

The earlier Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea had occurred with Soviet acquiescence and logistical support, if not by actual Soviet instigation. While we condemned both the Vietnamese action against Kampuchea and the Chinese action against Vietnam, the potential escalation of the situation that could have arisen if the Soviet Union had initiated direct action against China was averted, largely because both Moscow and Beijing seemed aware of the great risks involved.

Cuba. There are two aspects of the Soviet-Cuban relationship that recently have burdened U.S.-Soviet relations: first, the use of Cuban troops supported by Soviet logistics and using Soviet weapons to fight in regional conflicts elsewhere in the world, particularly in Africa; second, the provision of military assistance to Cuba, as well as the construction of military facilities in Cuba, which could constitute a threat to American security or to the security of other countries in the hemisphere.

Apprehensions have been raised on three occasions over the past year in the context of Soviet activities in Cuba: first, when MiG-23's were first observed in Cuba; second, when an expanded naval facility was noted under construction at Cienfuegos; and third, when the presence of a Soviet ground force combat unit was detected.

Throughout our discussions with the Soviets on these issues, they have declared their continued adherence to the 1962 understanding that brought an end to the Cuban missile crisis and the confirmation of that understanding in 1970, but they have insisted on their right to implement the military component of their special relationship with Cuba insofar as it does not infringe on the 1962 accord. Our current concerns are to insure that the 1962 understanding as confirmed in 1970 is, in fact, being observed and to deal with situations affecting our security that are not covered by that understanding. The measures announced by the President on October 1 were designed to satisfy our requirements on both counts.³

Afghanistan. The course of events unfolding after the Afghan coup of 1978 brought this previously neutralist government into close alignment with the Soviet Union, at a cost of major internal resistance. The Soviet Union evidently feels committed to defending what it terms the "Afghan revolution" and is providing substantial military assistance to the Kabul government, consisting of modern equipment and military advisers numbering several thousands.

As the insurgency threat to the cen-

tral government has become more acute, the Soviet Union has faced a dilemma: How far should it go to save a leftist revolutionary government on its periphery? Some indication of the acuteness of this dilemma can be seen in President Taraki's departure from office just a few days after he met with Soviet President Brezhnev.

For our part, we are opposed to intervention by any country in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We are consulting widely with other countries in the region and have found they share our concern about this situation.

Iran. The winds of political change that brought down the Shah of Iran were largely internal in origin; this was not a movement instigated or substantially supported by outside powers. Although Moscow has sought to work with the new Islamic Republic and lost no opportunity to blame the evils of the past on U.S. involvement in Iran, there are signs of strain between the Soviet Union and Iran; the Soviets have openly criticized the Islamic movement that has emerged.

It is difficult to predict how things might go in the future, but for the moment it is notable that the setback to U.S. interests in the political transition in Iran has not been accompanied by a corresponding gain for Soviet interests.

Africa. With fingers crossed, I would point to what did *not* happen as the most important aspect of U.S. and Soviet involvement in Africa. The Soviet Union has continued to follow the lead of the front-line states on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia problem and has been prepared to let the negotiation process go forward. Soviet political and military support for the patriotic front forces has remained steady but has not grown substantially.

Similarly, the Soviet Union has remained in the background while efforts are underway to resolve the problem of independence for Namibia. Nevertheless, the potential for escalation of violence in southern Africa remains the most serious potential problem on the horizon in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Ethiopia. Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the Mengistu government has continued, but the Ethiopians have been unable to silence the insurgency in either Eritrea or the Ogaden. Moscow has moved to consolidate its position, and Premier Kosygin was the ranking foreign guest at celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution. Despite outward signs of close cooperation, however, Soviet-Ethiopian relations have been troubled by Mengistu's refusal to agree

15th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 25, 1979¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

In my last Cyprus report to the Congress, dated July 25, I noted that UN Secretary General Waldheim and his staff were seeking to bring the two parties back to the conference table. Unfortunately, the recess in the intercommunal talks continues, largely because the two sides still have major differences both with regard to their approach to this negotiation and to the content of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The UN Secretary General, through his staff, is continuing to consult informally with the parties. He has had some success in creating a foundation on which the talks might resume. We are giving strong and continued support to this effort. We have frequently discussed the situation on Cyprus in a frank manner with all parties, reminding them that negotiation is preferable to stalemate, and that their broad interests would be served by a return to the conference table. Other interested third parties have made similar points to them.

Despite the difficulties, we continue to believe that a way can be found to end the present impasse and to permit the two sides to commence a serious negotiation of the Cyprus problem.

This Administration will continue to strive for progress in that direction. In pursuit of this goal, we shall remain in close touch with the United Nations, the parties to the Cyprus dispute, and our close European allies.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER □

¹ Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 1, 1979).

to Soviet demands that he create a Marxist civilian party. There have also been reports of Ethiopian dissatisfaction with the level and quality of Soviet economic aid.

Angola. Soviet-Angola relations have been troubled by the death of former Angolan President Neto during a visit to Moscow. Prior to Neto's death, the