," considering them "... so politically to the left that they would be as dangerous to U.S. interests as Castro." The C.I.A. blocked the Board from gaining access to the U.S. state. The Board, however, maneuvered around their opposition and reached the civil wing of the U.S. state, which was now eager to assist them. Walt Rostow, chief of "Policy Planning" at the State Department, instructed the C.I.A. to develop a "track two" approach to exile militancy. The C.I.A. would retain its contact with remnants of the Conservative movement, while granting the Board military autonomy and financial independence.

The Board interlocked with the civil wing (White House, State Dept., Justice Dept.) of the U.S. state and various social democratic countries in the Caribbean Basin. Politically, the Board's "Declaration of Principles" echoed Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" and both shared an insurrectionary approach to overturning the revolution. New Frontier representatives, working on behalf of the Board, convinced like-minded social democrats in the Caribbean Basin, including Puerto Rico's Muñóz-Marín, Costa Rica's Figueres, Venezuela's Betancourt,
and the Dominican Republic's newly elected president, Bosch, to contribute to the anti-revolutionary cause that was, of course, partly a geopolitical effort. These social democrats assisted the Liberal militants by allowing them to hold rallies, collect funds and set up training camps in their countries; they also provided them with armaments and political contacts in the region.\textsuperscript{41} The New Frontier, because it could no longer rely on its own military wing, turned increasingly to the Liberals for intelligence gathering on Cuban defectors and internal conditions.\textsuperscript{42} The U.S.'s civil wing, on one occasion, sidetracked the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was already clamping down on the illegal and massive flow of armaments to the exile militants. Liberalism was now ready to make its bid for power.\textsuperscript{43}

Liberal militancy peaked after the Bay of Pigs Invasion until 1964, when it was deactivated by the United States. Beginning in June 1962, the number of guerrilla bands operating inside Cuba increased to 118 and the number of municipalities under guerrilla influence also rose to 65. Under the Liberals, the political geography of unrest changed, with the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, Camagüey, and Oriente displacing the still active provinces of Matanzas and Las Villas in the amount of yearly sabotage activity (old: 55; new: 72).\textsuperscript{44} Changes in the regional pattern of unrest had been accompanied by changes in the political outlook and composition of exile militancy. The militants had come a long way from the days of Batistianism. In May 1964, a detachment of Liberal guerrillas set out from Cayo Anguila, an island situated within Bahamian waters, to infiltrate Oriente, Cuba's eastern-most province. The Cuban government, threatened by the Board's renewed activism and plans to blow up important installations near the area of disembarkation, mobilized its Armed Forces and placed its regional militias on high alert, around the clock.\textsuperscript{45} But the Liberal infiltrators never made it into Cuban waters. The civil wing of the United States, having reviewed the changes underway in the Caribbean Basin and the ineffectiveness of a "localist" strategy for regaining control of the region, notified the British Coast Guard to deactivate the militants.\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{Movements and the rise of the enclave}

The state-sponsored movements under review were two-sided in their activity. The main aim of these movements was the overthrow of the Cuban Revolution, but as an unintentional byproduct of their mili-
tancy, they laid the foundations for the rise of the Cuban American enclave. Each of the various movements – Batistianist, Conservative, and Liberal – shaped the material and ideational preconditions that led to the rise of the Cuban American enclave. These movements transformed the emigre community into a “moral community,” one in which political convictions would play as large a role as market mechanisms in the daily affairs of its residents.

Prior to the arrival of the anti-revolutionary emigres to Miami, the Cuban community in the city was relatively small and composed of long-time residents who sympathized with the sociopolitical changes underway in the island.47 But the Batistianists soon changed the political and economic contours of the community. The first wave of exiles to arrive in Miami were the Batistianists. The members of the Old Regime fled the island before the revolutionary government had nationalized the banks and imposed a ban on exporting national currency.48 Among the Batistianists were some who brought personal savings and money embezzled from the national treasury, using it as start up capital for their small businesses in the area. Batistianist merchants, by becoming active in the local economy, spread their ideology across the community’s material structure, infusing and congealing their political preferences inside the ethnic market structure.

This network of Batistianist merchants relied on political discourse to regulate the local economy. Max Lesnik, a veteran of political struggles in the Miami community and editor of Reply, a Cuban-American tabloid, recalling this period, explained how the Batistianists instilled fear into the hearts and pockets of small merchants whose business could be ruined overnight by accusations of having been ex-supporters of the Cuban Revolution.49 These merchants were to be boycotted by the growing number of Batistianist consumers. Loyal Batistianists, on the other hand, were to be patronized by local shoppers. Examples of these ideologically tainted accusations and admonitions can be found in the form of advertisements and articles throughout the pages of Fatherland.50 By 1973, the year of Batista’s death, Hilda Inclán, the Miami Herald’s most experienced reporter on Cuban American affairs, summarized a decade of Batistianism in this way: “Batista managed to maintain a firm grip on the political thought of a great number of Cuban exiles here.”51 Batistianist political practice had seeped into the community.

The civil wing of the Batistianist movement, in the wake of its military
wing's defeat, met on four different occasions in late 1959 to breathe life into the beleaguered movement. The movement's civil wing spent its time in waiting publishing an elite journal and a mass tabloid that circulated widely in the community. These publications, aimed at reviving the old allegiances and networks among the movement's cadre, influenced the political practices of the emerging enclave. The editorial board of Cuban Institutional Defense, the Batistianist journal, declared its primary goal was to "reorient exile public opinion." The Batistianists intelligentsia published Defense on a monthly basis between the years 1959 and 1969. Circulation figures for the journal increased steadily: from 3000 in 1963, to 4,100 in 1964 and 12,500 in 1968. Defense's pattern of distribution also changed over the years. In 1964, when the journal's circulation was still relatively low, nearly 90 percent of the issues were distributed among an international audience, mostly representatives of Latin American governments, embassies, political parties, newspapers, and unions. But by 1968, when the circulation of the journal had peaked, nearly 70 percent of the total number of issues were sent to Cuban emigres in the Miami community. The journal reached mostly the hands of Batistianist militants and sympathizers, who relied on the publication to renew their old political identities and bonds. The circulation of Batistianism among this elite reactivated old allegiances and networks; these were put to work for different aims within the emerging emigre enclave. The journal enabled Batistianist militants to reestablish contact with each other and to rely on their solidaristic ties to advance their own businesses.

Like the journal Defense, the mass tabloid Fatherland worked to transform Batistianism from a threadbare defense of corruption and privilege into a visionary ideology. In the words of Mr. Eduardo Montaner, Fatherland's oracular editor, "Time and Fidel have proven our case, thereby undermining the position of those over there (Cuba) and here (Miami) who did not listen to us. Fatherland does not lie. It said that Fidel Castro was a communist and that his regime was a soviet type of barbarism, and now he himself has confessed to these very charges." Fatherland, with a circulation of 30,000, had mass appeal; it was freely distributed in the small Cuban-owned business – barbershops and beauty shops, restaurants and bakeries, drug stores and neighborhood markets – that were mushrooming along the little Havana section of Miami. Fierce anti-communism as filtered through the pages of Defense and Fatherland was rapidly seeping into the local political discourse, and becoming an important source of economic activity and moral cohesion.
The Conservatives, like the Batistianists before them, shaped the moral and material foundations of Miami's Cuban emigre community. Scholars agree that the success of the emigres is based, in part, on the human and financial capital they brought from Cuba, but most prefer to emphasize the process of insertion into the United States. Many early emigres were not awash in money, nor endowed with superior entrepreneurial skills. Soon after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, the government nationalized banks, passed a series of laws restricting access to private savings and checking accounts, and imposed harsh penalties on those caught smuggling national currency out of the country. And, because early emigres were under the mistaken belief that the revolution would soon be defeated, the wealthy hesitated to reconvert their immovable wealth to liquid assets. Human capital among the early emigres was, indeed, relatively high: thirty-seven percent were proprietors, managers, or professionals. But these figures tell only part of the story. The urban middle classes of Cuba, like those of other Latin American countries, were disproportionately engaged in white-collar jobs, as bureaucrats in Cuba's bloated public sector, as lawyers, accountants, and notary publics for one of the many U.S. or local corporations in the island, or as doctors. The professionals and managers on the list did not possess the type of skills that can be translated easily into the kinds of attributes necessary for entrepreneurial success. In any event, "social class is a place in one society which is not necessarily transferrable to another society." If the emigres were able to exchange their elite backgrounds for entrepreneurial currency in the United States, it was because of their political insertion into their new country.

The Conservative-C.I.A. coalition transformed the city of Miami into the largest C.I.A. field station in the world outside of Langley, Virginia, with a yearly budget of 100 million dollars, a staff of 300 U.S. agents, the employment of about 5,000 emigres and the establishment of 50 or more proprietary fronts. In fact, the C.I.A. had become the largest employer in the South Florida area. The C.I.A., through its ties with the exiled Conservatives, provided them with large quantities of explosives, ammunition, and hundreds of tons in heavy and light weaponry, which they, in turn, would sometimes sell for a profit. By 1967, prior to the return to Miami of those emigres who had travelled to the industrial north to gather investment capital, there were already 919 small, Cuban-owned businesses in the area. The Batistianist and Conservative presence in the local economy contributed greatly to the establishment of these small firms. In doing so, they were creating a local
economy in which political ideology was as important as supply and demand.

The Conservative movement contributed to the creation of the militant-entrepreneur. Conservative militants, by misappropriating C.I.A. supplies and funds, gathered enough capital to establish informal credit networks among themselves. These networks were made possible through the political affinities and organizational ties that bonded Conservative militants to each other, and that were solidified by the experience of war. Misappropriating C.I.A. equipment and funds had other repercussions. Militants who lacked entrepreneurial experience were provided with the rare opportunity of learning the art of buying and selling without risking loss of their own savings. Conservative militants and sympathizers on the C.I.A. payroll and on federal assistance from the Cuban Refugee Center were able to save a portion of their salary and stipend for future investment opportunities. The Conservatives, following Weber's well-known distinction, had transformed booty into entrepreneurial capitalism, a truly rare historical event.

The Conservatives' civil wing shaped mass political discourse in Miami through the *Diario de las Américas*, a daily whose local circulation in 1968 was estimated at 30,000. The Conservatives' civil wing placed some of its most distinguished ideologues on the *Diario*'s editorial and news staff. Theodore Draper, a journalist who had covered the Cuban beat for over a decade, described one of the *Diario*'s new, Conservative writers as "fanatically illiberal," and his defunct newspaper as "organ of the most reactionary circles in Cuban life," and a living symbol "associated in the minds of most Cubans with dictatorships of the right." The "Foreign Publications Company," a C.I.A. front organization, made available to the *Diario* undetermined sums of money in the form of advertisements, thereby keeping the Conservative cause alive in the community even after their defeat at the Bay of Pigs.

The *Diario* had a profound impact on the political contours of the emigre community. The community, in the wake of the tragic invasion, was demoralized and bewildered. Scores of exile families gathered communally to pray and mourn for their dead; countless grieved for their relatives and friends who had remained in Cuba and would never be seen again; and all lamented the loss of their homeland to revolutionaries. The Conservative publicists provided this disarrayed community with firm moral and political guidance. They attributed the community's woes to the Liberalism of the New Frontier, which had
forsaken the exiles by not providing them with the military support they had promised. The Conservatives, by projecting responsibility on "outsiders," preserved their own moral coherence and political credibility within the community. Gradually, the Conservatives began berating the "Anglo foreigners," and revising their pre-revolutionary discourse. Conservatives had been "pro-American" in Cuba; after the invasion they drew a wedge between themselves and their one-time geopolitical backers, and identified themselves as anti-Anglo and pro-community. Relations between Anglos and Cuban emigres went from friendly to adversarial.

The Conservatives, by infusing the emerging enclave with an "us" versus "them" mentality, established the preconditions necessary for ethnic communitarianism. These differences were further reinforced and intensified by the contiguous nature of group boundaries between Anglos and Cubans cohabitating in the Miami area. Close proximity between these two rivals led to mutual antagonism and this, in turn, crystallized further their differences in identity and loyalties and led to the creation of sturdy ethnic boundaries. The enclave's current cohesiveness and resilient identity is not, as some claim, the expression of some deep, mystical, primordial, nationalist sentiment rooted in pre-revolutionary Cuba (geopolitics, recall, had undermined nationalism) nor the mere manifestation of ethnic prejudice against Cuban-Americans; its sources are to be located in the moral-political discourse circulated by the militant exiled Conservatives.

Liberal militancy, because of its anti-revolutionary strategy, projected itself outward, away from the emigre community, and, consequently, had little impact on its subsequent development. The Liberals, as guerrilla infiltrators, did not stock the type or quantity of military hardware that had been made available to the community through the Conservatives. Moreover, Liberal discursive capacity was directed primarily at members of their underground movement in Cuba, and at sympathetic, social-democratic readers in countries bordering on the Caribbean. The Liberals flooded the island's clandestine movement with their journal, Liborio, and circulated Bohemia Libre, a weekly pro-Liberal magazine that was published by the emigres from New York and Venezuela, primarily outside of Miami. Furthermore, many of the key Liberal figures, having already established ties with various Caribbean leaders, later activated these same networks with the aim of reestablishing their professional careers outside of Miami, thereby further draining the community of their discourse. The Board's civil wing also
made their views known to an English-speaking circle of like-minded persons. In preparation for the insurrection, the Board provided U.S. liberals with a coherent anti-conservative solution to Cuba by publishing a series of articles in the New Republic, a major newsmagazine, and in the Cambridge Opinion, a Cambridge University publication; they debated widely against sympathizers of the revolution in public forums; and they maintained a visible presence in the corridors of power in the U.S. Congress. Unlike the Batistianist and Conservative movement, the Liberals failed to introduce their brand of discourse in the community, nor were they able to establish local sources of power. The “product cycle” of Liberal militancy contributed, unintentionally, to the disorganization of emigre Liberalism.

The decline of Liberalism within the community occurred in two stages. Conservatives initiated an anti-Liberal campaign after the U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs Invasion failed. Liberalism now became identified as a “foreign” mode of thinking. After the invasion, Liberalism was deprived of its external sources of support and could no longer invoke a cosmopolitan political heritage to sustain its credibility within the community. Emigres could no longer rely on a Liberal vocabulary and language to converse among themselves or with the outside world. During this initial stage, however, Liberalism still had local roots. Indeed, the Liberals were about to launch an insurrection from within Cuba and to regain the homeland. For the militant community, patriotism superseded partisanship. The failure of the Board to overthrow the revolutionary regime initiated the final stage in the demise of Liberalism. The Batistianists and Conservatives unleashed a massive campaign branding Liberalism as “Fidelism without Fidel,” a mode of thinking similar to that of the “enemy.” Both were totalitarian and extremist, they claimed; both were the cause of Soviet-backed Communism in Cuba; both had led to the death of scores of emigres; and, both were responsible for loss of the homeland. For the community, the political “enemy” was in Cuba as well as among their ranks. The Liberals, because they had not circulated their views and because they had failed to gain access to local sources of power, appealed unsuccessfully to the Attorney General to restrain the local press. Ironically, the triumph of emigre Liberalism, with its characteristic tendency toward rational, self-interested calculation, its unswerving commitment to “abstract, universal” equality, and its anti-communal and pro-integrationist tendency would have, in all likelihood, eroded the material and ideational preconditions that made the enclave possible.
Deactivation

Geopolitics

The Cuban Revolution had begun as a domestic movement aimed at transforming the island's sociopolitical situation but, given the nature of the Post Colonial Order, these modest ambitions were soon transformed into the "greatest single confrontation of East and West since 1945: the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962." This escalation proceeded in steps. States and exile movements initially pursued a "local" strategy for overthrowing the Cuban Revolution and reestablishing geopolitical order by creating state-sponsored movement. Failure on the part of these movements to achieve their goals set the stage for a more global solution to the conflict. While the U.S. now threatened Cuba with nuclear war (Cuban Missile Crisis), diplomatic sanctions (expulsion from the O.A.S.) and an economic embargo of the island (Blockade), Cuba was returning the challenge by building military and economic ties to the U.S.S.R., and by "exporting" revolutions to the rest of Latin America at a time when the United States was militarily committed to Indochina. The two countries, by mirroring each other's tactical maneuvers, became locked in an upward spiral movement. Exile militants would play no role in this global confrontation.

U.S. policy proved relatively successful in defusing exile militancy and ushering in a period of relative stability to the Cuban American community. The United States deactivated the community by cutting off aid to the various movements, patrolling its territorial waters, drafting many of the exiled militants into the U.S. army, and pumping massive amounts of federal aid to the exile community. The emigres, too, were ready to forsake their tenuous identity as political exiles for a more durable one of a hyphenated-American. Some ex-militants, however, defied U.S. directives to demobilize the community and rejected the identity change. These persons refused the officially imposed identity of immigrant minority and, instead of turning into naturalized citizens and civilians, they turned into terrorists in a last desperate attempt to destabilize the Cuban Revolution. Manuel Santana, head of the "northern zone" for the "Cuban Nationalist Movement," a well-known terrorist organization linked to the Letelier-Moffitt murder in Washington D.C. in 1976, summarized this rejection in the following manner: "...we used to be called Freedom Fighters. Now we're called terrorists. The only difference is that American policy has changed. We do not have the C.I.A. behind us anymore." Terrorists came to perceive them-
selves as having no obligations to U.S. law, even though some of them had become naturalized citizens in order to travel more freely to their bombing assignments.

*Geopolitics and terrorism*

Long-time analysts of international terrorism have claimed that “The Cuban refugee network (has been) the most important ... terror network operating anywhere during the past decade.”78 The F.B.I. considers them the “most dangerous terrorist organization in the U.S.”79 The entire Terrorist movement numbers 200 activists, is composed of a handful of groups and is divided into a civil and military wing.80 In the words of a terrorist, “We have a board of advisors that we keep secret – doctors, engineers, economists, philosophers, professors from university – and these are the people who give us ideas.”81 The movement is loosely structured, with each group exerting considerable autonomy over its own affairs; a terrorist spokesman expressed it this way, once a “general strategy is agreed upon, each group, or cells within the groups are free to mount their own attacks.”82 Given this type of structure, the terrorists can respond flexibly to changing conditions. When terrorist activity is high or when federal authorities are hot in pursuit, the autonomy between and within each group increases. This distance serves to protect each wing from the other, and both from the federal government. When bombing is on the decline or when federal investigations are at a lull, then the civil and military wing of the various movements renew contact, and the entire movement comes closer together.

The history of Cuban-American Terrorism has been intimately associated to geopolitical events in the Caribbean Basin.83 In 1964, with the U.S. encapsulation of Cuba and the deactivation of the exile militants, Felipe Rivero and Ignacio Novo, veterans of the invasion, organized the Cuban Nationalist Movement (M.N.C.) to carry out acts of sabotage within the island. Three years later, the M.N.C. released its influential manifesto, “War Through the Roads of Life,” arguing that the Cuban Armed Forces had tightened internal security, making it nearly impossible to proceed as before.84 Emigre Terrorism would now be aimed at Cuban officials in transit through foreign countries. For the next decade, the Terrorists were engaged in bombing assignments throughout Central and South America. In 1976, with discussions over normalization underway between members of President Carter’s
administration and Premier Castro, the Cuban American community became politically reactivated.\textsuperscript{85} This opening prompted Liberal Cuban Americans to travel to the island and to negotiate directly with Premier Castro over the release of political prisoners, family reunification, and economic trade with the island; 10,000 emigres followed in a twelve-month period. The Terrorist Movement responded by calling a general meeting, creating the "Coordination of Revolutionary Organization" (C.O.R.U.) to oversee Terrorist activity in this new phase, and by lifting the previous ban prohibiting bombing within U.S. territory. The Cuban American community would now become its principal domestic victim.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{Terrorism and the consolidation of the enclave}

For the Terrorists to make political sense to the Cuban American enclave, they had to project the image of, and the community had to perceive them as "Freedom Fighters." This meant waging an incessant campaign for the hearts and minds of the Cuban Americans. Gloria Gil, editor of the terrorist-affiliated tabloid, \textit{Chronicle}, in an interview with one of Omega 7's commanders, asked him to define who were the "traitorous" sectors within the community. The commander responded: "...those who have decided to dedicate their time and effort enriching themselves and living a vacuous life without remembering with their militancy the homeland which continues to suffer..."\textsuperscript{87} The Terrorists were opposed to the Cuban American merchants who had forsaken their homeland for ethnic entrepreneurship. Market activity and patriotism were, for these modern-day Jacobins, irreconcilable.

The Terrorists were opposed to Cuban American merchants but, ironically enough, they relied on them for symbolic support. In a community such as the Cuban American where politics had permeated the mentality and everyday practices of its residents, the Terrorists pointed proudly to their patriotism and disinterested concern for their homeland, in contradistinction to the "greedy" merchants whose drive for profit and personal success had led them to focus on self-interested and rational gains. In symbolic terms, the Terrorists are identified with communal concerns, and merchants with narrow utilitarian transactions. Cuban Americans were not political supporters of Terrorism, but they did resonate symbolically with its appeal to communal welfare. By focusing on the "homeland issue," the Terrorists were, unintentionally, contributing to group solidarity and cohesion.
Table 2. Partial list of bombings by Cuban emigre terrorists 1973–1980.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place^</th>
<th>Total number of attempts</th>
<th>Organizational responsibility</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F.L.N.C. 2</td>
<td>deaths 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L.A.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>C.L.N. 4</td>
<td>backfired 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>G.S.C. 1</td>
<td>unknown 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>D.R. 1</td>
<td>property damage 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>F.L.N.C. 6</td>
<td>deaths 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L.A.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zero 2</td>
<td>backfired 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Alpha 66 1</td>
<td>unknown 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>unknown 16</td>
<td>property damage 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C.P. 1</td>
<td>undetonated 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wounded 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>F.L.N.C. 3</td>
<td>deaths 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L.A.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>unknown 8</td>
<td>unknown 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>property damage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>wounded 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L.A.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>F.L.N.C. 8</td>
<td>unknown 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C.N.M. 6</td>
<td>property damage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Omega 7 7</td>
<td>wounded 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown 5</td>
<td>deaths 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
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<td>Omega 7 4</td>
<td>unknown 4</td>
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<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>C.O.R.U. 3</td>
<td>deaths 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Omega 7 3</td>
<td>unknown 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Omega 7 2</td>
<td>unknown 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>unknown 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:

^ Prior to 1976, the Terrorists, in spite of their strategy prohibition sabotage activity in the U.S., undertook occasional, special assignments in this country.

^ The acronyms stand for the following organizations: F.L.N.C.-Cuban National Liberation Front; C.L.N.-Cuban National Liberation; G.S.C.-Cuban Secret Government; D.R.-Revolutionary Directory; C.P.-Cuban Power; C.O.R.U.-Coordination of Revolutionary Organization; C.N.M.-Cuban Nationalist Movement.
The Terrorists have shaped the political practices of the enclave in important ways. Cuban American Liberalism was revivified briefly in the late 1970s, soon after its leading representatives travelled to Cuba and delivered on some of the community’s most pressing demands: release of political prisoners, family reunification, and growth of enclave through new markets. Liberalism had resurfaced and was winning new adherents to its cause. For the first time in the community’s twenty-one year history, Liberalism was successfully disorganizing Conservative thought and the movement was gaining local power. The Terrorists, when confronted with this dual threat, unleashed a Robespierre-like “reign of terror.” These modern-day Jacobins favored war and armed struggle because of its capacity to produce selfless, “virtuous,” militants; they were opposed to peace, for it was accompanied by the sins of “sweet commerce.”

The Terrorists rekindled anti-revolutionary fervor in the community, but it was not accompanied by the experience of armed militancy or a soldierly ethic. The “International Association of Chiefs of Police,” in a report, stated: “because of the hopelessness of the struggle it (terrorism) had no accompanying political ethos.” Earlier, when the conservative militants had identified Liberals as the “enemy,” they had done so in metaphorical, connotative, political terms without actually assassinating their rivals. Now, when Terrorists branded them in similar terms, they did so in denotative, concrete, and military terms with the aim of physically extinguishing Liberal figures. The “enemy” lurking within would now be extirpated. Terrorists unleashed a savage campaign against those who favored normalization of relations with Cuba by assassinating, harassing, and bombing Liberal spokesman and merchants. A merchant from Union City, New Jersey described his experience in this way: “It was Capone-style. They put their stickers on my store window. I told them they had no right. They came back the next day and smashed my window. They were everywhere down Bergenline Avenue. Later I sold my shop.” Terrorists had shattered Liberal discourse and its economic base of power within the community and they had prevented Conservative discourse from unraveling, but they did this by disrupting community cohesion.

Terrorists manage their political image within the enclave by regulating the local flow of information. In August 1974, for example, the Terrorist movement ordered about 70 small shops in the Miami area to discontinue selling the anti-terrorist Reply, a tabloid with a weekly circulation of 86,000. The Terrorists, to ensure compliance, sent out its hit-
squad to inspect the magazine racks of these shops, then bombed the offices of *Reply* causing $50,000 worth of damage, and ended the campaign by bombing the Latin Chamber of Commerce as a further warning to local merchants that the distribution of anti-terrorist publications would not be tolerated. When Emilio Milián, a leading Cuban-American radio commentator for one of Miami's most popular radio stations, aired his opposition to the Terrorist movement, they detonated a bomb while he was riding in his car, leaving him legless. The radio station, under threat from the Terrorists, fired Mr. Milián.91

Terrorists extorted from merchants to cover movement expenses, and they sometimes gained the support of local city officials vying for votes from a sector of the community. A New Jersey shopkeeper, in his halting English, highlighted the public side of extortion in the following way: "The nationalists (Terrorists) come and demand pay money. If no give they smash in window. This window smash three times." A second store owner underscored terrorisms more "private" aspect: "They call me and threaten me and tell me they are going to destroy my business and I do what they want."92 Local officials seeking votes among the emigres have been known to support the Terrorist cause. The ex-Mayor of Miami, Maurice Ferre, in 1974 wrote letters on behalf of convicted Terrorists facing trial on related charges; city officials have made Terrorists, upon their release from jail, directors of city programs with annual budgets of $50,000 to be used at their discretion; Miami's city commissioners in 1983 proclaimed 25 March as "Orlando Bosch Day," in honor of a terrorist charged with bombing a Cuban airliner and killing all 76 passengers on board, and in 1982 they voted to grant Alpha 66, a leading terrorist group, a $10,000 stipend; in 1979 the advisors to the mayor of Union City, New Jersey allocated $23,000 to pro-Terrorist tabloids out of a total municipal budget of $28,000 earmarked for community publications.93 The recent lull in Terrorist activity may be a sign of reprieve or, perhaps, its final demise. Either way, what remains clear is that exiled militants contributed to the rise of group solidarity and cohesion, and that the Terrorists have reproduced it by invoking collective concerns and the homeland issue.

**Summary**

The Cuban American community shares many of the structural features commonly associated with other types of immigrant enclaves. But its specific mode of political incorporation into the United States dis-
tnguishes it from other enclaves, making it a unique sociopolitical formation: "authoritarian enclave." The Cuban American enclave arose out of Caribbean geopolitics as an unintentional byproduct of four state-sponsored movements. These movements interlocked in an uneven manner, sometime via the civil, other times via the military, and still other times based on a combination of both. The internally divided Batistianist movement interlocked via its military wing with Trujillo's relatively unified Dominican state. In contrast, the highly unified Conservative movement interlocked with the military wing of the internally divided U.S. state. The Liberal movement, like the previous movement, was internally unified but, unlike them, its contacts were with the civil, not military, wing of the U.S. state. Preliminary research on the Terrorist movement, a community-generated movement that responds to changing geopolitical situations, suggests that its civil and military wing are discreetly and flexibly linked to each other. These movements had the cumulative and unintentional effect of creating a new organizational space within the Caribbean geopolitical system from which the Cuban American community was later to emerge. The Cuban American enclave rooted in Miami is today an important actor in the Caribbean Basin.

The four movements under review left an indelible imprint on the material and ideational contours of the enclave. The Batistianists, Conservatives, and Terrorists contributed to the formation of an emigre moral economy where politics and profit were fused. The Batistianists, by investing their smuggled capital in the Miami area, by relying on the civil wing of their movement to rejuvenate old allegiances and networks, and by boycotting and harassing politically heterodox merchants, established a type of political monopoly over the local economy. The Conservatives, by misappropriating C.I.A. funds and reselling weapons, learned the art of buying and selling, developed sympathetic sources of credit from politically like-minded militants, and gathered enough investment capital to establish small enterprises in the Miami area. The Terrorists, by bombing Liberal merchants, prevented their discourse from gaining a local material base of power. The militant Liberals, through their inactivity in the community, facilitated, unintentionally, the rise of the enclave.

The community's collective identity and sources of normative integration remain partly rooted in its militant past. Batistianism, Conservatism, and Terrorism, with its characteristic concerns for custom, patriotism, anti-communism, order, and community, concerns which have
always been lacking in Liberal thought, a current of thought that in any case never circulated widely in the community, contributed, ironically enough, to the enclave’s subsequent success. If the enclave entrepreneur can today invoke collective claims in order to legitimize his patriarchal system of capital-labor relations and contribute to group cohesion, it is because the militants and terrorists had earlier inculcated the community with these very same notions. In the next few years the Cuban American entrepreneurs, the community’s leading strata, will need to generate a new set of ideal interests similar to the ones they inherited from their predecessors.

The extreme conservatism of the Cuban Americans is in direct opposition to the political practices of all other immigrant groups, enclave or otherwise. Immigrant groups tend to support politically liberal causes and, among recent arrivees, this tendency is even more pronounced.94 But the Cuban American enclave, itself a relatively recent group, defies this pattern. But the mid-1970s the Cuban Americans had established themselves as the single most conservative minority group in the United States.95 Cuban American exceptionalism is not, as some neo-Marxists scholars have claimed, the product of their privileged background in Cuba nor their relative economic success in the United States.96 Political practices, after all, cannot be deduced from simple market locations. Cuban American conservatism was constructed during the early years of community formation as the result of the interaction of discourse and power.

The community’s shift toward extreme conservatism runs counter to the early composition of the exiles. Recall that in demographic-political terms the base of the community shifted in 1962 from the Batistianists and Conservatives, to the Liberals. The political practices of the community, however, travelled a reverse path: from Liberal, to Conservative and Batistianist. Political practice, in other words, had defied the very same organizational and demographic determinants that until now had served to structure its existence. Emigre politics had become unhinged from its “base” and was flowing downwards and shaping the material and ideal interests of the community at a time when it was undergoing a transition from exile to ethnic minority. The discursive practices and power maneuvers of the Batistianists and Conservatives infused the community’s collective identity, economic life, and group cohesiveness with their own moral-political preferences. The Liberals, due to their insurrectionary strategy, failed to do so. During deactivation, the Liberals who advocated normalizing relations with Cuba successfully
disorganized Conservative thought, but the Terrorists prevented them from circulating their views or gaining local power. Thus, emigre politics preceded the rise of ethnic markets and the availability of federal aid, and influenced Cuban American group and identity formation.

The Cuban American community, to summarize my argument, is an expression of exploitation and domination along with representation. In typological terms, the community ought to be characterized as an "authoritarian enclave," a type of formation that fuses economic entrepreneurship, social communalism, and authoritarian politics. Those unacquainted with the Cuban American community sometimes view it as a sociological aberration, an idiosyncratic enclave when compared to other ones in the United States, yet its trajectory reconfirms two of history's oldest lessons: the boundaries of nations and states rarely coincide; and, words and silences matter ... as does power.

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Notes


2. Portes and Manning, "The Immigrant Enclave."


14. Throughout this essay I use upper case letters whenever referring to the movements or their ideologies.


20. Data gathered during my visit in June 1987 to the “Museo de la contrarrevolución,” in Trinidad, Cuba.


34. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 66–167, 290; Tad Szulc, ‘Anti-Castro Unit May Quit Council,’ NYT, 928 April 1961) 2; Maxwell Taylor, Operation Zapata, 356.

35. The University of Miami’s “Cuba Collection” has the entire series of Cuba Nueva.

36. Data gathered during my visit in June 1987 to the “Museo de la contrarevolución” in Trinidad, Cuba.

37. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs, 307–309; Haynes Johnson, Manuel Artíme, José Pérez San Román, et al., The Bay of Pigs Story: The Leaders, 75; Maxwell Taylor, Operation Zapata, 17–18, 68, 178–180. When President Kennedy finally approved exile plans for overthrowing the revolution, he was under the impression that it would be a Liberal-led insurrection from within, with limited participation from invasionary troops. Kennedy remained skeptical of this plan to the very end, approving it only at the last minute, well beyond the C.I.A. deadline. When the New Frontier finally did clear the operation, they had no idea it would take the form of a full-scale invasion. The C.I.A., in the meantime, had assured the militants that they would receive U.S. air-support for the approved invasion.


41. ibid.

42. ibid.

43. ibid.

44. Data gathered during my visit in June, 1987 to the “Museo de la contrarevolucion” in Trinidad, Cuba.


47. Peter Kins, “Most Cubans Here Held Pro-Castro,” NYT, (17 April 1960) 21. The editors of two leading Hispanic papers estimated that 70 percent of the emigres favored the Cuban revolution.


49. Personal interview with Max Lesnik, Miami, Fla. (26 January 1980).


52. Personal interview with Manuel Atoñes, Batistianist Archivist, and review of his untitled files; Miami, Fla. (26 April 1980).


54. Personal interview with Jacobo Sáif, managing editor of Patria; Miami, Fla. (28 February 1980).

55. All the leading scholars of the Cuban American community, Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach, Kenneth Wilson and Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, downplay the importance
of background factors while at the same time emphasizing the significance of the insertion process.
60. It is, of course, impossible to obtain archival data to substantiate this point. I was first alerted to the significance of C.I.A. involvement in the emigre community's success during a causal conversation with an ex-militant. Subsequently, I interviewed four ex-militants currently engaged in entrepreneurial activity in Miami; three affirmed my interpretation, one, Manuel Salvat, denied it. Those who affirmed it asked to remain unidentified. These interviews took place in Miami, Fla., between the 6 and 25 of March, 1980.
62. Telephone interview with the DA's head of circulation; Miami, Fla. (16 June 1980).
68. Alejandro Portes maintains this position.
69. Personal Interview with Javier Pazos, editor of *Liborio* and member of "Board." Liborio was published from 1964–1965; 10,000 copies of each of its five issues circulated in Cuba.
70. Felipe Pazos, Javier Pazos, Justo Carrillo, Rafael Betancourt, Manuel Ray, Angel del Cerro and many other distinguished figures exited from the community.
71. Between January 1962 and December 1964 the *New Republic* published a total of 33 articles and 13 editorials on the issue of Cuba. During this same time, leading members of the Board published the following articles persuading their English-speaking, Liberal audience that the revolution had betrayed them. See: Javier Pazos Vea, "Cuba: Long Live the Revolution," *NR* (3 Nov. 1962) 15–19; Raul Chibás, "What Next for Cuba – An exile's view," *NR* (10 Oct. 1962) 9; Javier Pazos Vea

72. *Patria* was the first publication to write about “Fidelism without Fidel.” This expression soon circulated widely in the community, summarizing the general trend toward anti-Liberalism. The C.I.A. had assured the Conservatives, without previous authorization from the Kennedy administration, air cover for the invasion. The Conservatives would now hold U.S. Liberalism responsible for its defeat, without realizing they had been misinformed. See footnotes 35 and 36. Personal interviews with José Rasco, Justo Carrillo, and Javier Pazos.

73. Select Committee, *Investigations* 77–78, 139–140.


75. Henry Paget and Carl Stone, *The Newer Caribbean*. My discussions with Rafael Hernández of the “Centro de estudios sobre América,” in Havana, Cuba clarified my analysis of the geopolitical situation. But George C. Homans disagrees vehemently with this interpretation, regarding it “communistic” and “inaccurate.”


81. David Vidal, “In Union City, the Memories of the Bay of Pigs Don’t Die,” NYT, (2 Dec. 1979).


83. See Table 2 for partial list of Terrorist bombings.

84. Personal interview with Felipe Rivero, co-author of “War Through the Roads of Life”; Jeff Stein, “Face to Face with Omega 7”, CubaTimes, 1 (Spring, 1980) 3–12.


88. There is a striking parallel between Jacobin and emigre terrorism. For the Jacobin side, see: François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge:


97. This anti-economistic notion is a loose adaptation of Guillermo O’Donnell’s term, “bureaucratic authoritarianism,” used to define certain types of Latin American dictatorships.