

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

18

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TO : Department of State

737.00(W)/6-851

JUN 15

FROM : HABANA 2434 June 8, 1951

Action Assigned to *Vincelette*

REF :

Action Taken *not*

SUBJECT : WEEKA NO. 23 FOR STATE, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR DEPARTMENTS
FROM SANA

Date of Action *6-8-51*

Action Office Symbol *180*

Action Office *Vincelette*

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SECTION I

POLITICAL

Cuban Communists claimed that 175,000 signatures have been obtained so far in support of a "peace pact among the five great powers". Allegedly, 110,000 signatures were obtained in Habana Province and 40,000 in Oriente. Leaders are exhorting militants to step up the campaign, particularly in the other four provinces.

An Embassy officer, recently returned from an inspection trip through the island, reports that the Communist campaign is meeting with an apathetic response in practically all areas. Many confuse it - or rightly associate it - with the earlier Stockholm Declaration which received much adverse publicity in the non-Communist press.

A counter-campaign undertaken by the Embassy is beginning to make itself felt, not only in the daily press, but also in the official C.T.C. labor journals distributed throughout Cuba and to other American republics. An example is the C.T.C.'s "Noticuario Obrero Internacional (2nd issue) of May 22 which carried two articles, one written by the Embassy and both supplied by it. One was entitled "The Struggle Against Communism. What 'Peace' means to the Soviets", the other, "The Struggle Against Communism. The new and false Treaty of Peace". Another instance of the counter-campaign was the publication of a statement by the Acting Mayor of Santiago de Cuba retracting his signing of the call for a peace pact and warning others against the Communist trick. The retraction was brought about through the combined efforts of this Embassy and the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba.

The Communist leadership is urging militants 1) to sign up new affiliates for the October 7 party "reorganizations", and 2) to support the Communist press through purchases of publications, paying up and obtaining new subscriptions, etc. The Communists are continuing their daily campaign against the sending of Cuban troops to Korea. During

ETCrain:rc

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the past two or three days they have begun to look askance at their former idol MOSSADEGH, asserting that his latest actions in Iran's oil controversy have been "highly suspicious" (the responsible press has stuck to factual reporting on the Iran issue). In local politics the Reds are busily promoting the idea of a Popular Front and telling the faithful to be prepared to vote for non-Communist candidates should that best serve P.S.P. purposes.

The Supreme Court's decision upholding Judge Harold MEDINA's verdict against Communist leaders in the U. S. has been very well received. Responsible newspapers are stating in editorials that the decision can be taken as a guidance by the OAR in arriving at a legal definition of Communism. Anti-Catholic action by the Chinese Reds is also beginning to have its effect here.

The submission to the House of a resolution proposing that efforts be made to bring Albizu CAMPOS to Cuba (Weeka 22 June 1) has been followed by 1) a student FEU resolution proposing that the Puerto Rican nationalist be given a guarantee of personal rights and be examined by a U.N. doctor, and 2) a violent article published in Rep. MASFERRER's Tiempo accusing the U. S. of trying to discredit Albizu Campos politically by casting doubts as to his sanity, and by planning to assassinate him "just as the U. S. laid an ambush for the assassination of SANDINO", but making it appear he died a natural death. The Embassy has requested information as to his actual physical condition and the medical attention he is receiving.

With election day^{1/} now less than a year away and party reorganizations scheduled for early October, the pre-electoral period may be said to be well on its way. So far it is a race between three groups: CHIBAS' Ortodoxos (with possible Communist backing), BATISTA's P.A.U. (plus any alliances he may be able to muster) and the government P.R.C. (A) coalition. The latter suffers from the fact that no candidate has been announced. The action of Minister of Defense de LEON (Weeka 22, June 1, 1951) in retiring in favor of Carlos HEVIA failed to impress other candidates such as Miguel SUAREZ Fernandez, "Tony" VARONA, Felix LANCIS, etc., who have redoubled their efforts to stay in the race. De Leon is believed by the Embassy to have withdrawn with the approval of the President and possibly at his instigation. The Embassy interprets the move as an unofficial effort on the part of the President to strengthen Hevia's position and as a trial balloon to ascertain Hevia's possibilities before becoming more deeply involved in what might turn out to be a losing proposition.

^{1/} June 1, 1952

So far the PRC (A) is allied with the Liberals and Democratas. It is making serious efforts to expand the group to include GRAU's followers as well as those of Mayor CASTELLANOS and Vice President Alonso PUJOL (who, typically, is the central figure in the current negotiations). There is a fair chance these efforts may succeed, in which case the government coalition would find itself in a strong unified position against a divided opposition. The immediate obstacle to such unity is the reluctance of the various government aspirants (especially Suarez Fernandez) to renounce their ambitions.

ARMY

In a conversation with the Cuban Army Liaison Officer on June 6 the Army Attaché was informed that the Cuban Army is making no preparations for the training of the battalion for Korea. There is apparently little expectation in Army circles of any congressional action in the near future to authorize the sending of Cuban troops to Korea.

NAVY

Negative.

AIR

Negative.



C. Burke Elbrick
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Participants:

CBElbrick, DWGClark,
ETCrain, REGomez,
Schaffer (MA),
Ryan (NA), Mason (AA)

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