NATO, the United States provided IRBMs to Europe: Thors and Jupiters in England, Italy, and Turkey. We deployed sixty in England, thirty in Italy, and fifteen in Turkey, for a total of a hundred and five. These IRBMs became operational just before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, but after the crisis was resolved, the United States dismantled its entire IRBM operation in Europe, all 105 missiles. Nothing is left of the extremely expensive complex of Thors and Jupiters which were capable from their bases of countering to some extent the Soviet IRBMs. The reason for dismantling these sites given by OSD at the time was that United States IRBMs were obsolete and no longer necessary. Submarine-launched Polaris missiles could replace them.

The fact is, however, that our IRBMs in Europe had just become operational. I did not accept the explanation that the missiles had become obsolete so quickly, nor did any other military man I know. We should have left them in place. If President Kennedy had negotiated a quid pro quo with Chairman Khrushchev for getting Soviet missiles out of Cuba, I did not know about it.

The principal counters to the Soviet IRBMs today are the Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean and Atlantic waters and the NATO fighter bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. President Johnson has announced that we have seven thousand nuclear weapons in Europe, many of them capable of being loaded onto fighter bombers. These tactical weapons would be used only if the Soviets attacked with ground forces, and under “flexible response,” maybe not even then.

Since the Western powers have no intention of launching a first strike, all our nuclear arms in Europe can be considered reaction weapons. How many friendly airfields would be left operational after a Soviet first strike with nuclear missiles? We can be sure that airfields are certainly a prime target for the 750 Soviet IRBMs. There is no missile warning system in Europe as with BMEWS in North America. Besides, short range IRBMs give little warning at best.

The United States nuclear-capable Pershing tactical missile with a range of perhaps 400 miles is available in Europe, but because of its short range could not be considered as a counter to Soviet missiles. It could not reach into the Soviet Union from European bases, no matter how close it is placed to the Iron Curtain.

Mr. Harlan Cleveland, the United States Permanent Representative on the NATO council in 1967, said in a talk to the American Club of Paris that “the Soviets are still aiming an enormous proportion of their actual military strength at targets in Western Europe.” He also said:

Anybody who gets a peek at what our intelligence services know about Soviet military technology is instantly cured of any tendencies to euphoria. The Soviets are continuing to invest very large chunks of their own controlled economy in developing, producing, and deploying more intercontinental ballistic missiles in harder sites; they are working on an anti-missile defense; they are constructing an impressive fleet of submarines and other instruments of naval warfare; and they have aimed medium-range ballistic missiles at every relevant target they can find in Western Europe.

We cannot forget that this dynamic technology is at the service of Communist politics; that is, at the service of a party which thinks it has a monopoly of power. As long as this is true, the rest of us are compelled to maintain an effective deterrent at all levels of armed conflict which are in the range of Soviet capabilities. That does not require us to behave as though the Soviet Union were about to pounce. But we cannot know what the Soviets intend to do with their very large and modern armed forces. Aggressive intent without capability would not be particularly dangerous; but a known capability combined with ambitious intent is not to be trifled with. It takes years to make significant changes