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# THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION

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## HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION

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that are involved in quasi-government jobs and quasi-political positions have been involved in writing for some of those magazines or periodicals.

Senator DENTON. How about electronic media—radio, for example?

Mr. BENITEZ. During some of the incidents that we have had, it has been reported that the electronic media—basically, the Spanish media—has been involved in adding something to the mood of the public or to the mood of the people involved, rather than objectively reporting what is actually happening.

Mr. PINON. One of the Latin media, in my opinion, was advocating violence during these particular incidents, and right now is under investigation.

Senator DENTON. I am going to have to excuse myself for a few moments. I will turn this over to Mr. Joel Lisker, my staff director.

Mr. LISKER. Can either of you gentlemen identify the electronic media involved—the call letters of the radio stations?

Mr. PINON. I would like to defer that to the executive session due to the fact that they are being investigated right now.

Mr. LISKER. I see. These are Spanish-language stations broadcasting to the Cuban population in Miami?

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. LISKER. Prior investigation and testimony has disclosed that much of the intelligence collected is collected by so-called “front groups”; that is, organizations which have an ostensible legitimate purpose, but in reality have a more sinister purpose.

Could you describe any organizations—you have already mentioned the Committee of 75, and I presume that your characterization leads you to conclude that that is a front.

Mr. PINON. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. Could you describe any other organizations of which you are aware that actually are fronts for the DGI?

Mr. PINON. Well, for example, the Antonio Maceo Brigade; we believe that that is specifically sponsored and headed by the Cuban DGI. There may be members of the brigade that may not know exactly what their purpose is, but it is being led by them.

There are other brigades, like the Venceremos Brigade, which is also sponsored and led by the Cuban DGI. We have BAMM, which is the Black Afro Militant Movement. This group is headed by Alfred Featherston. Although there are basically American blacks involved, members of this group have been meeting with members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, as witnessed by us during surveillances.

They have met, and we have received reports from informants that they have received money from the Antonio Maceo Brigade to supply the blacks with their militant movement.

Mr. LISKER. In your opening statement, you mentioned Havana-tur, American Airways Charter, Cuba Travel, et cetera. Those are also—

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir. Central Travel, which was one of the agencies—it is a retail credit front which was used to funnel money to Cuba. That firm is being indicted right now for trading with the enemy.

Mr. LISKER. Mr. Benitez.

the Americas." I then learned that the Castro regime had made contact with Soviet intelligence as early as July 1959, when it sent the head of the rebel army's intelligence section, G-2, on a secret mission to Mexico to meet with the Soviet ambassador and KGB officers there. That emissary was Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, who today controls all Cuban security and intelligence activities as Minister of Interior. Valdés' contacts with the Soviets, when the Cuban Revolution was scarcely 6 months old, effectively disposes of the myth that we "pushed" Castro into Moscow's arms by such unfriendly acts as the trade embargo, which, of course, had not yet been initiated.

My study of the DGI began with its activities in the continental United States, and what I learned essentially is that Cuban President Fidel Castro has been following a two-track policy with regard to this country. One track, which a DGI defector named Genaro Pérez described to me as "Plan Alfa," "or A", calls for the normalization of United States-Cuban relations while the other, "Plan Bravo", or "B", is aimed at destabilizing the United States should normalization fail to come about.

Plan A was followed by Cuba during most of the Carter administration, when the normalization process reached its highest point to date with the establishment of "Interest Sections" in each of the two nations' capitals. They were manned, respectively, by U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban diplomats here in Washington. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, however, turned out to be largely a cover for intelligence operations with the "vast majority" of its 20-member staff, and I am quoting a State Department source, consisting of intelligence agents. The section's very chief, Raímon Sánchez Parodi, doubles as head of the DGI in this area and reports to the DGI's overall chief in the United States, Mario Monzón.

A central objective of plan Alfa was also to split the Cuban-American community in the United States and that, unfortunately, has been largely achieved.

Much of the DGI penetration has been done by front groups organized by Cuban intelligence or persons cooperating with them. Among them are the Center for Cuban Studies, the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade.

Cuban intelligence, aided and abetted by persons who may not be agents but are at least willing dupes, also penetrated respectable American organizations such as the Latin American Studies Association. I attended its 10th national meeting in Washington, D.C., only last week, and I was struck by the overwhelming degree to which this once respected professional group has been infiltrated by pro-Castro elements. Even Cuban officials are regularly given a platform by the LASA.

Our business community, as well, is penetrated by DGI agents and supporters who seek to influence it to violate the trade embargo against Cuba. To encourage normalization, President Carter, in February 1977, announced that he would lift the embargo if Castro would withdraw his troops from Angola. That galvanized the DGI, through the Cuban Interests Section here, to woo U.S. businessmen with special ardor, and they began visiting Cuba in droves. In fact,