U.S. Mobilized Hostage Rescue
Elite force alerted for jungle mission before 4 Americans freed in Ecuador
BY JUAN O. TAMAYO
QUITO, Ecuador -- An elite U.S. Delta Force team was
poised to attempt a rescue of four kidnapped Americans
being held in Ecuador's jungle by a band of ex-guerrillas who
had already killed an American hostage and declared their
intention to kill another, U.S. officials say.
Preparations for the high-risk operation, which had been
suggested and rejected twice before by U.S. officials
following the kidnapping in October, were revived after the
murder of an American hostage on Jan. 31.
U.S. Army and Ecuadorean intelligence units believed they
knew the whereabouts of the four American and three foreign
oil workers held in the Ecuadorean Amazon region since
Oct. 12, paving the way for a possible attempt to rescue the
group.
But rescue preparations were called off after the kidnappers
agreed to a $13 million ransom on Feb. 14, following weeks
of hard bargaining that often created strains among the three
ransom-negotiating firms and officials of four governments
involved in the case, knowledgeable sources said.
The use of American forces to rescue private U.S. citizens
held hostage is rare. The U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983,
ostensibly designed to rescue American medical students
held under house arrest during a political crisis on the
island, is one of the few exceptions.
The U.S. Marshals Service sent a hostage rescue team to
Quito in 1995 to help rescue kidnapped American
missionary Donald Coks, but an Ecuadorean police team
chanced on the kidnappers' camp and rescued Coks without
U.S. help, the team's chief said.
But the growing threat of kidnapping -- and the imminent
arrival of more U.S. oil workers in Ecuador -- could well
mean that more Americans will be at risk, posing a critical
dilemma for U.S. policymakers: Use American forces and
inflame anti-American feelings in the region, or do nothing
and watch helplessly as U.S. citizens become easy prey for
kidnappers.
In this case, the hostages were freed March 1, after 141
days in captivity and delivery of the ransom in U.S. $100
bills.
The money was packed in seven boxes weighing more than
900 pounds and pushed off a helicopter as it hovered over a
jungle clearing.
But before the ransom was paid, the execution of hostage
Ronald Sander, the glacial pace of the ransom bargaining
and disputes among the negotiators had left the hostages'
employers and relatives angry -- and threatening lawsuits.
None of the principal players in the case would comment on
the record.
But a dozen U.S. and Ecuadorean government officials,
employees of the firms involved and U.S. security industry
experts interviewed by The Herald provided an outline of the
kidnapping.
NEGOTIATORS INTO ACTION
Employers had kidnap insurance that specified security
firms
When 35 to 40 men armed with assault rifles and wearing
army fatigues seized the hostages Oct. 12 from the
Pompeya oil drilling camp, 47 miles south of the Colombian
border, ransom-negotiating firms on three continents swung
into action.
The hostages' employers all had kidnap insurance, standard
for firms working in the region, where Colombia's guerrilla
and drug violence often spills across the border.
Their policies required them to use the ransom negotiators
designated by their insurers:
Sander, from Sunrise Beach, Mo., and David Bradley of
Casper, Wyo., worked for Helmerich & Payne (H&P), a
Tulsa, Okla., oil drilling firm. Its insurance company called in
Corporate Risk International (CRI) of Fairfax, Va., one of the
top firms in the field.
Arnold Alford, Steve Derry and Jason Weber, all of Gold
Hill, Ore., and Dennis Corrin of New Zealand were
employees of Erickson Air-Crane, an Oregon heavy-lift
helicopter company. Its insurance policy brought in Control
Risks of London, another leading security firm.
Germán Scholz of Chile, Juan Rodríguez of Argentina and
Frenchmen Jean Louis Froidurot and Jamy Marcelly worked
for Schlumberger Ltd., a New York oil-field services
company.
Its policy required the use of Honor y Laurel, a security firm
based in Bogotá, Colombia. The Frenchmen escaped four
days after they were abducted.
The FBI sent agents to Quito to investigate the case and
informally advise the ransom negotiators.
The Ecuadorean police Anti-Kidnapping and Extortion Unit,
known as UNASE, and security officials from Chile and
Argentina also joined the negotiating process.
The involvement of so many participants from a variety of
countries proved to be a recipe for confusion.
``This case was a failure because of the internal disputes,''
said retired Col. Fausto Terán, the former head of UNASE,
who rescued Coks.
``Any case that has multiple victims, from different
organizations, from different countries, becomes infinitely
more complex,'' said Robert Klamser, a California hostage
negotiator not involved in the Ecuador case.
FIRST NEGOTIATING SESSION
Kidnappers, via VHF radio, demand $80 million ransom
At the first negotiating session, over VHF radio, the
kidnappers called themselves the ``Free America
Commando'' and launched a tirade against the $1.3 billion in
U.S. aid to Colombia's battle against its narcotics industry.
The kidnappers' leaders are former leftist Colombian
guerrillas, but they were bent purely on getting their hands
on the ransom money and had no political motives, U.S. and
Ecuadorean government security experts say.
Then, in that first session, the kidnappers demanded an $80
million ransom.
``The room went quiet. Then everyone broke out laughing,''
said an employee of one of the ransom negotiating firms who
kept abreast of daily developments in the case.
The last kidnapping of foreigners in Ecuador -- seven
Canadians and one American oil worker seized in the hamlet
of Tarapoa in 1999 -- ended with a $3.5 million ransom paid
after 40 days.
The same kidnappers carried out the Tarapoa and Pompeya
abductions, U.S. and Ecuadorean government officials said.
Negotiators for CRI, Control Risks and Laurel argued that the
$3.5 million had been too high, and that by taking a tough
stance they could win a lower ransom, said two participants
in some of the negotiations.
Their initial offer: $1 million for the eight hostages, according
to transcripts of some of the radio negotiations published by
the Quito newspaper El Comercio after the hostages'
release.
As the bargaining went on, tensions arose among the
hostage negotiators, the hostages' employers and some of
the government officials involved in the process.
``There were arguments about who should lead the
negotiations, what to offer, how quickly to offer it, all kinds of
complications,'' said the employee of the ransom negotiating
firm.
Col. Bolívar Cárdenas, current chief of UNASE, added:
``When you have several companies, you have several
concepts on how to proceed. But in the end, there was
agreement on the strategy to follow.''
RESCUE: A RISKY OPTION
U.S. considers military action as kidnappers stick to demand
By early November, with the kidnappers sticking stubbornly
to their $80 million demand, the negotiating team began
considering the risky option of a rescue attempt.
A 35-member team from a super-secret U.S. Army
intelligence unit believed it had pinpointed the kidnappers'
location, said two U.S. government officials who were kept
well-informed on developments in the case.
Just before Christmas, Ecuadorean police captured an
Ecuadorean peasant who had worked as a camp cook for
the kidnappers.
He passed two FBI lie-detector tests on the locations of their
bases, the U.S. officials said.
Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller said in
Washington last week that his country's security forces had
located the hostages, but did not attempt to rescue them at
the request of the United States and other governments. His
comments were confirmed by Ecuadorean security officials
in Quito.
It would have been an extremely risky mission.
The Miami-based U.S. Southern Command had sent a team
to Ecuador in late November or early December to evaluate
UNASE and its commando team, the Intervention and
Rescue Group, the two U.S. officials said.
UNASE had a good record. Under Terán, it had safely
rescued two kidnapped Americans in northern Ecuador --
Coks in 1995 and John Heidema in 1996 -- amid gun battles
that left eight kidnappers dead.
Southcom concluded that an Ecuadorean rescue attempt
would be too risky because the hostages were being held in
the deepest part of the Amazon jungle, covered with thick
underbrush and 200-foot trees, the U.S. officials said.
Over the next few weeks, FBI officials handling the case
twice suggested calling in a U.S. rescue team such as Delta
Force or Navy SEALs or the FBI's own Hostage Rescue
Team, in meetings with U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador Gwen
Clare, the two U.S. officials said.
Clare consulted with State Department officials in
Washington, but it was decided that any rescue attempt
would be too risky and could spark a wave of anti-American
sentiment in Ecuador, they added. Clare is out of the
country, and the U.S. Embassy had no comment on the
report.
``Our primary concern was always the safety of the
hostages,'' said another U.S. official knowledgeable about
the case.
NEGOTIATIONS GO SLOWLY
Kidnappers send an ultimatum: They will kill one hostage
By January, the kidnappers had grown impatient with the
lack of progress in the negotiations.
They had bombed Ecuador's lone oil pipeline five times
between Oct. 30 and Dec. 13, killing eight people in a bus
that was driving past one of the explosions, as added
pressure on the ransom negotiators to increase their offer.
And on Jan. 15, they sent an ultimatum: They would kill a
hostage on Jan. 31 unless they received $80 million. Then
they cut off radio contact with the negotiators.
``Everyone was frustrated. They couldn't do anything. They
just hoped that the kidnappers would sort of forget the
deadline and that nothing would happen,'' said a U.S. official
who was briefed on the standoff just hours before the
deadline.
On Jan. 31, Ronald Sander's body was found, covered a
white sheet inscribed with the message, ``I am a Gringo. For
nonpayment of ransom.''
He was shot five times in the back, with two AK-47 assault
rifles and a 9mm pistol.
He was the first hostage executed in the 148 kidnappings
reported in Ecuador since 1994, Cárdenas said.
After the killing of Sander, the ransom negotiators raised
their offer to $4 million on Feb. 2 and $9 million on Feb. 10,
according to the transcripts published by El Comercio.
The kidnappers initially held to their $80 million demand, but
on Feb. 11 they reduced it to $40 million. The next day, the
negotiators offered $10.5 million and the kidnappers dropped
to $20 million -- but added a warning:
Another hostage would be killed unless a deal was reached
Feb. 15.
The White House's National Security Council quickly put
Delta Force, the most elite commando unit in the U.S.
military, on a two-hour alert for a possible rescue attempt,
the two knowledgeable U.S. officials said. This condition
requires soldiers to be packed and ready to deploy from their
U.S. base on two hours' notice.
``It was all `Go' when I went to bed on the 14th. I expected to
wake up the next morning, turn on the TV and watch the
reports on CNN,'' one of the U.S. officials said.
But on the afternoon of Feb. 14, the ransom negotiators
increased their offer to $13 million, and the kidnappers
accepted.
The money was wired to a Quito bank Feb. 19. The
negotiators sent the kidnappers ``proof of life'' questions on
Feb. 21 that only the hostages could answer, and received
satisfactory replies the following day.
On Feb. 23, an oil company helicopter carrying seven boxes
packed with the money and wrapped in waterproof plastic
dropped off the ransom at a jungle clearing marked by the
kidnappers with a red tarpaulin.
The seven men were released six days later, escorted by
four kidnappers to a trail head and told to walk on until they
reached the village of Santa Rosa and its police station.
They left Ecuador the next evening.
IT'S OVER -- BUT IT ISN'T
U.S. vows to bring killers of American hostage to justice
``Normally, when hostages are released, it's over. You go
home and rest,'' said one U.S. official involved in the case.
``But not this time. Not with an American dead.''
A U.S. Embassy statement on the day of the hostages'
release vowed that ``the U.S. government will continue
working with the Ecuadorean government to locate, arrest
and bring the perpetrators of this horrible crime to a court of
law to be prosecuted to the fullest extent possible.''
Just who the ``Free America Commando'' is remains
unclear.
U.S. government officials and U.S. security industry experts
who have followed the trail of the kidnapping gang's leaders
insist that they are former leftist Colombian guerrillas out to
score money rather than political points.
But some of the evidence suggests a more complex picture
-- one that mixes the profit motive with a typical guerrilla
structure and resentment against the growing U.S.
involvement in Colombia.
Now armed with assault rifles, grenade launchers,
shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons and night-vision goggles,
the kidnapping gang is certainly a cut above common
criminals, said UNASE chief Cárdenas.
And their success in this case could embolden them to try
again.
``We celebrate their liberation, but this is a bad sign that
could eventually promote a perverse industry of abduction,''
Ecuadorean Air Force Gen. Oswaldo Domínguez said after
the seven hostages were released.
It is not an unfounded fear.
In July, a consortium of seven foreign companies, including
U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum, is scheduled to begin
construction of a new oil pipeline from northeastern Ecuador
to the Pacific coast.
Several hundred new foreign oil technicians are expected to
work on the project.
Herald special correspondent Jim Wyss contributed to this
report.