Following are excerpts from the ruling today by the United States
           Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta that extended a
           court order keeping Elián González in the United States:

          Elián González ("plaintiff"), a 6-year-old child from Cuba, has made his
          way to the United States. Plaintiff, as an alien, submitted an application for
          asylum to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. His father asked, in
          effect, that the application be withdrawn. After an investigation, the I.N.S.
          -- deciding that plaintiff could not apply for asylum himself and that under
          the circumstances, only his father could seek asylum on plaintiff's behalf --
          concluded that there was no reason not to honor the father's request and,
          accordingly, refused to consider plaintiff's application. Plaintiff then brought
          suit in Federal District Court challenging on several grounds the I.N.S.'s
          refusal to consider his application. The district court rejected plaintiff's
          claims.

          Plaintiff has appealed the district court's decision to this court. His appeal
          is scheduled to be argued orally next month. Plaintiff, however, now moves
          for an injunction "to preclude [plaintiff's ] physical removal from the
          jurisdiction of the United States during the pendency of this appeal." We
          conclude that plaintiff is entitled to such an injunction and grant the motion.

          In considering a motion for injunction pending appeal, we examine four
          factors: (1) whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits of his
          appeal; (2) whether, if we do not issue an injunction, the movant will suffer
          irreparable harm; (3) whether, if we issue an injunction, any other party
          will suffer substantial harm; and (4) whether an injunction would serve the
          public interest. Although the first factor is generally the most important, the
          movant need not always show that he probably will succeed on the merits
          of his appeal. Instead, where the "balance of the equities weighs heavily in
          favor of granting the [injunction]" the movant need only show a "substantial
          case on the merits."

          In this case, the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of enjoining
          the removal of plaintiff from the United States pending appeal. And
          plaintiff has made a "substantial case on the merits" of his appeal.

          1. Balance of the Equities

          The equities, in this case, weigh heavily in favor of issuing an injunction
          pending appeal. Apart from concern about what might happen to this child
          if he is returned to Cuba (which we do not address), if plaintiff leaves the
          United States during the pendency of his appeal, his case will likely
          become moot. Our failure to issue an injunction pending appeal, therefore,
          could strip the court of jurisdiction over this case and deprive plaintiff
          forever of something of great value: his day in a court of law. That
          circumstance alone presents a significant risk of irreparable harm to
          plaintiff.

          In addition, we doubt that an injunction would harm the I.N.S. Plaintiff has
          been in the United States for nearly five months. The I.N.S. refused to
          consider plaintiff's application for asylum more than three months ago. The
          I.N.S., however, has not sought to remove plaintiff in the meantime from
          the United States. The suggestion that an injunction pending appeal,
          prohibiting the removal of plaintiff from the United States until plaintiff's
          expedited appeal is decided on the merits, will harm the I.N.S. is not
          compelling. . . .

          2. Substantial Case on the Merits

          This case is mainly about statutory construction and the proper exercise of
          executive discretion. Among other things, we must ultimately decide what
          Congress meant when it said:

          Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in
          the United States . . . irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for
          asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, Section
          1225(b) of this title. Plaintiff argues that the I.N.S.'s refusal even to
          consider his application violates United States Code Section 1158(a). The
          I.N.S. contends that, because plaintiff is a 6-year-old child, he is
          incompetent to submit an application on his own behalf and that, on the
          facts of this case, he must have his father submit the application for him.
          Because his father did not do so, the I.N.S. contends that plaintiff never
          actually applied for asylum and that, therefore, no application exists for its
          consideration. Even accepting as we do the principles of deference set out
          in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, we at this time have
          doubt, in the light of the record and plaintiff's arguments on appeal, about
          the correctness of the I.N.S.'s interpretation of Section 1158.

          In considering an agency's interpretation of a statute, we first must
          examine the plain meaning of the pertinent statutory language: "If the intent
          of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
          the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
          Congress." The statute in this case seems pretty clear. Section 1158(a)(1)
          provides that "any alien . . . irrespective of such alien's status, may apply
          for asylum." Plaintiff appears to come within the meaning of "any alien."
          And the statute plainly says that such an alien "may apply for asylum." We,
          therefore, question the proposition that, as a matter of law, plaintiff (unless
          his father consents) cannot exercise the statutory right to apply for asylum.

          . . .

          The I.N.S. has not pointed to (nor have we found) statutory, regulatory or
          guideline provisions which place an age-based restriction on an alien's
          ability to apply for asylum. And we have found no pre-existing requirement
          that a minor, in submitting an asylum application, must act through the
          representative selected by the I.N.S.

          Not only does it appear that plaintiff might be entitled to apply personally
          for asylum, it appears that he did so. According to the record, plaintiff --
          although a young child -- has expressed a wish that he not be returned to
          Cuba. He personally signed an application for asylum. Plaintiff's cousin,
          Marisleysis González, notified the I.N.S. that plaintiff said he did not want
          to go back to Cuba. And it appears that never have I.N.S. officials
          attempted to interview plaintiff about his own wishes.

          Even if the I.N.S. is correct that plaintiff needs an adult legal
          representative for his asylum application, it is not clear that the I.N.S., in
          finding plaintiff's father to be the only proper representative, considered all
          of the relevant factors -- particularly the child's separate and independent
          interests in seeking asylum. It does not appear that the I.N.S. ever spoke
          to or interviewed plaintiff before making this determination. And Lázaro
          González, plaintiff's great-uncle, is no stranger to plaintiff. The I.N.S.
          placed plaintiff in Lázaro's care upon plaintiff's arrival in this country, and
          Lázaro is a blood relative. When Lázaro submitted applications for asylum
          on plaintiff's behalf, Lázaro was the I.N.S.'s designated representative to
          take care of plaintiff and to ensure his well-being.

          Lázaro's interests, to say the least, are not obviously hostile to plaintiff's
          interests. So, for now, we remain unconvinced that the asylum application
          submitted by Lázaro on behalf of plaintiff necessarily was ineffectual
          under the law.

          For these reasons and in these circumstances, we believe that plaintiff has
          presented a substantial case on the merits.

          Conclusion

          By its nature, this order sets out more questions than answers. We have
          not attempted to address every point advanced by both sides, but we have
          attempted to explain our decision to grant the injunction. No one should feel
          confident in predicting the eventual result in this case.

          The true legal merits of this case will be finally decided in the future. More
          briefing is expected. We intend to hear oral arguments. We need to think
          more and hard about this case for which no sure and clear answers shine
          out today. Still, because of the arguments presented as well as the potential
          inconsistencies of the I.N.S.'s present position with the plain language of
          the statute and with the I.N.S.'s own earlier interpretations of the statute in
          I.N.S. regulations and guidelines, and because of the equities in this case,
          we conclude that plaintiff is entitled to an injunction pending appeal.

          Therefore, it is ordered that: (1) plaintiff Elián González, is enjoined from
          departing or attempting to depart from the United States; (2) any and all
          persons acting for, on behalf of, or in concert with plaintiff, Elián González,
          are enjoined from aiding or assisting, or attempting to aid or assist in the
          removal of plaintiff from the United States; (3) all officers, agents, and
          employees of the United States, including but not limited to officers, agents,
          and employees of the United States Department of Justice, are enjoined to
          take such reasonable and lawful measures as necessary to prevent the
          removal of plaintiff; Elián González, from the United States.