Elian Gonzalez (``Plaintiff''), a 6-year-old child from Cuba, has made his way to
 the United States. Plaintiff, as an alien, submitted an application for asylum . . .
 to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (``INS''). His father asked, in effect,
 that the application be withdrawn. After an investigation, the INS -- deciding that
 Plaintiff could not apply for asylum himself and that, under the circumstances,
 only his father could seek asylum on Plaintiff's behalf -- concluded that there was
 no reason not to honor the father's request and, accordingly, refused to consider
 Plaintiff's application. Plaintiff then brought suit in federal district court challenging
 on several grounds the INS's refusal to consider his application. The district court
 rejected Plaintiff's claims.

 Plaintiff has appealed the district court's decision to this Court. His appeal is
 scheduled to be argued orally next month. Plaintiff, however, now moves for an
 injunction ``to preclude [Plaintiff's] physical removal from the jurisdiction of the
 United States during the pendency of this appeal.'' We conclude that Plaintiff is
 entitled to such an injunction and grant the motion.

 In considering a motion for injunction pending appeal, we examine four factors: (1)
 whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits of his appeal; (2) whether, if
 we do not issue an injunction, the movant will suffer irreparable harm; (3) whether,
 if we issue an injunction, any other party will suffer substantial harm; and (4)
 whether an injunction would serve the public interest, See In re. Grand Jury
 Proceedings (11th Cir. 1992). Although the first factor is generally the most
 important, the movant need not always show that he probably will succeed on the
 merits of his appeal. Garcia-Mir v. Meese (11th Cir. 1986). Instead, where the
 ``balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the [injunction],'' the
 movant need only show a ``substantial case on the merits.''

 In this case, the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of enjoining the
 removal of Plaintiff from the U.S. pending appeal. And Plaintiff has made a
 ``substantial case on the merits'' of his appeal.

 1. BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES

 The equities, in this case, weigh heavily in favor of issuing an injunction pending
 appeal. Apart from concerns about what might happen to this child if he is
 returned to Cuba (which we do not address), if Plaintiff leaves the United States
 during the pendency of his appeal, his case will likely become moot. Our failure to
 issue an injunction pending appeal, therefore, could strip the Court of jurisdiction
 over this case and deprive Plaintiff forever of something of great value: his day in a
 court of law. That circumstance alone presents a significant risk of irreparable
 harm to Plaintiff.

 In addition, we doubt that an injunction would harm the INS. Plaintiff has been in
 the United States for nearly five months. The INS refused to consider Plaintiff's
 application for asylum more than three months ago. The INS, however, has not
 sought to remove Plaintiff in the meantime from the United States. The suggestion
 that an injunction pending appeal, prohibiting the removal of Plaintiff from the
 United States until Plaintiff's expedited appeal is decided on the merits, will harm
 the INS is not compelling.

 Nor do we believe that an injunction pending appeal in this case would offend the
 public interest. The INS, in opposition to Plaintiff's motion, invokes the
 well-established authority of the political branches of government in immigration
 affairs. We fully recognize the plenary power of Congress over immigration
 matters. See Jean v. Nelson (11th Cir. 1984). But we fail to see how an injunction
 in this case infringes upon the congressional power; after all, the heart of
 Plaintiff's appeal is that the INS by refusing to consider Plaintiff's asylum
 application has disregarded the command of Congress. And we doubt that
 protecting a party's day in court, when he has an appeal of arguable merit, is
 contrary to the public interest. We therefore, conclude that the equities weigh
 heavily in favor of granting an injunction pending appeal.

 2. SUBSTANTIAL CASE ON THE MERITS

 This case is mainly about statutory construction and the proper exercise of
 executive discretion. Among other things, we must ultimately decide what
 Congress meant when it said:

 Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the
 United States . . . irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in
 accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.

 Plaintiff argues that the INS's refusal even to consider his application violates 8
 U.S.C. 1158(a). The INS contends that, because Plaintiff is a 6-year-old child, he
 is incompetent to submit an application on his own behalf and that, on the facts of
 this case, he must have his father submit the application for him. Because his
 father did not do so, the INS contends that Plaintiff never actually applied for
 asylum and that, therefore no application exists for its consideration. Even
 accepting as we do the principles of deference set out in Chevron v.
 Natural-Resources Defense Council Inc. (1984), we at this time have doubt, in the
 light of the record and Plaintiff's arguments on appeal, about the correctness of
 the INS's interpretation of section 1158.

 In considering an agency's interpretation of a statute, we first must examine the
 plain meaning of the pertinent statutory language: ``If the intent of Congress is
 clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
 effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'' Chevron (1984). The
 statute in this case seems pretty clear. Section 1158(a)(1) provides that ``any
 alien irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum.'' Plaintiff appears
 to come within the meaning of ``any alien.'' And the statute plainly says that such
 an alien ``may apply for asylum.'' We, therefore, question the proposition that, as
 a matter of law, Plaintiff (unless his father consents) cannot exercise the statutory
 right to apply for asylum.

 Congress's provision for ``any alien'' is not uncertain in meaning just because it is
 broad. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, (1998). If Congress had
 meant to include only some aliens, perhaps Congress would not have used the
 words ``any alien.'' In addition, although the INS has the authority to issue
 regulations and procedures governing the submission of asylum applications, the
 INS cannot properly infringe on the plain language of the statute or the clear
 congressional purpose underlying it. See Shoemaker v. Bowen (11th Cir. 1988).
 Nor can the INS properly narrow the scope of a statute through regulation. See
 Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (11th Cir. 1998). At this time, we
 cannot say that ``any alien'' excludes Plaintiff: given the plain language of the
 statute, he might be entitled to apply personally for asylum. Furthermore, it
 seems unclear that an INS decision to treat Plaintiff's application as a nullity
 without an adjudication on the merits is a ``procedure for the consideration of
 [Plaintiff's] asylum application.''

 Not only does the plain language of the statute seem to support Plaintiff's
 argument that he, despite his age, is entitled to apply personally for asylum, the
 present regulatory scheme created by the INS also seems to strengthen Plaintiff's
 position. The existing INS regulations do envision situations where a minor may
 act on his own behalf in immigration matters. Moreover, the regulations
 contemplate that a minor, under some circumstances, may seek asylum against
 the express wishes of his parents. Also, the INS Guidelines for Children's Asylum
 Claims envision that young children will be active and independent participants in
 the asylum adjudication process.

 The INS has not pointed to (nor have we found) statutory, regulatory or guideline
 provisions which place an age-based restriction on an alien's ability to apply for
 asylum. And we have found no preexisting requirement that a minor, in submitting
 an asylum application, must act through the representative selected by the INS.

 Not only does it appear that Plaintiff might be entitled to apply personally for
 asylum, it appears that he did so. According to the record, Plaintiff -- although a
 young child -- has expressed a wish that he not be returned to Cuba. He
 personally signed an application for asylum.

 Plaintiff's cousin, Marisleysis Gonzalez, notified the INS that Plaintiff said he did
 not want to go back to Cuba. And it appears that never have INS officials
 attempted to interview Plaintiff about his own wishes.

 Even if the INS is correct that Plaintiff needs an adult, legal representative for his
 asylum application, it is not clear that the INS, in finding Plaintiff's father to be the
 only proper representative, considered all of the relevant factors -- particularly the
 child's separate and independent interests in seeking asylum. . . . It does not
 appear that the INS ever spoke to or interviewed Plaintiff before making this
 determination. And Lazaro Gonzalez, Plaintiff's great uncle, is no stranger to
 Plaintiff. The INS placed Plaintiff in Lazaro's care upon Plaintiff's arrival in this
 country, and Lazaro is a blood relative. When Lazaro submitted applications for
 asylum on Plaintiff's behalf, Lazaro was the INS's designated representative to
 take care of Plaintiff and to ensure his well-being. Lazaro's interests, to say the
 least, are not obviously hostile to Plaintiff's interests. So, for now, we remain
 unconvinced that the asylum application submitted by Lazaro on behalf of Plaintiff
 necessarily was ineffectual under the law.

 For these reasons and in these circumstances, we believe that Plaintiff has
 presented a substantial case on the merits.

 CONCLUSION

 By its nature, this Order sets out more questions than answers. We have not
 attempted to address every point advanced by both sides, but we have attempted
 to explain our decision to grant the injunction. No one should feel confident in
 predicting the eventual result in this case.

 The true legal merits of this case will be finally decided in the future. More briefing
 is expected. We intend to hear oral argument. We need to think more and hard
 about this case for which no sure and clear answers shine out today. Still,
 because of the arguments presented as well as the potential inconsistencies of
 the INS's present position with the plain language of the statute and with the INS's
 own earlier interpretations of the statute in INS regulations and guidelines, and
 because of the equities in this case, we conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to an
 injunction pending appeal.

 Therefore, it is ordered that:

 (1) Plaintiff, Elian Gonzalez, is enjoined from departing or attempting to depart
 from the United States;

 (2) Any and all persons acting for, on behalf of, or in concert with Plaintiff, Elian
 Gonzalez, are enjoined from aiding or assisting, or attempting to aid or assist, in
 the removal of Plaintiff from the United States;

 (3) All officers, agents, and employees of the United States, including but not
 limited to officers, agents, and employees of the United States Department of
 Justice, are enjoined to take such reasonable and lawful measures as necessary
 to prevent the removal of Plaintiff, Elian Gonzalez, from the United States.

MOTION GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.