CUBANS IN EXILE: A DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

RICHARD R. FAGEN and RICHARD A. BRODY
Stanford University

INTRODUCTION

Self-imposed exile is one of the most interesting and important political phenomena of the post-war world. Over the past decade, Berlin, Hong Kong, Vienna, and Miami have all at times become the focal points of international attention as German, Chinese, Hungarian, and Cuban refugees have fled from their native lands and the regimes currently in power.

To the social scientist concerned with the relationship of rulers to the ruled, this international flow of refugees is of special interest, for in the vast majority of cases these refugees did not flee for their lives, nor were they displaced by the physical destruction of their homes or the political reallocation of territory.

We are dealing with a phenomenon which seems to differ from such exoduses as those of the Jews from Germany in the late 1930's (a religious minority singled out for extreme persecution) and the Arabs from Palestine in the late 1940's (a national grouping dislocated by the creation of the State of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli War). In contrast to the German Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, the East German, Chinese, Hungarian and Cuban refugees do not constitute a religious or ethnic sub-group set apart from the majority of their fellow countrymen and they generally did not flee under the threat of massive and imminent persecution, physical destruction or dislocation. Rather their refugee status derives from some complex of personal experiences which came to be perceived as intolerable.[1] What constitutes an "intolerable" set of personal experiences differs widely from individual to individual and, since the self-imposed exiles are not meaningfully typed in terms of religion, ethnic background, or even political beliefs, neither motivational nor sociological mappings of the refugee flow are immediately apparent.

This paper will present and analyze data on the composition and flow of one such self-imposed refugee group—the Cubans who left their homeland and came to Miami after Castro took power in January of 1959.

We actually know very little about these refugees—who they are, why they left, and what they believe. Initially, we are seeking answers only to the first question: *Who* are the Cuban refugees? The larger study of which this is a part also seeks answers to the second and third.[2] This paper, then, presents an analysis of some demographic characteristics of the refugees. It is our hope that this presentation will provide the foundation on which

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[1] For background and bibliography on refugee problems in general see Elfan Rees, "Century of the Homeless Man," *International Conciliation,* No. 515, November, 1957 (entire issue), and James M. Read, "The United Nations and Refugees—Changing Concepts," *International Conciliation,* No. 537, March, 1962 (entire issue).

[2] In addition to the data used in this analysis, the larger study includes data gathered in 209 interviews with Cuban heads of households drawn from a systematic sample of the records of the Cuban Refugee Center. These interviews were accomplished in Miami in March, 1963, with the full cooperation of the Center. Demographic data on a sample of 300 relocated refugees (out of the State of Florida) were also obtained.

a subsequent interpretation of refugee motivations and ideology can be constructed.

SOURCES AND DATA

The primary source of data for this study was a roster of all previously employed or employable Cubans who had registered with the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami by March, 1963. This roster contained data on 84,578 individuals classified according to occupation and month of entry into the United States. When students, housewives, retired persons not classified by occupation, and all persons who entered the United States prior to the Castro takeover were removed from the roster, 59,682 persons remained. These individuals comprise the occupationally classifiable among the refugees; it is this population which will be analyzed in the remainder of this paper.

Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to specify in more detail the relationship of these 59,682 refugees to the total influx of Cubans.

It has been estimated that approximately 215,000 Cubans emigrated to the United States between the latter part of 1958 and the early part of 1963.[3] Approximately 165,000 or almost 77 per cent of these refugees registered with the Center in Miami, and our group of 59,682 Cubans represents these 165,000 minus the children, housewives, students, retired, and those few who entered before January, 1959.

What do we know about the 23 per cent of the refugees who did not register with the Center and for whom we have no data? Do they differ in some systematic manner from those who did register? We must assume they do, but unfortunately we cannot specify in great detail all of the differences. However, two statements can be made with some certitude. First, those who did not register tend to be the more affluent and well-connected Cubans; the Center was established precisely to aid the majority who came with neither accumulated wealth nor immediate occupational plans. Second, those who did not register tend to come from among the refugees who arrived during the early months of the Castro regime. This is so because the very affluent tended to leave first, because the Refugee Center was not established until early in 1961, and because Cuban regulations governing the removal of wealth and possessions from the island did not assume their present stringent form until the middle of 1961.[4]

Thus, our analytical population under-represents by some unknown amount the early arrivals and the more wealthy refugees.[5] Where particular problems of analysis and inference suggest that this under-representation is especially important, we shall call attention to it. More usually, however, we assume that an awareness of this systematic bias on the part of both of authors and of readers is sufficient to caution all concerned against making any linear projections of our findings onto the entire refugee community.

THE REFUGEES AND THE CUBAN POPULATION

What kinds of Cubans have left the

[3] See statement by Edwin M. Martin, "U. S. Outlines Policy Toward Cuban Refugees," *Department of State Bulletin,* June 24, 1963, pp. 983-990.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 984.

[5] As a very rough estimate of the magnitude of this under-representation, we can note that Martin, *op. cit.,* says that about 3000 Cubans entered Miami in 1958 and in the early months of 1959. The Refugee Center records show 597 "employables" who registered as entering in 1958 or the first three months of 1959. If we assume that each "employable" actually represents three persons (himself and two dependents), then the Center records account for 1791 refugees or approximately 60 per cent of the 3000 mentioned by Martin.

TABLE 1

OCCUPATIONAL COMPARISON OF CUBAN WORK FORCE AND CUBAN REFUGEES*

Occupation	1953 Cuban Census	% of Census	Cuban Refugees	% of Refugees	Ratio: % Refugees to % Census
Lawyers and Judges	7,858	.4	1,695	3.1	7.8
Professional and Semi-Pro.	78,051	4.0	12,124	21.9	5.5
Managerial and Office	93,662	4.8	6,771	12.2	2.5
Clerical and Sales	264,569	13.7	17,123	30.9	2.3
Domestic Service, Military and Police	160,406	8.3	4,801	8.7	1.1
Skilled, Semi- and Unskilled	526,168	27.2	11,301	20.4	.75
Agricultural and Fishing	807,514	41.7	1,539	2.8	.06
Total	1,938,228	100.1%	55,354	100.0%	

*Cuban Census data are taken from Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, *Cuba*, New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962, pp. 343-4. Data on the Cuban refugees cover the period of January, 1959, to the end of September, 1962. When doing most analyses of the occupational composition of the refugee community we shall limit our population to those who arrived before this September cut-off date. After the missile crises of October, 1962, regular air service from Cuba to the United States ceased. Subsequently, the only refugees arriving were those few who escaped in small boats and those (mainly relatives of Bay of Pigs prisoners) who came to the United States on the ships which carried drugs and food (exchanged for the prisoners) to Havana. The use of this cut-off date explains the discrepancy between the total of 55,354 refugees used in this table and the total of 59,682 mentioned earlier in the text.

island and fled to the United States? How do these refugees differ from those who have remained behind? The most powerful demographic variable for investigating these two related questions is occupation. When we compare the occupational distribution of Cubans from the most recent Cuban census (1953) with the occupational distribution of refugees, striking differences appear. As can be seen in Table 1, professional and semi-professional persons are over-represented in the refugee community by a factor of more than five,[6] while persons engaged in agriculture and fishing are under-represented by a factor of about 16. The other occupational types are distributed between these two extremes.

The occupational non-representativeness of the refugees is also reflected in the educational composition of the exile community. Since 62 per cent of the employable refugees have white collar occupations, it is not surprising that more than one-third have at least

[6] This is an instance in which the bias of the Refugee Center roster tends to make our estimate conservative. Since professional and semi-professionals are the occupational types most likely to bypass the Refugee Center when entering the United States, the true value of this ratio of over-representation is actually greater than reported in Table 1.

TABLE 2

EDUCATIONAL COMPARISON OF CUBAN ADULTS (OVER 25 YEARS OF AGE) AND REFUGEES (OVER 16 YEARS OF AGE)*

Education	Census Males (N=1,372,000)	Refugee Males (N=790)	Census Females (N=1,261,000)	Refugee Females (N=295)
Less than 4th grade	53.0%	4.4%	52.0%	2.4%
4th to 11th grade	43.0	59.0	45.0	62.0
12th grade to 3 years of college	3.0	22.3	3.2	26.8
4 years of college or more	1.2	14.2	.3	8.8
Totals	100.2%	99.9%	100.5%	100.0%

* Cuban Census data (1953) are taken from United Nations. *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963,* New York: United Nations, 1963, p. 314. The refugee data are taken from a systematic sample (by occupation) of the 59,682 individuals on the roster. The 1096 refugees so selected will hereafter be referred to simply as *the sample* in order to differentiate sample estimates from true values derived from the roster. The sample size in Table 2 is only 1085 because educational data were not available for 11 persons. From the sample we estimate that approximately 13 per cent (141 out of 1096) of the employable refugees were under 25 years of age at time of entry into the United States.

a high school education. Table 2 compares the distribution of education in the Cuban total adult population (1953 census) with the distribution of education among the refugees. Notice that both in the census and in the refugee population there are only slight differences between the educational attainments of males and females.

Despite the similarity of educational level, women were far outnumbered by men in the Cuban work-force; they accounted for only 15 per cent of all those employed in 1953.[7] Among the refugees, however, approximately 27 per cent of the employables were women.[8] Table 3 suggests a reason for this finding. As can be seen, women were heavily over-represented in certain occupations in Cuba, notably among professionals, semi-professionals, and domestic servants. Since at least the professionals and semi-professionals are in turn over-represented in Miami, we expect to find women contributing more heavily to the refugee work-force than to the island work-force. In fact, the calculation in Table 3 of an expected 25.2 per cent women among the refugees is quite close to the estimate of 27 per cent previously made from the sample.

Finally, materials are available for one other comparison. Using the data in Table 4, we can estimate the average age of all adult Cubans in 1953 as about 40.7 years and the average age of the employable refugees as about 40.9.[9] Thus, there is no difference in average age between all adult Cubans and the refugees. However, as can be seen, the shapes of the two distributions are different. The descending order of the census distri-

[7] MacGaffey and Barnett, *op cit.,* pp. 343-4.

[8] This is an estimate from the sample where 301 of the 1096 refugees were female.

[9] The estimate was made by using the mid-points in all age groups except the last where 75 years was used.

TABLE 3

RATIO OF FEMALES TO ALL PERSONS IN EACH OCCUPATION IN CUBA, AND EXPECTED TOTAL PER CENT OF FEMALES AMONG REFUGEES*

Occupation	Ratio of Females to All Persons in Occupation (1953 census)	Distribution of Refugees by Occupation (Roster)	Expected % of Refugee Females in Each Occupation
Lawyers and Judges	.068	3.1%	.2%
Professional and Semi-Pro.	.526	21.9	11.5
Managerial and Office	.054	12.2	.7
Clerical and Sales	.179	30.9	5.5
Domestic Service, Military and Police	.547	8.7	4.8
Skilled, Semi- and Unskilled	.118	20.4	2.4
Agricultural and Fishing	.015	2.8	.1
Totals		100.0%	25.2%

* Sources: Same as Table 1.

bution reflects a typical mortality curve, while the refugee distribution ascends to a peak in the 36-40 year old age bracket and then descends. Moreover, if a 1953 distribution of age of all employed Cubans were available, we would expect the average age of the employable refugee community to be higher than the Cuban average. This is so because refugees in those occupations which are over-represented in Miami tend to be older than refugees in occupations which are under-represented.[10]

In summary, then, the refugee community differs from the total of Cuban adults in that it sharply over-represents some occupations while under-representing others. These differences in occupation, in turn, are reflected in the educational composition of the refugee work-force, in the ratio of women to men, and in the age distribution. Cubans who are well-educated, female, and in the "middle years" of life are thus over-represented among the employable refugees.

THE FLOW OF REFUGEES

There are two notable characteristics of the flow of refugees into the United States: First, the total number entering in any given calendar quarter varies from a low in the beginning of 1959 to a peak in the third quarter of 1962. Second, the occupational "mix" changes through time so that occupations which contribute heavily to the refugee total in some quarters are less strongly represented in others. Data relevant to these two characteristics are presented in Table 5.

Notice that the percentage contribution of some occupations (e.g., managerial and office) is fairly constant through time, while the percentage

[10] For instance, from this sample we estimate the average age of refugee lawyers, and managerial and office workers to be approximately 46, while we estimate the average age of those in agriculture and fishing to be approximately 35.

TABLE 4
AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF ADULT CUBANS IN 1953 AND POST-CASTRO REFUGEES*

Age Group	1953 Census	Employable Refugees
21-25	16.5%	11.2%
26-30	14.4	12.1
31-35	12.8	13.1
36-40	12.2	16.4
41-45	11.0	14.9
46-50	9.3	11.0
51-55	6.7	7.5
56-60	4.4	7.4
61-65	4.8	2.8
66-70	3.4	1.8
71 and over	4.5	1.9
Total	100.0%	100.1%

*Census data are from United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook,* 1960, New York: United Nations, 1960, pp. 184-5. United Nations age categories are actually 20-24, 25-29, etc. We have used the refugee age categories to group the data here. Refugee percentages represent estimates from the sample (N=1075; 21 persons dropped for no data or because age was under 21). The 1953 census did not present a breakdown by occupation and age so it is not possible to compare the Cuban work-force and the refugee work-force directly with respect to age.

contribution of others (e.g., military and police) is subject to more extensive variation. These differeces can be seen more clearly in the following three figures where the variation within each occupation is plotted as a function of time and deviation from expected contribution. The metric on the y-axis is the ratio of actual contribution to expected contribution. For example, since lawyers and judges constitute only 3 per cent of all refugees but 8 per cent of all those who entered in the first quarter of 1959, the ratio of actual to expected contribution for this occupation in the first quarter is 8/3 or 2.7.[11]

No simple interpretation of the data in Table 1 and Figures 1, 2, and 3 is possible. The great increase in the quarterly totals of refugees through time undoubtedly reflects increasing dissatisfaction among the Cuban population as the Revolution became more pervasive and radical. But we have no ready explanation for specific quarterly fluctuations within the general trend.

One background fact is important, however. In the early months of the Revolution there was no lack of transportation from Havana to Miami. Pan American World Airways alone had over 12,000 Havana-Miami seats available each month. Furthermore, securing the necessary exit and entry papers was not overly complicated or difficult. Thus, originally the flow of refugees was not significantly curtailed by lack of transportation or by political constraints. On the other hand, from the beginning of 1961 (the break in diplomatic relations) to late October, 1962 (the missile crisis), only about half as many seats were available. Stringent exit and financial regulations further complicated emigration during this period, and it seems safe to assume that perhaps double the number of Cubans would have left after January, 1961, had they been able to make the necessary arrangements.

However, the most interesting trend apparent in the flow of refugees is not the simple increase in quarterly totals but rather the changing occupational mix through time. Observers of the Revolution have frequently commented on this, but it is difficult to cull from their writings any systematic set of propositions.[12] Therefore, in the remainder of this paper we shall not attempt to support or refute specific hypotheses. Rather, we shall limit ourselves to introducing some analyses and suggesting some interpretations which seem to add to our understanding of

[11] The actual plots in Figures 1, 2, and 3 were made from the raw data, not from the rounded percentage figures given in Table 5.

TABLE 5
REFUGEE FLOW BY OCCUPATION AND DATE OF ENTRY*

Occupation	Date of Entry (Year and Quarter) 59-1	59-2	59-3	59-4	60-1	60-2	60-3	60-4	61-1	61-2	61-3	61-4	62-1	62-2	62-3	Total
Lawyers and	8%	5%	4%	2%	3%	4%	4%	6%	6%	5%	4%	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%
Judges	19	20	19	15	20	39	108	280	145	211	247	174	166	140	92	1,695
Professional	19%	19%	15%	14%	18%	18%	20%	26%	25%	29%	26%	23%	22%	19%	16%	22%
and Semi-Pro.	42	74	69	87	143	174	498	1301	650	1102	1727	1631	1681	1564	1406	12,124
Managerial	12%	10%	10%	11%	12%	11%	14%	15%	15%	16%	16%	12%	11%	10%	9%	12%
and Office	27	41	45	66	93	109	345	741	380	616	1047	874	819	823	745	6,771
Clerical	17%	17%	16%	19%	18%	24%	26%	27%	30%	26%	30%	34%	33%	36%	33%	31%
and Sales	38	66	75	121	146	236	628	1344	766	1001	1972	2447	2511	2874	2898	17,123
Domestic	8%	8%	14%	14%	14%	14%	10%	7%	5%	4%	3%	4%	5%	5%	6%	6%
Service	17	31	63	87	112	137	234	342	142	139	223	310	886	382	511	3,116
Military	20%	20%	18%	16%	11%	6%	5%	2%	3%	4%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%
and Police	44	77	84	103	88	60	131	119	78	167	153	191	123	133	134	1,685
Skilled, Semi-	14%	20%	21%	21%	23%	22%	19%	14%	14%	14%	15%	20%	22%	24%	29%	20%
and Unskilled	32	78	99	133	186	214	455	713	358	537	998	1449	1623	1924	2512	11,301
Agricultural	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%	4%	3%
and Fishing	5	6	11	13	10	13	31	88	71	91	204	166	205	244	381	1,539
Total %	100%	101%	100%	99%	100%	100%	99%	99%	101%	100%	99%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%
Total N	224	393	465	625	798	982	2430	4928	2590	3864	6571	7207	7514	8084	8679	55,354
Quarter Total as % of all Refugees	.4	.7	.8	1.1	1.4	1.8	4.4	8.9	4.7	7.0	11.9	13.0	13.6	14.6	15.7	100.0%

* Data are from roster of refugee employables. Column percentage totals vary from 100 because of rounding.

Figure 1. Variation Through Time in Professional Occupations



Figure 2. Variations Through Time in White Collar and Military Occupations



Figure 3. Variation Through Time in Blue Collar Occupations



the refugees and the Revolution.

An overall effort to link changes in the occupational mix of refugees to a chronology of events in Cuba was not successful. The emigration process and the occupational flow are too complex to allow us to make a cohesive set of relational statements of the form, "when event X happened in Cuba, persons of type Y left." Nevertheless, inspection of Figures 1, 2, and 3 does suggest the following limited propositions:

1. The emigration of professional and semi-professional, managerial and office, clerical and sales, and skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled was fairly constant through time. In none of these groupings did the ratio of actual to expected emigration fall outside of the interval .5 to 1.5.

2. The two peak periods of lawyer and judge emigration follow the Castro takeover in 1959 and the far-reaching Urban Reform Law of the last quarter of 1960. These are events which we might expect to alienate large numbers of lawyers from the regime.

3. The relatively great out-flow of military and police during 1959 and early 1960 confirms what Draper and others have said

[12] Twenty books and many articles were examined in our search for at least a partial "theory" of emigration. Only two writers offer comments detailed enough to warrant mention here. Theodore Draper in *Castro's Revolution,* New York: Praeger, 1962, gives a brief explication of the refugee flow and concludes (p. 61) that "The emigration was top heavy with businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals, but skilled and semiskilled workers were conspicuous in the later stages of the outpouring. Nevertheless, the Cuban exiles were hardly representative of Cuban society as a whole." Our data support this broad-gauge analysis. Second, Edwin Martin, *op. cit.,* p. 983, suggests that the emigration "can be divided, . . . into four reasonably distinct waves." (1) Supporters of the Batista regime and the old military in the early part of 1959. (2) Upper economic and social strata in the latter part of 1959 and the first 10 months of 1960. (3) Upper and middle social and economic classes, professionals, businessmen, from the end of 1960 to the middle of 1961. (4) Office and factory workers, small merchants, and some fishermen and peasants from the middle of 1961 to October, 1962. Although some elements of this "wave" model (such as the early flight of the military) find support in our data, it seems to us to impose an overly precise and not particularly accurate order on the emigration.

TABLE 6

AVERAGE EDUCATION OF REFUGEES (YEARS OF SCHOOL) BY OCCUPATION AND DATE OF ENTRY*

Occupation	Date of Entry: Jan. '59-June '60	July '60-Dec. '60	Jan. '61-June '61	July '61-Dec. '61	Jan. '62-June '62	July '62-Dec. '62	Total
Professional, Semi-Pro., and Lawyers (S)	13.7 (7)	14.7 (35)	15.8 (31)	14.6 (67)	13.7 (66)	12.8 (42)	14.2 (248)
Managerial and Office	10.6 (7)	11.2 (18)	10.1 (18)	9.4 (35)	9.2 (28)	8.9 (25)	9.7 (131)
Clerical and Sales (S)	8.9 (10)	10.9 (27)	10.2 (33)	9.8 (78)	10.0 (102)	8.4 (75)	9.6 (325)
Domestic and Military	8.7 (12)	7.2 (15)	8.1 (8)	7.8 (12)	5.9 (21)	6.1 (24)	7.0 (92)
Skilled, Semi- and Unskilled	6.6 (5)	6.8 (14)	8.3 (13)	7.4 (36)	6.3 (46)	6.7 (83)	6.8 (198)
Agricultural and Fishing	0 (0)	12.0 (1)	11.0 (4)	6.6 (5)	7.3 (6)	5.7 (14)	7.1 (30)
Mean	9.7	11.2	11.4	10.6	9.8	8.2	9.9
Total N	(41)	(110)	(108)	(233)	(269)	(263)	(1024)

*Based on the sample from the roster. Upper figure in each cell is a mean based on the number of cases indicated in the lower figure in each cell. Total n is less than 1096 because of missing data. The sign (S) is explained in the text.

about the flight of the Batista military.

4. The over-representation of domestic service in the last half of 1959 and the first half of 1960 probably reflects the fact that during this period many wealthy families left as complete households, bringing bag, baggage, and servants.

But as we examine the contribution of individual occupational groupings to the refugee flow, we are in danger of losing sight of important trends in the aggregate. And it is primarily these aggregate characteristics of the community which help give it its particular sociological and political tone.

We have quarterly data on both the educational level and age of the refugee employables, and we can quite simply summarize our findings with respect to change in these two variables: *Since the beginning of 1961, each successive quarterly group of refugees has been younger and less well educated than the previous group.*[13] The data on which this conculsion is based are presented in Tables 6 and 7.

Inspection of Tables 6 and 7 raises two questions: Are the observed differences on the margins statistically significant? And, if so, are the trends in the aggregate mean level of the two variables since the beginning of 1960 attributable solely to changes in the occupational mix?

In order to shed some light on the first question, a two-way analysis of variance was done on the data in each table.[14] This analysis yielded significant differences ($p<.01$) between

[13] As can be calculated from the marginals in Table 5, only 20 per cent of the employables who registered at the Refugee Center came during 1959 and 1960. Thus the trends noted, although covering only a two year time span, cover 80 per cent of the registered employables.

TABLE 7

AVERAGE AGE OF REFUGEES BY OCCUPATION AND DATE OF ENTRY*

Occupation	Date of Entry						Total
	Jan. '59-June '60	July '60-Dec. '60	Jan. '61-June '61	July '61-Dec. '61	Jan. '62-June '62	July '62-Dec. '62	
Professional, Semi-Pro., and Lawyers	43.7 (7)	41.8 (36)	43.0 (36)	43.3 (66)	41.3 (66)	38.0 (42)	41.6 (253)
Managerial and Office	50.2 (7)	46.1 (18)	48.0 (18)	46.2 (35)	44.5 (28)	41.2 (25)	45.3 (131)
Clerical and Sales	41.5 (10)	37.5 (27)	41.7 (33)	38.6 (78)	39.0 (102)	39.0 (75)	39.2 (325)
Domestic and Military	41.4 (12)	41.5 (16)	34.3 (8)	44.3 (12)	38.7 (21)	35.1 (24)	38.9 (93)
Skilled, Semi- and Unskilled	48.0 (5)	38.0 (15)	42.0 (14)	37.7 (36)	41.9 (46)	37.1 (85)	39.0 (201)
Agricultural and Fishing	40 (0)	63.0 (1)	35.5 (4)	32.0 (5)	32.0 (7)	33.7 (14)	34.5 (31)
Mean	44.1	41.1	42.4	41.2	40.5	37.8	40.3
Total N	(41)	(113)	(113)	(232)	(270)	(265)	(1024)

*See note to table 6.

both date of entry and occupation for both education and age. The interaction between date of entry and occupation was also found to be significant ($p<.01$) in both tables. This suggests that we are dealing with real differences in both average education and average age as we move across occupations and through time. But it leaves unanswered the second question which may be rephrased as follows: Given that both education and age vary with occupation, and given that younger and less well-educated occupations tend to be proportionally over-represented in the later quarters, does the total variation in education and age through time reflect anything more than the variation in occupational mix? Or more formally, if we hold occupation constant do education and age still vary through time?

To investigate this question, a one-way analysis of variance was done on each of the first five occupational groupings in each of the two tables. In Table 7, no significant through-time differences in mean age were found in any of the occupations. This indicates that the increasing youth of the refugee community is accounted for by the change in occupational mix. In Table 6, however, mean level of education was significantly different ($p<.01$) in both the first and third rows. This is indicated in the table by the sign (S) after the appropriate occupational grouping. Educational trends within the other occupations are also generally in the expected direction, although they do not reach statistical significance.

Thus, the educational analysis suggests that the type of professional, semi-professional, and white collar person leaving Cuba has changed through time. Whereas earlier the university professor left, recently the grade school teacher has been more typical. Or simi-

[14] The technique used is described in Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference,* New York: Holt, 1953, pp. 381-2. This technique yields an approximation for the special case when the analytical subclasses are of unequal frequencies.

larly, where at first the corporate sales manager came to Miami, more recently the retail clerk has been the immigrant. We are still, of course, only dealing with trends, but the point is clear. The lessening educational level signals a shift in socio-economic emphasis within occupations. And this shift coupled with the changes in occupational mix suggests that by 1962 a considerable proportion of the refugees were neither rich, well-educated, occupationally advantaged, nor in any sense members of the pre-Castro "establishment."

SUMMARY

In this report we have sought to establish a picture of the Cuban refugee community: Comparison of the occupational, age, and educational composition of the community with the Cuban population indicates that the refugees are better educated and come from higher status occupations than the population from which they have exiled themselves. Time-flow studies indicate that the composition of the community has changed; more recent exiles are more representative of the Cuban population but the rural worker is still vastly under-represented.

Clearly, the existence of such a large group of political exiles has created problems both for the United States and for Cuba. Approximately one out of every 35 Cubans has fled to the United States since 1959, and the majority of these are still in the Miami area. Without going into much detail, it is possible to suggest three major consequences of this emigration for the Castro regime.[15]

In the first place, and most obviously, the regime has lost great numbers of highly trained and skilled citizens. The doctors, engineers, accountants and others who now eke out a living in Miami represent human resources which are currently in very short supply in Cuba. Just as the Revolutionary Government began a massive restructuring of the society and economy, many of those with skills crucial to the effort fled. Crash programs have been started in Cuba to replenish and expand the depleted ranks of the managers, professionals, and technicians. But judging from recent reports in the Cuban press, there are still critical shortages of persons who combine the necessary skills with the required political loyalties.

Secondly, the refugees are quite politically conscious and active. Certainly they have in common an undying hatred of Castro and the current regime. The extent of this political consciousness and activity can be estimated from our interviews with a systematic sample of 209 exile heads of households in Miami. Of these respondents, 62 or 30% reported that they have been active in a Miami refugee organization. Also, a slightly larger number, 69 or 33% of the respondents, reported that they had aided Castro's cause in some manner before he actually came to power.[16] Here, then, we sense the genesis of the continuing verbal and physical attacks on the regime. A substantial number of exiles were at one time active supporters of Castro. They feel betrayed, cheated, and frustrated by the regime, and they are now using their substantial political skills in a variety of anti-Cas-

[15] The consequences of the immigration for United States authorities are well treated in U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Hearings, Cuban Refugee Problems,* 87th Congress First Session, December, 6, 7, 13, 1961; and U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Hearings, Cuban Refugee Problems,* 87th Congress Second Session, December 3 and 4, 1962. Among the problems discussed are employment, housing, relocation, law enforcement, education, and financial aid.

[16] Because our sample was limited to males, these figures tend to overestimate the aggregate total of pre and post-emigration political activity by the refugees. Nevertheless, even the briefest acquaintance with the refugee community convinces one that politics, family, and making a living are the three main topics of conversation for both males and females.

tro activities. It is not likely that exiles of this type, highly articulate and deeply committed, will soon cease their attempts to undermine and overthrow the Cuban Government.

In the third place, and this is closely related to the preceding discussion, the existence of the refugee community has occasioned a complex set of reactions in Cuba. The Revolutionary Government justifies its extensive military organization as a defensive capability against attacks by the exiles, the United States, or a combination of the two. Certainly the Bay of Pigs invasion served to make this line of argument more credible both inside and outside of the island. Less obviously, but perhaps of equal importance, the Cuban authorities view the refugees as a psychological threat to the Revolution. Because so many of the exiles were men of importance and reputation in the early stages of the Revolution, and because so many Cubans still on the island have relatives and close friends in exile, the refugees represent a continuing threat to the legitimacy of the regime. Thus the authorities seek in a variety of ways to discredit the refugees, to cast suspicion on their motives, and to condemn their activities. Officially, all exiles are referred to as *gusanos* (worms). A daily column in *Revolución,* a government newspaper, is headed *Gusanerias* (worm doings) and it reports with ridicule and invective selected material on the exile community. And the schools, television, radio, and other government channels repeat and amplify these attacks.

We have briefly suggested some ways in which an understanding of the exiles contributes to an understanding of the Cuban Revolution. But this paper has presented only a part of the analysis. Subsequent papers will report in more detail the motivations and beliefs of those who have chosen exile in Miami over continued residence in Castro's Cuba.

THE SOCIETAL REACTION TO DEVIANCE: ASCRIPTIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PSYCHIATRIC SCREENING OF MENTAL PATIENTS IN A MIDWESTERN STATE

THOMAS J. SCHEFF
(with the assistance of Daniel M. Culver)
University of California, Santa Barbara

The case for making the societal reaction to deviance a major independent variable in studies of deviant behavior has been succinctly stated by Kitsuse:

> "A sociological theory of deviance must focus specifically upon the interactions which not only define behaviors as deviant but also organize and activate the application of sanctions by individuals, groups, or agencies. For in modern society, the socially significant differentiation of deviants from the non-deviant population is increasingly contingent upon circumstances of situation, place, social and personal biography, and the bureaucratically organized activities of agencies of control."[1]

In the case of mental disorder, psychiatric diagnosis is one of the crucial steps which "organizes and activates"

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[1] John I. Kitsuse, "Societal Reaction to Deviant Behavior: Problems of Theory and Method", *Social Problems,* 9 (Winter, 1962), pp. 247-257.