DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1964

HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas

PART 6
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE
TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1963
TuESDAY, MAY 14, 1963.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE

WITNESSES

HON. BROCKWAY McMILLAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT)

LT. GEN. JAMES FERGUSON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

MAJ. GEN. W. W. Momyer, Director of Operational Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Requirements

D. V. SCHNURR, Chief, Missile and Space Systems Division, Directorate of Budget, U.S. Air Force

MAJ. GEN. JACK G. MEERBEE, Director of Budget, U.S. Air Force

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT J. FRIEDMAN, Director of Aerospace Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Requirements

Object classification

[In thousands]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1962 actual</th>
<th>1963 estimate</th>
<th>1964 estimate</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Personnel compensation:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Permanent positions</td>
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<td>200,387</td>
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<td>Positions other than permanent</td>
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<td>547</td>
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<td><strong>Direct obligations</strong></td>
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<td>Personnel compensation</td>
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<td>Transportation of persons</td>
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<td>Transportation of things</td>
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<td>Travel, communications, and utilities</td>
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<td>Printing and reproduction</td>
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<td>Services of other agencies</td>
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<td>Supplies and materials</td>
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<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td>3,593,106</td>
<td>3,709,423</td>
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<td>Deduct quarters and subsistence charges</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total direct obligations</td>
<td>3,429,372</td>
<td>3,593,106</td>
<td>3,709,423</td>
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have a broader application as well, under stellar inertial guidance and all other components of the program would approximate —— million.

An approximation of the development, the investment, and a 5-year operating cost would be on the order of about —— billion.

Mr. Ford. How many launchers would you have for —— missiles?

General Friedman. The —— are actually missiles on launchers. This operating cost here would include test birds, spares, and so forth. This would be the cost of a force deployed over a period of 5 years. I would like to make that clear, that is an accumulation of operating costs over a 5-year period.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Sheppard. What is the present operational date?

General Ferguson. I should say at the rate we are going now, ——.

Mr. Sheppard. Is there any indication that you might expedite the present date to a greater degree?

General Momyer. Those decisions with respect to JUPITER and THOR were made much above the Air Force.

In the case of THOR and JUPITER, you have a fixed, a soft site. Consequently, the vulnerability as far as targeting is concerned is very high.

In the case of this kind of system, as I pointed out earlier, I think the vulnerability on it is relatively low. From an operational point of view, there is no question of survivability between the two.

Mr. Ford. Will the chairman yield?

Mr. Sheppard. Mr. Ford.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

Mr. Ford. Is it the operational plan to have these trucks with a missile moving around Western—is the answer yes?

General Momyer. Yes.

Mr. Ford. Moving around Western Europe or any other country

General Momyer. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Ford. How many auxiliary vehicles would be moving around with this?

General Momyer. ——.

Mr. Ford. How much of a crew?

General Momyer. Off the record.
Mr. FLOOD. I have been preaching for 15 years, since we first started talking about this weapon. I had information given to me through the middle European contacts I have as to what the Soviets were doing with mobile missiles, where they would go, pinpointing villages, roads, highways, and type of equipment. I gave that to Mr. Dulles, and he did not bother with it. He was wrong then, and he is still wrong, and they have been wrong ever since. This whole thing was brought out several years ago. It was all confirmed later on, very belatedly.

I have been trying to urge our people to do this thing when they went into THOR and JUPITER, to back them up with this pigeon. They got halfway through it and then quit again.

This is a Western European weapon. The positioning in Verona and Turkey of the JUPITERS puts them pointing in the wrong direction, pointing at the wrong front for the kind of war you are going to fight in Western Europe.

That is the second reason. There is no longer any strategic bombardment need for these missiles in Turkey and northern Italy. They point in the wrong direction, pointing at the right enemy but at the wrong place.

Mr. FLOOD. You stick to Western Europe and the combat zone and don't worry about your conscience not justifying it. If you know how to justify this thing, you should have had it 10 years ago. You can get it. Don't let these jokers push you around.

Mr. MCMLLAN. I think that it is the Germans or any of the other NATO countries are going to develop such a weapon.

Mr. FLOOD. You mean they do not want it?

Mr. MCMLLAN. We are not developing it.

Mr. FLOOD. The answer is the Germans.

That is the end of the story.

Mr. SHEPPARD. The Britons in Germany are nuclear warheads. That is the answer.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Let us proceed with this hearing.

POSSIBLE USE OF PERSHING

The Army's PERSHING is a powerful ballistic missile program that was described by Mr. DULLES as a means to attack most tactical targets in Europe. Perhaps this was why the PERSHING missiles were not used. Why not depend on the PERSHING system?

Mr. MCMLLAN. This was an important program and the MMSEMB program even got as far as it could now. I think the conclusion is that the addition of PERSHING is the only weapon that is required.

This does not negate the value of the Army in battlefield operations.

Mr. SHEPPARD. We have had a very good international picture by France, by Belgium, and by others.

Have the conditions that are present in Europe been of such character and proportion as to demand a program for your request, and has it been necessary?

Mr. MCMLLAN. Off the record.

Mr. FLOOD. I do not believe it is necessary for the development of the PERSHING system.

INTEREST OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Mr. FLOOD. Are there any foreign nations interested in this concept, this program, for eventually procuring a version or their version of the MMRBM?

Mr. MCMLLAN. I know of no explicit stated interest by foreign countries in this particular weapon. There is considerable interest in the military headquarters, Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe, in this weapon. In fact, there has been for many years, paralleled by interest in the U.S. Air Force. I know of no official government reaction of interest.

Mr. FLOOD. What confuses me is the West Germans have MACE B. If that is a good weapon from their point of view, why is this not even being considered as a possibility for withdrawal of the U.S. missiles?
Mr. McMILLAN. I think that it is very unlikely that the West Germans or any of the other NATO countries have official word that this country is going to develop such a weapon.

Mr. FORD. You mean they do not know we are developing it?

Mr. McMILLAN. We are not developing it. We are going through a program definition phase, which is a very different thing.

Mr. Flood. The answer is the British will not stand for it — period. That is the end of it. The British are not going to give the West Germans nuclear warheads. This is the family entrance.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Let us proceed with our hearings.

POSSIBLE USE OF PERSHING MISSILE INSTEAD OF MMRBM

The Army's PERSHING is approaching operational deployment. This program has been described to the committee as the most successful ballistic missile program yet undertaken by the United States. PERSHING missiles, with a 400-mile range, would surely be able to attack most tactical targets in Europe if deployed in Germany. Why not depend on the PERSHING to furnish tactical missile fire?

Mr. McMILLAN. This was an issue considered at great length before the MMRBM program even got under the sort of limited headway it now has. I think the conclusion in favor of a longer range missile in addition to PERSHING is the additional basing flexibility which it gives one ——.

This does not negate the value of PERSHING as a weapon for the Army in battlefield operations.

Mr. SHEPPARD. We have had a series of problems interjected in the international picture by France and some by Germany. Have the conditions that are presently prevailing in those countries been of such character and prominence that you are using that as a basis for your request, and has it been screened on that premise or not?

Mr. McMILLAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MCMILLAN. I do not believe that that analysis bears very heavily on the research and development funding for such missile. I do not believe it will negate the Air Force view that such a missile is required and, therefore, it will not alter our view that funds are necessary for the development of such a missile.

WITHDRAWAL OF THOR AND JUPITER MISSILES

Mr. SHEPPARD. I would like to revert to this question a moment. That is, the withdrawal of the THOR and the JUPITER, which I understand are to be withdrawn. Are they to be withdrawn immediately?

Mr. McMILLAN. Yes, sir; THOR missiles are now, the boosters from THOR missiles are now being recovered, some to be used for space boosters.

Mr. SHEPPARD. This may be a question you will not care to answer, but I would appreciate an answer if you can give it. The THOR and JUPITER missiles did have certain value. I think that has been
established. Until such time as you can deploy a substitute, why, in your opinion, are they being removed?

Mr. McMILLAN. I cannot speak to all the points, but let us understand that at the time the THORS and JUPITERs were installed the ballistic missiles we had installed in this country in operational condition were very few in number. We are increasing that number rapidly. POLARIS as well.

Mr. Flood. You have two POLARIS submarines in the Mediterranean on station and two more in 60 days. What do you want, diamonds?

Mr. Ford. Would the chairman yield?

Mr. SHEPPARD. Yes.

Mr. Ford. When is this report to be finished that you mentioned a moment ago?

Mr. McMILLAN. In June, I believe.

Mr. Ford. June of this year?

Mr. McMILLAN. Yes.

Mr. Ford. This is an investigation requested of the Air Force by the Defense Department?

Mr. McMILLAN. I am sorry. You were asking about this analysis of deployment concepts?

Mr. Ford. Yes.

Mr. McMILLAN. I will have to supply the date for the record.

Mr. Ford. One involving — — and related problems.

Mr. McMILLAN. A request to the Air Staff from the Secretary of the Air Force to initiate such study was made about 6 weeks ago. I cannot give you the deadline for its return. I can supply it for the record.

General Momyer. It is due to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense about the same time that the program definition and evaluation is due. It should be done within the next 3 weeks.

MILITARY ASTRONAUTICS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT

AEROSPACE PROPULSION

Mr. SHEPPARD. We will take up "Military astronautics and related equipment." The first program is aerospace propulsion; $37,280,000 is requested for aerospace propulsion. This is the third year in which you have requested this approximate amount for these studies. Have you developed any new propulsion systems as a result of expenditures heretofore made?

General Ferguson. The purpose of the program is to provide adequate propulsion for aerospace vehicles required to accomplish future aerospace missions. The goal is to operate propulsion devices at higher efficiencies, thrust-to-weight ratio, and specific impulses. The program also provides the technology advancement necessary to develop reliable, lightweight, nonpropulsive power equipment and systems for future aerospace vehicles.

I should like to provide for the record the accomplishments we have made in the last year.

(The information is classified and has been furnished for committee use.)

Mr. SHEPPARD. Why are military propulsion systems used in the atmosphere budgeted under astronautics?