Communism obtained a firm beachhead in this hemisphere under a Republican Administration. A Republican Administration—not a Democratic—watched Castro come to power. Republicans—not Democrats—countenanced the conversion of Cuba into an outpost of the Soviet Union in the New World in defiance of inter-American obligations and the Monroe Doctrine.

Castro signed his first agreement with the Soviets in February 1960 and with the Red Chinese in July. Cuba established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in May 1960 and with the Soviet satellites and Red China in succeeding months. On July 9, 1960 Premier Khrushchev made his offer to support Cuba with Russian rockets, and President Dorticos replied the following day hailing, as he put it, "the message of solidarity spoken by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union." Soviet arms in large quantities soon followed. On January 2, 1961 Castro paraded these weapons for the world to see.

All during this period he heaped calumny, scorn and ridicule on the United States, culminating with an order that the American Embassy in Habana reduce its personnel
to the point where we had little choice but to break relations. He also defied the Organization of American States and got away with it. Two meetings of Foreign Ministers not only failed to take any action against him but did not even mention Cuba by name.

Meanwhile, Castro was constructing the apparatus of a Communist state in Cuba. He reneged on his pledge to follow the 1940 constitution and hold elections. He destroyed freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He converted the educational system into a mechanism for propaganda and indoctrination. He did away with free labor unions and associations of professional groups. He confiscated private property, including close to a billion dollars worth of property belonging to United States citizens and the United States Government. He set up mass organizations—communist style—covering women, youth, farm workers and industrial workers and forced the disbandment of private associations. He created the people's militia and the revolutionary courts. With the aid of Communist Bloc technicians, he established an elaborate nationwide police apparatus complete with a far-flung system of informers.
By the end of 1960 Cuba was locked fast in the grip of a communist dictatorship.

The objective of the Democratic Administration has been and continues to be a truly free Cuba, from which communism has been removed and which lives in peace and harmony with its neighbors. This Administration has regarded and continues to regard the communist regime as temporary. The policy and all the programs of this Administration toward Cuba are aimed at this objective. As a result of those programs, the present regime is not a military threat to us or to Latin America. Nor will we ever permit it to become a military threat. The subversive threat posed by Cuba to Latin America has been contained and reduced by the actions of this Administration taken unilaterally and in cooperation with the other members of the OAS. The Cuban regime has been ostracized in this hemisphere. Its economy is a shambles. The appeal of Castroism in Latin America, so marked in 1960, has been sharply reduced.

In addition to being effective, the Cuban policy of this Administration is measured and responsible. It takes into account the real nature and dimensions of the current threat which the Cuban regime represents. It takes
into account the fundamental necessity of viewing Cuba, not in isolation, but in the context of the shifting worldwide confrontation between the worlds of communism and free men. It takes into account the mutuality of our alliances, which establish rights and responsibilities not only for us but also for our allies. It takes into account the great truth that we are a nation which lives by the rule of law and respects its international agreements. It takes into account the awesome and unshirkable responsibilities we bear as one of the two nations which have it in their power to reduce the world to chaos. It is a truly realistic policy.
Responsibility for Bay of Pigs

The Bay of Pigs expedition was a mistake for which President Kennedy and other Administration leaders accepted their full share of responsibility.

The expedition failed because of a serious miscalculation about the extent to which the island had been organized as a communist police state during 1960.

A far graver mistake was made by the Republican Administration in permitting communism to take over Cuba in 1959 and 1960.

In the summer of 1960 the Republican Party Platform claimed that the Eisenhower Administration refused to "tolerate the establishment in this hemisphere of any government dominated by the foreign rule of communism". Nevertheless, when the Kennedy Administration came to office, a full-blown communist regime was in power in Cuba.

The Cuban Freedom Fighters went into Cuba voluntarily and fully aware of the risks involved. The "ransoming" of the prisoners was a humanitarian act carried out with private funds and contributed materials through the American Red Cross.
Failure to Press Advantage During Missile Crisis to Force Soviets Out of Cuba

The objective during the missile crisis was to force the Soviets to withdraw their offensive weapons systems from Cuba. We fully achieved this objective. The Soviets withdrew their missiles and bombers. In choosing the tactics to attain this absolutely essential goal, we avoided confronting the Soviets with unacceptable conditions which could have led to an escalation of the crisis with the most serious risk of nuclear war.

In a statement on November 20, 1962 President Kennedy indicated that the Soviets would also withdraw their troops from the island. In the months since the missile crisis the Soviets have gradually reduced the number of military personnel on the island. The total withdrawn over the past two years has been very substantial. The withdrawals are continuing.

The handling of the missile crisis in which the issue of war and peace hung in a most delicate balance is an example of the highest kind of responsible statesmanship. The margin for miscalculation was too narrow to permit reckless brinkmanship.
On September 13, 1962 President Kennedy said: "...If at any time the communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our Base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

The Administration's action in the missile crisis speaks eloquently about the fulfillment of this pledge. The offensive weapons were immediately removed and the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel started. Today, only a small fraction of the more than 20,000 Soviet soldiers estimated to have been in Cuba at the height of the missile crisis remains. The withdrawals still continue, and the personnel remaining are engaged primarily in training.
On December 12, 1962, President Kennedy said, "...it is our best judgment that the missiles have been removed from Cuba..." and he added, "...we will continue to use our own method of verification, which we believe gives us assurances against a reintroduction of these weapons into Cuba...". We have no reason to believe that any have been reintroduced since 1962. All reports of the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba are carefully checked as a matter of continuing priority interest. Aerial surveillance is one of the principal methods for doing this. Regarding this surveillance, President Johnson stated on April 21, 1964, "I do think that it is essential that we maintain surveillance and know whether any missiles are being shipped into Cuba."

"We will have to maintain our reconnaissance and our overflights. Any action on their part to stop that would be a very serious action. We have so informed them and informed their friends." On June 2, 1964, he reaffirmed our position when he said: "This nation, in order to protect its people, must have a knowledge of what is taking place, and we propose to keep informed."

There are occasional reports of large Soviet or Cuban submarine pens in Cuba. There never have been nor are there now any submarine pens in Cuba.
Success of the Economic Boycott

We are gratified by the results of our efforts--taken in common with our allies--to deny to the Cuban regime the industrial resources of the free world. These results would not have been possible without patient, determined and consistent day-to-day diplomatic activities at all levels.

What are these results?

First of all, the Castro regime is a pariah among the American Republics. Its total trade with the hemisphere has fallen from about $1.2 billion in 1958 to about $45 million in 1963. For example, the total trade of the United States with Cuba which totaled about $1 billion in 1958 had by 1963 been virtually halted. Existing commerce is now restricted to the export each month from the United States of a few thousand dollars of medicines and medical supplies.

Moreover, the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics have just concluded a meeting in Washington to hear Venezuela's complaint of Cuban aggression. The Foreign Ministers by an impressive majority approved measures which will virtually complete the political, economic and psychological ostracism of the Castro regime from the hemisphere.

Secondly, the Castro-directed economy is in a mess. The Gross National Product remains at least 15 percent below the
figure for 1958 of $2.6 billion. Taking into account the
growth of population, the per capita decrease in the GNP is
even higher. Industry remains stagnant and its products
shoddy; sugar production--mainstay of the economy--has dropped
almost 45 percent in three years--from 6.8 million metric
tons in 1961 to an estimated 3.8 million in 1964. The indus-
trial plant--primarily of western origin--deteriorates for
want of spare parts. All basic foods and household neces-
sities are rationed. Rationing allotments are often not met
and inferior items substituted.

Cuban labor in the absence of material incentives has
lost its enthusiasm for work. Absenteeism and low produc-
tivity plague the regime. Labor has rebelled against the
coercion growing out of enforced production norms, the stan-
dardization of wage scales, and a military draft rigged to
provide cheap labor for the regime. Seventy percent of the
arable land is under state control.

The Cuban economy is expected to operate at a low,
stagnated level for at least the next two years.

Cuba's economic plight is the result of external pressures
and the Castro regime's ineptitude and mismanagement. For
example, the supply of industrial and agricultural spare parts and of transportation and power plant equipment has been sharply restricted. For want of external and internal transportation equipment, perishables have rotted and durables rusted away. Because of shortages of convertible currency, the purchase of essential items has been severely limited.

Thirdly, total Cuban trade with the free world dropped nearly 80 percent between 1958 and 1963. Recent publicity given the sales of British buses to Cuba and a few other West European contracts for exports to Cuba has obscured the fact that our European allies have cooperated in controlling the export of items critical to the Cuban economy and have totally denied strategic goods to Cuba.

The estimated temporary increase in total free world trade with Cuba in 1964—the result of inflated world sugar prices in 1963 and early 1964—is overshadowed by the expected sharp drop in Cuban earning capacity in 1965 and 1966. Sugar prices have fallen from a peak of 13 cents a pound a year ago to less than 5 cents a pound at the present time. Sugar futures for 1965 indicate a further decline. The Castro regime will probably have to expand sugar production by at least 20 percent
in 1965 to earn as much foreign exchange as in 1964. Such expansion is unlikely. Moreover, Soviet requirements for Cuban sugar may further reduce the supplies available to the free world.

Fourth, Cuba is heavily in debt to the Communist Bloc, upon which it heavily relies for economic assistance. Communist aid to Cuba in the period 1960-1963 amounted to more than $1 billion in balance-of-payments and development credits. The very great bulk of this assistance came from the USSR itself, a sharp drain on Soviet resources. The end is not in sight. The prospective decline in Cuban earnings suggests that Cuba is likely to need further substantial Soviet assistance in 1965 and again in 1966.

Finally, the effectiveness of our systematic program of denial has been admitted by Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara. Cuban leaders have struggled--in vain--to prevent the deterioration of their western-equipped economy. The Soviet Union has not been able to supply substitute parts in the quality and quantity required. Castro therefore attempted to increase trade with western nations. He has met with only limited success. Moreover, his temporary windfall from sugar sales
is fast declining. His credit rating--always shaky--will be increasingly questioned by exporters and by governments in 1965 and 1966.
Success of Our Sea and Air Isolation of Cuba

This Administration by its own actions and its almost daily pressure on our allies is working to isolate Cuba from the inter-American system and the free world. This policy is working. The number of calls by free world vessels at Cuban ports in 1963 was 60 percent lower than in 1962. In 1964 we anticipate a further drop.

As for air communication with the free world, there is today only one free world airline providing scheduled passenger service to and from Cuba once a week. In October 1962 four free world airlines operated 20 flights a week.

On July 26, 1964 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS countries decided that the American States/"...should suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature."

This decision is obligatory for all OAS members. Its implementation will virtually seal off Cuba in the field of transportation from the rest of the hemisphere. The only exception will be the one Cuban airline service between Habana and Mexico. It will also further facilitate the control of travel of Latin American subversives to and from Cuba.
As a result of this Administration's own measures to restrict sea and air communication with Cuba, ships trading with Cuba cannot load United States Government-financed cargoes from United States ports. We have also vigorously enforced those provisions of the Foreign Aid Act of 1963 which withhold aid to countries whose aircraft or ships are engaged in the Cuba trade.
The Control of Castro's Subversive Activities

The continuing policy of the Castro regime to promote terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla warfare in an effort to overthrow established governments of the hemisphere has been amply demonstrated. The United States has been fully aware of the threat of Castro-inspired subversion and has moved promptly and effectively to combat this menace through multilateral, bilateral and unilateral means.

Our common effort with the other nations of the hemisphere commenced with the formal finding of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, meeting at Punta del Este in January 1962, that the Castro regime was incompatible with the inter-American system. The United States has provided strong leadership, through regional and sub-regional forums, in the development of detailed programs to reduce the capacity and will of the Cuban Government to disrupt the political order and economic progress of Latin America.

Our efforts have concentrated on countering 1) Cuban attempts to indoctrinate and train selected Latin American trainees in the techniques of subversion and guerrilla
warfare; 2) the movement of Cuban propaganda material; 3) the supply of arms and other equipment to Latin American terrorists and insurrectionaries; and 4) the movement of funds for subversive purposes to and within the Latin American countries.

The Council of the OAS, acting under the Punta del Este decisions, is maintaining vigilance over Cuban attempts at aggression and subversion, and has prepared a series of recommendations to member governments calling for specific measures to control subversive travel and the movement of funds and propaganda. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS meeting in Washington in July 1964, in addition to obtaining measures further to isolate the Cuban regime politically and economically, established the position that subversion as practiced by Castro is aggression and warned the Cuban Government that the full weight of the Rio Treaty provisions will be applied if such activity is not halted.

The six countries of the Central American isthmus are special targets of Cuban subversion. In recognition of that fact, the nature and extent of subversion was thoroughly discussed by President Kennedy and the Isthmian Presidents at
San Jose, Costa Rica in March 1963. As a consequence, the respective ministers responsible for internal security met at Managua in April 1963 and at San Salvador in January 1964 to develop common measures to control subversive activity. Specifically, the ministers recommended to their governments that steps be taken to: 1) prohibit travel of their citizens to Cuba; 2) impede clandestine arms shipments; 3) prevent the introduction of propaganda material; 4) establish a cooperative system of surveillance to identify and halt movement of subversive persons, propaganda and weapons; and 5) establish organizations in each country to coordinate the counter-subversive program. Another ministerial-level meeting is to be held in Tegucigalpa in September to assess the progress already made and to take further measures.

In all of these multilateral actions, the United States has encouraged a realization of the extent of the subversion threat and the adoption of necessary counter-measures, and has pledged moral, material and technical support to the national and collective programs.

Bilaterally, our military advisory program and the AID public safety program are aimed at enhancing the internal
security capabilities of the military and police forces of the host governments, helping them to meet and overcome the threat of violence and subversion. This high-priority program has achieved solid results and is being intensified.

In the unilateral sector, the United States, in July 1963, denied Cuba access to a substantial part of the international financial system when it froze all dollar transactions with the Cuban Government or with citizens of Cuba. A central objective of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations was to deny to the Castro regime dollars to finance its subversive apparatus in the other countries of Latin America. The US controls on travel to Cuba by American citizens have been executed in consonance with the OAS recommendations in this field.

As a result of this series of interlocking measures, the Castro regime is encountering increasing difficulties in carrying out its policy of subversion:

- Cuba is politically isolated from the rest of the hemisphere. The United States and 15 other countries of the hemisphere have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the Castro regime is excluded from the OAS.
- Cuba is physically isolated from Latin America. Air service, interrupted at the time of the missile crisis, has never resumed previous schedules. In fact, Cubana's flights to Mexico City two-three times weekly and the weekly flights to Madrid by Cubana and Iberia Airlines represent Cuba's only scheduled air links with the entire free world. There is no passenger ship service between Cuba and the free world.

- The governments of the OAS countries are either limiting the travel of their citizens to Cuba or maintaining close surveillance over travelers who do go. The travel control and aviation control programs resulted in a very substantial drop in the number of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba.

- Increasing awareness by the Latin Americans of the nature and extent of the subversive threat, coupled with improved capabilities to maintain internal public order, has seriously hampered the activities of subversive elements in many areas of the hemisphere.
The United States is cooperating with other interested countries in maintaining a surveillance system for the purpose of identifying and intercepting subversive shipments from Cuba to neighboring countries.

Finally, Castro has suffered serious setbacks in several countries which were major targets for his subversive offensive:

- In Venezuela, where the Cuban regime supported the insurgent PALN terrorists with training, propaganda and weapons, the police and military were able to control the situation, and the Venezuelan people overwhelmingly repudiated the revolutionaries in the elections held last December. The discovery of the Cuban arms cache on a Venezuelan beach resulted in the OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting in Washington, which condemned Cuba's subversive activity and imposed further sanctions against the Castro regime.

- The problem which flared up between the United States and Panama during January presented Castro with what appeared to be an ideal opportunity to exacerbate the conflict and to assume leadership of those Panamanian groups willing to commit themselves to violence. Instead, order was restored and differences are being settled by negotiations.
- In Brazil, Castro was preparing to take advantage of a rapidly deteriorating political and economic situation, and in fact was maintaining close liaison with those individuals and groups advocating violence as the solution to Brazil's problems. This opportunity, however, was suddenly denied Castro by the coup which removed the Goulart government.

We have sound reason to be pleased by the results thus far of the many measures which have been taken with US support and leadership to neutralize the dangers of Castro-communist subversion. But the adversary is determined and clever, and our efforts, built upon the base already established, must continue without slackening.
Unleashing the Exiles and Recognition of a Cuban Government-in-Exile

This Administration enforces the applicable laws of the United States to prevent the use of our territory for launching, manning or equipping hit-and-run raids against Cuba by Cuban refugee groups. This policy in no way reflects lack of sympathy with the cause of freeing Cuba from communist domination. We believe that there are more effective ways of working toward this objective.

President Kennedy on April 3, 1963 summed up the position of this Administration regarding hit-and-run raids against Cuba by Cuban refugee groups when he said: "...we don't think they are effective, we don't think they weaken Castro..." They..."may assist him in maintaining his control."

We also believe that these raids might provoke armed reprisals, the brunt of which would have to be borne by United States Armed Forces. President Kennedy pointed this out when he said that when American territory was being used and..."these issues of war and peace hang in the balance,... the United States Government and authorities should... have a position of some control in the matter."

It is illusory and irresponsible to suggest that Cuban exile elements themselves could overcome, by military assault,
the forces of the Castro regime. Such an operation could be carried out only by direct and large-scale involvement of United States armed forces. The present nature and dimensions of the threat posed by the communist regime—a subversive and not a military threat—do not warrant resort to such a measure.

This Administration has rejected the idea of a Cuban Government-in-Exile for several reasons.

First, our policy is based on the fundamental premise that the Cuban people themselves will decide how they will achieve and organize their freedom. This means that those now within Cuba must have a major share of that responsibility. A Government-in-Exile constituted solely of exiles would give those in Cuba who are struggling against communism, or who might be disposed to turn against the regime the idea that they are being disregarded and will have no role to play in determining how Cuba will be governed.

Second, the problem of finding a government capable of uniting a majority of the exiles is virtually an impossible task. Unity among exile groups is something only they, and they alone, can achieve. It cannot be imposed.
Third, our consistent policy has been to recognize governments in exile only when they have a direct constitutional connection with the last constituted government of the country, usually when they have exercised power in the country just prior to being forced out.

Finally, there is a legal issue involved in this question. A Republican Administration recognized the Castro regime as the legitimate government of Cuba. Although diplomatic relations were broken with the Castro regime on January 3, 1961, that regime continued to be recognized as the Government of Cuba. That is true today. We hold the Castro regime responsible for its international obligations, including the protection of United States citizens and the recognition of our rights under the Guantanamo Treaty. Recognition of a Government-in-Exile might put these rights in legal jeopardy.
Control on US Travel to Cuba

Controls on the travel of American citizens to Cuba were instituted in mid-January 1961, shortly after the rupture of diplomatic relations. Under the controls, which are based on the pertinent provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, American passports include the notation that they are not valid for travel to Cuba, and such travel is possible only if specific validations are given.

The controls are enforced for several reasons. First, the US Government is unable, in the absence of diplomatic relations, to provide normal protection to its citizens traveling in Cuba. Second, unrestricted travel to Cuba would tend to give the Cuban Government an aura of respectability. Third—and this is very important—the Council of the Organization of American States has recommended to all the American Governments the restriction of travel by their citizens to Cuba as a means of curtailing Castro's promotion of subversion in the hemisphere. We intend to support this cooperative effort by maintaining and enforcing our Cuban travel control regulations.

The policy of travel isolation does not mean that no US citizen can travel to Cuba. Under established procedures,
Americans desiring to go to Cuba must apply to the Department of State for a specific endorsement of their passport authorizing such travel. Such endorsements are granted when the proposed travel is considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Specifically, legitimate newsmen have been permitted to go to Cuba to enable them to observe the Cuban scene and to keep the American public informed on the true situation there. Recognized scholars able to demonstrate a definite need for first-hand research in Cuba have been permitted to go. Also, American Red Cross personnel and others traveling for urgent humanitarian reasons have received the necessary endorsement.

US citizens who travel to Cuba without receiving the special endorsement are subject to having their passports invalidated by the Department of State and are liable to prosecution by the Department of Justice.

The group of American students who traveled to Cuba during the summer of 1963 did so despite specific and repeated warnings by US authorities that such travel violated the Federal travel restrictions to Cuba. When the students, ignoring these warnings, continued on their trip, the
Department of State sent letters to their last known address, stating that their passports had been withdrawn.

Upon their return, some students surrendered their passports, which were stamped "NOT VALID - TENTATIVELY WITHDRAWN". A second letter stating the passports had been withdrawn, and having the same legal effect as physically stamping the passports, was given to each student. These passports have remained invalid pending petitions for State Department hearings by the individual travelers.

As a result of Justice Department investigations, a Federal Grand Jury indicted four persons for having instigated and organized the students' trip. The four were charged with "unlawfully, willingly and knowingly conspiring to induce, recruit and arrange for Americans to travel to Cuba in violation of the regulations". The case is currently pending in the courts.

Possible courses of action against the American students now traveling in Cuba in violation of the regulations are being determined jointly by the Departments of State and Justice.
**Surveillance Flights Over Cuba and the Noninvasion Pledge**

When President Kennedy informed the American people on November 20, 1962 that the Soviet offensive weapons systems had been dismantled and withdrawn, he noted that important parts of his understanding with Chairman Khrushchev remained to be carried out. These parts included failure of the Cuban Government to permit on-site verification of the removal of the offensive weapons and the lack of agreement on safeguards against their reintroduction in the future. "Consequently," he said, "if the Western Hemisphere is to be protected against offensive weapons, this government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba." Authority to conduct surveillance was clearly established in the OAS Resolution unanimously adopted on October 23, 1962.

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have continued aerial surveillance over Cuba since that time to maintain the security of the hemisphere and to reassure the American people that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba. The surveillance is purely defensive. The aircraft are unarmed and carry out their missions in a manner designed to get the job done with minimum risk of an incident.
The Castro regime, supported by the Soviet Union, has indicated that the overflights are intolerable and wants them stopped. But Castro has stated he plans to take no direct action until first raising the matter in the United Nations. Shortly after Castro announced the Cuban stand, President Johnson made clear our determination to maintain surveillance. At a news conference on April 22 he said: "We will have to maintain our reconnaissance and our overflights. Any action on their (Cuba's) part to stop that would be a very serious action. We have so informed them and their friends."

The understanding reached by President Kennedy with Chairman Khrushchev in October 1962 contemplated this quid pro quo: if the Soviets met certain conditions regarding on-site verification of the withdrawal of the offensive weapons and future safeguards against their reintroduction, the United States would give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and attempt to get other American States to do likewise. President Kennedy further explained the scope of the understanding on November 20, 1962 when he said: "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of the hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day
be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Khrushchev was unable to carry out his side of the bargain. Castro in the meantime has continued his promotion of subversion. The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics on July 26 of this year warned the Cuban Government that should it persist in carrying out acts of aggression and intervention, as it did against Venezuela, the American States "shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere."
Accommodation with Castro

This Administration has stated that it is opposed to the establishment anywhere in the Americas of governments dominated by foreign powers. This is a historic policy of the Democratic Party. President Kennedy stated on January 30, 1961 that this Administration objected to the domination of the Cuban people by "... foreign and domestic tyrannies" and that "... Communist domination in this Hemisphere can never be negotiated."

On July 17, 1963 President Kennedy again stated our policy: "... the United States has indicated very clearly that we do not accept the existence and cannot coexist in a peaceful sense with a Soviet satellite in the Caribbean."

President Johnson was asked on July 10, 1964, about Fidel Castro's offer to negotiate with the United States and he replied: "I am much more interested in deeds than words."

Our basic position has been and continues to be that there are two elements in the Cuban situation which are not negotiable. These are: Castro's ties of dependency with the Soviet Union which are tantamount
to Soviet domination of the regime, and Castro's continuing promotion of subversion elsewhere in the Hemisphere. There will be no retreat from our policy toward the Castro regime. Moreover, we regard that regime as temporary. With the other nations of this hemisphere, we expect the Cuban people to regain their freedom and rejoin the inter-American system.
United States Leadership in the OAS to Achieve Collective Measures Against Cuba

Two Meetings of Foreign Ministers were held in 1959 and 1960 to consider situations affecting the peace of the hemisphere arising in whole or in part from the interventionist activities of the Castro regime. Not only did these meetings take no action against the Castro regime—they did not even mention Cuba by name.

The task of taking effective action against the Castro regime fell to Democratic Administrations. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations accepted the challenge and have played a leading role in the OAS in obtaining strong collective measures against the Castro regime. This is the record of the Democratic Administrations:

1. At the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, the American Governments took their first, historic stand against communism in Cuba by excluding the Castro regime from the Organization of American States. Earlier, in November and December 1961, the US participated in the investigation made by the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Castro régime which served as the basis for the Punta del Este action.
2. The United States took the initiative in convening an informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers in October 1962, which helped to pave the way for strong collective action under the Rio Treaty when the missile crisis broke three weeks later.

3. United States leadership is responsible for the precedent-setting OAS action on October 23, 1962 which played such a significant role in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba. This decision also gave us a sound legal basis for the surveillance flights over Cuba which we have maintained since that time.

4. The United States under President Johnson took an active part in the OAS investigation of the Cuban arms cache found in Venezuela. The findings of this investigation served in turn as the basis for the strong sanctions taken by the 9th Meeting of Foreign Ministers against Cuba in July of this year. The sanctions imposed are:

   a. That the governments of the American States not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba;

   b. That the governments of the American States suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with
Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and

c. That the governments of the American States suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

The OAS action also included a stiff warning to the Castro regime to stop forthwith in promoting subversion against other American governments. The warning reads as follows:

To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.

5. The United States has taken the lead in the OAS and with the Isthmian countries in developing measures
for countering Cuban subversion, particularly with regard to propaganda, funds and travel. These multilateral measures have been accompanied by a stepped-up bilateral program to strengthen the counter-insurgency capabilities of individual countries. The vehicles for this cooperation are the Military Assistance Program and the Public Safety (Police) Programs of the Agency for International Development.
This Administration has no intention of agreeing to any change in the status of our Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. We will take all necessary steps to insure its defense.

Our rights in Guantanamo are based on international agreements with Cuba. They include the exercise by the United States of complete jurisdiction and control over the area. These rights cannot be modified or abrogated without the agreement of the United States.

The importance of the Base to this country never has been seriously challenged, and its strategic position for our security arrangements in the Caribbean sea area has been underscored by every Administration since the Base was established.

The importance of the Base to the security of the Continent was again demonstrated two years ago when the Soviet Union audaciously moved to place strategic missiles in Cuba—and failed. In view of the continuing intimate ties which exist between the Cuban regime and the communist world, Guantanamo remains more important than ever to the
defense of the entire hemisphere. It should be underscored that the Base poses no threat to the Castro regime—so long as it takes no hostile action against the Base—or to the Cuban people. In fact, the Base always maintained excellent working relations with Cuban officials and the people of the area until the Castro regime came to power. The Base has also contributed substantially in the past to the economic welfare of that section of Cuba.

Last February Castro cut off the Base water supply. President Johnson directed that the Base reduce its dependency on the Castro regime. This has been done.

The Cuban regime has increasingly launched irresponsible propaganda attacks on the Base, its Commander, Rear Admiral Bulkeley, and Base personnel. The charges focus for the most part on false accusations that United States Marine guards have shot and wounded or killed Cuban guards around the perimeter of the Base. These charges are not true. They have been fully investigated and found to be complete fabrications. To counter the Cuban big-lie technique, the State and Defense Departments have moved quickly and emphatically to deny them.