LIFE OF

GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

COMMANDER OF THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

BY

RICHARD MEADE BACHE

ILLUSTRATED WITH PORTRAITS AND MAPS

Veritas, visû et morâ; falsa, festinatione et incertis valescunt.—TACITUS.

PHILADELPHIA
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PREFACE.

It should be obvious that I cannot fitly portray General Meade's character and work without evidencing that I knew him personally, and without so speaking. The duty assigned me would be additionally difficult if I should not only be hampered by a supposed necessity of circumlocution in referring to him, but in referring to other sources of my knowledge. I therefore purpose, in the reader's interest as much as in my own, to avoid these difficulties by directness of statement upon the basis of what is for the most part extant evidence. The explanatory background might form the subject of voluminous notes, or would by its introduction in the main text serve to dam the current of the narrative; but being in either case equally objectionable, both of these alternatives are rejected in favor of the one here described and adopted. At the same time it is incumbent upon me to declare explicitly of General Meade, as one of the sources of my knowledge, that whatever I have to say regarding his civil life is derived from my own observation and family knowledge, but that, as to his military life, as circumscribed by the limits of the Civil War, I have no information whatever as given by him to me personally. General Meade is therefore not to be held responsible for the opinions here expressed with reference to the

events of the war, except in so far as his acts made him responsible, rightly or wrongly, for my own conclusions. I do not remember ever having asked him a question about the war, or his ever having volunteered to speak of it, or having spoken of it to me. My action was brought about by my observation, that every *quid nunc* seemed disposed to bore him with questions about military matters, and by the fact that I felt great regard for the rest to which I thought him entitled after the troublous associations of the times. Doubtless, I could have learned much from him, had I so desired, for he was always frankly expansive in his talks with me, and often, after his death, I regretted that I had not sometimes taken opportunities to learn much that would have been interesting. But when, in the course of time, I came to be confronted with the duty of writing a memoir of him, I rejoiced that there was nothing in my possession of testimony of his to me, regarding his relation to the war, to be drawn upon for my work. Thus both he and I have escaped suspicion of the introduction of at least direct bias in what I have said.

It becomes necessary for me, for self-protection, in writing this memoir, to include a statement without which I should place myself in a false position, through omitting mention of action over which I had no control. When, some years ago, I wrote the article, "George Gordon Meade and Family," for Appleton's Cyclopædia, an interpolation, unauthorized by me, was made in it regarding the battle of Gettysburg, including the statement that General Meade had neglected to occupy Little Round Top. As I was not in any way re-

sponsible for this interpolation, I repudiated it as soon as it came to my knowledge, upon which the Messrs. Appleton promised that in future editions of the Cyclopædia my name as the author of the article should be omitted. I have therefore since then regarded the matter as finally closed, and here make mention of it only for the imperative reason assigned.

Lest a doubt may arise in the minds of some persons as to whether recollections which revert to seven years of age are trustworthy, it should be remarked that that depends upon idiosyncrasy. Records show that, in certain cases, accurate memory of events of a simple order has reached three or four years anterior to the period mentioned. I know a person who, when a boy of five years of age, was carried one night to a window, whence he was shown the aurora-borealis, which, in after years, he declared, amid the jeers of his companions, to have been pink. He grew up, however, to learn from scientific statistics that his perception had not been at fault, for the aurora of the date corresponding with his age at that time is noted as pink. I shall not therefore shrink, when I could add to this mention of the early recollections of John Stuart Mill and others, from speaking with confidence of things which first appeared upon my mental horizon at seven years of age.

I was, for two years of the war, through surveying for defensive works, and engagement in some cognate matters, associated with military operations; have been intimately connected in and outside of my family with men of both branches of the military service; and have also been some-

what of a student all my life of military affairs. These experiences constitute in sum the modest claim that I make to be able to speak with some authority in a memoir which is necessarily military.

As some readers may, I know, ask themselves why, although General Meade was not present at the first battle of Bull Run, an account of it is introduced in this work (for the question has already been propounded by a person who knew of what the manuscript consisted), I may be permitted here to anticipate any similar enquiry. Regarding completeness in this case from an historic point of view, one must, to secure it, put oneself in the position of the general reader, of individuals of new adult generations, and of the present generation of youth, to perceive with these how imperfect would be their grasp of the sequence of events concerned, if an account of the first battle of Bull Run were omitted from a history of the great conflict of the Civil War. The War in the East of the United States may be truly regarded as one great drama, to which the simultaneous action in the West stands in a more or less subsidiary relation. To omit the first great scene of its campaigns, whether or not it should be regarded as an episode of a part, or of the whole, of the gigantic struggle, because, with one exception, the principal actor in them had not up to that time appeared upon the boards, would be a violation of dramatic proprieties. The omission of the first great battle of any war would be a serious blemish in an account of it, and in this case peculiarly so, for the result of the first battle of Bull Run which, in the day of its occur-

rence, was naturally looked upon as an unmitigated disaster, ought now clearly to be recognized as having been a blessing in disguise. The preliminary movements and the battle itself conclusively proved for the first time to the North the determination and momentarily military superiority of the South. Had victory in that first contest been with the North, it could but have had the evil effect of increasing a confidence there which needed dissipating by comprehension of the fact that the South was in deadly earnest, backed by military ability and perfect faith in success, and that the struggle upon which it had entered with the North was intended to be *à outrance.* The result of the battle did, as nothing else could have accomplished it, arouse to that knowledge, although with lingering inappreciation of the degree of force needed to meet the emergency; and this it was that first braced the intention of the North adequately, even if still imperfectly as to means devised, to meet with equal determination the danger with which the life of the nation was menaced. Lastly, I may say, there is a subsidiary, but important reason why an account of the first battle of Bull Run should be here presented, as related not less to the whole war than to its vicissitudes in the East. It is because this account puts the responsibility for the loss of the battle where it belongs, where justice proclaims that it shall be placed, and not where it is, even at this late day, popularly laid.

No one, as a contemporary, can hope to write for contemporaries the history of even a single operation of any contemporaneous war without running counter to both

prejudices and well-grounded opinions as to many points. I therefore do not expect to escape the fate of any one who has attempted or ever shall attempt a task similar to mine. All that any honest historian has, under such circumstances, the right to deprecate, in the interest of arrival at truth, is uninstructed commentary, or else imputation of ulterior motives in his work. So far as his personal interest is concerned, however, he can afford to bear the latter slight temporary infliction, in the light of knowledge of the prevalence of the practice of Dodson and Fogg, when there is no case, to abuse the plaintiff; but the other interest is eternal. The address made in the following pages is to minds capable of sitting in judgment on a reopened case, or rather upon one which has never been really tried, and back of that appeal, in the interests of justice, lies another, to the final decision in the affairs of men, constituted by the verdict, be it of few or many individuals, of the supreme court of posterity. That an author should be deemed sometimes mistaken is easy for him to bear, in the universal recognition that it is human to err, especially as he can take to his own soul the same flattering unction with reference to difference of opinion between his readers and himself. This condition is but in the nature of things, and places all differences of opinion and sentiment on an equal footing of fairness. I hope, with the aid of advocates, and of adversaries as well, whose agency, if taken aright, is not generally appreciated, eventually to be able to divest this volume of minor errors, which not even the most painstaking care in any work has ever been able entirely to avoid and finally to leave it, as nearly

letter-perfect as may be, as a legacy to the cause of historical truth.

While no one but myself is responsible for any of the opinions expressed in the course of this work, I am much pleased to learn from my friend, Judge Craig Biddle, of Philadelphia, that the portion of the chapter on Bull Run relating to General Patterson, of which he made critical examination, is correct in its statement of the difficulties under which General Patterson labored; and as Judge Biddle was a member of his staff at the time, his opinion in the matter ought to have great weight. Another chapter, that entitled, "The Change of Base and Attempted Surprise of Petersburg," has been examined by my friend, John C. Ropes, Esq., of Boston, who, omitting verification of minute details (to do which I would not have had him take the trouble, being very sure of them myself), writes me that my account of the affair is, from his standpoint, strictly accurate.

The necessity of modifying excellent battle-maps of the Government by the sketches herewith presented arose from the circumstance that they, being on a much larger scale than the sketches, and additionally, represented in colors, a photographic reduction of the untouched originals would, through diminution in size and photographic color-limitations, have rendered many of their conventional signs imperceptible. Moreover, as elevation of ground in many of the aforesaid maps is represented solely by what are called contour lines (horizontal lines representing equal differences of elevation), and the effect as thus given is unintelligible to

the general reader, elevation has in such cases been here shown by what is technically called haçhuring, by a shading made with due regard to steepness of slope, giving an effect familiar to every one.

That the reader will not find some stereotyped beliefs here repeated has at least the advantage of the assurance thereby afforded, that what is due the public has been set down, that what is here presented has been penned with freedom from undue influence of preoccupation of the field, whatever such matter may be as to facts or conclusions, whether resting, as they will be variously deemed by the lingering generation, on weak or on solid foundation.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., August 2, 1897.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Genealogy of the Meade Family, and residence of Richard Worsam Meade in Spain, ... 1

CHAPTER II.

Return of the family of Richard Worsam Meade from Spain to America, ... 7

CHAPTER III.

Lieutenant George Gordon Meade in the Mexican War, . . . 13

CHAPTER IV.

Cause of the Civil War and respective advantages of the belligerents, ... 16

CHAPTER V.

Truths and popular errors about the War, ... 29

CHAPTER VI.

The Missouri Compromise. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Mr. Lincoln, who succeeds Mr. Buchanan in the Presidency of the United States, calls for a levy of seventy-five thousand men after the bombardment of Fort Sumter. General Patterson's prescience of what later events confirmed. A Southern army impends near Washington, south of the Potomac. A Northern army gathers north of that river. The first battle of Bull Run, otherwise called the battle of Manassas. Defeat of the Federal troops. The phenomenon of panic. Disorderly retreat of the Federal army on Washing-

PAGE

ton. Call by Congress for five hundred thousand volunteers. The summoning of General George B. McClellan to the command of the troops in the field near Washington. Demonstration that it was not General Patterson's, but General Scott's fault, that General McDowell, in command of the Federal army south of the Potomac, had not been reinforced before the battle of Bull Run, ... 38

CHAPTER VII.

Washington fortified by General Barnard. Description of the region between Washington and Richmond, Va. Review of the principal successes of the Federal arms in other parts of the United States. Plans for the advance of the Army of the Potomac on Richmond. McClellan appointed general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States. Enemy retires from Centreville, near Washington. Army of the Potomac transported by way of the Chesapeake to the Peninsula on which Richmond stands. Siege of Yorktown. Evacuation of Yorktown. Pursuit of the retreating enemy. Battle of Williamsburg. Army of the Potomac makes a partial investment of Richmond on the east. General Johnston takes advantage of a flood on the Chickahominy, which separates McClellan's two wings, to attack the left. Battle of Fair Oaks. Command of the Confederate army devolves upon General Robert E. Lee, Johnston having been wounded on the first day of battle. Alarm at the progress of the Confederate general, Stonewall Jackson, towards Washington, causes the recall of General McDowell's column, which had been intended to join General McClellan, while Jackson eludes the troops sent from that column against him, and successfully joins forces with Lee in time for the next battle near Richmond. Exaggeration of the numbers of the enemy. General Meade joins the army, ... 74

CHAPTER VIII.

McClellan prepares to attack the enemy's position opposite his left wing. Is seized with false apprehensions as to the enemy's numerical superiority. Jackson arriving, reinforces Lee, and the enemy's attack falls on the right of the Union army straddled across the Chickahominy, whilst the left remains almost inert. The first assault of the Confederates falls on

PAGE

McClellan's lines at Beaver Dam Creek, and results in the battle of Mechanicsville. General Meade commands a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves in this quarter of the field. Night falls with the attack of the Confederates a failure. During the night the troops at Beaver Dam Creek retire along the Chickahominy to Gaines's Mill. Next day the battle of Gaines's Mill takes place, and the whole right wing of the Union army retreats across the Chickahominy at night. Next day the retreat of the whole army begins in earnest. The action of Allen's Farm, near Savage's Station. The variously named battle of Glendale, Charles City Cross Roads, New Market Cross Roads, Frazier's Farm, and Nelson's Farm, where there was fighting along an extended line. General Meade is badly wounded defending the position of New Market Cross Roads, and is conveyed to Philadelphia. Federal victory at Malvern Hill. The Union army retires to Harrison's Landing, on the James River. The President visits the army at Harrison's Landing. General Halleck, now commander-in-chief, visits the army. A council of war at Harrison's Landing recommends the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. The withdrawal is taking place when General Meade, recovered, rejoins the army, . . . 105

CHAPTER IX.

The Army of Virginia, under General Pope, is north of the Rapidan. The intention is to reinforce it by the Army of the Potomac, brought by water from the Peninsula. The battle of Cedar Mountain. Lee arrives and begins to press Pope backward across the Rappahannock. General J. E. B. Stuart, with his cavalry, makes havoc within Pope's lines. Next day the first reinforcement from the Army of the Potomac arrives, the Pennsylvania Reserves, Meade commanding his old brigade. Jackson, with his corps, makes a circuit around the right flank of Pope's army, and gains a position far to the rear, at Bristoe Station. Engagement at Bristoe Station. The second battle of Bull Run. General Meade's effective work in holding his line at a critical moment of the retreat. Battle of Chantilly. Itinerary of General Meade. Comparison between the elements respectively composing the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, ... 145

PAGE

CHAPTER X.

The Army of Virginia, combined with a portion of the Army of the Potomac, retreats behind the fortifications south of, then across, the Potomac. Lee crosses the Potomac above Washington and begins an invasion of the North. Capture of Harper's Ferry by the Confederates. The battle of South Mountain, in which General Meade, with General Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, distinguishes himself, . 173

CHAPTER XI.

Advance of the Federal army from South Mountain to the Antietam. Battle of the Antietam, where General Meade again distinguishes himself. Lee retreats across the Potomac. Harper's Ferry and surrounding positions reoccupied by the Federals. The President of the United States visits the Army of the Potomac. Upon the President's return to Washington McClellan is ordered to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee. After considerable delay, he crosses and marches towards Culpeper. Is relieved from the command of the army and General Burnside appointed in his stead, ... 200

CHAPTER XII.

Burnside assumes command of the Army of the Potomac. It advances on Fredericksburg. Delay takes place in the attempt to cross the Rappahannock there. Battle of Fredericksburg. Meade attacks the right flank of the enemy with impetuosity. Is repulsed with slaughter. Burnside falls into hopeless confusion of mind. The battle ends with the victory of the Confederates at all points. The so-called Mud Campaign, . . 220

CHAPTER XIII.

General Hooker put in command of the Army of the Potomac. He conceives and executes an admirable plan of campaign, which takes the enemy completely by surprise and places him at Hooker's mercy, but becomes suddenly paralyzed in mind under the weight of responsibility. Hooker retires by night across the Rappahannock. Sedgwick's corps, Hooker's left wing, also retires across the river, ... 249

PAGE

CHAPTER XIV.

Lee advances through the Shenandoah Valley for the invasion of the North. Hooker desires to attack the isolated corps of General A. P. Hill, but is forbidden from Washington to do so. The advance of Lee northward is continued. Lee crosses the Potomac above Washington. Hooker crosses it below him and advances on Frederick, Maryland. Hooker and Halleck disagree about Harper's Ferry, Hooker recommending its evacuation, Halleck refusing to evacuate it. Hooker asks to be relieved of the command of the army. His request is granted, ... 280

CHAPTER XV.

Meade is appointed to the command of the army at Frederick, Maryland. He directs his army from Frederick northward. Buford's cavalry and the First and Eleventh Corps become engaged at Gettysburg. Meade sends Hancock to report as to fitness of the field there for battle. Meade orders all the troops to Gettysburg. Account of the fight that takes place there before General Meade reaches the field, . . . 290

CHAPTER XVI.

Sickles withdraws from the position assigned him on the left on the field of Gettysburg. General Meade sends reinforcements to endangered left wing, goes personally to its assistance, leads troops into action. The battle on the left rages until nightfall. Its result for a long time doubtful. The enemy takes advantage, to make a lodgment there, of reinforcements having been sent from the extreme right of the lines. Council of war that night decides that the battle shall be fought out on the ground occupied, ... 317

CHAPTER XVII.

Opening action on the third day of battle. Pickett's famous charge, with which the battle ends. The losses on both sides during the three days' conflict, ... 339

CHAPTER XVIII.

Lee retreats through the mountain passes in his rear. Meade follows by the route east of the mountains, passing through them

PAGE

further south. Meade finds Lee strongly entrenched near Williamsport. His corps-commanders are not sanguine of success in attacking the position. He concludes to essay the storming of the position, but upon advancing, finds that the enemy has gone. General Meade follows the enemy and takes position on the Rappahannock, near Warrenton. Lee, marching by way of the Shenandoah Valley, takes position opposite Meade, between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, ... 354

CHAPTER XIX.

Skirmishes occur south of the Rappahannock. Meade, beginning a more serious movement, it is countermanded from Washington. Lee sets his army in motion by the left flank to drive Meade out of his position, at Culpeper, south of the Rappahannock. Meade is forced to retire, but by forced marches thwarts Lee's intention of getting in his rear. The fight at Cedar Run. The engagement at Bristoe Station. The retirement of Lee. The skirmish of Buckland Mills. Meade advances as Lee retires, until he reaches the Rappahannock, where Lee holds with works across that stream. Meade plans to surprise Lee by marching suddenly by the left flank on Fredericksburg, but Halleck overrules him. Meade captures Lee's works astride the Rappahannock, and compels him to abandon his positions immediately south of that river. Meade being now again between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, takes Lee by surprise by crossing the Rapidan and reaching his right flank. His plan proves abortive through the dilatoriness of a general. Meade retires to his former position and Lee resumes his former position. Campaign ends with a demonstration by the army, as a diversion in favor of an operation of General Butler's near Richmond, ... 363

CHAPTER XX.

General Grant is appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, and makes his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. He orders a midnight advance towards the Rapidan. Pushes forward the next day by a short march into the Wilderness. Lee is on the alert, and confronts the Army of the Potomac early in the morning. A

PAGE

battle begins and continues with varying fortunes. On the next day the battle is renewed. Reinforcements for both sides having arrived, the conflict becomes hotter and hotter. Grant directs General Meade to move by the left flank to Spottsylvania Court House. Sheridan fails to clear the front of the advancing infantry. The enemy appears in force at Spottsylvania before General Warren reaches there. Sheridan goes off on a raid towards Richmond. The Army of the Potomac comes into position around Lee's lines. A portion of the Second Corps passes around Lee's left flank, but is recalled. Generals Wright and Warren assault the enemy's works in front and are repulsed. Hancock renews the attack, supported by Warren, but fruitlessly. Farther to the left General Upton has success, but is finally obliged to relinquish his hold of a captured line. The next day is spent in preparing to capture the salient of the enemy's works. The assault of the salient takes place early. The lines there are carried and held. The enemy shuts off the salient by a line of works. Burnside's attack is ineffective save as a diversion. Troops of the Army of the Potomac march and countermarch, seeking a weak point in the enemy's defences. The army marches by the left flank, masked by the left in position, to Hanover Junction. Approaching the North Anna, Lee's troops are discovered coming into position behind that stream. The Army of the Potomac crosses on the right and left of Lee's lines; on the right with no opposition until the southern bank is reached, on the left, with considerable. Grant orders the retirement of the army to the north side of the river. It marches towards the southeast, and crosses the Pamunkey at and in the vicinity of Hanovertown, . . 401

CHAPTER XXI.

Co-operative movements in different quarters, far and near, . 437

CHAPTER XXII.

The battles near the Totopotomoy. Bethesda Church and Cold Harbor. Sheridan goes on a cavalry raid towards Charlottesville. The Army of the Potomac moves out of its entrenchments to make a change of base by crossing the James River. Just before it starts General Butler makes an attempt to capture Petersburg, ... 444

PAGE

CHAPTER XXIII.

The march of the Army of the Potomac from the Chickahominy to James River. The crossing of that stream, and march towards Petersburg. Grant intends to capture Petersburg by a *coup de main*, but omitting to inform Meade or Hancock of the project, it fails. The lines of Petersburg are vigorously attacked on three successive days, ... 456

CHAPTER XXIV.

The various corps come into position for the siege of Petersburg. The enemy makes a sally while the operation is proceeding. Sheridan's cavalry operations north of the James still going on. Cavalry expedition under General Wilson, south of the Appomattox, before Sheridan rejoins the army. He returns by a devious path to the lines of the army, shattered by loss of men and material. Sheridan returns to the south bank of the James too late to make a diversion in his favor, . . . 471

CHAPTER XXV.

The autumnal siege of Petersburg. Investment of Richmond and Petersburg proceeds. Attack on the enemy's lines north of the James, near Richmond, whilst preparations go forward to spring a mine under the enemy's works at Petersburg. The latter enterprise fails. Lee despatches General Early to threaten Washington. Grant detaches troops to safeguard that city. Sheridan placed in command of the forces in the Shenandoah Valley, to put a stop to Early's threatening Washington. To prevent Lee's sending more troops to oppose Sheridan, Grant orders attacks near Petersburg. The enterprise north of the James fails, but that south of it succeeds. Check of the Second Corps at Reams's Station. North of the James some works are captured. South of the Appomattox, infantry and cavalry make a movement and gain and maintain a foothold for the extension of the line of investment of Petersburg. Meade makes a narrow escape of his life from a shell. The first attempt to capture the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad. Hancock bids farewell to the Second Corps and goes north to recruit veterans. General A. A. Humphreys succeeds him in command, . . 481

PAGE

CHAPTER XXVI.

The winter's siege of Petersburg. Butler's unauthorized command of the fruitless expedition against Fort Fisher, N. C. General Terry, in command of the second one, succeeds. Destruction of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad for forty miles. A slight engagement with the enemy while making a reconnoissance in force. Extension of the lines of the Army of the Potomac towards the left. Sheridan rejoins the army with his cavalry, having rid the Valley of the Shenandoah of Early, and reduced him to harmlessness. Sheridan's intimate relations with Grant. Sheridan's return to the Army of the Potomac coincides with a visit of the President to General Grant, and with General Sherman's arrival on the following day for the purpose of concerting military movements. Movements outside of the zone of those of the Army of the Potomac. Lee foresees the doom of Richmond and Petersburg, and makes preparations for evacuating them and successfully retreating. The Army of the Potomac stands ready to defeat his intention, ... 506

CHAPTER XXVII.

A strong force, under General Gordon, makes a sortie from Petersburg and captures a portion of the lines of contravallation there. The officers on the Federal side soon retrieve their loss with gains, which they secure permanently. The Army of the Potomac, holding its lines in front of Petersburg with sufficient troops, moves by the left flank, and after a check to Sheridan between Five Forks and Dinwiddie Court House, makes a final break everywhere through the enemy's positions and starts Lee on his long contemplated retreat. Petersburg assaulted and occupied. The two armies are put rapidly *en route*, the Army of Northern Virginia striving to escape to Danville or Lynchburg, the Army of the Potomac to frustrate its intention by intercepting the retreat in either direction. Skirmish at Deep Creek. Battle of Sailor's Creek. Humphreys crosses the Appomattox at High Bridge, detaches Barlow to follow a column of the enemy along the railroad, and himself pushes towards the stage road on the right, where he brings the enemy to bay. Grant, availing himself of this detention, sends a note to Lee demanding the surrender of his army. Lee replies. A regular corres-

PAGE

pondence between them ensues. Grant makes a detour to Appomattox Court House. He does not, in consequence, receive Lee's last letter in time to conclude hostilities at the earliest possible moment. Meade prevents unnecessary slaughter by assuming the responsibility of allowing a brief truce. The Confederate army, after an attempt to break through the Federal lines between Appomattox Court House and Lynchburg, is surrendered by Lee. General Meade is not present at the formality of the surrender, . . . 521

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Movements preparatory to the disbandment of the Federal armies. The assassination of President Lincoln. His obsequies. The evil effects of President Johnson's policy. The final review of the armies of Meade and Sherman in Washington, ... 551

CHAPTER XXIX.

Recollections of General Meade from young manhood until death; from lieutenant to general. His service in the Mexican War. Takes the field as brigadier-general in the Civil War. His sudden death. Burial at Laurel Hill, Philadelphia. The neglect to which, partly through accidental, partly through designed influences, his eminent services have been consigned, ... 556

APPENDIX, ... 575

ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND PLANS.

PAGE

Heroic Statue of General Meade on the Battle Field of Gettysburg, ... Frontispiece

Plan of the Battle Field at Bull Run, July 21st, 1861, . . . 46

Map of the Battle Grounds in the Vicinity of Richmond, Va., . 90

Map of the Field Operations of the Army of Virginia during the Months of July and August, 1862, ... 144

Map of Operations of the Army of Virginia under Maj.-Gen. John Pope. Position of Troops on the Night of August 27th, 1862, 158

Map of Operations of the Army of Virginia under Maj.-Gen. John Pope. Position of Troops at Sunset, August 28th, 1862, . 160

Map of Operations of the Army of Virginia under Maj.-Gen. John Pope. Battle Field of Manassas, Va., Close of Action, August 29th, 1862, ... 162

Map of the Battle Fields of Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg, with Position of Troops, Routes of Army, etc., September 13th to 17th, 1862, ... 200

Map of the Battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862, 220

Map of the Field Operations of the Army of the Potomac under Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker in the Battles with the Army of General Lee, near Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, between April 27th and May 7th, 1863, ... 248

Map of Portions of the Military Departments of Washington, Pennsylvania, Annapolis, and Northeastern Virginia, . . 282

Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg—First Day, . . . 290

Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg—Second Day, . . . 314

Headquarters of General Meade at Gettysburg, ... 320

PAGE

Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg—Third Day, . . . 336

Headquarters of General Lee at Gettysburg, ... 352

Sketch Showing Positions of Union and Rebel Forces on November 30th, 1863, in the Vicinity of Mine Run, . . . 384

Map of the Battle Field of the Wilderness, Va., ... 400

Map of the Battle Field of Spottsylvania Court House, Va., . 420

Map of the Battle Field of North Anna, Va., ... 432

Map of the Battle Field of Totopotomoy, Va., ... 436

Map of the Battle Fields of the Totopotomoy and Bethesda Church, Va., ... 446

Map of the Battle Field of Cold Harbor, Va., ... 452

Map of the Battle Grounds in the Vicinity of Richmond, Va., . 458

Map of Petersburg, Va., ... 482

Portrait of General Meade, after a Mezzotint by Max Rosenthal, 522

Portrait of General Meade, after an Engraving by J. C. Buttre, from a Photograph by Brady, ... 566

GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER I.

GENEALOGY OF THE MEADE FAMILY.

(RESIDENCE OF RICHARD WORSAM MEADE IN SPAIN.)

It is a great satisfaction, at this period of sudden American interest in genealogies, to be able to state that General Meade is not known to be descended from William the Conqueror. He sprang, on the paternal side, from the loins of a race which gave England her Wellington and France some of her most distinguished soldiers, and on the maternal side from a family of recognized worth and social position. In a word, he came of a martial race, and of families of gentlemen and gentlewomen. Without going back, therefore, to citation of the records of the Old World well known to the family, suffice it to begin the detailed portion of the genealogy of George Gordon Meade with the history of his progenitors in America. General Fitzhugh Lee, in his memoir of General Robert E. Lee, in speaking casually of General Meade's father in connection with General Robert E. Lee's father, "Light-horse Harry," inadvertently uses an unqualified term well calculated to mislead regarding Mr. Richard Worsam Meade's position. He says, "Meade's father served as a private soldier in the Pennsylvania troops to suppress the 'Whisky Insurrection' in western Penn-

sylvania, and therefore was under General Lee's father, who commanded the force raised for the purpose." Now, the "Whisky Insurrection" being an episode in the early history of Pennsylvania, productive in that and some contiguous States of results similar to those in the later history of the United States, in Labor Riots, including disturbances in mining districts, to suppress which men of all ranks in various communities lent a hand, the term "private" may be, and is, in this case, misleading. Employment in such a field of action affords no more criterion of a man's social position than would his serving voluntarily, or in response to a summons, on a *posse comitatus*, which, in fact, the troops referred to really represented on a large scale.

George Gordon Meade was born in Cadiz, Spain, on the 31st of December, 1815. His father, Richard Worsam Meade, was an American citizen residing there in pursuit of mercantile affairs, and incidentally acting as Naval Agent of the United States. General Meade was therefore doubly an American citizen, if such a thing could be, being a child of an American citizen, and born under the flag of the United States as represented in foreign parts. Thus the absurdity of the discussions which sometimes appeared in the newspapers as to his eligibility to the presidency of the United States becomes apparent.

Beginning with Colonial times, Robert Meade was the great-grandfather of George Gordon Meade. The exact date of his coming to the United States from Ireland, his native land, is not known, but the records show him to have been living, in 1732, in the city of Philadelphia, having in all probability arrived there from Barbados, where he had relatives, with which island, when he was settled in business in Philadelphia, he had mercantile transactions. He was an influential citizen and zealous Catholic, and being also a man of means, his presence in the city at that time was

opportune for the community, for with influence and fortune he contributed largely to the erection of the chapel which first occupied the site on which now stands St. Joseph's Church. Dying in Philadelphia, in 1754, when just returned from a voyage to the West Indies, his wife having previously died, his will bequeathed his property to his three children, Garrett, George, and Catharine, and named his brother-in-law, George Stritch, of Barbados, executor.

The bequests of the will, which are our only guide toward determining what other, besides business, relations he had with the West Indies, prove not only that he had property in Barbados, but imply that his brother-in-law, Stritch, lived there, and, moreover, that his own children were there at the time of his decease. Only a few years afterwards the children were certainly settled in Philadelphia, the two sons as merchants, under the firm-name of "Garrett and George Meade." The records show that they occupied a prominent position in the mercantile world of Philadelphia, and, being among the signers of the Non-Importation Resolutions of 1765, that they were public-spirited citizens. Catharine, the daughter of Robert Meade, married, in 1761, a talented young man named Thomas Fitzsimons, who achieved distinction in state and national affairs. George, in 1768, married Henrietta Constantia Worsam, who was a daughter of the Hon. Richard Worsam, of his Britannic Majesty's Council, in the island of Barbados, who died, in 1766, while on a visit to Philadelphia. Thomas Fitzsimons entered into partnership with George Meade (Garrett Meade having probably died), under the firm-style of "George Meade and Co."

George Meade spent all his life in Philadelphia, taking an active part in municipal affairs. An ardent patriot, his sympathies were with the struggling Colonies, and we find his firm, in 1780, subscribing the enormous sum, for that time,

of two thousand pounds sterling towards supplies for the suffering army of Washington. He assisted towards the building of St. Mary's Catholic Church, of which he was trustee and member, his wife being equally attached to the church known in those days solely as the Church of England. Both he and his partner were among the charter-members of the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, on whose rolls appear the names of Washington and those of numbers of other distinguished men of the time.

George Meade had five sons and five daughters. Two of the five daughters married brothers, Thomas and John Ketland. The third daughter married William Hustler, whose descendants still live at Acklam Hall, Middleboro' on Tees, Yorkshire, England. With the exception of Richard Worsam Meade, the remaining children, seven in number, died unmarried.

Richard Worsam Meade, after having passed through a thorough preliminary training, was taken into his father's counting-house, in the course of which engagement he was sent by his father on voyages to the West Indies; and in 1795, when he was a youth of only seventeen years of age, he was despatched as supercargo on one of his father's vessels sailing for Europe, extending his tour through England and France, and returning to America in 1796. At the age of twenty-two, after having spent three years on his own account in business in the West Indies, he had achieved a competence and returned to the United States. There he married, in 1780, Margaret Coates Butler, daughter of Anthony Butler, of Perth Amboy, New Jersey.

He resumed business in Philadelphia, and additionally endeavored to extricate his father from business embarrassments into which he had fallen through having entered with other capitalists of Philadelphia into extensive purchases of lands in various parts of the country, with the

expectation that they would be rapidly taken up by settlers. His father, broken in health, and suffering with increasing infirmity from age, finally yielded up to the struggle, and, with the fullest confidence of his creditors, the son took charge of the affairs as assignee. It was, however, in connection with his own business affairs, that soon thereafter he took his course towards Spain. Finding, incidentally to his visit to that country, what he regarded as an excellent opportunity, he established a business house in Cadiz, and, in 1804, his wife and the two children who had been born to them by that time joined him there.

His father, George Meade, died in 1808. The widow, with her only surviving daughter, visited England only a few years after his death. She had not been without her trials in life. Her father, being an Englishman of station, had long delayed her marriage with George Meade, well known for his patriotic devotion to the Colonies, and now, after the loss of many of her children, and finally of her husband, she found herself bereft of most of what life had held dear to her, on the shores of her native, now almost a foreign land to her. After being subjected to various delays in returning to America, she died near Edgebarton, Berkshire, England, at the age of nearly eighty years. Her son, Richard Worsam Meade, continued to live in Spain for seventeen years. In 1806 he was appointed Naval Agent for the United States for the port of Cadiz. He was enabled, through his large mercantile connections, to enter into numerous contracts for supplies to the Government of Spain during the stormy period of the Peninsular War, and thus to contribute to the success of the Spanish cause. Impoverished as Spain became on account of the drain upon her resources caused by the war, she fell greatly into debt to Mr. Meade for supplies furnished in her time of need. Spain formally recognized, however, through the action of

the Supreme Junta, organized for the defense of Cadiz, and afterwards through the Cortes, its great indebtedness to him, the Cortes wishing to confer upon him the citizenship of the country; but Mr. Meade publicly declined to accept it, expressing himself as appreciative of the honor, but as preferring to remain an American citizen.

During his residence in Spain the house of Mr. Meade had become a place of great resort, to which visitors were attracted by the courtliness of his manners, the charm of his wife, and the *entourage* generally of his private and official life. He lived luxuriously in the midst of the best social advantages, even gathering a choice collection of pictures which eventually formed one of the first private collections in the United States. His family had increased, since his arrival in the country, by eight children, one of whom, born in Cadiz, on the 31st of December, 1815, as has already been mentioned, was George Gordon Meade, the subject of this memoir.

CHAPTER II.

RETURN OF THE MEADE FAMILY FROM SPAIN.

At the end of the war between France and Spain, which eventuated in the return of Ferdinand VII. to the throne from which he had been driven by Napoleon, everything was in confusion in the country. Mr. Meade was anxious to receive payment for the supplies with which he had furnished the Government, so as to be able to return with his family to America, but as if the delay in this matter were not enough to try his patience, he had additionally to bear the consequences of a complication grown out of his having been appointed assignee of an English mercantile firm established in Cadiz. At that time England, through her close alliance with Spain, representing their joint resistance to the Napoleonic invasion of the country, was all-powerful with the Spanish Government. Through this paramount influence the arrest of Mr. Meade was brought about in connection with his action as assignee of the English mercantile firm in Cadiz, notwithstanding that he had in the administration of its affairs strictly conformed to legal instructions. In consequence, although he had the freedom of the grounds and the privilege of seeing his family, he was, until liberated at the instance of the Court of Spain through the intervention of the United States Minister, held prisoner for nearly two years in Santa Catalina, the fort situated on the left in entering the Bay of Cadiz, near Puerto de Santa Maria (St. Mary's Port).

Spain, finding it impossible, in the straitened condition of her finances, to settle her indebtedness to Mr. Meade, he

concluded to remain in the country, to supervise in person his large business interests, compromising with this evil turn of fortune by sending his wife and children in advance to America, three of the children having already preceded them to Philadelphia. Soon afterwards the "Treaty of Florida" between the United States and Spain having been signed, by which treaty the United States was pledged to pay all the just claims of Americans against Spain, in consideration of the cession of Florida to the United States, a satisfactory solution of Mr. Meade's difficulty seemed to be providentially reached, and accordingly, in 1820, three years after the departure of his family, he rejoined it in Philadelphia, and after living there a year, removed with it to Washington, where he expected to be best able to forward the claim which had been transferred by Spain to his own country, and with his own consent. But, as the event proved, he had much better have waited for Spain's recuperation in her finances, for although prosecuted zealously by Mr. Meade, and after his demise by his widow, and although on one occasion passing both Houses of Congress, but not at the same session, and acknowledged to be just by all the legal talent which has examined the claim, it still remains unpaid, whilst Florida, to the ultimate inch of her shores, is the undisputed territory of the United States. The outcome of Mr. Meade's pursuit of justice in the country to which he had returned, his native land, was that, harassed by long suspense and repeated disappointments, his health was affected, and he died in Washington on June 25th, 1828, at fifty years of age.

It became necessary for the widow, under the circumstances of her diminished fortune and numerous family, to live with an economy to which she had never been accustomed. Accordingly, as one means toward it, George Gordon Meade was withdrawn from the boarding-school

where he was, at Mt. Airy, near Philadelphia, and became a pupil in Washington, at a school kept by Mr. Salmon P. Chase, afterwards Secretary of the Treasury under Mr. Lincoln's first Administration. Thence he went for a while to a boarding-school at Mt. Hope, Baltimore. The tastes of the youth were inclined towards a collegiate education, which his mother also favored, but the change in the financial affairs of the family rendering another course desirable, she sought for him an appointment to the Military Academy at West Point. The first application failed, the second succeeded, and during the interval of waiting, George continued at the school at Mt. Hope, and in the summer of 1831 he was appointed to the cadetship which had been promised him. At the Academy he remained during the usual routine course of books and physical training, not particularly high in his stand, nor, on the other hand, particularly low. Nothing is more fallacious, however, than judgment of mental powers and character at an early age, for the reason that some persons have the capacity of indefinite mental growth, and others seem even to retrograde.

George had never intended to remain in the army after his graduation, but merely to serve in it sufficiently long to warrant his resigning, as having afforded an equivalent for his education; so we find him, at the end of the second year of the military course, feeling that the routine is very monotonous. Still he kept on, and passed through the whole four years of the course, and then, securing the customary leave of three months after graduation, he went during that time on the survey of the Long Island Railroad. His health was delicate at this period, his constitution far from confirmed, and some of his friends were very anxious that he should not be exposed to the malarious atmosphere of Florida, where his regiment was stationed, and they even went the length of advising him to resign his position in the

army. He determined, however, to give the climate at least a fair trial, and as, at that juncture, luckily for him, his brother-in-law, Commodore Alexander James Dallas, in charge of the West India Squadron, invited him to take passage to his post on the flagship of the squadron, he started for Florida under the most favorable auspices. After a short detour among the West Indies the ship touched at Havana, and there the intelligence of Dade's Massacre awaited it, and Commodore Dallas, proceeding at once towards the seat of war, and taking measures with reference to the Indian outbreak, was able incidentally to land Lieutenant Meade at Tampa Bay, where his company was stationed. This was the beginning of the Seminole War.

The campaign was conducted by General Winfield Scott. The column with which Lieutenant Meade marched was commanded by Colonel William Lindsay. Lieutenant Meade was not destined, however, to remain long on duty in this campaign. As had been apprehended, his delicate constitution was unequal to the stress put upon it by the climate of the interior of southern Florida, where the Indians lurked in the Everglades and other fastnesses, and he was seized with a low fever which rendered him unfit for the contemplated duty of active pursuit of the enemy. So he was ordered to deport to the North Fork of the Canadian River, Arkansas, a party of Seminoles, who were to be there settled as a measure for the pacification of Florida. This duty performed, he reported in person, under orders, to Washington, where, in July, he was assigned to duty at the Watertown Arsenal, Mass., but did not long remain there, for, towards the close of 1836, he resigned his commission in the army.

He accepted a position at once as assistant-engineer in the construction of the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia Railroad, of which his brother-in-law, Major James D. Graham,

U. S. A., was chief engineer. This took him to Pensacola, Florida, where he was engaged until nearly the middle of July, 1837, when a survey at the mouth of the Sabine River, the boundary line between the United States and Texas, being needed by the War Department, he was recommended to and selected by the Department as a competent person to execute the work. After this survey, which related to the navigability of the waters at the mouth of the Sabine River, he went, as principal assistant-engineer, with Captain Andrew Talcott, U. S. A., who was to make a survey at the mouths of the Mississippi River, with reference to improving the navigation there, his employment on this duty, including office work, lasting from November, 1837, until the early part of 1839. In 1840 Lieutenant Meade was employed as one of the assistants to the joint commission appointed to establish the boundary line between the United States and Texas, and, after the completion of the work, he returned to Washington, where, in August, he was appointed by the Secretary of War one of the civil-assistants on the survey of the Northeastern Boundary, the line between the territory of the United States and that of Great Britain.

In the society of Washington, Lieutenant Meade was accustomed to meet the family of the Hon. John Sergeant, to whose eldest daughter, Margaretta, he became engaged, and the young couple were married on the 31st of December, 1840, at the house of Mr. Sergeant, in Philadelphia, Lieutenant Meade continuing to hold his position as civil-assistant on the survey of the Northeastern Boundary. This new responsibility, however, coming upon him after his experiences of various employments in civil-engineering, all of which had lasted but a short time, induced him to try to procure reinstatement in the army, and, this aim proving successful, he was, in 1842, appointed second-lieutenant in the Corps of Topographical Engineers, continuing, however,

as assistant-engineer in the survey of the Northeastern Boundary until near the end of 1843, when he was ordered to report to the office of Topographical Engineers, in Philadelphia, where his duties, under Major Hartman Bache, became those of the designing and construction of lighthouses.

He had been fulfilling this assignment to duty for somewhat over a year and a half, when, in August, 1845, he received orders to report for service at Aransas Bay, Texas, with the military force organized with reference to the troubles growing out of the disputed boundary between the United States and Mexico; a force which was at first an army of observation, but which became converted into one of invasion, General Zachary Taylor, soon thereafter to become President of the United States, commanding the American troops at the designated point. Lieutenant Meade was at this time thirty years of age. His constitution had wonderfully hardened between this and the time we found him unable to support the exposure of campaigning in the Seminole War. His appearance had entirely changed within that period. The dandy phase of his existence, mentioned in the concluding chapter of this work, had sloughed away in the rude contact of men and affairs in different climes on the frontier of the country. He was now simply a well-dressed man, but nothing more than that; mindful of the axiom of Lord Chesterfield, never to be the first to adopt a fashion, nor the last to leave it; always particular in his attire, except in the field, where he was singularly indifferent to dress; a statement which the statue of him in bronze, in the Philadelphia Park, confirms, where the artist has sacrificed to the literalness of the brief moment the spirit that should endure through time. His manner was alert, and indicative of quickness of apprehension and fertility of resource, and his manners were those of a man gifted by nature, and by education adapted to shine in society.

CHAPTER III.

LIEUTENANT MEADE IN THE MEXICAN WAR.

An extended account of the Mexican War, so far as it relates to General Meade, would not seem to be imperative in a brief history of his military career, in view of the fact that he was then only a lieutenant in the army, and that the bearing of his presence in its military operations was therefore proportionally limited. The account of that episode of his life is therefore confined to the moderate limits of this chapter.

General Meade, a lieutenant of Topographical Engineers in 1845, a corps merged during the Civil War in that of the Engineers, arrived at Corpus Christi on September 14, 1845, having been assigned to the staff of General Zachary Taylor, who was in chief command of the American forces then assembling as an army of occupation on the Mexican frontier. Passing through the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, he finally marched with General Taylor to Monterey, assisting there in reconnoissances of that portion of the enemy's position which was assailed by General Worth. General Worth said, in his official report of the operations here, "Annexed is an accurate sketch of the theatre of operations, for which I am indebted, as in many other respects, to the intelligent zeal and gallantry of Lieutenant Meade, Engineers."

Marching beyond Monterey to Saltillo, on November 13th, General Taylor made dispositions in advance of Monterey, sending General Quitman to Victoria. Under General Taylor Lieutenant Meade made, in connection with

the new operations, reconnoissances of the passes of the Agua Nueva, and under General Quitman, of the passes of the Tula.• But, at this point of time, a sudden change took place in affairs, General Taylor, upon returning to Monterey, finding that the whole character of his operations had to be changed, General Winfield Scott having arrived on the coast in supreme command, and having ordered many of General Taylor's troops to join him in the projected capture of Vera Cruz and of the city of Mexico. Lieutenant Meade had, at that moment, reached Victoria with the column under General Quitman. Marching thence, under the command of General Patterson, for Tampico, on the coast, he was there about to take ship for Vera Cruz, when, on the 23d of February, 1846, the battle of Buena Vista was fought by General Taylor.

On the 9th of March General Scott's army began debarking near Vera Cruz, and on the following day invested the town, which lies at the water's edge; a walled town, supported in its defensive capacity by the Castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, a short distance off, seaward. Lieutenant Meade assisted his immediate chief, Major William Turnbull, in the survey of the lines of contravallation, and helped in the designing of the naval battery. After a severe bombardment lasting several days, a parley was sounded from the town, resulting, after some negotiation, in its surrender. Here Lieutenant Meade's duty with the army terminated. He had been in the field nearly two years, had shared in three battles and this siege, and the officers of his branch of the service were present in sufficient numbers for the needs of the army of General Scott. Consequently General Scott relieved him from duty in a complimentary order, in which he said that Lieutenant Meade "was much distinguished in the field since 1845." Here, then, we will with the reader leave General Scott and his gallant little army on

the eve of their triumphant march to and capture of the city of Mexico. Lieutenant Meade's departure from the army must, we have reason to believe, have been coupled with his regret that his duties had not been with the line rather than with the staff, for we find him, at the beginning of the Civil War, evidently resolved that it should then be otherwise. We meet him at that time, fourteen years afterwards, as a general of brigade, and so often in the forefront of battle, in that rank and in that of corps-commander, that the marvel is he was not killed outright instead of wounded before the Civil War was two years old.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RESPECTIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE BELLIGERENTS.

THE essential difference between the ancient and modern way of regarding great movements among mankind lies in difference of view as to the propulsive forces at work, the ancients believing that they obeyed a blind destiny, represented chiefly by some powerful human leadership, whereas the wiser moderns have come to look for and find directive cause for such phenomena in race, climate, geographical distribution, clashing material interests, and a multitude of other agencies in that which compels men to change and to collision with their fellow men. Ancient history, in a word, regards the mass of men as mere ciphers, which give value to an inexplicable range of activities, while modern history regards them as subject to and moving amid these, under law; the people, more than their rulers, the source of grand movements; the ruler but the product of surrounding root and soil. Hence Macaulay was wise when he introduced into his *History of England* an account of the people as the main source of the events which he proceeds to describe. The peoples of the same and of contiguous countries, more than a Greek Chorus, bearing as they do the chief part in the drama, serve, however, in formal history, that purpose also. Otherwise, to mental vision, the principal actors would go mopping and mowing and gibbering over the stage of life, as inane as dancers without music look to one whose ears are closed.

It is with a very simple fragment of history with which

we have to deal, and yet, to this day, simple as it is, it is sometimes misunderstood. It was represented, even in an English work published about the time of the Civil War, that the Southerners were fighting only for their independence. To account for fighting for independence, however, some rational cause must be assigned and proved to exist. That there was no just cause for secession, leading to fighting for independence, is amply shown in the demonstration of Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, a man of distinguished ability, who afterwards became the Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy. The real cause of secession was not the presence of slavery in the Southern States and its absence in the Northern ones, but the fact that the difference between them in that respect had gradually had the effect of making two peoples of different interests in social and governmental development. There was, at the beginning of the Civil War, no general feeling in the North against the institution of slavery, save as an abstract proposition; none such as would have made any great sacrifice for its abolishment. It was only as the war proceeded that the feeling in the North grew stronger and stronger against it as the cause back of the estrangement between the two parts of the country. The South, as represented especially by new generations, is now, in retrospection, grateful that it did not achieve a success which would have blighted the magnificent future of the country; and in this feeling even the majority of those there who bore the heat and burden of the day profoundly share. The South can now afford to admit, the fever-fit of passion being past, that it was not, even by the conceded right of revolution, justified in its action, when, having held the power of the general Government for many years, having been assured by Congress that whatever was lacking in protection of its rights should be given, having entered into and been defeated in a general

election in which it had put forward its own candidates, it took that time, of all times, to declare its independence.

The theory upon which the Southern States attempted to secede ignored the law of development upon which all society proceeds, and they made no attempt to reconcile their practice with their theory. Men claimed that they primarily owed allegiance to their States, secondarily to the United States. Yet thousands of men whose States refused to secede took up arms against the United States. States which had deliberately placed themselves on the side of the United States were invaded with the intention of forcing them to secede. Even when in arms against the United States, Southerners frequently appealed to the Constitution which, by the act of war, they had repudiated. But to revert to the theory of secession, pure and simple,—leaving aside minor inconsistencies, of which men under stress of circumstances must always be guilty,—if the theory of secession had been true in the nature of things, then, obviously, the Southern Confederacy, once successfully formed, could not deny the right of secession to any one or any number of the composing States. Suppose, then, because it has no seaboard, that Arkansas should have seceded from the triumphant Confederacy. It would, of course, by prescription, have possessed as full autonomy as that of the remaining States of the Bund, could coin money, levy war, and exercise all other rights of sovereignty. But suppose that it should have declared war abroad, how could a foreign enemy get at it? The absurdities which the contemplation of a multitude of sovereign States, without marked geographical boundaries, which have lived for nearly a century together the common life of a nation, coupled with the right of secession at any time, exhibit to us, are infinite. The whole movement leading to secession ignored the fundamental law of growth, yet this, beyond

written constitutions or aught else of formal agreement in treaties or otherwise, by which men seek to bind themselves and others, controls all that they do and all that they can become throughout the lapsing ages.

At the beginning of the strife between the two parts of the country there were, besides these fundamental ones, minor errors, of which Southerners had not the slightest suspicion. The most flagrant of these at the beginning was the prevalent belief in the South that the North would not act with anything like continuous determination. Of course the Southern leaders knew better; for subsequent memoirs and biographies of many of them show plainly that they had no such delusions as those by which the majority of Southerners were possessed. Another of these crude notions was that Northerners were destitute of courage, as compared with Southerners, three Northerners to one Southerner being the usual proportion allowed to establish equality. When, however, troops from the North met troops from the South, of similar experience in the field, it was not found that there was any essential difference between them in the display of courage. At the very first, at the battle of Bull Run, there was some apparent difference; but this arose from the circumstance that the sentiment of the North did not correspond in intensity with that of the South. It had no animosity, whereas the South was in deadly earnest. While there is undoubtedly a difference in individual and racial courage, still, back of all courage, and especially in gross, as in armies, lies the force of habit. As for difference of race between the North and South, both represent mixed races. By the physiological law by which repetition dulls sensibility, expressed by Byron as to this particular region of sensibility discussed, when he says that in a duel, after one or two shots, the ear becomes "more Irish and less nice," habit declares itself paramount

in producing indifference in all varieties of danger. Long before the war ended there was nothing to choose between Northerners and Southerners in fighting capacity. That implies that there was something to choose between them at the beginning. The reason for part of this difference ought to be obvious to everyone; part has more than once been noted, in discussions on the war, but the chief reason seems to have escaped attention. Men often moult the memories of what they once knew to exist as unconsciously as they change the plumage of their opinions. The inhabitants of the Northern States had not, at the beginning of the war, the same outdoor habits of exercise as they have now. It was almost impossible to find, for long distances along the northeastern coast of the United States, a horse tolerable for riding; and if that were secured, it might be difficult to find a saddle. Southerners almost universally had ridden on horseback from their earliest youth. Hence for a long time their cavalry excelled, gentlemen of the South regarding that branch as of especial distinction as compared with the other arms of the service, being imbued by tradition with the notions associated with the cavalier. Not only was there in the North at that time a singular absence of athletic exercises, but the people there generally were not addicted to field-sports. In fact, throughout a large portion of New England a man who kept a gun and a dog was looked upon pretty much as Dr. Johnson regarded one who wore a cane. Just the opposite condition of things prevailed in the South. One could hardly find a man at any age who was not devoted to hunting in some form or other. Now, it ought to be evident that shooting of every kind, especially that which compels a man to walk over all sorts of surface, through swamp, through woods, through brush, through briar, constitutes the best sort of exercise; that which, in the open air, makes exertion recreation,

trains the eye and ear, steadies the hand, strengthens the limbs, and confers vigor obtained in wholesome contact with mother-earth. Nor was this all that was obtained by life in the South, as compared with the then existing life in the North. The Southerner's gun became to him a part of himself; he had become as automatic with it as if it had been a member of his body. The Northerner had, as a general rule, to learn to shoot as shooting is practised in the expanse of nature. Except as a member of a small class, and then only as a marksman at a target, the Northerner knew little about shooting. The general population knew nothing. The Northerner was therefore at first at a great disadvantage as compared with the Southerner, a disadvantage which he had to overcome in the field. But beyond this difference, brought about by the difference in habits between the two parts of the country, lay a subtle difference originating in the same manner. One may well despair of ever being able to see in what way the chase or hunting of any kind, even that of the most ferocious beasts, can be likened to war, and to be in any way, as it is said to be, a good preparation for it, unless it be conceded that, out of the practice of hunting grows that intimate acquaintance with the face of nature which one acquires in hunting. Nature has, to one who comes closest to it, a physiognomy from greatest to minutest details, and he who has wandered through its recesses becomes gifted with an insight such that, given but a part, he sees, with greater clearness than unpractised men, what may be to the eye concealed beyond. This is the acquired faculty which, doubtless, in a primitive stage of existence, all men possessed, the faculty which Southern troops brought with them into their masses during the war, and which necessarily at first told in their favor when they confronted men who were without it, amidst all sorts of eccentricities of ground in wood and hill and

swamp and swale. They brought with them the faculty which the Indian practices to perfection in his fastnesses, even to the point of protective color; the faculty which, through bitter experience at first, the Northern troops gradually acquired, in imitation of the Southerners, who, with their facile lines, flowed into the sinuosities of the wooded battle-field, the efficiency of the unit as a woodsman contributing to that of the line of battle which it went to form.

Back of these causes making for the efficiency of Southern troops at the beginning of the war was a potent one, which enabled the Confederacy to put forth to greater advantage than could the United States, whatever strength it possessed, not only at the beginning of the war but throughout its whole duration. This lay in the superiority of the South for waging war, growing out of its political and social life, habits, and traditions. There the theory and the practice of equality were as wide asunder as the poles. There, from the earliest times, the possession of large landed properties by the educated class, and the political and social weight inuring to their owners from the consolidated vote which they enjoyed as masters of the black tillers of the soil, made them not only tend to the study of national politics and the acquisition of office (making them paramount in the councils of the nation), but set them apart among their own people as a distinctively ruling class. Upon the surface, so strictly were drawn the lines between white and black, all white men stood upon an apparently equal political footing, and with equal social capacity. As a matter of fact, however, there existed in the South a dominant, educated class, recognized ungrudgingly by the commonalty as the gentlemen—lords of the soil. And just because the difference was so palpable between the two estates, and their interdependence so great, there was between the members of the dominant class and the general white population of the

sturdy yeomen of the country a real comradeship, tempered with respect, which was not to be seen, because it did not exist in the North. Between the two classes there was, as there always must be in any community when differences are not arbitrary, but real, no feeling between the respective ranks in the community but one of mutual liking and respect. To the men of a class which had been from time out of mind justly regarded in peace as their superiors, the rank and file of the South naturally looked up for direction and followed loyally in war. Can any one, in reflecting on this political and social condition of the South of that time, fail to see that, for purposes of war, it offered a great advantage over the political and social condition of the North? In the North there was no leadership of a class; even the class of gentlemen was not known outside of its own bounds; a multitude of great little men were ever momentarily rising like bubbles to the surface, only to disappear; mere wealth played a part in public affairs which would have been impossible in the South.

The moral and physical advantages in the conflict were for a while in favor of the South. The existence of the condition of slavery, save as the mediate cause of dissension between the two parts of the country, had, as already intimated, little to do with the conflict. Some of the foremost men of the South had, from the beginning of the Government, declared against the injustice of slavery. The possibility of its territorial extension, that was all, had come to an end, whether the South should succeed or fail. Men's views of things are independent of what is founded in eternal justice uncomplicated with human difficulties. We have to consider the point of view. We have to consider the obscuration by self-interest. In the question asked by Festus of St. Paul, "What is truth?" is touched and summed up the everlasting possibilities of difference in

the opinions and sentiments of men even as to those things which they have most deeply pondered. Both North and South fought in support of their beliefs; both suffered for them; each ardently prayed that the righteous cause (its own) might prevail. Thus, so far as the abstract question of right was concerned, the two sides were on an equal footing for all acquirement of the strength that the sense of justice can convey. With regard, however, to the possession of strength on lower moral planes than the highest, it may be with reason claimed that the South had at first an advantage over the North. Growing directly out of the political and social organization of the South, came, at the very initiation of the war, a singular advantage to the Confederacy. It put the direction of affairs at once into the hands of a trained military oligarchy. Mr. Davis had had experience in military affairs, and besides having been Secretary of War of the United States, had always been associated with military men. It would not be to the purpose to call attention, in contradiction of the inference from this, to the fact that Mr. Davis had very serious limitations to his usefulness. The advantage of the South in having possessed him grows out of the implied contrast between him and Mr. Lincoln as occupants of opposing presidential chairs, in presence of the sudden flaming out of war. Fine as Mr. Lincoln's touch was as to political men and affairs, the absence of it in military affairs was keenly felt at first. It is almost impossible to conceive that any one could have thought it judicious to let General Scott remain as long as he did, with his infirmities, at the head of military affairs in one of the greatest crises of the world's history. Mr. Lincoln must, however, be largely exonerated from blame for having retained McClellan so long as he did, for the American people were in that under a delusion which resembled a hypnotic condition. We can, however, plead in

excuse for these mistakes, that time was needed within which to distinguish and to select from the mass the best leaders, but to nothing save defect of military capacity can be ascribed some of Mr. Lincoln's essays in suggesting, modifying, or controlling certain operations of the war.

In many most unfortunate respects the position of Washington and the character of its population bore heavily for the Southern and against the Northern cause. Washington was, in affiliation, much more a Southern than a Northern city, and, in consequence, the enemy was, through one means or another, from the beginning to the end of the war, possessed of much better information as to the movements in that capital than was the North of what was done or contemplated in Richmond. The presence, too, of Washington on the very borderland of war has been frequently mentioned as a serious disadvantage in the prosecution of the war, and it was. The United States, as an established government, could not afford, as was said at the time, to swap queens with the enemy. But besides that, there was in the topographical relation of Washington to Richmond another serious embarrassment, which seems to have escaped mention. From Washington to the Blue Ridge it is only half as far as it is from Richmond to the Blue Ridge, so that when the enemy, in his numerous raids, marched down the Shenandoah Valley to demonstrate on or cross the fords of the Potomac, he approached nearer and nearer, as he marched north, to the chief towns of Maryland and Pennsylvania and to the capital at Washington, masked in his movements and protected by a mountain range during the whole time of this approach. Thus the enemy could, as he more than once did, appear suddenly in a new field of operations close to the capital, and profoundly influence, not only there but elsewhere, the current of military events. Add to these advantages possessed by the Confederates in

Virginia the additional one, that the moment the Army of the Potomac advanced toward Richmond it found itself penetrating a hostile country where every scrap of information to the enemy's advantage reached him, and every scrap that might benefit the invading army was concealed. Add to this, again, the fact that the scouts of the enemy, having a greater knowledge of the country than that possessed by those of their adversary, were able to make their way through hostile lines in a manner truly marvellous on occasions.

It would appear at the first blush, as is proved by the fact that persons who have not examined minutely into the matter believe it without hesitation, that the South was, from beginning to end of the war, morally and physically, in everything, greatly overmatched. That it was, in the long run, overmatched, is undeniable, as the event proves. The question raised here, however, is as to the degree to which it was overmatched, and as to the degree there is a very general misapprehension. Territorially the United States was represented by twenty-two States, as arrayed against eleven States of the Southern Confederacy. Twenty-two million freemen and half a million slaves apparently adhered to the Northern cause, as against five and a half million freemen and three and a half million slaves apparently adhering to the Southern cause. But, on the other hand, it should be remembered that, in addition to the signal advantages which have been recited in favor of the South, the sentiment of the Union was numerically insignificant there after secession was once fairly entered upon, as compared with the sentiment in the North which opposed the prosecution of the war, and numerically increased as the war went on. And, additionally, it should be remembered that the slaves of the South were able to perform the tillage of the ground, and thereby release every able-bodied white

man for military service; whereas, for the tillage of the soil of the North there was no such class of laborers working from the earliest to the latest age, and its multifarious industries required the presence of skilled labor, while at the same time there was nothing in the South to correspond with such industrial occupations. The greatest disadvantage under which the South labored was that its ports were blockaded, and that it had scarcely the semblance of a navy. This meant that it was largely cut off from the importation of munitions of war and other things, and that the blockade could not be raised except by the intervention of foreign powers. Its inconsiderable wealth, too, as compared with that of the North, and the almost boundless credit of the latter, was a source of relative weakness to the South.

If the reader will carefully scan all these various elements with relation to each other, and will strike the balance, he will see that, although the North preponderated in strength over the South, yet that the difference between them was not so great as is frequently imagined. He will see that the South had just as much faith in the justice of its cause as the North had in the justice of its cause, and, therefore, that so far as moral force is derived from the contemplation of doing right, the contestants were equal. But he will also see that, at the beginning, there were certain minor moral advantages possessed in larger degree by the South than by the North. It is only by recognizing the fact, that any one can account for its desperate prolongation of the struggle. What the dynamic value of these minor elements of strength may have amounted to, no man can say. The statement sometimes made that the moral is to the physical as five to two is an absurdity, the two things being incommensurable. All these questions will be of especial interest to the future historian who, in his calm analysis of events, will test them in the crucible of world-experience with solvents of a vast

array of collated facts. They begin to approach this historical interest even at this early day, when, reconciliation having followed strife, men have had opportunity to revise the experiences which, owing to the rapidity of modern events, seem to belong to quite a remote past. What now presents itself to the reason and imagination as most interesting is, that the event of the war was one which, with the greater enlightenment that time has wrought, has long been a subject of thankfulness among the people of a united country.

CHAPTER V.

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS ABOUT THE WAR.

No more prejudicial error entered into the conduct of military affairs in the North than the popular notion that a military education necessarily makes the great commander. The ideal soldier, the *strategos* of the ancients, the general of modern times, is born as truly as the poet is born, not made. A military education does but give the training which brings forth to the best advantage natural powers. There are, and always have been, but two military schools in the world, that of actual war, and that of the academy, for the teaching of the theory and practice of war; but neither of these can create a soldier of any grade intrinsically beyond that of the rank and file of an army. The reason of this is not far to seek, if one come to realize two fundamental facts, that genius or talent for war, like any other special manifestation of mind, cannot be created or supplanted by any amount of technical acquirement; and, additionally, that back of the intellect requisite to constitute a great commander, and the very foundation without which his gifts are unavailing, is character, the sort of mind which, in the midst of the mutability of affairs, keeps its equal poise. Who can doubt that, even if Napoleon had had no military education whatever, he would have been, except perhaps Masséna, the first of France's strategists fitted for the field. The popular ignorance in the North on this subject rose far beyond the bounds of ordinary popular limitations, pervading the sphere even of men of military training, some of whom had modesty conson-

ant with their just estimate of their powers, but some of whom exaggerated those powers to their own minds, or else came to think, as was extremely natural, that they must have the talents which were attributed to them by others. Even in the immediate realm of the occupants of the highest civil executive positions of the Government, there was not any previous association with military men, technical education, or aught else that could have put them in touch with military demands. Moreover, as has been previously remarked, it was unfortunate for Washington to be situated where it was, near the theatre of the most important military operations. There is another aspect of the same circumstance, which was not less objectionable. It was as unfortunate for the Army of the Potomac to be so near Washington as it was for Washington to be so near the army. In consequence of this, petty interference with the army, and with lesser forces posted in the vicinity of the city, went on from the beginning to the end of the war. Congress took an amateur hand in its operations, the hotel corridors of the city became the greenroom and the coulisses of the awful drama which was being enacted only a few miles away and over the whole United States. Blatant military orators there declaimed of the progress or retardations of events, with which they had naught to do but by their presence at the front. Scheming for rank and place and assignment, speculating in gold and bonds, money-seeking amidst the throes of the nation, went on apace. Virtue and vice, patriotism and selfishness, were blended in apparently inextricable confusion; but only apparently, sad as that was, for amidst the chaos patriotism stood firmly, and shaking off at last all crawling things, brought the nation, through dearly bought experience, to a triumphant issue.

It will be well here, as we are about to enter upon a

description of more extensive military movements than those connected with the Mexican War, to define what are meant by the terms strategy, tactics, and logistics. "Logistics" relates simply to the science of moving armies, which necessarily includes any means of movement, in marching and commissary, or any other kind of locomotion. "Strategy" is sometimes distinguished from "tactics" by representing the former as related to movements made out of sight of the enemy, and the latter as made within his sight. But this definition is positively incorrect, for a strategical movement may, on occasions, be made within sight of the enemy and a tactical movement beyond it; that is to say, if "within sight" is to be construed as meaning within the range of sight, and this is what is intended by the expression "within sight." For instance, supposing two armies to be drawn up, facing each other, and so near that, at any point in either line, the opposing one is clearly seen, and that, by means of a sunken rōad in the rear, a large body of the troops of one of these lines is subtracted and placed, unknown to the opposite side, on either flank of the line to which the troops belong. That would, according to the current definition, be a tactical movement; and yet, according to the intrinsic difference between strategical and tactical movements, it would be strategical. To take a converse case, supposing that, after two opposing lines are drawn up as just described, and in plain sight of each other, a false appearance is intentionally presented, as Cæsar once created it by dressing up teamsters and camp-followers as legionary soldiers, and thus making the enemy think that a powerful military body was marching off from camp. Sheridan employed, partly within and partly beyond sight, a similar strategical stratagem at Deep Bottom, on James River, when he made cavalry march by night over a pontoon-bridge muffled with hay, marching the men back on foot on the following morning,

with the intention of leading the enemy to believe that reinforcements of infantry were arriving from the south side of the river. These were strategical movements, and yet, according to the common definition, they were tactical, because they were made not only within the range of sight, but within actual sight of the enemy. Therefore it is plain that the distinction which is really to be drawn between strategical and tactical movements, as representing their true differences, has sometimes no relation to whether the operation is performed within sight, within the range of sight, or beyond sight. The real difference between them, related to space and time, whether much or little of either, consists in the fact that, whereas strategy either deceives or anticipates the enemy to his disadvantage by acts relating to prospective or present battle, and secures or interferes with combinations leading to the best concentration for prospective battle, tactics are confined, without intermediation, to the best concentration during battle. Strategy as well as tactics therefore enter into the actual collision on the battle-field.

Strategy, acting over a large zone of operations may force an adversary to fight a battle in a place tactically disadvantageous. This, at bottom, reverts to the advantage inherent in skill of concentration for prospective battle; successful concentration sometimes involving tactically, as to place, as well as strategically, as to time, a disadvantage to the adversary in position. It thus becomes evident, from all that has been said, that strategy may occur beyond the horizon of the zone of operations, or near the field of battle, or, lastly, at the very place of and amid the operations in the heat of battle, while tactics are confined to the time and place of actual battle. Tactics, however, has a range beyond this, when the body of men called an army is not in action. In advancing it has an advance-guard,

and if possible, flanking columns of cavalry. In retiring it has a rear-guard. In camp it has a cordon of outposts and pickets. All these conditions relate to tactics.

The few fundamental principles of the art of war are immutable, like all other principles. But as, in the course of time, weapons, commissariat, transportation, and a thousand other things have changed, so both strategy and tactics have had to change to conform in practice to the other changes. It is therefore not in principles, but in details of practice, that change has affected, and must, for the same reason, always continue to modify practice in the art of war. For example, as to strategy in the time of Napoleon and Jomini, neither of these nor any other general of that period could have imagined that soon there would be an electric telegraph. None of them countenanced the concentration of armies from widely-separated bases, on exterior lines. But since then it has been done successfully by means of the facility which the telegraph affords, and will be done on occasions for all the future. Besides this use of the telegraph, it has been adopted on the field of battle itself, as in the Wilderness, at Petersburg, and many other places during the Civil War. Take, on the other hand, a case in tactics. Even so recently as the time of the Crimean War, as Kinglake, the chief historian of the war minutely relates, the Russians, at the battle of the Alma, preserved the antiquated, solid masses of infantry against the thin lines of the English, with the consequence that they were mowed down like grain ripe for the husbandman. Since then artillery and small-arms, having enormously improved in range and effectiveness, in consequence a formation closer than the thin English line at the Alma has been discarded. Infantry lines succeed each other, the formation is more open than formerly; it is only cavalry, which, owing to its speed, is capable of acting in masses.

Yielding to the pressure of necessity, both French and Germans, on the fields of the Franco-Prussian War, fought in loose infantry formation, compelled to this difference in tactics solely by the change from the old to the new forms of weapons. In fine, whether we go back to the campaigns of Hannibal, who maintained himself for fifteen years in Italy against the whole Roman power, or bring our glance down to the most fearfully concentrated struggle of historical times, in the Franco-Prussian War, and include that mighty one, over a larger space and longer time, our own Civil War, it will be found that the fundamental principles of the art of war are few and immutable, but that the practice of it varies and must vary with the ages. Hence it follows that only by the study of the campaigns of the great masters of the art of war of all times can one know what constitutes, at a given point of time, the true practice of the art.

The popular notion, at the beginning of the Civil War, as to what constitutes the best common soldier was nearly as erroneous as the popular notion of what constitutes the general. Even drill and discipline were confounded in the popular mind. This country had inherited from the Prussians of Frederick the Great's time the starched warrior, who could scarcely move on dress parade for his girting collar and hands held stiffly at his sides; and the difference between campaigning and dress-parade was hardly appreciated in a long period of piping peace. France was the first nation in modern times which let soldiers march as nature prompts, with the swinging gait of a walk, where a disengaged arm served its due function of helping swift propulsion. The experience of war, however, soon did away with all martinet tendency, so that men of the East and the West and the South at last marched like the veterans that they were, with such glorious pomp and circumstance of

war as stiffness left, with much other *impedimenta*, far behind.

It is regrettable that, in this country, even military men have sometimes, through pride in the particular arm of the service in which they excelled, or in which they had perhaps most shone, unduly exalted its value as compared with the same arm abroad. The most notable instance, probably, of this kind on record, is that in which General Sheridan, when a guest at the headquarters of the Prussians, in 1870, wrote a letter, which was published in a newspaper in the United States, in which he made comparison between the German cavalry and the American cavalry of the Civil War. Now, every military man knows that the cavalry of Europe and America cannot be likened to each other, because some of their spheres of action being different, difference in their organization has become imperative. The ordinary battle-fields of Europe are different from most of the battle-fields during our Civil War. The cavalry of Europe, which were generalized in Sheridan's account merely as cavalry, consist of light and heavy cavalry, whereas the American consisted of light cavalry only, serving generally as dragoons ; that is, armed with the carbine as well as sabre, and able to fight afoot or on horseback. But whether light or heavy, regarding it on both continents simply as cavalry, its action is different on the two continents, because of the general difference in the characteristics of the battle-fields, those of Europe being generally on open ground. The American cavalry served efficiently in scouting parties, in guarding the front and flanks of armies on the march, or in making raids, sometimes of the proportions of invasions, into the enemy's country. But where could this cavalry have acted as Blücher's did in the rout of Waterloo, or as the cavalry on both sides at Vionville, in the Franco-Prussian War, where, moving in

great masses, the French and Germans alternately made furious charges on infantry, and but for the modern repeating fire-arms, would have swept it off the field.

Very differently from Sheridan, a German of military experience, Major J. Scheibert, of the Prussian Royal Engineers, speaks of the distinctiveness of cavalry for different kinds of service, cavalry fitted for the fields of Europe, and cavalry fitted for Virginia and neighboring soil. He served with the Army of Northern Virginia for months, and considered the Southern far superior to the Northern cavalry, as indeed it was at first; yet in speaking of this cavalry, so well adapted in his opinion, as it was in that of all good observers, to its special service, he does not confound it in description, as Sheridan does, with cavalry of another sort, adapted to a different kind of service. He remarks:

"Through its minute instruction in the duties of elementary tactics, through the rapid execution of evolutions which have become matter of habit, and through the certainty of rapid concentration in all the new forms of combination, even in reversed order, the German cavalry is far superior to the Southern cavalry, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is composed of men who have been horsemen from their earliest youth, whom, except when wounded, I never saw fall from the saddle."*

After describing the various requirements of German cavalry-drill, he adds:

"Where could the Southerners have found the time and the means for instruction in these preparations and exercises?" etc.

The underlying fact of Sheridan's undue exaltation of the Federal as compared with the German cavalry was that it was in the line of his habitual practice never to blench from

* I quote from the French translation of Major Scheibert's work, made by Captain J. Boneque, of the Third Regiment of French Engineers, not having the original in German at hand.

claiming more than the merit in whatever he was concerned. As he claimed that the Federal cavalry had never effected much until he was given command of it, which statement flies in the face of historical facts, he thereby necessarily implied that the best of all the Federal cavalry-commanders was himself, a statement disputed, and still open to dispute. But, as he so believed, or at least so affected to believe, the natural consequence of the first affirmation, supported by his habitual practice of claiming everything, was that the cavalry which he commanded, after he had commanded it, was rated by him as the best on earth.

That which made General Meade so good a general in the field was that he possessed that poise of character which has been noted as the foundation of all great military achievement. But, besides this, he had never ceased to study the art of war through recurring European conflicts. The peace of thirteen years that intervened between the end of the Mexican and the beginning of the Civil War found him studious of everything that related to the methods of civilized warfare, so that when the Civil War broke out in America he came to his task fitted in every way for its demands. During these apparently fallow years he had done the only thing which will enable a military man at any time to be equal to taking a great part in war. He had continued to study mutations in the practice of the art of war. He well knew that, although its principles are immutable, its modifications are not to be covered save by the whole range of the inventions and changes derived from the never-ceasing activities of mankind.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN, OTHERWISE CALLED THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

THE great political mistake that the South made, astute as it was in governmental affairs, was in pressing to a successful issue, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which thus became an Act of Congress. The Missouri Compromise, entered into as long before as the year 1820, had admitted the State of Missouri as a slave State into the Union, but with the express agreement that thenceforth slavery should not be permitted north of latitude 36° 30′ within the bounds of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the land which the United States had bought of France. By the repeal, in 1850, of the Act of Congress through which this arrangement had been made binding without reference to time, it was believed that, as the status of freedom had been incidentally settled by the fact that the Mexican territory had not recognized slavery, a quietus had been put on the dangerous pro-slavery and anti-slavery agitation in the struggle of the South for the maintenance of its political supremacy, or at least equality; that a reconciliation of conflicting interests and final pacification of the country had been effected. But, by the action of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the whole political aspect of things changed for the worst. As the Compromise of 1850 had repealed the Missouri Compromise, so the Kansas-Nebraska Act had the effect of repealing the Compromise of 1850, and unsettled the whole question. The Kansas-Nebraska Act recognized the right of

the people of a Territory to make the final determination as to whether or not the resultant State should be free or slave. It naturally followed, as the opinions and sentiments of the inhabitants of a Territory, existing as a prospective State, would determine whether or not, at the time of admission to the Union, a Territory should, as a State, be free or slave, that a contest should ensue between the existing settlers of a Territory; and moreover, that the new conditions introduced by the repeal of the Compromise of 1850 should lead to the colonization of Territories north of 36° 30′ by settlers intending to determine their free or slave status with reference to their ultimate recognition as States. The Territory of Kansas, being just on the western border of Missouri, became, therefore, at once the scene of intestine confusion, freedom of elections being interfered with and forays made into the Territory, so that civic affairs there were kept in the greatest turmoil.

The repeal of the Compromise of 1850 was but affording a cause and a great arena for strife to thousands of combatants inspired by sentiments impossible to reconcile regarding the future of the prospective State, as individually concerned and as influentially affecting the fortunes of the whole country. This political situation, resulting from what was called "squatter-sovereignty," which term signified, as already indicated, that they who could arrive and maintain themselves in greatest numbers would be they who would eventually remain masters of the field in the contest between freedom and slavery, was that which led immediately to an acerbity never before reached between the North and South; this, and the feeling on the one side that the Fugitive Slave Law was no more than due recognition of the rights of the South, while, on the other side, it was regarded as imposing upon the North a duty which, considering its sentiments, was revolting. Thus the two parts

of the country approached nearer and nearer to strife. The little cloud, of which few took any note in 1850, became larger and larger until it overshadowed the inhabitants of the whole land, who, for the most part, were still unconscious of its portent when the ominous calm set in before the long pent-up storm, before the thunder pealed and lightnings flashed in war. This calm was the period of pause, when Southern Senators and Representatives and Cabinet officers, as their States passed ordinances of secession, gradually took their leave and shook the dust of Washington from their feet; when commissioners, accredited from the Southern States, appeared in Washington to treat with the United States as with a foreign power, the basis of conference being what it was impossible for the nation to grant as a preliminary, the recognition of the Confederacy; when Fort Sumter, manned by a few men under Major Robert Anderson, stood beleaguered in the midst of Charleston harbor by the batteries built around it by an unmolested enemy. Still the North temporized, and protested that there was no reason for this display of force against it; that it merely asserted its right to its territory, to its forts, its custom-houses, and its light-houses; but further than the implication contained therein, that it would repel force by force, all that was done by the North was in the line of conciliation. To no purpose. Suddenly the stillness was broken by a sound that showed that the storm had broken loose at last. The besiegers had fired on Sumter. Then the North roused itself from its partial incredulity as from slumber, and the stand then taken by secession found its grave in four years' time, after a frightful struggle, in the surrender at Appomattox Court House.

On the 12th of April, 1861, the bombardment of Fort Sumter had begun, and it had ended on the 13th. Successful resistance was impossible against the batteries of the

enemy established at their leisure on the shores surrounding the work. The besieged were only a handful, inadequately provisioned, because the enemy had let no stores reach them, and occupying a partially dismantled work. Mr. Lincoln at once called for a levy of seventy-five thousand men, for three months, apportioned according to their respective populations among the different States which recognized the central Government. The spirit of conciliation still continued to pervade all he said and did, even in this crisis of active hostility to the Government. He did not recognize directly or by implication that it could be possible that States were actually warring against the Government. He treated the situation as if it represented merely the turbulence of an insurrection which would soon subside with due amount of judicious management. But, in meeting the emergency in this admirable manner, he made one capital mistake of far-reaching consequences. He fixed the term of the troops demanded by the levy at only three months' service. It would be vain to say that no man could have foreseen at the time when Mr. Lincoln called for three months' troops, that the emergency which demanded any could possibly last over three months. Many men did not, probably the majority did not; but many did. The First Massachusetts Regiment and the Second Massachusetts Regiment went in for the war. General Patterson, of Philadelphia, so fully realized the inadequacy of a three months' term to cover the exigencies presented by the military situation, that he induced Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, to raise regiments additional to the quota assigned to Pennsylvania, an act disapproved by the War Department, so far as may be indicated by its non-acceptance of them. And yet it fell to the lot of those very repudiated regiments, which formed the celebrated Pennsylvania Reserves, to be the most immediate resource for the defence

of Washington after the defeat at Bull Run. The cases cited will suffice for instances of outspoken appreciation of the situation, and doubtless there were many others, even although the form taken by some of them may not have been exactly the same.* The term of three months was not long enough for the men, although largely militia, to acquire the drill and discipline necessary to make good soldiers. The testimony given before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War showed that the regiments at Bull Run had been brigaded only for the march. The very same thing also happened about the time of the battle of Bull Run, that happened in the Mexican War, when men were disbanding and dispersing at the end of their term of service, at a time when their presence was most urgently needed. This contingency Mr. Lincoln evidently did not see, nor did Mr. Seward either, the Secretary of State, whose view was most roseate as to the small time needed to bring about pacification. Yet to accept troops for any term, however long, it was not necessary to depart from the language which Mr. Lincoln used out of regard

* General Patterson's prime agency in this matter, in having made to Governor Curtin the first suggestion of an additional levy for Pennsylvania, has been recently disputed. But, if anything in the world would seem to be clear, as establishing the existence of an occurrence, it is the coincidence between the letter of April 25, 1861, from General Patterson (the authenticity of which is undisputed), requesting the Governor to call out an additional twenty-five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with the expression in the Governor's Message of 1862, where he says, "Men more than sufficient in number to form some ten Regiments of the Reserve Corps had, previous to the 15th of May, been accepted by me in pursuance of a call upon me (afterwards rescinded) for twenty-five regiments, and were then already assembled and subject to my control. Most of these men volunteered for the Reserve Corps, and were immediately organized." It was not through the subsequent action of General Patterson, but through that of the Government, that the call was rescinded.

for the susceptibilities of the people. The euphemism in which he indulged, in his political adroitness and kindness of heart, would have covered any duration of strife just as completely as though he had used the word "war."

A skirmish at the village of Falling Waters, on the Potomac, just below Williamsport, took place on July 2d, between the force under General Patterson and that under General Thomas J. Jackson, the latter falling back towards Winchester. But no battle, except the engagements of Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, in the western part of Virginia, won, on July 11th and 13th, by General George B. McClellan, had taken place at this time in the East. The district mentioned, which was part and parcel of Virginia, became, on June 20, 1863, by the will of its people and the formal acceptance of the United States, the State of West Virginia. In Missouri, in the West, a battle had taken place. Between the date of the firing on Fort Sumter, April 12th, and that of the battle of Bull Run, July 21st, the troops had been distributed in and near Fort Monroe, near Baltimore and Washington, and along the fords of the Potomac. On May 24th they had occupied Arlington Heights, which dominate the city of Washington from beyond the Potomac; while at Manassas, with pickets thrown out beyond Centreville towards Washington, the enemy silently impended as, in Bulwer's "Zanoni," the Shape, with horrid possibilities of harm, brooded as the Dweller of the Threshold.

A Confederate army, under General P. G. T. Beauregard, the capturer of Fort Sumter, in occupying Manassas (the point where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running from Alexandria to Richmond, meets the Manassas Gap Railroad after it has passed through Strasburg, Front Royal, and Manassas Gap, and thence to Manassas Junction) held a strategic point of great importance. A Confederate

army, under General Joseph E. Johnston, occupied the town of Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley, some forty-five miles distant from Manassas Junction. From where Johnston was, however, in Winchester, points along the aforesaid railroad leading through Strasburg, Front Royal, and other towns, were within a day's march of Beauregard's position. Consequently Johnston could at any time within a few hours reinforce Beauregard, or, conversely, Beauregard could reinforce him within the same time. General Patterson, with a force of not much over ten thousand Federal troops, was ordered by General Scott to detain Johnston at Winchester, so that he could not reinforce Beauregard. But the position he was ordered to remain in for the purpose of holding Johnston rendered it physically impossible that he could have any influence whatsoever over Johnston's movements, for whereas Johnston had, by means of the railroad described, ample facility for reinforcing Beauregard or being reinforced by him, General Patterson was obliged by his orders, despite the fact that he had pointed out to General Scott where his true strategical position was, to remain in the front of Johnston, by way, forsooth, of keeping him from going in the *opposite direction, towards his unobstructed rear, towards Beauregard's position.*

There never was a simpler strategical problem presented than the one which offered itself to the military authorities at Washington. Supposing that Johnston should attempt to reinforce Beauregard, Patterson should have been where he could simultaneously join the Union Army near Manassas, and jointly with it oppose both Beauregard and Johnston. If Beauregard had reinforced Johnston, there would have been no recourse for Patterson but to make a rapid retreat to Williamsport. The event fell out in the very opposite way, but one in which Patterson was power-

less even to modify its course, as will now be shown. It will appear, as we proceed, that General Patterson's presence at the Battle of Bull Run became, on account of the orders which he received, absolutely impossible. Why, then, the defeat of Bull Run should have been attributed to the absence of Patterson's troops there is a mystery not to be solved except by reverting to a very prevalent practice in mundane affairs. The battle was lost, there was no denying that, but the cause of its loss must be accounted for so as to save the susceptibilities of those in fault. *Les absents ont toujours tort;* therefore General Patterson was responsible for the defeat. This is not the place for presenting at length a special plea for any man, and it may be said, too, that history has in a measure set this matter right, but this circumstance is so intimately interwoven with the history of the battle of Bull Run, that it cannot be allowed to appear as an incident of the defeat in the minds of persons not disabused of the entire falsity of the charges against General Patterson. To repeat, it was as impossible for General Patterson to have reached, under his orders, the field of battle, as if he had had his forces in the moon. But the full demonstration of this, as a part of the history of the war in the East, may properly be postponed until we have dealt with the incidents of the battle itself.

Under pressure of public opinion, and against the first judgment of General Scott, the Administration was induced to countenance an order to General Irvin McDowell, the commander of the Federal forces on Arlington Heights, to advance, on the 16th of July, against the enemy posted at Manassas Junction. If General McDowell had been able to attack Beauregard on the 18th, he would have found him without any but trifling reinforcements, without a single man from Johnston's column at Winchester; but the faulty organization of his troops delayed active operations, and by

the time he was ready to attack Beauregard, Johnston had joined him in force.

McDowell brought up at Centreville on the 19th, and remained there on that and the next day. In front of him, to the southwest, running, with many sinuosities, in a northwest and southeast direction, and emptying into the Occoquan, was the stream called Bull Run, distant at its nearest points from two and a half to three miles. Behind it lay the enemy's main body, his left flank covering the turnpike going to Warrenton, towards the southwest, and his right flank, the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, at the point, Manassas Junction, about five miles in the rear. Bull Run, at ordinary stages of water, is fordable at several places along its length, and is crossed by a stone bridge on the continuation of the turnpike from Warrenton to Fairfax Court House, on the way to Alexandria.

The two forces opposed to each other at the battle of Bull Run did not differ in numbers by more than about one thousand men, the advantage being on the side of the Federals. The organization on both sides was as defective as may be imagined from the fact that on both sides they consisted of raw levies. The highest officers on both sides were men of good military knowledge, some of great capacity, as the future showed, but none of them of any experience in the handling of large bodies of troops, so that they were equal in that respect. The Confederates were superior to the Federals from the fact of their greater mental preparedness, for they had long contemplated this very shock of arms, and with their overweening sense of superiority and long-harbored resentment from a sense of wrong, which had been fostered by the ruling class of the South, they welcomed it with a certain martial ardor. They were superior, too, in the use of fire-arms through their individual practice. They were, as a body, decidedly more trust-


North.
Supplemented from another official map, and otherwise modified and redrawn, to suit the general reader, by
R. Meade Bache
PLAN
OF THE
BATTLE-FIELD AT BULL RUN.
JULY 21st 1861.
Federal
Confederate

worthy than the troops, as a body, on the Federal side, for it came out finally, in the testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that, on the Federal side, the men were often superior to their officers, cases occurring where officers had even deserted their men on the field. And the worst element of all on the Federal side was that constituted by a regiment of so-called Fire Zouaves, of whom, before the fight, regular officers had expressed themselves as utterly distrustful, because, on the march, they had proved themselves to be mere marauders and without any military discipline whatever. All history has shown that military bodies formed of those who in time of peace belong to a reckless class have no stomach for that sort of a fight in which is involved a question of principle, even if it be no higher than loyalty from man to man in the presence of danger. A real army being that kind of combination which is represented by the highest organism,—interpenetrated from the brain, the general, down to the lowest fibre, the common soldier, with intermediate ganglia, the officers,—unless the whole structure be co-ordinated, its parts cannot perform their functions because they cannot be efficient save through the central control and intermediate direction actuating the mass. From this, the true point of view, neither army was worthy of the name, as compared with thoroughly organized forces, and judged by this criterion it ought to be clearly seen that the Federal army was not so trustworthy as that of the Confederates, in which, generally, there was the solidarity derived from better *personnel* in the minor commands.

Johnston began to join Beauregard on the 19th of July, his last troops coming up in time for the battle of the 20th. Both sides were eager for battle. On the morning of the 21st Beauregard contemplated turning the Federal left flank at Centreville, three miles off, by passing over the lower

fords of Bull Run. At the same time the main body of McDowell's troops, leaving reserves at Centreville, was on the march for the ford of Bull Run, near Sudley Springs, about five miles away, with the purpose of crossing at the ford and marching down the right bank of Bull Run, while another force marched directly to make a junction with the first, by the stone bridge over Bull Run, on the line of the Warrenton turnpike, the whole movement being concerted with the purpose of falling on the Confederate left flank. If the order from General Beauregard had not miscarried, in which he had directed General R. S. Ewell to take the lead in crossing the lower fords of Bull Run, the field presented would have been Beauregard marching to Centreville and intercepting McDowell's communications with Washington, while McDowell had put his main force behind Bull Run. How preposterous it is, then, in view of this, for certain writers, from the Federal standpoint, to have deplored that, through defective marching orders and the confusion and delay attendant thereon, McDowell's advance had been delayed three hours, for, as remarked, if Beauregard had been able to carry out his intention, the Federal communications would have been seized while McDowell was passing to what had been Beauregard's rear. Beauregard had instructed Ewell to begin his march at 7.30 A.M. General Ewell did not receive the order, so the whole right wing of Beauregard's army remained deadlocked, as Ewell's crossing was to be the signal for the general movement. It was on account of this detention that, at 10.30 A.M., Beauregard and Johnston became apprised that the Federals were advancing on their left flank. Now, if the Federals had really lost three hours, the time at which they were fairly *en route* must have been about 7.30 A.M., or, in other words, at about the same time that Beauregard had expected starting with his right wing in the opposite direction. Had this *contrêtemps*

actually taken place, as certainly would have happened but for the miscarriage of the order to Ewell, we should have had on the field a repetition of the situation in which Prince Eugene and Turenne once found themselves. Although Johnston, by right of seniority of rank, had, by the fact of his coming, superseded Beauregard, he relinquished the immediate command of the troops to Beauregard, whose battle Bull Run undoubtedly was, and as such was universally recognized. What happened when the cloud of dust towards the north was perceived by the Confederates awaiting the beginning of the movement ordered from their own right, proving that their attack was anticipated by one on their left, ought to be obvious. Orders were sent at once to the lower fords for reinforcements from the troops waiting there, and Beauregard and Johnston at once rode rapidly towards their left flank, four miles away, reaching there, of course, after the engagement had begun. The extreme left flank was held by General N. G. Evans with a portion of a brigade, covering the stone bridge crossing the Warrenton turnpike. As soon, however, as he had found that Federal troops were approaching in force on his left flank, he had at once retreated to a commanding position to his left and rear, leaving only a small force of observation at the bridge, and at the same time had despatched to the right the news of the advance of the enemy on his flank. He had previously seen movements of that portion of the Federal troops which had appeared on the Warrenton turnpike, but had become satisfied that they portended no immediate advance, and as he was guarding the stone bridge, obstructed by abattis, and the fords in its vicinity, he held on there until he had observed the advance on his flank, which it was impossible for him alone to resist. Colonel A. E. Burnside, who was in command of the brigade at the head of McDowell's column, attacked Evans in the position which he had taken up to

the left and rear of the stone bridge. Why it was that he was not able with his larger force, with arriving accessions, to dislodge Evans in the course of an hour, before reinforcements arrived for him, does not appear on the surface. Perhaps Burnside may have felt that, from the character of some of his troops, they were more than ordinarily to be shielded from harm. Certain it is that, at a moment when he had not lost a dozen men in killed and wounded, he excitedly charged an aide of General Andrew Porter's to tell him that he was being cut to pieces.

Finally, General Bernard E. Bee, with his brigade, and some additional troops belonging to Colonel F. S. Bartow's brigade, reinforced Evans and enabled him for a while longer to hold his ground. But the brigades of the Federal column, gradually arriving and deploying, overlapped this force on both flanks and compelled it to retreat in great disorder to the southward, across the Warrenton turnpike, and take position on the Henry House hill. This Henry House hill, as it is usually called—for it is sometimes called the Henry House plateau—is a great plateau, with sides sloping in all directions. It is bounded around the northern sweep of its base by a little tributary of Bull Run, called Young's Branch, around the eastern sweep of its base by the same tributary, and around the western sweep of its base by the road from Sudley Ford to Manassas. The retreating Confederates took position on and formed their line across this plateau-like hill. Here General Jackson, coming from the right flank of Beauregard's forces, had reached a position, and was able to afford by his presence and the steadiness of his brigade strong moral support to the discomfited Confederates. Here it was that Jackson, through his brigade, earned the celebrated *sobriquet* conferred upon it by the casual remark of Bee, that the brigade stood like a stone wall. It was fortunate for the Confederates that

there were present at this juncture troops that stood imperturbably amidst the confusion of their routed men, rushing pell-mell to take up a position on the hill.

There had been in the main praiseworthy earnestness in the conduct of the troops which had finally dislodged and driven the Confederates upon the Henry House hill. But in this very first part of the battle became apparent what was perfectly manifest before its close, that the successful handling of large bodies of troops in attack must be preceded by much previous drill. To disengage the regiments coming up successively in McDowell's column and bring them into action took, from a military point of view, entirely too much time. The situation was now this: The Federals occupied the ground in front of the Confederate line on the Henry House hill, which line, therefore, of course faced north. Colonel Wm. T. Sherman, commanding one of the brigades of General Daniel Tyler, had crossed Bull Run at Red House Ford, just above the stone bridge, and had combined his forces with McDowell's in the final advance which had driven the enemy south of the Warrenton turnpike. General Tyler, commanding in person another brigade of his division, crossed at the same place, but after making only a slight attack on the enemy at the Robinson House,—a house on the northeastern side of the Henry House hill,—marched to the south along Young's Branch, and was not heard from again during the battle. To this unfortunate occurrence must also be added, that Burnside's brigade had most inopportunely been allowed to rest and refresh itself. To march away after firing a few shots, or to rest and refresh in an emergency like this, when the enemy is sure soon to receive reinforcements from his unattacked wing, is an introduced condition likely to lead, as it did in this case, to need of much longer rest and refreshment. Here were two brigades neutralized at one

of the most critical parts of the day, the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the fact being that there was at the time an impression in some quarters that the affair engaged in was somewhat of the nature of a picnic.

At this time, about 2 P.M., when McDowell made his attack on the Henry House hill, he had only four brigades in hand—Colonel Wm. T. Sherman's, Colonel William B. Franklin's, Colonel Andrew Porter's and Colonel Orland B. Wilcox's, two batteries of regular artillery, and a company of regular cavalry. The pioneers of General Robert C. Schenck's brigade, of Tyler's division, were clearing away the abattis at the stone bridge, so as to permit the brigade to cross Bull Run, the rest of Tyler's division having crossed at Red House Ford. The brigade of Colonel Oliver O. Howard, of Colonel Samuel P. Heintzleman's divison, had not reached the field by the circuitous route from Centreville around by the way of Sudley Springs. The brigade of Burnside, and that of Tyler—which, in the presence of his superior officer, Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes only nominally commanded—have been accounted for. Therefore, at the moment when McDowell concluded to attack the hill, he determined to do it with only two-thirds of the force close at hand. It would not have done to await the coming of Howard, but there is no reason why, when he was advancing, Burnside and Tyler should not have been summoned to follow, or to try to outflank the enemy. Tyler's brigade was nearly intact, and the men of Burnside's were merely fatigued, not exhausted, and could at least have rested in reserve.

The first great mistake of the day was in not overwhelming Evans at once. This was the second, to be followed soon by a greater than both of the preceding. The general in command ought to have seen that, as it was 2 P.M. and he was pushing the enemy toward the south, he was

pushing him towards reinforcements that must be on the way and on the eve of arrival, and therefore, that if the enemy was to be finally routed, it were well that the attempt were made quickly to put him to flight. The Confederates, doubtless appreciating the situation, fell back to the southern and eastern edge of the plateau, which was thickly wooded there. Here, under shelter, their sharpshooters began to come disastrously into play, and they could retreat, and under cover reform and advance at their pleasure. This was the point of time when the third and final great mistake of the day was made, and all the more remarkable a one because regulars committed portions of it. McDowell ordered forward, near the Henry House, the two batteries of regular artillery. It is sometimes as dangerous to pursue when one fleeth, as it is to flee when no one pursueth. It is not good military practice to advance artillery within musketry range of woods held in force by the enemy, or to any position unsupported by reliable infantry. The pieces, in this case, began to advance before the infantry to support them had arrived, and when the infantry selected for this purpose had been pushed forward, it proved to be the only thoroughly worthless regiment in the army, the regiment of New York Fire Zouaves. So incredible was the order to Captain Charles Griffin, that he at first remonstrated with the chief of artillery, Major William F. Barry, who seemed to think it imperative, and so Griffin and Captain James B. Ricketts promptly obeyed it, and placed themselves where their presence meant almost certain destruction in the face of an enterprising enemy. The enemy's sharpshooters in the woods began to disable the batteries by picking off their men, the Fire Zouaves were routed by a charge of cavalry whose men they ought to have destroyed, for the enemy had only two companies of horse; and, finally, a regiment of the enemy,

emerging from the east toward the left, was mistaken by the chief of artillery for supports arriving, when it, coming within range, poured into the batteries so deadly a volley that they were rendered completely useless. The final possession of the batteries became the object upon which the energies of the combatants were concentrated, and the enemy was repulsed into the sheltering woods. Too late in the contest Howard's brigade, which had come up, took a share in it.

Here General McDowell ought to have seen that, with the force which he had at his disposal at the moment it was impossible to win the battle. It would seem to have been perfectly feasible, if the movement had been ordered in time, for Burnside's and Tyler's brigades to turn the enemy's position. The enemy had as much as their forces engaged could encounter, as proved by the fact of his taking shelter in the woods. If two brigades, under General Kirby Smith and Colonel J. A. Early, which now arrived as reinforcements to the enemy, changed the fortunes of the day, it is presumable that two Federal brigades, which were not utilized to any great extent, would, had they been put into a timely turning movement, have routed the enemy before he was reinforced.

The battle was a drawn one when the Confederates received the reinforcement of the brigades under Kirby Smith and Early. They fell in on the left of the Confederate line, and overlapped the right of McDowell's. Then the Federal troops began to move simultaneously towards the rear. There was no appearance at first of rout. That episode in the retreat occurred later. The troops for a while took their way gradually towards the rear, and reached the open plain from which they had ascended the Henry House hill, and then pursued their course back to Centreville by the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley Springs road. Their

organization was for a time fairly well preserved. When, however, those retreating by the Warrenton turnpike reached the bridge over Cub Run, a tributary of Bull Run, and came under the fire of a battery which the Confederates had brought to bear on it, panic manifested itself. The panic, like all other panics, was unnecessary. Panic is either a fear entirely groundless, or else with grounds that ought to be inadequate to produce the loss of self-possession. On the northern side of Bull Run were bodies of troops with *morale* undisturbed. The smaller one of these, under Colonel Israel B. Richardson, had guarded Blackburn's Ford. Troops from it repulsed the enemy in an attempt to cross McLean's Ford. The larger force, under Colonel Dixon S. Miles, was nearer Centreville. The two bodies, constituting the reserve mentioned, of three brigades, became the rear-guard of McDowell's retreating army. Between Centreville and Washington two brigades had guarded the communications. Some portions of the army, under good officers, maintained their organizations, while others poured continuously, as a mere mob, towards Washington, and the next day thronged the streets of the city and filled it with the tales of their wonderful experiences. There was, however, really no disgrace attachable to most of the troops. They had been called upon to do more than lay in the power of their recent organization and often faulty leading. General Johnston himself warned his own people against vainglory in consequence of the event of the battle, calling their attention to the fact that the task which had been set the Federal troops to perform, in marching and attacking, was a far more difficult one than that which they themselves had executed in standing on their defense.

The mistakes connected with the battle at this place may be summarized as follows: It may be said that, as Centreville is a strong position, and as raw troops are better fitted

for defensive than for offensive movements, it was an error not to wait at Centreville for two or three days, and give the enemy a chance to attack, which course, it seems, he intended to pursue. There, too, McDowell's reserves would have been available for the time of actual conflict. They were available only for covering the retreat under the circumstances under which the battle actually took place. It is not apparent, as has been charged, judging from measurement on the large-scale map furnished by McDowell to accompany his official report of the battle, that his troops, although mainly raw, were called upon to make a march unduly long, by the Sudley Springs road, before they encountered the enemy. The day was extremely warm, but it must be considered, also, that they started early in the morning, and that the longest distance marched by any body before it reached the first part of the battle-field was nine miles. An exaggerated idea of the number of troops opposed to them, at the first onslaught on Evans, the most common of the misapprehensions at the beginning of the war, led to wary measures, when Evans could have been crushed, and, in turn, the supports arriving for him could have been brushed away. Assault on the Henry House hill was injudicious with the small force with which it was attempted, without the support of the two brigades on the ground that were not utilized. The advance of the artillery to the place to which it was ordered was an operation that is indefensible. Persistence in the attack, when it ought to have been clearly seen that, on account of the woods in which the enemy had taken refuge it was impossible without a turning force to dislodge him, was the final error, ensuring reinforcement to the enemy and probable disorderly retreat to the Federals, if not actual rout. If a reverse comes to men, even those inured to war, who are tired and hungry, it comes with cumulative force. Thousands of

the men were true to duty, as proved by the steadfast way in which they at first moved from the field. They began the movement because they had simultaneously perceived the impossibility of achieving success. If they had been unable to drive the enemy from his wooded defences, how could they hope to do it when he was reinforced by two brigades on his left, outflanking their right? The efforts of their officers, and there were more good ones than worthless, could not counteract that conviction in the men, which they, too, must have shared, even whilst they strove to keep the men in hand and prevent them from retreating.

Not until the moment when the men were relatively safe did panic overtake them. This phenomenon of panic, although one so extraordinary, is nevertheless one which seems never to have been examined critically as to its cause. Putting aside the special case under observation, including all the elements in it of novelty, hunger, and fatigue, and looking at the phenomenon of panic, with the evidence before us as to the main conditions attending it, contributory ones apart, let us see whether the rationale of it cannot be reached. In the first place it is observable that panic was much more prevalent among the ancients than it is among the moderns, so much more, indeed, that even the most advanced of the ancients could account for it only by supposing that it was due to supernatural agency. The voice of the god Pan was supposed to inspire terror on the battle-field. The Athenians believed, at the battle of Marathon, that the rout of the Persians was ascribable to the terrible voice of this god. In the second place, those who, in modern times, are most liable to panic are the ignorant and uneducated. Here is an apparent anomaly; the highest general intellectual development of the centuries and the lowest are found in the same category of weakness. But the anomaly is seen to be only

apparent when it is considered that, in the realm of imagination, the Greeks were savages, when looked at from the educated modern point of view. One of the chief effects of modern education is to train the imagination, and bring it under entire subjection to the intellect. So, in fine, those persons it was, and is, who, having untrained imaginations, are most prone to panic, which may be defined shortly as unreasonable fear.

This being premised as to the sole condition of susceptibility, it remains to specify the conditions under which panic chiefly manifests itself. It may be produced in an instant among masses of mankind, before they have time to think, by an alarm of fire in a crowded building, or by the belief that an overloaded balcony is breaking down with or upon them. But this is not the particular variety of panic with which we have to do here. We are speaking of panic in armies, and under circumstances where there is plenty of time to think. Let us, then, as throwing light upon the cause, observe when panic takes place in great armies or in smaller bodies of men composing armies. It might be supposed that, if ever there were a time when a body of troops would have been seized with panic, it was when the younger Cyrus, leading an army against his brother Artaxerxes, was killed in battle, and then the principal officers, invited to a conference, treacherously murdered. But no; under Xenophon chiefly they pushed their way back through the Persian Empire to the Bosporus. In some of their first encounters with the Arabs the French were killed to a man without a thought of escape. In our Indian wars the same thing has often occurred. The steamship "San Francisco," with seven hundred troops aboard, went down in the Atlantic, losing two hundred and forty of their number, and so conducting themselves as to elicit from the War Department a complimentary order. It will be found that,

in all cases, the phenomenon called panic reverts to a physiological peculiarity belonging to the constitution of mankind. Through that peculiarity man is capable of supporting any degree of danger with unblenching courage if the nervous system gradually inures itself to stress, but he cannot bear with equanimity any sudden revulsion of feeling. People in grief have been known to die from the shock of a sudden access of joy. After a victory of Napoleon's, some artillery and troops were drawn up in a village by night, the enemy being in full retreat, when a tumbril came rumbling through the streets, and instantly the victorious French, imagining that the enemy was upon them, fled in the wildest panic towards the rear.

It is thus apparent that panic takes place in armies only when there is a revulsion of feeling from the hope or belief that victory will be or is achieved. At Bull Run, novelty, fatigue, and hunger were merely accessory to the creation of that kind of revulsion. Another point is still to be noted. The officer is not so much subject to panic, if at all, as the common soldier is. That is entirely true, comparing mass with mass. We say that the *morale* of officers is superior to that of common soldiers, but that does not explain anything; it merely states a fact. The reason of the difference is that, by the very circumstance of his ordinarily higher education, the officer has, as compared with the common soldier, a trained imagination, not given to vain fears, imaginary fears, fears which control action in spite of the reason, and his sense of responsibility and capacity for meeting responsibility are immensely increased. The ideal officer is so imbued with the sense of responsibility, the imperious claim of duty, it has become so much a habit of mind, that it excludes alarm that cannot be controlled by reason and its cause met with the faculties of mind and body undisturbed. These are the attributes, and thus derived, which the ideal

officer possesses in such full and overflowing measure as to be able to share them in critical moments with the average soldier of the ranks.

About eighteen thousand men on each side took part in the battle, the losses on each in killed and wounded amounting to nearly two thousand. Bee was killed on the Henry House hill. On the map of the ground which Beauregard presented to the city of New Orleans the spot where he fell is indicated. "Stonewall" Jackson was wounded, and so was Kirby Smith. On the Federal side Hunter and Heintzelman, both commanders of divisions, were wounded. The statistics of losses bear out the statement that, so far as mere fighting was concerned, the troops did well for men not inured to war.

The panic increasing rather than decreasing as the troops neared safety, all attempts to rally them at Centreville were in vain. Supported by the rear-guard of the three brigades which had been posted on the hither side of Bull Run, the troops poured in an unceasing stream of disorganization towards Washington. As day dawned, the next morning, on the banks of the Potomac, a solitary horseman might have been descried, as Mr. G. P. R. James, the novelist, used to say, approaching the western end of Long Bridge, where, so he told me, there was not even a corporal's guard on duty. It was a young officer of the Federal army, bearer of despatches to General Scott, doubtless sounding a warning note lest the enemy might capture the city unawares.

On that same day, the day after the battle, the spirit of the North rose to fever-heat. The House of Representatives passed a bill for the enlistment of five hundred thousand volunteers for the war. General George B. McClellan was summoned to Washington to take command, under General Scott, of the troops in and around the Capital. It

was realized now that General Scott was too infirm for the duties of the position, even of command of the operations there, let alone command of the armies of the United States, which latter position, however, he continued nominally to hold until November 1, 1861. He was, in fact, an invalid, borne down by weight of years and by ill-health. For his own sake and that of the people, the burden of any chief command should not have been placed upon him. At the beginning of the war General Scott's first choice had been General Robert E. Lee, but he thought that his duty lay with his native State, Virginia. It is not by any means a wild supposition that, if General Lee, with his military genius, had come, through General Scott (as would have been inevitable, had he cast his lot differently), into the chief command of the Union armies, the Confederacy would have been dealt at the beginning such stunning blows as to have caused its collapse at once. But the fates ordered it otherwise. The valiant Army of the Potomac was doomed, headless for a long time, to hold in check the fierce energies of a force directed by a hand so capable that it might fitly be described, as a character of Dumas' styled one of the first swordsmen of France, as *une lame vivante*. Considering all things, the Army of the Potomac was a marvel in fortitude. Nothing but the undaunted Roman legions, defeated time and again by Hannibal, can parallel its *morale*, maintained steadfastly until it fell under worthy leadership. Even the Continental armies, amidst the promiscuous blows of Napoleon, had occasionally some respite; but to the Army of the Potomac there was for a long time none.

It only remains now to dispel a popular error by showing that it was put out of the power of General Patterson to save the day at Bull Run, if the day could have been saved.

General Patterson demanded at once a court of inquiry, and could not get it, upon the plea that, as he had been honorably discharged, that was recognition of the value of his services. He did not think so, especially as public prints in various parts of the country represented him to be a brother-in-law of General Johnston's (which was not the fact) and a secret friend of the Southern cause. He spoke to the President, who gave him five hours of his precious time, and became satisfied, from an examination of his orders, of the injustice that was being done him. He applied to Congress, Congress in turn applying to the War Department for the papers of the case. The War Department declined to furnish them, on the ground of the interests of the public service. So General Patterson had to suffer obloquy in many quarters until the end of the war, when he brought out a pamphlet containing the official record and everything else appertaining to his case, proving that it was not he, but General Scott, who had been responsible for that for which he had to bear censure. But so difficult is it to suppress the echoes of many-tongued rumor, that even at this late day there is not one man in a hundred who does not believe that, but for General Patterson's default, the battle of Bull Run would not have been lost to the Union cause. It is, therefore, my purpose to show conclusively, as a part of the history of the battle, and in justice to the man who was so wronged, that the public impression was entirely erroneous regarding General Patterson.

General Patterson, to begin with, has been spoken of in connection with the battle as a man of seventy years of age, and also as a man who had had no military education, thus by implication attributing to him disabilities which did not exist. General Patterson was a very able man in mind, and of so robust a constitution of body that, at nearly ninety years of age, he continued vigorous, and at seventy he

was not really older than the average healthy man of fifty. He had been educated in the best of military schools, that from which some of the greatest captains of all time have been graduated—the school of actual war. He had been an officer in the War of 1812, and he had served with great credit in the Mexican War, in 1846. With him, in the campaign near Washington, were some of the ablest officers of the army, with whom General Scott instructed him to confer, and with whom he did confer, they coinciding with him entirely as to what he did. But now, as the object here is not to prove that high military authorities agreed with him, but to show that he was controlled at every turn, and then censured for not doing what had been rendered impossible, we must follow the course of events from the period when Patterson took command of the troops which were to occupy the Shenandoah Valley for the purpose of detaining Johnston in Winchester so that he could not reinforce Beauregard.

In a letter of instructions from General Scott to General Patterson, dated June 8, 1861, he tells him that he approves of the projected expedition against Harper's Ferry, but adds that there must be no reverse, and then goes on to say that he had just ordered Burnside's Rhode Island regiment of infantry, with its battery, to join him; also that he is to be reinforced by a company of the Fourth Artillery, which, however, may not reach him in time. Towards the end of the letter General Scott refers again to its being indispensable that there shall be no reverse, because that would result in engendering high hopes in the enemy. He concluded his letter by reiterating the same idea that he had twice before expressed about a reverse, in the following words: "Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly; make a good use of your engineers and other experienced staff-officers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear

prospect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly posted and not inferior to you in numbers."

Johnston retreated from Harper's Ferry and fell back towards Bunker Hill. Patterson pushed his forces across the Potomac to pursue, but when his column was actually astride of the river he received a telegram from General Scott which read as follows: "What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you propose to make consequent on the evacuation of Harper's Ferry? If no pursuit, and I recommend none, specifically, send to me at once all the regular troops, horse and foot, with you, and the Rhode Island regiment."

In reply to this telegram General Patterson begged to be allowed to keep the regulars, and to be allowed to transfer his base from Williamsport to Harper's Ferry, and to open and maintain communication east and west along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to hold at Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, and Charlestown strong forces; securely advancing, as the troops are prepared, portions of them towards Winchester, and thence towards Woodstock, and thus cut off the enemy's communication with the west.

General Scott objected to this plan that, if a detachment were sent towards Winchester it would, if strong enough, drive the enemy away from Winchester and Strasburg, to Manassas Junction and greater concentration, and if the detachment were not strong enough, it would be lost. The telegram concluded by saying that the regulars with Patterson were most needed in Washington, and by directing him to send them and the Rhode Island regiment as fast as disengaged.

General Scott telegraphed again, on the 17th of June: "We are pressed here. Send the troops I have twice called for, without delay." This order left General Patterson without a single piece of artillery and with only one troop of

cavalry. The Hon. John Sherman, at that time on General Patterson's staff, wrote him the following August: "The great error of General Scott undoubtedly was that he gave way to a ceaseless apprehension that Washington was to be attacked before the meeting of Congress, and therefore weakened you when you were advancing. No subsequent movement could repair that error."

On the 21st of June General Patterson, by request, sent by telegraph to General Scott a plan of operations. This, abbreviated, is as follows: To occupy Maryland Heights (which is the key of Harper's Ferry); to cross the Potomac with horse, foot, and artillery near Point of Rocks; to make a junction with Colonel Charles P. Stone at Leesburg. Observe, that where Patterson wanted to go was to Leesburg, whence he could have gone by rail to Alexandria, and thence nearly to Centreville, in a shorter time than Johnston, at Winchester, could go thence to Manassas Junction, because Johnston would have had a long day's march before he could strike from Winchester the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. It will appear, as we proceed, that General Patterson was not allowed to go to Leesburg, but was kept on the front of Johnston almost up to the last moment.

On June 23d General Patterson was at Hagerstown, still recommending that Maryland Heights be occupied and a supporting force left in the valley, the whole command to be about twenty-five hundred men.

On June 25th General Scott telegraphed to Patterson to "Remain in front of the enemy while he continued in force between Winchester and the Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force you may cross and attack him. If the enemy should retire upon his resources at Winchester, it is not enjoined that you should pursue him to that distance from your base of operations without a well-grounded confidence in your continued superiority. Your attention is

invited to a secondary object, a combined operation on Leesburg, between a portion of your troops and the column of Colonel Stone at, and probably above, the Point of Rocks, to hold that village. The enemy has reinforced Leesburg to sixteen hundred men, and may increase the number. Inquire."

General Patterson very pertinently remarked in his vindication, written in 1865: "Yet the commander-in-chief, who had, on the 25th, given me permission to offer battle, 'if superior or equal in force; on the 27th, when he knew I had but six guns and no mode of moving them, telegraphs: 'I had expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the enemy.'"

In response to this General Patterson wrote to the adjutant-general of the army a reply which is so long that it must be condensed to the principal points. General Patterson said that the telegram received implied that orders had been sent to cross and attack the enemy; but if such orders had been sent, he had not received them. He then spoke of the force of the enemy as estimated at fifteen thousand men and twenty-five pieces of artillery and nearly one thousand cavalry, and said that he himself had only about ten thousand volunteer infantry and six hundred and fifty cavalry and artillery, chiefly recruits. He goes on to say that the artillery horses are untrained and without harness; that he had frequently requested to have batteries sent, but had received none; that he had not enough cavalry or artillery to defend the fords of the Potomac between Harper's Ferry and Hancock. He concluded by saying: "While I will not, on my own responsibility, attack without artillery and superior force, I will do so cheerfully and promptly if the general-in-chief will give me an explicit order to that effect."

On the 29th of June the harness for General Patterson's

single battery arrived. On the 30th a reconnoissance in force was made and his troops were concentrated at Williamsport. On the 2d of July he crossed the Potomac with less than eleven thousand men and with one battery of six smooth-bore guns. After crossing, and just beyond Falling Waters, the advance of the enemy, under "Stonewall" Jackson, three thousand five hundred strong, with cavalry and artillery, was met, and was driven back for several miles with some loss. On July 3d the troops entered Martinsburg, and there had to await supplies and the arrival of the command of Colonel Stone. The means of transportation were entirely inadequate, nothing being furnished by orders from headquarters in Washington, the only reliance being upon the deputy quartermaster-general attached to the column.

Upon the arrival of Colonel Stone's force General Patterson issued, on July 8th, an order for an advance on Winchester; countermanded at midnight, as the men under Colonel Stone had arrived footsore and weary. On the following morning, the 9th, General Patterson having come to know that some of his chief officers were of the same opinion which he had entertained from the first, that they were on a false line of advance, called a conference of the following officers: General William H. Keim, General George Cadwalader, Colonel J. J. Abercrombie, Colonel George H. Thomas, General James S. Negley, Colonel Charles P. Stone, Captain James H. Simpson, Captain Amos Beckwith, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Crossman. These represented seven officers of the regular army and three officers of volunteers.

General Patterson, mindful of the injunction of General Scott, that he should consult with his principal officers and run no risk of sustaining a reverse, submitted to these all the orders he had received and a general statement sum-

marizing his views of the military situation. The verdict of the conference was that the line on which the troops were advancing was false and dangerous, that instead of their threatening the enemy, the enemy was threatening them, and that they ought to move to Charlestown. Charlestown is within a march of Leesburg. From Leesburg the army could have reinforced McDowell more quickly than Johnston could have reinforced Beauregard, and from Charlestown could have reinforced McDowell just as quickly as Johnston could have reinforced Beauregard. The opinion of the best informed officers was that Johnston had fallen back from Martinsburg to lure Patterson dangerously on.

General Patterson's largest force assembled at Martinsburg was about eighteen thousand men. When he had marched thence he had, as remaining available troops, after leaving a garrison there and deducting for the sick and train-guards, about thirteen thousand effectives. After the conference General Patterson wrote to General Scott, saying that he had proposed to move to Charlestown; "from which point," he added, "I can more easily strike Winchester, march to Leesburg when necessary, open communication to a depot to be established at Harper's Ferry, and occupy the main avenue of supply to the enemy." At Charlestown he would have been within easy supporting distance of McDowell, as has been shown. He had suggested that before unavailingly.

General Patterson went on to say, in his letter to General Scott: "General Sanford informs me by letter that he has for me a letter from you. I hope it will inform me when you will put your column [McDowell's] in motion against Manassas, and when you wish me to strike. . . . . If the notice does not come in any other way, I wish you would indicate the day by telegraph thus: *Let me hear from you on* ———."

Affairs seemed to be at last drawing to a well-concerted crisis when, on July 13th, General Scott said, in the course of a telegram, dated on the 12th: "Go where you propose in your letter of the 9th instant. . . . . *Let me hear from you on Tuesday.*" Now, Tuesday was the 16th day of July, and General Scott's telegram, therefore, gave permission to move to Charlestown, and announced that McDowell's attack on the enemy at Manassas would take place on the *16th of July*, and that, on that day, General Patterson would be expected to co-operate with McDowell by attacking Johnston. On the 13th General Scott wired General Patterson: "I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force towards Manassas and it be hazardous to follow him, then consider the route *via* Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg," etc. This enlarged the permitted scope of co-operation specifically. General Patterson might, at his discretion, attack Johnston or might reinforce McDowell, depending upon circumstances mentioned.

General Patterson and his advisers did not consider the army strong enough to beat Johnston behind the entrenchments of Winchester. Therefore Patterson was constrained by his orders to adopt the other alternative, of making demonstrations against Winchester. But, as General Patterson very properly observes in his vindication, making demonstrations against Winchester placed him in a position which incapacitated him from changing his base suddenly, or, in other words, from being able, in case of the desirability arising for him to reinforce McDowell, to do so; besides rendering it likely that demonstrations on Winchester would have the effect of driving Johnston away just when it was most dangerous that he should join Beauregard, when he,

Patterson, from the position of making demonstrations, could not follow him in time.

General Patterson made a demonstration on Winchester *on the 16th of July*, the day announced by General Scott as that of McDowell's attack on Beauregard. He marched from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill and encountered the advance of the enemy, which consisted of cavalry. He sent a message from that place to General Scott, that the whole road to Winchester was obstructed, and that he would move the next day to Charlestown. He reported the term of the three months' men with him to be nearly expired, and that they were unwilling to remain beyond it. He added that if General Scott should desire it, he would, after leaving enough troops for the security of Harper's Ferry, advance with the remainder *via* Leesburg, provided that the forces under Johnston did not remain at Winchester after the success which he anticipated from McDowell. Of course, as that was the 16th on which he was speaking to General Scott, he supposed that the battle at Manassas was in progress.

On the 17th General Patterson was in Charlestown asking of General Scott if he shall do what he had suggested—send troops to occupy Harper's Ferry, and, under conditions previously mentioned, advance to Leesburg. On the 18th he was also in telegraphic communication with General Scott.

The reader will now perceive that, as Patterson, at Charlestown, was only one day's march from Leesburg, and the first of Johnston's reinforcements to Beauregard did not reach him before the evening of the 19th, and the last of them not before the day itself of the battle, the 21st, there was still time for Patterson to reinforce McDowell.

The attack on the enemy at Manassas had been unavoidably deferred. General Scott telegraphed General Patterson, on the 17th, "McDowell's first day's work has driven

the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow."

On the 18th General Scott was in possession of the fact that Patterson had made his demonstration on the 16th, and that he was then in Charlestown. On the 18th he learned from Patterson, by telegram, that the enemy had not left Winchester, that the demonstration on the place, on the 16th, had effected that.

It is time now to draw conclusions, after a brief summation of the facts. Scott appointed the *16th of July* as the day for the demonstration on Winchester. It was made by Patterson on that day. The enemy was known at that time not to have reinforced Beauregard. The battle at Manassas did not take place *on the 16th*, as expected, but was postponed, according to General Scott, *to the 18th.* At Charlestown, *on the 18th, three days before the battle, twelve hours before any reinforcements whatever left Winchester for Manassas*, General Patterson telegraphed General Scott that, from the condition of his force from anticipated disbandment, he considered an attack on Winchester hazardous, but concluded with the words, "shall I attack?"

There was not only no answer to this, but General Patterson was left in entire ignorance of General McDowell's movements. So it is as clear as day that, even as late *as the 18th*, General Scott could either have ordered Patterson to attack Winchester or to reinforce McDowell by the way of Leesburg.

Finally, General Patterson, tied as his hands were for personal endeavor, did what he could by sending, *on the 20th*, the following despatch to the assistant-adjutant-general: "With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester by the road to Millwood, on the afternoon of the 18th, his whole force thirty-two thousand five hundred." General Scott, in his comments upon Patterson's statement, sub-

mitted to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, said, "Now, it was, at the reception of that news, too late to call off the troops from that attack [McDowell's], and, besides, though opposed to the movement at first, we had all become animated and sanguine of success; and it is not true that I was urged by anybody in authority to stop attack, which was commenced as early, I think, as the 18th of July."

It was either too late, or it was not too late, "to call off the troops." The frame of mind in which the authorities at Washington found themselves cannot qualify the possibility of calling off the troops. The frame of mind in which those authorities did find themselves doubtless brought it about that, *on the 18th*, Patterson was neither told to attack Winchester nor to reinforce McDowell by the way of Leesburg. And it does look very much, indeed, as if that frame of mind had prevented calling off the troops. Had the battle terminated otherwise than as it did, General Patterson's action, which really represented the views of some of the best officers of the army, would have been regarded as highly commendable. Yet despite the sufficient facts that were presented to it, the Committee on the Conduct of the War said in their report, that "the principal cause of the defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the Valley of the Shenandoah." However, although General Patterson, failing in being allowed a court of inquiry, had to wait until 1865 for vindication, he had the solace of many testimonials from men of the highest military talent, justifying him in his course in every respect, and recognizing that, in obedience to his orders, the result could not have been other than it was.

Owing to the fact of the changes that took place in the names of the main armies contending on the eastern coast

of the United States, they having been in one instance even interchanged, it becomes necessary to mention here formally what these names on the respective sides were and what they finally became. Beauregard's army was called the Army of the Potomac, and Johnston's the Army of the Shenandoah, while McDowell's army was not popularly known by any distinctive name. In the next campaign, that of the Peninsula, under General George B. McClellan, which campaign we are now about to consider, the Federal army was known as the Army of the Potomac, and the Confederate one as the Army of Northern Virginia. In the immediately following campaign, that of the second battle of Bull Run, some of the troops of the Army of the Potomac reinforced a Federal army under General John Pope, known as the Army of Virginia, which fought a number of battles with the Army of Northern Virginia. Finally the Federal army continued to retain the name of the Army of the Potomac, and the Confederate army to retain that of the Army of Northern Virginia, and they thus remained named and known until the end of the war.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN—THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN AND THE BATTLES OF WILLIAMSBURG AND FAIR OAKS.

GENERAL MCCLELLAN assumed command of the Army of the Potomac on July 27, 1861. He at once began, and he continued in the most energetic way, the organization of an army worthy of the name and of the dire need of the Republic. Simultaneously the defensive works of Washington, planned and executed by General J. G. Barnard, chief-engineer of the army, were carried as an *ençeinte* around Washington, from a point on its western bank, touching the Potomac at Hunting Creek, just south of Alexandria, in a curve to the northward of the city, to where the line rested on the eastern branch of the Potomac, just above Bladensburg, a stretch altogether of some thirty-two miles. Here McClellan was in his element, both through the particular constitution of his mind and his previous military training. He worked smoothly and expeditiously within the groove of routine, with a special knowledge of the particular branch of routine with which he had to do. He had, in the Mexican War, seen service which had redounded to his credit. Nothing there, however, had made him especially conspicuous among the brave and brilliant group of young officers who served under Scott and Taylor, but he had subsequently been selected as one of a small band of *élite*, only three in number, of whom Major Richard Delafield and Major Alfred Mordecai were the other two, to visit Europe during the Crimean War, and

there study the most approved methods and appliances of war. This distinction had so crowned him, as with an aureole, through the years between that event and the breaking out of the Civil War, that even in the minds of American military men he was thought of as the peer of Lee. Natural bent of mind, therefore, and special training, and accruing confidence from recognition of his powers, had peculiarly fitted him for the creation and organization of an army. We have the authority of Napoleon for believing that this is no light task when there are no existing *cadres* to be filled up, and, therefore, we should award to McClellan full measure of praise for his accomplishment in giving to the Army of the Potomac that soul and body with which it afterwards bore itself so heroically in all times of trial, whether of victory or defeat.

It is not anticipating to say here what is already so plainly written on the scroll of history, that with all this military aptitude in McClellan, there was still conjoined with it such defects in that part of character upon which great military achievement principally depends, that they neutralized his other efficiency. Contrasting what he declared, when he said that he would make the conflict short, sharp, and decisive, with the progress and conclusion of affairs of which he had control, their outcome was lamentable. Say that he was unduly interfered with at times, and any one must grant it; but it would only be fair to add, that if he had not been interfered with at other times, the turn of events would have been disastrous. That he should, despite his shortcoming as a general fitted for the great emergency in which the nation found itself, have possessed for a long time the implicit faith of the army and of the whole country, is a thing for which the following pages among others ought to show that it is impossible wholly to account. No doubt a winning personality, when he

chose to reveal it, might account in some measure for the admiration which he excited; and the fact that he was essentially the creator of the admirable organization which he led might also account in some measure for the glamour which he exercised. But when, as the fact is, proof after proof was afforded of his incompetency for large command, the rank and file of the army in wrathful, disciplined silence, saw him relieved, this passes all comprehension, unless we believe that the habit of the average human mind is so confirmed in the retention of beliefs in the line of what is sometimes denominated consistency, but is the very opposite, that it is incapable of changing its opinion even upon the most conclusive evidence. The intensity of this indignation may, however, be justly attributed to the fact that the man by whom McClellan was relieved, and who superseded him in command of that faithful army, was not to be spoken of in the same breath with McClellan in any capacity in which mind and acquirement are concerned.

The preceding are merely general conclusions. Let us therefore consider the special ones in the light of which the following pages are to be read in considering whatever verdict the reader may conscientiously feel disposed to render to his own mind. One of the fundamental traits of a general McClellan had in a high degree. It cannot without qualification be said, in describing it, that he was not unduly elated by success nor discouraged by disaster, because he achieved no great success, his victories in West Virginia being gained with overwhelming forces. But when we come to consider that he was not appalled by disaster, it seems to be a legitimate conclusion that he would have preserved a balanced mind in military success. One of the greatest of his defects made it possible that he could imagine himself, as a general in the field, to have anything to do with questions of national polity. Yet, acting as independently

as the ambitious Napoleon when he served under the Directory, it was not long before he gave the President of the United States in the most unequivocal manner to understand that, with respect to slavery, he regarded himself as the conserver of the Constitution as well as the commander of the Army of the Potomac. General John C. Fremont and General David Hunter took action in the very opposite direction, in favor of the manumission of slaves, but without any allied direction to the civil authorities. All erred; for as military men, in command of armies, they had nothing to do with the determination of a status which it was the province of the civil authorities to settle. McClellan always inordinately magnified the forces of the enemy and minimized his own. Brocken-spectres of gigantic hosts moved to the eye of his imagination along the heights of Richmond and overflowed on to the swamps of the Chickahominy, easily transported thence to the field of Antietam. Yet, although he always clamored for reinforcements, he never fought his army as a whole, after making all due allowance for reserves. But greatest of his military defects was his organic deficiency in appreciation of the value of time. Of the fleeting moment of which Napoleon speaks, the moment which, lost, is never to be regained, he seemed to have no conception. Everything must, to his mind, be done decently and in order. There was always some small item necessary to completeness, when readiness should beckon on the way to victory. The defect is one of the commonest among mankind, and absolutely fatal to good generalship. Against an army led by Lee, whose enterprise was bounded only by the possible, it would have been fatal to McClellan, but for the vast resources lying back of his unintermittent slowness. Indeed, it almost seemed as if he believed, with Immanuel Kant, that there is no such thing as the passage of time, that time is always present, and that

we picture it to ourselves as passing only because we see the decay of things.

War is like any other game in turning upon the balance of exchanges. But it is different from other games in this, that the exchanges bear to the untutored mind the character of unwarrantable sacrifices, whereas, to the military mind, they are so directly related to passing and final events, that they are recognized as often economical in men, treasure, and material. Whatever nation goes to war upon the plan of protecting itself at every point invites and encounters defeat. How many men and millions of treasure were sacrificed during the war by frittering away the resources of the Government in mere gifts out of hand to the enemy! The tendency everywhere, at the beginning of the war, and continued long afterwards, was towards the *morcellement* of the forces of the United States, whether with reference to the zone of military operations or the terrain of the actual shock of battle. Both civil and military authorities were guilty of this, but the palm of all misdoing must be awarded to the civil authorities, when they consented to give to Butler and Banks thousands of soldiers with whom to play "boom-a-laddies!"

The theatre of operations in which the Army of the Potomac was to act was necessarily the area bounded on the east by the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay, and on the west by the eastern boundary of the Shenandoah Valley, the Blue Ridge. It is easy enough to form a general mental map of the area described. Imagine a line very nearly one hundred miles long drawn south from Washington to Richmond, for they differ in longitude by only about twenty miles. Now assuming that base, by way of orienting ourselves, lay off in imagination from it courses that represent the eastern water-front of Virginia. Starting from Washington, the general course of the Potomac is south for

about forty miles, then a little north of east for about fifteen miles, and then southeast for about fifty miles, to its mouth, where it enters Chesapeake Bay, whence the shore of Chesapeake Bay runs about south to the mouth of the James River, on which, northwest, lies the city of Richmond, between the James and a branch of it called the Chickahominy. If the reader can see, in imagination, these courses with reference to the imaginary north and south line between Washington and Richmond, he will perceive that the part of Virginia circumscribed by them on the east makes a large, blunt protrusion towards the east above and below Richmond. The principal streams intersecting this all trend, in a general way, from northwest towards southeast, and are, in order, beginning at the north, the Rappahannock (branch Rapidan), and the York (branches Mattapony and Pamunkey). Of the Pamunkey, the branches are the North Anna and the South Anna. Lastly comes the James (branches Chickahominy and Appomattox). These streams divide the area described into a number of peninsulas, having numerous intermediate streams and low swampy bottoms; the peninsula, *par excellence*, with which we shall shortly be concerned in connection with the approaching campaign, being that between the York and the James Rivers, terminated by Fort Monroe, from which point to Richmond it is seventy-two miles, whereas from Washington to Richmond it is about ninety-five miles.

It would take too much space here to discuss all of the various Federal successes in military operations that took place between the campaign of Bull Run and that of the Peninsula. On the 29th of August the works at Hatteras Inlet, in North Carolina, were captured by General B. F. Butler and Commodore Silas H. Stringham. General Rosecrans closed the campaign in West Virginia, on the 10th of September, by winning the battle of Carnifex Ferry. The

Federals encountered a terrible disaster at Ball's Bluff on October 22d, when the troops, through mismanagement, were routed with great slaughter. Near Dranesville, however, a few miles from Washington, there was, on December 20th, an affair favorable to the Federal arms, in which the Pennsylvania Reserves were alone engaged. On the 8th of January General A. E. Burnside, assisted by the navy, captured Roanoke Island, in North Carolina, and on the 14th of March took Newbern. On the 19th of January General George H. Thomas won the battle of Logan's Cross Roads, in Kentucky. On the 6th of February General U. S. Grant and Commodore Andrew H. Foote, in the department under Halleck, captured Fort Henry. On the 16th of February Grant captured Fort Donelson, with thousands of prisoners, the first very great success of the Union arms. I saw throngs of them in Indianapolis, a sturdy, butternut-hued crowd, in which the component unit knew as much of the destructive retrograde metamorphosis in which he was assisting as does the grain of powder in the tamped mine that is to rend the earth asunder. On the 8th of March concluded the battle of Pea Ridge, in Arkansas, won, after a long and hard contest of two days, by General Samuel R. Curtis. On the 6th and 7th of April Grant won the battle of Shiloh, the forces of Buell reaching him just in time to save the second day. On the 24th of April Commodore David Glasgow Farragut passed the forts near the mouth of the Mississippi, and the next day captured and put General Butler in possession of the city of New Orleans. By this success the Mississippi was now open, except at Vicksburg and thereabouts, from its source to its mouth. The successes of the Federals had vastly preponderated over those of the Confederates.

Three plans were mooted and discussed in Washington, whether to advance thence on Richmond by crossing the

Potomac and taking the way of Manassas; or thence, by means of transports, adopting Urbanna as a base, a place on the right bank of the Mattapony River, near its mouth; or, using transports as before, to march to Richmond from Fort Monroe. At Fort Monroe the army would be seventy-two miles from Richmond, but from Urbanna would be only about forty from it. Nothing was finally decided upon until shortly before the time to take action, the President and the Secretary of War on the one hand and McClellan on the other falling farther and farther apart in mutual confidence. Confidence having been impaired, their relations with each other proceeded, as usual, from bad to worse, with the inevitable commission of faults on both sides. Finally McClellan was given the choice in the spring of adopting the Manassas line of operations or the line of operations from Fort Monroe. Strange to say; he selected the latter, although at the time he had no true basis of confidence, by his own demonstration, or positive assurance from the navy, that there was not grave danger to transport-service for the troops from the "Merrimac," otherwise called the "Virginia." This was a frigate which had been captured, with the Gosport Navy Yard, by the Confederates, and which had destroyed or neutralized all adversaries in Hampton Roads, near Fort Monroe, until the Monitor, the first craft of her kind, appearing the very next day, March the 10th, had just held its own with the new sea-monster, sheathed, in pent-house form, with railroad-iron, the result of another encounter with which no one could with certainty predict.

It is impossible to decide which of the two, the Administration or McClellan, was more in the wrong than the other in the aggregate of contentions which led up to destroyed confidence between them. McClellan's last act, however, when leaving Washington with his army, in the spring of 1862, is not defensible. The number of men needed to

make Washington secure had been authoritatively estimated at forty thousand, and he himself had indicated to the Administration that he would leave thirty-five; but as, upon his departure, it was discovered that he had included in the count of garrison troops which he claimed could easily be recalled to Washington from the vicinity, it being deemed that he had indulged in a subterfuge, the unfortunate relations which had previously existed between him and the Administration became still more strained. The Administration had been unwise in expecting important operations to be undertaken before the spring of 1862, that is, before the organization of the Army of the Potomac was perfected, but it had been perfectly reasonable in expecting McClellan to do what he did not do, in raising the blockade of the lower Potomac, maintained by the batteries of the enemy where the channel of the river approaches the Virginia shore. On the other hand, McClellan had, from the very beginning, shown a disposition to act on his own judgment and responsibility, as if he had been clothed with dictatorial powers. When, however, probably as a rebuff, he was not, as he should have been, allowed to appoint his own corps-commanders, a most injudicious step was taken by the Administration, to which, doubtless, it was prompted by all that had gone before in the form of inharmonious combination of the civil and military authorities. It has been surmised by some persons that, if McClellan had had the appointment of these corps-commanders, the issue of the Peninsular campaign would have been very different from what it was. But nothing derived from examination of the general conduct of the corps-commanders who were actually appointed, or in that of the sequence of events on the Peninsula, can lead to the slightest suspicion that the final result would have been essentially changed had McClellan been allowed to make these appointments. What appears

throughout his military career as a commander in the Civil War is his inability to appreciate at a glance any military situation whatsoever, and to act with corresponding vigor. That he, a man not by any means destitute of energy, quite the contrary, never acted quickly in any situation, is proof positive that he wholly lacked the intuition, the inspiration of military genius or talent. He was, from first to last, in his operations, the receiver, not the giver of surprises. The enemy praised him highly, but it is a truism that, in military operations, the praise of an enemy cannot be accepted as of value until the war engaged in is over. In the most positive, the highest faculty of the general, McClellan was wholly lacking; in the initiative derived from intuition, present in victory or defeat, as closely allied as the lightning's flash and the thunder's roar, and capable, if the enemy gives the opportunity, or chance throws it in the way, to turn to success a tide of disaster that has set in, not less than to marshall battalions in an overflowing, resistless advance.

On November 1, 1861, General McClellan had been made commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States. In that capacity the interests under his immediate eye largely blinded him to what was beyond its range. General Don Carlos Buell, a man never appreciated at his full worth, perhaps because, like St. Paul, he was, in relation to operations in the West, born out of due time, made excellent suggestions to McClellan for a plan of campaign in Kentucky and Tennessee, but they were not appreciated by either General McClellan or Mr. Lincoln, and remained unadopted at the time. Now McClellan, in going to the Peninsula, went without other duties than those of commander of the Army of the Potomac, for, on March the 11th, he had been relieved of those of general-in-chief of all the armies. Before the assumption of the same duties by General Henry W.

Halleck, who had exercised the largest command of any in the West, and under whom Grant had served, Mr. Lincoln assumed control of the general conduct of military affairs.

In March, 1862, the enemy had suddenly evacuated the position of Centreville and retired upon the Rapidan. This move was probably made in anticipation of McClellan's, about which, the enemy, doubtless, had sources of information, and was intended by the enemy, no matter where McClellan went, whether by Manassas, Urbanna, or Fort Monroe, to make sure of being in a strategic position with reference to Richmond. Washington was, from the beginning to the end of the war, a whispering gallery, of which the receiving end was in Richmond. When the enemy had evacuated Centreville, McClellan marched his army to the position, and then immediately withdrawing it, began to send it by transports to the Peninsula. He himself arrived at Fort Monroe on April 2d. A force of nearly sixty thousand men had already arrived there. On the 3d marching orders were issued, and on the 4th the troops set out along the Peninsula towards Richmond.

General McClellan was met at the outset of the campaign with difficulties for which he deemed himself in no wise responsible. He found that the navy would not guarantee to try to neutralize the "Merrimac" and to capture Yorktown too, and he complained of the absence of accurate topographical knowledge of the country. It was, however, a pure assumption, on his part, that the navy would capture Yorktown, and as for absence of accurate topographical knowledge of the country, to whom but to himself should he have looked to see that it had been obtained? If nothing more had been done than to order a competent purveyor of bull-frogs for the market to make a reconnoissance of the swampy part of the country from Fort Monroe to Richmond, he would at least have learned what he did

not know, that a shallow stream called Warwick River runs nearly across the Peninsula, from the James River towards the south of Yorktown, on the York River. On the 5th of April the troops, formed in two columns, brought up against the defensive lines of the enemy formed in part by this stream; the right column near Yorktown and the left opposite Lee's Mills, on the road across the Warwick to Williamsburg in advance. General McClellan made no attempt to take the enemy unawares, but deemed that it was necessary, first of all, to make elaborate reconnoissances. He assumed that the line, consisting of inundations from dams, redoubts, and epaulements, was too strong to capture by assault or lodgment beyond it. It is true, however, that he imagined that the force defending it was very large; whereas it was at first extremely meagre, General John Bankhead Magruder having for the whole extensive line only about eleven or twelve thousand troops. General Benjamin Huger held Norfolk, near the mouth of the James, with about eight thousand. McClellan's conclusion led, of course, to the final conclusion that a siege was necessary, and for this he had some justification in the fact that his chief-engineer, General Barnard, agreed with him, although after the campaign he had changed his opinion. This conclusion was adhered to, although, on the 16th of April, the Third Vermont Regiment broke through the river line at one point, and maintained itself for two hours with reinforcements of only about five hundred men from the Fourth and Sixth Vermont Regiments. So McClellan had sat down to make a regular investment and siege, while the enemy received constant reinforcements, and Johnston, at last, with his army of fifty thousand men, arrived from the Rapidan to resist the march of McClellan as soon as Yorktown and the defensive line resting on it were reduced. On April 20th fire was opened on Yorktown wharf for the purpose of

destroying it as a landing facility to the enemy, and preparations being nearly completed for the bombardment, Magruder evacuated the town on the night of the 3d; showing that he had had good sources of information, for it was expected by McClellan that everything would be ready on the 5th to dislodge him. Magruder had given a sigh of relief when he had seen McClellan deliberately sit down before his lines to make a regular siege; showing how well he appreciated his weakness to resist assault at the beginning, in view of the fact of his extended lines and the appearance before them of an army of certainly sixty thousand men. The enemy had had a month, of which he had availed himself, not only to bring up his main army, but to strengthen the fortifications of Richmond. So, in the first operations, from the 5th of April to the 4th of May, when the Federal troops entered Yorktown, just a month, the advantages had all remained with the enemy. Could the line have been forced without undue sacrifice for the gain? There is the best reason for so believing upon the evidence now extant from both Federal and Confederate sources. It is, however, the sphere of great generalship to divine the unknown, or to solve by trial the problem of the undivinable.

The enemy having evacuated his lines in the night of the 3d of May, General McClellan, on the 4th, promptly ordered cavalry and horse-artillery to pursue him on the roads towards Williamsburg. General Edwin V. Sumner was in command of this portion of the advance, and General Philip Kearny's division and General Joseph Hooker's division, of General Samuel P. Heintzelman's corps, and General William F. Smith's, General Darius N. Couch's and General Silas Casey's divisions, of Keyes's corps, were ordered forward in support of Sumner. The troops which they were pursuing from the lines near and at Yorktown were fifty-three thousand in number, under the command

of General Joseph E. Johnston, only slight skirmishing with the rear-guard taking place until the lines before Williamsburg were reached.

Early on the following morning Hooker attacked Fort Magruder, about a mile from Williamsburg, the most formidable of the enemy's line of defences, which reached across the Peninsula from the James to Queen's Creek, on the York. About three or four o'clock in the afternoon Kearny arrived and relieved Hooker by continuing the attack with his division, which had been so spirited that Johnston had been obliged to recall some of his troops who had continued their march. Sumner had been ordered to take command of all of the troops until the arrival of McClellan; but McClellan did not arrive. The resistance met with was much more severe than had been expected or need have been encountered, for all that the enemy was essaying to do was to gain time for his orderly retreat. As the event proved, the general-commanding should have been at the front. The function there to be exercised was very much more important than attending to what any one on his staff could have supervised, if supervision were indeed needed—the embarkation of General William B. Franklin's command, which was to go to a place on the right bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point, so as to take in reverse any defences which might have been prepared higher up on the Peninsula.

The losses at Williamsburg on the Federal were much greater than those on the Confederate side, and, as already indicated, were sustained for an inadequate purpose. The sole redeeming feature of the operation, except the admirable conduct of the troops everywhere, was the brilliant move of General W. S. Hancock, who, under orders, crossed Cub Dam Creek, on the right, with five regiments of Smith's division, and occupied a redoubt commanding the mill-bridge

across the creek. Here he remained unsupported for a long while, all the troops not being yet up; but although lacking reinforcements to enable him to hold his position and gain the left and rear of General James Longstreet's division, he still tenaciously held on to the ground in the hope that he would finally be able to advance and accomplish his purpose. He was waiting, however, in vain, when the enemy, recognizing the dangerousness of the lodgment which he had made, marched a column against him, led by Generals Jubal Early and D. H. Hill. By this time Hancock, holding the first, had occupied another redoubt nearer to Williamsburg, and was threatening two others. Seeing, at a glance, with his consummate grasp of a tactical situation, that it would be impossible, without reinforcements, to hold on to his captures, he fell back for a space from his most advanced position, and there halting, as the enemy threatened his right flank, he delivered his fire and charged with the bayonet, wounding Hill and throwing his troops into disorder; when Early, seeking to restore the battle, was compelled to beat a hasty retreat. Not until the affair was over did reinforcements, under General Smith, reach the ground; but they were too late to be available for a renewed advance on the enemy, who, having gained the time needed, continued his retreat towards Richmond. Here began and was conspicuously exhibited that strange fact of the absence of control of the battle-field by the commanding-general which continued to manifest itself throughout the Peninsular campaign. As no one has ever been able to attribute to him want of personal courage, the indisputable fact remains to be accounted for only by the ascription to him of a psychical trait of incapacity to see things in their relative importance as to event and time. If his corps-commanders were not those whom he would have chosen, all the more need was there that he should

have been at the front. Not only was he not at the front, but he had been detained of his own free will from being there by an affair so trivial that, if there had been no question of battle, it was beneath his official dignity to give it personal attention. General McClellan did not arrive upon the field until between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, when everything was virtually over. The next morning the army of Johnston continued its retreat towards Richmond.

While these operations were going on before Williamsburg, the divisions of Franklin's command were embarking at Yorktown for the point on the right bank of the Pamunkey opposite West Point, and by the 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter had reached the place at the White House where they established a depot of supplies. The expedition effected nothing more of moment, Franklin, soon after landing, merely repulsing an attack of General William H. C. Whiting, for as, on the 7th, Johnston's army had been concentrated at Barhamsville, only a few miles south of West Point, all chance of a turning movement was at an end. McClellan had ceased at Williamsburg all forward movement that could by the most strained construction of the meaning of the word be deemed pursuit, for in the following ten days the enemy moved only between thirty and forty miles to his point of concentration at Barhamsville. While the Confederate army was at Barhamsville, where it remained five days, all that McClellan did was to send out from Williamsburg reconnoissances and a force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry to open up communication with Franklin, beginning his forward movement on the 8th of May, and advancing his headquarters on the 10th nineteen miles beyond Williamsburg. On the 19th the troops which had gone by land, and those which had gone by water up the York, reunited at the White House, on the

Pamunkey. This was to be the depot of supplies for the army when it should be in position before Richmond. Here passes the Richmond and York River Railroad, which, beginning at West Point, at the end of York River, and between its branches (the Mattapony and Pamunkey), runs to Richmond.

A reorganization of the army was effected at the White House. The Second Corps, under Sumner, was to consist of the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick. The Third Corps, under Heintzelman, was to consist of the divisions of Hooker and Kearny. The Fourth Corps, under General Erasmus D. Keyes, was to consist of the divisions of General Darius N. Couch and General Silas Casey. The Fifth Corps, under Fitz-John Porter, was to consist of his own division, under General George W. Morrill, and that of General George Sykes (regulars). The Sixth Corps, under Franklin, was to consist of his own division, under General Henry W. Slocum, and that of Smith. The last two corps were organizations authorized by the President. These changes effected, headquarters, with Franklin's command and Porter's corps, marched to Tunstall Station, five miles from the White House, on the 19th of May, and on the 20th Casey's division forded the Chickahominy near Bottom's Bridge, which had been destroyed, occupied the high ground beyond, and began to rebuild the bridge. On the 21st the advance guard had reached New Bridge, eight miles further up the Chickahominy than Bottom's Bridge. On the 24th the village of Mechanicsville, north of the Chickahominy, four miles above New Bridge, was captured, but the bridge between it and Richmond was destroyed by the enemy. On that day also the left wing of the army secured a position south of the Chickahominy, at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks Station, across the Williamsburg road and near the Richmond and York River Railroad. The advance had been exceedingly slow.

However, the army was at last tolerably near the final position which it was to occupy. To understand its position in a rude, diagrammatical way, it will be necessary to conceive of the lay of the land from the following description. Imagine, then, the James River to run, neglecting numerous bends, in a straight line from southeast to northwest, and Richmond to lie north of the northwestward projection of that line. Now, again, imagine the Chickahominy to be a stream with broad swampy bottom on each side, covered with dense foliage, running from its mouth, about thirty-five miles below Richmond, for about seven miles nearly at right-angles to the line of the James, and then gradually sweeping around and running parallel with it, so that, as it proceeds, it runs about four miles back of Richmond. These being the main features of the country to be memorized, require added to them one which, although very subordinate from certain points of view, played a very important part in some of the military operations which we are about to consider. White Oak Swamp, so-called, is in reality a creek, which, starting south at about right-angles from the Chickahominy, about twelve miles from Richmond, then turns and runs parallel to the Chickahominy for about eight miles, distant about four, and degenerates into a veritable swamp, after having begun at its mouth in somewhat similar condition.

If the preceding description of locality has been understood, the final position of the army will be realized when it is stated that the left flank of its left wing rested on White Oak Swamp, near a place called Swamp Ford, the left wing passing thence, to the right, in advance of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks Station, by the former of which runs the direct road from Richmond to Williamsburg; and thence, beyond Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad, finally resting its right flank on the Chickahominy, near

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to a farm called Golding's, and just behind a small branch of the Chickahominy. The right wing partly consisted of the Pennsylvania Reserves. These lay to the north of the Chickahominy, their left flank resting on that stream, four miles above where the right flank of the left wing rested on the other side of the Chickahominy, and behind the strong line of Beaver Dam Creek, a north branch of the Chickahominy. In front of this branch strong detachments watched Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville Bridge, then destroyed, which cross the Chickahominy from Richmond to Mechanicsville. Between the left and right wings troops were stationed along the north side of the Chickahominy, covering the bridge-heads and the communications with the White House. Both wings, of course, were finally protected by entrenchments, the line along Beaver Dam Creek being naturally very much stronger than that south of the Chickahominy.

From the nature of the ground, and from the fact that the entrenchments of the enemy south of the Chickahominy were well thrown forward, the position of the Federal army could not help being vicious; but the terrain and the other conditions mentioned admitted of no better disposition of the troops. The mistake made, as the sequel showed, and due foresight ought to have prevented, was in having the troops north and south of the Chickahominy most unequally distributed, and not sure of facility of mutual reinforcement. Bridges connecting the two wings in places beyond the enemy's fire were soon finished, but in a country like that in which operations were being conducted, where nature had plainly, in the aspect of the ground, given her testimony and set her seal on the physical conditions which had endured for centuries, infallibly proclaiming that in these creeks, in times of heavy rains, a freshet would send the waters brimming over the normal banks across the low

bottoms, it was blindness itself not to see that only trestle, not pontoon bridges, could be depended upon to connect the dissevered wings of the army, dissevered not only by the Chickahominy and outlying bottoms, but by an interval of four miles between the line of troops south of the Chickahominy, and the second line constituted by troops north of it.

If the reader now has the map of the ground in his mind's eye, he will see that the left wing stretched across the opening of the loop made by the White Oak Swamp Creek with the course of the Chickahominy, and that, on the other side of the Chickahominy, four miles in advance, was the right wing, behind Beaver Dam Creek, connected with the left by troops posted on the north side of the line of the Chickahominy. On the north side of the Chickahominy, between it and the Pamunkey, running parallel with the Chickahominy, roads lead towards the southeast, to the White House and Tunstall Station, and other roads cross them, passing to the south over the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp Creek. South of the Chickahominy roads lead in a southeast direction, either directly to Williamsburg or by a roundabout course in that direction, crossing the Chickahominy on the first reach that it makes on leaving the James. Transverse roads, the continuation of the transverse roads north of the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp, lead towards the south, meeting the shore of the James at Malvern Hill, Haxall's Landing, and Harrison's Landing, to become famous in the final operations of the campaign.

The position of the army which led to the enemy's attack upon the left wing, which attack developed into the battles of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, was, beginning at the extreme right, north of the Chickahominy, composed of the corps of Porter, Sumner, and Franklin, while the left wing, south of the Chickahominy, was composed of the

corps of Keyes and Heintzelman. Bottom's Bridge was five miles away in the rear, entirely unavailable for reinforcing one wing by troops from the other. There were only two other bridges at that time, and these opposite the position of Sumner, occupying the centre, north of the Chickahominy, none for the right wing, four miles in advance of the left one. The position on the north side of the Chickahominy was stronger than that on the south. The troops there could be dislodged only by a turning movement of the most resolute sort, such as Jackson afterwards executed with overwhelming forces. Yet here were three corps in position at the stronger point and only two at the weaker, and the facilities of communication were, at best, inadequate. But the facilities for reinforcement, such as they were, suddenly became alarmingly less. On the afternoon and in the evening of May 30th came one of those drenching rains that make watermen look to the fastening of their floating property, and even to the security of their more stable property by streams. Had a man but heard of it, and not heard the sizzle and rush of the downpour, that alone would seem capable of setting him to thinking. The swollen Chickahominy began to glide faster within its banks, bearing whatever *débris* lay in its path; began to rise above its banks and call attention to its overwrought condition. The sun of the next morning rose on the placidity of the commanding-general, while the torrent still rose and rushed wildly along. The signal of heavy rain, which had passed unheeded in the Federal camps, had, however, sent a thrill of joy through those of the Confederates. Here was the opportunity, heaven-sent, as Jackson would have deemed it (and as Lee doubtless did, although he was not yet in chief command), to overwhelm the Federal forces in detail, the very waters of the sacred soil rising to sweep from its face the rash invader.

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with the aid of reinforcements. Here Casey found in time of direst need some entrenchments which had been made before the advance of the lines of the left wing, and was able, with partially sheltered forces, to call a halt to the enemy.

The fortunes of war were not, however, wholly on the side of the Confederates, notwithstanding that the Federals had so completely opened the doors to them in the enemy's favor. Just as the intended attack on the left flank proved an entire failure, through Huger's not coming up to time, so also the intended attack on the right proved nearly abortive through long delay. These two occurrences saved at least Casey from annihilation, for, possibly, Couch might have escaped. There was, however, another element that entered into the situation, which saved the Federals from disaster. Sumner, on the left bank of the Chickahominy, the brave Sumner, no general, but one of the noblest of soldiers, was chafing when he heard the cannon, and like the war-horse, pricking up his ears at the sound of the battle afar off, when he received orders to prepare to march. Without, however, awaiting in camp further orders, he marched his corps for the bridges, which still held precariously to the banks of the Chickahominy, their component parts grinding away on themselves and loosening in the stream, the approaches all flooded and mired in the sticky mud of the Chickahominy. Here he impatiently awaited final orders, but no orders came. There, across the stream, his brothers-in-arms, as he well knew, must be engaged in a desperate struggle against the greater part of the Confederate army. At last patience had had its perfect work when, at 2.30 P.M, he was obliged to stand the strain no longer, orders arrived, and Sumner marched his men towards the treacherous, surging foothold of the two spans that united in some sort the banks of the Chickahominy,

kept in position for only a brief space of time by the sheer weight of the troops, who, half-wading, passed through the current, horses dragging guns across, some of which settled in the quagmire of the opposite shore, mingled with the corduroy approaches of the bridge. One bridge failed after the passage of a brigade, the other still held faintly to its moorings, weighted with the hastening masses of men, and at last the gallant Second Corps stood on the Chickahominy's southern bank. The rescue by Sumner came not a moment too soon. When the long delayed attack on the right was made, General Couch, who had been holding on there, had finally been obliged to recede, on account of the threatening attitude of General G. W. Smith, under the immediate direction of Johnston, to envelope his right. Falling back to a position about half a mile in the rear, so as still to be somewhat on Casey's right flank, he there made a stand against the enemy, anxiously expecting reinforcements from the other side of the Chickahominy by the way of the bridge in his rear.

Sedgwick led Sumner's advance and soon caught sight of Couch in an attitude of expectancy, waiting to see in which direction to deploy his four regiments and his battery, the enemy before whom he had fallen back from the Chickahominy not having yet reappeared on his front or flanks. But, as Couch caught sight of Sedgwick, he deployed his men, and one of Sedgwick's regiments was instantly sent to his right, while the remainder of Sumner's column still marched swiftly forward through the woods to take position on the field. Hardly had the first dispositions been made when the pursuing lines of the Confederates issued from the woods in front into the open. A battery, under Lieutenant Edward Kirby, joined on Couch's right the battery of Captain James Brady. Sumner's regiments poured out of the woods on their side and ranged them-

selves in support of the batteries, on the right and left of Couch's flanks, the batteries thus occupying the centre of the whole new line. The Confederates must have been astonished at this sudden apparition. To no generalship was its suddenness ascribable, but simply to the prompt action of stalwart old Sumner that Couch's little force was not demolished. A Confederate brigade, seeking to enter between Couch and Keyes, paused, the general line of the Confederates rapidly took shape, but the whole situation had changed. The enemy precipitated a strong attack against the Federal right-centre, varied by fitful charges on the batteries. Later the conflict concentrated itself on the right, to which position two pieces of artillery were shifted from the centre. The position of the Confederates was largely masked by the woods which they occupied, and from which they made repeated and desperate charges on the guns. On both centre and right flank, however, their attacks were successfully repulsed, and then Sumner began to take the offensive. Committing the right wing to Sedgwick, the centre to Couch, and himself taking command of the left, he charged with five regiments on the Confederate right, which had already been severely handled, and sent it in retreat, leaving wounded behind and losing many prisoners. The fighting ceased at nightfall, with the partial retreat, near Fair Oaks, of the Confederates who had attacked there, whose loss had been very severe.

General McClellan did not, from first to last, appear upon the scene, but contented himself with directing Heintzelman to cross the Chickahominy and in person report to him. During the evening and night Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, of Heintzelman's corps, and Richardson's division, of Sumner's corps, were all up, and the rest of Sumner's artillery had been brought to the front at Fair Oaks. The remaining front of the old formation was now at Fair Oaks.

Behind that, and considerably to the rear, were, with reinforcements, the troops of Casey, which had been driven along the Williamsburg road. These two lines were connected by a third line. The whole formed a line roughly resembling the letter U. The left leg of such a misshapen letter would represent the formidable force at Fair Oaks, facing west, the right leg, the line facing east, held by Casey and reinforcements, and the connecting link, the troops, facing south, establishing communication between the two other lines.

General Johnston had been wounded, and the command of the Confederate army had devolved upon Lee, but, evidently, the sudden change of affairs, wrought by the disablement of Johnston, had brought doubt and confusion into the counsels of the enemy. Early in the morning of the next day, June 1st, the battle recommenced, but it has always been uncertain which side began it. General McClellan's orders had been simply to hold the position. It is credibly supposed that a mere change in the disposition of some Federal troops by crossing the railroad track to take position slightly in advance of the Richmond and York River Railroad, gave the impression to the enemy that an attack was contemplated. The fighting lasted less than three hours, but while it did last it was very severe, the part of the line engaged being the centre and left wing. Colonel Samuel K. Zook's regiment, Richardson's division, with the brigades of General William H. French and General Thomas F. Meagher, belonging to it, and Hooker's division, with two New Jersey regiments, were very sharply engaged, Hooker in person leading General Sickles's brigade and the New Jersey regiments into action. Here Howard received the wound from which he lost his arm, retiring from the field when struck, after having turned over his command to Colonel Francis C. Barlow, with orders to hold

the advanced position gained. It was a musketry battle, scarcely any artillery was used. After the fighting was over, General McClellan arrived on the field, all that he had contributed to the battle having been his order of the preceding night to hold the position. It is very naturally called by the Confederates the battle of Seven Pines, and by the Federals the battle of Fair Oaks, because the Confederates were victorious at Seven Pines and the Federals at Fair Oaks. It was effectively, however, the same battle.

General McClellan had scarcely arrived before Yorktown when he received a despatch from the President notifying him that the force of General McDowell, on the upper Potomac, amounting to about forty thousand men, was detached from his command. This order of the President's had been prompted by the discovery that General McClellan had not carried out the terms of the arrangement, by which he was to leave Washington safe from attack by a garrison of at least thirty-five thousand troops. McDowell's corps finally advanced from Washington, and in the latter part of April took position at Falmouth and opposite Fredericksburg. McDowell was anxious to move from this position towards Richmond, and endeavor to join McClellan, but he was not at first permitted to make the attempt. He was in May, however, when reinforced by General James Shields's division, of General N. P. Banks's corps, then in the Shenandoah Valley, ordered by the President to advance by the route towards Richmond, and to join McClellan. The first part of his advance left Fredericksburg on May 24. In concert with this movement from Fredericksburg the President had caused McClellan to execute one northward. General Fitz-John Porter had been sent by McClellan to Hanover Court House, north of Richmond, had met the enemy there, and had defeated him, but at the very time when the corresponding advance to the southward by McDowell had

reached within eight miles of the Court House, it was countermanded, and the troops that had made it retired as they had come. Almost immediately after the advance in force from Fredericksburg had been authorized by the President, who was in person on the ground, and had agreed that it should take place on the 26th, and he had just returned to Washington, McDowell received news that General "Stonewall" Jackson was marching down the Valley of the Shenandoah. This had changed the whole aspect of affairs, caused the recall of McDowell's advance, and led to a train of consequences not to be stated in a breath. McClellan had not pressed the Confederates sufficiently hard at Richmond, so they had been able to spare the force marching down the Valley. This stroke accomplished several objects, of which not the least was the detention of McDowell's troops for the pursuit of Jackson. In vain did McDowell attempt to show, what was the fact, that he was not in a position from which he could successfully intercept the retreat of Jackson; he was compelled by the President's orders to make the attempt. As, in meteorological disturbances, one may combine with or may neutralize another, and even numerous conflicting or conspiring tendencies may set the whole atmosphere in doubtful array for days or weeks, so here, the little war-cloud represented by the march of Jackson was destined to throw into confusion the whole of the Federal plans of campaign and continue in well-defined consequences up to the close of the battle of Antietam. On the 9th of June, however, while McDowell's force was still in pursuit of Jackson, the First and Second Brigades of Pennsylvania Reserves were sent aboard transports near Fredericksburg, and proceeded to join McClellan on the Peninsula. General Meade, in command of the Second Brigade, having been detained by official business at Fredericksburg, followed on the 12th of June.

Landing after nightfall, on the 11th of June, at the White House, on the right bank of the Pamunkey, the First and Second Brigades of the Reserves bivouacked only a few miles off, at Tunstall's Station, where they were just in time to offer effective opposition to the cavalry of General J. E. B. Stuart, who at this point of time was engaged in making the first of the great raids around the rear of an army, in which particular kind of feat several generals on both sides became distinguished, but none so famous as Stuart. The Third Brigade of the Reserves did not reach the White House until the 14th of June. Upon its arrival the Division was, as has already been mentioned, posted on the extreme right, at Beaver Dam Creek, under the command of General Fitz-John Porter.

There is little room to doubt that, had McClellan pressed the enemy after the battle of Fair Oaks, he might, with his right in advance, across the Chickahominy, have been able to capture Richmond. He himself seemed to think, judging from his representations to the President, that it would have been necessary to march troops on the right around, by the way of Bottom's Bridge, to join the left, and that that plan was not feasible, as indeed it was not. It is hard to understand, however, that an enterprising general could not have taken Richmond under the circumstances. Such a one, it would seem, could have crossed the Chickahominy from the right flank, with the troops already north of the stream. Almost the whole of the Confederate army in Richmond had attacked the left wing of McClellan, and yet it had failed in its intention, while two Federal corps which had not fired a shot were close up to Richmond on the north bank of the Chickahominy. The enemy had on the ground then only the most moderate resources in troops which had not been engaged. It is interesting to note at this point how much depends upon the mental attitude of a general

of an army. Whilst guarding themselves against underrating an enemy, it has been the practice of military men of the highest stamp to exalt in the minds of their troops their own resources. But while from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac the sombre views of its chief as to the enormous strength of the enemy pervaded the camps, and the population of Richmond was panic-stricken at the result of the battle of Fair Oaks, there was found no such weakness in Lee. Reinforcements were summoned from all quarters, Richmond's narrow escape became the entrance upon its final safety, and the golden opportunity of its capture was lost.

The battles in which the Pennsylvania Reserves are about to share were shaped by Jackson's march down the Shenandoah Valley. Owing to that came the diversion of McDowell's command. Widespread panic pervaded the Valley of the Shenandoah and the country beyond as Jackson took his way north. Milroy was driven off with little trouble. The Hon. N. P. Banks, formerly Speaker of the House of Representatives, major-general of volunteers by the grace of folly, was in the latter part of May hustled out of Strasburg and driven through Winchester, bringing up all distraught at Williamsport, whence, a year before, he had started on a triumphal march up the Valley. Jackson had not minded a bit his ruling, or being out of order, or the ghosts of the gavel and mace of authority which he had once wielded in person or by proxy. He had just lifted him up, as Hercules once raised Antæus, and set him down hard at Williamsport. After Banks's defeat the transformation scene presented two small armies, respectively under Fremont and McDowell, in pursuit of the agile and wily Jackson, who, after various vicissitudes, devious courses, engagements, advances and retreats, took up the fateful march towards Richmond with which this account now has

to do. Heaped up consequences, in confusion worse confounded, growing out of inertness at one, and activity at the other end of directly related hostile lines, bring that redoubtable march southward until it passes the right flank of the devoted Pennsylvania Reserves before Richmond, and halts only before the fiery storm from land and water at Malvern Hill.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.—THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

By the 24th of June everything was deemed ready by General McClellan for a forward movement, several bridges having been thrown across the Chickahominy, reinforcements having arrived and all other preparations having been made, and on the 25th the picket-line of the left wing advanced from the now well-fortified entrenchments resting on their right near Golding's Farm near the Chickahominy. The engagement that ensued was regarded by McClellan as successful, and he telegraphed the Secretary of War that he had fully gained his point: General Lee denied it. This point was the alleged gain of ground by picket-advance, enabling him with advantage to attack in force on the 26th or the 27th of June. The next day, the 25th, however, came a change over the spirit of his dream, in which one can clearly perceive the influence of his constitutional infirmity of purpose. Although, on the 24th, he had been inclined to believe, upon the testimony of a deserter, that Jackson was approaching from the direction of Gordonsville, he betrayed no particular apprehension, but carried out the plan for the picket-advance of the next day, and as we have seen, contemplated supplementing that by an attack in force on the following day or on the next day but one. But when, on the 25th, he learned through some "contrabands" (slaves manumitted by the fact of war), that Jackson was approaching with thirty thousand men (which ought not to have occasioned surprise, considering his late performances in the Shenandoah Valley), he telegraphed at once to the Secretary of War, "I incline

to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. . . . . I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements. . . . . I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders, it must rest where it belongs." The night of the 25th Jackson was at Ashland.

When the "Merrimac" had been destroyed, on the 11th of May, General Huger evacuating Norfolk on the 10th, it was open to General McClellan to do what he would have done at first if the "Merrimac" had not existed,—to make the James, instead of the Pamunkey, his base of operations. Whether or not he would finally have done so, but for the impending onslaught of Lee, is a question that cannot be positively determined, but the weight of evidence in favor of supposing that he would not have done so preponderates over that in favor of supposing that he would, unmolested, have changed his base. On the one hand, we have reason to believe that he would have done so, because the James had been recognized by him as being, but for the presence of the "Merrimac," preferable to the Pamunkey for a line of communication and depot of supplies. But, on the other hand, stands the fact that, when first notified of the impending attack by the enemy, he concluded to hold on to the Pamunkey, and it was only when some hours had elapsed that he concluded to change his base. It would, therefore, seem that if, when he could have made the change without pressure, he did not conclude to make it, and then, the pressure seeming to

become greater, he concluded to make it, that he would not eventually have made it if by some chance the pressure had been suddenly removed. The fact that the change was determined upon only when there could be no question that the enemy was about to attack in force, therefore points to the belief that the expression, "change of base," was only a euphemism used to cover the word "retreat;" and this view of probability is confirmed by the circumstance that, when the change of base had been successfully crowned by a victory in the last battle which secured it, the commanding-general, although superior in numbers and equipment to the enemy, and supported by the belief of some of his officers in their superiority to the enemy, settled quietly down into a purely defensive attitude, in a position which, from the use of the expression, "change of base," was rightly regarded as one properly belonging to an army acting on the offensive, not on the defensive. It seems tolerably clear, therefore, in the light of the sequence of events just narrated, that McClellan's greatest military defect is admirably covered by Napoleon's characterization of the kind of infirmity of mind which finds in submitting to extraneous action escape from the pain of resolution required for self-prompted action; inspired by the false idea that responsibility for consequences inheres less in a negative than in a positive attitude of will. Speaking of generals who thus evade what seem to their own minds a greater, to accept a less responsibility, he says: "They take up a position, make their dispositions, meditate on combinations, but there begins their indecision, and nothing is more difficult, and yet nothing more precious, than to be able to make up one's mind."

General McClellan had nearly one hundred and fifteen thousand infantry, with admirable artillery. Lee had eighty-five to ninety thousand infantry, including Jackson's and

other reinforcements, and his artillery at the time was not believed to be equal to that of the Federal army. Much of the ground was, from its nature, not adapted to cavalry; there was not a large amount of that arm on either side, and such as there was bore a very small part in the following seven days' battles.

The reader will remember that, on the south side of the Chickahominy, facing west, the lines of McClellan's left wing passed in front of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and rested finally at Golding's Farm, near the Chickahominy, and that his right wing, also facing west, was at Beaver Dam Creek, on the north side of the Chickahominy, and about four miles above the general line of the left wing. The Richmond and York River Railroad, passing over a bridge near Bottom's Bridge, in the rear of the Federal left wing, went thence past Savage's Station in the rear, and struck about the middle of the entrenchments of the left wing, whence it passed on, unavailably to the Federals, towards Richmond. In consequence, at one of the ensuing battles, the enemy was enabled to bring a piece of railroad-artillery to bear upon the Federal line of battle.

It follows, from the description of the ground, that if the enemy should attack the right wing, and the intention of the commanding-general were to retreat to a point on the James southeast of him, the right wing must become the rearguard of the whole army, and so remain until both wings were concentrated on the south bank of the Chickahominy. The enemy did attack on the right, and therefore the Federal retreat to Malvern Hill having been previously decided upon, it took place as indicated. It was a well-planned and well-executed retreat, and but for the absence of chief leadership on the field might have been made perfect; but this will incidentally appear in the course of the following sketch of the Seven Days' Battles.

On the 26th of June the enemy began to drive in the pickets and forward posts along the line of Beaver Dam Creek. About twenty-five thousand infantry in all represented the troops defending a stretch of the Chickahominy and Beaver Dam Creek, the natural and artificial strength of which position made that number of troops, of such good quality, ample for the duty assigned to them for the first day. The whole position of the right wing is defined by saying that it began on the Chickahominy below New Bridge, passed along parallel to the Chickahominy until it reached Beaver Dam Creek, and thence turned at about right-angles along the creek ; that part of the line running parallel to the Chickahominy from about New Bridge to the creek being held by Morrill's and Sykes's divisions of the Fifth Corps, and that along the creek by Reynolds's and Seymour's brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves, attached to that corps ; Meade's brigade being held in reserve on the left-rear of the Beaver Dam Creek line. Beyond the Beaver Dam Creek line, towards the right front, lay the village of Mechanicsville, and beyond, towards the left, and much further away, showed the spires of Richmond. On the very front, beyond Beaver Dam Creek, was Meadow Bridge, and close to it a bridge of the Virginia Central Railroad, and not far from them Mechanicsville Bridge, the turnpike bridge from Richmond to Mechanicsville. In consequence of the lay of the land and the position held with reference to it by General McCall, the commander of the Pennsylvania Reserves, the brunt of the day's fighting would necessarily fall upon his troops on Beaver Dam Creek, of which Reynolds's were on the right, Seymour's on the left, and, as been said, Meade's in reserve, on the left-rear.

The outposts of both cavalry and infantry were soon driven in. One company of infantry was for a while cut off from the line of Beaver Dam Creek. Another, being also intercepted during the first encounters of advance-

guards, was permanently cut off, and after hiding for three days without food in the swamp, was forced to come out and surrender. The resistance of the outposts had been strenuous enough, and, about 2.30 P.M., they were withdrawn behind the entrenchments east of Beaver Dam Creek. The skirmishers had all fallen back behind the entrenchments, when, about 3 P.M., the enemy, no longer opposed in his advance on the west of the creek, and consisting of A. P. Hill's division and Colonel Thomas R. R. Cobb's so-called Legion, appeared before the Federal lines, while a large body of Jackson's infantry continued its march far away to the right. Jackson himself, however, was present, with at least some of his artillery, and General McCall says, in his official report of the battle, that General Lee in person commanded. The enemy's skirmishers came rapidly forward, and under cover of artillery-fire attacked from right to left, the attack being particularly heavy on the right. Both artillery and musketry-fire then concentrated from the right-centre to the left flank. Throughout, however, the Confederates were mowed down by hundreds, leaving the remainder no choice but to seek the refuge which they found in the wooded swamp below.

The two previous attacks having failed, the enemy, later in the day, attempted the left, held by Seymour's brigade. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the Confederates advanced along the mill-road leading across the creek at Ellerson's Mill, but the move having been anticipated by General McCall, the line had been reinforced there; still more troops were sent to the point, and the Confederates made no greater progress there than they had made elsewhere. The action lasted from 3 P.M. to 9 P.M., with the result that the attacking force, although far outnumbering the attacked, for the Confederate divisions were, at their full complement, always much larger than the Federal ones,

had been frustrated at every point, and had suffered heavy losses. Even had the brigade of General Lawrence O'B. Branch, whose arrival they had hoped for, come up, there would not have been any change in the final result, for the Second Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, under General Meade, remained unengaged, and besides, there were the two divisions of the Fifth Corps, which had taken a scarcely appreciable part in the battle. It was, as has been indicated, imperatively necessary to hold the ground for the purpose of covering the retreat of the army. The Pennsylvania Reserves and the Fifth Corps were therefore temporarily occupying it with a resistance which, as we shall see, will gradually make it assume the appearance, as well as represent the reality, of a rearguard to the forces preparing to move towards the James. Towards the close of the engagement reinforcements from the Fifth Corps arrived, but the light was waning, and in consequence they scarcely participated in the closing scene. Thus ended the battle of Mechanicsville, with very great loss to the enemy, and relatively very little to the Federals. The Pennsylvania Reserves were engaged in cleaning their arms in readiness for the contest which no one doubted would be resumed on the following day, the 27th of June, when orders from Fitz-John Porter reached General McCall before daybreak to fall back to Gaines's Mill. To the rear, about three miles and a half from Beaver Dam Creek, another creek from the north watershed of the Chickahominy, having the same general direction as Beaver Dam Creek, a little west of north, runs into the Chickahominy. This is Powhite Creek, and on it, some distance from its mouth, is Gaines's Mill. The Reserves withdrew from Beaver Dam Creek about daylight, and retired towards the new position at Gaines's Mill, skirmishing with the enemy as they retreated in perfect order.

In the new position at Gaines's Mill the left of the line of battle to be formed was on an elevation near Watts's house, from which rise the ground sloped down to the westward towards Powhite Creek, curved around thence towards the north by New Cold Harbor, and thence ran to a rise on the extreme right, on which was a house known as McGee's. The line in this position formed the arc of a circle of which the left end of the chord rested on the summit of the acclivity which falls gradually into the valley of Powhite Creek, and the right end on a summit at the McGee house. Morrill's division, of the Fifth Corps, which was the only corps north of the Chickahominy on the morning of the 27th of June, was on the left flank near Watts's house, and Sykes's division of the same corps continued the line to the right, troops from each division being held in reserve. The main line of reserves was formed of McCall's division, because it had been so heavily engaged on the previous day; Meade's brigade being posted on the left and Reynolds's on the right, while Seymour's was held in reserve to it. General Philip St. George Cooke, with fifteen companies of cavalry, regular and volunteer, was in observation on the left flank, near the Chickahominy. The open space in the fall of the land towards the creek was commanded by artillery on the south side of the Chickahominy, as well as by artillery on the north side of it, and the artillery of the rear commanded the valley of the Chickahominy for some distance. The artillery was posted in the usual way, at intervals around the front. As the line of battle backed the Chickahominy, the bridges in the immediate rear were covered. Discussions have gone on up to the present day regarding the number of troops on each side here engaged. It will be impossible, on account of their voluminousness, to enter into a review of these. It therefore becomes necessary to give the conclusion of the

writer. This is, that the Confederates at first attacked with about twelve thousand men, and eventually with at least fifty thousand, and had sixty thousand north of the Chickahominy; and that the Federals had at first less than twenty-five thousand, gradually reinforced to about thirty-three thousand, but not effectively, because the reinforcements did not arrive until the line at Gaines's Mill had been broken and borne back by sheer force of numbers of the enemy.

The Confederates were unusually slow in coming into position. It was not until noon that they appeared, and not until 1 P.M. that there was an attack by A. P. Hill, who was outnumbered and made no progress. Joined by Longstreet about 2.30 P.M., the attack was violently resumed. When, finally, all the Confederate forces were up, they outnumbered the Federals, even when reinforced, nearly two to one. On their right was Longstreet's division, then Whiting's, then two brigades of Jackson's, then Ewell's, then two other brigades of Jackson's, then A. P. Hill's division, and lastly, D. H. Hill's division occupied their left. It was impossible for the Fifth Corps and the Pennsylvania Reserves finally to withstand the rush of these masses when General Lee ordered a general advance of his lines. Every available reserve was used, brought up and distributed in any direction where the Federal line seemed to waver. Then was seen to advantage that divine fury in combat, with which Homer gifts his heroes, when General Meade ubiquitously coursed the field, exhorting and leading the regiments he brought up to steady the faltering and failing ranks. It would, however, have been in vain that he and other officers strove strenuously to stem the adverse tide of battle, if reinforcements asked for, at what time is matter of dispute, had not arrived after 6 P.M. in the crisis of the fight. They consisted of General Henry W. Slocum's

division, of the Sixth Corps, which arrived just as the last of the Pennsylvania Reserves had been used to strengthen the lines. General John Newton's brigade of the division was led by regiments to the right of General Charles Griffin, of Morrill's division, and to the left of Sykes's division, Tyler's brigade soon following it, and relieving regiments out of ammunition. Finally Colonel Joseph J. Bartlett's brigade, of Slocum's division, was put in on the right of the hard-pressed Sykes. Near this part of the field Reynolds had stemmed the tide in a measure by his energetic succor of weakened points. General Fitz-John Porter in his report called the attention of the commanding-general to the meritorious conduct of various officers on the field, among whom he speaks of "brigade-commanders Reynolds, Meade, and Seymour, who successfully led their regiments into the thickest of the fight to support and relieve their exhausted commands."

A most untoward event took place near the close of the engagement. General Philip St. George Cooke had been stationed on the left-rear in observation in the valley of the Chickahominy, with instructions to keep below the summit and act only on the bottom-land, but had, through a misunderstanding, charged on the enemy while emerging from the woods on the left, in consequence of which so destructive a fire was poured into the cavalry that, despite the efforts of their riders, horses dashed through the batteries in their rear, spreading consternation among the gunners, who, thinking that they were charged by the enemy, left some pieces on the field. At this moment, however, as Fitz-John Porter narrates in his account of the battle, the brigades of General William H. French and General Meagher, of the Second Corps, arrived; and although they were too late to join in the battle, the enemy having ceased his attack, they were useful in restoring confidence and as-

sisting to hold the lines while the troops retreated that night with all their material and supplies to the south side of the Chickahominy. The Federal losses on this field were very severe, and those of the Confederates were great. One would never suspect, however, from General Porter's account, that a defeat had been sustained by him. But it was a defeat which, considering the odds against him, was more honorable than many a victory. With timely and somewhat greater reinforcement, it might have been a victory. The end, however, had come with defeat. Duane's bridge and Woodbury's bridge had been captured by the enemy, but Alexander's bridge had been held, and under cover of the night and the front presented towards the enemy by the two brigades of the Second Corps, the troops which had been engaged marched over to the south side of the Chickahominy, and the rearguard following, the bridge was destroyed. General Reynolds, getting separated from his command, was, with his assistant-adjutant-general, captured during the retreat.

The Fifth Corps, the Pennsylvania Reserves, and the reinforcements which had come to their succor, having been safely withdrawn on the night of the 27th of June to the south side of the Chickahominy, where all the troops of the Federal army then were, it will now be well to consider what was doing on that side of the stream during the 27th, when the battle of Gaines's Mill was being fought north of the river. The entrenched and otherwise fortified line in front of Richmond, on the south side of the Chickahominy, reached, as has been more than once mentioned, from the front of Seven Pines and the front of Fair Oaks, on its right, to Golding's Farm, on the Chickahominy. It had been held, on the 27th, in order from left to right, by Couch's division of the Fourth Corps, Kearny's and Hooker's divisions of the Third Corps, Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions of

the Second Corps, and Smith's and Slocum's divisions of the Sixth Corps. Slocum's division, of the Sixth Corps, consisting of two brigades, and, later, French's and Meagher's brigades, of the Second Corps, had been withdrawn, as we have seen, on the 27th, to reinforce Porter. At the same time some other troops had been sent over from the left to the right of the line of the left wing to stiffen up Smith's position, on account of the division of Slocum having been withdrawn thence. On the morning of the 27th the Confederates, by way of making a diversion in favor of Lee fighting at Gaines's Mill, had opened fire on Franklin's position, near Golding's, and towards dark had advanced infantry, which led to a slight engagement. The movement was so palpably a diversion, with the sounds of desperate battle on the other side of the Chickahominy, that it should not have prevented the sending of more timely reinforcements to Porter. In the night, after the battle of Gaines's Mill, Slocum's division returned to the right and joined there Smith's, the other division of the Sixth Corps, and the brigades of French and Meagher rejoined the Second Corps at Fair Oaks.

On the next day, the 28th, Franklin, on the right at Golding's, had, about mid-day, a slight infantry engagement. In this quite a large number of Confederate prisoners were captured. On the same day General Keyes, of the Fourth Corps, occupied the positions necessary to control the crossings of White Oak Swamp, to secure the continued safe retreat of the army, McClellan being now ready to make his second move in the plan of taking up a new base on the James, the one on the Pamunkey having been relinquished by the retreat across the Chickahominy after the battle of Gaines's Mill. The large herd of commissary cattle was put in motion towards the James. Porter's corps, accompanied by the Pennsylvania Reserves, crossed White Oak Swamp,

and on the 29th took up positions to cover the Charles City Road, leading from Richmond to Long Bridge across the Chickahominy. Early on the 29th Sumner's corps and Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division in due course followed the previous advances towards James River, and took up a line with its left resting on the entrenchments in rear of the main line of entrenchments which had proved so serviceable on the day of the disaster at Seven Pines, and thence passed around Savage Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad, while Slocum's division was held there in reserve. The locality and approaches about Savage's Station made it certain that it would be necessary to stand off the enemy at that point, although it was not, as will later appear, the most critical one of all in the line of retreat.

The defeat at Gaines's Mill having taken place on the 27th, and the operations on the 28th, just described, having proceeded on the south side of the Chickahominy, where Magruder had been occupying his lines with a force of twenty-five thousand men in face of the enormously greater one of McClellan, it behooves us now to inquire into what Lee and Jackson were doing on the 28th of June with the sixty thousand men they had north of the Chickahominy, less the heavy losses they had incurred in the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mill. Through a misapprehension of Lee's, the day of the 28th was lost to him, a gain to McClellan of inestimable value. Lee very naturally imagined that McClellan was retreating down the Peninsula to the southeast, by the way in which he had advanced to Richmond; but when cavalry had scoured the country around the left bank of the Chickahominy to its mouth, and had found no sign there of infantry, of course he knew at once that McClellan was retreating to the James inside of the loop formed by the Chickahominy with reference to

the course of James River. Time having been seriously lost to him, it remained to recover it in a measure by superlative exertions, which partially inured, through the fatigue of the Confederate troops, to the benefit of McClellan.

The misty morning of the 29th of June had stood the Federal troops in good stead when they had fallen back from the entrenchments, and the five divisions took the position already described at Savage's Station, to protect at that point the retreat of the army towards the James. But when the mist lifted, about eight o'clock, Magruder came to know that the line in front of him had been evacuated, and at once set off in hot pursuit of the retreating rearguard. In the course of an hour he appeared before the front of the Second Corps, at Savage's Station, and without delay advanced over the ground of Allen's Farm, from which the following action takes its name, his attack falling at first on French's brigade. Three several times he advanced, only to be thrice repulsed, falling back at his third experience to desist from his attempt. Sumner, who, by all accounts, always seemed, through the doggedness of his resolution, to wish to continue a fight once begun, without regard to the general disposition of the field, was at last induced by Franklin to fall back nearer to Savage's Station, and there make his line continuous with that of Smith's division of Franklin's corps. Concurrent testimony fixes the fact that, early in the afternoon, Heintzelman marched his corps off the field, in continuation of the line of retreat. The excuse he subsequently gave for this action was that the troops were so crowded on the ground as to make it desirable that he should vacate it with his command. The consequences, at any rate, of his action were most unfortunate, not that disaster resulted from his absence, but that, with his presence, might have been achieved a great success. The position, notwithstanding his withdrawal, had to be held. The first

affair with the enemy had occurred before eleven o'clock; something much more serious was to be expected before sundown, and it came.

About 4 P.M. the enemy again advanced. From what troops the Federals had on the ground they had to spare those necessary to fill the void left by the withdrawal of Heintzelman. The action began. Suddenly, the "Land Monitor," as the Confederates called it, a great gun mounted on an ironclad car, appeared, coming down the railroad track from Richmond, and fired its huge shot into the Federal lines. The troops held their own, however, and something more, for at the very last, about sundown, their lines were advanced, and Magruder was driven from the field. A great sense of relief was experienced, for with the absence of Heintzelman and the imminence of Jackson's appearance from the other side of the Chickahominy, the day had been an anxious one. By the early morning light of the 30th the bridge near Savage's Station, over the little stream on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, was destroyed by the last brigade that crossed, and the commands of Sumner and Franklin continued on the road in that direction.

It is desirable now that we should resume the consideration of the position and movements of the various bodies of Lee's troops. On the 28th, when General Lee had been uncertain about McClellan's designs, he had sent Ewell's division down the Chickahominy after the cavalry reconnoissance, and it had halted in observation at Bottom's Bridge. Being recalled as soon as Lee ascertained that McClellan was not retreating in that direction, A. P. Hill and Longstreet crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, heading then around White Oak Swamp, on the northern side of which Huger, as well as Magruder, then was. Three roads running southeast, the Charles River, the Central, and the

Newmarket, the last passing so near the James as to be called also the Shore Road, led to the flank of McClellan's army. These were pursued by Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Magruder, and Huger. Magruder, as we have seen, had, on the morning and afternoon of the 29th, attacked the Federal rearguard at Savage's Station. Jackson, on the north side of the Chickahominy, had not been able to get across to aid him, because he was engaged in rebuilding Grapevine Bridge, just below Alexander's Bridge.

While these movements were going on among the Confederates, Slocum relieved Keyes, who had been guarding the bridge of the crossing of White Oak Swamp, Keyes, as soon as relieved, taking up the line of march in retreat, and assuming a position on the following day below the bridge on Turkey Creek, which runs for a considerable distance around and quite close to the base of Malvern Hill. By five o'clock in the morning of June 30th the Federal army had all crossed White Oak Swamp, and the bridge there was at once destroyed. To General Franklin was assigned the duty of barring the passage of the swamp at that main critical point.

There were now two very dangerous, if not seriously vulnerable points in the line of the retreat—the crossing at White Oak Swamp, which it would certainly not be long before Jackson would attack, and the position between it and Malvern Hill, on the stretch between Charles River Cross Roads and New Market Cross Roads, upon which the Confederate troops, led by Lee in person, were pouring down from the direction of Richmond. The occupation of the crossing at White Oak Swamp protected the rear, and the occupation of the salient stretch of road between Charles City Cross Roads and New Market Cross Roads, of which the position of New Market Cross Roads was the most salient of all, protected the trains finding their way towards

Malvern Hill. There was, from the nature of the ground, great defensive strength for holding the crossing at White Oak Swamp; but at Charles City Cross Roads and New Market Cross Roads, no more for defensive than for offensive purposes, the character of the ground there rendering a combat virtually one of a fair field and no favor.

An army marching by the flank within sight, or within striking distance of the enemy, is in an exceedingly dangerous situation, as armies so placed have often found to their cost. It is true that, under certain conditions of ground, roads, and formation of troops, the flank can be converted almost instantly into a line of battle. But these conditions did not exist here, with poor roads, and trains interspersed with regular and reserve artillery and supplies, with troops escorting them. The general position of the army and the trains so marching by the flank was from the crossing at White Oak Swamp, where General Franklin held the ground on the hither bank, to the western side of Malvern Hill, on the shore of the James, the goal for which all this movement was striving, where, if it could be reached, safety would lie, from the fact of the occupation of a commanding position, and the additional one that the Federal gunboats lying in the river could sweep with their guns the lower land occupied by an army advancing upon the position.

It has already been mentioned, so as to include the incident as to time and place appropriately in the narrative, that the Pennsylvania Reserves had, early in the afternoon of the 29th, passed over White Oak Swamp, and had taken up a defensive position across the Charles City Road. As, however, we have reached the moment when we are more particularly concerned with the movements of the Pennsylvania Reserves than with any other body of troops, because General Meade commanded a brigade in them, it is proper now to follow their march in detail from the begin-

ning of their retreat to the time when, by a most extraordinary chance, they found themselves, after having passed through as severe an ordeal of battle as that to which any other division of the army had been subjected, left in the focus of fire under which their ranks melted away to the point of annihilation.

The reader will remember that, just as the James puts off towards the north a stream called the Chickahominy, which forms with the James a great loop towards the northwest, so also the Chickahominy puts off, towards the south, an interior creek, called White Oak Swamp Creek, with which the course of the Chickahominy forms a small loop between the James and the Chickahominy. It is within this smaller loop that the retreat towards the James had been taking place, the main *débouché* from which was by the crossing of White Oak Swamp Bridge. Heintzelman used and then destroyed the bridge above, near Brackett's Ford, on the morning after he had marched away from Savage's Station and left Sumner and Franklin there in the lurch. Inside of this loop made by the courses of the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp Creek are roads running towards the fords, but those which the army chiefly followed converged on that which ran to the bridge over White Oak Swamp. Off to the north of Savage's Station, near the banks of the Chickahominy, was a place called Trent's Farm. Savage's Station is, as the reader will remember, on the Richmond and York River Railroad. It was from Trent's Farm that the Pennsylvania Reserves began their march in retreat.

At Trent's Farm McClellan had had his headquarters. On the 28th he left them and went forward to Savage's Station. After the retreat from Gaines's Mill, on the night of the 27th of June, followed by the destruction of Alexander's Bridge, to prevent the pursuit of the enemy, the Fifth Corps,

to which the Pennsylvania Reserves were still temporarily attached, had bivouacked on the hills on the southern side of the Chickahominy, at Trent's Farm. Here the reserve-artillery, one hundred guns, under General Hunt, was committed to the custody of the Pennsylvania Reserves as an escort, and not long after dark of the 28th the Division took up the line of retreat towards the James. The night was rainy, and the troops plodded forward through the gloom towards Savage's Station. Between one and two o'clock in the morning of Sunday, the 29th, the head of the long column reached the Station. Here there was a glimpse of McClellan giving his last instructions before he went still further forward. The Pennsylvania Reserves here had a brief rest, and later in the morning pushed on before the first action of that day, at Allen's Farm, had begun. At the Station a trying ordeal had awaited them, for there they had found many wounded, had learned that communication with the depot at the White House had ceased, and that most of those in the field-hospitals must fall into the hands of the enemy. Such among the wounded whom they could make shift to aid in various ways, and patch up so as to brave the attempt to take to the road, they set to work to aid in the attempt to accompany the retreating column. The column, guarding the reserve-artillery, set out again on the march, and in the early afternoon of the 29th crossed the bridge over White Oak Swamp, where, as was mentioned in due order in connection with the movements of other troops, General McCall deployed his force across the Charles River Road, one of the roads leading from Richmond down on the flank of the retreating army. Here the division relinquished the charge of the reserve-artillery, and at 5 P.M. moved forward, under orders, towards the James River.

We are on the eve of reaching the fortuitous circumstance

which brought it about that the overtaxed Pennsylvania Reserves bore the brunt of a battle equal in severity to that of Gaines's Mill. The point for which General Fitz-John Porter's corps was aiming was for a highway called the Quaker Road, turning off in the direction of Malvern Hill. It is now the night of the 29th of June. Keyes has arrived at Malvern Hill. Heintzelman is not far off. Porter and McCall are moving toward New Market Cross Roads. Counting still from the left, the troops are strung along in a position to be able to make some sort of face, if need be, towards the roads leading from the direction of Richmond. Slocum is at Charles City Cross Roads. Franklin is at White Oak Swamp crossing, on the extreme right. The line is a very ragged one, and so far Providence, upon which Lee and Jackson invariably count for their side, has been decidedly adverse to them. Lee lost the whole of the 28th by following a false direction of manœuvre. On the 29th Jackson could not get across the Chickahominy, because Grapevine Bridge was gone. Then, on the 30th, when he had got across by rebuilding the bridge, he found Franklin barring the passage of White Oak Swamp, with the thoroughfare of the bridge in front of him destroyed. There is a current anecdote in regard to the late period of Jackson's arrival which seems incredible, that he was fagged out and asleep, and that his staff would not wake him. It is told of Frederick the Great, that he once instructed a page to wake him early on the following morning, and that the page, essaying to perform his duty by the exceedingly cross king, carried out his orders despite all resistance, winning the wider-awake commendation of his sovereign. So Jackson would have felt, and so his subordinates must have known, if there had been any question of waking him, and therefore we may well discard the story as apochryphal.

Late at night General Meade, riding in advance with an officer of Porter's staff and a guide, expressed his conviction that they had passed beyond the Quaker Road. Halting his brigade, he rode forward and discovered that the road for which the guide had been making was a disused track, impracticable for the passage of troops. Reporting the ascertained fact to General McCall, he in turn communicated it to General Porter, who, not giving entire credence to the discovery, directed McCall to bivouac where he was, and himself proceeded with the Fifth Corps, when, ascertaining the fact which he had previously doubted, he countermarched his troops, reached the road where the whole column should have turned off, and continued his march towards Malvern Hill.

The consequences of the order which the Pennsylvania Reserves had received were momentous. As they involve the details of the severe battle in which they were engaged on the morrow, it is pertinent here to ask three questions, rather than to interpolate them between the accounts of those active operations. 1st. If General Porter did not regard the Pennsylvania Reserves, and he subsequently said that he did not, as any longer attached to the Fifth Corps, how could he have so thought, since they had been so assigned and not relieved from that duty? 2nd. If the Pennsylvania Reserves were no longer attached to the Fifth corps, how could he have directed General McCall to remain all night where they had paused? The next question concerns not Porter's, but McClellan's action. 3rd. If only by the merest chance the Pennsylvania Reserves were left where they were, with what, early in the morning of the 30th, could he have filled the gap left by their absence? As New Market Cross Roads was the salient and centre of the army, it will become plain that, but for the accidental presence there of the Pennsylvania

Reserves, with such aid as they had from the presence of troops right and left, the army would have been cut asunder.

Left in this unexpected manner on the way to Malvern Hill, at New Market Cross Roads, General McCall took in the full significance of the situation, and pushed out the First Brigade of the Reserves about a mile towards the west, to act as an outpost during the night. When, in the early morning, the brigade was withdrawn and the Reserves had broken their fast, General McCall, in obedience to orders from headquarters, formed his men in line of battle on both sides of the New Market Road. The Second Brigade, commanded by General Meade, formed his right, the Third Brigade, commanded by General Seymour, his left wing. The First Brigade, commanded in the absence of General Reynolds, taken prisoner, by Colonel Seneca G. Simmons, was posted on Meade's left, in the centre, with its line somewhat withdrawn rearward. The Third Brigade, Seymour's, thus formed Simmons's left, the line in which it was drawn up, advanced on the left flank, being nearly at right-angles to the line of Simmons's brigade. The disposition was faulty on the left, inasmuch as it assumed the occurrence of what did not take place, that the Confederates would make their first advance from the direction of the Central Road, whereas, in attacking the left, they diverged from that road, and coming through the woods, struck Seymour in flank. Lieutenant Alanson M. Randol's battery, Battery E, First Artillery, was posted on the right. Captain Cooper's and Captain Kerns' batteries occupied the centre, and two New York German batteries, of the artillery-reserve, which had reported to McCall only on the previous evening, occupied the left. Continuing the line to the right was Kearny's division, of the Third Corps; while, to the left, was Hooker's division of the same corps. It is plain that, if divisions and bri-

gades form short sides of a polygon around an arc representing a line of battle, if the right or left flank of one fraction is thrown outside of the general line of curvature of the arc, it destroys the proper relation of support between it and the next fraction to the right or left, the two being then neither in continuation of the general line nor in correct *échelon* with each other. This formation, however, represented the line of battle at the salient New Market Cross Roads' position. Only one other point requires mention. General Meade's brigade was weak. A regiment of its four component regiments had been surrounded and partially captured at the battle of Gaines's Mill, only two of its companies having been able to preserve their organization and join their comrades there in line of battle. The force, therefore, which General Meade, on the morning of the 30th, could dispose of, was, instead of four regiments, two regiments and two companies.

Here, at the point of the field which was bound to become the most critical of all, because, as has been mentioned, it was not only central with reference to roads, but not strong from the nature of the ground, the Pennsylvania Reserves found themselves in the very vortex of danger. Should the enemy fairly break through their lines, the wings of the army would be taken in reverse. Such was the military situation, with the commander-in-chief of the army far away. Napoleon says that battle is joined, then comes a mingling of the elements of strife, of which the outcome is unpredictable, then, as with a spark, the atmosphere clears, the battle is won. The spark he refers to is the flash of the commander's inspiration at the moment opportune to act with a final exercise of will. If councils of war do not fight, as is popularly said without due qualification, they certainly tend to differences of opinion, which Jomini thinks are even intensified by the intelligence of their component

parts. If this be a broad truth applying to deliberate action in calmness of surroundings, it must certainly also be true of men of the best capacity, when acting without a supreme head, amidst the noise and confusion of battle. War is, as Jomini well observes, a passionate drama. It is not too much to assume that, if the commander-in-chief had been present on the very ground of New Market Cross Roads when the lines there were taken up, the faulty dispositions would have been rectified long before the enemy struck them late in the day. The extreme left of the Pennsylvania Reserves would not have been allowed to remain, as it had been posted, so entirely in the air as to invite and be unable to advantage to repel attack.

It is now the morning of the 30th of June. By daylight the troops and trains were all over the crossing of White Oak Swamp, and the bridge there had been destroyed. There is now to be fighting all along the line from that point to Malvern Hill. The battle has been variously called the battle of Glendale, the battle of Charles City Cross Roads, the battle of New Market Cross Roads, and also the battle of Frazier's Farm and the battle of Nelson's Farm. Glendale is certainly the prettiest name, but as New Market Cross Roads was where the battle was most intense, that point would seem to be entitled to the bestowal of its name on the occurrence.

On the right, at the crossing of White Oak Swamp, was Franklin, with Smith's division of the Sixth Corps, Richardson's division of the Second Corps, two brigades of Sedgwick's division of that corps, and Naglee's brigade of the Fourth Corps. Further to the left, at Glendale, was Slocum's division of the Sixth Corps; further still to the left, at New Market Cross Roads, was McCall's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, reduced by casualties from ten thousand to about six thousand men. *En échelon* with that

division were Kearny's and Hooker's divisions of Heintzelman's corps, the Third, Kearny to the right-rear and Hooker to the left-rear. On the extreme left flank were the corps of Keyes and Fitz-John Porter, the Fourth and the Fifth. The remaining brigade of the Second Corps, Burns's, the others being with Franklin, was drawn up to the left of Heintzelman. Thus, on the extreme left, was a force unnecessarily strong in numbers, for Malvern Hill had begun to be occupied by artillery, and the Fourth and Fifth Corps, with only slight detachments from the Fourth, were posted along a line not only so covered, but, from the nature of the ground, one upon which the vehemence of the approaching attack was not likely to fall; and thus, in consequence, the centre at New Market Cross Roads was proportionately weak.

The attack on the left by General Henry A. Wise and General Theophilus H. Holmes was so trifling as not to warrant anything more than the mere mention of it. Perhaps they took in at a glance the strength of the position and the number of troops posted there. At any rate, they were shelled away by a few discharges from Malvern Hill and the gunboats, without coming into collision with infantry. At the other end of the line, however, the extreme right, Franklin was enabled to do great service in repulsing the attempt of Jackson to rebuild the bridge at White Oak Swamp crossing. Between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning Jackson had arrived in front of Franklin, having come by way of Savage's Station. This was the falsest move Lee had made if he knew the ground; for the thirty thousand troops which Jackson is believed to have had with him were, in consequence, as good as interned for the day, Jackson's attempt to restore the bridge here, or otherwise to cross the stream, being frustrated at every turn by the skilled and vigorous resistance of Franklin. The

thunders of the artillery combat there had long resounded along the lines when Huger made a feeble attack on Slocum, which was easily repulsed with artillery. But then, about the same time, 3 P.M., came the serious attack on the Federal centre which was to resolve itself into a death-grapple for the rest of the day. It struck the Pennsylvania Reserves, drawn up as already described, Meade on the right, Seymour on the left, Simmons in reserve in the centre. The pickets had been gradually driven in for a half hour before that time, but the main attack did not come until about 3 P.M.

Two regiments of the enemy, one on the right-centre and one on the left, and supported by artillery fire, advanced to feel the position, but were at once repulsed. The next attack by the enemy, Longstreet and A. P. Hill, was in greater force, upon the left flank of the Reserves. This attempt was foiled by refusing the left sufficiently to face in that direction, and reinforcing it by two regiments from the reserve under Colonel Simmons. The enemy, however, did not desist from his intention in that quarter, but persistently pursued it for over an hour with artillery and musketry-fire and advances, repelled only by the utmost vigilance and gallantry. In command of the troops which he had brought over from the Third Brigade, Colonel Simmons here fell mortally wounded while withstanding these attacks. Although the attack on the left flank was at this particular point of time more serious than any other on the field, yet the enemy was at the same moment able to afford enough troops to assault the centre of the Reserves, with the evident intention of capturing the two batteries there. Here too, however, his attempt to gain any decided advantage was frustrated; but meanwhile the left wing gave way under continued and heavy pressure, some of its troops fighting for the rest of the day with the right of Hooker.

The enemy perceived at last that it would be by no ordinary measures that the lines of General McCall would be broken. Such a one was planned and executed with numbers and determination so great as to bear all before it. A large body of the enemy, adopting the wedge formation, charged at a trail-arms across the field directly upon Randol's fine battery on the right. Here General Meade was to be seen as they came on, animating his men by word and gesture with that exalted courage which could take the form suited for the occasion, from the blaze of eagerness that rouses the common soldier to his intensest action, to the aspect of coolness which puts the seal on confidence of success. General McCall himself galloped to the spot and lent his own encouraging presence to the crisis which had arrived beyond all doubt. A few yards of space and seconds of time were well employed in the most murderous discharge which they could bring to bear on the enemy, and then the madding torrent of Confederate soldiers swept forward, the guns were captured and overturned, and all was in an instant inextricable confusion on the spot, General Meade badly wounded, his young aide, James Hamilton Kuhn killed, while General McCall and his officers still desperately endeavored to hold the position where the artillery lay disabled on the ground, the left wing being mainly gone, and the centre holding on with the utmost difficulty for the few minutes before it too was driven back. The right and centre, however, despite the fact that the troops had been so overmatched in number and lacking in support, were not routed. The lines had been forced at last to yield after five hours of fighting to the overmastering force surging against them. The left had been swept back by the torrent, but the centre was still holding its ground when the deluge broke on Randol's battery on the right, the centre also losing Cooper's battery in the final events

of the field. As for the German batteries on the left, they did not belong to the Division, and represented the only portion of the lines which did not nobly uphold its reputation. General McCall reorganized such fragments of his force as he could bring readily to bear, and placed them in position near where the enemy had for a moment carried everything before him, only to recede without daring to attempt the withdrawal of the pieces which had cost both contestants so dearly. The Reserves had been decimated. General McCall was so destitute of staff or other officers that he had to advance almost alone to reconnoitre in the dark the situation just in front of his position, and, in consequence, he had not gone more than a few yards when he was captured by the enemy.

The Division was now almost destitute of officers of every grade. Meade was wounded. Simmons was dead. McCall was a prisoner. Reynolds was a prisoner. Only Seymour, of the Third Brigade, remained of the chief officers. Whether or not the Pennsylvania Reserves fought bravely on that day ought to appear from the list of casualties which will be given in due time and place. Whether or not they were fought skillfully, no one ought to doubt, from consideration of the facts already mentioned, and from the names of their commanders.

The fight of the Pennsylvania Reserves at New Market Cross Roads has thus far been treated of as an isolated occurrence of the battle-field, a condition which at the first blush would seem impossible. And yet that treatment represents as to them the most accurate statement of facts. In a certain loose, wholly untrue sense, the Pennsylvania Reserves were reinforced, because, had there not been other troops fighting to the right and to the left of them, the force which the enemy precipitated on their lines would have been even greater than it was. But, in the true sense, to be rein-

forced means to be lent aid when the body of troops needing reinforcement, however badly injured, still preserves in the main its integrity of form and capacity of inflicting injury or making resistance, not when it is utterly spent by hours of labor and on the point of disintegration. But such reinforcement was not given to the Pennsylvania Reserves. Two hours of hard fighting passed, and no succor came. Their left wing was dislodged, and still no succor came. Time passed, and both right and centre, long hard-pressed, were forced to recede, the centre still clinging to the ground; and even then in broken condition they held, night fallen, back of their former lines, the enemy so exhausted as to be unable to carry off the assaulted guns, glad to have a respite from the contest.

Yet, despite these facts, the brilliant action of the Pennsylvania Reserves on that day was for a long time unknown, and even apparently authentic statements made that they had been reinforced, and had not worthily upheld their former reputation. The facts are, however, as here stated, as to the vigor of their resistance to the powerful assaults of the enemy, more concentrated than elsewhere along the lines attacked, and as to their not having received any reinforcement from the beginning to the end of the contest. It was once supposed that a brigade which reinforced Kearny, on the right-rear of the Reserves, had gone to them. When the contest was over, and when the Reserves had partly fallen back and partly been driven back, Burns's and Dana's brigades of Sedgwick's division, of the Second Corps, led by Sumner in person, were called from the right and advanced. The Twentieth Massachusetts Regiment was especially conspicuous in this movement, passing over the ground which had been occupied by the left of the Reserves, where some of their scattered troops rallied to its standard, doing excellent service in presenting a renewed bold front

to the enemy; but this was not reinforcement to the Reserves; it was isolated action, after an accomplished fact, the day after the fair. Heintzelman, who was a half mile in the rear, and, as one can judge from his own account, saw nothing, and knew but little more of the ordeal through which the Reserves had passed, presumed to make unfavorable statements in his report to McClellan, which McClellan naturally adopted in his general report.

The final all-inclusive fact is that, through neglect, the Pennsylvania Reserves fought from 3 P.M. until dark without having received, from the beginning to the end of the conflict, the slightest reinforcement; that but for their strenuous resistance at the most critical point on the flank of the Federal army, it would have been cut in two, seeing that the troops, imperfectly *en échelon* with them on the right- and left-rear had as much as they could contend with, Kearny, on their right, receiving reinforcements; and that had the Reserves not been so steadfast as they were, Kearny, Hooker, and the rest, to the right and left, would have encountered more than they could resist. The breakers of the attack on the flank at New Market Cross Roads beat fiercely along the line held by the Pennsylvania Reserves and Kearny, dying away gradually beyond until they roared afresh in the contest on the extreme right between Jackson and Franklin. The use to which the Pennsylvania Reserves were put differed from that of a forlorn hope only in that they resisted instead of made attack; in essentials their action and their fate were the same.

General Meade had been struck simultaneously in the arm and in the side, the former a trifling, the latter a dangerous wound. Received at first into the field-hospital, he was thence transported to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, just below Malvern Hill. The next day he was placed on a hospital-transport and sent to Baltimore, where he was

met by his wife and one of his sons, and placed aboard one of the small steamers that ply between Baltimore and Philadelphia by the route of the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal, connecting Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, arriving on the morning of July 4th in Philadelphia, where he was met at the wharf by other members of his family and by friends, and thence escorted home.

The Federal lines, from the crossing of White Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill, remained intact when the sun went down on the evening of the 30th of June. As soon as darkness had fairly fallen over the scene, Franklin quietly withdrew and continued the retreat, following the rear of the train ahead on the road to Malvern Hill and Haxall's Landing, and Heintzelman and Sumner, as in order mentioned, fell in behind him in the same direction.

By early night General McClellan had learned that Franklin was retiring, and sent orders to Sumner and Heintzelman to follow him. General Seymour, then in command of the Pennsylvania Reserves, withdrew his troops about the same time. Later in the night McClellan joined General Fitz-John Porter on Malvern Hill, and learned from him the history of the day's encounters, when he returned to Haxall's Landing, committing to Generals Barnard and A. A. Humphreys, of his staff, the duty of posting the troops on Malvern Hill as they might arrive. Assisted by other officers, these two engaged in reconnoissance of the ground before daylight of the following morning.

Malvern Hill is a plateau over a mile long by three-quarters of a mile in width, comparatively, for that country, free of timber, and affording favorable slopes for artillery-fire, and ravines for infantry positions. On the left of the general position which the enemy would first encounter in coming from the direction in which his army lay, was stationed Fitz-John Porter's corps, the Fifth, with

Sykes's division on the left, and Morrill's on the right, the artillery distributed, and the reserve-artillery and siege-guns massed behind on the summit of the plateau. Next, to the right, came Couch's division, of General Keyes's corps, the Fourth. Next, Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions, of Sumner's corps, the Second. Next, Smith's and Slocum's divisions of Franklin's corps, the Sixth. Then the remaining division of Keyes' corps, the Fourth. The line extended in a semi-circle, the line of the James representing the diameter. The Pennsylvania Reserves were stationed back of Fitz-John Porter's corps and Couch's division, in reserve, a just recognition of the severity of the service which they had performed. The days being long at that season of the year, the enemy soon began to make his appearance from his matutinal start on the 1st of July. But although he was visible on the ground, nothing of moment occurred until 2 P.M., when a large body of troops appeared a long distance off to the right. Nothing came of that, however, and another long pause ensued, during which, doubtless, he was reconnoitering, when, about 3 P.M., artillery opened on the left-centre, followed by a spirited infantry attack, repulsed with signal success by Morrill and Couch. There came then an apparent lull in the enemy's activity, during time probably employed in making dispositions of troops out of sight. At six o'clock the first determined attack began, the enemy concentrating a tremendous artillery-fire on Morrill and Couch. Huger, Magruder, and D. H. Hill were the assailants in the struggle which now began. They pushed column after column of attack by brigades against the part of the line assaulted; but all in vain, for the Federal troops unflinchingly maintained their position, while delivering withering volleys upon the advancing troops. Meagher's, Caldwell's, and Sickles's brigades, coming up at different times, reinforced the points

attacked, until finally there were nine brigades in all on the Federal side engaged in the action. The contest was fiercely waged, the gunboats on the James joining in with huge shells sent hurtling into the recesses of the woods or into the open where the enemy's ranks or formation of any kind occupied ground of vantage for assault, until at last endurance failed, and, with ranks battered and broken, he recoiled from the field of the greatest disaster that he was for a long time to suffer, night falling, and the shells from the gunboats and the artillery on the hill describing their fiery arcs to burst in destructive explosions over the retreating army. The last occurrence, that by night, has been denied by at least one writer on the Federal side, but there is the highest Confederate authority to vouch for its truth, and the Confederates were in a position to know.

During the night McClellan continued his retreat to Harrison's Landing, why, in reason, has never been made apparent in view of the facts that he himself declared that the battle had ended with his victory. The Federal artillery had proved itself to be superior to the Confederate, and the infantry quite its equal, and many officers of high reputation deemed it shameful to retreat after such a success. He alleged, however, that there could be security of supplies only at Harrison's Landing, and therefore that the army must perforce retire to that place. Other generals thought, as they had thought before Jackson's arrival, and some even after it, that a strong push would carry the army into Richmond; that with the gunboats on the James, it was not necessary to give up the position of Malvern Hill, that the *morale* of the army was concerned in its retention and making no further backward step. Which side was right is one of those questions which will remain forever unsettled.

To Harrison's Landing, a few miles below Malvern Hill, the army retreated, there entrenching, and there General

McClellan seemed satisfied to remain indefinitely, unless prodigies could be performed in his favor in making him numerically far stronger than the enemy. He had, as we have seen, represented in a despatch to the President that the enemy was two hundred thousand strong. To the Comte de Paris he said about the same time, as the Comte narrates in his history of the war, that the enemy was one hundred and sixty thousand strong. As the enemy was certainly less than ninety thousand strong at the time referred to, while he, at the same time, was at least one hundred and six thousand strong, he had therefore fought in the Seven Days' Battles, at the lesser of his estimates, an addition to the forces of the enemy of about seventy thousand men in buckram; and if he were sincere in his despatch to the President, he may perhaps, in accordance with his greater estimate, have fought on those days about one hundred and ten thousand men in buckram. No general ever won battles on these terms. Although it is extremely unsafe to assert that a thing is not, to affirm a negative, as the phrase goes, because so many apparently incredible things exist, it would hardly be hazardous to say that one may defy all military history to show a single other case where a general so exaggerated on all occasions, as General McClellan did, the numbers of his adversaries.

Except for a cannonading, about midnight of the 31st of July, upon the entrenched position of the Army of the Potomac, from the southern side of the James, an attack distinguished by its ineffectiveness, and except for a slight attack by McClellan on Malvern Hill, to be described later, perfect quiet settled down upon the army after the battle of Malvern Hill. The losses on the Federal side had been very great, but not so great as those on the Confederate side. The sum-total of the losses in the Army of the Potomac for the Seven Days' Battles were fifteen thousand

eight hundred and thirty-nine men. The Fifth Corps, together with the Pennsylvania Reserves, lost seven thousand six hundred and one, and of that number the Reserves three thousand one hundred and eighty-seven, the loss of the Pennsylvania Reserves exceeding the loss of any division of the army but that of the First Division of the Fifth Corps, which lost sixty-five men more than the Reserves. The Reserves, a mere division, lost more men than were lost by any entire corps except the Fifth, which included the aforesaid First Division; and as the loss of the Pennsylvania Reserves was only a little over four hundred at Mechanicsville, although that of the enemy was very great, the Division must have lost over two thousand five hundred men in the two battles of Gaines's Mill and New Market Cross Roads. As, at Gaines's Mill, the Division was at first held in reserve, the reader is in a position to judge whether or not it did its duty at New Market Cross Roads.

General McClellan was now in his element of deliberate preparation,—reminiscent, and forecasting. Having ample time on his hands, in the attitude of expectancy in which he had placed himself, his thoughts were largely engaged in diplomacy, and on prospective strategy and tactics with large reinforcements. From this coign of vantage he wrote to the President, on July 7th, a long and extremely indiscreet letter, in which he instructed him in a matter of statesmanship in which the President finally proved himself to the whole world a consummate master. The breach between the Administration and the general became too wide to be filled. What chief representative of a people ever did or possibly could keep terms with a general who wrote to him in a pedagogic strain? Think, too, for a moment, of the mental calibre of Lincoln as compared with that of McClellan, of his realization and recognition at every turn, by every possible sign, of the fact that all

power under our form of government is derived from the people. Think of his scrupulous exercise of authority within the well-defined limits of the fundamental law of the land, knowing with superb forecast that problems beyond any man's solving would work themselves out with patience and time, and then compare with this the narrowness of one who wrote to him, as his superior in moral and intellectual force, utterly inappreciative of the fact that a new order is to come from the old, and the noblest attitude is waiting, and who complacently indited advice to one of the greatest men of the age.

On the 8th of July the President in person visited the army. General McClellan says, in his memoirs: "Mr. Lincoln visited me at Harrison's Bar. I handed him myself, on board of the steamer on which he came, the letter of July 7, 1862. He read it in my presence, but made no comments upon it, merely saying, when he had finished it, that he was obliged to me for it, or words to that effect. I do not think that he alluded further to it during his visit, or at any time after that." If any one with a knowledge of the relation between civil and military authority, and with appreciation of the situation at that time, will dispassionately read this letter, which in manuscript must have occupied several pages, he will not be surprised at Mr. Lincoln's silence. Mr. Lincoln was a man of the keenest sense of humor, allowance to whose play sometimes lightened as heavy a burden as man ever bore; and he was also a thinker and writer of great force, who was soon to produce a few effortless lines that will be immortal. He had had presented to him by his chief commanding-general, not a mere fragment of composition, in taste similar to specimens previously received from the same source, but pages of implied instructions, evidencing a benighted state of mind. He was withal a man full of pity, and he may well have murmured to him-

self, "and common is the commonplace, and vacant chaff well meant for grain." He said, however, nothing, but that he thanked the general, and did not allude further to the subject. Nothing could have been more generous, but evidently the general did not appreciate it, because he could not, from his point of view, realize the gravity of the offence, or that he had committed any, regarding himself as playing the part of guide, philosopher, and friend.

On the 25th of July General Halleck, who had been created general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, and had established his headquarters in Washington, also visited the army. A council of commanders was called, and the general opinion expressed by it favored the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. On the 30th of July General Halleck sent to General McClellan an order to press the enemy in the direction of Richmond, so as to ascertain his movements. It becomes very evident from McClellan's papers of this time, that he apprehended the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, and even his own supersedure. In pursuance of Halleck's instructions, Hooker, by way of clearing the passage towards Richmond, was ordered to dislodge some of the enemy from Malvern Hill, which task he accomplished. McClellan also occupied Coggins' Point, on the south side of the James opposite Harrison's Landing, for the purpose of preventing any future attempt, like that on the night of the 31st of July, to bombard the camps. He seemed to cling to the hope that something might occur to change the suspected intention of withdrawing the army from the Peninsula, but with very serious doubt if anything would avail to change it. His anxiety to remain is very conspicuously shown in a despatch of August 5th to his chief-of-staff, General Marcy, whom he informs of the success of Hooker, requesting him to send a despatch to

Halleck, saying how he (McClellan) hated to give up the position, and that if he could have reinforcements he would be successful.

The die, however, was cast, for on the 4th of August McClellan received an order from Halleck, dated the 30th of July, to withdraw the army to Acquia Creek. It will be impossible to enter here into a discussion of the cross-purposes exhibited by the ensuing correspondence between Halleck and McClellan. It would seem, however, that a good general idea of the greater or less expedition that followed the order to withdraw may be condensed into the statement that, whereas General Halleck did General McClellan wrong in construing the expression in his despatch of the 16th, "movement has commenced by land and water," as if it meant that the movement had just begun, instead of, as was the fact, that it was entering on its final stage, yet that, on the other hand, General McClellan was not so expeditious at the very first as he might have been, for no man is, who, while formally obeying an order, tries to have it rescinded, as happened in this case.

The campaign had been badly conducted from beginning to end. A base of operations does not mean merely a depot of supplies. A base of operations means a line, or points of support on a line, to the rear of the front of operations, to cover the security of supply, including the contingency of the enforced retreat of an army. When an army bases itself on a river, it must not only have bridges, but either *têtes de pont*, or strong forts, preferably astride the river. The campaign included at the beginning a false position, because the force of McDowell at Fredericksburg was supposed to be there to join eventually the force of McClellan's right wing reaching out to it from the north side of the Chickahominy. Therefore McClellan's force had to be partly north of the Chickahominy. But while accepting this sup-

posititiously temporary drawback, it did not follow that when the army of McClellan was placed astride of the Chickahominy, the larger body of troops should have been placed north of that stream, in the stronger position, the immediate consequence of which was the disaster at Seven Pines. The army should, moreover, according to the best ancient and modern practice in war, have been supported as to its base, without which a base is only a name, by the completion of the *tête de pont* at Bottom's Bridge, and by *têtes de pont* on the upper Chickahominy, and besides, the line from the White House to Bottom's Bridge, beginning at the White House, should have been strongly held by detached works.

Taking things as they actually were, with the vicious first dispositions, the capture of Richmond should have been attempted while the battle of Fair Oaks was proceeding. Again, McClellan should either have caused the whole force north of the Chickahominy to retire south of it during the night of the 26th of June, destroying the bridges behind it, and thus have avoided fighting the battle of Gaines's Mill, or else he should, on the 27th, have heavily supported the troops fighting that battle. General McClellan should have been present in person near New Market Cross Roads, to see to the disposition of the troops, because it was the most critical point of the field. A general-in-chief should not leave so much as he did to his lieutenants, who, however competent, represent so many different minds and views and wills, and successful generalship, however much it may draw from accessories, is conditioned, as a finality, upon the action of one supreme thought and will. That he was not permitted to advance on Richmond again, when he so earnestly requested it, is ground for great rejoicing, for experience points to the probability that the Federal and Confederate sides would in very deed have "swapped queens." Whether or not, in consideration of the loss of *morale* by

the Federal troops, and its corresponding gain by the Confederates, an advance on Richmond just after the battle of Malvern Hill would have been successful, must remain somewhat problematical. The relative gain and loss of such imponderable matter as *morale* remains unknown, save by the test of actual trial.

The enemy, on his part, made three grievous mistakes, to his cost, one in assaulting the position at Beaver Dam Creek, when it needed only to be turned, as it was the next day; another in Jackson's action leading to his losing so much time as he did in rebuilding a bridge across the Chickahominy, when it ought to have been known that, even with that accomplished, he would not be able to force the crossing at White Oak Swamp; and finally, the mistake of attacking Malvern Hill from a direction in which it was impregnable, as held by troops supported by the fire of the gunboats in the James.

Whilst General McClellan's army was in process of removal from the Peninsula, General Meade, having recovered from the serious wound which he had received at New Market Cross Roads, took steamer from Baltimore for Harrison's Landing. There he found everything in confusion incident to the transportation of the army to the Potomac. Generals McCall and Reynolds had by exchange been released from the Richmond prison, but had not yet been able to rejoin the army, in consequence of which he found General Seymour in command of the Division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, about taking ship with it for Falmouth, near Fredericksburg. It started on the night of the 15th of August. General Meade, therefore, finding no immediate need existing for his presence, went to Washington, *via* Baltimore, remaining there for a day or two, when, hearing of the arrival of the Division at Falmouth, he proceeded there by rail, and thus rejoined the army.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

It was on June 26, 1862, as will be remembered, that the action at Mechanicsville, on the Peninsula, was brought about by Jackson's and other forces of Lee's turning the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, an event followed at once by the retreat of the army during a period known as the Seven Days' Battles, resulting in a change of base from the Pamunkey to the James, where the army, in its final stand at Malvern Hill, reinforced by the fire of the Federal gunboats on the James, repulsed the enemy, and then took refuge at Harrison's Landing, where it was insured from further molestation by the continued presence of gunboats, by entrenchments, and by the occupation of commanding positions for artillery in the vicinity. By a coincidence, it was on the very same day that General Pope was appointed to the command near Washington of the previously disunited forces of that vicinity, which had been under McDowell, Fremont, and Banks, among which Jackson had just made such havoc, and which, when concentrated, were to be known as the Army of Virginia, Fremont resigning because he would not serve under his junior in rank, General Pope, and Sigel taking command of his corps.

It will therefore be perceived, when we remember that the first day's serious contest of the forces of the Army of Virginia, the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a direct consequence of McClellan's retreat on the Peninsula, did

not take place until August 9th, that, after making all due allowance for uncertainty as to whether the Army of the Potomac should be removed from the Peninsula, or should be reinforced and retained there, the postponement of the decision until July 30th entailed great risks to the forces under General Pope's command. Had the Army of the Potomac lain between Richmond and Washington, or had it been engaged in threatening Richmond, the case would have been different; but where it was, and inert as it was, at Harrison's Landing, it was, by the fact of the occupation of that position, and by that attitude, temporarily neutralized. Except for one diversion at the last moment before its removal from the Peninsula, when it made a partial advance to Malvern Hill, nothing was done to relieve the stress on Pope, whereas, so superior was the Confederate to the Federal initiative, that, secure of McClellan's inactivity, Jackson with his corps was, on the 9th of August, advancing south of Culpeper Court House in the movement which was to culminate in the battle of Cedar Mountain. Nor did this extraordinary inactivity on the part of the Federal authorities in Washington, who were equally remiss with McClellan, cease even when at last the troops of the Army of the Potomac were ordered away from the Peninsula *en masse*, and some of them had reached Acquia Creek and Alexandria, as the official correspondence ensuing between General Halleck and General McClellan, with relation to pushing forward troops, fully exemplifies. First of all, McClellan had not been sufficiently zealous as to the removal of the army. Then Halleck's thoughts, upon the arrival of McClellan, were so bent on the defence of Washington, as if succor to Pope had nothing to do with its safety, that he actually permitted transportation to be devoted to routine work, and cavalry, of which there was sore need for reconnoissance towards the front, to be sent scouting on the

upper Potomac. When emergency pointed to the front, he did not attempt heartily to push there two corps which, even without artillery, might have saved the day at the second battle of Bull Run, hampering McClellan with despatches which tied his hands for effective action. Transportation of the regular sort he certainly could have supplied from Washington, or have extemporized it. On his side, McClellan had been instructed, while on the Peninsula, to make ample provision of ammunition for the landing troops, and had even replied that he could supply Pope's whole army, yet, when the time arrived for final action, he answered Halleck's urgency for it by saying that he did not know the calibres of Pope's guns. Halleck, although knowing the confusion of affairs at Alexandria, instead of appearing on the scene, only a few miles from Washington, alleged the pressure of office duties by way of apology for not going. Halleck was, therefore, guilty of the action which imposes responsibility without conferring corresponding powers, embarrassing McClellan in every way by neglect of promptness of reply and the contradictoriness of his instructions. Without danger to the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Virginia might have been reinforced more largely than it was. At the last moment, when affairs for the Army of Virginia were at their most critical point, Halleck was found wholly wanting in the emergency, proving conclusively that he had not that order of executive ability which is fitted for great command. Well might von Moltke have remarked, if this case of military management had come under his notice, as he is reported to have said, under a misapprehension of the whole tenor of the war, that he took no interest in its military operations, as they were merely the conflicts of armed mobs.

Of all this General Pope had a right to complain, but he had no right to complain of the want of confidence which

pervaded the minds of his subordinates, for even if there had been no prepossession against him, he began his assumption of the command of the Army of Virginia with declarations which of themselves were sufficient to create it, by most unmilitary addresses to the army, and kept it alive by his unskilfulness in the field. It was not the mere invidious comparisons that he made in his first address to the army, between the armies of the East and the West, that destroyed confidence in him; it was the fact that a general presenting himself to his army professed to scorn some of the most important military practices, maintenance of strong positions and lines of retreat and bases of supplies, recognized by the greatest captains of ancient and modern times. He little realized, although he should have done so, that he was to meet veterans who were the flower of the Confederate troops, and under extraordinary leadership, that he was to have an experience to which, as Sancho Panza would have said, all he had seen at Island No. 10 on the Mississippi, where he had signalized himself, was tarts and cheesecakes.

In the first part of his operations General Pope made some excellent dispositions of his troops and excellent movements. For certain mistakes at the beginning he was not responsible. It was not by his wish, but by General Halleck's orders, that General Rufus King's division of McDowell's corps was kept at Fredericksburg for the inadequate purpose of guarding, in such an emergency as that presented by the advance of Lee on Pope, the communication through Falmouth with Acquia Creek, and thus protecting Government property. Banks was ordered from the Shenandoah Valley, and was stationed at Little Washington, while Sigel was also ordered from the Valley, and occupied Sperryville to the left of Banks, and General James B. Rickett's division, of McDowell's corps, was ad-

vanced from Manassas Junction to Waterloo Bridge at the Rappahannock. McDowell, as is thus seen, was already on the ground with two of his divisions, Franklin's being still with McClellan. Pope's force was near the Rappahannock, with its right near the Blue Ridge, and its communications with Washington open, defended at the Rappahannock in his rear. It was from these positions, after making certain reorganizations preliminary to the anticipated movements of the army, which at first was to be directed on Richmond, when the unwelcome tidings of McClellan's retreat came even before it had assembled, that Pope made his first movements to check the advance of Jackson. He had entered upon active operations by trying to break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. It was through no fault of his that, while the first attempt under King from Fredericksburg succeeded, the latter failed, for General John P. Hatch, in charge of it, reached his destination only to find the ground held by the enemy in force, because he had not, as directed, employed only cavalry for the expedition. Hatch had found on the ground the vanguard of the Confederate army, consisting of two divisions, under Generals R. S. Ewell and C. S. Winder, Jackson in person commanding, who, just before the end of July, was joined by the third division of his corps under General A. P. Hill.

The campaign was fairly opened now by a renewed, and this time strong demonstration on Gordonsville, and on the 7th of August Jackson began the general advance which led to the battle of Cedar Mountain, not as contemplated by either side, but as it took place. Whether General Pope did or did not intend the action to take place through Banks attacking Jackson in his advance can never be known from that completeness of evidence which constitutes proof positive to most persons. The only instruc-

tions in writing extant in the matter are ones which purport to be a statement of Pope's intentions, made at Banks's request by Pope's inspector-general, who dictated them to Banks's chief-of-staff. But it is very evident that this filtering process may have introduced error. Pope might have said one thing, his emissary might have modified it, and the transcriber might have modified that version again. If two changes are thus shown to be possible, assuming that Pope himself did not make a mistake as to what he directed, a certain one of those two is the more likely to have been the one actually made. Experience shows that a person making a verbal repetition is more likely to make a mistake than he is who merely transcribes what he believes to be dictated. Therefore, so far as circumstantial evidence goes, one must believe that Banks received an order in the words of the paper which was eventually produced in his justification. This paper, dictated by Colonel Marshall to Banks's chief-of-staff, dated 9.45 A.M., August 9, 1862, reads: "General Banks to move to the front immediately, assume command of the forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately as he approaches, and be reinforced from here."

General Pope denied that he had sent such an order, which, if Banks received such a one, proves how strong it is in his favor. It has just been said that that was the written order which Banks did receive. It has been contended that the words, "deploy his skirmishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately as he approaches," only mean, "attack him with the skirmishers." Pope, however, as proved by his denial of sending such an order, admitted by implication that that was not the meaning of the order produced, as he read in the light of military usage. Although, in modern practice, skirmishers are sometimes pushed forward in tolerably dense array, their further ad-

vance is not generally represented by what is known as attack between two forces. As the wording of the supposititious order stands, it clearly means that skirmishers are to be pushed forward, and that movement followed in due course by line of battle. Military construction of the words proves that the attack, as specified by them, was to be by the main force of Banks. The dictated order, being what it was, however derived, plainly instructed him to attack the enemy with his whole force, instead of merely trying to hold the position which had been assigned to him. Unfortunately, however, for the justification of Banks through the evidence on the face of the written order mentioned, it is proved from other evidence, that General Pope did not intend Banks to attack with his small force, and that if General Pope really did use the expression imputed to him, Banks must have nevertheless known, from other instructions and from a variety of circumstances, that he was violating a previous thorough understanding as to action. But, apparently carried away by the idea that he might unexpectedly achieve a great victory, which would have the effect of obliterating remembrance of his miserable conduct of operations in the Shenandoah Valley, where he had had ample time to retire to advantage before being struck by Jackson, and would crown him with the laurels which he had so vainly longed for, amidst which anticipated glory all fear of charge of disobedience of orders disappeared, Banks precipitated his heroic little force into an unequal conflict with thrice their number, led by one of the first soldiers of the age. Without entering into an elaborate discussion of the evidence to substantiate the view here expressed, a few facts are conclusive as to the foundation which it has in fact. Banks was put into a strong position, selected long in advance, which he recognized at the moment when he was placed there as the position which he was to maintain. Yet

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It was on June 26, 1862, as will be remembered, that the action at Mechanicsville, on the Peninsula, was brought about by Jackson's and other forces of Lee's turning the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, an event followed at once by the retreat of the army during a period known as the Seven Days' Battles, resulting in a change of base from the Pamunkey to the James, where the army, in its final stand at Malvern Hill, reinforced by the fire of the Federal gunboats on the James, repulsed the enemy, and then took refuge at Harrison's Landing, where it was insured from further molestation by the continued presence of gunboats, by entrenchments, and by the occupation of commanding positions for artillery in the vicinity. By a coincidence, it was on the very same day that General Pope was appointed to the command near Washington of the previously disunited forces of that vicinity, which had been under McDowell, Fremont, and Banks, among which Jackson had just made such havoc, and which, when concentrated, were to be known as the Army of Virginia, Fremont resigning because he would not serve under his junior in rank, General Pope, and Sigel taking command of his corps.

It will therefore be perceived, when we remember that the first day's serious contest of the forces of the Army of Virginia, the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a direct consequence of McClellan's retreat on the Peninsula, did

he deliberately made an advance which relinquished the whole of it, except where General George H. Gordon had been on the right, in reserve, and finally he ordered desultory charges, without even full knowledge of his own side of the field or the positions of his troops, and he did not send for reinforcements when he saw that battle had seriously begun, although he knew, for he had passed them on the march, that the division of Ricketts, numbering eight thousand men, was only about three miles off in his rear, and that Pope might have some of Sigel's troops, then on the march. Flagrantly, he did not send for reinforcements, although he had been told that they would be forthcoming, and there is no other conclusion tenable then that he did not wish to have them, because he was so ignorant of what he was about to encounter, and underrated it so utterly that he thought he could gain a victory in which there would be no one else to share. As it fell out, less than eight thousand troops attacked over twenty thousand, under the experienced Jackson, and, although badly defeated, rendered such an account of themselves as is memorable in the history of the war; but there is nothing in that circumstance more than palliation of the evil encountered in their being led to slaughter through the ignorance, disobedience, and vanity of their commander.

The centre of Pope's forces was at Culpeper, so that the position of Banks near the Blue Ridge had been his extreme right, and that of King, at Fredericksburg, his extreme left. As will be remembered, Sigel was just to the left of Banks, and what has just been said as to the dispositions at the battle of Cedar Mountain incidentally shows that Sigel had been ordered forward when Banks had gone to the front, and that Ricketts had come up from Waterloo Bridge, twenty miles in the rear of Culpeper. The dispositions of Pope at the beginning of the campaign, even in-

cluding those preliminary to directly opposing Jackson's advance, were strategetically and tactically correct. He had been able to damage the communications of the enemy, and his intention to defeat Jackson's first advance would have succeeded but for the failure of Sigel to arrive in time, through a most impotent delay in advancing, while he was unnecessarily asking, when there was a direct and fine road before him, by what road he should march. Even putting that drawback out of question, Pope would have succeeded in checking Jackson without disastrous loss had Banks but obeyed the spirit of his instructions. At the time, however, when Pope at a disadvantage thus met Jackson, and succeeded in checking the advance with more serious loss to himself than to the enemy, Jackson falling back, as he did, only to gather more strength, he should at once have retreated behind the line of the Rappahannock, retiring thence on pressure to Centreville. Where he was now advanced, towards the line of the Rapidan, he was in a position where he ran, with his inadequate force, the risk of being twice flanked before he could reach Centreville, whereas, behind the line of the Rappahannock, the possibility of being flanked was reduced to once, against which, with due vigilance, he ought to have been able to guard. Driven to extremities, it was only on the line at Manassas and Centreville, between Washington and Alexandria on the one hand, and the Bull Run Mountains on the other, that he could make sure of his communications. Failing in the open field, he could, at the worst, fall back, as he was finally compelled to, behind the defences of Washington. What he had to meet with all circumspection, with an imperfectly organized army, under a new commander, was the thoroughly organized Army of Northern Virginia under leaders who had learned to wield it at will, under a mind which even at that early day had given evidence of a high order of military talent.

In one respect, however, Pope differed as fatefully in character in one direction as McClellan in another. Where McClellan, looking at his distant enemy, viewed him magnified manifold and portentous in strength, Pope's self-consciousness mirrored everything diminutively by contrast with his own sense of power. Pope fondly believed that the enemy about to press finally upon him was not so formidable that his retreat towards his prospective reinforcements and the maintenance of his communications could be seriously endangered. The reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, which he was prospectively to receive, he flattered himself were as good as in hand, and that he could count upon them to look out for his rear at Manassas. It seems never to have occurred to him that no general of repute had ever before based his plans upon contingencies of the nature of hopes, rather than of beliefs warranted by circumstances. It is not upon the hazard of such dies that great commanders tempt the fortunes of war. Perhaps not even Pope would have done so, but for the fact that he had declared in his address to the army that he had always been used to seeing the backs of his enemies, and had he not thereby morally burnt his ships behind him? As it was, he fell back, but not in the best manner, not at his own option, but under the initiative of Lee, when he allowed to slip into the hands of Lee his own control of the question, and when he was occupying a position which there was no object, unless from bravado, in pretending with his small force to maintain.

General Pope ordered up King's division, which had been guarding Fredericksburg, and Jackson, knowing of the concentration of the forces which Pope then had in hand, retreated in the night of the 11th of August to the Rapidan, General Pope advancing in correspondence with that movement, and on the 12th picketing that river. It was at this

point of time, however, or shortly thereafter, that Pope, to avoid Lee's initiative, should have withdrawn to the Rappahannock. He knew then to his cost that Jackson was not far distant, and was soon to be heavily reinforced, that the removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula having been determined upon, was in progress, and that reinforcements were on their way to him. Generals Halleck and Pope should have seen that, with Pope's then relatively small force, he ought not to be occupying longer than absolutely necessary a line near the Rapidan. Nothing further could be accomplished near the Rapidan, the enemy then being in ample force to defend his communications and too strong to attack. The division of King, as has been mentioned, had been withdrawn from Fredericksburg and had joined Pope. There was absolutely no reason for Pope's remaining longer near the Rapidan, but every reason against it. But the fatal idea expressed in his address to his troops, that they should discard such notions as lines of retreat and bases of supplies, and that the strongest position is one from which to advance upon the enemy, seemed to dominate him to his destruction. Pope was at the Rapidan with a military chip on his shoulder, to dare the consequences, not deeming them more serious than such as he could adequately meet.

Lee was soon on the ground. By a lucky capture, however, on the 16th of August, of a letter of Lee's, Pope became apprised that he was about to advance, and, leaving his cavalry in observation, began a retreat across the Rappahannock with his infantry. Lee kept away towards Pope's left, so as to come in between any possible reinforcements that might be arriving for Pope from the direction of Fredericksburg. He attempted to capture the bridge on Pope's left over the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station, but it was burnt by the retreating forces.

Then he endeavored to turn Pope's right at Warrenton. Pope was at last where he should have retreated almost immediately after the battle of Cedar Mountain, occupying a better position than on the Rapidan. General Jesse L. Reno had brought up reinforcements on the 14th of August, marching by the way of Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, from Falmouth with two divisions, eight thousand men of the Ninth Corps, just arrived from North Carolina. None had yet arrived from the Army of the Potomac. In the right position at last, on the 20th of August, Pope made on the Rappahannock some judicious dispositions to protect his new line, but with a neglect of what might soon be going on in his rear that led to woeful consequences. The enemy, after vainly endeavoring to cross the river just above or below Rappahannock Station, and finding it impracticable, attempted to turn the Federal right between ten and fifteen miles above that point. At this juncture General Pope had reason to believe, from communications made to him from Washington, that he would soon have large reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac. But he had no right to confide the protection of his rear to a hope. His force was insufficient to protect the whole line upon which the enemy was operating with a larger one, threatening him with it in front while it endeavored to push around his right flank. Sigel, on the right flank, perceived this, and suggested that he fall back for the sake of greater concentration and for the protection of the railroad. But, collating all the material at hand to afford a basis for judgment, it would seem that at this point of time Pope was balancing in his mind very different plans of conduct, one of which was certainly as grandiose in conception as it would have proved abortive and disastrous in attempted execution. That plan was to cross the river and attack the enemy in the act of marching up the Rappahannock.

The attempt to turn the Federal left flank from the position on the southern bank of the Rappahannock having been seen to be of doubtful expediency, on account of a freshet rendering the fords of the Rappahannock impassable, the burning by Pope of the railroad bridge over the river, and the difficulties experienced, through the rise of water, in attempting to cross the river above, caused Lee suddenly to change his plan from that of attempting to cross there at Waterloo Bridge, and to try an experiment which would have been hazardous, but for the fact of the unskilfulness of the general by whom he was opposed. Pope, after moving to the right, had established his headquarters on the Warrenton turnpike, the main road leading to Alexandria, from which place, or from Acquia Creek, his expected reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac were to arrive. The first of these had reached him on the 23d of August, from Falmouth, near Fredericksburg,—the Pennsylvania Reserves, under General Reynolds, in which General Meade commanded the same brigade as that with which he had set out in the war, and which he had just led on the Peninsula. The Division was at once assigned to General McDowell. General Fitz-John Porter, with his divisions, under Morrill and Sykes, joined Pope, by way of Acquia Creek, on the 26th of August.

On the night of the 22d General J. E. B. Stuart started from Lee's army, and passing around Pope's, with between one and two thousand troopers, reached Catlett's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, working the usual havoc effected by light-cavalry raids reaching the rear of a hostile army, and captured important papers of Pope's. Escaping essentially by the same route as that by which he had come, Stuart rejoined Lee near Waterloo Bridge, and it is at this point of time that Lee altered his intention of attempting to turn Pope's right near Warrenton.

He now converted his previous intention into a feint that deceived Pope. Maintaining, as he had done for some time, an artillery fire and show of force along the Rappahannock, Lee laid out his plans for a *coup* at Manassas. On the morning of the 25th of August appeared a cloud of dust slowly sweeping over a great space and extending towards the northwestward. It was known that Jackson occupied the enemy's left, it was known what a man of enterprise Jackson was, he had given many and only recently convincing evidences of it, and it was believed that it was Jackson's corps moving towards the north under that cloudy canopy of dust. It would be incredible, if the fact were not historical, that Pope thought this movement of infantry might mean either a raid into the Shenandoah Valley or a continued attempt on his right flank above Warrenton. The conclusion to be reached under the circumstances was the one which Pope thought least probable, its possibility being in his estimation countervailed by the assumption that ample reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac would arrive in time to protect his rear. And thus we see constantly in Pope at this juncture the great military defect which metamorphoses hope into belief.

Jackson, under Lee's orders, had, however, done just the thing which Lee, with knowledge of Jackson and Pope, would be likely to attempt, just the thing which Jackson was capable of executing, and therefore just that which Pope should have expected him to try to accomplish from the tempting positions in which the armies stood with relation to each other, under the circumstances of his having been thwarted in endeavoring to turn the Federal right flank on the Rappahannock. Jackson had marched off on the 25th of August, from where he was on Lee's left flank, and making from Jefferson a circuit around the right of the Army of Virginia, passing Amissville and Orleans, had


MAP No 3.
OPERATIONS
OF THE
ARMY OF VIRGINIA
under Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE
POSITION OF TROOPS
ON THE NIGHT OF
August 27th 1862
W. Hoelcke, Capt. and Add't Aide-de-Camp U.S.A.
United States Forces
Rebels
Scale of Miles
Modified, to suit the general reader, by R. Meade Bache.
Catoctin Cr.
Catharpin Creek
Hopewell
Georgetown
Hay Market
New Market
McDOWELL
SIGEL
RENO
KEARNY
JACKSON
Milford
Greenwich
Warrenton
Cedar Run
Turkey Run
Mile Store
Catlett's Sta.
Fayetteville
Germantown
Licking Run
Liberty
Oak Shade
Jefferson
Negro Run
Thumb Run
Kettle Run
Freemans Fd.
Fox's Fd.
Hazel
Church

reached Salem by night. Thence, the next day, passing through White Plains, he debouched from the Bull Run Mountains through Thoroughfare Gap, and found himself on the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad and in full possession of the Federal communications with Washington, the first knowledge of his presence there coming to the front when he was at Bristoe Station, on Broad Run, an affluent of Cedar Run, which flows into the Potomac. Pope's failure to fall back almost at once when that cloud of dust appeared on his right led to manifold consequences, in which he was forced to retire by the stress put upon him in the rear, groping for the position of Jackson during the precious interval when Longstreet had not reinforced him, and when his corps might have been shattered by skilfully disposed superior forces, and perhaps overwhelmed. On the 26th of August Pope, as his orders and the terms in which they are expressed testify, was in the utmost bewilderment, and his mental condition was aggravated by messages from Halleck which embarrassed instead of assisting him. He still thought that his danger was on his front, and especially at Warrenton, and as he still held firmly at the town, he also maintained his extension to the left which he had combined with his concentration at Warrenton. And not only was the general-commanding distraught, but his troops were fagged out with useless marching and countermarching, what cavalry he had was well-nigh spent, and the slight confidence in him that had existed had departed at the spectacle of irresolution of which so many might be victims.

Stuart, with his cavalry, had started from near Waterloo before daylight, on the morning of the 26th of August, just when Jackson was about to begin his second day's march. That allowed ample time for cavalry to overtake infantry. In the evening, after dark, Lee, with Longstreet's

corps, crossed the Rappahannock at Hinton's Mills, six miles above Waterloo, and followed Jackson's line of march, while General D. H. Hill left distant Hanover Junction with a division, to concentrate his force with the other columns. Thus was the whole of Lee's army on the march towards or in Pope's rear that night, Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, being at Bristoe Station. The prescribed limits of this memoir do not permit of describing all that immediately ensued during the recoil of the Federal army, or the devastation at Manassas. New dispositions having been hastily made on the following day, the 27th, the army faced to the right-about, and Hooker, who had arrived on the 25th from Alexandria, now marching from Warrenton Junction, defeated Jackson's rear-guard, under Ewell, at Bristoe Station. Simultaneously with Hooker's, ensued the general movement towards the rear. Pope had directed a strong force on Gainesville, subsequently relinquishing the position, thus opening the gate near Thoroughfare Gap through which Longstreet could join forces with Jackson. But for McDowell's sending Ricketts's division to check Longstreet beyond Thoroughfare Gap itself, Lee would have passed through absolutely without opposition. Then followed in swift succession the battle of Gainesville, on the 28th, in the course of the false move in full force from Gainesville to Manassas, and then the two days' battles of the Second Bull Run, on successive days; both of them, with only the difference of tactical changes, taking place on essentially the same ground, the first being fought with the troops of Jackson in a position which, the next day, became Lee's left wing, and the second being the final contest of the second day.

At Groveton, at dawn of the 29th of August, Jackson was occupying a slightly curved line, about two miles long, of mixed bank and excavation of an unfinished railroad.


MAP No. 4.
OPERATIONS
OF THE
ARMY OF VIRGINIA
under Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE
POSITION OF TROOPS
AT SUNSET
August 28th 1862.
W. Hoelcke, Capt. and Adt. Aide-de-Camp U.S.A.
United States Forces
Rebels
Modified, to suit the general reader, by R. Meade Bache.
Scale: Half an Inch to the Mile
Hopewell
Catharpin Creek
Sudley Springs
Thornton
Centreville
Hay Market
New Market
Milford
Bristoe
Greenwich
South Fork
North Fork
Broad Run
Kettle Run
Cedar Run
Bethlehem Church
Manassas Sta.
Cub Run
Bull Run
Rickett's Div.
King's Div.
Manassas Gap R.R.
Warrenton Turnpike
Gull Run
Ackson
Young's
Pointer

Jackson's old division held the right of this, under General W. E. Starke, and Ewell's division, under General A. R. Lawton, the centre; the two previous commanders of these divisions, General W. B. Taliaferro and General R. E. Ewell having been wounded the evening before while on the march from Gainesville, in which the brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday on the Federal side, and the divisions of Taliaferro and the brigades of Lawton and Trimble, on the Confederate side, opened the series of contests by the severe engagement known as the battle of Gainesville. Jackson's left wing was constituted by the division of A. P. Hill. The position of Jackson was masked to a great extent by woods occupied by the Confederate skirmish line. On the Federal right, in its advance on the enemy, was the division of General Carl Schurz, on his left General R. H. Milroy's brigade, on his left General R. C. Schenck's division, and on his left General John F. Reynolds's division, in which General Meade commanded the Second Brigade. Schurz was on one side of a turnpike running about west-southwest, and Schenck and Reynolds on his left, on the other side of the turnpike, the Warrenton turnpike, which leads to Alexandria. Reynolds attempting, according to orders, to turn the enemy's right by advancing Meade's brigade, he was obliged to recall him, owing to the Confederate countermovement on the Federal right, necessitating the withdrawal of a brigade sent to Milroy by Schenck, who had been supporting Reynolds's movement. The troops were not numerous enough to cover a line of two miles in length opposite to the enemy's sheltered position formed by the partly rampart, partly excavated line of the unfinished railroad. Notwithstanding that fact, one signal success crowned the efforts of the Federal troops that morning, in the assault by General A. Schimmelpfennig upon and retention of a part of the enemy's railroad entrenchment until 2 P.M., when his

division was relieved by fresh troops. When the Federal line slightly retired after its severe onslaughts on the enemy, the feeling was that, considering the smallness of the attacking force, and the strength of the enemy's position, the troops had accomplished all that was possible. Everything to some looked hopeful, for they believed reinforcements were on the march to join them; but thinking men must have gravely reflected, knowing that, so far, only Jackson's forces were in front of them, that as he had been long alone on the ground in the rear, reinforcements for him could not be far distant, and such men must have marvelled that they had not yet been heard from on the field. Of course, no one could have then known that the corps of Fitz-John Porter, left by McDowell with orders so vague that Porter could not do better than remain where he was, in a position where he was able merely to distract some force from the enemy during the afternoon, would not be able to aid by direct attack.

The Federal force which had been engaged in the morning had consisted chiefly of Schenck's, Schurz's, and Milroy's troops, under Sigel's immediate command. Although Reynolds's division, the Pennsylvania Reserves, had, on the Peninsula, been attached, under Porter, to the Fifth Corps, we now find it marching with its fellow-divisions of the First, known as those of King and Ricketts, the former of which, on account of King's illness, is now under Hatch. Before midday Heintzelman, with the divisions of Kearny and Hooker, reinforced General Pope, and so also did General J. L. Reno, with his two divisions of the Ninth Corps.

General Pope thought that the time during the early part of the afternoon would be well devoted, while McDowell and Porter were coming, to a rest for the troops which had been actively engaged. He fondly imagined they would strike Jackson on his right flank and rear. But



Modified to suit the general reader by R. Meade Bache

McDowell, acting under a modified joint-order which he and Porter had received from Pope, had neutralized Porter by leaving him and his troops with a vague direction; and expectant of further instructions, Porter could do nothing but await developments. Confident that the attack on Jackson's right flank and rear was on the eve of opening, General Pope ordered Heintzelman to attack Jackson with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny. Hooker charged the centre of the enemy's line; but unfortunately, the attacks intended to be simultaneous were not. That of Hooker, after carrying a portion of the railroad entrenchment of Jackson, and reaching the line of the enemy's reserves, failed for want of support in due time; while that of Kearny following it, and supported by the division of Stevens, although it was vigorous, and found the enemy so shattered by the previous onslaught that Jackson's left wing, but for timely reinforcement, would have been routed, could not maintain itself unsupported. About this critical time McDowell arrived with King's division, Ricketts's being still on the march. Hatch, in command of King's division, King having been taken ill, was ordered at once to advance with the division on the right of Jackson, upon the presumption that these fresh troops would force Jackson to retreat. But instead of meeting Jackson's troops in his front, the climax of all that had gone before was reached, for he encountered those of Longstreet. Hatch was met by a portion of General J. B. Hood's brigade and a brigade under Colonel E. M. Law, a severe engagement immediately following, lasting from about half past six in the afternoon until after seven o'clock. Longstreet pressed forward his reinforcements, compelling Hatch to retire. Then night came on and preparations for the morrow. Longstreet's advance had been on the field since noon of the day. Thus the fortunes of war had

turned, or rather, they had been trifled with, for fickle as Fortune is, she is not so foolish a jade as would be indicated by charging all these consequences to her.

At this juncture the proper move to make would have been to fall back during the night behind Bull Run, a move which could have been made with perfect ease to a position only between two and three miles in the rear. The advantage would have been three-fold—the avoidance of the entrenched line of Jackson, the gain of the protective line of a stream, and the respite of a day during which reinforcements might have come up, as they finally did, just too late. But the tenacity of Pope did not even permit him to think of retreating. He had no conception of the philosophy embodied in the common phrase, "*reculer pour mieux sauter.*" He actually thought, as his despatch to General Halleck shows, that he had gained a victory, and laid out his plans for cutting off the enemy's retreat on the following day.

The battle of the following day was, as has been noted, fought on essentially the same ground as that of the day before. The Confederates arranged their line of battle conformably to the conditions introduced by the struggle of the day before and to their plan of operations for the present one. Lee's forces were now all up, except, of course, those marching from distant Hanover Junction, the division of General R. H. Anderson having reached the ground the preceding night, the 29th of August. Lee in person had been present since the morning of that day, since the time when the advance of Longstreet had arrived. Yet Pope continued to be fully persuaded, from the movements of the enemy, that he was preparing to make his escape, and had issued an order for pursuit. But while preparations were making on the plan of an advance which was to cut off and pursue the enemy, suddenly, on the Federal left, it was discovered by Reynolds that, so far from the enemy's being in the posi-

tion from which he was by orders to be driven, he was quietly stealing around in force, under cover of the woods, south of the Warrenton turnpike, on the left flank of the Federal troops. In consequence, that portion of the formation which had been made to sweep supposititiously everything before it, north and south of the turnpike (Porter on the right, then Hatch, and then Reynolds, on the left), had to be modified at once, from the necessity imposed upon Reynolds of facing to the left, to meet the imminent danger of being enveloped on his flank. So much for the situation on the Federal left flank is sufficient for the present to be said. The right wing, beginning at the right of Porter, who had escaped from his position of the day before, like that of a ship "in irons," able at first to turn in no definite way, was composed of the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, supported by the division of Ricketts. Reno was also there, and part of Sigel's troops and Sykes's regulars.

Porter, on the right, about four o'clock in the afternoon, attacked the position of Jackson with the brigades of General James Barnes and General Daniel Butterfield, of General G. W. Morrill's division. Hatch attacked the same line, further to the right. Sykes's regulars on the right were fortunately held in reserve, for later in the day their freshness was all needed. Both attacks were splendidly made and pressed Jackson home, but he had a terrible advantage in position. Despite that, however, he sent to Lee for reinforcements, who, in turn, ordered Longstreet to send them. Longstreet, however, recognized, from the relation of his point of the field to that occupied by Jackson, that reinforcements of the kind which he was ordered to despatch were not necessary. It is rare, indeed, on any hilly ground of various accidents of surface, that some point cannot be found (indeed impossible on any but a right-line of defence) which will enfilade with its guns placed there a long

stretch of entrenchment of its own side. Where Longstreet was, on the Confederate right, there were numerous tops of hills on which it was advantageous for that purpose to plant artillery, and he had stationed some guns most favorably to sweep Jackson's front. Consequently, Longstreet answered substantially, that he would bring all requisite succor to Jackson with his guns. But for these guns, in the position which they occupied, the Federal attack on the enemy's left wing would have been successful.

It was Lee's knowledge that the Federal right was beating itself in vain against the impregnable barrier of Jackson's position, that withheld him for a while from making an attack on the Federal left, which could have had but the effect of bringing on a contest in that part of the field before his formation there was fully completed.

Pope's main attack on the right was the only serious one there, some of Hooker's troops merely demonstrating against and driving away the enemy on the extreme right flank. As for Kearny and Ricketts, who were, on Pope's theory of Jackson's intended retreat, and according to his plans to attack on Jackson's extreme left flank, on the Haymarket road (a road running nearly parallel with the Warrenton turnpike), they were withdrawn to the south of the turnpike, to meet the enemy's movement on the Federal left, dispositions for making which Lee had been perfecting while the Federal right was furiously engaged in assaulting Jackson. The situation was now complicated by an order from Pope to Reynolds, on the left flank, to reinforce Porter, near the centre, opposite Jackson. Now, as has been shown, attacking Jackson entailed a useless sacrifice of life, and he had proved it. It was too critical a moment on the Federal left to withdraw troops from it, even for the purpose of holding Jackson in check, if he should advance as a diversion for Lee's attempt on the left. The consequences

would be immediate and far-reaching. To countervail them in a measure, Sykes let Colonel G. K. Warren march with his brigade to the left, to supply the place of the troops which Reynolds had been ordered to withdraw and had withdrawn thence to reinforce Porter.

At last the Confederates, having completed their formation on the Federal left, while demonstration and assault had been going on against Jackson's safe position, and while the greater part of the Federal force was north of the Warrenton turnpike, Longstreet's line, massed for assault, revealed itself pressing forward from south of the turnpike on the Federal left, from the woods already mentioned as towards the southward. There was still some time for preparation for the Army of Virginia to meet this movement. Although Longstreet was rapidly approaching, nearly at right-angles to the turnpike, on the left flank of the Federal army, with five divisions,—those of Anderson, Evans, Kemper, Jones, and Wilcox,—in columns stretching from opposite Groveton to opposite a road east of it leading to Sudley Springs, a road running north and south between Bald Hill and the Henry House hill, two eminences about a mile apart, on the left flank of the Federal army, there was still some precious time available to organize a strong defence along the line of the Warrenton turnpike and on the two hills south of it, an imaginary line between which hills runs parallel with the turnpike. The Federal field-batteries swarmed to the newly-created front, and with infantry supports held the ground near the turnpike. Sigel's corps, which had not been engaged, occupied Bald Hill, on which two brigades of Ricketts's division were also posted, under General Zealous B. Tower. Upon the other eminence, the Henry House hill, were directed, first, the two brigades of Reynolds, and then the two brigades of Sykes's regulars, the former commanded by Meade and General

Seymour, and the latter by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert C. Buchanan.

Jackson, partially relieved of the pressure upon him, had begun to advance from north of the turnpike, in concert with Longstreet on his right, but was held in check by Reno and Heintzelman. The enemy was unable to dislodge the forces on the general line dominated by the two naturally strong twin positions of Bald Hill and the Henry House hill, first assaulting the former, with such ill success that Hood had to await reinforcements. Here fell several men of note among the killed and wounded. The attack on the Henry House hill was equally severe, but was repulsed with success even greater than that which had attended the attack on Bald Hill. The loss on both sides was very great. Finally, the continual reinforcements by the enemy of the troops attacking Bald Hill compelled its relinquishment. But not so with the Henry House hill. The key to the whole position, the key to the whole situation, lay in the remaining *point d'appui*, the Henry House hill, the very hill which had figured so prominently in the first battle of Bull Run. Sykes, with his regulars; Seymour and Meade, with their brigades; Lieutenant-Colonels William Chapman and Buchanan, with all the troops that could be hastily gathered for its defence, were assembled there. Mass and assault and strive as the enemy would, he made but little progress against a desperation of defence which every officer present knew to mean, as a consequence of its failure, the rout of the Army of Virginia. As the event proved, this key of the position remained at nightfall in the hands of the Federal army, and it was, in consequence, enabled quietly to make a retreat behind Bull Run.

It can hardly be doubted that, if Halleck and McClellan had not proved unequal to the emergency, the corps of

General E. V. Sumner and that of General W. B. Franklin,—the Second and Sixth,—would have reached General Pope before the 30th of August, the day of the last battle, instead of reaching him the day afterwards. It can therefore also hardly be doubted that, as those two corps consisted together of about twenty thousand men, the scale would have been turned by their presence in General Pope's favor. If, however, it must be repeated, Pope had only fallen back behind Bull Run to the position at Centreville, instead of fighting on the 30th of August, Sumner and Franklin would still have been in time, despite the dilatoriness of Halleck and McClellan, to compel Lee's retreat or to be the added means of defeating him.

The Army of Virginia nearing Centreville, after having crossed Bull Run, the indefatigable Jackson was the next day started by Lee for Sudley Ford, on the upper part of Bull Run, on the right of the Army of Virginia, and struck opposite to it one of the main roads that lead to Alexandria, the Little River turnpike. Marching for Fairfax Court House, while Pope's trains were still making for Centreville by the Warrenton turnpike, and seeking to pass the point of intersection of the two roads, he found himself confronted about dark by heavy masses of troops with which he had been engaged the day before, and which had been advanced to prevent the retreat from being intercepted, and the battle of Chantilly began amidst a tremendous thunderstorm. Here his usual good fortune deserted him, and, after losing heavily in killed and wounded, he was brought to a stand, night preventing both sides from taking in the precise situation of affairs. Before morning Longstreet reached the ground, the Confederate plan having been to break up the communications with Washington by flanking the Federal right. As the best possible course to pursue under the circumstances, it was resolved by the authorities

in Washington to call the troops within the defences of the city, and they were accordingly so disposed of on the 2d of September. Besides serious losses in rank and file at Chantilly, two officers of exceptional merit were there killed on the Federal side, Stevens and Kearny. It is grievous to contemplate the necessity of omitting in this memoir all that pure justice would, if untramelled by material bonds, award in mention of merit and sacrifice; but as a hundred such books as the one here contemplated would not suffice to fulfil the wish, it must meet the fate which lies beyond the bounds of the possible. It need hardly be said, moreover, that this work is for a single purpose, to which all else should be subordinated. General Meade did not appear more conspicuously on these particular fields than did many another officer, not so much so as some other officers, and yet all that precedes and is yet to follow chiefly relates, and should relate, to the trace which his presence makes as an episode, great and small, of the war, in a memoir which professes to be devoted to him.

On August 21st, at 10 P.M., General Meade had left Falmouth with his brigade as part of the division of Reynolds, and had marched thence towards Barnett's Ford on the Rappahannock, making but slight progress on account of the darkness of the night and uncertainty as to the road. Continuing the march on the following day, the command reached Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, on the 23d, bivouacking for the night near Warrenton. On the 28th the brigade, while on the march, took some slight part in what finally drifted into the action at Gainesville. On the 29th it was formed in line of battle on the left of Sigel, and joined in the battle at Groveton. On the 30th, the day of the second battle of Bull Run, the brigade advanced along the Warrenton turnpike in line of

battle, occupying a ridge in advance, until withdrawn by orders of the general-commanding to the ridge behind it, from which it had advanced in the morning. About 3 P.M. of that day, Reynolds, under orders from Pope, moved almost entirely across the field of battle, from the south to the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, to reinforce Porter, which his division had no sooner done than it was ordered to march back to the plateau of the Henry House, on account of the pressure of the enemy on the Federal left. There Meade's brigade, in conjunction with Seymour's, deployed in line of battle, and charged down the slope of the Henry House ridge towards the Sudley Springs road, driving before it such portions of the Confederates as had advanced beyond that road, and finally taking position in the road and holding it at that point until relieved by Sykes's regulars under Buchanan. General Meade says, in his official report, with relation to this part of the action, that "it is due to the Pennsylvania Reserves to say, that this charge and maintenance of this position was made at a most critical period of the day."

It was at this critical period of the day, when, if the Pennsylvania Reserves had not repulsed the enemy and compelled him to take shelter temporarily in the woods, the enemy might, as General Meade says, have gained the Henry House ridge, which, as General Meade adds, "might have materially altered the fortune of the day;" that Buchanan's brigade of regulars came up, none too quickly, to reinforce them. McDowell was accused by General R. H. Milroy of refusing to send reinforcements. McDowell claimed, in justification, that in the excitement Milroy had lost his head, or, as he expressed it, "was in a frenzy," and made no communication of the sort upon which he would have been justified in sending him reinforcements. And, McDowell went on to say, before the

court of inquiry in which the case was tried, "whilst in doubt for the moment, in view of the circumstances, as to the course to be taken, I received a clear and definite message from that intelligent, as well as gallant officer, General Meade, on which I knew I could rely, and immediately sent the reinforcements forward."

The fact is most moderately stated by General Meade when he said that but for the Pennsylvania Reserves, at this critical juncture, the fortunes of the day might have been materially altered. The advance of the enemy was very confident, and the ensuing conflict very hot. Here "Old Baldy," the horse which bore the General through many a fight, received one of his wounds. The worst of the disasters of the campaign were now over. Lee's army as well as Pope's had suffered severely. Pope's had lacked that strategic and tactical mastery, and that subtle bond between chief and troops which make them, as has been already remarked, like a single organism of the highest type, in which the directive intelligence permeates the body to parts of the lowest rank. The Army of Virginia, like the leviathan attacked by the skilful swordsmen of the sea, had fruitlessly floundered without direction, and had finally sunk into unknown depths out of the sight of men. But only so in appearance, only so as to visible presence, for soon, with parts restored and reincorporated, it issued forth as the Army of the Potomac, not invincible, but with honor untarnished, and, as ever, amid all scenes of disaster, in spirit unsubdued.

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

THE various phases of mental tone which General McClellan exhibited to credible witnesses who were actors with him in the drama of the war, and perhaps, still more, the record which he himself has left in writing, in the form of despatches, private letters, and other documents, show him to have been a man without the poise that is capable of directing to great deeds. At first, amidst the universal acceptance of him on credit by the North, as possessing all the attributes needed for success in command of the armies of the United States, his mental attitude was arrogant. Put to the actual test of war, and suspicions of his shortcomings for his task beginning to invade the sober common sense of the people, not to be in the long run deceived as to what concerns them nearly, some abatement of this arrogance became perceptible, although he still had so false a view of his relations as a military man to the civil power, that he could reconcile himself to writing to the President a letter unprecedented in its assumption of ability to counsel in a sphere the threshold of which he should not have touched. There was, at this time, however, more moderation observable than had been exhibited previously. He no longer exactly admonished, but rather deprecated the conduct of affairs. At this point of time he scarcely doubted that his army would be withdrawn from the Peninsula, and he feared, from news that he had lately received, that he would be superseded. When the army had been withdrawn, and he had reached Alexan-

dria, he evidently thought for some time that his occupation had gone, and he entered upon a new mood, unknown to him before, in which he answered a despatch from the President—"Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give," etc.

This moderate frame of mind soon ceased, however, as the following brief account, cited from his own memoirs, proves. According to them he went out on the road towards the front to meet the retreating troops of Pope, under an order from the President to command the fortifications and the troops for the defence of Washington. He meets pretty soon a regiment of cavalry, marching by twos, with Pope and McDowell and their staffs "sandwiched," he says, between them. "Pope," he remarks, "had evidently not troubled his head in the slightest about the movements of his army in retreat, and had early preceded the troops, leaving them to get out of the scrape as best they could." A former suggestion of McClellan's in writing, that Pope should be allowed to get out of his "scrape" as best he could, had been justly the subject of a good deal of animadversion, and yet he here repeats it with gusto. In saying what he does as to the retreat, he fails to see the comparison which he has conjured up, for he too attended to the last of his own retreat in a casual way. The likeness between the two cases is not perfect, however, for there was no such urgency of the enemy in Pope's case as in his own. "Pope and McDowell," he goes on to say, "asked my permission to go to Washington, to which I assented, remarking at the same time that *I* [italicized] was going to the artillery-firing." Evidently some kind power had never conferred upon him the "giftie," for here he did not perceive the difference in their favor, the difference, when there was really no great danger,

between a man fresh and *débonnaire*, and two battle-worn men seeking some repose. Why, at that very moment the troops were retiring into the fortifications on the opposite side of the Potomac from Washington, under orders which General Halleck had sent, and which McClellan himself had repeated as to the different corps with reference to their respective dispositions on the ground! Nothing, therefore, could be more disingenuous than this statement, nor more unkind than the way in which it gloats over the misfortunes of Pope and McDowell.

The horn of McClellan was now again evidently exalted to the highest pitch. All was to his mind changed. The President had orally requested him to take command of the defences and of the troops for the defence of Washington, and he, having consented, had followed the action by a formal order to that effect, which, by the way, was afterwards modified to the form of transmission by the War Department. Why the President should have "requested," instead of "ordered," McClellan does not state. Nor does McClellan state why he thought it proper to take credit to himself for acceding to the President's request without making any conditions. His feeling is explicable only on the supposition that he had now again resumed the mental attitude which had suffered eclipse for a moment, only to reappear under the circumstances of his renewed conviction of his indispensability. When he reached the point of highest self-satisfaction, however, was yet to come, as he reveals in his memoirs, when, as he says, although not reappointed to the command of the army, and although knowing that he would fight with a halter around his neck, he yet, because the path of duty was clear, left his card at the White House, the War Office, and Secretary Seward's house, with P. P. C. written on it, and marched with the army. The path of duty, it would seem, might have been otherwise followed

with greater propriety. The state of affairs was all wrong, if the circumstances which General McClellan describes could be. Accepting them, however, exactly as reported by himself, the point remains as before, simply with regard to his relation to events, as limned by his own hand, from his modest reply at Alexandria, through his meeting with Pope and McDowell, through his self-gratulation at having made no conditions with the President, through his final leave-taking of P. P. C.; and it is not pleasant to reflect that such things under the administration of a great government could be.

The truth, without gloss, is that he was right in thinking that he was at the time indispensable to the Administration. The Administration had nowhere else to turn to obtain a general who could properly supersede him. The winnowing process, at enormous cost of blood and treasure, had not gone on long enough to reveal to the Administration the men who were finally to conduct affairs to a successful issue. Mr. Lincoln had no knowledge of military affairs. Strange to say, Halleck, too, fell as to them far below the standard which his natural parts and training would seem to have indicated as reached by him. What might be called Halleck's civil administration of his military department in the West was excellent, but whether he came to devise military operations at a distance, or himself personally took charge of them in the field, he appeared in the full incapacity of his character. Moreover, one of the chief elements of chieftainship in any sphere being recognition and employment of signal talent within that sphere, he proved himself wanting in original perception of it. He did all he could in the West to suppress Grant, and he was at first completely deceived by Pope, who deceived scarcely anybody else among military men. The fault in him lay in defect of character. He was a ponderous-minded, ease-loving man, oppressed with a sense of his greatness, vacil-

lating, and utterly unfit for the direction of military affairs in the urgency of field-operations.

McClellan was doubly proved right in thinking that he was indispensable, because, in addition to the President's having nowhere else to look to replace him, he still had the confidence of the rank and file of the army, although some of the higher officers had lost it, and thinking men among civilians who had closely watched the progress of events were sorely disappointed in him. As for his having left Washington in command of the army with a halter around his neck, should he lose in the approaching contest, that is the most vapid statement, unworthy of a man of ordinary intelligence. The very memoirs in which are printed those lines gave his correspondence with the War Department as the army was marching to battle; it is also necessarily part of the public records, and it constitutes, however acquired, the fullest recognition of his command.

The Army of Virginia ceased to exist save by incarnation with the Army of the Potomac. Pope had written Halleck, on September 5th, "I have just received an order from General McClellan to have my command in readiness to march with three days' rations, and further details of the march. What is my command, and where is it? McClellan has scattered it about in all directions, and has not informed me of the position of a single regiment. Am I to take the field, and under McClellan's orders?" To which Halleck replied, on September 5th, "The armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report for orders to the Secretary of War." The Army of the Potomac, revived, with dismembered limbs restored, remained within the defensive works of Washington, or within supporting distance, while the enemy, victorious over Pope, waited expectantly on the Virginia side of the Potomac for the longed-for opportunity of administering to it a final blow.

In many respects McClellan is seen to better advantage in the ensuing campaign than in any of his previous operations with the Army of the Potomac. He is still, however, overmastered by his constitutional slowness and caution. He remarks, in the part of his memoirs relating to this campaign, that he had known Lee in Mexico, and that he was a man, pitted against whom it behooved one to be very wary. But he could not see,—the man sitting in judgment upon matter of his own subjectivity,—he could not judge correctly, of himself or of Lee's view with regard to him, which, of necessity, would shape in a measure Lee's action. Doubtless he seemed to himself in that campaign as indulging in a celerity, all the way through it, that bordered on rashness. So erroneously guided, it would not occur to him that, Lee having also known him, Lee's point of view might be very different about him from his own. Still, if McClellan could not rise above the defects inherent in his organization, he did now seem to act for the first time as if spurred on by better appreciation than before of the difficulty of the task committed to him. He now appears more than before *en évidence* in the midst of things, directly controlling them to a greater extent than before, although not with the masterful mind of a great general. It should be remembered, however, that as to the first part of these operations he was hampered by Halleck. Halleck himself, the slowest of the slow in field operations, as those which he had personally conducted in the West prove, kept nagging at McClellan through despatches from Washington, cautioning him against letting the enemy slip in between him and Washington, across the upper fords of the Potomac, or leading him so far away from the city, before he could know that Lee's forces were really massed to invade Maryland, and his apparent movement not a mere feint, that the city might be captured by attack from the

direction of Arlington Heights across the Potomac. Yet, afterwards, in despite of the despatches proving this conclusively, Halleck testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that his action had not been that described. It undoubtedly was, as any one may see from examination of those despatches, and with knowledge of the existing situation. So much less speed than requisite in the first advance as would otherwise be properly ascribable to McClellan may therefore be justly charged to the action of Halleck. From that time on, however, to the end of the campaign, with the exception of the episode of the battle of South Mountain, the dilatoriness with which it was conducted belongs wholly to McClellan, and under circumstances, too, where, if he could have sat in consultation with Lee, he could not have been better prepared to act with the utmost precision and celerity. Had he so acted, the folly committed by Halleck in attempting to hold Harper's Ferry without properly defending it, after it was known that the enemy was in Maryland, might have been more than counterbalanced by an overwhelming defeat administered to Lee.

As the result of the whole campaign turned upon the attempted retention of Harper's Ferry, it becomes necessary here to discuss the bearing which its topographical situation had upon all the operations, inclusive of the battle of Antietam. Harper's Ferry was called the key of the Shenandoah Valley, but it became a key in the possession of the enemy from the time when the enemy got on the wrong side of the door, or, in other words, from the time when the position was turned by the enemy's invasion of Maryland, because it was indefensible, or rather undefended from that direction. This will easily be comprehended from the following description. The Blue Ridge trends about northeast. As it comes from the south it strikes the

Potomac three or four miles above the place whence it departs from the other side of the Potomac as it still proceeds northeast. The two lines, although virtually forming the same ridge, are not continuous, but parallel. The two parts of the same main ridge are therefore, as divided by the Potomac, *en échelon* with each other. South of the Potomac the ridge is known as the Blue Ridge, while north of the Potomac it is known as the Blue Ridge or the South Mountain. The particular line which we have now, however, immediately to consider (for the other relates to prospective operations) is the straight one formed by the Blue Ridge as it strikes the Potomac, coming from the south, and its development beyond for a few miles in the same straight line, north of the Potomac, in a minor ridge called Elk Ridge. It is through these straight and moderately lofty ridges, formed by the Blue Mountains and Elk Ridge, that the Shenandoah, having joined its stream with the Potomac's, they together burst their way, and thence flow onward with commingled waters. Within the area, making a tongue of high land, formed by the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah, lies the post and village of Harper's Ferry. It therefore lies just west of the ridge constituted by the line of the Blue Ridge and its continuation as Elk Ridge north of the Potomac. High as it is, it is, however, completely dominated by the summit where the Blue Ridge abuts on the Potomac, known as Loudon Heights, and still more completely by the summit where Elk Ridge abuts on the Potomac, called Maryland Heights, while to the westward of it, without the intervention of a stream, is a long spur called Bolivar Heights, parallel with the aforesaid ridges, which heights also dominate the position, and which, although slightly fortified, could avail little against investment from that side, and nothing if Loudon and Maryland Heights were held by the enemy.

By three nearly equiangular lines of attack, comprising the circle, Harper's Ferry was liable to capture; two, by plunging fire from Loudon and Maryland Heights, and one by regular approaches from the west; under the condition that the enemy, in the undefended state of Maryland Heights, had turned the position by entering Maryland by crossing the Potomac immediately above the post. The lion-ant, one of the fiercest and most voracious of all living insects, makes a circular hole with sloping sides, and invites his prey to slide into it and be demolished, as it invariably is; but then he is sure that his enemy will put himself within his grasp; but here, at Harper's Ferry, in civilized warfare, this case of necessity was reversed, and the garrison was placed in a hole just where the enemy would have put it, and could have no option but to surrender at discretion.

General McClellan strongly represented to Halleck that Harper's Ferry should be evacuated. The post was not tenable without the occupation of Maryland Heights in force, and besides, its evacuation would contribute several thousand men to the active army. It was in vain that this representation was made. General Halleck directed Colonel Dixon S. Miles, the commander of the post, to hold it. Thus far Halleck was responsible, and perhaps beyond, for he neglected to order Miles how to hold it, and Miles unfortunately construed his instructions almost literally, as meaning occupation of the very ground called Harper's Ferry. Lee had been so sure that the post would be evacuated, that he took it for granted it had been, and his army was massed in Maryland before he found out that it had been neither evacuated nor properly put in a posture of defence, and he then set vigorously to work about reaping the fruit of his adversary's folly. The swift-footed Achilles of his army, Jackson, taking his own three divisions, A. P.

Hill's, Starke's, and Lawton's, and those of Lafayette McLaws and Richard H. Anderson, passed rapidly to the rear by forced marches. Jackson personally, with A. P. Hill, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, the garrison at Martinsburg retreating before him into Harper's Ferry, and invested the post from the west, while McLaws, with Anderson, held Crampton's Gap and Brownsville Gap, just south of it, and occupied Maryland Heights, General J. G. Walker conducting two brigades across the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and occupying Loudon Heights. Thus they held the post completely in their power unless it were quickly relieved.

McClellan advanced north on three main and two subsidiary roads from Washington towards Frederick, with his corps spread out within easy supporting distances of one another, covering Washington and Baltimore. His right rested at first on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and his left, strongly picketed by cavalry, was thrown out to guard the fords between his left flank and Washington, lest the enemy should interpose by crossing the Potomac between him and the city. The right wing, consisting of the First Corps and the Ninth Corps, was commanded by General Burnside; the centre, consisting of the Second Corps and the Twelfth Corps, was commanded by General Sumner; and the left wing, consisting only of the Sixth Corps, was commanded by General Franklin. The division of Couch, of the Second Corps, which finally joined Franklin, was on the extreme left flank. It will be remembered by the reader that two of the corps of the old Army of the Potomac, the Second and the Sixth, had not reached Pope in time for the series of battles in which he had lately been engaged.

It is true, as alleged, that the reorganization of the army had to be partially accomplished during the march, but, on

the other hand, it ought to be remembered at the same time that, when the final collision occurred between the armies, Lee had less than forty thousand men, and McClellan had over eighty thousand. That, with this enormous preponderance of force in his favor, the result of the final battle should have been what it was, with such able officers for the most part, and with such brave troops as McClellan had, must be ascribed to poor generalship, and the justness of this conclusion will be fully borne out by consideration of the sequence of events.

On the 12th of September the advance of the right wing entered Frederick, after a skirmish with the cavalry rear-guard of Lee's army, and on the 13th the whole right wing and centre reached that town. There, on the night of the 13th, the main body remained halted, Franklin well off to the left at Buckeystown, and General Couch further still, at Licksville, near where the Monocacy enters the Potomac, while General Jesse L. Reno was heading for Middletown, and General Alfred Pleasanton's cavalry had about noon dislodged Stuart from the pass he was holding in the Catoctin Range, the range east of and parallel to South Mountain, west of which range lies Middletown. The general direction of the army marching on Frederick from Washington was north of northeast. The direction of its continued line of advance, after leaving Frederick, is indicated by saying that, in taking a slight left-wheel, it was brought parallel with the line of South Mountain, through which are the passes by which it had to continue its further manœuvres.

McClellan had reached Frederick to have put in his possession, through the most extraordinary good fortune, a piece of information to which allusion has previously been made as such that it was equivalent to his having been in counsel with Lee himself. It comes within that class to which Hirtius, in his account of Cæsar's conduct of the

Alexandrian War, refers in the passage in which he says, "The nature of the ground giving a great advantage, contributed to by the favor of the immortal gods, who, entering as they do into all warlike events, especially do so in those for which no possible calculation can be made." He refers to an incident where the enemy had, to the astonishment of Cæsar, blindly surrendered all the advantage he had had in position, Cæsar instantly taking advantage of the mistake and putting him to utter rout. On the afternoon of the 13th, a private of Indiana volunteers discovered in or near Frederick, for the locality is disputed, a paper enclosing three segars. But the paper was no ordinary wrapper; it was a copy of an order to General D. H. Hill, which revealed Lee's designs through a general order giving his new plan of campaign. Its presence, as found, has been satisfactorily explained from Confederate sources of information by the statement that Hill received, and had still in his possession, the same order from Jackson, sent to him under the impression that Hill still belonged to his command, whereas the lost and found order was from Lee's own headquarters, sent to Hill as being directly under Lee's command, and how lost will probably never be known. The lost order reached McClellan immediately, and infused new life into the whole movement of advance. In the hands of a commander of the first class the knowledge conveyed by the order would have been tantamount to overwhelming the Confederate army, but in McClellan's it only modified somewhat the current of events. The advance had reached Frederick only to learn that Lee had begun to evacuate it two days before, and had retired westward over the mountains. The reason of this sudden retrograde movement, and at least temporary abandonment by Lee of his plan of invading Maryland, and possibly Pennsylvania, had turned upon his having suddenly become

aware of the fact that Harper's Ferry had not been evacuated. The general order, now in the hands of McClellan, represented in all necessary details the plan of campaign by which Lee had modified his original plan of invasion.

Lee's original plan of campaign is well condensed in the following passages quoted from his official report of the operations at South Mountain and Antietam :—

"It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-fields. Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into Western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond through the Shenandoah Valley, and by threatening Pennsylvania induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies."

He goes on to speak, as follows, of the modification of the plan brought about by the Federal neglect to evacuate the positions on his line of communication :

"It had been supposed that the advance upon Fredericktown [Frederick] would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from those positions before concentrating the army west [east] of the mountains. To accomplish this with the least delay, General Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg, and after driving the enemy from that place to move down the south side of the Potomac upon Harper's Ferry," etc.

Lee would not, if it were avoidable, run the risk of leaving Harper's Ferry, garrisoned by several thousand men, in the rear of an advance by which his line of supply by the Shenandoah Valley would be flanked ; and he could, while preventing that, incidentally make prisoners of the garrison of Harper's Ferry, simply by taking a post invit-

ing easy capture. So he had at once begun to carry out the plan, the success of which has already been strongly implied by the description of the positions in which the present narrative has left Jackson and his lieutenants.

Lee was not astonished at the sudden conversion of what one of his staff afterwards wrote of as "the snail-like slowness" of the pursuit into a rapid movement towards South Mountain. Before daylight of the 14th a zealous partisan of the Southern cause, who had learned of the finding of the lost order, had made his way to the cavalry rear-guard of Lee, under J. E. B. Stuart, and the intelligence that he brought was forwarded to Lee. Before that time, however, Lee had been informed by Stuart of the vigorous manner in which McClellan was pushing forward towards South Mountain from Frederick. He ordered Longstreet, with whom he was near Hagerstown, to reinforce D. H. Hill at Boonsboro', west of Turner's Gap of South Mountain. All that the knowledge of McClellan's being in possession of the lost order advantaged Lee was in making him aware that now, if ever, McClellan would display energy. There had, however, been brought from that into the situation great difference in McClellan's favor, in the knowledge of just how many divisions Lee had with him and how many were absent at Harper's Ferry. But that knowledge, which would have been of immense value to an active general, proved to be of no use to him. The mere fact of the siege had been known long before the finding of the order, from the firing heard in the direction of Harper's Ferry, to which McClellan was responding, to let the garrison know that he was approaching. Manœuvres and encounters occurred as the result of the present and pending dispositions of the troops of the respective armies, almost exactly the same as though Lee had not written General Order No. 191, and McClellan therefore could not have it in his pos-

session. The important, outstanding, unknown quantity was the amount of speed that McClellan would exhibit, and for at least a few hours fear as to this must have made Lee very uneasy, with his knowledge of the power that McClellan had in his hands through an extraordinary incident in war. With Lee were now only the two divisions of Longstreet near Hagerstown, under General John B. Hood and General Jones, and the division of D. H. Hill, with some of Stuart's cavalry. With only three divisions with him, and five away beyond supporting distance, more than half his army, the enemy had suddenly become alert and vigorous. The tables had been fairly turned. While he had awaited the return of Jackson, he had moved with Longstreet's two divisions towards Hagerstown, and D. H. Hill, with his division and a force of cavalry, had been left to hold Boonsboro', west of Turner's Gap. Lee had not expected to be obliged to defend Turner's Gap against McClellan. Hill's force had been left at Boonsboro', in charge of the reserve-artillery and some of the trains, merely to guard against the escape of the garrison from Harper's Ferry in that direction. The moment, however, that Lee, in the night of the 13th, learned that McClellan was approaching the South Mountain Range with unwonted rapidity, he had ordered back Longstreet's two divisions from Hagerstown to reinforce Hill. If some hours could not be gained before McClellan should debouch to the westward of the pass, Lee would be hopelessly cut off from Jackson investing Harper's Ferry.

As the progress of the campaign continues to hinge on the incidents of the siege of Harper's Ferry, involving the absence of a large part of Lee's army, it is unavoidable to treat first of events relating to the attack on and attempted relief of the post. Halleck had had the fatuity to withhold from McClellan until the 12th of September control of the

garrison of the post. When, too late, he did authorize it, McClellan's left wing had advanced so far that the best chance to relieve the post was through Crampton's Gap, five miles in the rear of Maryland Heights. Even supposing, however, that McClellan could earlier have directed Franklin on the position by the road close to the left shore of the Potomac, it would have been impossible on those steep banks to deploy his force, and the position would have put him out of all proper relation to the main body of the army. The true plan to relieve Harper's Ferry, as the case both now and just before stood, in an emergency which ought not to have been allowed to arise, was the one which McClellan was prosecuting, by pushing Franklin through Crampton's Gap, whence he could descend into Pleasant Valley, between South Mountain and Elk Ridge, on which was Maryland Heights, occupied by the enemy, whom he might be able to dislodge.

Crampton's Gap and Brownsville Gap, just south of it, through the latter of which passes McLaws and Anderson had entered Pleasant Valley, were held by detachments from their troops, afterwards reinforced, consisting in sum of the brigades of Cobb, William Mahone, and P. J. Semmes. McLaws had, on the 13th, summarily put an end to the occupation of Maryland Heights by the two thousand troops sent there by Colonel Miles, which troops, having no confidence in their ability to hold their ground against two Confederate divisions, had made only a brief resistance, and had spiked their guns and tumbled them down the mountain-side, McLaws hauling some of his guns up the steep and occupying the deserted position, looking down from his eyrie on an extended scene below, across the Potomac and Shenandoah, where his allies were about to take position, and the enemy's works were within easy cannon-range, and almost under plunging musketry-fire.

The question pending is a nice one. Franklin bespeaks the attention of the enemy, now reinforced, at Crampton's and Brownsville Gaps, only five miles up Pleasant Valley. Will Harper's Ferry surrender before Franklin can break through the passes? If he can break through them before that can happen, is he strong enough to prevent two divisions of the enemy from still holding Maryland Heights and assisting in the capture of Harper's Ferry? Or, supposing that he is not strong enough for that, is he strong enough to thwart them, after the post is captured, in attempting to join Lee by marching directly northward through Pleasant Valley? McLaws well knew, and speedily he must have signalled the fact to Jackson, Hill, and Walker, on Bolivar and Loudon Heights, that the enemy was trying to break through the gaps in his rear. That meant to them that, for some inexplicable reason, McClellan's whole force was abreast of the passes along South Mountain, and that Lee and they were all in jeopardy. Soon Jackson learned it by couriers from Lee himself. Would Harper's Ferry surrender in time to enable the besiegers to rejoin Lee before McClellan would confront him? If they should raise the siege at once and march forthwith to join Lee, then all their labors would have been in vain. If they could consummate their design within a few hours, then by forced marches they could concentrate, but not before McClellan did. But, succeed or fail, their march could not be postponed more than a very few hours, or their army would be fatally divided, because Lee's fraction of it would be destroyed.

This was the situation. The chief element entering into it was time, the importance of which Lee and Jackson so thoroughly appreciated, the importance of which they seemed also to have been able to infuse into all who came under their command. This same element was that which

McClellan least regarded. Preparation he dealt with as if with an isolated fact having little or no relation to time, not seeming to feel that, inasmuch as in war an adversary is concerned, all preparation concerns not time in general, but that special interval of time which is utilizable by the enemy as well as by one's self; that in opposing armies success in preparation is simply relative, and that to seek beyond a certain point to be ready is to confer upon the enemy, through incidental consumption of time, the preponderance of advantage. Had Jackson been pitted against Lee, instead of fighting on his side, he would not have stayed an hour at Harper's Ferry after he knew that Lee, in McClellan's place, had reached the eastern slopes of South Mountain; but knowing that they had to deal with McClellan, and he pitted directly against Lee, he held on for a few hours longer, during which he heard from Lee, instead of having marched away with his divisions by night.

The reader cannot fail, after the minute description given, to have in his mind's eye the topography of Harper's Ferry, the positions of Jackson's troops with reference to it, and the position of McClellan's left wing, under Franklin, with reference to them. But there has not yet been presented the wherewithal to enable him to orient himself with relation to the whole zone of operations in which the movements of the two armies are taking place. From Harper's Ferry, then, as the point of departure, imagine the Potomac to have, except as to its slight but abrupt windings, a northwestwardly course, and the range of South Mountain to be distant from it at the river only about five miles, but at a point eleven miles up the river to be distant from it about nine miles, which would make, as in fact it does, the general direction of the range north-northeast. It is near this point on the range, eleven miles off from the Potomac in a north-northeast direction, and nine in an east direction, that Lee

in person is holding the passes of Turner's and Fox's Gaps, which McClellan is about to assault.

It is the 14th of September. Jackson has been gone from Lee four days. He had started on the 10th, and had expected to capture Harper's Ferry on the morning of the 13th. His troops are in the position described with reference to Harper's Ferry. Franklin is in the position described with reference to Jackson, or, more precisely, with reference to Jackson's lieutenant, McLaws. But Franklin alone is not breasting the eastern side of South Mountain. McClellan's advance is at Fox's and Turner's Gaps, about six miles above Crampton's Gap. If McClellan break through, he will have only seven miles from the western base of the mountains to march to reach Antietam Creek, an affluent of the Potomac, circling around in the same general direction, behind which Lee will take refuge to concentrate his forces. Jackson's divisions, each depending upon its particular position, will have to march from twelve to fifteen miles to rejoin Lee; unless in one case, the one that Franklin cannot bar the way to McLaws seeking to march directly north to a junction with Lee by the way of Pleasant Valley.

By the morning of the 14th, the Ninth Corps, under General Reno, and by the afternoon, the First Corps, under the command of General Hooker, both nominally under the command of General Burnside, respectively arrived at the base of South Mountain. The Ninth Corps brought up opposite Fox's Gap, a minor pass, and the First Corps to the right of Turner's Gap, the main pass, about a mile north of Fox's Gap. Reno, arriving on the left, dislodged the Confederates under D. H. Hill from the first ridge at Fox's Gap, but could not at first proceed beyond. The pass to the right, however, was the more important one of the two, on account of the roads leading through it. The

range of South Mountain here attains an elevation of a thousand feet. The pass called Turner's Gap sinks into it to the depth of four hundred feet on the main, or National Road, which leads directly, in an almost undeviating line, from Frederick on the east to Boonsboro' on the west of the mountains. At the east base of South Mountain the old Hagerstown Road, departing from the National Road, swings around a mile or so to the right and re-enters the National Road at right-angles, between two elongated tops of the mountain-range, at the summit of Turner's Gap. Whatever force adequate to hold it captures the high rugged top on the east of the depression through which this road reaches at right-angles the summit of the Gap, commands the Gap, by commanding not only the National Road, but the old Hagerstown Road where it runs north and south through the depression.

To the right of the pass, dominated by the easternmost top described, and partially by the way of the old Hagerstown Road, before it circles around into the aforesaid depression, the efforts of the Pennsylvania Reserves, of Hooker's corps, were therefore directed, first to a short spur on the hither side of the top, and then through the dip in the land there by which the top is connected with the general level of the mountain-range to the north, while Hatch's division, of the same corps, aligned on the lower ground to the south of the dip in the land, advanced simultaneously to capture the top, securing which, all the ground to the southward in the Gap, where the National Road runs, and the ground to the westward, where the old Hagerstown Road joins it in the valley beyond the top, will be untenable by the enemy. In the afternoon, accordingly, when Hooker had arrived, he swept around to the right of the Gap to assault this position to the north of it. General Meade was, by right of seniority, in command of the Division of Pennsylvania

Reserves, of Hooker's corps, General McCall not having returned to the field after the Peninsular campaign, and General Reynolds having been detailed, at the request of Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, to organize the militia which the Governor had called out under the name of emergency troops. General Meade pushed Seymour out on the right. His own line prolonged that of Seymour towards the left. He gives great credit to Seymour, in his report, for the admirable manner in which he manœuvred his brigade in outflanking the enemy. Hatch's division, of the First Corps, prolonged General Meade's line to the left, and the division of Ricketts, of the Corps, was held in reserve.

By this time Longstreet had reinforced Hill. General Meade pressed forward and up the rugged slopes with his division, Hatch, on his left, maintaining the line there. He captured the spur, and then, with a brief pause, advanced to the assault of the commanding top, which was the key to the position. After a sharp engagement the forces found themselves completely masters of the ground assailed. General Meade had, at the hottest part of the engagement, sent to Hooker for reinforcements, and General Abram Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts's division, had been sent to him, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the distance to be gone over, did not reach him in time for more than one regiment to open fire when darkness set in for the night. A most grievous loss to the army in the brilliant action of South Mountain, in which, although the Federals outnumbered the Confederates two to one, the latter had the advantage of position, was in the death, at Fox's Gap, of General Reno, who commanded a division in the Ninth Corps. On the side of the Confederates, they had especially to mourn the loss of General Samuel Garland, who had been opposed to Reno at Fox's Gap. In an article by D. H. Hill, which appeared in the *Century*

Magazine for May, 1868, he speaks with soldierly admiration of the splendid appearance and bearing of Meade's and Hatch's troops. Of Meade personally he says, "Meade was one of our most dreaded foes; he was always in deadly earnest, and he eschewed all trifling. He had under him brigade-commanders, officers, and soldiers, worthy of his leadership."

It has been stated by Mr. William Swinton that, if McClellan had shown the energy which Jackson had exhibited in marching to Harper's Ferry, the passes of South Mountain might have been occupied in the evening of the 13th of September, and the time spent in forcing them in the engagement of the 14th thereby saved. This would have been impossible, as would appear from examination of the conditions existing when the order was found on the 13th. Pleasonton was farthest in advance towards Turner's Gap, but J. E. B. Stuart was contesting every inch of the way with him through the Catoctin Range. Reno, with infantry, was well up towards Middletown, but the main body of the army was eleven miles distant from the base of South Mountain, and D. H. Hill soon took position in the gaps on McClellan's line of march, with his reserves in Boonsboro'. If Hill alone managed, as he did, the following day, to resist for hours the first assault at Fox's Gap, it is not apparent how he could have failed, even with his small division of five or six thousand men, to hold in check a fragmentary force brought upon the scene when night was falling. Franklin, it is true, might have been ordered to make a night march on Crampton's Gap and assault there early in the morning of the 14th, instead of only being ordered, as he was, to march for that point in the morning, the consequence of which was that he was not able to make his way through the pass until the afternoon, and descending into Pleasant Valley, push the enemy

before night put a stop to active operations. But even if he had been able to descend into Pleasant Valley in the morning of the 14th, he could not have relieved Harper's Ferry by dislodging McLaws. McLaws was so strong and confident with his and Anderson's divisions, that, leaving one regiment on Maryland Heights to support his artillery there, and stationing two brigades on each of the roads, one to the north and one to the east, leading from Harper's Ferry, he, during the night of the 14th, threw in advance across Pleasant Valley his remaining six brigades in so formidable an array that Franklin, as he says in his report to McClellan, did not consider it prudent to attack him. It stands to reason that, if Franklin could not attack him in the valley, drawn up as he was, he could not have dislodged him from Maryland Heights.

It becomes imperative now sedulously to condense what remains to be said within the rigid limits of this sketch, as regards the culmination of operations along the South Mountain Range, involving, on the Federal right, efforts to pass the range and drive Lee out of the north end of Pleasant Valley, and on the left to relieve Harper's Ferry; and correspondingly, involving efforts by the Confederate left to hold the gaps opposite to it, so that Jackson should have time to receive the surrender of Harper's Ferry and join forces with Lee, while, six miles away, the Confederate right is partly engaged, through McLaws, in standing off Franklin's intended interference with the siege.

It has been mentioned that, by nightfall of the 14th, the position at Turner's Gap had been rendered untenable to the enemy, through the Federal occupation of the key-point to the right. Reno had also, in a renewed attack at Fox's Gap, that in which he lost his life, proved successful there. Both sides continued at nightfall to hold ground at the gaps, but while the enemy still occupied the National Road,

passing through the more important gap, Turner's, the Federal forces had obtained lodgment beyond both flanks of the enemy, and Gibbon, who, with a brigade, had advanced in the centre along the National Road, threatened the defenders of the pass in front. The position would by daylight be no longer tenable, and so, about the middle of the night, the enemy began the evacuation of the place, and by morning had passed down beyond the west base of the mountain-range, having been perfectly safe under cover of darkness. Franklin had, the day before, broken through Crampton's and Brownsville Gaps and dispersed the troops defending them, although they had been reinforced by McLaws. Therefore his alone, of the three columns assaulting the passes in the South Mountain Range had, on the 14th, gained a foothold in Pleasant Valley. But, by the morning of the 15th, it having been discovered that the enemy had evacuated Turner's and Fox's Gaps, the advanced columns of the main Federal army also soon debouched into the valley beyond.

Harper's Ferry was, however, not relieved. It fell by surrender, with the loss of between eleven and twelve thousand men, and with that of arms and munitions of war. Assailed from Maryland Heights and Loudon Heights, with its position at Bolivar Heights turned, with batteries of the enemy stationed at enfilading points, and columns at the last moment preparing for assault, it was perfectly helpless. Only thirteen hundred men, cavalry, part of the force that had been driven by Jackson out of Martinsburg, of the whole number of troops at the post, escaped. They crossed the Potomac on the bridge just below the post, and moving close under Maryland Heights, unperceived by McLaws, made their way into Maryland and successfully evaded the columns of the enemy.

Had the whole force originally at Harper's Ferry been

removed, with ample artillery, to Maryland Heights, they could not have been captured by the enemy, nor, of course, would Harper's Ferry have been tenable by him. Had McClellan's suggestion been adopted to evacuate the post and let the troops join him, it would have been captured, but the troops would not have been lost, and might have done good service. Had Colonel Ford, to whom was committed, with two thousand troops, the defence of Maryland Heights, made a more vigorous defence than he did, perhaps the Heights would not have been taken, and then, if he had had sufficient artillery, Harper's Ferry would not have been captured. A court of inquiry was held, which dismissed Colonel Ford and censured the conduct of affairs, in which the chief instrument in the field was the dead commandant of the post, Colonel Miles, among very few casualties; although, it should be said in passing, that the censure reflects not at all on the defence when it had reached the last stage, for holding out longer, when Hill was advancing to the assault, would have been useless sacrifice of life. The decisions cannot be regarded as having represented the purest justice, for the man who was chiefly responsible for the disaster was General Halleck, who remained unscathed.

At eight o'clock, on the morning of the 15th of September, the scene presented near Harper's Ferry was McLaws's six brigades drawn up in line of battle across Pleasant Valley, confronting Franklin, and barring his advance towards Maryland Heights. On Maryland Heights McLaws's batteries, supported by the regiment which he had left there, were bombarding Harper's Ferry. From Loudon Heights came a convergent fire, and from the batteries placed by Hill, under Jackson's orders, the fire helped towards perfecting the periphery of the circle. A. P. Hill's troops were forming for an assault that could not by any

possibility prove under the circumstances a failure. Then a white flag from the works in Harper's Ferry appeared, the fire of the Confederates was stopped as soon as possible, the last of it killing Colonel Miles, and at 8.30 A.M. the post surrendered.

Jackson at once left Hill to attend to details, and he himself, with two of his divisions, marched rapidly away to join Lee. McLaws, retiring from Franklin's front, instead of trying to break through his line to join Lee by the way of Pleasant Valley, crossed the bridge at Harper's Ferry to the south side of the Potomac, and also took up the line of march to join Lee. Later, Franklin marched directly northward up Pleasant Valley to join McClellan, leaving Couch to occupy Maryland Heights; for what purpose it is difficult to imagine, the stable door being open and the horse gone, and as, upon a single battalion, as says Napoleon, may depend the fate of a battle.

The order of the day on Lee's side is concentration, and the order of the day is the same on McClellan's. But whereas the order of the day on Lee's side is concentration with direct reference to imminent battle, it has, on McClellan's side, no relation to imminent battle. All the advantage gained by McClellan through the Confederate miscalculation by two days of the time requisite to capture Harper's Ferry, all the advantage of his knowledge of Lee's immediate presence with less than half his army, is to be lavishly handed over to his adversary. He has Lee's own plan of campaign in his possession, knows just how his divisions are separated, should know the strength of an average Confederate division, and should know how depleted the ranks of Lee must be from the late battles and straggling. Notwithstanding, he estimates the somewhat less than forty thousand troops of the enemy at nearly a hundred thousand, and although he knows that there are only three infantry

divisions of the enemy, besides cavalry, in front of him, he thinks he must proceed with great caution. He has seven miles to march, and it is two days before he regularly joins battle across a stream spanned by four bridges. We may well say of such liberality to an adversary, as was said by General Pélissier of the charge of the Light Brigade, "*C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.*" Nothing can equal it but the generosity of the English and the French at Fontenoy, each of whom insisted that the other should fire first.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM.

By the morning of the 15th of September the two corps of Sumner, the Second and the Twelfth, had closed up on the east side of South Mountain with the two corps of Burnside, the First and the Ninth, the last two occupying the range where they had fought on the day before, at Fox's and Turner's Gaps. The pickets of Burnside's corps pushed forward at daylight and found that the enemy had gone. The four corps therefore descended unopposed into Pleasant Valley, near the town of Boonsboro', from which the pass is sometimes called Boonsboro' Gap, the Confederates naming the action there the battle of Boonsboro', while the Federals name it the battle of South Mountain.

It ought not to be doubted that, with mobility equal to that of European armies of the first class, as witnessed in many wars, with only from seven to eight miles, or, at farthest, in case of detours, ten miles to march, and with the enormous disproportion of numbers between the Federal and Confederate forces present, McClellan could, by a forced march at daylight from the passes of South Mountain, have been able, despite the shortness of the autumnal day, to put the small force of Lee behind the Antietam to utter rout. But mobility in armies lies far less in the locomotive powers of the men than in the will of the commander. As the head is, so is the body destined to prevail or suffer. There is no truer saying of Napoleon's



Modified, to suit the general reader, by R. Meade Bache. Their positions, without distinctive signs for the respective troops, ought to indicate the sides sufficiently

MAP
OF THE
BATTLE FIELDS
OF
HARPER'S FERRY AND SHARPSBURG
WITH POSITION OF TROOPS, ROUTES OF ARMY &c.
Sept. 13 to 17, 1862.
FROM OFFICIAL MAPS
BY
G. HOWELL BROWN, Lt Corps Engr Troops
IN CHARGE TOPL DEPT A.N.V.
Jan. 21 1864.
Scale of Miles

than that, in the conduct of war, there is not so much need of men as of a *man.*

From seven to eight miles in a straight line, to reach the stream called the Antietam, was the distance which McClellan had to march after debouching between eight and nine o'clock in the morning from the South Mountain Range. The army was in the north end of Pleasant Valley, beyond which, towards the west, continuing beyond the town of Boonsboro', is the valley of the Antietam, confined between the line on the one side where Elk Ridge coming from the south has dwindled away to a lower height, and that, on the other side, defined by the low ranges of hills beyond Antietam Creek. Beyond the Antietam, which is crossed by four bridges, and had, at the low stage of water then prevailing, several fords, is the Potomac, about two miles off, with Lee's line of retreat to the left, at the town of Shepherdstown on its right or farther bank. The course of the river and the creek, about two miles apart, are about the same, slightly east of north, and in the loop formed by creek and river, about midway between the two, lies the town of Sharpsburg, after which the Confederates named the approaching battle, the Federals calling it the battle of Antietam. Resting his right on a sharp westerly bend of the Antietam, Lee's line of battle at first passed in front of the town of Sharpsburg along the range of hills bordering its west bank, his left stretching away backward in a long curve to the Potomac.

The force which McClellan had in hand was his whole army, except the corps of Franklin, the division of Couch, both now at Crampton's Gap, and the division of General Andrew A. Humphreys, left at Frederick. McClellan's full force on leaving Washington was eighty-five thousand men. Allowing for those absent with Franklin and Humphreys, and for stragglers, he could not have had in hand

less than sixty thousand men when he debouched from the South Mountain Range, while Lee's three divisions of infantry with him did not number more than seventeen thousand men. It would seem that he ought to have crushed Lee's army before the sun set that night. But what person of experience has not seen in life those who are stimulated by some extraordinary circumstance or outside personal pressure, and who have under that stress seemed to act with resolution, and then, that being spent, have immediately relapsed into their veritable selves, nothing being more persistent than character? So McClellan exhibited for a brief moment some appreciation of the great reward held out to adequate endeavor, but just at the moment when it needed but stretching forth to grasp it, he fell back into the full sway of his plodding circumspection, and let all that fortune offered escape him.

Fitzhugh Lee continuously resisted with his small cavalry command the advance of McClellan all the way from Boonsboro' to the Antietam. But it ought to have taken ten times the force he was able to muster seriously to delay the advance of sixty thousand men over a distance of between seven and eight miles. Meanwhile Lee, knowing his adversary much better than his adversary knew him, quietly took up his position behind the Antietam, and by the time that McClellan reached it, the day was too far spent for active operations.

If, however, it was necessary to pursue so slowly on the 15th as to bring it about that active operations must be postponed until the following day, would the most procrastinating general of whom we know, except McClellan, have postponed them for still another day? What reconnoissances and dispositions of troops could compensate for those which the enemy was making on the other side of the Antietam, and for the accessions of troops which he would

receive through McClellan's delay? All this benefit, out of all proportion to that which McClellan could receive by delay, the enemy continued to enjoy throughout nearly the whole of the 16th of September. Reconnoissances and posting of troops and artillery, which might have been made merely incidental, continued on the east of the Antietam, while McClellan must have known that Lee's absent divisions were rapidly joining him from Harper's Ferry. The two divisions of Jackson joined him on the 16th, and also the two brigades of Walker, but the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and A. P. Hill could not get up for service on that day, but did for the next, the day of battle.

Two of the greatest errors had been committed, that involved, on the 15th, in a tardy pursuit and no attack on the enemy, and that involved, on the 16th, in spending nearly the whole day in making reconnoissances and posting batteries and troops; and these two were crowned, on the afternoon of the 16th, by sending a small force over the Antietam, late in the day, to attack the enemy's left flank. Yet, if there is anything thoroughly accepted and practised in war, it is the avoidance, unless it be intended for a feint (and that is not a movement of the kind here referred to), of beginning a movement so late in the day that it cannot be continued, for the very obvious reason that it notifies the enemy of what is intended, and enables him during the night to make his preparations against it.

By the morning of the 17th General McClellan had surrendered all the advantage of taking the initiative at the point of time of Lee's greatest weakness, only one small division of Lee's still remaining to come up. He had, moreover, by sending a small force across the Antietam on the preceding afternoon, put Lee on his guard at that point, and under these cumulative circumstances of mismanagement he finally laid out his plan of battle by confiding it in

chief part to a man of whose efficiency he had the most profound and well-grounded distrust, confiding to him one of the most delicate operations of the field, that of the execution of a movement upon which the success of the plan largely, if not wholly, depended.

McClellan, referring to incidents just before and after the battle of South Mountain, speaks thus in his memoirs of Burnside :—

"About the time I started, Reno sent back desiring that a division might be sent to the rear of the pass. I sent the order to Hooker to move at once (Burnside had nothing to do with this)," etc. Again, "Burnside never came as near the battle as my position. Yet it was his command that was in action." Continuing, in another place, he says, "I at once gave orders for the positions of the bivouacs, massing the army so that it could be handled as required. I ordered Burnside to the left. He grumbled that his troops were fatigued, but I started him off anyhow."

If McClellan had, as he hereby implies that he had, such distrust of Burnside, and he had known him, as he elsewhere says, for a long while, it is astounding that he put him, as he did, with reference to the impending battle, in a position higher, because one calling for great judgment, than that which any other of his corps-commanders enjoyed. The plan of battle was, using McClellan's own words in his memoirs, "to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's; and as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried the position, to press along the crest to our right; and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces then disposable."

Hooker was ordered, about 2 P.M., on the 16th, to attack

the enemy's left wing by crossing the Antietam at Bridge No. 1 and the ford below it. But an order given so late in the day made it impossible for the attack to be made long before evening. General Mansfield was ordered to cross at the same place during the night, and be ready to support Hooker the next morning, and General Sumner was ordered to hold his corps in readiness to cross by morning. Sumner was given command of the right wing so constituted. Porter, newly arrived with the Fifth Corps, consisting at the moment of only two divisions, but strong in artillery, occupied the centre. Burnside, on the east side of the Antietam, with the Ninth Corps, occupied a position down the stream near Bridge No. 3.

The immediate consequence of the manœuvre of sending Hooker across the Antietam on the afternoon of the 16th was that the Third Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves came into a very sharp engagement, extending to some of the other troops of the corps, with the final result that they were obliged to lie all night on their arms in the closest proximity to the enemy. On the following morning the engagement was hotly renewed between the enemy and Hooker. The Twelfth Corps, under Mansfield, soon came up to support Hooker. Hooker was wounded and obliged to leave the field, turning over the command of his corps to General Meade, General Seymour taking command of the Division of Pennsylvania Reserves. The head of Sumner's column reached the ground about nine o'clock. General Meade, relieved by the arrival of the corps of Generals Mansfield and Sumner from the pressure put upon him alone by the enemy, withdrew the shattered First Corps to the ridge to the rear of where the engagement was taking place on the left-centre and -wing of the enemy. Why had not Sumner been ordered to cross the Antietam during the night, as Mansfield had been? There is no apparent reason

for it, except in the dominating love of McClellan for parcelling everything out in fractions of men and time. The whole attack was extraordinarily ill-conducted and ineffective. It was not even being carried out according to its defects, but with heightened defects. Hooker had been nearly fought out before Mansfield entered on the scene. Mansfield was nearly fought out before Sumner arrived. And when Sumner arrived, Sedgwick's, of his three divisions, was led into unsupported and misdirected action by Sumner himself, with the consequence that it was decimated, and French's and Richardson's went into action without perfect simultaneity, and with a space between them of which the enemy took advantage.

It seems at first sight incredible that such troops as these, however faulty the way in which they were brought on the field, should, against a force so numerically inferior as that of Lee, fare so badly as they did. It would be incredible but for one thing not yet mentioned, that, owing to the inertness on McClellan's left, Lee had been stripping his right to such an extent that a formidable move against it would have swept it from the field. General McClellan says in his memoirs:

"The troops of General Burnside held the left of the line opposite Bridge No. 3. The attack on the right was to have been supported by an attack on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on the evening of the 16th, General Burnside's corps was moved forward and to the left, and took up a position nearer the bridge."

General McClellan further says:

"Early on the morning of the 17th I ordered General Burnside to form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in front and to await further orders.

"At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along the crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear.

"After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I despatched an aide to ascertain what had been done. The aide returned with the information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge and carry it at all hazards. The aide returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in possession of the enemy. Whereupon I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector-general, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly.

"After these three hours' delay the bridge was carried at one o'clock by a brilliant charge of the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania volunteers. Other troops were then over, and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond.

"A halt was then made by General Burnside's advance until 3 P.M., upon hearing of which I directed one of my aides, Colonel Key, to inform General Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops with the utmost vigor and carry the enemy's position on the heights; that the movement was vital to our success. . . . . He replied that he would soon advance, and would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the left would permit. Upon this report I immediately sent Colonel Key to General Burnside with orders to advance at once, if possible to flank the battery, or storm it and carry the heights. . . . . The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforcements just then reaching the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked General Burnside's troops on their left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge.

"If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured from which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear. Our victory might thus have been made more decisive.

"The ground held by Burnside beyond the bridge was so strong that he ought to have repulsed the attack and held his own. He never crossed the bridge in person."

There is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of this account of McClellan's. There is only one particular in it, and that merely nominal, which seems to be in error.

Burnside did cross the bridge, but only formally, and soon returned. It seems that he was not pleased at McClellan's dividing his command by sending the First Corps to the right and leaving only the Ninth Corps to him. However that may be, whatever his motive, he took a very inert part in the battle, leaving the conduct of the Ninth Corps to General Jacob D. Cox, who was, of course, hampered by his formal presence and nominal command. The truth of the statement just made is partially confirmed by certain extant letters of Colonel Sackett's, and one may say also, confirmed by Burnside's subsequent career. But while condemning Burnside, the circumstances do by no means exonerate General McClellan. He had long known Burnside. His own testimony about what passed before the battle shows that he had no faith in Burnside. Yet he left to Burnside's execution the most delicate and important duty of the day. The chief responsibility for the failure to make the battle an unqualified victory lay not only in McClellan's assigning to Burnside so important a duty, but in his own instructions for the attack on the enemy's left wing. There, too, is to be observed remissness without which it might have been possible to win the battle, despite the inefficiency of Burnside, and with proper agency substituted for his, to make victory certain. Had McClellan, at dawn of day on the 17th of September, thrown three corps across the Antietam, on the right, and had he, on the left, given to either Hooker or Porter the performance of the task assigned to Burnside, it would have been all up with the army of Lee. We know, through Confederate sources, that only five hundred men held Bridge No. 3, and that the whole force on Lee's right was two thousand five hundred men. The reinforcements which McClellan mentions as reaching Lee's right late in the afternoon were only the two thousand men of A. P. Hill's division, which had been

left at Harper's Ferry by Jackson to attend to the details of the surrender of that place.

Before noon General Franklin, with the Sixth Corps, arrived on the field with two divisions, Smith's and Slocum's, having, as already mentioned, left Couch with his division to occupy temporarily Maryland Heights. Couch was, however, countermarched before he arrived there, but did not reach the battle-field in time. Franklin had brought up Smith with his division, and had supported Sedgwick after his disaster by making disposition on Sedgwick's left of both of its brigades. Slocum's division of the same corps, the Sixth, was posted between eleven and twelve o'clock on the right, and stretching away from right to left were then Slocum's, Sedgwick's, Smith's, French's, and Richardson's divisions, formed and ready to advance, when Sumner, who had been shocked at the recent slaughter, placed his interdict on the movement, and the conflict ceased about one o'clock, with artillery-firing in fitful outbreaks along the lines. Who can doubt that if McClellan had ordered an advance instead of accepting Sumner's judgment, Lee's army would have been crushed by the terrible odds against it? Some of the best officers on the Federal side thought so then, and all Confederate testimony since confirms the justness of their view. We know now that the Confederates had been fought out to the point of demoralization on their left-centre and -wing, and that Lee had not another man to send from his right. Suppose, then, that Burnside had pushed Lee's right vigorously, as he ought to have been doing, Franklin's attack on the left could not have failed. It may well be doubted if, at that period of the battle, even without the co-operation of Burnside, an attack on the left of the enemy would have failed. Had the two attacks been simultaneous, or nearly so, and had the enemy been driven back, Porter's corps on the centre would have advanced and completed his

discomfiture. This corps had not been quite idle during the action on McClellan's right. Its powerful artillery had swept the hills on the other side of the Antietam, and battalions had passed over the stream and encountered and driven back skirmishers of Lee's centre. Pleasanton's cavalry was supported on the west side of the stream by Sykes's regulars. Porter's corps also sent some reinforcements to Sumner, which, however, did not come into action. By the end of the battle Lee's whole line had somewhat retracted and fallen back of its original position. The battle may be summed up, so far as McClellan was concerned, by saying that the whole army was not fought, and that that portion of it which was fought, was fought by small fractions, in violation of all tactical principles. It was truly not men that the Federals lacked, but a man, and he was on the other side.

It may, indeed, upon evidence be regarded as certain that if the attack had been resumed on the enemy's left on the afternoon of the 17th, the army of Lee would have been badly defeated. Whether or not, if it had been resumed on the 18th, the same thing would have come to pass, as some persons have thought, may well be doubted. Numbers of stragglers, some shoeless, and others footsore from late marches over flinty roads, had rejoined Lee's forces. His army during this feat of arms had gained rather than lost *morale*, as proved by the way in which A. P. Hill audaciously repulsed the corps of Porter attempting to harass his retreat. McClellan wrote and spoke of the result of the action as a great victory, remarking in one place, in a letter, that "those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly, and that it was a masterpiece of art." No man ever penned greater testimony to his blindness to his own shortcomings. Whether we consider the vast numbers relatively to those of the enemy of which

he could dispose, or the actual dispositions he made of them in time and space, or the lack of judgment he showed in choosing instruments for carrying out his designs, he stands condemned as a general utterly wanting in skill.

It was a terribly bloody day, the bloodiest single day of any in the annals of the Civil War, the losses on each side being between fourteen and fifteen thousand. It was fought on the Confederate side by a master of tactics, on the Federal side by an inept apprentice to the art of war. It freed Maryland from invasion, but at undue expense. Would that the scale upon which this work is framed permitted mention of the details of the battle, in which Generals Mansfield, Richardson, and many other noble officers were killed on the Federal side, and General Hancock appeared more conspicuously than before on the scene, replacing Richardson, borne from the field with three wounds! Would that it permitted mention of the way in which the rank and file bore themselves with courage and constancy in opposition to a heroism on the other side which it wrings the heart to think was spent in a mistaken cause! Elsewhere the reader must look for these details of battle, in default of the possibility of including them here. Glancing for a moment, as in duty bound, to the particular subject of this memoir, the reader will observe that, amidst the chances and vicissitudes of war, just as Hancock during the battle was transferred from his brigade of the Sixth Corps to the command of Richardson's division of the Second, so also General Meade, through similar recognition of his deserts and adequacy in time of need, came rapidly to the front. It was, indeed, through the veriest chance that, General Reynolds, having been detailed for other duty, General Meade found himself in command of the Division of Pennsylvania Reserves at the beginning of the battle; but it was by order of General McClellan that he assumed command of the

First Corps, and, as was believed at the time, at the urgent request of General Hooker, when wounded. In this action General Meade was struck in the right side by a spent grape-shot, which, fortunately, had not velocity enough to penetrate the body, but made merely a severe contusion. His aide, Lieutenant William Riddle, was slightly wounded in the hand. His favorite horse, "Baldy," was shot through the neck, but recovered. This same horse, it may be remembered, had been wounded at the Second Bull Run. Another horse, which the General rode at the battle of Antietam, was shot in the flank. At the battle of New Market Cross Roads, on the Peninsula, the horse of the General was wounded.

Couch's division, of the Second Corps, came up on the morning of the 18th, and on the same morning General Andrew A. Humphrey's division, of the Fifth Corps, arrived from Frederick. In the night of that day Lee retreated into Virginia by the way of the ford in his rear over the Potomac at Shepherdstown. The renewal of the battle, therefore, contemplated to take place on the 19th, did not occur. On the morning of the 19th a detachment from the Fifth Corps attempted to harass the enemy's rearguard, and met with some slight success. On the following day, however, a reconnoissance in force by the Fifth Corps being made, with a large number of troops, it resulted in serious Federal loss, although not so serious as represented by A. P. Hill, who repelled it. Lee gradually retired to the vicinity of Martinsburg, with communications open to Winchester and elsewhere towards the south, employing his army in destroying the railroad which would make McClellan's line of supply in an advance on Richmond, and in the mean time he recruited it there in numbers, and by rest and supplies from the fertile region of Shenandoah Valley.

On the 20th of September Maryland Heights were re-

occupied by Federal troops, and on the 22d Harper's Ferry also was reoccupied by them. General Lee's position was in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan, as he admitted to Halleck, did not feel confident enough to cross with his main body to the south side of the Potomac. He therefore confined himself to posting bodies of troops at Williamsport, Downsville, and Bakersville to watch and guard the passages by which Lee might seek to re-enter Maryland. He meanwhile strongly represented to Halleck the necessity of his being reinforced, and the destitution of his army in clothing. Doubtless much improvement in the way of supplies could have been desired, but if the condition of the Army of the Potomac was needy, that of the Army of Northern Virginia was beggarly, its soldiers being so destitute as to look like a swarm of tatterdemalions. "The Lord bless your dirty, ragged souls," is said to have been the fervid greeting, by a female sympathizer, to a band of them as they passed through Frederick. In fact, not to put too fine a point on it, they were so miserably clad, fed, and so overworked, had become, through continuous hard marching and fighting, so divested of the pomp and glorious circumstance of war, that with their presentation of themselves in Maryland disappeared almost the last vestige of romance with which their reputation had endowed them. In vain they vociferously sang, while tramping to their self-appointed task of liberation, "Maryland, my Maryland." The apostrophized sleeping Genius of the State did not rouse herself to make even a languid response. Alas, that there should be no pure rationality nor sentiment among men, but that they should be so carnal that a cause should suffer because it is habited in rags! Yet, never was there a better illustration than that afforded by these men of the truth of Napoleon's dictum, that poverty is the best school of the soldier.

Two congratulatory despatches reached McClellan regarding the battle of South Mountain,—one from the President and one from General Scott. Nothing of the same sort was vouchsafed him regarding the battle of Antietam. On the 21st of September he wrote that he had not heard a word from the President, the Secretary of War, or Halleck, about that battle. No doubt the result had set them all seriously to thinking. They knew that here, at least, was none of the disparity of force which McClellan had previously alleged to exist. They knew that here were none of the difficulties of ground of which McClellan had had to complain in his own chosen field of the Peninsula. They were silent, therefore, about the battle; but dissatisfaction pierced through the tenor of Halleck's despatches, of the character of which McClellan complained to him, and doubtless with some reason, for Halleck was an inconsiderate and tactless man; and by that strange law of nature which the most casual observer has noted, that unfortunate attributes mirrored in another are strangely disagreeable to the observer, he found particularly heinous in McClellan those military defects which were also peculiarly his own.

Maryland Heights, Bolivar Heights, and Loudon Heights were fortified by McClellan to guard against a repetition of the mishap of the capture of Harper's Ferry. The army meanwhile settled into a quiescent state, awaiting reorganization and supplies. McClellan's reasons against the resumption of active operations at once were not only the need of reorganization and of renewed supplies, but the existence of a low stage of water in the Potomac. A rise in the water would be desirable, lest the enemy should renew his invasion of Maryland, while he himself hardly felt strong enough to venture upon putting the Potomac at his back by crossing it, lest there might be a sudden rise in its waters.

On the 1st of October the President visited the army and remained with it for some time, going over the recent battle-fields under the escort of McClellan. McClellan did not neglect the opportunity of trying to impress upon the President what he called "a conservative course." He doubtless referred by this expression to the fact that the President had, on the 22d of September, issued a preliminary proclamation of emancipation to slaves. Mr. Lincoln had tried in vain to bring about some gradual solution of the matter. He had tried to induce the border States to concert with Congress measures for compensated emancipation. His own position on the subject had been clearly defined by him in a letter to Horace Greeley, of the New York *Tribune*, in which he had said :—

"My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could do it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that."

He saw now that the logical necessity of the edict for the manumission of the slaves of the South could not, as a war measure, be much longer postponed. The South had drawn the sword and flung away the scabbard. It had declared, through the second officer in rank of its government, that the corner-stone thereof was slavery. It was not fitting that the sword so drawn, for the object so declared, should longer possess to any degree the shield of the Constitution of the United States. There was no idea back of the action, as was falsely charged in the heat of passion, that such a proclamation, whether provisory or final, would promote servile insurrection. The slaves were known to be too docile to admit of such a supposition, and every man of sound judgment knew that, even if that were possible to the

thought of the slaves themselves, it would be impossible in deed with the whole white population of the South in arms.

Regarding this visit of the President to the camp, McClellan records that it was entirely satisfactory to him, that he had Mr. Lincoln's assurance that he could move at his own chosen time. On the 7th of October, however, after the President had returned to Washington, McClellan received a telegram from Halleck, showing that, unless McClellan had not been mistaken in it, a wondrous change had taken place in the President's mind. Halleck telegraphed that, by order of the President, McClellan was directed to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south, that the army must move while the roads continued good, that if McClellan should move east of the Blue Ridge, covering Washington, he could be reinforced by thirty thousand men, but that if he should move by the way of the Shenandoah Valley, he could not have more than from ten to twelve thousand men. On the 9th of October Stuart crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry, above Williamsport, with about fifteen hundred cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery, captured Chambersburg, there destroyed a large amount of public property, and made good his escape across the Potomac near the mouth of the Monocacy.

McClellan was determined not to move until he deemed himself ready. Therefore it was not until the 26th of October that he began to cross the Potomac. By this time the railroad bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry had been rebuilt, and nearby two pontoons spanned the Potomac and one the Shenandoah. Lee's army had been rapidly recruited, so that, by the 20th of October, it amounted to sixty-seven thousand eight hundred and five officers and men of all arms. As early as the 20th of September, three days after

the battle of Antietam, the Army of the Potomac, with reinforcements, had slightly more than covered its losses, and numbered eighty-five thousand nine hundred and thirty men of all arms.

McClellan's plan for the approaching campaign was to march southward towards Richmond, east of the Blue Ridge, masking in succession the passes through it, repairing the railroad destroyed by Lee, and if Lee should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, and if opportunity should offer, to slip through and attack him at a disadvantage. If he should divide his forces, and opportunity should offer to interpose between the fractions, the Army of the Potomac would avail itself of the chances which might offer themselves. Afterwards, when Lee left Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and passed around McClellan with Longstreet, heading him off at Culpeper, McClellan thought that his opportunity had come. But, on November 7th, while his army was on the march to Warrenton, he was suddenly relieved of its command by an order of the 5th from the President. The time selected for relieving him was not well chosen in the interest of the cause at stake, in that of personal consideration, or in that of respect for the sentiment of the rank and file of the army. That he should have been displaced there ought to be no question from what has here preceded, but with battle far from imminent, the Administration would have done better for the *morale* of the army and all other proprieties concerned, had it waited at least until the advance was over.

To class McClellan, as Swinton does, with Wallenstein, who met creditably the greatest general of his age, Gustavus Adolphus, with the finest infantry of Europe of that time, is to exalt him to a rank far above his deserts. When we say that he was an honest, and therefore a well-meaning man, and a man of fair ability for the ordinary walks of

life, we have said all that is in truthfulness due him. Jomini once took pains to answer the stricture of a military critic upon his position, that war is a passionate drama, not an exact science. His answer substantially was, that war is not an exact science, because it is complicated by differences of intellect, character, passion, materials, accidents, and all that enters into the diversity observable among men and among their possessions and surroundings. The stricture of his critic is, however, much more easily disposed of than by his admission, which is not true, that war is not an exact science. It is astonishing that such a writer as Jomini did not see that the facts of observation do not need any such fallacy to reconcile them. The precise truth is that the science of war is exact, but that the art of war is complicated by all that belongs to human diversity. We have an illustrative case of the truth of this in General McClellan. He understood the science of war, but his defects of character made it impossible that he could practice successfully the art of war.

The measure of McClellan's mind lies in his military performances with great resources, and not less in the output of his written and oral speech. His blindness to the relations and to the eternal fitness of things, in spheres both military and civil, is proved by the history of his service as a general and in that of his conduct in politics, to which he betook himself. His career as a general has been here sufficiently discussed, and therefore it only remains to cite as evidence of his incapacity for civil affairs of magnitude, that he should have allowed himself to become a candidate for the Presidency of the United States upon the platform which contained the humiliating declaration that the war was a failure. There is a difference between the view that the conduct of the war was a failure, and that the war in itself was a failure. To affirm even the first would have

been indelicate for a man to whom part of its failure might be attributed, but to affirm the second was to repudiate the very principles for which the people of the North had striven as strenuously as the people of the South were striving to maintain their opposites; and enunciated at the time chosen for their denial, when the dawn of the future was lighting up the whole land, was a confession of dwelling in Cimmerian darkness. Happily the people saw with the utmost clearness the implications of the candidacy which was offered on the one side, as contrasted with those which were offered by the candidacy of the other, and they rose with intelligence and irresistible might to uphold common sense and justice in a political victory which may well give joy to the hearts of the men of the North and of the South who believe in the capacity of themselves and their fellow-citizens for self-government.

be as blind as he to his inadequacy. He had created a splendid army, but he was unequal to the high generalship indispensable to so great a command.

Time, in due course, worked its slow wonders, and when the moment came, two years afterwards, when the same general invoked the voice of people and army to acclaim him President of the United States, it was still; while for his opponent it waked the echoes from the Atlantic to the Pacific shores. But even the wiser who witnessed the farewell of McClellan to his army in the field, when he rode down their enthusiastic ranks, although astounded at the fatuity exhibited, could not but feel a responsive thrill of sympathy at the display of such devotion. Time, the curer of all things, the assuager of pain, the kindly minister to pleasure, has since then passed on and left but a memory of those days behind. Shorn of the sting of their humiliation and hopelessness, they bring now no acute pain, but leave us fancy-free in sentiment and mind to judge in the calm of the philosophic mood.

General Burnside was a very inconsiderable man. If greatness may be said to have been thrust upon McClellan, willing to receive it, and fully a believer in the justness of the award, we can say of Burnside that, reluctant to accept it, it was not only thrust upon him, but he was knocked down with it, and hammered with it into partial insensibility of the absurdity of its being attributed to him. When the poor man awakened on the morning of the 8th of November, he found that he had not been dreaming, but that there was a conspiracy to make him famous. He protested, as he had done before, that the Government had made a mistake, that he was not the person whom it took him for, that he was entirely unfit for the command of the Army of the Potomac. What, however, could he, seemingly to himself, do under the circumstances, the verdict in his favor by the

military authorities in Washington being so uninfluenced and confident. If he were sane, he could not, he doubtless flattered himself, reach any other conclusion than that he must have underrated himself. The opposite conclusion would have savored of presumption to hold his moderate opinion of himself against that of the whole world, at least that of the special world in which he was living for the time. So it came about that he may have seemed to himself obliged to be conceited so as to avoid seeming conceited, and after a formal resistance he settled down into the duties of commander of the Army of the Potomac.

It is not positively known to this day what were the influences which brought about his appointment. It has been said that Mr. Lincoln was pleased with him personally, and with his military bearing, and that had had weight. The inspiring motive at bottom for making a new appointment was to get rid of General McClellan, but why, of all men in the Army of the Potomac, Burnside should have been pitched upon as his successor is a mystery, and yet we must believe that the President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck were all essentially agreed as to this unfortunate move. All the more extraordinary was it, because it occurred so soon after the battle of Antietam, the significance of Burnside's participation in which ought to have been known. Burnside was universally acknowledged to be a good fellow, a very taking character in the world for piping times of peace, and one without whom it could ill dispense. But if any one can cite a case in history where the constitution of mind of the good fellow proved fitted for stirring times in either peace or war, the historian would like to make a note of it as conducive to the interests of his studies of great events. The fact is, according to the moderate lights shed on the present page, that the character of the good fellow, pure and simple, is entirely exclusive of greatness and frequently

of common ability. It is, however, in the capacity of a good fellow, and no general at all, that Burnside passed his active military career, inclusive of the battle of Fredericksburg.

We are back on the ground at the Rappahannock, over which General Pope fought, and from which he was driven during a succession of battles to the defences of Washington on Arlington Heights. As was mentioned, the army was, on the 7th of November, on the march for its final positions near Warrenton, to cover the line of the Rappahannock. When the removal of General McClellan took place, and he turned the command over to Burnside, the orders for the concentration of the army which he had issued were continued in force by Burnside until the final halt on the 9th, McClellan departing from the army on the following day.

At this time, on the 9th, the positions of the respective armies may be briefly stated as follows: The main body of the Army of the Potomac was at and near Warrenton. The Sixth Corps was six miles to the rear, at New Baltimore. The Eleventh Corps was three or four miles further to the rear, near Gainesville. Sickles's division, of the Third Corps, was picketing the railroad from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction. The Ninth Corps was a few miles to the right, at Waterloo, near the fords of the upper Rappahannock. The cavalry was patrolling the country to the south of the Rappahannock and watching the fords below. The Confederate forces were widely separated. Longstreet had headed McClellan off at Culpeper, about twenty miles from Warrenton, and was there with his corps. A division of Jackson's corps had come across the Blue Ridge, but his other divisions, on account of the abundance of supplies to be drawn thence, still remained in the Shenandoah Valley, distributed along the line between Winchester and Strasburg. Lee's two main

bodies were thus two marches apart, but he had no fear for them in confronting the general whom he had to oppose. McClellan had contemplated taking advantage of the division of Lee's forces, but that any such attempt would have failed under his leadership we have seen good reason to believe. We shall see, as we progress, how consummately Lee proved to be the master of the situation from beginning to end.

On the 10th of November took place the grand ceremonial of McClellan's farewell in person to the army, when he passed on horseback along the lines of troops cheering enthusiastically in his honor. And then he departed, leaving a general sadness behind him, the *morale* of the army seriously impaired, not only by his loss, but by lack of confidence in his successor, a man greatly his inferior in attributes, both as man and soldier. Upon the altar of its country patriotism was still to offer up rich sacrifices to the demiurge of blind gropings for the way of victory.

Burnside, upon assuming command on the 10th of November, found himself under the necessity of adopting at once a plan of campaign. He was decidedly averse to attempting to avail himself of the separation of Lee's two corps, and as for the road to Richmond by the way of Orange Court House, well to the west of the Potomac, it offered too precarious a line of supply for the army. So he proposed adopting the line from Fredericksburg to Richmond; which was a good selection, for, from Acquia Creek, to be constituted a great depot of supplies, it is only ten miles to Fredericksburg, on a line represented by a railroad easily restored after the damage done to it by the enemy, and additionally, there are the ordinary roads through the country. From Fredericksburg, assuming that he could cross the Rappahannock there, he thought that he might be able to anticipate the Confederate army by two marches,

and accompanied by a large wagon train, carrying several days' provisions, might be able, unopposed, to reach the heights back of Fredericksburg, whence he could take the direct road to Richmond and encounter the Confederate army to advantage when he was brought to bay. That he should have thought that he might steal two marches on Lee, or indeed any march at all, shows how little Burnside knew his man. But, otherwise, the plan was rational. It was rational to think that, with his largely superior forces, he would be able to cross the Rappahannock and first encounter the Confederate army to advantage beyond the heights back of Fredericksburg. How, assisted at first by the inefficiency of Halleck, and then, left to his own devices, the plan in execution proved wholly abortive, will appear in the sequel.

Burnside's plan of campaign was received in Washington on the 11th of November. Halleck did not approve of it, and so he went to Warrenton, and there, on the 12th and 13th, discussed it with Burnside. It was finally agreed that the decision should rest with the President. Halleck returned to Washington, and on the 14th telegraphed Burnside that the President had approved of his plan.

A new organization of the corps of the army, begun by McClellan, was completed by Burnside. The army was now comprised in what were called grand divisions. The Right Grand Division consisted of the Second and Ninth Corps, under General Sumner. The Centre Grand Division consisted of the Third and Fifth Corps, under General Hooker. The Left Grand Division consisted of the First and Sixth Corps, under General Franklin.

The Right Grand Division marched at dawn of the 15th, and on the 17th reached Falmouth, on the north side of the Rappahannock, just above Fredericksburg. The Centre and Left Grand Divisions, preceded by the cavalry,

began their march on the 17th. On the 18th the Left Grand Division reached Stafford Court House, eight miles to the northeast of Fredericksburg. On the 19th the Centre Grand Division reached Hartwood, eight miles to the northwest of Fredericksburg.

Now presented itself an insurmountable obstacle, for which Halleck seems to have been entirely responsible. It had been agreed upon between him and Burnside that the pontoons for crossing the Rappahannock should be expedited from Washington, but they did not arrive until the 25th, the excuse for the delay being that it had been expected that Burnside would send an officer to receive and conduct them to the front. But if anything can be clear, it is that Halleck, having promised to expedite them, it was not implied in the arrangement that Burnside had any further agency in the matter. Not until eight days after Sumner had arrived at the proposed point of crossing did the pontoons arrive, and it need hardly be said that Lee had not been idle in the mean time. Sumner proposed to cross by some fords with the Right Grand Division, but Burnside vetoed this proposition. He was right. The danger was not from the small garrison on the other side of the river, somewhat reinforced by troops from Longstreet about the time Sumner reached Fredericksburg, but from a possible sudden rise of the river from rain. If that had occurred when Sumner was south of the stream, he might have been cut off so long from succor that he might have been overwhelmed by the gradually concentrating forces of Lee.

Having now established the Army of the Potomac at its projected point of crossing the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg, with its cavalry now toward the rear, guarding the fords over that river as it curved backward toward the north, we must examine what Lee has been doing while

these operations were proceeding. There was no march stolen upon him. He possessed sources of information in the country, in his scouts, and in his cavalry, far superior to those enjoyed by Burnside. Through these quiet sources of information he had learned enough to justify him, as we have seen, in sending some of Longstreet's corps to reinforce the garrison at Fredericksburg. Through a reconnoissance in force in the vicinity of Warrenton he had gained through his cavalry information sufficient to induce him to send the remainder of Longstreet's corps to Fredericksburg. Thus, three days after Sumner's arrival at the Rappahannock near Falmouth, Longstreet's whole corps had crossed its main branch, the Rapidan, had marched along its southern bank to the Rappahannock, and was concentrated at Fredericksburg, while the Army of the Potomac waited helplessly on the opposite shore for pontoons. Lee was making his moves as deliberately and calmly as if he had been playing a game of chess. He now first said to the Army of the Potomac, "check." Had the Army of the Potomac been able by any chance to cross the stream, Lee would have been obliged to sidle off towards the west until he was joined by Jackson moving towards him from further west, Jackson being now east of the Blue Ridge. As things stood, he could afford to stay where he was, on ground of his own choice, quite as much as it was eventually to be Burnside's, and with more reason for his choice. What with the natural difficulties of the ground, and resistance to the attempt at crossing the Rappahannock, Lee evidently thought that Burnside might not be able to cross for some time to come. There would be plenty of time for himself and Jackson reciprocally to approach each other, or, without his stirring, for Jackson to join him.

The Army of the Potomac, without pontoons, and with the Rappahannock risen above the stage at which it had

been found, was necessarily stalled until they were received on the 25th of November. In all probability Lee knew from Washington more about their arrival than Burnside did. Burnside, naturally confiding in Halleck, awaited them, but Lee, who had excellent spies in Washington, was doubtless apprised as to when he might expect them. Otherwise, the coincidence is remarkable, that Jackson, who had been quietly resting near Orange Court House, thirty-five miles from Fredericksburg, began, on the 26th of November, to move thence towards Fredericksburg.

Burnside, having received his pontoons, was all ready to cross the Rappahannock, but having incurred a delay of many days, his readiness was unavailing, for Lee's army was holding the line of the Rappahannock, the fords on the Rappahannock, the Rapidan also being well guarded, and the carrying out of the original plan, which would have been so feasible just after Sumner's arrival, now seemed to need serious revision. The situation naturally gave Burnside pause. It was not at all the one which he had contemplated meeting. Exactly what it was he did not know, not knowing the exact disposition of the enemy's forces, but he at least knew that it was very different from that contemplated, and so the last part of November and a portion of December passed away, a period which was not neglected by the Confederates for the proper defence of the town of Fredericksburg and the Heights beyond.

It seems to be an almost universal weakness in those who engage in a contest to magnify their own difficulties and to minimize those of their adversaries. In accordance with this tendency, Confederates have often said that the position at Fredericksburg was not a particularly strong one either by nature or by art. Nature remains the same there as it was on the day when the battle was fought, and one who should visit the spot now can see at a glance that the

frontage of the Heights near the river, with a superior ridge in the rear, making an adequate position for reserves, or for rendering untenable the outer and inferior ridge, that the general concavity of the face of the Heights with its re-entering angles, that the almost level and bare surface of the plain between the Heights and the river, constitute a position of enormous advantage to a defending force, and corresponding disadvantage to one assaulting. And as for the artificial defences constructed there just previously to the battle of Fredericksburg, although it should be confessed that they did not occupy the ground nearly so strongly as it was afterwards elaborated for defence, the defences at that time were a great addition to the strength of the position, and through the fact of their conformity to the nature of the ground, made it truly formidable. The position, taking it as a whole, considering it with reference to the relatively less exposure of the defenders than that of the attackers, was as strong as that afterwards held by the Federal army at Gettysburg.

Burnside's first offensive move was down the Rappahannock opposite to Skinker's Neck, where there were good facilities for crossing the river. But Lee anticipated this move by sending a heavy force, which fortified and remained there, and on the 5th of December Stuart's horse-artillery drove off some Federal gunboats which attempted to pass by there to Fredericksburg. The dispositions of Lee's forces at this time, before his final concentration took place on the Heights of Fredericksburg, were wide apart. The main body of his troops occupied the Heights back of the town, with reserves, consisting of A. P. Hill's division, at Guinea's Station, a few miles in the rear, while the two divisions of D. H. Hill and Early were posted from ten to twelve miles below, on the south side of the Rappahannock, and W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry further still, beyond Skinker's

Neck. Colonel Thomas L. Rosser's and General Wade Hampton's brigades of cavalry guarded the fords of the Rappahannock and Rapidan above, on Lee's left. A. P. Hill was so placed at Guinea's Station, in the rear of the main body, that he could by a single march readily reinforce either it or the extreme right near Skinker's Neck.

As one glances south from Stafford Heights, north of the Rappahannock, occupied by Burnside's army, at an elevation of one hundred and fifty feet above the river, he overlooks the town of Fredericksburg and the plain on the other side of the river, terminated by the ridge somewhat parallel to the river, on which Lee's army was finally to be concentrated. The general elevation of Stafford Heights is so much greater than that of the ridge south of the river, that artillery posted there had the artillery of the Confederates at a great disadvantage; so much so that many of the Confederate batteries along the ridge had to be protected by being sunk in gun-pits.

At Stafford Heights the river Rappahannock runs in an eroded channel of steep and moderately high banks, and Fredericksburg comes down to the edge of the southern bluff so made. The ridge on the south side of the river passes, on the right, as seen from the Heights, about a mile back of the bluff, parallel with the river; but as it proceeds, curves away towards the southeast, to a point about two and a half miles from the river, where it reaches its greatest concavity, trending thence towards the Rappahannock. Marye's Hill, back of Fredericksburg, is the salient between this straight line and this curve. The range of which it is a part varies from forty to ninety feet in height (Telegraph Hill, now called Lee's Hill, being the highest point, where Lee stood during the battle), and gradually falls away in height towards the southeast, to Prospect Hill, a height of forty feet.

The position rested its left on the Rappahannock, at Tay-

lor's Hill, fifty feet high, and its right on a deep, wooded ravine, in which flows Massaponax Creek, an affluent of the Rappahannock, which meets the ridge nearly at right-angles. Back of the Rappahannock runs, parallel with that river, a small stream known as the Mill Sluice. This is a branch of Hazel Run, a stream which flows from between Marye's and Telegraph Hills, making between those summits on the range a decidedly re-entering angle.

It is, in the interest of the general reader, not desirable to proceed much further in topographical description. The rest will therefore be confined to a few additional necessary details. A stream called Deep Run flows directly from the range into the Rappahannock, entering there only a short distance below the mouth of Hazel Run. The plain on which the range described rests is the main terrace of the Rappahannock at this point. On it, midway between the river and the range of hills, and somewhat parallel with both, is a road called the Old Stage Road, which, forking near the line of the Massaponax, goes with one branch to Richmond and the other to Port Royal. Back of this road, and nearly parallel to it, is the railroad to Richmond. On the range the directions of the roads are too diverse to be made clear by verbal description. Suffice it to say, therefore, that they run both along the range and across it. An additional one was cut by Lee through the woods for the purpose of facilitating communication to and fro along his lines. The position was somewhat bare from the centre to the left, but heavily wooded from the centre to the right.

The position was, as must be evident to any one, tactically very strong. It was also, however, what is not known to every one, strategically weak. It ought to be evident that as, for the purpose of protecting a line of communications, an army should be either athwart or parallel to it, the worst possible position for it to occupy is when stationed on the

prolongation of the line of its communications. But the latter was the exact situation of Lee's army, and it was unavoidable. The best generals, as a choice between evils, have been obliged to accept that disposition of their troops, and upon it has turned many a disaster.

Burnside knew that a large detachment from Lee's army was lying at and in the vicinity of Skinker's Neck, distant from it by twelve miles, and more, as to some parts of the force. He does not seem, however, to have known of A. P. Hill's position at Guinea's Station, in Lee's rear. He could not cross the Rappahannock at Skinker's Neck, that had been essayed. He seems not to have sufficiently considered the feasibility of turning Lee's position by the upper fords, which were practicable, and although guarded, could have been captured. He assumed that he could take Lee by surprise by a rapid movement, attack him in front, and defeat him before he could be reinforced from below on the river. Of all surprises, however, this proved to be the very slowest.

Before daylight of the 11th of December some of the *pontoniers* of the Army of the Potomac began to fit up their boats for throwing bridges across the stream in front of Fredericksburg, while others engaged in the same operation just below the mouth of Deep Run, at a place less liable to serious interference with the work by the enemy. Six bridges in all were to be laid, three in front of Fredericksburg, and three in the place below.

The signal guns from the Army of Northern Virginia announced to the Confederates that the enemy was in movement. Lee had not been deceived by the renewed demonstration at Skinker's Neck, any more than he had been in that on Culpeper, when Burnside, instead of going there, had rapidly marched to the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg. Longstreet's troops were all astir, marching towards their

designated positions, as if they had merely been resting on their arms, and had been suddenly ordered to fall into ranks. Lee wished nothing better than that Burnside should cross. He had seventy-eight thousand troops occupying a strong position, against one hundred and thirteen thousand troops that would have no position at all, and in addition to that, would have a river at their backs. He had no cause for the slightest apprehension. The resistance he was about to make to the crossing was not because he wished to prevent it, but simply to gain time for perfecting his own concentration, while incidentally doing the enemy as much damage as possible. He still kept Jackson where he was to guard against the turning of the demonstration at Skinker's Neck into a real attack.

The Federal army enjoyed only one advantage, if that can be called such which only helped to pave the way to disaster. A heavy fog hung densely over the river vale, as fogs so incline, and spread over the landscape beyond. In consequence, the enemy could not at first obstruct the Federal operations by artillery fire. The enemy, occupying Fredericksburg in large numbers, and crowning the range beyond, waited for the fog to lift. Houses along the river-bank at Fredericksburg had been crenelled, and rifle-trenches had been run along the bank. All that the Confederates wished for now was light. Gradually, as one of the bridges advanced from the northern to the southern shore, its end, with the *pontoniers* working upon it, appeared ghostlike through the mist, and the Confederate riflemen picked the men off with unerring aim. Searched by Federal infantry- and artillery-fire, directed on the face of the town, the sheltered Confederates still held their own, and made it impossible to construct the bridge opposite the town. Lee again called "check," but he saw the game far beyond, to the inevitable checkmate.

The Federal artillery was now concentrated on Fredericksburg, all unavailingly. Men sheltered in holes, crannies, and drains do not suffer much from the indiscriminate fire upon a town. The fire was a wild and useless expenditure of force. There was only one way in which the thing was to be done, a method universally practised under similar circumstances in civilized warfare, unless it so happens that, at the site of the intended crossing, the stream makes so sharp a bend towards the attacking force that the tongue of land so produced on the enemy's side of the river can be scoured by the protective fire of the force seeking to cross. Cæsar, in a desperate strait, near the east coast of Spain, shut in between the Cinga and Sicoris, two affluents of the modern Ebro, had his siege of Ilerda, the modern Lérida, brought to a sudden stop by a freshet which carried away his bridges. Constructing pontoons at a point beyond the observation of the enemy, he threw troops across the Sicoris, and soon made himself master of the situation by thus restoring his communications for supplies and reinforcements. With pontoons all ready to his hand, Burnside did not do what Cæsar had done two thousand years before.

At last General Hunt, chief of artillery, after several hours had been fruitlessly spent in trying to complete the system of upper bridges, suggested that advantage be taken of the lull, though not cessation, of the enemy's rifle-fire, to throw a force across the river in pontoons; and after all the waste of time and life that had preceded, four regiments were thus thrown over the river and the bridges soon afterwards finished. The bridges below, where Franklin was to cross, were completed with comparatively very little difficulty. It was evident, however, that all idea of obtaining an advantage through taking the enemy by surprise must be relinquished. By one o'clock in the afternoon Franklin, on the left, had completed his three bridges near Deep Run,

but it was half-past four before the three bridges opposite Fredericksburg were ready. Franklin crossed some of his troops over the river on the left. The town of Fredericksburg had been evacuated after the contest with the troops which had captured the rifle-pits. Burnside has been blamed because he did not cross all his troops during the rest of the day and the following night, with the purpose of assaulting the enemy early in the following morning. This stricture is not just. The day was a December one, short. All hope that the enemy would not concentrate before morning should have gone from his mind. His troops could deploy by daylight to better advantage than by night, and still leave of the next day ample time in which to fight a battle. The irremediable mistake had been made in not having thrown all the pontoons across by one o'clock in the afternoon. Then there would have been time to fight a battle before the enemy was fully concentrated, or at least to make all the dispositions for the morrow.

The next day, the 12th of December, was again foggy in the early part of the morning. The Right Grand Division, under Sumner, crossed the river by the three upper bridges, and the Left Grand Division, under Franklin, crossed the remainder of its troops by the three lower bridges. The Centre Grand Division, under Hooker, remained nominally on the north bank of the Rappahannock, but, in fact, many of its troops were, from first to last, parcelled out between the two other Grand Divisions. Sumner's Grand Division stretched away from Fredericksburg to the right, and also to the left, until it joined the right of Franklin's Grand Division. The left of Franklin's was held *en potence* (that is, refused at about right-angles) by a strong force, the left of which touched the river. This was to guard against or to repel a flank attack by the enemy.

Longstreet was on Lee's left, Anderson's division touch-

ing the river, while the divisions of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood continued the line towards the right. Ransom supported batteries on Marye's Hill. At the foot of this summit lay Cobb's brigade, of McLaws's division, and the Twenty-fourth North Carolina Regiment. They were protected by a stone wall which had been reinforced by earth on the outer side and prolonged towards the northwest by a shelter-trench and corresponding parapet, rifle-pits being constructed on the side of the range at sufficiently great elevation above to enable their occupants to fire over the heads of the defenders below. Small earth-works on Marye's Hill and to the right and left of it were manned by the Washington Artillery, supported by four battalions drawn from different commands. Next came Jackson's corps. Hood came first. A. P. Hill was posted between Hood's right and Hamilton Crossing, the point where Lee's military road and another intersect a road to Richmond which turns off from the Old Stage Road. His first line consisted of Pender, Lane, and Archer, drawn up on the edge of the woods. The Thirty-fifth and Fortieth Virginia Regiments, with artillery, were on the right of Thomas's brigade and Gregg's. The Twenty-second and Forty-seventh Virginia Regiments formed A. P. Hill's reserves. In the second line there were Early's and Taliaferro's divisions, with D. H. Hill's division in reserve. Stuart, with two brigades of cavalry and his horse-artillery, was on Jackson's extreme right, closing in the ground to the ravine of Massaponax Creek. It is to be observed that Lee's forces were massed on his right flank to an enormous strength. It was known to Burnside that this was tactically and strategically Lee's weak flank, the one, therefore, to receive the main attack, the one, therefore, where the greatest number of troops ought to be and would be found; and yet the plan which he finally adopted with reference to it was puerile.

Time seemed to be no more an object to Burnside than it had been to McClellan. Day was waning on the 12th, and still Burnside was uncertain what to do. In the afternoon Franklin advised attacking the enemy's right, the next morning early, with thirty thousand men, and the manner in which Burnside left him implied that he would adopt that plan, marching over the river during the night some additional troops from Hooker's corps, and sending his orders in writing immediately. The night, however, passed, and no order, no additional troops reached Franklin. It would give a false impression to say that Burnside had lost his head; he never had any. To do something safe, that could not hurt him very much, if it failed of its object, is the policy of all weak generals, and therefore was his. He did not seem to see, as a French officer says, in his military text-book, that a general to succeed must be ready, "*de se bien battre.*" A determined policy, whether for retreat or battle, is the only course that fits in with war. Halting decisions that make "'I dare not' wait upon 'I would,'" are the most merciless expedients, the most bloody in consequences. Thirty thousand men hurled at dawn on the right flank of Lee, which presented no special difficulties of ground, as his left did, would have won the battle; at least that plan afforded the only chance of winning it. The unexpected would in itself have lent itself to victory. Even the calm Lee, the steadfast Longstreet, the impetuous Jackson might in that event have thought that their time had come. Instead of that plan, what one did Burnside adopt? At half-past seven of the morning of the 13th of December orders reached Sumner on the right and Franklin on the left for each to attack with a division. A division! Burnside says that his idea was to turn the enemy's right flank, and obtain a position from which to move along the rear of the crest of the range of hills occupied by him.

Gaining this point, he intended to push Sumner on the right against the enemy in his front, and at least capture his artillery if he attempted to retreat.

General Franklin had on the left the First and Sixth Corps, one division of the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the Third Corps, and Bayard's cavalry. The part of Burnside's orders which applied only to Franklin was somewhat confusing to him. The particular parts of the orders, that he was to send in *at least a division, supported*, and that Sumner was to attack with *a division or more*, were perfectly clear, but the general drift of the orders applying to Franklin was such as to confirm him in the belief that he must hold his main force well in hand, implying, of course, his preparedness for a move not mentioned. Despatches passed through the following hours which prove that Burnside was satisfied at the time with what Franklin did. He expressed his dissatisfaction with it only after his failure, and then he charged Franklin with not obeying orders. There is no other way in which the question as to whether Franklin did or did not obey orders can be answered than by adopting the French form of speech for similar cases. "*Oui et non.*" "*Yes and no.*" He did, and he did not. Up to a certain point of time he did implicitly obey them. Beyond that point, the orders becoming even more than before ambiguous in meaning, and the situation on the left evidently not what Burnside imagined it to be,—supposing that he had a correct view of anything,—Franklin, anxious, and restive under the infliction of the muddle produced by his chief's incapacity, adopted a course which might, from one point of view, be deemed disobedience of orders, but from the standpoint here, one that should be regarded as lying within the discretionary power of any general so terribly placed as Franklin was to decide in which direction duty lay.

General Reynolds had returned to the army. His corps,

the First, was selected to furnish the division to make the assault on the left. This was General Meade's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, supported on the right by Gibbon's division, and on the left by Doubleday's. The formation of the Division being completed with the First Brigade and the Third Brigade, the Second Brigade in support, it marched half a mile down the Rappahannock, and turning sharply to the right, pushed for the railroad defences at the base of the range of hills held by the enemy. The point for which it was pushing was not on the extreme left of the Confederates, as was soon proved by its being halted by a sharp artillery fire to the left and rear, which necessitated placing Doubleday's brigade *en potence*, and his advancing against the enemy in that quarter. After some interchange of artillery-fire with the attacking force on the left, the Division resumed its forward movement.

Meade's First Brigade drove the enemy from the railroad entrenchment and advanced up the slope beyond, driving back two brigades of the enemy in great confusion. The Third Brigade, less fortunate, failed to reach a point quite so advanced, and the Second Brigade was still less successful than it. The First Brigade having thus penetrated far into the enemy's lines, and being unsupported on account of the mishaps with which the two other brigades had met, had expended its force, and could not but recoil before the masses concentrating against it, so great that they threw it and the two other brigades into disorder, and pursued them retreating down the slopes and across the railroad; not in rout, however, but maintaining their organization as well as could be expected after the severe losses they had sustained. The task that had been assigned Meade's division, of only four thousand five hundred men, was too great for it to accomplish. It is wonderful that it achieved so much against the masses against which it was thrown, the First

Brigade so effectually piercing the enemy's lines that, as General Meade expressed it in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he found himself in the presence of the enemy's reserves. Coming down beyond the railroad, rallying his men, when he had reached a quiet spot he took off his hat, and in his cool, soldierly way, merely remarked that it was pretty hot up there, showing to Franklin two holes from bullets that had barely cleared his head. He had had a horse wounded under him. His aide-de-camp, Captain Arthur Dehon, had been killed. General Conrad Feger Jackson, commander of the Third Brigade, had also been killed, and Colonel William T. Sinclair, commander of the First Brigade, had been wounded. In a few minutes he had lost nearly forty per cent. of his division. Yet his assault had not been made without serious loss to the enemy.

The miserable plan of Burnside had borne for the left the fruit which might have been, and was by some officers expected. The Confederates in great numbers precipitated themselves down the slopes and beyond the railroad embankment, in pursuit of the rash division of General Meade and Gibbon's division seeking to bring it off the field, Gibbon's division itself being considerably shattered. The remainder of the First Corps deployed, Birney's division of the Second Corps coming up to aid in stemming the tide of the enemy while the Pennsylvania Reserves were being withdrawn by General Meade to the river, there to reorganize and rest.

We are now coming into plainer and plainer sight of a phenomenon which is common to all events where a man of no mental poise is in command. Failing through the weakness of his tentative method, he grows desperate, and becomes more daring than the boldest of mankind. In a whirl of emotion, through which pierce the promptings of insanity, Burnside will soon prove that he has entirely lost

his balance. He had, strictly speaking, no plan. Such fragmentary ideas as he had in his mind, jostling each other in terrible confusion, out of which chaos appeared on the surface only the desperate desire to do something, the feeling that by doing something he might happen upon something fortunate, could gain no victory over the possessor of the calm eyes that watched from the heights overlooking his resolute infantry, sheltered there in front of the devoted troops to be thrown recklessly against a wall of fire.

Burnside says that he gave the final order for the attack on the right after the attack on the left had been made. But telegrams which passed from left to right prove that he knew, when he ordered the attack on the right, that although the advance on the left was in progress, the attack there had not been made, but on the contrary, that the advance there towards attack had been checked. But, all the same, in violation of his written order of the day, he ordered the attack on the right. This was about eleven o'clock in the morning.

To do justice to this attack, in so far as the gallantry and persistence of the troops are concerned, would take many more pages than can be devoted to the description here. In praise of the exhibition of these qualities on that field, both right and left, no panegyric can be too strong. In condemnation of the generalship which made the sacrifice possible, no denunciation can be too severe. It may be questioned whether, if the assault had been made with double the number of troops who executed it, it could have been successful against the defences at the base of Marye's Hill, consisting of the stone wall reinforced with earth, the continuation of it in the shelter-trench and corresponding parapet, the rifle-pits in the side of the hill above, and the artillery crowning the ridge back of them. And yet the devoted soldiers of the Army of the Potomac advanced

time and again against the driving metal storm, on an open plain, at the behest of frightful incapacity for war. It is the commonest of beliefs that it is only the bad who do harm in this world. One may well question, however, if some of the good do not do as much. Against the bad the world is on its guard, and some of them are in jail, but among the good there is, through the law of distribution of qualities, so much stupidity, that large numbers of them are ever unobstructedly working sincerely towards the perdition of every cause with which they have to do.

The artillery along Stafford Heights ceased firing. French's division of the Second Corps, with Hancock's division of the same corps in support, was the only force at first detailed for the momentous assault on the right. "The cry is still,—they come!" The enemy had them under full artillery-fire even as they passed in places through the streets of Fredericksburg, and Longstreet said afterwards that, when they were on the plain, he could see, at the distance of a mile, the gaps made in their ranks by the guns on the ridge. It was with this force that Burnside was first to essay to follow the main roads leading out of the town, running parallel with each other, about three hundred yards apart, until they diverge, one to the right, going to Orange Court House, the other to the left, to form what is known as the Telegraph Road. It was at this place of divergence that the force also was by orders supposed to separate and diverge in opposite directions for the purpose of capturing the summit on the right, Marye's Hill, and the summit on the left, Telegraph, or Lee's Hill. Skirmishers are at the front, and the two divisions are marching to their doom. They reach the Mill Sluice, the planking over one of the bridges crossing it gone; and as if that were the most natural thing in the world, they teeter in part as best they can over the stringers of the bridge. Finally, by the

time they reach within striking distance of the enemy's works, they have been so decimated as to be unfit to undertake the task for which they set forth. The order came to storm the works. The men were being mowed down in ranks. Howard is ordered up to support Hancock, to check the paralysis that is seizing the lines. The two divisions advance only to be shattered and sent in full retreat after having reached within a hundred yards or less of the stone wall and shelter-trench. All vivacity of attack was over for the moment at half-past two o'clock in the afternoon. First French and Hancock, later Howard, leading the third and last division of the Second Corps, and later still Samuel D. Sturgis, of the Ninth Corps, had come into action unavailingly. It should have shown Burnside that it was impossible to carry the enemy's lines at that point, but desperation had now fully seized his soul. He was verging nearer and nearer to the impotence of despair.

Getty's division, of the Ninth Corps, came into the fight. Whipple's division, of the Third Corps, merely guarded Howard's right while he was making his attack, and was not engaged to any great extent. To a greater extent Colonel Samuel S. Carroll's brigade, of Whipple's division, was engaged, suffering considerable loss. He supported Sturgis. Griffin's division, of the Fifth Corps, also supported Sturgis, and met with very heavy loss. Sykes's division of regulars, although in reserve, lost a good many men.

The Second Corps and its supports had been pretty well fought out when Humphreys received his orders at half-past two o'clock to cross the river and support the assault. Advancing with one of his brigades, and ordering the other forward from the rear, he was soon at the front. At first the men began to answer the enemy's fire with fire, but

Humphreys saw at once that this could never succeed, but that they must use the bayonet. He therefore at once charged with the bayonet, with the result that the formation of his two brigades was broken before they had gone many yards. Retiring to the rear, they were then reformed for a renewed and more determined charge. In the first advance he had observed hundreds of men lying on the ground under the shelter of a roll in the surface, and was apprehensive that their presence would impede his movement, but he could hardly have anticipated what occurred. By what motive inspired, no one can say, but these men tried to frustrate the attempt of the line to advance, either by persuasion or main force. In consequence, Humphreys had much difficulty in passing through and over them, and the momentum of his charge was considerably diminished by their presence and resistance. As in previous efforts, this, too, came to naught. General Humphreys had one horse killed under him and another wounded, and the attempt to take the wall was a complete failure. In fact, the place was impregnable, held as it was by a line of sheltered infantry as dense as effective firing would permit, and reinforced by fire from the rifle-pits ranging above and back of it along the face of the hills. Here ought to have been made no attack beyond a strong demonstration. Surely Burnside could not have substantiated his claim that this was not a real attack, when at 2.25 P.M. he renewed an order to Franklin to attack the heights in front of him. The order was so obscurely worded that Franklin could not decide if it were intended to instruct him to attack at a single point or to attack along his whole front.

Here is where the question, long discussed, enters, as to whether or not Franklin disobeyed orders. Doubt had arisen as to what were the orders. Was Franklin to do one thing or the other of two things possible under the

orders, so as, hit or miss, technically to obey orders? To sit in fair judgment upon Franklin's conclusion we must, first of all, place ourselves in the position of holding well in mind what had preceded during the day, and what were the conditions existing at the time of the receipt of the orders. Franklin must have had, from the morning's experience, the full conviction that Burnside had no grasp of anything that, by rational coherence of parts, could be called a plan, his actions and his obscurity of speech having proved it. In consequence of Burnside's inadequate move of the morning, the left wing had been more or less seriously engaged. There were decided signs of the intention of the enemy to make a counter-attack there. Either possible attack prescribed by Burnside seemed to have no probability of success against the large force of Jackson, developed by the preceding assault on the left; and then, too, the time remaining of the short day would be small after all the dispositions were made for any attack. Franklin knew Burnside; he knew the situation on the left better than Burnside did; he thought, as he subsequently testified, that Burnside's orders were so framed that they gave him some discretionary power. He decided not to attack. So deciding, he probably saved the left wing from another and greater repulse than the one which had been previously experienced. Lee had finally said, "Checkmate."

General Longstreet says, in his work entitled "From Manassas to Appomattox," in speaking of the carnage that took place in the right attack (at the sunken road running along the base of the Heights from the road which is the extension of Hanover Street in Fredericksburg to the point where it cuts Telegraph Road before the latter climbs eastwardly along the Heights to Telegraph, or Lee's Hill):—

"A series of braver, more desperate charges than those hurled against the troops in the sunken road was never

known, and the piles and cross-piles of dead marked a field such as I never saw before or since."

"The curtain of night fell sadly over the scene of immense losses on the Federal side in killed and wounded, as compared with those suffered on the Confederate side. Under cover of that pall the wounded were withdrawn from between the lines, and the dead as far as possible were buried. The next day the army stood to arms. Burnside had conceived an heroic plan. This was in person, on the right, to lead his old corps, the Ninth, to the assault. What better mettle had the Ninth Corps than the First, the Second, and the others, or he than Humphreys, Hancock, and the rest? Was this ravening for more slaughter, or was it vainglorious vaporing? It was the last despairing cry of temporary insanity. His chief officers gradually brought him to reason, and on the night of the 15th, shrouded by storm and darkness, the army skilfully withdrew across the pontoon-bridges to the north side of the Rappahannock. So ended one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Had Lee, in turn, attacked, he would have met with an equally signal repulse, the railroad embankment forming an admirable parapet, and the artillery of Stafford Heights completely dominating the range of hills from which he must have made an offensive movement.

On the 30th of December Burnside received a despatch from the President forbidding him to make the movement against Lee by the passage of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, which he had been informed was in progress, or indeed to make any movement at all unless it should first receive his approval. The explanation of this action of the President's Burnside soon learned to his chagrin from a visit which he immediately made to Washington. Generals in the army had taken pains, after the battle of Fredericksburg, to convey to the President their disbelief

in Burnside's ability to command the army. He then laid out another plan of campaign by way of retrieving his great failure. This was to cross the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg. The movement, long in preparation, began on the 19th of January, 1863. How it would have prospered, had it continued, no one can say, but it was stopped by heavy rains. These produced such a condition of the roads, that the wheels of the artillery and of the wagons were often embedded to the hubs, and soldiers were covered with a coat of slime. So the movement came to an end amid laughter and jeers, for the Army of the Potomac never lost heart, and this passed into history under the name of the Mud March. Burnside's command had begun with a tragedy and it ended with a farce.

Much ill-merited sympathy and false sentiment have been lavished upon Burnside for the manly way in which he took upon himself the blame for the disaster at Fredericksburg. But who should be allowed to expiate by expressions of regret the fault that sacrificed fifteen thousand men? The mantle of charity is broad enough to cover that among the multitude of sins over which it is cast, but there is a great gulf between the forgiveness that may be granted to frailty, and acceptance of the wrongdoer's deep regrets as full quittance for his deed. The responsibility for the consequences that ensued from the appointment of Burnside as commanding-general must be apportioned between the Administration and Burnside. The Administration was to blame for appointing him, and he for accepting the appointment. He could not be held blameless for that, unless he had first positively declined to accept the appointment, and then accepted it only in obedience to express and positive orders, which, as a soldier, he would be bound not to disobey. This he did not do, but weakly yielded after demurring. To him,

therefore, belongs the greater share of fault, for whereas the Administration acted in ignorance of his incompetency, he knew it well, and ought not to have thought that he had relieved himself from responsibility by confessing his unfitness to command.


MAP
FIELD-OPERATIONS
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER
ARMY OF GENERAL LEE
CHANCELLORSVILLE and FREDERICKSBURG
Federal
Confederate
Supplemented with the positions of the Confederate troops, as obtained from General Robert E. Lee's map of the same ground, and drawn, in accordance therewith and some trifling other modifications, by
R. Meade Bache.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

THE bitterness of the chalice that the North constantly drained was from time to time mitigated by the welcome draught of successes in the West and Southwest. From the first it was not intended, for want of space, to make special mention of these; nor is it now, but only occasionally to record, as illustrated here, remarkable events having bearing on the war, lest the Army of the Potomac should appear as if occupying a world of its own, having no relation to the rest.

On the 6th and 7th of April, 1862, Grant won the battle of Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing, in Tennessee, through the timely arrival of Buell's army to his assistance. Halleck, however, then taking command of those forces in the field, made progress so slow towards Corinth, in Mississippi, moving fifteen miles in six weeks, that the enemy availed himself of the ample time placed at his disposal to evacuate the place with all his material, and leave only the husks of victory behind. Yet Halleck was the general who, from Washington, subsequently told McClellan that his men did not march enough for exercise. Such military critics may well be likened to the literary ones said to be recruited from the ranks of unsuccessful authors. His generalship, however, had not, as we have seen, prevented Halleck from being called to Washington as general-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

On the 1st of January, 1863, Mr. Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Emancipation.

Burnside, upon paying a visit to Washington to demand the carrying out of very high-handed measures which he had devised against recalcitrant officers of his army, who had been disgusted at his conduct of the Fredericksburg campaign, found that the pressure against him was too strong to be resisted, and accordingly, resigning his command, was replaced by his most conspicuous opponent, General Hooker.

A word here in passing is but just to the tone of the army at that time, because it was the subject then of much animadversion. It is admitted on all sides that it was far from that representing the highest *morale*. The incident just described is one of the evidences of the fact. But a moment's reflection ought to show that, to have expected the army to be other than it was, was to expect the impossible. Whence, in a word, it may be asked, is the *morale* of an army derived, or, more properly speaking, in what does it consist but in the integration in all its parts of a self-consciousness and general life so blended in every fibre as to make of it a single unit of being? But here there had been no prime generative force at work, equal to producing the highest *morale*, for a representative of the highest life in military intellect had been absent. Wonderful, indeed, in view of this, it is that this army had bravely toiled on for months in bivouac, in march, in battle. To feel well commanded, not to be called upon to sacrifice in vain, gives of itself to the soldier calmness and content. To have the hope, or better still, faith in victory, grown out of experience of the past, gives him additionally the buoyancy with which he more willingly supports fresh hardships and seeks new laurels. In the moral world, neither more nor less than in the physical, naught can stand without prop or foundation. But to feel, as every ill-commanded soldier does in his inmost heart, that all his fortitude and

courage are in vain, dampens his spirits and impairs the *morale* of both officers and men. To expect of a soldier under these circumstances the highest emprise of which he is capable, would be as foolish as to imagine that the virtue of a saint could be resplendent without the hope of salvation. It is always ample service in the minds of those who do not strive and suffer and bear the heat and burden of the day, to "hang hissing at the nobler men below;" but for those who are filled with a sense of duty that knows no fulfilment of it save in action, they may perform it well, though they may, as was said of the army at this time, "growl," since, after all, the men had the final limitation of being human. History can show no army which preserved its *morale* better under the most disheartening circumstances, and none with a sublimer faith that there must be a brighter future for it beyond the shadows of the present, through which it long marched to uninterrupted disaster.

General Hooker, the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, was a man of considerable ability, but not of thoroughly well-balanced character. He had long and deservedly been known as a very daring officer in action, earning thereby the *sobriquet* of "Fighting Joe." The special love of personal combat is, however, a demerit in a general commanding a large army, because it is prejudicial to combined movements on a large scale. Beyond the capacity, therefore, fitted for the command of a corps, Hooker did not range, and even this capacity was, of course, subject to the limitation just referred to as affecting large concerted movements. He bore, too, the reputation which continued to attach to his subsequent military career, of tendency to insubordination, a trait which was the parent of the independent spirit and way in which he loved to fight. He came distinctly within the category of men capable in ordinary affairs and emergencies. He had withal a cer-

tain geniality of disposition which made him engaging. His personality, in sum, might be said to be composed chiefly of an overweening sense of his own ability, great physical courage, democratic manners, gasconading temperament, and considerable powers of organization and execution.

How the best of these last attributes can be reconciled with the extraordinary event about to be recounted, every one must decide for himself, as in all other things, on evidence. Both to avoid interrupting the narrative about to be entered upon, and to account as it proceeds for the irrationality of the final event alluded to, it is best here to dispose of the subject of Hooker's condition when the battle of Chancellorsville was fought. At the time of the occurrence many persons thought that Hooker's failure was attributable to intoxication. Everything, however, that can be gleaned from eye-witnesses and from other sources of information goes to show that this supposition was entirely erroneous. The very fact of the mental condition of Hooker having been for several days under the eyes of officers of the highest rank, without their imagining him to have been under the influence of stimulants, goes of itself to show that he could not be charged with intoxication. All the evidence obtainable points in the very opposite direction, to the effect of extreme abstinence adopted suddenly. The explanation of this is that Hooker had been in the habit of what abstemious men would call drinking too much, but that, on the eve of active operations, feeling the great responsibility of his position, he had suddenly adopted the opposite regimen. That, up to the moment of joining battle, he was perfectly clear in intellect, is proved by the admirable plan for it which he devised, and carried into execution, too, until the ground was reached, when all was changed and catastrophe entered on the scene. It was only at the moment of joining battle that he exhibited a sudden and

strange inhibition of his mental powers, as if he had been hypnotized. There is only one way to account for this physiological fact. This is that, on account of the stress experienced in his system by the sudden change of habit adopted, the excitement of immediately impending battle, unexpectedly forced upon him by the enemy, so overwrought his nerves, that he was seized with a species of panic; not that which sometimes prompts a private soldier to run away, but one which is producible in any one when, in an abnormal neurotic condition, supreme exaltation of spirits is suddenly met by the perception of an impending terrible weight of responsibility. Previously in these pages I have, as I believe, given a rational explanation of the genesis of panic, as an uncontrollable revulsion of feeling from a condition of over-confidence. In a man like Hooker, physically, and in good bodily condition, probably morally courageous, panic would not assume the form of seeking to run away from danger, but that of an inhibition of the play of the intellectual faculty, and abeyance of the express control of will for determinate and far-reaching ends. We enter in this case on the joint domain of physiology and psychology, and in its light we may clearly read that Hooker was thrown (through surexcitation of his nervous system, supervening upon abnormal physical conditions produced by radical change in alcoholic habits, and in face of the unexpectedness of Lee's advancing from his entrenchments to fight, instead of retreating) into a temporary paralysis of his mental faculties, representing panic, but with a manifestation of it which, being rare, is at present not even scientifically recognized.

With the abortive movement, under Burnside, called in derision the Mud March, which took place on the 20th of January, 1863, active operations of the Army of the Potomac had come to an end for the winter. The period of

mental and bodily rest and refreshment that ensued until the following spring had been well earned, and had had the effect of completely restoring the *morale* of the army and making it eager for action long before the season became fit for operations. During the winter it was largely recruited, *cadres* filled up, military exercises practised, and everything done to perfect its organization in men and material. The old form of Grand Divisions was discontinued by Hooker, and the corps remained as they had been constituted and entitled previously to their combination. They were the First Corps, under General Reynolds, the Second Corps, under General Couch, the Third Corps, under General Sickles, the Fifth Corps, under General Meade, the Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, the Eleventh Corps, under General Howard, and the Twelfth Corps, under General Slocum,—seven corps in all,—numbering one hundred and twenty thousand men. The army of Lee was numerically far inferior to the Army of the Potomac, numbering, according to official returns at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, only about fifty-five thousand men. The cause of this diminution in its numbers was that Longstreet, with two divisions, had been detached from the army, and was engaged in military operations and collection of supplies near Suffolk, south of the James River. Lee's army was posted south of the Rappahannock and its main branch, the Rapidan, from Port Royal, on the east, to United States' Ford on the west, opposite to the Federal army on the north bank of the Rappahannock. There was in the Army of the Potomac during the whole winter only one trifling movement in February; Stoneman's cavalry, supported on the 25th by a division of the Second Corps, being concerned in one near Berea Church.

Here it becomes, as usual, necessary, in beginning the description of a new series of operations, to give a brief

topographical sketch of the lay of the land in which they were conducted. To do this without a large-scale map, and so that they may be at the same time clearly present to the imagination, it becomes necessary to generalize details. For example, inasmuch as both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan have bends, we must simplify the idea of their courses by regarding them, either as forming straight lines, or as determined with reference to straight lines. From Fredericksburg as a centre, therefore, it may be said that, barring its sinuosities, the Rappahannock runs east for about eighteen miles to Port Royal, on its south bank, except where a great northward bend in it, a little west of Port Royal, is made by Skinker's Neck. Starting again from the same centre, it runs, always excepting its bends, west for about ten miles, from Fredericksburg to where the Rapidan puts off from it, thence running about six miles northwest, to Kelly's Ford, the Rapidan running west to Ely's and Germanna Fords. The termini on the west of the approaching operations were at these three fords, and the terminus on the east, at Port Conway, opposite Port Royal. Going up the Rappahannock and Rapidan the distances of the important fords, measured in straight lines from Fredericksburg are, in round numbers, Banks's Ford, five miles; United States' Ford, seven miles above that; Ely's Ford, nine miles above that; and Germanna Ford, six miles above Ely's, the two latter on the Rapidan.

The opening of the new campaign began on April 16th with a cavalry combat between General William W. Averell and the enemy at Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, opposite Ely's Ford, to the south, on the Rapidan. The movement that led to this was a reconnoissance to ascertain how the fords there were guarded. The main body of cavalry, under Stoneman, was finally sent across the fords higher up, near Warrenton, and then to make a wide circuit

thence between the enemy and Richmond, destroying his communications and supplies.

The plan which Hooker had formed was admirable. The ill success that attended the operations was not on account of the imperfection of the plan, but because it was not carried out. It was faulty only in one point, the sending of Stoneman's fine body of cavalry off on a raid. This was based upon the pure assumption that Lee would retreat instead of fight, and by sending off nearly all his cavalry Hooker divested himself of one of the important agencies to bring about Lee's retreat, or to harass it if it were once begun. Otherwise the plan was unexceptionable, and even with the drawback of Stoneman's absence, it would have succeeded if it had been executed. The experience of Lee on the Lower Rappahannock, in resisting the repeated efforts of the Federals to capture and hold that line near Fredericksburg, had led him to make it impregnable to direct attack from Port Royal to United States' Ford. Below Port Royal, where his right rested on the Rappahannock, the river was too wide to render practicable the crossing of the Army of the Potomac in face of a force resisting; and beyond United States' Ford, where his left rested, he held a cavalry force and videttes at the fords. Nevertheless, by a very skilful movement, Hooker succeeded in making a lodgment on Lee's left flank, and had the tactical skill exhibited been equal to the strategical, the movement would have been crowned with complete success. Never before, except at Antietam, was the Army of Northern Virginia placed in such a strait, never was it afterwards until its surrender. Yet this rare chance of the war to inflict upon it at the height of its power a crushing defeat was lost forever.

Hooker had more than twice as many troops as Lee had, and Lee's army was not concentrated. So Hooker could

afford to operate on exterior lines. The idea of the ground concerned in Hooker's advance might be still further simplified by saying that, if one should hold horizontally where Hooker's army lay, the butt of a pole towards the east, supporting on the other end, towards the west, two broadly branching tines, he would present a rude representation of the ground as divided north and south by the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. The position of Port Conway and Port Royal would be represented by the butt of the pole, Fredericksburg by a point two-thirds from the butt to the junction of the tines, Banks's Ford by a point a little beyond that town, United States' Ford by a point just short of the junction of the tines, the northwest one of which would be the Rappahannock, on which is Kelly's Ford, and the west one the Rapidan, on which are Ely's and Germanna Fords. There are other fords, but the ones mentioned are the most prominent in the pending operations.

It should now be apparent that, in the position of Hooker's army, he would be obliged, in order to turn Lee's left flank, to cross both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and march along the south bank of the Rapidan until the same shore developed into the south bank of the Rappahannock. He could not cross directly over United States' Ford, for there Lee's left rested. But if he could turn the position in the manner described, he would then eventually uncover United States' Ford, and any body of troops remaining on the north bank of the Rappahannock could join forces with him by that ford. Further, if he could continue to advance towards the east, and reach a point three and a half miles in the rear of Fredericksburg, he would uncover Banks's Ford, and troops could reach him by that ford from the north bank of the Rappahannock, or, if his left wing could capture Fredericksburg, it could reach him directly from that place. The success of the plan primarily hung upon making a success-

ful lodgment on Lee's left with a force sufficient to advance to the rear of Fredericksburg against any resistance that Lee could offer. That achieved, Hooker's last reinforcements could reach him by Banks's Ford, or from Fredericksburg, and he would have more than double Lee's force on the flank of his communications with Richmond and across the line of his communications with Orange Court House.

There is no reason to doubt that the advance and lodgment of Hooker on Lee's left flank was wholly unexpected by Lee. Lee's army was entrenched, and the circuit by which Hooker could reach his left flank was long and difficult, over the two rivers, the Rappahannock and Rapidan. Nevertheless, Hooker's strategy succeeded. On the 21st of April Doubleday's division, of the First Corps, made a feint of crossing the Rappahannock at Port Conway, opposite to Port Royal. On the 27th of April the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps marched to Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, twenty-seven miles off to the right, and passing over that stream, during the night and the next morning, the Eleventh and Twelfth finally crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, and the Fifth at Ely's Ford, thus placing General Meade in the advance along the south banks of the Rapidan and Rappahannock. In due time, after this movement had begun, the First, Third, and Sixth Corps, and Gibbon's division of the Second Corps, marched, and before daylight of the 29th four pontoon bridges were thrown across the Rappahannock a few miles below Fredericksburg, and just after daylight, one opposite Fredericksburg. This force, constituting the left wing, was under the command of Sedgwick. Hooker in person, with the two remaining divisions of the Second Corps, crossed the Rappahannock at United States' Ford, as soon as the turning operation on the right of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps was completed. This was on the 30th, and the plan had so

far succeeded perfectly. Sedgwick was in front of and threatening the Heights back of Fredericksburg, and the First, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with the two divisions of the Second, had been massed near Chancellorsville. Moreover, Sedgwick had been informed of the lodgment on the right, and had detached the Third Corps, which, on the morning of the 1st of May, crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford and joined Hooker, making his force now four corps and two divisions, while Sedgwick still threatened Fredericksburg with two corps and one division. Lee was between the upper and the nether millstones. What was needed now was but a Blücher to say "*Forwarts.*" But Hooker did not say it. The paresis which was to assail him in deadlier and deadlier form made him hesitate. From having been so highly elated at the success of the first steps of his plan as to be able to write, in a preliminary order, "The enemy must either ignominiously fly, or come out from his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him," his arrogance had departed, and he awaited instead of seeking the arbitrament of battle. What a fall was that in spirit, represented by his declaration that Lee's army was now "the legitimate possession of the Army of the Potomac," contrasted with the reluctance with which within a few hours he marched towards Fredericksburg. His temporary and immoderate exaltation of spirits is to be noted in connection with their sudden collapse, in the light of the theory which has been presented as to the liability to revulsion of feeling in feeble natures, or in strong ones in abnormal conditions, under such circumstances. Evenly poised character is not susceptible to such influence, it is incapable of the most transient megalomania; but from nature or temporary disease, or both, the character may not be, or may cease to be, well poised, and so conditioned it is liable to opposite states

of extreme exaltation and depression. In the fundamental characteristic of Hooker's mind, vain-gloriousness, stimulated by nervous disorder superinduced by sudden change of habits, lay the match that was to explode his justly high anticipations of success. How different the exaltation of a man like General Meade. Although of imagination "all compact," with him it was imagination in leash, trained to do the bidding of its master, he not its slave; born in him, schooled in life, speaking in restrained terms its highest hopes and sternest resolves, because they were bounded by the determination to do his duty, from which nothing could make him blench. He greeted Slocum as he met him upon his arrival from Germanna Ford with the words, "This is splendid, Slocum; hurrah for old Joe; we are on Lee's flank and he does not know it. You take the plank road towards Fredericksburg and I'll take the pike, or *vice versa*, as you may prefer, and we will get out of this wilderness." But his anticipations were at once dampened by the reply of Slocum, who said, "My orders are to assume command on arriving at this point, and to take up a line of battle here, and not to move further forward without orders." Hooker's heart had begun to fail him, therefore, just as he had reached the field. This was the first sign of what soon assumed an acute form of imbecility.

Chancellorsville consisted of a single house and grounds. Three main roads lead from it towards the east, Fredericksburg;—the Plank, Old Turnpike, and Shore Roads. About midway between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg the Plank and Old Turnpike Roads, after having run parallel with each other for some four miles, unite near Tabernacle and Zoar Churches, making a single main road thence to Fredericksburg. Looking towards Fredericksburg from the point of Chancellorsville, where all three roads unite, the Plank Road is towards the right, the Old Turn-

pike in the centre, and the Shore Road towards the left. All intersecting at Chancellorsville, there is westward thence for two miles only a single main track, at which distance the Plank Road and the Old Turnpike are resumed, and diverging for a short distance again, continue to pursue a westerly course in a somewhat parallel direction. The whole system, excepting for some distance back of Fredericksburg, passes through the tract known as the Wilderness. Departing from these main roads, subsidiary ones pass northward, by which Scott's Dam, near and below United States' Ford, and Ely's and Germanna Fords are reached, and, of course, many of these same cross-roads pass beyond the east- and west-main tracks towards the south, and intermediate roads in various directions form a network of connections over the country. The country is diversified by various creeks running into the Rappahannock and Rapidan, among which, further west, is Mine Run, a southern branch of the Rapidan, celebrated in a future campaign conducted by General Meade.

Spurred on, no doubt, by the manifest expectations of the officers around him, Hooker at last advanced towards Fredericksburg. Slocum, on the right, marched along the Plank Road, Sykes's division, of the Fifth Corps, supported by Hancock's division, of the Second Corps, marched in the centre along the Old Turnpike, while Meade, with the two divisions of his corps, Humphreys' and Griffin's, marched along the River Road. Sickles, with the Third Corps, now across United States Ford, was closing up in the rear. The troops, soon opposed by the enemy, drove him at first, and reached a position about three miles in advance, and about six miles from Fredericksburg, on the ridge that runs there at right-angles to the trend of the roads which they had been pursuing. It was on open ground, where the artillery could have free play, a position such that the

army could not have expected better. Banks's Ford had been uncovered by General Meade's advance, and by this, if Sedgwick could not capture Fredericksburg, he could easily rejoin the main army by the route of the bridges below. But to the astonishment of all in the advance, orders came from the commanding-general to retire to the first position occupied, the lines which the army had left, the thickets of the Wilderness. Deprecatory messages were sent to the rear, and a slight modification of orders was received, but of no moment, for the retrograde movement had begun, and the enemy had already taken advantage of the falling back of Slocum to try to interpose between the right and centre of the lines. The King of France had marched up the hill and was now marching down again. "My God," General Meade is authentically said to have cried, when he found himself among a group of general officers on the lower ground for which the commanding position they had occupied had been relinquished, "if we can't hold the top of a hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it."

The army retired to the first lines which had been occupied by the orders of Hooker, the enemy pressing all the time on its rear. Hooker had now, so he said, got the enemy where he wanted him. If so, why had he advanced? The enemy was equally satisfied, but with more reason. He occupied a commanding position, from which he had direct and enfilading fire on the lower ground occupied by the Army of the Potomac, which, by its retirement, had sacrificed its superiority in artillery. Banks's Ford had been surrendered, and Sedgwick could not now join the main army, save by a long detour, or else by running the risk of being intercepted by Lee, if marching directly for junction with Hooker. The army was worse off than if it had had no head. Lee had left Early, with some nine thousand men,

to defend the Heights of Fredericksburg, while he was throwing the rest of his force upon Hooker. It had at first been Hooker's theory that Lee would not fight, but would incontinently retreat. In that he had offended against the practice of the wisest generals, who consider in advance all the contingencies which they can summon up to mind, so that they may be able best to meet any exigency that may arise. When he found Lee's columns charging him *à outrance*, the rapidly approaching crisis of his disorder seized him in the form of dismay, to which his speech and inconsequent actions and his looks bore ample testimony. He was neutralized. In seeking shelter in the Wilderness he had acted with the simple, primitive, animal impulse of the hunted creature to seek safety by recoil and concealment from danger and attack.

The army fell back and took up the general position represented by its centre being in advance of Chancellorsville, whence its departing lines covered the single two-mile-long track uniting the eastern and western points of divergence of the Plank and Old Turnpike roads, and those points themselves, the left wing being sharply deflected to the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam. More precisely, the morning of the 2d of May found the lines of the army adjusted as follows: The Fifth Corps had its left on Scott's Dam, and its front west of Mineral Spring Run, covering United States' Ford. On the right of that came French's division of the Second Corps, with its right extending towards the Plank Road. Some distance in advance of that division was the other present division of the Second Corps, with its right beyond the Plank Road. As viewed from the east, one division of the Second Corps partially masked the other. From the advanced division of the Second Corps the lines suddenly took a westerly, from their previously southerly direction. At the point of divergence there the

left of the Twelfth Corps touched Hancock's right, and its line swept out to the south far beyond the Plank Road, enclosing the so-called Chancellorsville plateau and beyond, continued in its sweep by the Third Corps, whose line fell backward towards the Plank Road, nearing which it was joined by the left of the Eleventh Corps, which enclosed, on the south, the east and west trend of the Plank Road, ending finally in a weak crotchet. The line consisted towards the east of a number of weak angles, the right of Hancock's position being the apex of a salient. The First Corps was on the march from Sedgwick to cross the Rappahannock at United States' Ford, leaving Sedgwick still one corps, the Sixth, and one division of the Second Corps.

Hooker was now in a purely defensive attitude, if such a passive condition be compatible with defence. To await just what an enemy may choose to do never can be effectively defensive. If Hooker had no plans, Lee was fertile in them, and he was now about to carry out one which he never would have attempted in the face of an adversary who was skilful and audacious. Even at this late day the plan is often ascribed to Jackson, although Lee himself has given the most positive testimony that it was his. Jackson, however, was the man, and possibly the only man, who could have carried it out successfully, and without him Lee probably would not have attempted it. Hooker's cavalry was away. It had not been able until the 29th of April to get across the upper fords of the Rappahannock. It was now engaged in a raid in Lee's rear, which was to effect nothing of importance, and which, even if it could have accomplished more, could have done nothing commensurate with what it could have contributed under the most ordinary circumstances by its presence with the army, to say nothing of what it could have effected now, under the extraordinary circumstances that its presence could have controlled. Jackson, under

Lee's orders, had taken a circuitous route, masked by cavalry, towards the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, and although attacked in the right rear-flank by Sickles with a portion of his force, still held on with his design in face of an enemy apparently bent on believing that he was witnessing a retreat.

There is an aura of battle as there is of epilepsy. Amidst the sound of axes felling forest trees, of metal clashing and sight of rising parapets, amidst the indescribable hum of thousands of muffled voices dominated by words of command, there is no time for any experience but the thought of preparation for battle. But when the men rest from their labors and stand to arms, as did those engulfed in this leafy wilderness, ready for action, and hours pass, and nothing such as they expect ensues, a strange, weird sensation takes possession of them, such as in mediæval times must have been felt by the inhabitants of those lonely tracts in which were-wolves were supposed to course and witches to be abroad by night. The mixed feeling with which deadly combat is awaited, sensation neither of pleasure nor of pain, but strangely blended, must revert for its explanation to the ever-present, but not always imminent, unsolved mystery of life and death, to which the mind on such occasions reaches forth for solution, craving only that the tension shall be soon relieved by action. Not until that comes does any one feel the joy of battle. So these men now waited with tense expectancy of something, of the mysterious unknown. And yet there were very many there who knew that the right flank of the Army of the Potomac was in the air, that Lee's favorite blow was by a long and rapid march to the enemy's rear, and that Jackson's was the arm which had never failed him yet.

Striking the Brock Road at last, which crosses both the Plank Road and the Old Turnpike, Jackson turned slowly

to the right along the Old Turnpike. A. P. Hill's division moved at first in line of battle along the ground north of the Old Turnpike, marching east in support of the deployed divisions of Rodes and Colston, in the order mentioned, but afterwards in column along the Old Turnpike Road. Jackson at length reached a position from which he securely reconnoitered the ground occupied by the Eleventh Corps; as in the German folk-lore the ritter-giants sometimes looked down from their strongholds on the land tilled by the frugal husbandmen ploughing for their benefit below. Then he directed the leading divisions still further to the rear, until he could see the left flank of Hooker's army in reverse. Suddenly he burst with fury into the astonished camp. As by a whirlwind the whole right flank was doubled up, Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck, with his brigade of the Eleventh Corps, which had formed the crotchet on the right, vainly attempting to hold his ground. Artillery, horses, soldiers, the right of the Eleventh Corps, struck on end, were put to precipitate flight. Let not the flattering unction which has so frequently been taken to the soul about this affair be still considered saving. Less than one-half of the Eleventh Corps was German, but all were dislodged, and some were in rout. Any men so fallen upon in flank would have been at irretrievable disadvantage. Being routed was not the fault of the men, but of the generalship which permitted them to be there without cavalry on that wing, or in default of cavalry, without sufficient pickets and grand-guards thrown out to the intersection of the Brock Road with the Old Turnpike. Until the Franco-Prussian War the "Dutchman" represented one of the distinctively comic elements of American life. It was amusing to observe how even the words in which English, not German, had made change, were charged up against him as if he were guilty in mispronouncing English. Even if, as

reported, some of the Germans cried, as they rushed to the rear, "*Alles ist verloren; wo ist der ponton?*" they were not the only ones who weaponless and hatless tore through the steady ranks to the left.

Those ranks to the left were not in the least bit shaken. The moment that the sound and sights of Jackson's attack manifested themselves, Lee had pushed an assault as hard as possible on the right-centre. He had been awaiting with only two divisions on that front. All the time, until between five and six in the afternoon, the period before which Jackson could not make his flank attack, Hooker had been facing only these two divisions on his front. Lee had meanwhile been making feints here and there along the lines to distract Hooker's attention from his real design. It is almost needless to say that the event would have been very different had Hooker attacked then instead of remaining entirely on the defensive. Now, in the midst of the turmoil caused by Jackson's successful onslaught on Hooker's right, Lee fiercely launched into a diversion in its favor. Hancock's lines, forming a salient, first received the brunt of his efforts in that direction, but he, bravely supported by Colonel Nelson A. Miles, and the troops to the right and left of him, foiled the enemy. Part of the divisions of Williams and Geary, of the Twelfth Corps, which had been advanced to the support of the Third Corps, were resuming their places in line during the progress of the catastrophe which had begun on the right. Birney's and Whipple's divisions, of the Third Corps, were absent from their lines, engaged in harassing the right rear of Jackson's column, which had been believed to be in retreat. Berry's division, of the Third Corps, which had been in reserve at Chancellorsville, was ordered to the right by Hooker to try to stem the Confederate tide running from the direction of Jackson. Sykes's division, of the Fifth Corps, Hays's brigade, of the Second Corps, artillery

posted by Generals Meade, Warren, Captain Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps, Captain Osborn, chief of Berry's artillery, and halted fragments of the Eleventh Corps, formed a line of battle facing west. Sickles's advance, consisting of Birney's and Whipple's divisions of the Third Corps, and his reinforcements of Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps, and Williamson's brigade of the Twelfth Corps, and Pleasanton's cavalry, now cut off from the main army, attacked Jackson's advance on its right flank. These troops of Sickles's were now completely isolated, as will be seen they must have been, if one considers that they had been harassing the right rear-flank of Jackson's force marching towards the right, and that Jackson had passed around the right flank of the Federal army and driven it towards its left flank. Pleasanton directed the artillery, and Sickles the infantry, in working effectively towards checking the advance of Jackson by attacking his exposed right flank marching now in an exactly retrograde course. General Meade, who has been already casually mentioned in connection with the measures taken to repulse the enemy, had not, as may well be imagined, remained an idle auditor of the sounds on the right. Realizing what had occurred, he had summoned his staff, mounted his horse, and taking Sykes's division of the Fifth Corps, then facing to the east, and marching westward, he threw it, facing west, on the ridge commanding the junction of the Ely's Ford Road with the road between Chancellorsville and Ely's Ford which leads to United States' Ford. Here he formed line of battle, heading off stragglers from the Eleventh Corps, and ordering Captain Weed, his chief of artillery, afterwards General Weed, killed at Gettysburg, to mount on it some fifty or sixty pieces of artillery, which, being effected, there was presented along that portion of the lines an obstacle insuperable to the enemy's advance.

During the night the First Corps, under Reynolds, arrived from Sedgwick, and formed on Meade's right behind Big Hunting Run. The details of the new dispositions would be too voluminous for introduction here. It must suffice to say that the attack on the right wing reaped all the more success because troops from the Twelfth Corps had been advanced to support Sickles, and that the gap which had necessarily been thereby left in the general lines was reached by Jackson's troops before those which had advanced to Sickles's support could fairly resume their positions, and that, in sum, the right centre having been patched in a fragmentary way, the right wing, now sharply refused to the right, towards the Rapidan (for the lines now embraced the confluence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan), was occupied by the Twelfth Corps, Berry's division of the Third, Sykes's division of the Fifth Corps, later in the night, by the First Corps, and additionally during the night by troops from the left. In the night and on the morning of the following day the remainder of the Fifth Corps came over from the left to the right. Sickles having established communication between his outlying and the inlying lines of the army, was authorized by Hooker to make a night attack on the enemy, in which he was supported by Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps and Berry's of the Third. Aided by moonlight, the attack, finely executed, regained possession of the eastern portion of the breastworks that had been occupied by the Eleventh Corps, and necessarily of the Plank Road in that quarter.

The shades of evening were coming on apace when Jackson had gone beyond his lines peering into the darkness to ascertain how his advance could be best continued, when, as he was returning, he and his staff were mistaken for Federal troops, and received a volley by which he was mortally wounded. Borne to the rear, the command finally

devolved on Stuart, instead of upon A. P. Hill, on account of Hill's being wounded in Sickles's night-attack, and of Stuart's having more intimate knowledge than he of the country, through his preliminary reconnoissances of it and movement concerted with Jackson. Jackson was an irreparable loss to the Confederate army. He is one, whether as a man or general, entitled to respect, on account of his genius and daring, and in despite of the narrowness of his views as a fanatic.

The next morning, Sunday, the 3d of May, was the greatest day of battle. The lines of the army were now markedly different from those held at first, the distribution of the corps even more so. The left flank consisted of the Eleventh Corps, resting its left at Scott's Dam, on the Rappahannock, and enclosing United States' Ford. To the right of it, in extension of the southward general line, was Hancock's division of the Second Corps, faced, as at first, east across the angle between the Shore and Old Turnpike and Plank Roads. French's division, at first partially to the rear of Hancock's division had been sent to the right. On the right flank of Hancock, the point of junction of the left wing with the narrow front, Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps covered the Plank Road, making with Williams's division of the same corps, to its right, an acute angle just at the front. Beyond these lines was the Third Corps, partly facing west, and partly towards the front, occupying there a summit called Hazel Grove. French's division of the Second Corps faced west across the Plank Road. Beyond that point were in succession the Fifth and the First Corps, covering the Road to Ely's Ford towards the northwest, and its junction with the road to United States' Ford, towards the northeast.

Hooker was incapable of fighting a great battle, whatever the numbers and dispositions of troops might have been.

His mind was open only to the halting and half measures to which irresolution is always given. The day opened ominously by his relinquishing the summit of Hazel Grove, a bare top capable of a strong defence, and tactically an important position. When evacuated it was at once occupied by the enemy, and crowned with artillery that was destined to carry havoc into the Federal ranks. Lee in person was in command of the Confederate troops on his right, Stuart on his left. The battle again opened at daybreak. Stuart, advancing from the left, engaged Berry's division of the Third Corps and French's division of the Second Corps. He charged repeatedly with untiring ardor, bringing up towards the accomplishment of his purpose his very last reserves, while to the Federal side came no succor beyond that of a single brigade from the Fifth Corps to the support of French. Hooker had no command of the field. A part of the army was, as usual, fighting it out without a supreme head.

If the reader has received from the description of the positions of the Federal army a clear idea of the field, he must perceive that, by only a slight shift to the right, Stuart could strike at the same time the left of the Third Corps and the right of the Twelfth. As he was working with the purpose of joining hands with Lee, that happened at the point of time when he had been brought to a stand on his left. Further around the Twelfth Corps, on its front and on its left, where Hancock at right angles to it on its left-rear looked eastward, the enemy had been making vigorous demonstrations to prevent the reinforcement of the line engaged on the right with Stuart, but for hours without coming to close quarters. Miles, under the immediate eye of Couch and Hancock, vigorously defended the rifle-pits along their front.

Between nine and ten o'clock the enemy, who had thus

felt the Federal lines all around the front, and thus measured his strength with what was opposed, or likely to be opposed to his force, gathered himself together for a final assault. His artillery perfectly commanded the position, and with it he opened an unceasing direct and enfilading fire that swept the plateau of Chancellorsville. In vain Hooker was appealed to for reinforcements, in vain was even ammunition applied for; nothing moved. At last he was disabled by a blow from a pillar of the Chancellor House, against which he was leaning when it was struck by a cannon-ball, and upon his recovery from the insensibility that ensued for half an hour, he soon turned over the command to General Couch, with instructions to retire to a previously determined upon position. This lay about a mile back of the front then occupied by the army, its right flank resting on the Rapidan, protected by Big Hunting Run, and its left flank, as before, enclosing Beaver Dam and United States' Ford.

This occurrence of the battle, immediately following the accident to Hooker at the Chancellor House, seemed for a while to bring home to him, now that some physical disability had been added to his previous mental incapacity, that he was unfit, for the time at least, to command the army. Major (now Colonel) James C. Biddle, of General Meade's staff, writes me as follows: "Soon after Hooker was stunned, he came over to the place where General Meade was, on the new front which he had established the evening before on the occasion of Jackson's advance, and ordering a tent pitched there, had a conference with General Meade. In my presence General Meade urged that he be allowed to attack, saying that his troops were in fine condition and spirits, and that he had reason to think that he would meet with success. General Meade said this more than once, but General Hooker positively refused to accede

to his proposition, insisting that he should remain on the defensive where he was, at the junction of the Ely's Ford and the United States' Ford roads. While this colloquy was proceeding, General Couch, coming to see General Hooker, entered the tent, and shortly afterwards issued therefrom, directing Hooker's staff to report to him, as the command of the army had been turned over to him by the commanding-general. Thereupon the staff hastily entered the tent, with the result that General Hooker almost immediately appeared and informed General Couch that he was laboring under a misapprehension, that he had not meant to commit the command of the army to him, but had merely meant him to consult General Meade, and to do what to General Meade seemed most advisable. Thereupon Couch rode away, evidently disgusted."

Soon after Hooker gave the order to retire, the most terrible part of the day ensued. The enemy fell recklessly on the narrow front before him, many of the troops on which had been for some time without ammunition. The Confederates, now joined as to their right and left wings, swept resistlessly forward. The Federal centre and right-centre were dislodged and the troops borne back, but not in rout. The last left of the field was the rearguard of Hancock's division, back to back, looking east and west, and parts of other commands. A battery of the First Corps, two batteries of the Fourth United States Artillery, General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, and other organized bodies, also held on to the advanced ground as long as possible, in order to give the forces in retreat time to retire without confusion to the new lines. The two corps constituting the right wing, the First and Fifth Corps, had not come into action at all, either as organizations or in the form of reinforcements for the front by detachments, having been withheld from assist-

ing their comrades either by men or ammunition, with the sole exception of one brigade from the Fifth Corps, already mentioned. This was Hooker's battle of Chancellorsville. How those true men, good soldiers, Meade and Reynolds, must have chafed during the weary hours when they were held in bondage by their incompetent chief, all who knew them must have been well aware. How galling it must have been to them at last to be called upon to beat a retreat with over thirty thousand men who had not fired a shot!

Lee did not press the retiring forces as vigorously as he might have done, for something suddenly supervened. He learned that Sedgwick had captured the Heights back of Fredericksburg and was marching towards the battle-field. We must therefore revert to the movements of what had been Hooker's left wing, now reduced by the withdrawal of the First Corps to only one corps and one division. It was near the middle of the night preceding the battle which has just been described, the night of the 2d of May, that Sedgwick received orders to storm the Heights of Fredericksburg and join Hooker by the way of the south bank of the Rappahannock. A most dangerous operation, it will be seen, had been committed to him. The Heights were those from which Burnside had been bloodily repulsed, and the march which he was instructed to make was directly towards Lee's army. Early the next morning, Sunday, the 3d of May, Sedgwick set his command in motion. Left and right and front in succession, after occupying Fredericksburg, he tried to attack to advantage the enemy's position on the Heights. Finally a line of battle and two columns, profiting by the experience of the battle of Fredericksburg, were formed back of the town, and charged without firing, capturing the enemy's stone wall and rifle-pits at the base of Marye's Hill, the storming column taking the crest be-

yond. Simultaneously, a division on the left captured the crest further to the south, and the enemy was sent in full retreat, with the loss of numerous prisoners and guns. Sedgwick then set out on the march towards Chancellorsville, distant from the Heights nine miles.

If Sedgwick could reach Hooker at this juncture, the Army of the Potomac in full force would be on Lee's line of communication with Gordonsville, and on the flank of his line of communication with Richmond; that is on, or on the flank of, his only lines of communication. Counting with reason on the supineness of Hooker, Lee, however, had held his hand in the midst of the furious battle which he was delivering against the nearest portions of Hooker's forces, fought as an army totally without *ensemble*, and detached several brigades to join Early, which, with the considerable force Early already had, and a Confederate brigade which had been holding Banks's Ford, he judged sufficient either to check or to crush Sedgwick's command. The two grand detachments met at Salem Heights about four o'clock in the afternoon, between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. After a partial success, Sedgwick was pushed back. He was now in a critical situation, with a large force between him and Hooker's army, while Banks's Ford, on his right, might, in case of disaster, be successfully occupied and held by the enemy; and in an attempt in that case to retrace his march, his force might equally be compromised. The narrative must leave him where he is holding the ground at sunset, and return to the main army at Chancellorsville.

The 4th of May was a Sabbath with General Hooker, he had done all the fighting he apparently intended to do on Sunday, the 3d. There was only a skirmish on the front of the Twelfth Corps, in which General Whipple, of the Third Corps, was killed. By retreating, Hooker had given

up the roads by which Sedgwick could reach him by the south bank of the Rappahannock. The appeal of the guns of Sedgwick, now unable to cope with additional forces, under McLaws and Anderson, sent against him by Lee, had no power to move the dazed general. He was no better and no worse than he had been before he had been knocked down by the concussion at the Chancellor House. His malady had preceded that event. Sedgwick was in a desperate situation, confronted by superior forces and Early in his rear on the recaptured heights of Fredericksburg. No help came from Hooker, and the day of the 4th came to an end, with only a skirmish in front of his lines, amid the sound of Sedgwick's guns plainly audible, Hooker himself lying safely within his new lines. He had ordered Sedgwick to join him by the south bank of the Rappahannock, yet he had relinquished to the enemy the only roads by which this order could be obeyed if Lee opposed the march and he did not aid it, and, as the sequel will show, he did not aid it. Judging the case simply on moral, as distinguished from purely military grounds, and taking the circumstances as what they became, wholly unmodified by Hooker, it may truly be said that he left Sedgwick to his fate. But, can it be thought that Hooker was then amenable to moral laws? Probably not, for the Hooker who nominally fought the battle of Chancellorsville was not the Hooker of old, but, by some strange fatality, another man, who, through changed manner and appearance, bore to him some shadowy resemblance.

Colonel Biddle gives me, with reference to some of the last incidents before the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rappahannock, some information which proves that, to the very last, it was without a competent head. It was, in the night of the 4th, decided in council of war to withdraw in the night of the 5th of May, by crossing the river in the

immediate rear, a plan which probably would not have been voted for by certain officers who formally approved it, but for the fact that they knew all further effort and sacrifice under Hooker's leadership would be in vain. Colonel Biddle says that it was while this withdrawal was taking place, in the night of the 5th, that the officer of engineers in charge of the pontoons reported to General Meade that they were in danger of being carried away by the increasing freshet. General Meade's reply, according to Colonel Biddle, was, "Why do you not report this to General Hooker? it is not my affair." The response of the officer of engineers was that General Hooker could not be found.

Shortly after this occurrence during the night, Generals Couch, Reynolds, and Sickles, Colonel Biddle says, came to General Meade's quarters to confer with him as to what should be done. General Meade thereupon directed Colonel Biddle to cross the river by the pontoon-bridge at United States' Ford, find General Hooker, and ask for orders. The storm was threatening the pontoons at the ford, but some artillery was passing, and Colonel Biddle easily reached the other bank of the river. Here he found Hooker with his staff asleep on the floor of a house on the northern bluff of the stream, and awakening General Daniel Butterfield, he informed him of the situation. Butterfield's reply was that the order of retreat was to be obeyed. Returning to General Meade, Colonel Biddle, upon reporting the result of his mission, was ordered by the General to summon his staff, and to communicate to General Reynolds the state of affairs. Reynolds, found occupying a tent with General James S. Wadsworth, was awakened, and replied to General Meade's message, "Say to General Meade that some one should be waked up to take command of this army." The fact was that there was a brief space of time when some of the general officers hoped

that the Rappahannock would rise so as to make it absolutely impossible to cross, in which event Couch, being then by seniority in command, there would be an opportunity to try conclusions with the enemy under more favorable auspices than those under which it had previously fought. Colonel Biddle, upon returning to General Meade, found that the retreat was being pushed by orders from Couch. About daylight of the 6th, the artillery having preceded it during the night, the army as a mass could be seen assembled on the south bank of the river, the appearance of its organization leaving much to be desired, with the exception of that of the First and Fifth Corps, which, as the reader will remember, had not, with the exception of one brigade from the Fifth, been in action. During the 5th Warren and Comstock, of the engineers, had traced an interior entrenched line, about three miles long, which General Meade held with the rearguard, as the rest of the army was retiring over the river. As General Meade rode up to Reynolds as the retreat was proceeding, Reynolds advanced to meet him, saying, "General, I will support you. If there is any fighting to be done, we will do it together."

The main army safely crossed. The afternoon of the 4th Sedgwick had been surrounded and so severely attacked by McLaws and Anderson, in addition to the troops which he had already been engaging, that he had been glad by night to make good his retreat over Banks's Ford.

Hooker should have been relieved at once. He recovered his normal health, he recovered with it his old arrogance, demanding from the military authorities at Washington that they should make some recognition of the merit of the army. But it is hard to dissever an army from its chief, impossible in official orders to recognize their duality. He found only condemnation for Sedgwick, the one who, as an independent commander, had had the opportunity to

distinguish himself, and he had not neglected it. The one bright spot in the operations at Chancellorsville, regarding them as a whole, is the part which Sedgwick there played. Hooker, who had declared that he held the enemy on ground of his own choice, found out that he had failed because there was not room enough to fight; as if, where there is room enough for one side to fight, there is not room enough for the other, and as if there is not room enough to fight where there is enough to run away. It always seems puerile to discuss the self-evident, but among the smaller ills of life is the task set by unreason to have the self-evident demonstrated. Falsification often masquerades under the name of charity, but in history it certainly can have no claim to place. At any time Hooker would have been unequal to the command of a large army in the critical event of battle, and when he commanded in that event the Army of the Potomac, he was not entirely in his right mind. The army was worthy of all praise for its conduct, doubly so for its conduct under the most trying circumstances, such as an army never before experienced, and possibly never will again. What Hooker might have been able to do under different conditions of mind and body, we can never know. We can never know about the affair in general aught but that which the military authorities should have known at the beginning, that Hooker was by constitution of character, apart from his military capacity, whatever that may have been, unequal to so great a command as that which he confidently and exultantly undertook.

CHAPTER XIV.

FROM CHANCELLORSVILLE TO GETTYSBURG.

THE rank and file of the army did not suffer demoralization through the failure of Chancellorsville. They were indignant that the army, although it had not been fought, had been obliged to bear the stigma of having been disgracefully defeated. Naturally, the relation of the higher officers to the affair was different. They too felt indignation at what had occurred, but additionally, their superior position brought greater responsibility and greater power to control events. It would be to expect more than human beings are capable of, more than in high-spirited and capable officers would be duty, to imagine that they should not wish and endeavor to make it impossible for the future that the army should be helplessly offered to the blows of the enemy. The losses that the enemy had sustained might, it is true, equal their own, but losses in killed and wounded do not alone settle the question of victory, for the victors sometimes sustain the greater losses in these. Lee had not only caused the army, half-fought, to retreat, but while the two forces had remained arrayed against each other, had dictated the whole course of events as though toying with his opponent. Hooker, in relative repose, actually let his adversary play his own game. Two whole corps, and parts still intact of a third, had been either idle spectators or auditors of battle. The sting of this disgrace naturally made officers of high rank freely communicate to each other their fears for a future under Hooker's command. Hooker, on his side, must have known of the general sentiment

against him, for he took the honorable course of paving the way for free expression of opinion to the President as to the conduct of affairs.

It could not have escaped the attentive reader, in connection with the episode of recrossing the Rappahannock, narrated in the last chaper, that General Meade was highly regarded by other corps-commanders besides Reynolds, between whom and himself there was the warmest friendship. That the inference is correct is clearly shown by an occurrence that took place soon after the battle of Chancellorsville. Reynolds and Couch were successively sounded by the authorities in Washington as to whether or not they would be willing to accept the command of the army, and we know now more than General Meade himself for a long time did, that they both declined it, and recommended him as the fittest man for the place. In addition to the feeling which any officer would have under the circumstances, that his succession would be to a command in which there had been three conspicuous failures, there was the much-to-be-dreaded military administration of affairs at Washington, represented chiefly by the position of Halleck as general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States. It is no wonder that, under these circumstances, even such men as Reynolds and Couch should have shrunk from accepting the command of the army, even if they both had not had the conviction that Meade was the man for the place. If Couch, moreover, was not willing, even although senior corps-commander of the army, to accept the command of it, he was not even able to bear the anticipation of being again found amidst active operations under the command of Hooker, and therefore, alarmed at a demonstration across the Rappahannock which Hooker was making with the Sixth Corps, he requested to be relieved from the command of the Second Corps, and on the 10th of June bade it fare-

well, and proceeded to take charge of the newly created Department of the Susquehanna, succeeded in command of the Corps by General Hancock.

Lee's forces had been largely increased by the return of the two divisions of Longstreet which had been south of Richmond, and by the addition of troops levied by conscription, while at the same time Hooker's had been diminished by the expiration of the short terms of service of certain levies. There was no longer between the two armies the disparity in numbers which had existed at Chancellorsville. Hooker's army was reduced to about eighty-five thousand men, including cavalry, and that of Lee increased to an amount very slightly over that number. Under these circumstances, to which must be added the low condition of Lee's commissariat, the need of an effective invasion to replenish it, and the prevalent desire of the South to make an invasion as a political stroke which might have the effect of causing the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy by foreign powers, involving the breaking of the blockade and the triumph of the Southern cause, the authorities at Richmond resolved upon an irruption into the North under what they deemed more favorable conditions than those under which it had been previously attempted.

Hooker, through floating reports in Southern newspapers, had suspected this design, and was on the alert to discover the beginning of any movement. On the 3d of June, 1863, Hood's and McLaws's divisions, of Longstreet's corps, marched from different positions to concentrate at Culpeper, off to Hooker's right, about midway between the Rapidan and Rappahannock, while the corps of A. P. Hill continued to occupy the lines south of the Rappahannock. The movement could not, however, be so completely disguised that Hooker should remain in entire ignorance that something


PART OF
MAP OF PORTIONS
OF THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
OF
WASHINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA, ANNAPOLIS
AND
NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA
Compiled in the
BUREAU OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENG^RS WAR DEPARTMENT &c.
July 1861.
Union
FRANKLIN RAILROAD
Fairview
Cherry Run
Williamsport
North Mountain
Hedgesville
Bedington
Downsville
Bakersville
Mercersville
Hard Scrabble
Porterstown
MARTINSBURG
Shepherdstown
Darkesville
Kearneysville
Leetown
Duffields
HARPER'S FERRY
Smithfield
CHARLESTOWN
Cameron
Wadesville
Stephensons
Berryville
Purcellville
Snickersville
Millwood
Bloomfield
Union
Middleburg
Springfield
Newtown

projected was going forward. It was in consequence of this that, on the 6th of June, the Sixth Corps made a reconnoissance in force across the Rappahannock, the movement already referred to in connection with the final resolution of Couch to depart before worse should come of Hooker's manœuvres.

Hooker's manœuvre, however, was perfectly correct, but Couch did not feel assured as to what it would lead. No positive information was gained by making it, for A. P. Hill presented a solid front, and the march of Hood and McLaws continued uninterruptedly to Culpeper without Hooker's being any the wiser. Accident, however, revealed what design had failed to ferret out. The knowledge that Stuart's cavalry was at Culpeper induced Hooker to send the whole of his cavalry force, now under General Alfred Pleasanton, to dislodge it from that point. In consequence, a long and spirited cavalry engagement occurred, characterized by many changes of fortune experienced by the combatants. The main outcome of the action, however, known as the cavalry engagement at Brandy Station, proved doubly advantageous for the Federal side, inasmuch as, incidentally to its being the first cavalry fight in which the Federal had proved itself able to cope with the Confederate horsemen, it revealed the presence of the infantry advance of Lee.

It was imagined that Lee would take the same line of advance that he had adopted against Pope, but he did not. He would not have dared to take the one that he followed but for the fact that, on this occasion, he underestimated his opponent, or else knew that the supreme authority in Washington would not let him carry out his plans. While Hooker, naturally supposing that Lee would adopt the safe line of advance, was manœuvring to guard it, Lee, still keeping A. P. Hill behind the Rappahannock and Long-

street at Culpeper, had sent Ewell, with his corps, through Chester Gap, in the Blue Ridge, whence, marching north through the Shenandoah Valley, he, in rivalry of the former wonderful speed of Jackson, and with Jackson's old corps, arrived before Winchester in the evening of the 13th of June. It was a most daring operation in which Lee had engaged, if anything can be called daring attempted against the obtuseness of Halleck. Hooker was nominally in command of the army, Halleck was the drag attached to all its operations. Hooker had anticipated the possibility that this situation might arise in case that Lee should begin an invasion, and had prepared to meet it by requesting that he be allowed, in the event of its occurrence, to fall on the isolated force in the rear with the whole army. This had been positively prohibited by Halleck. In the specified eventuality, what all military teaching schools men to do, Halleck, as general-in-chief of the armies of the United States, had forbidden and presumably had induced the President also to forbid. There remained for Hooker now only one rational move. The one discarded would have caused Ewell's recall. The one that had to be adopted was to fall back along the line with which the reader became acquainted during the recital of the operations under Pope, the line through Warrenton to Manassas; this, with the object of covering Washington while awaiting there Lee's further initiative. Lee's first purpose was gained. A. P. Hill, relieved of the presence of the Army of the Potomac near his front, was at liberty to take up the line of advance, and he joined Longstreet at Culpeper.

While these movements were taking place east of the Blue Ridge, west of it, in the Shenandoah Valley, Ewell was having full swing towards the execution of Lee's ultimate designs. Before this campaign, the Confederate army had been reorganized by being thrown into three *corps d'armée*,

so that the three corps of which it was now composed, A. P. Hill's, Longstreet's, and Ewell's, each formed a little army of about twenty-five thousand men, with all three arms complete, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, capable of operating to advantage alone, or when concentrated with the others, acting as a single grand army. Never before had the Army of Northern Virginia been so well equipped and so elated. To itself it seemed equal to any enterprise, and it may well be questioned whether it ever again attained to such a pitch of moral and physical force. The reader may easily imagine that, under these circumstances, Ewell had an easy task to make himself master of the ill-guarded Valley of Virginia.

It has been mentioned that Ewell arrived before Winchester on the evening of the 13th of June. Cutting off telegraphic communication by his cavalry, he drove Milroy, with whom the reader made some slight acquaintance at the second battle of Bull Run, behind the defences of Winchester. Milroy, with his small force of about five thousand men, was wholly unequal to holding the place against one so great as Ewell brought against it, or of making a spirited defence of it, and attempted to withdraw his troops on the night of the 14th of June, but being unable to make good his retreat, lost during the running fight that ensued nearly the whole of them as prisoners. The small garrison at Berryville was captured, and the garrison at Harper's Ferry had to be withdrawn to Maryland Heights, just across the Potomac, the topography around which place has been here elaborately described in connection with Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry on the occasion of the battle of the Antietam. By these operations Lee became possessed of the *débouchure* from the Valley of the Shenandoah proper into the valley as continued north of the Potomac; for it would be absurd to suppose that, with the respective forces,

as now distributed, Lee would not be able to force the passage of the Potomac above Washington.

The two corps of A. P. Hill and Longstreet being at Culpeper, and the corps of Ewell near Winchester, Lee's next move on the military chess-board was to advance Longstreet, with Stuart's cavalry, along the east side of the Blue Ridge, to hold Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, leading to the Shenandoah Valley, while that of A. P. Hill, marching through the gaps in his rear, continued down the valley to Winchester, protected in flank by the disposition of the corps of Longstreet. Hooker was powerless to do anything but to await developments, whilst he made excellent dispositions and felt for the position of the enemy, in order to ascertain his progress without compromising any portion of his own forces or uncovering Washington. On the 17th of June, beyond Aldie's Gap, in the Bull Run Range, just east of and parallel to the Blue Ridge, a cavalry engagement took place which enabled Pleasanton, in following it up on the 20th and 21st, to learn something of the dispositions of the enemy further westward.

Lee, who was with Longstreet's corps, the First, passed through the Blue Ridge, and on the 18th of June was at Berryville, just east of Winchester, where he made his final preparations for crossing the Potomac. He left to the discretion of Stuart, who commanded his main body of cavalry, where to cross the river, after his duty of still holding the passes of the Blue Ridge had ceased with the advance of the army of Northern Virginia over the Potomac. Ewell's corps, the Second, crossed on the 23d of June, and A. P. Hill's, the Third, on the 24th, while Lee himself crossed with Longstreet on the 25th. Small bodies of cavalry, however, had already, under Jenkins and Imboden, preceded the advance of the infantry, and were then engaged in the work of railroad destruction and the collection of supplies.

Hooker had not been taken unawares. He had advanced correspondingly, and had possessed himself of the fords in the vicinity of Leesburg, over which he began his advance in a parallel line to Lee's direction,—towards Frederick. We are again brought to the consideration of the peculiar conformation of the country, noticed in a former chapter, with reference to the singular advantage it afforded to the invader from the south. What might be called the Shenandoah Valley *coulisses* of the theatre in which war was now being waged, continuing north of the Potomac as Cumberland Valley, converge more and more towards Washington and the seats of the densest population, so that the Southern actors in the drama could with impunity arrange and play their parts ending with the last act of battle, and with a mountain-curtain which, if not needful for victory, would go far towards securing safety in defeat. So far, the advantage is with Lee, in the characteristics of the country, and in his having the initiative in advancing. There is one disadvantage, however, under which he will continue to labor for several days. Stuart makes a mistake in his calculations, and crosses the Potomac below instead of above the Army of the Potomac, whose interposing columns cut him off from all communication with Lee until after Gettsyburg has been reached.

The Army of the Potomac crossed the river on the 26th and 27th of June. Therefore, excluding question of cavalry, the Army of Northern Virginia, counting Ewell's advance, had the advantage of it by from three to four days in time. On the 28th the Army of the Potomac was concentrated at Frederick. Hooker's manœuvres now evidently indicated at least a demonstration on Lee's rear, by throwing a force through the main gap at South Mountain, the same for the possession of which the battle of that name, previously described, took place. His plans were brought to a sudden

termination, however, by an event wholly unexpected by the army. Halleck was on this occasion, as he continued to be to the end of the war, the chief one of the *impedimenta* of the army. As the garrison of ten thousand men, which, under General French had evacuated the post of Harper's Ferry, upon the advance of Lee, remained in occupation of Maryland Heights, where it could have no influence whatever on the current of events, Hooker had requested that it might be ordered to reinforce him, and this Halleck refused to allow. The discussion led to acrimonious feeling on both sides, which resulted in Hooker's being relieved of the command of the army at a time when, so far as the conduct of the campaign up to the present was concerned, he merited nothing less than the fullest recognition and praise. Still, the occurrence may be regarded now as a fortunate ending of the controversy. But that is, as after the event, judging easily. Only such a man as Halleck, timid and irresolute, could have been blind to the danger of the experiment, for in emergencies timidity and rashness often go hand-in-hand. What is, however, most conspicuously censurable in this proceeding is the motive which to all appearance brought about Hooker's fall, and the injudiciousness displayed in the choice of time for his removal, which ought to have taken place weeks before it occurred. Hooker, harassed as he had been by Halleck's recent interference with his plans, and piqued to the quick by the continued disregard with which his recommendations were treated by a man deciding at his ease in Washington, while he had the pressure of the field, asked to be relieved of the command of the army. It is questionable, judging by the character of Hooker, and by the circumstance that an engagement was known to be imminent, if Hooker was sincere in his request, if he really thought that it would be granted, if he did not rather imagine that in the emergency his self-

assertion would be respected and tolerated. However that may be, his request was actually granted, and he was relieved of the command in the night of the 27th of June, and General Meade appointed to it. Both parties were obviously in the wrong, Hooker in proffering his resignation and Halleck in accepting it, but Halleck the more grievously. The crying injustice of the thing as it actually occurred was in the advantage taken of Hooker's act to relieve him when his course had been meritorious, instead of having relieved him when he had by signal failure justified that extreme measure. The circumstance forms one of the incontrovertible proofs of the unfitness of Halleck for the general administration of military affairs. Not only with reference to personal consideration is what has been adduced against the untimeliness of the removal irrefutable, but with reference to the situation of the army on the eve of battle, the removal, as unprecedented under such circumstances, and as involving the gravest risks, rendered the act of Halleck wholly unjustifiable.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIRST DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

THE field of Gettysburg was, from the nature of things, not to either hostile commander a pre-elected ground on which to join battle, but was forced upon both by conditions which neither could anticipate, but which each, seeking to control, could at best but modify. Only to one whose superlative knowledge included that of every disposition of troops, and that of every order emanating from the headquarters of both armies, would it have been possible to predict where the final collision would take place. Armies so situated, and groping for each other, may be likened to huge predatory creatures which put forth their tentacles in all directions, and when they find the nucleus of their prey, where the greatest force resides, concentratedly move to and attack from the point of greatest vantage. The general reader would not be interested in the itinerary of marches representing this first condition of things in both armies. It will therefore suffice to describe here incidentally, in due order of time, their respective positions just before their final concentration.

On the 28th of June the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac was at Middletown. On the morning of the 29th General Meade set the whole of his force in motion towards the north, to make, as he expressed it, the enemy loose his hold on the Susquehanna, for at that time Ewell had reached York and Carlisle, and was about to capture Harrisburg by crossing the bridge at that place, when he was recalled by

THE BATTLE
Drawn (from authentic sources) by R. Meade Bache.
FOR THE SAKE OF CLEARNESS, ALL BUT
THE PRINCIPAL ROADS ARE OMITTED,
AND ALSO DETAIL OF WOODS AND HOUS
Hagerstown
Willoughby Run
Marsh Creek

Lee. Early, of Ewell's column, attempted to capture the bridge below, at Wrightsville, when it was burned by the opposing troops, and he, too, retraced his steps towards Lee. Lee, with Longstreet and Hill, at Chambersburg, had been contemplating junction with Ewell towards the east, when he was forced to concentrate elsewhere by the fact that the rapid advance of Meade threatened his communications with Ewell. Spreading out his different corps, fan-shaped, from west to east, Meade was approaching by forced marches. General A. L. Long, Military Secretary to Lee, says in his memoirs of that general: "The rapid advance of General Meade was unexpected, and exhibited a celerity that hitherto had not been displayed by the Federal army. A speedy concentration of the Confederate army was now necessary. Before dawn on the morning of the 29th orders were despatched requiring the immediate junction of the army, and on the 30th the Confederate forces were in motion towards Gettysburg. At the same time General Meade was pressing forward for that place." Pressing forward towards that place he certainly was, but in the sense that he had determined on that place for battle, he was not pressing forward "for" that place. At the time General Meade thought that he might be obliged to fight on the line of Pipe Creek, and had taken his measures accordingly, and General Lee had not the slightest idea as to where he would be forced to fight. Gettysburg was simply a strategic point of great value on account of the important roads converging there, but whether it would prove in the view of either commander to be tactically well adapted to battle neither commander knew, for neither intimately knew the character of the ground.

Buford, with his cavalry, was, as early as the 29th of June, guarding the northern approaches to the town of Gettysburg. On the 30th Pettigrew's brigade, Heth's division,

of Hill's corps, was advancing on the town from the north, intending to levy a contribution of shoes from the inhabitants, when it found the roads in possession of Buford, and withdrawing, planned for the next day the descent in force which led to the battle of Gettysburg. Hill was only about seven miles off and Ewell only about nine when they bivouacked on the night of the 30th of June preceding the fateful encounter of the morning of the 1st of July. Ewell, recalled by orders from the direction of Harrisburg, was arriving on the field by the roads from the north and northeast, while Hill, having issued from Cashtown Pass, in the South Mountain Range, Lee accompanying Longstreet in the rear, was arriving by the roads leading from the northwest into Gettysburg.

Reynolds, in command of the left wing of the Army of the Potomac, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, of which he had with him, on the morning of the 1st of July, the First and Eleventh, heard, just after nine o'clock, as he was advancing towards Gettysburg from his bivouac of the previous night, the horse-artillery of Buford in action, and pushing hastily forward, while he sent orders to Howard to follow rapidly, he reached the field of battle about ten o'clock. Buford was engaged northwest of Gettysburg across the Chambersburg turnpike, in the valley of Willoughby Run, over which the turnpike passes at right-angles. Reynolds had hardly formed his line, Wadsworth coming first into action, when most unhappily he was killed by the bullet of a sharpshooter, and the army had sustained a loss which it is impossible to measure, so great was his military skill and force of leadership.

Reynolds had entered into Buford's action about ten o'clock, and had but just begun to make his dispositions when he was stricken down. Doubleday succeeded him in command, and so remained until the arrival of Howard in

advance of his corps, the Eleventh, when Doubleday, being thus ranked, relinquished the command to him. The Eleventh Corps arrived about noon south of Gettysburg, but did not get fairly into position on the north of it until after one o'clock in the afternoon. Schurz's and Barlow's divisions were the Third and First, Schurz in immediate command of the right, General Schimmelfenning taking his division, and General Doubleday commanding on the left of that part of the field. Von Steinwehr's division, the Second, coming up about two o'clock, was stationed to the rear, south of the town, on Cemetery Hill. Therefore it was, that from ten in the morning until after one o'clock in the afternoon, the First Corps alone, with Buford's cavalry, had borne the brunt of the enemy's attempted advance across the valley of Willoughby Run, and had forced Hill to pause and await the arrival of Ewell from the northeastward. During this lull in the battle, Schurz's and Barlow's divisions were coming into position on the right of the First Corps. Ewell's troops began to arrive about half-past two o'clock, and almost immediately attacking the line of the Eleventh Corps, hopelessly routed it. Schurz's and Barlow's divisions of the Eleventh Corps, having taken position on the right of the First Corps, the whole line thus enclosed the roads radiating north like the spokes of a half-wheel from the hub of Gettysburg. But Ewell's corps, arriving by the Carlisle, Harrisburg, and York roads, from north towards northeast, secured also the signal advantage of the occupation of the eminence, Oak Hill, between the Carlisle and the Mummasburg Road, a position which commanded the whole field and enfiladed part of it.

Scant justice has been done the Eleventh Corps as to the engagement of the first day of Gettysburg. It, as a corps, was far from equal to the First Corps, but the popular belief that the relative firmness of its stand on that field

wholly gauges their relative excellence is erroneous. The difference in the stand has generally been ascribed solely to difference in the quality of their respective troops, and to the Eleventh Corps' having extended its right too far, thereby permitting a gap to exist between its left and the right of the First Corps, of which the enemy took advantage to disrupt the line and take the right-rear of the First Corps in reverse. Now, although as a corps the Eleventh was far inferior to the First, the result of the collision of the first day, irrespective of the numerical superiority of the enemy, is not attributable to the cause assigned. The gap between the left of the Eleventh and the right of the First Corps was not caused by the undue extension of the Eleventh Corps to the right. The right could not have been placed otherwise than where it was, on and along Rock Creek.

The line occupied by the First Corps, in the valley and on the rise back of Willoughby Run, on McPherson's Ridge (a lower parallel ridge just west of Seminary Ridge), and towards the right, on the extension of Seminary Ridge, where it falls off to rise again and merge in the Heights of Oak Hill Ridge (on which Oak Hill, by the way, is not a separate hill, but a mere hump in the general range), is in places wooded and fairly strong against infantry attack. On the contrary, the line which the Eleventh Corps was forced to occupy with reference to the advance of the enemy from the north and northeast, and as nearly as possible in conformity with the position of the First Corps on its left, has no strength whatever as derived from the nature of the ground, being on a low, ill-defined roll in the surface, only a few feet above Rock Creek, and perfectly open in every direction. Besides, in saying that these are the essentially different characteristics of the position of the First Corps as contrasted with that of

the Eleventh, all is not included that is to the purpose. It is the interdependence of two or more positions, as constituting the excellence or the absence of it for a line of battle in its entirety, that is determinative of the relative staunchness of its defenders. A line of battle embracing the periphery of the ground described cannot assimilate the occupancy of its parts. The conditions here are such that the ground on the right, as compared with that on the left, is absolutely untenable against the advance of an equal adversary, and the line of the left thereby rendered untenable; its derived weakness from the right being intensified by the fact that it is partially enfiladed by an enemy occupying Oak Hill with artillery. Owing to the nature of the ground the strength of the whole field was involved. The right of the First Corps was perched up on the ridge where it is cut by the Mummasburg Road, while the left of the Third Division of the Eleventh Corps occupied the ground many feet below it, without the possibility of junction with it, save at the sacrifice of relinquishing for itself and the First Division of the corps, on its right, both direction and the trifling elevation of ground it already possessed. The position brought it about also, that the Eleventh, more largely than the First Corps, flooded the streets of Gettysburg upon the retreat of both bodies, which retreat ought to have been a foregone conclusion, in view of the weakness of the position and the numerical superiority of the enemy. If the Union infantry there present had been the best drilled, disciplined, and officered troops in the world, and every man as brave as Julius Cæsar, it would have been impossible for them finally to maintain themselves against even infantry attack, involving necessarily, with the relatively few troops in hand, the right and the left-rear of the Eleventh Corps and the right-rear of the First, or if that could be put out of question, to maintain themselves against a general

attack, after the enemy had fully deployed and occupied Oak Hill with artillery. The lines of the First and Eleventh Corps were, in fact, and, of necessity, disposed rectangularly, with the angle towards the north, while the enemy enveloped them by the full angle of one hundred and eighty degrees, and this circumstance was aggravated by the great numerical inferiority of the Union forces and the inferiority of the ground they held for both infantry and artillery; conditions which formed in the aggregate disadvantages inordinately more than sufficient to compel the abandonment of the field.

What with the signal advantage acquired by the enemy, through his occupation of Oak Hill, on one of the lines by which he was approaching from the north, resulting in a commanding artillery fire, the inherent weakness of the ground as a whole for a line of battle, and the inadequate number of troops for closing up the centre, the enemy finally advanced through the opening between the right of the First Corps and the left of the Third Division of the Eleventh, while, despite the reinforcement of Coster's brigade, of the Second Division, sent by Howard from Cemetery Hill to the right-rear of the First, the enemy also outflanked the right of the line of battle, and the troops fell back to Cemetery Ridge, through and beyond the town. The major portion of the Eleventh Corps retired in confusion through the streets of Gettysburg, in which some of the right of the First Corps also became entangled, fugitives from the former continuing their career along the Baltimore turnpike, beyond the town, towards the southeast. The centre and left of the First Corps retreated to Seminary Ridge, where for a while they prevented the enemy from advancing in that direction, after that marching across to the opposite heights of Cemetery Ridge. The reverse was decided. The action, favorably begun, and for a long time

sustained, chiefly through the excellence and good handling of the First Corps and Buford's force, had terminated in disaster, involving the loss, all-told, of nearly ten thousand men to the Federal army, of whom nearly five thousand, chiefly those entangled in the streets of Gettysburg, had been made prisoners. These great losses were only partly compensated for by the considerable ones which had been inflicted on the enemy in killed and wounded and very many prisoners, the number of the last, however, being much below those secured by the enemy.

It was about half-past four o'clock in the afternoon when the two corps which had been engaged found themselves in full retreat. Suddenly an actor arrived on the scene who changed chaos into order, and out of despair brought hope. How he came there so opportunely, as if descended from the clouds, was because General Meade had chosen him as the man of all men fitted to represent him on the ground. It is the attribute of littleness either not to recognize or to ignore superior qualities, and of greatness to perceive them at a glance and put them to the highest service. General Meade had always been outspoken in his admiration for Hancock's soldierly qualities, even to mention of his martial bearing, which he had always witnessed with unqualified delight. Here then were the men come together, as never more conspicuously happened, best fitted for achievement of a purpose, both without hesitation, and both gifted with indomitable energy for accomplishment. In vain was Meade reminded at noon, when he had heard of the collision that had taken place at Gettysburg, and he was giving Hancock instructions to take command on the field, that Howard was Hancock's senior. The President had, in Meade's case, knowing that he could rely on his judgment and justice, swept away the cobwebs of the rules of precedence by seniority. This was no time to trifle with the outcome of

events. Better that one man or that many should suffer than that a cause should be imperilled. Hancock was Meade's ideal for the mission on which he was bent. He could not go, and so he sent another self. His order to Hancock was dated at ten minutes past one o'clock, of the the 1st of July, and read as follows:—

"The Major-General Commanding has just been informed that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, namely, the Eleventh, First, and Third at Emmettsburg. If you think the ground and position there a better one on which to fight a battle, under existing circumstances, you will so advise the General, and he will order all the troops up. You know the General's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds."

The following postscript, dated five minutes later, was added:—

"Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move."

The phrase, in the orders to Hancock, "If you think the ground and position there [at Gettysburg] a better one on which to fight a battle," etc., needs explanation. What question was there of other ground? There was the question of the line of Pipe Creek. The reference was to that locality. Careful reconnoissances had been made of the ground.

General Meade had been in close consultation with Hancock, at Taneytown, under shelter of a tent. Hancock had learned briefly, from the terse speech which General Meade had at command, the whole bearing of the question

of a choice under the circumstances between Pipe Creek and Gettysburg, and when he left that tent with his written orders, and getting into an ambulance was driven rapidly towards the field of battle, studying the map of the country meanwhile, he was prepared, as he mounted his led horse, a few miles from Gettysburg, to act with the promptness which characterized him. As he rode up on Cemetery Hill the scene that met his gaze was very well calculated to make him feel that the emergency would tax all his energy. Hancock says in his report that he arrived on the field about three o'clock, but there is better evidence than that as to the time of his arrival from Hancock himself. His first written despatch from the field to General Meade is dated 5.25 P.M., and in it he says that he arrived about an hour before. Now, an officer writing from the field, time being an all-important element in war, looks at his watch. I shall, therefore, with reason state that Hancock probably arrived on the field about half-past four. Upon the fixing of the time necessarily depends what he could and what he could not have seen. The time mentioned in his report is incompatible with the generalized account of what he says he saw upon his arrival. Rectifying the time, we discover, independently of his account, through the medium of our knowledge of the periods at which the Eleventh Corps and the First Corps were respectively overtaken by disaster, and of our knowledge of the period of the occupation of Cemetery Ridge, that what he must have seen as to its details was Steinwehr's division in position on Cemetery Hill, and such other troops of the Eleventh Corps as it had been possible to collect as they came swarming from the town, half-halting, half-retreating along the Baltimore Turnpike; while the centre and left of the First Corps, not having been finally dislodged from their positions northwest of Gettysburg until about four o'clock, what he saw off to the left of the

town were organized bodies of that corps retreating in a comparatively orderly manner over Seminary Ridge, while Buford's cavalry was gathering on the plain in front, to form the rearguard to them in their march towards Cemetery Ridge. Soon Buford's cavalry presented the prettiest sight, than which war never afforded finer, drawn up in columns of massed battalions, midway in the valley between the ridges occupied by the respective forces, defiantly holding the Confederates back from their audacious appearance of an intention to advance, after the organized remnant of the First Corps had passed beyond Seminary towards Cemetery Ridge. The Confederates of Hill's corps occupied Seminary Ridge, as the First Corps in its retreat relinquished it, and Ewell's corps stretched around to the right, to take possession of Culp's Hill, a high knob in the right-rear of the position on Cemetery Hill; to which point, upon a threatening movement of the enemy in that direction, somewhat later, Hancock despatched Wadsworth's division of the First Corps.

It was under these discouraging circumstances that Hancock rode on the field, bringing with him the prestige of his name and deeds, and of his noble presence riding down the lines with centaur-like ease, fit, if ever man was, to witch the world with noble horsemanship. Drawing rein, he held around him a headquarters, to which officers coming sought orders to meet the crisis, and then moved on again for colloquy or command. As by a subtle shock, a force inducing other forces to array themselves and work a daily wonder, diffused matter takes on definite form, so Hancock riding upon the field caused mind and matter in mysterious combination to reassume their potent sway, and their units, resolving themselves under natural laws into thought and endeavor, crystallized once more into the military form and spirit which it had needed only his presence to evoke. As

by the wand of Prospero, a mightier, in moral force, had waved over the scene, and bade hearts be still, and hope rise again that seemed to have gone forever. So when Hancock, strenuously aided by Howard and Warren, chief-engineer of the army, by Buford and other officers of all ranks, had stopped the crowd of fugitives along the road to the rear, and received the broken regiments of the First and Eleventh Corps, still crowding on from Gettysburg, and had formed his lines to cover the ground until reinforcements should come, and Lee arriving, soon mounted the opposite crest of Seminary Ridge, there was in front of him an imposing Federal line of battle.

Ewell stated, in conversation with General Meade, after the war, that he had had twenty thousand men in hand, with whom he could have occupied Culp's Hill, but that he was restrained from so doing by a repeated order from Lee to act on the defensive. Colonel Taylor, however, of Lee's staff, says explicitly that he carried a message from Lee to Ewell, when the former had observed the retreat, saying that it was only necessary "to press those people" to secure possession of the northern Heights. Certain it is that if, at the point of time mentioned, Ewell had occupied Culp's Hill with a force of even ten thousand men, the Federal troops would have been obliged to evacuate the ground to the south of it, the prospective battle-field of the Union side.

In contemplation of the perfection of General Meade's dispositions, as illustrated by his successive orders, on official record, it is from one point of view amusing, and from another sad, to reflect that the popular notion, proved by thousands of discussions, is that the particular site called Gettysburg was the inevitable, foreordained spot on which the contest should take place, under penalty of its non-acceptance or abandonment being regarded as sacrilegious.

The event of concentration of the Union forces at Gettysburg, and at no other place, hinged upon two uncontrollable circumstances,—the impossibility of knowing in advance of final concentration exactly where the enemy's forces lay, and the impossibility of conveying a change of orders instantaneously upon the receipt of additional intelligence of his movements. Had General Meade either known earlier by a few hours where the scattered forces of the enemy were converging, or not knowing it, had the circular or the order which he sent Reynolds last had time to reach him, the great battle would not have taken place at Gettysburg, and, if on the line of Pipe Creek, would have taken place to much better advantage for concentration. The hands of both Meade and Lee were forced by events. It was out of their power to prevent the battle from taking place at Gettysburg. Reynolds did not receive the order which would have caused him to fall back on the line provisorily adopted by General Meade as the best, and the line which was strategically the best to assume, and so the battle took place in a good tactical, but a bad strategical position for the Union forces, because it could easily have been flanked on the south and its evacuation compelled. It took place on ground impossible for either leader to avoid,—for Lee, because he had no time to dally with prolonged manœuvres, or mind to take great risks, for Meade, because his forces had been so engaged that withdrawal of them would have been attended with certain loss of *morale*. The whole case is really stated in a brief note of Meade's to Hancock and Doubleday, dated 6 P.M. of the 1st of July, when he was still at Taneytown, in which note he says, "It seems to me that we have so concentrated that a battle at Gettysburg is now forced on us." The die was cast. Earlier in the day of the 1st of July a circular to the corps-commanders had been issued in which, from information of the enemy's dispositions, Rey-

nolds was ordered to fall back from Gettysburg towards Taneytown and Westminster. It was impossible to ascertain just where the enemy was concentrating. The several corps of the Army of the Potomac had to be held where they could meet to the best advantage any possible point of concentration of the enemy. Later in the day of July 1st a special order was despatched to Reynolds, showing that intelligence received indicated possible concentration of the enemy at Gettysburg, towards which Reynolds was marching. The order ends with the words:—"The movement of your corps on Gettysburg was ordered before positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received." At 12.30 P.M. of the 1st, General Meade, referring to this missive to Reynolds, sent an order to Hancock, in which he said, "In view of the advance of Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell on Gettysburg, and the possible failure of Reynolds to receive the orders to withdraw his command by the route to Taneytown, thus leaving the front of our position open, proceed with your troops out on the direct road to Gettysburg from Taneytown. When you find that General Reynolds is covering that road (instead of withdrawing by Emmettsburg, which it is feared that he may do), you will withdraw to Frizzellburg, as directed in the circular of directions for positions issued this morning." These and other similar instructions simply meant that, since the previous orders of march had been issued, General Meade had received information of the enemy's dispositions such as to render it desirable for him to fall back from Gettysburg, in view of the fact of the superior concentration of the enemy at that moment near that point, so that he himself could concentrate to better advantage further to the southward; and that he feared that Reynolds, without the knowledge which he himself possessed, would enter into an engagement from which it would

be impossible for him to withdraw. That happened. What General Meade had learned of the positions of the marching corps of the enemy, at the time when he so acted, was that the enemy would concentrate somewhere on the line joining York, passing to the north of Gettysburg to Mummasburg, thence to Chambersburg. He perceived that without the precaution he finally took, the enemy might, as actually occurred, concentrate to relatively better advantage. The course which he wisely took looked to the adoption of an appreciably parallel line to that just indicated as the one on which the enemy seemed to be moving; a line a few miles south of Gettysburg, from Manchester to Middleburg, in the general direction of Pipe Creek, where his right would be at Parr's Ridge, his left near the Monocacy, of which Pipe Creek is an easterly branch, his depot of supplies and his best line of communication at Westminster, in his rear; on which line his army could assemble without the exhaustion and numerical loss entailed by forced marches, where he would not only lie between the enemy and Baltimore and Washington, but on the flank of the enemy's line of communication with the Valley of Virginia, and in a position offering the alternatives of offence and defence from which to choose upon the final revelation of the intentions of the enemy, including the most advantageous position for his interception in case of his retreat without offering battle. The circular to the corps-commanders, however, expressly states that he might be obliged to assume the offensive from his present positions, as, in fact, proved to be the case. About noon of the 1st of July he knew that what he had apprehended, and worse, had taken place, that battle had been joined, and that General Reynolds was either dying or dead from a wound. Then he also knew that the die was finally cast, without possibility of reversal for the field of Gettysburg, unless tactically unfit for occupation, and thence came the sequence of

events in which Hancock was ordered to the field and the end came with victory. But, as stated at the beginning, the determination of the battle-ground as that at Gettysburg hung on two fundamental facts,—unavoidable ignorance, at the time when Reynolds moved forward towards Gettysburg, of the exact dispositions of the enemy, and after the receipt of fuller intelligence, lack of time for the new orders to reach his hands.

The Confederate army had had in its immediately preceding dispositions the facility of earlier concentration than that of which it had availed itself, in advance though it was of that of the Army of the Potomac with reference to the position of Gettysburg. Nothing could have been more favorable to it than that widely separated localities and positions of troops, uncalculated and incalculable by Lee as related to sudden concentration at that point, should conspire, as they did, in his favor to that end. By an accident of accidents it was brought about, that from northeast to northwest Lee's troops in great force began to pour almost simultaneously towards the town through roads representing a funnel emptying towards the north of Gettysburg. The Confederate army, as things eventuated, thus obtained, as a finality, the advantage of earlier, therefore, at first, of fuller concentration than the Federal one, only Pickett's division and Law's brigade, of Hood's division, remaining to reach the field on the morning of the 2d of July.

If things had fallen out otherwise than as they did, it would imply omniscience on the part of both of the generals commanding on this field. Reviewing the matter now, it is plainly seen that Gettysburg was not the best possible strategic position for the advancing Union army to assume, and that its occupation and the occupation of the opposing ridge by the enemy were the final resultant of able combinations by the opposing generals into which the unknown to

both largely entered. Both strategically and tactically Lee fought at a disadvantage, because, in both spheres, his situation was susceptible of betterment. Meade fought strategically to a disadvantage, for the reasons already assigned, and tactically to advantage, only because the enemy did not have time or wish to run the risk of relinquishing his lines of retreat through the mountains, in attempting to flank him out of his position. This is only reaffirming the wisdom of General Meade's course in selecting in advance the line of Pipe Creek as the probable scene of the conflict, and issuing the circular which indicated probable concentration there. If the enemy had been able to occupy Culp's Hill on the afternoon of the 1st of July, or, on the 2d, Lee had moved by the right flank across the roads to the south of the Gettysburg position, Meade would, in either case, have found the position untenable. In the first case he would have been driven out of it by reverse fire, and in the second, he would have been cut off from his base at Baltimore and Washington, between which and the enemy he was bound to lie.

Had Reynolds received the order, which, in connection with the preceding circular, would have shown him that the true strategical position, as determined by the latest intelligence, was to the south of Gettysburg, and he did not, he would have ordered Buford's force, already engaged north of Gettysburg, to withdraw, instead of supporting it with infantry. Had he, in default of the receipt of the new orders, been aware of what it was impossible for him to know, for lack of time to learn it, the utter weakness of the position north of Gettysburg against an enemy advancing on the roads converging there and occupying Oak Hill with artillery, he had too good a knowledge of the positions of the advancing corps of the Union army, and was too good a soldier to attempt to make an irrevocable

stand there. He would have disengaged Buford and retired by the open roads towards the south. But not having received the orders, not knowing all that time has disclosed, he was forced, upon the basis of the premises at his disposal, to decide exactly as he did, and Meade and Hancock, in turn, were, upon the premises respectively before them, forced to decide as they did. The fact is, glorious as is the name of Gettysburg, which is entirely beside the question, that through the inscrutable fortunes of war, a battle was fought at a point not strategically the best for the Union army, and tactically admirable only because the enemy allowed the army unobstructedly to occupy it by default of movement to his right; the first step in occupation leading to the unavoidable defeat and losses of the first day. Such, as well illustrated here, is the large part that chance plays in war, and all that the greatest of generals can do is to meet at the instant the emergencies which blended design and chance present to him for counteraction. As in this, one of the attributes of great generalship, General Meade was always equal to the situation, he accepted the inevitable, and Gettysburg became the battlefield that for the first time staggered the Confederate power.

Hancock arrived on the field, he says, at three o'clock in the afternoon, but as has been shown, at about half-past four o'clock. In an hour he had effected a wonderful transformation. At that time he despatched an aide to General Meade to inform him of the situation, and that the position was held. Later on he sent another aide with a written despatch to him. Just as Hancock's final dispositions had been made, a portion of Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, arrived, which Hancock ordered to the left, along the line to and inclusive of Little Round Top. As the main battle of the second day turned upon the abandonment of this position by General Sickles, it becomes neces-

sary here to fix beyond the peradventure of a doubt the incidents connected with the occupation of it. Hancock says, in his report, "I ordered the division [Geary's] to the high ground to the right of and near Round Top Mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmettsburg Road as well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown Road, to our rear." In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he says, "I directed General Geary, whose division belonged to the Twelfth Corps, (its commander, General Slocum, not then having arrived,) to take possession of the high ground towards Round Top." Further on, in the same testimony, he says: "The next morning [the 2d], some time after daylight, I again reported to General Meade, at Gettysburg, and assumed the command of my own corps after it arrived. I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only half way. General Sickles was directed [the context shows, directed by General Meade] to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by General Howard) to Round Top Mountain." In his official report, speaking of the morning of the 2d of July, in connection with his account of his dispositions of his own troops, the Second Corps, upon their arrival on the field, General Hancock says: "The troops were soon placed in position, the right resting near the Emmettsburg Road, to the west of Cemetery Hill, connecting there on the right with the Eleventh Corps and on the left with the Third Corps, the line of battle extending along the crest from the left of Cemetery Hill to Round Top Mountain, the ground being less elevated, as near Round Top." So, the line of the Third Corps was, to Hancock's eye, extended, at least in a general way, from his left to Little Round Top.

General Geary's report states that, "By his [Hancock's] direction, upon this threatening emergency [on the afternoon of the 1st] I took up a position on the extreme left of the line of battle, as the enemy was reported to be attempting to flank it, and cavalry were already skirmishing in front of that position." He adds, "At 5 P.M. this movement was consummated, and my line extended at that time from about half a mile west of the Baltimore turnpike to . . . . a range of hills south and west of the town, which I occupied with two regiments of the First Brigade. These hills I regarded as of the utmost importance, since their possession by the enemy would give him an opportunity of enfilading our entire left wing and centre with a fire which could not fail to dislodge us from our position. This line was held by the First and Third Brigades." Further on Geary says: "At 5 A.M. on the 2d, having been relieved by the Third Corps," etc.

Colonel Charles Candy, commanding the First Brigade, referred to by Geary above, says in his report, "Near about dark [of the 1st] was ordered to throw forward two regiments to the left, and occupy a high range of hills overlooking the surrounding country, and watch for any attempted advance of the enemy on the left of the army. This order was executed, and the Fifth Ohio and One Hundred and Forty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers occupied the above position during the night of July 1st."

General Meade himself, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, made a statement regarding the position which he had ordered Sickles to occupy on the morning of the 2d of July, in which this passage occurs: "directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the Second Corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in general terms that his right was to rest upon Hancock's left, and his left was

to extend to the Round Top Mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it."

No evidence was ever offered in a court-of-law more conclusive than this, that General Sickles's position was clearly defined, and the ground itself is extant to prove that the line, as thus defined upon it, is unmistakable. The obviousness of the necessity of occupying the position described is vividly brought before the mind by an incident which Major Veale, of Geary's staff, has recounted to me. He says that when he, in company with General Geary, approached Hancock on the field, he was standing all alone, and that Geary, riding up and introducing himself, Hancock almost immediately said, substantially in these words, indicating the Round Tops by a gesture: "General, that hill is the key-point of this position. Unless the army holds that point it will have to fall back to the line of Pipe Creek. In the absence of General Slocum I take the responsibility of ordering you to occupy that position."

There was in existence, then, to a certain group of men, a line of determinate position and fixed termini on the field of Gettysburg,—to Meade, Hancock, Geary, Candy, all of whom before and after the battle labored under the hallucination, or possessed true perception, that such a line exists in nature. Now, as the same hallucination does not beset different individuals at the same time, we may conclude that the perception of these men was not at fault. And to the testimony already cited as to the topographically evidential character of the line mentioned, may be added that of Birney and Humphreys, commanding the two divisions of the Third Corps, under General Sickles, both of whom describe a line in bearing and length and topographical limitation as a line which they actually occupied, which line corresponds in description with that of a position defined by Meade, Hancock, and Geary, the last of whom even speaks

of having personally occupied it. The fact that a line is described by so many persons in the same language would seem to indicate that it is identically the same line. It would also seem to have been fixed as the same by the statement of General Newton, when he remarked that the Federal troops had been "hammered into a good position," since the position to which he refers coincides with the previous descriptions, as they, in turn, agree with a characteristic feature of the field. All these men seem to have perceived a line which constitutes one and the same position, and yet General Sickles alone was found, with battle impending, and explicit instructions to guide him, unable to recognize it, and stating that his predecessor, Geary, had had no position, Geary's message to him, his sight, his orders, and everything else to the contrary notwithstanding.

Well aware am I that I have introduced here a surplusage of evidence to prove a fact, but I have been constrained to take that course because, to this day, there are persons to whom the demonstration is satisfactorily made, that the ridge along the Emmettsburg Road represents a better position than that of Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops. But even if it does, which is here conclusively disproved, such a statement in this connection is wide of the point as to whether or not General Sickles knew the position which it was intended he should occupy.

Between five and six o'clock Slocum in person arrived by the way of the Baltimore turnpike. His own mission having been accomplished, Hancock turned over to him, as the senior officer on the field, the command of the assembled forces, and rode off towards General Meade's headquarters. Meeting the Second Corps, his own, a short distance from the field, he ordered it to remain in that position to guard against an attack on the left at Gettysburg, and then continued onward to make his report in person to the com-

manding-general. Just after dark two brigades of the Third Corps, under General Birney, reached the field. General Humphreys, with his two brigades of the corps, having been misdirected by an aide of General Sickles's, did not arrive until between one and two o'clock in the morning of the 2d. The two remaining brigades of this corps of only two divisions did not arrive until ten o'clock in the morning of the 2d. The Fifth Corps, off to the left, about twenty miles, could, by a determined night march, reach the field early the next morning. The Sixth Corps was at Manchester, off to the left, over thirty miles by march. Its arrival could not be hoped for until later on the morrow, even with the unrelenting forced march which it was sure to make under a man like Sedgwick.

Hancock did not get back to Taneytown until about ten o'clock at night, just as Meade was preparing to depart for what he now regarded as the front, having, previously to Hancock's arrival, come to the conclusion to fight at Gettysburg, and having already expedited orders to the outlying corps to concentrate there. After a brief colloquy with Hancock, Meade rode rapidly towards the field, stopping only for a moment to order Gibbon, in position with the Second Corps, where Hancock had stationed it, three miles distant on the Federal left flank, to march by daylight for the Heights of Gettysburg.

Before resuming the account of the battle, a few points must be here disposed of at the expense of an unavoidable digression, for the reader must remember that, at bottom, this work represents a sketch of the life of General Meade, and that whereas, were I writing a mere history, I should have to dwell only on the facts that constitute the surface of things, I must here conduct the reader behind the scenes, if he would learn what vitally concerns the military reputation of the subject of this memoir. One of

these points relates to a cloud of misrepresentations intended to show, to the disparagement of General Meade, that he did not intend to fight at Gettysburg, as if that, of itself, were of any significance whatever. Every military man knows that no general can, in the midst of strategic movements, determine positively where he shall fight. The reason for this ought, indeed, to be self-evident. His adversary's movements complicate the question as the locality of battle. Lee, for instance, was able, through no default of Meade's, to concentrate a little earlier than he; but suppose that Lee had had the advantage of twelve hours more than he actually gained, the impending battle could not have been fought at Gettysburg. Suppose that, on the contrary, Meade had had the advantage of twelve hours more than he could obtain, as the event turned out, the battle would have been fought at least near, and if at Gettysburg, without the episode of the first day, and consequently without that of the second. It is an inevitable conclusion from facts, that Meade, at Taneytown, could not, for two reasons, know if, whatever he might desire, he would be able to fight at Gettysburg. First, in the natural order, is the fact that he could not know if the defence of the advance had been sufficient to enable him to occupy the ground in time; and second, if that were conceded, if the ground he could secure would be tactically well adapted for his line of battle. Consequently, when he despatched Hancock to the front, the resolution of these two points was involved in that mission, to determine if the ground were fit, and if the stand were sufficient to enable the other corps to reach the field. Had Hancock not made from the field a favorable report, and had he not given General Meade reason to believe that the ground could be held long enough for support to arrive, General Meade would have been forced to concentrate further to the south, and to order the falling

back of the force at Gettysburg to Pipe Creek. In short, there was not, and there could not well be, and ought not to have been, in a general so situated as Meade was at Taneytown, any predilection for a place to fight, except such as events determine upon as that in which he can fight to the best advantage.

Another point intimately connected with the one just discussed is involved in the repeated statement that Hancock, not Meade, chose the battle-field. That such a statement should have received any measure of even popular credence is a severe reflection upon the military knowledge of the country, inasmuch as a general is not supposed to be able to see everything for himself, and his staff, his engineers, his cavalry, his pickets, his videttes, are all supposed to be among the multitudinous eyes at his service, to which might be added, his couriers and telegraphic messages from distant parts. In the history of no other commanding-general but Meade can be found any intimation that he has had no part in doing that towards which a subordinate had lent his aid. General Hancock was a born corps-commander. As such he had the instinct of the capabilities of ground and troops with reference to a given field. He was despatched by General Meade to decide, as has already been said, two questions which were very simple to him. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Meade inadvertently says in one place, that he thinks it was after Hancock's return from the field, and report to him personally, that he sent out orders for the convergence of the rest of the troops upon the position at Gettysburg. But this statement was a lapse in memory, for he subsequently says, in the course of the same testimony, that he had issued orders for concentration before the return of Hancock, and Hancock himself says that he found the orders to concentrate had preceded his


THE BATTLE-FIELD
SECOND
Drawn (from authentic sources) by R. Meade Bache.
FOR THE SAKE OF CLEARNESS, ALL BUT
THE PRINCIPAL ROADS ARE OMITTED,
AND ALSO DETAIL OF WOODS AND HOUSES.
ONE M
Hagerstown Road
Willoughby Run
Marsh Creek
PEACH ORCHARD

arrival, as in fact the time noted on the orders also clearly shows. But, what if General Meade's orders to concentrate had followed, instead of preceded, Hancock's personal reappearance at Taneytown? Hancock's function was simply investigation and report; Meade's, decision upon the basis of investigation and report. General Meade was evidently so well satisfied with the report from the field that he acted at once, before his emissary had had time to return.

As to another point connected with the battle of Gettysburg, an interested attempt has been made to detract from the merit of General Meade by means of the allegation that, after having reached the ground, he showed immediate intention of retreating, as evidenced by a provisory order which he directed to be framed regarding the positions of troops and roads in all directions. Yet it can be shown conclusively, as he himself testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and as numerous officers present on the field have testified, that if he intended to retreat, he was at the same time doing things wholly incompatible with that intention, planning attacks, ordering up trains, artillery, etc. Every capable general, in undertaking a pitched battle, obtains all the knowledge possible of his surroundings, the position of his troops, of roads to the rear, of roads in advance, so that he may be able to fight to the best advantage, to pursue, or to retreat, as the fortunes of war may determine. The alleged instructions, upon which was based the figment of an order, were nothing but ones to cover any usual contingency.

Lastly, there has been an attempt to fix upon General Meade, through the citation of proceedings of a council of war, on the 2d of July, the charge of desire to retreat, although the condition of things at that time, and the testimony procurable as to the actual proceedings of the council, give no warrant for such a belief, while, on the

contrary, animus that would be fully equal to encouraging such a belief is clearly demonstrable. With this summary of the groundless aspersions to which General Meade has been from time to time assailed, I return with the greatest relief and pleasure to the main thread of the narrative.

When General Meade reached Gettysburg night had long fallen on the scene. Along the opposing crests preparations were making for the conflict of the next day. Weary men were resting on the field, and others pressing onward towards it through the moonlit gloom. In the stillness of midnight of the 1st of July General Meade rode up the Taneytown Road on to East Cemetery Hill. After receiving reports from various officers, he rode off with General Hunt, viewing the lines while Hunt was posting artillery. About daylight of the 2d of July he established his headquarters in a house just back of the centre of the army.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SECOND DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

It unfortunately happens that the majority of the world imagine that they know much that they have not studied, and that a small but active minority often act as bell-wethers to the innocent following flock. Things have come to be traditional about the battle of Gettysburg which are entirely false. They who have for the most part furnished these myths will, however, in the course of nature soon pass away, and with them the need of anything but the unvarnished truth as nearly as it may be reached by human imperfection. We are studying a battle in which, not we alone, but future generations of the earth will take interest. The world, as time goes on, and more and more as it lapses, will find it full of interest. The time will come when the battle shall stand in the minds of men as among the greatest, as representing an epoch in the continuous civilization of the world. Then, in that day, when students of government and of war scan the data from which they will reach their conclusions, there will be no question in their minds as to whether or not General Meade proposed to retreat from Gettysburg, none whatever as to the field being his own deliberate choice, none that Sickles was wholly unjustifiable in taking up the position along the Emmettsburg Road, none that Little Round Top was made secure by Hancock and finally by Meade, none that it was by no accident by which it was seized by Warren when relinquished by Sickles. The ascription of these and other events to the category of accident, or to the wrong person, will be

rejected. They were the outcome, either direct or indirect, of Meade's action, and unless the world should be prepared to say what it never yet has declared, that a general must personally do everything himself, under penality of forfeiting all credit for the event of battle, Meade will be safe in the future for the glory of Gettysburg. Nor should any one suppose, and parrot-like repeat, that the history of this and other great events of the same time is likely to renew the unreliableness of much past history. It is not so, for in these modern days the whole world, from land's end to land's end, is one vast library of information in the literature of letters, magazines, books, newspapers, and public records innumerable. The day will come, is in fact rapidly approaching, when it will be impossible to distort the history of the men and the events of our civil war, even false witness lending itself to analysis for the furtherance of the truth that will be patent in the distant, but not far distant future, even if the beginning of its term should be rated at a hundred years. Under the lead of false teaching, and with the sublime assurance of ignorance, writers who have evidently never set a squadron in the field, or studied the military art from the writings of its masters, have made all sorts of comments on the battle of Gettysburg. These will be part of the task of the future to consign to the limbo of the forgotten among the transient curiosities of literature. Imbued as I am with the deepest faith in this beneficent future, it will become manifest, as we proceed, that my intention is not to write from the point of view that General Meade, like the kings of old, could do no wrong, for it is fully admitted in one place, and intended to be implied throughout, that, as Turenne once said, when he confessed to having made a military mistake, that the general who has not made one has not been long engaged in war. The fixed purpose here is, however, incidentally to correct pre-

valent error, as indispensable to giving a true impression of the character, ability, and principal lifework of the subject of this memoir.

The enemy contemplated attack on the morning of the 2d, on the right and on the left. The Federal army contemplated making a right attack. Its left was guarded as well as concentration at the moment of its intended right attack permitted. That is, its left was *believed* to be properly guarded, for who could have known that Sickles would not occupy his designated post? The right attack, for which troops had been massed, was about to be delivered, when further reconnoissance decided against it. Then the masses on the right were lessened by detachments sent towards the left. The intention to make an attack on the right had been relinquished about 10 A.M., upon the report of Warren and Slocum as to the result of the reconnoissance of the ground there. Between 3 and 4 P.M. General Meade, after having ordered the Fifth Corps to march to the left, and passed with Warren and other officers in that direction, saw there to his astonishment that Sickles was no longer in the position assigned him, but that he had advanced his line of battle to the subordinate ridge previously described, where it lay exposed to attack on both of its flanks completely in the air. Hence the battle that ensued was on Sickles's plan, not on General Meade's, and all that remained for General Meade to do was what he did, to accept the situation, to meet what there was no time to rectify, to retrieve what might be possible of the free gift that Sickles had made to disaster. There can be no doubt that Sickles received, on the morning of the 2d of July, the order to occupy the line in continuation of that held to the left by Hancock, the line occupied by Geary before he was withdrawn to the right preparatory to the attack intended at first to be made from that direction. It was shown in the last

chapter that Hancock had ordered Geary to extend the line of battle from his left to and inclusive of the Round Tops, that Geary had, in obedience to that order, taken up a line; and as Hancock also testifies that General Meade ordered Sickles, on the morning of the 2d, to hold the line that Geary had occupied, it is clear that he knew where it was intended to station him; and as Hancock, who testifies as to his having been in position, was close by, that he, in the first instance, must, at least in a general way, have taken up the position defined by orders. Soon after six o'clock in the morning of the next day, the 2d of July, Captain (now Colonel) Meade,* of the commanding-general's staff, carried from him a communication to Sickles, notifying him of the locality of headquarters, inquiring if his troops were yet in position, and if he had anything of moment to report. Upon Captain Meade's arrival on the ground and ascertainment that General Sickles was resting after his night march, he transmitted the communication to him through the medium of Captain Randolph, of his staff, receiving in reply the information that General Sickles was doubtful where to go. This response evidently made General Meade anxious, for upon the return of his aide with it, he despatched him forthwith to Sickles to impress upon him the urgency of getting his troops at once into position. It was about seven o'clock when, in reply to this second message of the commanding-general, General Sickles, then about to mount, surrounded by his staff, already in the saddle, said, with reference to the renewal of the commanding-general's orders as to the position to be taken, that he was then moving into position. About eleven o'clock General Sickles presented himself at headquarters, and the commanding-general there

* Deceased since these lines were indited, which had been verified by Colonel Meade in the form of the written statement herein given regarding his connection as aide-de-camp with this affair.

HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL MEADE AT GETTYSBURG.

told him that he was to occupy, and pointed out in the distance the position in which Hancock had placed Geary on the preceding evening. To this Sickles said that, as far as he could make out, Geary had had no decided position. With General Meade's final word to him, that he was at liberty to occupy in his own manner the ground designated, within the general scope of his instructions, Sickles departed, the commanding-general allowing Hunt to accompany him to examine the ground to the left and select positions for artillery.

General Meade learned, after the war, from Geary, a circumstance which points to Sickles's having from the first intended not to occupy the position designated, for General Geary then told General Meade that, when he received the order notifying him that he would be relieved by the Third Corps, he sent an aide to General Sickles to communicate to him information as to the great importance of Round Top, and to request that he would send a member of his staff to view the ground and occupy it with troops. Nothing, however, he said, came of his action but a reply from General Sickles that the matter would be attended to in due time, when, after waiting as long as he could on the ground, in the hope that he should see the arrival of officers or troops, he was obliged to leave it in fulfilment of his own instructions from General Meade.

General Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, gives, in one of his articles in the *Century Magazine*, and in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, a circumstantial account of what occurred before, at the time of, and after General Meade's instructing him to examine the ground to the left. The gist of this, coupled with General Meade's own account to that Committee, is, that upon his returning to headquarters from an inspection of the lines for general artillery purposes, he

found Sickles there about eleven o'clock. General Sickles had expressed to General Meade his belief that Geary had had, in effect, no position, a view which ignored the information which Geary had already sent him. In consequence of this statement, General Meade instructed Hunt to go with General Sickles and examine ground to the left suggested by him as adapted to artillery positions, which ground Sickles had been authorized to take up within the scope of his previous general instructions; Hunt's delegated duty, as defined by words, being restricted to choice of artillery positions on General Sickles's alleged superior front. It is evident, however, that although, so far as words addressed to Hunt are concerned, General Meade commissioned him to accompany General Sickles with reference only to the selection of artillery positions, and nothing else, yet, as he so acted upon the basis of the immediately preceding statement of General Sickles to him, that Geary had had no position, meaning, as he had further declared, that Geary's troops had been merely massed, and had occupied no determinate battle-line, General Meade virtually commissioned General Hunt to inspect the ground which General Sickles had been proposing to occupy, not strictly with reference to artillery positions, but to its capabilities ascertainable through examination for artillery positions as the medium through which its advantages and disadvantages for a line of battle could be judged. General Meade must have thought, having seen the place only by moonlight, that the ground which General Sickles had been proposing to take up within the scope of his instructions was represented by protuberances on the general line from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top, but there are none such.*

* General Meade, in speaking of General Sickles's visit to him at his headquarters, says, in the course of a communication well known

General Meade therefore naturally supposed that General Sickles's troops would remain in essentially the same position as that in which they then were, the position which Hancock says in his report they then were, which was, refinements of posting apart, substantially in the position from the left of the Second Corps to Little Round Top. General Meade had given General Sickles no authority to make any radical change in their position, but, on the contrary, had warned him against exceeding the scope of his general instructions. General Hunt gave him no authority to that end, as delegated by General Meade; he possessed none such. On the contrary, he says, in his account of the battle, that he ascertained on the ground that the line proposed by General Sickles to him (necessitating, like any other, connection with the left of the Second Corps and with Little Round Top) would be unduly extended, and whilst recognizing some advantages, more than counterbalanced by disadvantages stated, including the paramount objection that there were not enough troops in the Third Corps to occupy it, his last words to General Sickles, in reply to a question from him if he should occupy it, were, "not on my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions." This he did, and General Meade took no further action, in the legitimate fulness of confidence that his repeated instructions would not be transcended. Nevertheless, Sickles eventually advanced and occupied the position on the Emmettsburg Road and the crest to the left, while Hancock, with his keen eye in tactics, that was not to be deceived by military display, observing and admiring the spectacle of the advance of the Third Corps, remarked that it would soon be coming back.

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as the Benedict Letter: "There it was I told him his right was to be Hancock's left; his left on Round Top, which I pointed out."

Aside from the question just discussed, looking at the matter simply from the tactical point of view, the place to which the advance had been made naturally belongs to the enemy's occupation, unless an army holding the position on Cemetery Ridge in opposition to an army on Seminary Ridge has two-fifths more troops than it. This advantage over Lee Meade's assembled army did not enjoy, and the number of troops in hand, on the morning of the 2d of July, were meagre even for the defence of the shorter line of the field from Culp's Hill to the Round Tops. The enemy's acquisition of the outer position occupied by General Sickles is objectionable, it is true, because that condition circumscribes the opposing army on Cemetery Ridge to the occupation of a line at the southern part of the field from which it is difficult to assume the offensive. But, as the ground and the forces stood, the line adopted by General Meade was correct, and the holding of the ground at Devil's Den and beyond to the right was then proper only for skirmishers and artillery easily withdrawn. To employ a homely comparison, perfectly illustrative, however, of tactical necessities, we may in conclusion justly say, in printer's parlance, that on any extended battle-field but a desert plain the lean must be taken with the fat.

It happens that the lines of an imaginary cross of the usual proportions, with their intersection centred in the heart of Gettysburg, and staff about five miles long, ranging north and south, make excellent lines and datum-points for laying down the battle-field. The area above the arms of the cross includes the battle-field of the 1st of July, and also the *débouchure* of all the roads, northwest, north, and northeast, by which the Confederates reached the ground, while the staff below the arms represents the direction of a line just back of the Federal position along Cemetery Ridge, and the foot a point not far in the rear of the

twin summits of Round Top and Little Round Top, with which Cemetery Ridge ends at the south. The staff of the cross, from the arms to the foot, therefore nearly represents the north and south line of the Federal position, as it looked west; but it also looked north, and that part of the position can be defined in the following manner with reference to the same figure. A fifth of the way down the staff from the arms is Cemetery Hill, where Cemetery Ridge is high. Thence the ridge swings around to the northeast, and thence to the southeast, forming one long curve towards the north for the distance of half a mile, at the end of which occurs its highest point, Culp's Hill, just before the ridge there ends in a lower top, whence the land slopes downward to Rock Creek, a stream which runs nearly south, along the east side of the infantry battle-field. It thus appears that the Federal position, without regard to its orientation, is best represented as to its general shape, as it often has been, by saying that it was curved like a fish-hook. From the orientation here given, the shank of the hook is seen to run from the south, just west of the lower part of the staff of the imaginary cross, to about two-thirds of a mile short of its cross-piece, and then to bend around gradually through a northward curve to its barb at Culp's Hill, southeast. The roads which, coming from the south, traverse the ground in centre, front, and rear of the position, converge at the southern outskirts of Gettysburg. Coinciding with the lower part of the staff of the cross is the Taneytown Road, therefore running north and south, just back of the general line of the north and south position of the army. Off to the east of the Taneytown Road, at an angle with it, or with the south, of forty degrees, is the Baltimore Turnpike. Off to the west of the Taneytown Road, at an angle with it, or with the south, of thirty-five degrees, is the Emmettsburg Road.

The position first occupied by the Confederate army opposite, on Seminary Ridge, averaged about a mile in distance from the general Federal position, and was represented by a reversed curve, approximately the line of beauty. Taking it from the Seminary, on the ridge, about half a mile off from the centre, on the western arm of the cross, it curved slightly eastward towards the Federal position, until its minimum distance from that was only about three-quarters of a mile, from which point it curved inward slightly until opposite to the Round Tops, distant a trifle over a mile most of the way, its slight concavity in its southern part corresponding to a slight concavity there in the Federal position. At Gettysburg itself, in the plain below, there was necessarily a break in the continuity of the Confederate line, and so the force brought against Meade's extreme right, around the curve from Cemetery Hill to Culp's Hill, lay under the disadvantage of indifferent facility of concerted action with Lee's left on Seminary Ridge.

One feature of the topography still remains to be described, an important, although subsidiary one, for upon it hung the character of the main battle of the second day. The Emmettsburg Road, running, as before described, to the outskirts of Gettysburg, at an angle of about thirty-five degrees west of south, necessarily runs transversely across the valley between the two ridges occupied by the opposing armies. This would have been a circumstance of little moment, but for the fact that the position of the road is determined by the existence of the low ridge along which it runs, and that General Sickles, seduced by the appearance of the ground to his eye, saw fit to occupy that ridge, and extend his line along it, instead of extending it in the continuation of the general line of the army along Cemetery Ridge. From just south of Gettysburg, and abutting on Cemetery Ridge at Cemetery Hill, imagine running thence

the subordinate ridge on which the Emmettsburg Road passes southward, diagonally across the valley between Cemetery and Seminary Ridges, until it reaches a point making an obtuse angle, open towards Cemetery Ridge. Now, if a perpendicular to our base line on Cemetery Ridge be dropped from the apex of the aforesaid obtuse angle, it would pass half a mile to the north of Little Round Top. This outer angle thus fixed with reference to Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top, the western angle of the subordinate ridge running diagonally across the valley, the apex of Sickles's line, the salient of the celebrated Peach Orchard, is thus shown to be nearly three-quarters of a mile beyond the true line of an army occupying the general position of Cemetery Ridge, the position of the supposed observer on the base line being slightly east of the true line of battle. To the outer point, thus determined in position, the transverse ridge on which the Emmettsburg Road is situated gradually increases in height as it runs southwest from Gettysburg. Thence it turns towards the southeast, making at the Peach Orchard an angle of one hundred and fifteen degrees with the line of the ridge running towards Cemetery Hill, and continuing on the other line for two-thirds a mile, ends on the escarpment of the gulch separating it from the bases of Little Round Top and Round Top, between which and it flows Plum Run proper, a branch of which flows through a swale to the westward, the two streams thus enclosing in their fork a portion of the ridge, traditionally known as the Devil's Den, from the tumultuous wildness of its rocky and wooded scenery, a name rendered by the events of the day forevermore appropriate.

By the construction employed has thus been defined with great minuteness the position of the lines of the Army of the Potomac, because, without it, the sequel could not possibly be understood, whereas, with both map and descrip-

tion, it cannot fail to be clear to every reader. Standing at the point determined by the perpendicular erected on the base opposite the apex of the Peach Orchard, that is, half a mile north of Little Round Top, and only a little back of where General Sickles's line should have been, we should have seen, if there had been no interfering woods, Sickles's corps drawn up around the angle of one hundred and fifteen degrees on the ridge described, the troops at the Peach Orchard, three-quarters of a mile off, thrust in the face of the enemy. Inasmuch, moreover, as the ridge which determined the direction of his right departs from Cemetery Ridge just back of the outskirts of Gettysburg, and ends beyond its obtuse angle abruptly at the escarpment on Plum Run, leaving a gulch between it and the Round Tops, and the only troops at Sickles's disposal for holding the ground were those of the Third Corps, it followed that his right flank was completely in the air, and that his left flank, also in the air, brought up on the steep, rocky slope of the Devil's Den, while the angle at which the troops were compelled to defend the position was not only one that could be enfiladed on both sides, but one that ensured to the enemy, should he break through on either wing, the ability to take in reverse the remaining wing. Thus was the left flank blindly stationed when General Meade, who had with reason supposed that Sickles's corps was in line with Hancock's, rode to that part of the field from the right before four o'clock in the afternoon, and discovered at a glance the situation and the impossibility of rectifying it in time by a retrograde movement. Several hundred yards intervened between Hancock's left and Sickles's right, on the Emmettsburg Road. Sickles's right guarded nothing but the ground on which it stood, and that imperfectly, his left inviting attack in reverse by the broad avenue of the gulch beyond, and his centre forming the double target of two

lines that could be enfiladed, and to complete the disadvantage at which the army had been placed, this faulty formation ranged from two-thirds to three-quarters of a mile in advance of its general position.

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d of July the weary Sixth Corps had begun to appear on the left from its long march of over thirty miles. The Fifth and Twelfth Corps were on the right, the extreme right at Culp's Hill being held by the Twelfth. On the left of these corps, on Cemetery Hill, was the Eleventh Corps, supported by the First. General Hancock's lines were drawn up on its left, on Cemetery Ridge, where it runs nearly north and south, and on the left of his line had been the Third Corps, until the moment when it had been advanced by Sickles to the Emmettsburg Road. Lying as Geary's front and flanks had at first lain, with left near the north base of Little Round Top, and on Little Round Top itself, he had had a firm hold on the position, while Sickles's lesser hold, from partial occupation of the ground, he had by his advance entirely relinquished. Beginning at Cemetery Hill, at the north, the ground droops and then rises gradually as it nears the northern base of Little Round Top, whence it rises abruptly into the massive protuberances constituting the twin tops.

General Meade rode down with his staff on to the ground back of the line where Sickles's troops were arrayed, and despatching Warren at once towards the left to look out for the security of the Round Tops with what troops he could muster for the purpose, listened to Sickles's reasons for having taken up the position occupied.* Two

* Warren says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "I then went, by General Meade's direction, to what is called Bald Top." [Little Round Top.] Yet it has even been committed to monumental bronze, on the battle-field itself, to tell,

divisions of the Fifth Corps were arriving under the orders previously mentioned. They were now hastened into position. Soon Caldwell's division of the Second Corps was ordered to the left. Later in the day Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions, of the First Corps, then under General Newton, reinforced the left-centre, and still later in the day General Williams marched from the right to sustain the left with the First Division of the Twelfth Corps, under Ruger, Lockwood's brigade of that division, however, being the only portion of it that became engaged. Whilst Generals Meade and Sickles were still in conference, General Meade telling Sickles that it was too late to retire as he had proposed, but that everything must be done to support him, the attack burst in fury on their immediate front. What followed would in all its details require a whole volume for adequate description of the sudden battle precipitated by the enemy's advance. Only a summary, therefore, can be presented of the conflict which ensued. Commanding-general of the army, General Meade continued to exercise that function, besides leading troops into action to inspire them, and riding in all directions on the field in one

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that through Warren's wonderful *coup d'œil*, this important position was secured. There cannot be a particle of merit ascribable to any one for looking to its occupation at that moment. It was certain, with the Third Corps thrown far in advance, that the enemy would appear in front of Little Round Top with his right flank, and that his lines of battle must be advancing on it at the very time General Meade spoke. This was what Warren actually saw when he reached the summit. The success of this is what he frustrated by his energetic action. It is lamentable that there should have been an attempt to base in any measure the military reputation of so fine a soldier, so intelligent, brave, and skilled as Warren, upon the statement that to his trained perception was due the holding of the position, when any intelligent boy would have seen that it must be instantly secured or the field lost, and when it was only his admirable seizure and retention of it that redounds to his credit.

of those crises which partially merge the chief in the simple fighter; such as sees a general, however exalted, as lately saw Reynolds, as saw Napoleon on the bridge of Arcola, and Cæsar, snatching a legionary soldier's shield, and entering into a hand-to-hand conflict, reduced to the necessity of coming at all hazards to the front of battle. The ground between the position in which Sickles's troops had been and the true position of the lines of the army became an arena of strife. To attempt to follow it here in all its varying incidents would, as I have said, be impossible. The account of the struggle must be confined to its general features.

Sickles's right was the division of Humphreys, and Graham's brigade, of Birney's division, and on the other side of the angle at the Peach Orchard were Birney's two other brigades, under Ward and De Trobriand. The troops occupying the right of Lee's army consisted of Longstreet's corps, formed of Hood's and McLaws's divisions, and on the left of Longstreet's corps was Hill's. The troops of these two corps which became actually engaged were Hood's and McLaws's, of Longstreet's corps, and Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, on the left of McLaws. The first attack was made by Hood's division (under one of his brigade-commanders, Law, Hood having been disabled) on the line to the left of the angle at the Peach Orchard. At the same time Hood's division pushed troops around his right, through the gulch between the Devil's Den and the Round Tops, and along the slopes of those great hills. There was no cavalry on the left. It had been there up to noon, in the form of Buford's three brigades, but General Pleasanton, the commander of the cavalry corps, had, with singular misjudgment, considering his usual conduct of his special operations, failed to keep Buford's troopers until they could be replaced by an equiv-

alent force, and they had been allowed to depart for Westminster for the purpose of refitting after his late exhausting service. About one o'clock General Meade had learned that his left flank had been entirely denuded of cavalry at a time when, as he knew, a crisis, through his own action or that of the enemy, was certainly approaching in that quarter of the field. Buford being then beyond recall, a single regiment of cavalry, drawn from Gregg, on the right, was the only mounted force available during the afternoon and night of the 2d and the morning of the 3d for picketing the left of the army. Kilpatrick did not reach the right-rear of the enemy until 1 P.M. of the 3d, with Farnsworth's brigade, and Merritt, who had marched from Emmettsburg at noon of the same day, came in on his left at 3 P.M. At 5.30 P.M., they together then made a desperate onslaught on the enemy. It is not too much to surmise that, if the two brigades of Buford, or their equivalent, had, on the 2d, continued in position on the left, the enemy's preparatory movements there on that day would have been so retarded as to have at least modified the eventual pitched battle in that quarter of the field, even if unable to alter essentially its character.

General Meade withdrew from Hancock's left Caldwell's division, of the Second Corps, and put it in on Sickles's left. The two divisions of the Fifth Corps which had been moving towards the left had now arrived. Warren had reached Little Round Top. Here he seized a regiment of Weed's brigade, of Ayres's division, of the Fifth Corps, followed soon by the rest of its brigade, and secured, after a desperate struggle with the enemy swarming up its sides, that one of the important twin heights, while Vincent's brigade, of Barnes's division, of the Fifth Corps, was put in by Sykes between the Round Tops. The remainder of the two divisions of the Fifth Corps which had come on the

ground, Ayres's and Barnes's, thus each minus a brigade, reinforced the left of Sickles's line. Later, when the whole line had been driven back to its true position, Ayres's division reinforced its brigade on Little Round Top. The remaining division of the Fifth Corps, the Pennsylvania Reserves, did not reach the battle-ground in time to share in more than the very last of the conflict before the firm re-establishment of the lines of the left of the army.

Humphreys' line, on the right of the Third Corps, had been demonstrated against at first, but had for some time remained unattacked, so that he had even been able to send a brigade to the left upon the approaching crisis of the contest. The attack developed along the enemy's lines from his right to his left, including Hood's, McLaws's, and Anderson's divisions. The end was that the centre of Sickles's line, at the Peach Orchard, was burst through, and his two wings, as represented originally by Humphreys on the right and Birney on the left, supported eventually by a division of the Second Corps and the two divisions of the Fifth, were driven back, fighting hard. To meet the condition of the Federal troops on the left having been driven back for some distance, Humphreys, on their right, still holding on to the Emmettsburg Road with his right, while severely attacked, pivoted on that, while striving to swing his left flank backward towards Cemetery Ridge. Into this vortex of fire and smoke was now launched reinforcement after reinforcement by General Meade. Sickles had been borne from the field grievously wounded, and Birney now commanded his corps. The ground was contested with varying success, but to the general disadvantage of the Federal side, owing to the directions of the respective lines of attack and defence as largely determined by the nature of the ground. No immediate advantage could accrue from tenaciously holding the ground, but it was indispensable to do so for

the ultimate one of forming meanwhile a proper line further to the rear. When Sickles was wounded and Birney succeeded him in command of the Third Corps, General Meade superseded him in the command of it by Hancock. No ordinary crisis had been reached at that point of time in the desperation of the struggle for victory. Hancock turned over the command of the Second Corps to Gibbon, and personally led Willard's brigade, of Hays's division, of the Second Corps, to the relief of Birney. Troops were sent by Gibbon to fill in the open space between Humphreys' right and the left of the Second Corps. General Meade, on the ground further to the left, led into action some of the reinforcements arriving under his orders from Culp's Hill, consisting of Lockwood's brigade of the Twelfth Corps and troops of the First. He advanced with the former, and rode at the head of the latter in their charge across the field of battle, scatheless through all the turmoil, in which he was so near harm that his faithful old horse, "Baldy," was shot under him, the same horse that was wounded five or six times during the war, and yet lived to follow his master to the grave.

The maintenance at one time of the terribly endangered lines on the left turned upon the establishment by General Hunt, chief of artillery, of a massed line of guns on the slight ridge along Plum Run, intermediate between the one on which the Emmettsburg Road runs and the lines of Cemetery Ridge, to the accomplishment of securing which position for the security of the lines still further to the rear, deficient in infantry, the Ninth Massachusetts Battery lent itself with noble devotion. In the most dangerous crisis of the fight, when the infantry of Humphreys and the artillery which had been advanced were struggling against the incoming wave of the enemy rushing over the ground towards Cemetery Ridge, Bigelow, the captain of the battery,

which had been fighting with prolonges fixed, was ordered by his chief, McGilvery, to hold to the last gasp his position near the Trostle house, in order to gain time for the other batteries, swarming in advance of the threatened point, to take position along Plum Run Ridge. Sternly Bigelow fulfilled his trust, while the batteries in quick evolution fell into massed line in his rear, until twenty-five pieces commanded and swept the ground to the relief of the disorganized troops and the retention of artillery left standing on the field, finally bringing off his guns, after a hand-to-hand fight, many of his command killed, himself, with others, severely wounded, and with the loss of eighty horses.

For a long while the ground within this hard-fought arena presented the spectacle of lines of troops at various angles charging, retreating, and recharging in determined *melée*, and no one would have dared at the moment to predict the issue of the conflict. At length the frantic efforts of the enemy died out from sheer exhaustion. The last Federal reinforcements came from the right. The Sixth Corps had previously, as already mentioned, arrived from its long march. Troops from various commands advanced and pushed the enemy back. The Pennsylvania Reserves had come up, and McCandless's brigade of that division had been directed in a charge by Crawford. Fisher's brigade of that division was sent to Big Round Top. The lines of the Army of the Potomac to and through both Round Tops were now occupied and victoriously held. The expenditure had been frightful, computed by General Meade himself as representing sixty-six per cent. of the loss in the whole battle of three days, and with the result of his line being driven back to the position from which it should not have advanced. Even Humphreys must on this occasion have had his fill of fighting, as he was seen coolly deploying on the ground below, where he lost half of his

division, and where, if one could have seen his expression, he would doubtless have observed it lighted up as usual with the serene satisfaction which he reserved for battle, and which could be interpreted by no other words than, "Is not this delightful?" Little Round Top, the scene of the most dramatic episode of the battle; the Peach Orchard, of the hurly-burly following the rupture of Sickles's line; the Wheat Field, of many a desperate charge and repulse; and the Devil's Den, of the guerilla warfare of thousands of begrimed gnomes fighting among the ragged rocks and dark woods, had become immortal.

The severity of the contest had required so great reinforcements from the right, in the troops of the Twelfth Corps, that the lines there had been stripped almost to the utmost possible denudation. An early morning attack by the Confederates under Ewell had been planned to carry those lines, no doubt delayed by General Meade's evident intention in the morning to attack at that point. Here operated against Ewell the lay of the land previously mentioned, rendering it difficult to combine movements which included troops in Gettysburg and those around the sweep of the lines from Cemetery Hill to Culp's Hill. At last, however, when the fighting was subsiding on the left wing, Ewell's attack fell on the right. The brigades of Steuart, Jones, Williams, and Nicholls, of Johnson's division, and those of Hoke and Hays, of Early's division, supported by that of Gordon, and the rest of Ewell's Corps, assaulted from left to right on the lines from Culp's Hill to Cemetery Hill. It had been intended that Rodes's division also, of Ewell's corps, should participate in the assault, but as his line extended through the town towards the west, his right resting on the road thence to Fairfield, it so happened that, when he had withdrawn his troops from the streets and changed direction, his advance, which had been intended to be simultaneous

THE BATTLE-FIEL

Drawn (from authentic sources) by R. Meade Bache. FOR THIE

FOR THE SAKE OF CLEARNESS, ALL BUT THE PRINCIPAL ROADS ARE OMITTED, AND ALSO DETAIL OF WOODS AND HOUSES. ONE



with Early's, had proceeded no further than driving in the Federal skirmishers when the assault of Early on his left had taken place and been repulsed. On the Federal line at Cemetery Hill, held by the Eleventh Corps, the enemy achieved a temporary success, but owing to the timely arrival of Carroll's brigade, of the Second Corps, sent to its assistance by Hancock, they were precipitately driven out of a portion of the entrenchments which they had captured. On the right of the position, opposed to Johnson, the enemy had made a lodgment in some entrenchments which had been evacuated by troops of the Twelfth Corps, drawn thence during the afternoon as reinforcements for the left wing of the army. Here Greene's brigade of that corps bore a distinguished part in thwarting a greater success of the enemy, who at nightfall still maintained himself in the extreme works on the right, the possession of which endangered the hold of the Army of the Potomac on the Baltimore Turnpike, and thus threatened its rear.

That night a memorable council of war met at General Meade's headquarters, which determined unanimously to fight it out at Gettysburg as representing an admirable position. After General Meade's death it was attempted to use this incident to his disadvantage. Why he called a council should be evident. He had, by the night of the 2d of July, been only five days in command of the army. An army, including its leader, being in constitution what it has been described to be, he would be presumptuous indeed who, in command for only five days, and nearly half of the time in the midst of a battle, would not seek the opinion of his corps-commanders. Within a few days thereafter, General Meade held another council, but still at a time when he had been in command only sixteen days. After Gettysburg he knew himself to be in command of an army which had as

much confidence in him as he in it, and never called a council again. It was in the interest of his corps-commanders, in his own, in that of the cause they all represented, at a time when he could not know that his individuality was welded with the mighty instrument of which he was a part, that he and they should meet, and the *morale* of all be confirmed by personal conference, thence communicated in assurance by a thousand paths to the rank and file which had proved so worthy of confidence. The subsequent inimically reported statement, that he had wished to retreat, was finally set at rest by a pamphlet, issued after long forbearance by his son, Colonel George Meade, in which the point as to whether or not General Meade had desired to retreat from Gettysburg is conclusively settled in the negative. Circumstances will lead the historian to believe that the accusation rests upon the basis of uneasiness from extraneous causes in the minds of his defamers.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE THIRD DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

THE enemy, as has been said, remained in possession at night of the works on the right which had been occupied by some of the Twelfth Corps, captured as the result of withdrawing a large force thence to the dangerously assailed left flank of the army. During the night of the 2d General Meade therefore massed a heavy force of artillery and infantry near the works, with the view to their recapture as soon as daylight should appear. Johnson's division, with three brigades of Early's, both of Ewell's corps, had, in the evening and night of the 2d, hugged and advanced up the hillsides around the sweep from Culp's Hill to the outskirts of Gettysburg, opening the attack on their left, where they finally made lodgment in the lines, thinly defended on account of the withdrawal of the troops mentioned; while the immediately succeeding attack, more to their right, at Cemetery Hill, under Early, was made by Hoke's brigade and by Hays's, the redoubtable "Louisiana Tigers," whose prowess, as believed by themselves, nothing could withstand. These troops had managed, under cover of the straggling outskirts of the town, to carry one of the Eleventh Corps' batteries, whence they were ejected by Carroll's brigade, of the Second Corps, which, as the reader will remember, had been opportunely despatched by Hancock from his lines for the reinforcement of the sorely pressed right of the general position.

We have now reached the morning of the 3d of July. General Meade took the initiative, which Ewell had intended

to take. The sun, rising on a cloudless day, saw the engagement renewed on the right with a furious cannonade. Here, on this part of the field, the Twelfth Corps had in force resumed its position on the right, the Eleventh, as before, was on its left, with Wadsworth's division of the First Corps between them, the same division which, on the first day, had prevented Ewell from occupying Culp's Hill. Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps had come over from the left, and was now ready for action on the right. The division of Geary, of the Twelfth Corps, and the brigade of Shaler, of the Sixth Corps, were hotly engaged from dawn for several hours, supported by Ruger's division, of the Twelfth Corps, and Wadsworth's division, of the First. The works which had been lost on the previous evening were finally abandoned by the enemy retiring before an advance of the Twelfth Corps, the action on this part of the field being final. For several hours there was no more fighting in any part of it, except that of a skirmish opposite the lines of the Second Corps, resulting in the capture of a barn, the possession of which by the enemy's skirmishers as a shelter had long been annoying.

General Lee is authentically reported to have said at Chambersburg that he expected to reach the field with a little over seventy thousand men. He probably reached it with numbers between seventy and seventy-five thousand of all arms. The Federal army on the field probably numbered ninety thousand of all arms. The exact numbers on either side can never be known. Owing to forced marches on both sides, the number of stragglers whose strength gave out before reaching the field was large. It may safely be assumed that General Lee's force was not much over seventy thousand men, nor General Meade's much over ninety thousand, unless one counts as belonging to the latter General French's eight thousand men from Harper's Ferry, which

troops had been ordered to report to General Meade, although previously refused to General Hooker. General Meade ordered them forward, but besides occupying a mountain pass further south, and destroying Lee's pontoon-bridges over the Potomac, and finally reaching Frederick, French's operations had no connection with those of the Army of the Potomac. The forces arrayed against each other were probably of the numbers, or at least relative proportions mentioned. General Meade's own estimate of his numbers, as given in his testimony before the Committee on the conduct of the War, is unquestionably too large.

The Federal loss on the first day of battle had been very much greater than that of the Confederates, and on the second day in excess of the Confederate loss, so that from the beginning up to the end of the second day, there had been a tendency to numerical equalization. The third day of battle, however, was destined to change the relation of loss. It is not to the question of relative loss, however, that attention is being drawn at the present moment, save as that question bears upon one vehemently discussed to the present day, as to whether or not Longstreet obeyed orders. We have, on the one side, a preponderance of verbal testimony going to show that he did not. He certainly seems to have been dilatory in coming into position and attacking on the second day. The space requisite for the examination of that question, however, would be too great to devote to it here. As to his equally discussed action on the third day, we may properly consider it, as not involving the same objection. If the statements of Longstreet's opponents are correct, they are damaging to the military reputation of Lee. That Longstreet was ordered to assault the left-centre of the Army of the Potomac with the whole of his corps, supported by half of Hill's, and if need were, by the whole of it, seems incredible as an order emanating from General

Lee. Longstreet claims, on his side, that those were not his orders, and a dispassionate view of the situation of both armies at the point of time under discussion would seem to show that they could not have been.

It is in this connection that the question of previous losses, involving the relative numbers of the two armies on the third day of battle becomes especially interesting. Lee could not have had at the beginning of the third day more than fifty-five thousand infantry. If, therefore, Longstreet was ordered to attack with his own, and, if necessary, the whole of Hill's corps, he was ordered to contemplate the desperate feat of attacking with nearly forty thousand men, or two-thirds of Lee's army, constituting the whole Confederate line of two corps, Longstreet's and Hill's, from opposite the Round Tops to Gettysburg. These were, by the alleged orders, to be troops engaged or else supporting. When, therefore, we are, on the one hand, asked to accept the evidence of those who testify against Longstreet, and on the other, to believe the evidence of Longstreet himself, reinforced by the unlikelihood of Lee's having contemplated such a plan of battle as that mentioned, one is forced to decide in favor of the supposition that Longstreet did not receive such orders. There may, of course, be a middle term, unknown, representing exactly neither the statement of one side nor that of the other.

The approach of columns of infantry for a distance of two-thirds of a mile over open country, subject to a cross-fire of artillery and final opposition by firm infantry, is a problem almost as difficult of solution as that presented by the proposition, If an irresistible force meet an immovable body, what must be the effect? Mere mass of men in an assaulting column is not sufficient. Too great mass frustrates the end in view. The French columns at Waterloo are believed to have been too dense. And, at Waterloo,

the range of effective infantry-fire was not equal to that at Gettysburg, as, at Gettysburg, it was not equal to that of the Franco-Prussian War. To combine mass to the degree which ensures momentum, with openness of disposition, ensuring ease of deployment and support, looking to reaching the enemy in an assault with the minimum of loss from artillery and small-arms, was the heretofore insoluble problem, now solved by the enormous increase in the efficiency of the small-arm. It may be safely predicted that never again can storming columns of any formation pass over two-thirds of a mile of open ground and come in contact with opposing lines of good infantry. It is not possible to conceive that, even at Gettysburg, had the enemy increased the density of his column and supports, there would have been more than a mere protrusion into the lines of the Army of the Potomac. A more compact array than the one employed would have been even more *en prise* to the artillery and infantry of the opposing lines.

The case presented against Longstreet is, therefore, unintentionally presented against Lee. If Longstreet's orders were in very deed those which have sometimes been alleged, then he was called upon by Lee to do the very thing which has just been described, and which it has been indicated would have been futile. May it not also be pertinently asked in addition, whether, if such a charging array, over such a distance, be not of more than doubtful expediency, how can one reconcile with it, in this particular case, the withdrawal of force capable of protecting the right wing of Lee in presence of the whole left wing of the Army of the Potomac. Whether or not Longstreet obeyed orders, he apparently did all that could have been done. If that be so, it is inconceivable that Lee could have ordered more.

The Confederates were during a long silence preparing for their final blow. By one o'clock in the afternoon their

artillery was planted on the long line that they occupied around the Federal position. It amounted to nearly one hundred and fifty pieces, as officially stated by General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia. On the shorter Federal line were only about eighty pieces, according to General Hunt. Along Cemetery Ridge were forty-one guns of McGilvery's batteries. On the right of them was Hazard's artillery of the Second Corps. In front of Ziegler's Grove, to the right of the clump of trees which was the directrix of the impending charge of the enemy, were, from right to left, Woodruff's, Arnold's, Cushing's, Brown's, and Rorty's batteries. In front of that celebrated clump, brought up later from the artillery-reserve, were Fitzhugh's, Cowan's, and Parsons'. Besides these and a few others, some guns on Cemetery Hill, to the right-rear, bore tolerably well towards the front. Far off to the left, the summit of Little Round Top was crowned with Rittenhouse's, late Hazlett's, six rifle-guns.

The din and destruction of the cannonade were tremendous. For two reasons the destruction was greater on the Federal side, despite the superior quality of its artillery. The Confederates had nearly twice as many pieces in battery, because the lay of the land admitted of this advantage, and the ground in rear of Cemetery Ridge sloped gently downward towards Rock Creek, along which declivity the shot ricocheting, soon clearing it of ambulances, waggons, ammunition trains, etc., stampeding them to the rear. Great, however, as was the destruction, it bore, as always, no reasonable proportion to the noise. Of the Alps and Jura Ranges in a thunder-storm, Byron says, peak answered peak, but here ridge poured towards ridge sheets of fire from flashing guns with ceaseless roar. Yet, because the angle subtended by the height of a man at the distance of

a mile is very small, and the infantry of the Army of the Potomac presented even a smaller one, in the men crouching or lying down at their posts, the destruction, as compared with the apparent danger, was disproportionately small. It was in artillery and artillery-horses that the destruction was greatest, guns on the lines being dismounted and artillery-horses killed by hundreds, while towards the rear, down the slope to Rock Creek, some of the caissons of the reserve-artillery exploding, a safer resting-place was sought. General Hunt, chief-of-artillery of the Army of the Potomac, afterwards jocularly remarked to General Long, a former pupil of his, who on that day directed the enemy's artillery, that he had scattered his fire too much. The Army of the Potomac, however, was tolerably satisfied that it was no better. The enemy was not chargeable with having erred in the case of General Meade's headquarters. It happening to be in range of the point destined for infantry assault, the enemy's artillery poured shot and shell upon the house so suddenly and profusely, that seventeen horses were killed within the enclosure before the General and his staff could vacate the premises and seek refuge where headquarters work could proceed to better advantage. The first choice of a spot for this purpose proving faulty, they all mounted and rode off to the hill-top on the southeast, where were the headquarters of General Slocum.

After nearly two hours of this terrific cannonade, General Hunt ordered a cessation of the fire along Cemetery Ridge, just as an order from General Meade to the same purport was on its way to him, the object of both being to meet the infantry attack which must now come from some quarter unknown, but somewhere along the lines where they approached each other nearest. The Confederate fire for a short time increased in severity, and soon the assaulting columns were seen deploying near the edge of the

woods opposite the centre of the Army of the Potomac, the point for which they will aim being the left-centre, and the beacon, the clump of trees about to become historical. Pickett's assaulting force was about fifteen thousand strong, Pickett's division, of five thousand, composed entirely of Virginia troops, had freshly arrived on the field, and had had sufficient time to rest. Longstreet held his two other divisions, Hood's and McLaws's, to cover his right flank, which Federal cavalry, Farnsworth's and Merritt's brigades, under Kilpatrick, were attacking, and infantry skirmishers feeling. The main column of attack was composed of Garnett's and Kemper's brigades, with Armistead's brigade in supporting distance. The immediate flanks of this main column were guarded on the right by Wilcox's brigade, of Hill's corps, and on the left, by Heth's division, of Hill's corps, commanded on that day by Pettigrew.

The troops of the Army of the Potomac witnessed passively, in admiration, the magnificent spectacle of the advance of Pickett's division with its supporting flankers, reserving even their artillery-fire for a while. Soon, however, the artillery began to play upon them, the Eighth Ohio Regiment in picket-advance, and off to the right, falling back to avoid being overrun. The torrent poured from ridge to ridge, broken into streams. From front and right and far away Little Round Top on the left, the artillery played upon the advancing columns, torn through in places and closing up with swirling motion and *débris* tossed in air, like little waves in the tide-rip of waters adversely beset by some strong wind. The gaps in the lines were closed as soon as made, and the march was continued as relentlessly as ever. The Federal artillery redoubled and then somewhat slackened its fire, some of the guns lacking long range ammunition towards the end. General Hunt says that, had his instructions been implicitly obeyed, the attacking

column would not have reached the Federal lines. The assaulting column, however, is nearing the infantry, which is reserving its fire. Stannard's Vermont brigade, of the Third Division, of the First Corps, in advance to the left, now pours a rapid fire into the right flank of the advancing troops. The battle-field is covered with smoke rolling like fog over the landscape, amidst which Wilcox's brigade loses its bearings and drifts away from Pickett and halts. The artillery-fire from the left to which the advancing column is subjected is terrible, so crushing that the troops instinctively shrink from it and oblique to their left. The enemy is advancing artillery with his infantry, but, through an accident, not so many pieces as he had intended to move forward with. The mass comes on undauntedly, despite the searching fire to which it is subjected, and the lines of hostile infantry are not far apart when Gibbon's and Hays's divisions, of the Second Corps, pour into it volley after volley of musketry. Only once in their swift course had the enemy's lines halted within range and delivered fire along their extended front.

Under the sudden attack of Gibbon and Hays, Heth's division, on the enemy's left, led by Pettigrew, goes almost to pieces, Hays's division capturing two thousand prisoners. That fire disposes of the left flanking support of the enemy, and the right one, under Wilcox, remains halted. Unsupported, Pickett's division, or rather what remains of its three brigades, charges, with some remnants from Pettigrew's men, up the crest of Cemetery Ridge, striking, true to its aim, taken two-thirds of a mile away, the left-centre of the Army of the Potomac. No escarpment is here up which to toil, dividing effort between climbing and fighting while breasting an adverse height. Here is where the ridge has swept downward from Cemetery Hill to a gentle slope on which the combatants are virtually on the same level. Well

and truly had Lee's skilled eye chosen the point of his enemy's lines most easy of assault. Kaleidoscopic are now the changes that take place within a few minutes. The brunt of the assault falls on the Sixty-ninth and Seventy-first Pennsylvania Regiments, of Webb's Philadelphia brigade, of the Second Division of the Second Corps, drawn up behind an extemporized entrenchment, and the Seventy-second Pennsylvania Regiment of the same brigade, drawn up a short distance in their rear. The two regiments in advance fire their parting shots and retire to the second line, where they are reformed, and Hancock, hastily withdrawing troops from his left, sends reinforcements to the threatened point, while Stannard's brigade, on Hancock's left, changing front to the right, attacks the charging column on its right flank. The head of the column, led by Armistead in person, has nevertheless crowned with its standards the line from which the two Pennsylvania regiments had retired upon their reserves. Hancock and Gibbon have been badly wounded, the field is all alive with aides careering over it bearing orders from officers and from the commanding-general himself pressing towards the front. Cushing and Rorty and Woodruff and others are dead by their guns, or mortally wounded. But I forbear special mention in a mere sketch of a scene like this.

There can be no doubtful victory here. From front and flank the Federal troops advance and sweep the field with a besom of destruction. The Confederates are spent with their desperate effort, and now, their three brigade-commanders either killed or dangerously wounded, are lost. In an instant the late embattled but now harmless surge rushes up with its last billow and eddies around General Meade and his staff, while the receding vestiges of flotsam and jetsam are borne backward with the reflux setting towards Seminary Ridge. As the main wave of the Confed-

erate attack thus broke and recoiled from the living rampart along Cemetery Ridge, the minor current of Wilcox's supporting column on its right, which had held an uncertain course under the dun war-cloud until it had halted, suddenly became reanimated, and resumed too late its onward movement. It was greeted with a storm of shot from the front, and Stannard's brigade, wheeling to the left, just as it had previously wheeled to the right, fired into its flank, whereupon it drifted afield with the general wreck setting towards Seminary Ridge. The Eighth Ohio Regiment and Stannard's brigade captured numerous prisoners from it. Of all that gallant array which had so bravely set forth but a few minutes before to anticipated victory, only about a third returned safely to their lines. Their repulse, however, was not accomplished without loss to the other side. Many officers of high rank, besides Hancock and Gibbon, were either killed or wounded, while the losses in the rank and file in killed and wounded were considerable.

General Meade has often been censured for not having ordered a countercharge. The assumption that this could have succeeded is generally also coupled with the notion that the movement could have been effected over the same ground over which Pickett's advance had been made. Nothing can betray greater ignorance of the situation which existed at that point of time in the ranks at and immediately to the right and left of the point where the charge had fallen most heavily. Confusion must be held as always existent, as it has always heretofore been known in experience to have existed under similar circumstances. In such a collision as that which has just been described, the anvil, although it suffers less than the hammer, still shares in its disintegration. The ranks which had repelled attack required time for restoration to their effectiveness. But even had they on the instant recovered their effectiveness, Lee

was amply prepared for a counter-assault over the same ground as that over which the assault had taken place. The troops forming Pickett's advance were independent of the lines in their rear, leaving no gap there. Those lines were intact, and could be plainly seen advancing to cover their return when the remnants of Pickett's force were retreating in confusion. And besides, there was the artillery of the enemy still in position ready to concentrate its fire on any advancing column. Only when, as has happened, a powerful body of heavy cavalry, heretofore unengaged, has been able to act instantly and seize the moment of a trained army's temporary discomfiture, has it ever been possible to make a counter-assault over nearly the same ground as the one over which an assault by infantry has been made and repulsed. Confederate officers within that portion of the lines from which Pickett's charge proceeded have testified that an attempt by Meade to make a counter-assault over the same ground over which Pickett had passed would have been followed by as signal a repulse as that which the Army of the Potomac had just inflicted. The testimony of such witnesses, if any is to be considered, must be held good. It remains, then, to consider the alternative of attacking elsewhere. The reconnoissance of the 2d had shown that the ground opposite the right, at and near Culp's Hill, was not a favorable one from which to make an assault. The ground on the left might perhaps admit of it. It is not even generally known that that was attempted. The repulse of the enemy on the left-centre of the army had scarcely been made certain when General Meade rode rapidly to the left and ordered an advance. The ground there, however, as has already been incidentally noted, is not favorable for the offensive of an army occupying the lines prescribed by Cemetery Ridge for the general and inevitable position of an army occupying the ground east of the valley. The enemy was occupying

with powerful artillery the ridge from which Sickles had been driven, and with infantry well closed up towards the new position of the Army of the Potomac on its left. McCandless's brigade, of Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, of the Fifth Corps, and Nevin's brigade, of the Third Division, of the Sixth Corps, advanced and pushed the enemy to some advantage, as he happened to be slightly withdrawing to strengthen his position there. The case, as I view it now, and believe that it will in the future be regarded, was one of deadlock, in which it was impossible at the moment, without undue risk, unhesitatingly to attempt to advance. The ability of the Army of the Potomac to assume a sure offensive had been distinctively impaired by the terrible losses of the second day, growing out of the then unfortunate advance of the lines on the left beyond their true position. The situation after Pickett's charge was such that hazards assumed in ordinary battles were not to be assumed here. Why Austria did not avenge Sadowa when the Franco-Prussian war subsequently came, no one but a few diplomats knew until Lord John Russell wrote his memoirs. We know now, and had reason to suspect then, that had the day at Gettysburg been lost to the Union cause, European recognition of the independence of the Confederacy and all that that implies would have immediately followed.

While this momentous charge on the left-centre of the Army of the Potomac was being made and repulsed, Stuart's cavalry, on the right-rear, was making strong efforts to break through the Federal cavalry under General David McM. Gregg. If Stuart had succeeded, the reserve-artillery and ammunition and supply-train of the Army of the Potomac would have been at his mercy, for even the reserve-artillery and munitions had, on account of the furious artillery fire on the front, been retired to a point on the Baltimore

Turnpike, well to the rear. Besides, Stuart's success would have directly contributed towards that of Pickett's infantry charge. Under Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton and Chambliss and Jenkins, brigade-commanders, represented the powerful Confederate force of cavalry on the right-rear. Gregg met the enemy's four brigades with three, led by J. B. McIntosh, J. Irvin Gregg, and by Custer, of Kilpatrick's division. Only two of the Federal brigades, however, were in strenuous action. Randol's and Pennington's batteries were present, the fight beginning with artillery and ending with charging. At one point of time Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton emerged in strong force from a wood, and charged with the sabre, in the full belief, which the Confederates cherished until late, that the Federal cavalry would not stand before cold steel. But on this, and on the recent occasions at Beverly Ford and Brandy Station, and also at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, the Federal cavalry proved that its training had had its effect, and that, from being at first unable to cope with that of the Confederates, it was able to meet it on equal terms. Hampton was severely wounded, and the fight died out without the enemy's being able to effect his purpose. But for the circumstance that prescribed limits do not admit of presenting the details of this cavalry action, it could be here shown that solely because it was eclipsed to popular interest by the main events of the day, has its meritoriousness never been generally known, and that, but for its skilled and gallant conduct under General Gregg, the issue might have been serious, nay, in the event reversed, fatal to the Army of the Potomac, had Pickett's charge also been at the same time successful.

On the left of the Army of the Potomac had continued to be stationed, from the afternoon of the 3d of July, Farnsworth's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, and Merritt's brigade, of Buford's division. These two brigades

HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL LEE AT GETTYSBURG.

gallantly attacked the right flank of the enemy's infantry. Here was a lamentable occurrence in the decimation of the troopers that Farnsworth led, and in his own death. Through a quixotic order of Kilpatrick's, Farnsworth made a hopeless charge, plainly visible from the summit of Little Round Top. Surrounded by the enemy's infantry, the troopers pursued their way among stone walls, working what destruction they could, until a mere handful of them regained their own lines.

Victory for the first time in any great battle perched on the standards of the Army of the Potomac. By official record the loss of the Army of the Potomac in killed, wounded, and missing, was twenty-three thousand and forty-nine, and that of the Army of Northern Virginia, twenty thousand, four hundred and fifty-one. Discrepancies in the official returns of the latter army, however, and other allied facts, lead to the belief that the losses of that army as there given do not represent the correct sum-total. Swinton, who is generally temperate in his statements, places the probable Confederate loss at thirty thousand, and all the evidence at hand justifies belief in the correctness of that estimate.

If, as the poet says, "Freedom shrieked as Kosciusko fell," she must have drawn a deep sigh of relief as the sun went down upon that field. African slavery was but a portion, great as that was, of the contents of victory there for progress. "We cannot consecrate this ground," said Lincoln, as he delivered his beautiful address before the multitude soon afterwards assembled there to do its perished heroes honor. No, nor priest nor prelate nor gorgeous ceremony can add to the simple dignity and pathos of the memories which there and elsewhere the battle-fields of the nation awaken wherever nature left undisturbed murmurs in every brook and sighing breeze amid the graves the requiem of the dead.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

General Lee had been driven by fate to fight, and to fight just as he did fight the battle of Gettysburg. The Confederate victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, following closely on the heels of others, had so elated the officers and soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia, that if they did not feel positive contempt for the Army of the Potomac, they certainly had a feeling akin to it, in the belief that it was no match for the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee was constrained by this sentiment to fight a pitched battle whenever he might meet his enemy in force. He was constrained to fight in the particular locality of Gettysburg, because the strategical movements of both armies had led up to that consummation, and to both the tactical requirements of ground seemed to be sufficiently fulfilled. Moreover, Lee was forced to fight without delay. He had no time to manœuvre, because he had no means of renewing his supplies of food and ammunition. Meade, on the contrary, could afford to delay, because he could obtain ample supplies of both. Lee was therefore obliged to fight at once an offensive battle, and Meade was enabled to fight a defensive one.

If Lee had not been so far from his base, and with his communications interrupted, he would doubtless have tried to manœuvre Meade out of his position by extending his right towards the Baltimore Turnpike, thus seeking to intercept the communications of the Army of the Potomac with its base. Now, having fought under the conditions

imposed upon him, he was defeated. The battle had gone irretrievably against him. Safety in retreat had to be sought. So, having withdrawn his left wing through Gettysburg, he at once threw a line of entrenchments in front of his army on Seminary Ridge, sharply refused to the right and resting on Marsh Creek, of which Willoughby Run is an affluent, and on the left continued the entrenchments across the Chambersburg Turnpike and the Mummasburg Road, leading to the nearest passes through South Mountain. Here, safely retired, the work of burying the dead and succoring the wounded proceeded during the 4th of July, his retreat taking place on the night of the 4th. On the Federal side the same sad task was performed on the 4th and part of the 5th. On the 7th came to the marching army the joyful tidings from the West, that, on the 4th, Grant had captured Vicksburg and its garrison of thirty thousand men, and that the Mississippi was then open from its sources to its mouth, except at Port Hudson, which, on July 9th, surrendered to General Banks.

It has been much discussed whether General Meade should not have followed the enemy through the passes of South Mountain opposite Gettysburg instead of doing what he did, in following the enemy's line of retreat in a parallel direction along the east side of the range. The alternative which has been discarded always seems to have extraordinary fascination for the average human mind, so easy is it to demonstrate success of the thing not tried. General Meade evidently contemplated adopting the course of a direct pursuit, but for good and sufficient reasons, which will now appear, discarded it. General Lee retreated in the night of the 4th of July, leaving numbers of his wounded. Early on the 5th General Meade despatched with cavalry the strongest corps in the army, the Sixth (which as a corps had not been engaged), in pursuit

of the enemy. His combinations were perfect to meet the conditions. Lee, retreating with his main body through the Fairfield Pass, midway between Gettysburg and Hagerstown, and partly by the Cashtown Pass, opposite Gettysburg, Buford was despatched to Williamsport on the Potomac, to head off and attack the enemy's trains arriving; Kilpatrick, through Monterey Pass, south of the Fairfield Pass, to come upon the trains while in transit. Cavalry, of Gregg's division, harassed the enemy through Cashtown Pass. The Sixth Corps with cavalry marched for Fairfield Pass to attack the enemy. On the morning of the 6th Sedgwick reported that he could engage the enemy at Fairfield Pass, upon receiving which intelligence Meade arrested one portion of the flank movement in progress by holding the First and Third Corps in hand to support the Sixth in case of an engagement of the latter at Fairfield Pass. Sedgwick's final report that afternoon showed plainly, however, that great delay in pursuit would be entailed by a battle at Fairfield Pass, and therefore, on the 7th, General Meade adopted the flank route through Frederick and the Hamburg and High Knob Passes in the Catoctin Mountains, much delayed in the latter by torrents of rain on the 7th and 8th. There had also been pouring rain in the night of the 3d and on the 4th, impeding movements from the beginning.

Swinton thinks that General Meade adopted a wrong course, but it will soon become apparent that his view is not tenable. He says, in his "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,"

> "The principles already laid down as those that should guide criticism on McClellan's conduct after Antietam apply with equal and even greater force to Meade's conduct after Gettysburg. That an army that had moved so far from its base as that of Lee; that had crossed the frontier; that had been defeated in a great battle of three days'

duration, in which it had suffered immense loss; that then sought safety in flight only to find itself barred at the frontier by the rise of the Potomac (as though Providence fought with the Union army), should have been destroyed or hopelessly crippled, appears indisputable."

That the ordinary observer, entirely unread in military matters, should so think and speak unhesitatingly, would not be strange, for such a one always so thinks and speaks, but that Swinton should have so declared awakens surprise. He knew that defeat does not always end in rout, that after it retreat cannot always be prevented; and moreover, was generally as capable as any man of seeing the existence or the absence of parallelism in conditions. Let us examine into the correctness of his view in the particular case under consideration. Had he reflected that, even if the Army of the Potomac had followed the Army of Northern Virginia directly into Cumberland Valley, it would have had to do only with a rearguard, and that while the rearguard was delaying its advance, Lee would have gained all the time he needed with the main body to take up the position near Williamsport that he adopted? Humphreys, who was chief-of-staff after the battle of Gettysburg, says in his little volume, "Gettysburg to the Rapidan" (it is best here to give his exact language),

"Possibly a prompt, vigorous, direct pursuit by the whole army on the morning of the 5th of July, by the Cashtown and Fairfield Passes, would have brought on a general engagement before the Army of Northern Virginia had taken up the position covering the crossing-places of the Potomac; but probably it could not have reached Hagerstown before the evening of the 7th, and Lee would have had the few hours needed to make his entrenchments too strong for successful attack."

"Possibly," according to General Humphreys, such a movement would have succeeded, but "probably" it would

not. The adoption of either route, therefore, would find the enemy sufficiently entrenched, and so far as that point is concerned, expediency is balanced. But there were reasons why the route by the east of the mountains was much more desirable than the other. Supplies in shoes and other articles needed reached the army much more easily by that route than they could have done by the other. And all the while the Army of the Potomac was advancing down the east side of the mountains, and finally turning and crossing them, it was interposing between Baltimore and Washington and the enemy, so that even a raid by the enemy would have been impossible.

The conditions existing after Gettysburg therefore do not exhibit parallelism with those after the battle of the Antietam, both on account of the circumstances just mentioned, and on account of another with which this summary will be concluded. Lee's army had suffered defeat and great losses at Gettysburg, but could muster then far more troops than those with which it had fought the battle of the Antietam. Regular armies are not generally destroyed. It is the rarest of all things for fine modern armies to be routed. Lee's army was crippled, but not so badly crippled as not to have been able to fight another tremendous pitched battle. Where McClellan was after the battle of the Antietam, both he and the enemy were on the west side of South Mountain. Where General Meade was after the battle of Gettysburg, he was, upon the retreat of the enemy through the mountains, under obligation to interpose between him and the zone east of them.

These reasons must have been paramount in determining General Meade's choice of the line of march which he adopted, together with the encompassing consideration recognized as belonging to the art of war among civilized nations, in *la politique militaire*. Hence he was prudent to the end. He

had Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville behind him, and other defeats in which he had shared without being responsible for them. It was his duty to see to it, that what had been secured should be retained, unmarred by the slightest reverse, leaving, if need were, for a future time, on the enemy's soil, far from the nation's Capital, the final arbitrament of war. When Lee's army was met on the 12th of July entrenched in front of Williamsport, we find Meade anxious to attack on the following day, but dissuaded therefrom by the lack of confidence among his corps-commanders as to possible success. He learned this through a meeting of them to which he submitted certain information upon the basis of which he requested their opinions. It was found that they had no faith in the success of any plan of attack (based upon the meagre reconnoissance so far possible to obtain) against the enemy holding the position where he was entrenched. General Meade, therefore, for a moment prudently waited, for if they who are to act think they must fail, one of the first elements of success is absent. Whether, when, despite this, upon renewed consideration, Meade decided to attack on the 14th, he might have succeeded, no one can now positively determine, whatever he may be inclined to think, but examination of the enemy's position, after he had abandoned it, made it extremely doubtful that the attack would have met with success. Humphreys says that it would have failed. In harassing the enemy's retreat from the beginning, capturing prisoners, waggons, and other trophies, Meade had apparently accomplished all that was possible.

Lee retreated over the Potomac on the night of the 13th of July, having partly recovered and partly rebuilt a pontoon bridge that had been damaged by General French before the arrival of the Army of Northern Virginia at the river, and utilized both this and the ford near Williamsport. Meade promptly followed by crossing the river at Berlin

and at Harper's Ferry, and by marching on Lee's left flank, prevented him from entering Loudon Valley by the passes through the Blue Ridge, hemming him in the Shenandoah Valley, as he himself successively took possession of the passes as he marched south on a parallel line with the enemy, the mountain barrier between them. On the 23d of July, the Second, Third, and Fifth Corps,—the Third, under General French, leading,—passed through Chester Gap, near Manassas Gap, to advance on Front Royal and attack the Confederate flank as it presented itself in the southward march along the Shenandoah Valley. The Gap, occupied in some force by the enemy, was captured, but through the want of enterprise and slowness of French, the operation which, under higher leadership might have been brilliantly successful, came to naught. Thus continuing to march south, with the intervention of the mountain-barrier between them, Lee finally effected his passage across it, and took up a position near Culpeper, General Meade's orders from Washington not to proceed beyond the Rappahannock, but to take up a position of observation there, enabling Lee to concentrate just within the fork made by that river and the Rapidan.

As an illustration of the kind of administration in Washington with which the army had to contend, and as a sidelight on the character of Halleck, it should not escape mention in a memoir of General Meade, that at the moment when the first great victory in the East had been won, and when one should suppose that every loyal voice would be inclined to shout pæans in token of gratitude to the army, Halleck sent a despatch to General Meade, saying that the President was very much dissatisfied that the Confederate army had escaped. In consequence, General Meade very properly requested to be relieved at once from the command of the army. Thereupon Halleck represented, in reply to

his request, that he had intended his despatch only as a stimulus. Halleck's idea as to what would be likely to prove stimulating to a high-minded man was on a par with his general military administration of affairs. It is questionable if the kind-hearted President ever made the observation in the sense in which it was conveyed in the despatch to General Meade. Perhaps Mr. Lincoln said "disappointed," of which the bearing is very different. General Halleck, in a subsequent despatch, changed the word to "disappointment." Doubtless every loyal man in the North was disappointed that the remainder of the Confederate army had not been made prisoners of war, so far do wishes exceed the hard and fast lines of possibilities, and Mr. Lincoln may have remarked, as General Meade himself might have said, that he regretted that more could not have been accomplished. But, between a personal aspiration and an official despatch conveying the same expression, there is a whole heaven. The same absence of sensibility seemed to be in the very texture of Halleck's mind. When the Army of the Potomac advanced, after its arrival at the Rappahannock, and drove Lee beyond the Rapidan, as will be described in the next chapter, General Meade sent Colonel Biddle, of his staff, to General Halleck, with despatches informing him of the movement, and requesting that he might be allowed to continue it. Unfortunately for the Colonel, his zeal outran his discretion in dealing with a man like Halleck, for deeming his mission of sufficient importance to make it his duty to have the General awakened in the middle of the night to receive the message which had been brought, the General expressed himself as much incensed. Halleck was, in fact, a sort of magnified Department clerk, with the least possible tincture of military high-mindedness. Dearly he loved routine, and routine coupled with personal ease, although he was quite regardless of that

man, the highest military honors, was the sway of the uncontrolled favoritism which was the weak point of his character.

The campaign, upon an account of which we are now entering, does not captivate the popular imagination, because, with that, nothing succeeds but the most palpable success. Sheridan, riding up to the front after the restoration of the battle of Cedar Creek, and aiding in restoring what was already virtually restored, is fascinating to that sort of fancy which dearly loves a *coup de théatre*. Napoleon seems glorious at Lodi, Arcola, Austerlitz, Marengo, but who hears people generally speak of the time when, in 1814, he made head with a force of a hundred thousand men against the allies girdling the frontier, marching on Paris with four hundred thousand, when he turned, rending them, turning again only to rend? He did not succeed, that is all, but went into exile, and so one of the greatest of his marvellous exploits suffers from partial oblivion. That campaign of manœuvres from the Rapidan to Centreville and back again was what represented holding Lee in check while forces drawn from both armies were warring elsewhere; and more than holding Lee in check, for, but for the lamentable failure of a subordinate general to fulfil his part in the advance of Meade at Mine Run, Lee would probably have been there defeated. Meade, making head against Lee in this campaign, enabled Grant to put the final touch in the West to that "separate military renown," which he tells us in his memoirs he desired also as the guerdon of Sherman and Sheridan, but which he denied to Meade, at the expense of placing himself with the Army of the Potomac, where he himself admits that he should not have been, by acknowledging that his place as general-in-chief of the armies of the United States was in Washington. General Meade's campaign of manœuvres made the victory of

Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge possible, made possible the advent of Grant to the general-in-chiefship of the armies of the United States and the final successful advance on Richmond.

For a while, as mentioned towards the end of the last chapter, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia lay in observation, confronting each other, the Army of the Potomac north of the Rappahannock, and the Army of Northern Virginia just south of it, within the fork made by the junction of the Rapidan with that river. The Army of the Potomac now suffered some depletion from the detail of a force to New York, to suppress the riots there brought about by the draft to recruit the armies, and by the expiration of the terms of service of certain regiments. Both armies lay harmlessly for some time within their respective lines, engaged in the operation of refitting and recuperation of an organization which no other equals in wear and tear. On the 1st of August this quiet was somewhat broken by a cavalry expedition sent by General Meade across the Rappahannock on reconnoissance to Brandy Station, followed by some infantry in support. On the 31st there was a little flurry in the advance of some infantry to the fords of the Rappahannock, preceded by cavalry on the lookout for gunboats reported to have entered the river. Gradually more serious operations were drawing nigh. On the 12th of September General Meade learned that Longstreet's corps, with the exception of the division of Pickett, had been sent to oppose General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, in the West. In consequence, the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac, with the cavalry of the army, was pushed across the Rappahannock on the next day, and pursued the enemy over the Rapidan, not particularly loth to go, as Lee, with his diminished force, found there a stronger line. The

Army of the Potomac then, in turn, occupied the positions about Culpeper which the enemy had abandoned, advancing the Second and Sixth Corps to near the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crossing of the Rapidan. Meade, attempting to bring about an engagement, had sent his cavalry under Buford on a reconnoissance up the Rapidan, and was about to follow the movement with a march by the right flank across the river when it was stopped by an order from Washington for the detachment of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the reinforcement of General Rosecrans. This made any projected movement impossible, and placed the army again in a position of masterly inactivity.

The sending away to the West of two whole corps of Meade's army necessarily paralyzed it for active operations. The period of waiting that ensued was, however, followed by the accession of reinforcements in the form of new levies, and finally by the return of some troops in the East. This tedious period in the life of an army at last began to look to the rudest soldier as if it must soon disappear. Just when General Meade was initiating a renewal of the countermanded march on the enemy by the right flank, a despatch of Lee's, read by Meade's signal-service, showed that the enemy himself was about to move. This simple, but significant despatch directed Fitzhugh Lee to draw three days' rations of hard-tack and bacon. Three days' rations to a commander of cavalry could mean nothing less than a considerable movement. The despatch thus intercepted on the 7th of October, in its passage through the air, of course placed General Meade on the alert. Nothing could be done, however, until the coming movement of the enemy should be more developed. He might contemplate making an attack on the army where it was posted near Culpeper, or interposing between it and Washington, or an advance through the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah

Valley, or lastly, the abandonment of the line of the Rapidan by retirement on Richmond.

On the 8th Confederate cavalry began to move around the Federal right. Far away to the right the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Rapidan on the following day, some force being left south of it for the purpose of concealing the movement. On the 10th Stuart's cavalry attacked Meade's advanced posts at James City, and the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were ordered back from the Rapidan, where they had been advanced to cover the contingency that the enemy was retiring on Richmond; and Lee's intentions being now in a measure revealed, the army was put in position at Culpeper, but not for long. Before daylight of the morning of the 12th the whole Federal army, with its trains in advance, was set in motion to cross the Rappahannock, and by the afternoon had crossed and taken position there. Lee approached Culpeper on the 11th at a distance of between five and ten miles, only to find that Meade had anticipated his intention of flanking him, and that the Army of the Potomac was so far advanced towards the Rappahannock that he could do nothing but halt his infantry and despatch Stuart to harass the rear of the retiring columns, covered by Pleasanton and Sykes as a rear-guard. The next day, the 12th, he advanced towards Warrenton. Having failed at his first attempt to outflank Meade, he determined to make a new one by taking the direction of Warrenton, and trying again to intercept him. So far only cavalry engagements accompanying the movements had taken place.

Now entered one of those incidents which so influence the events of war. Buford had been ordered, when, the intentions of the enemy being unknown, they were thought possibly to be to abandon the line of the Rapidan and fall back upon Richmond, to make a reconnoissance on the

Rapidan, had crossed it on the 10th, at Germanna Ford, and had moved thence to Morton's Ford. At the latter ford he had found Fitzhugh Lee with cavalry supported by infantry, and had had an encounter with him there, and later on with him at Stevensburg, finally joining Pleasanton at Brandy Station, where they together, on the 10th, met Stuart. It was the ascertained fact of the presence of infantry with Fitzhugh Lee on the Rapidan that now turned plans all awry. The commanders of the rearguard of the Army of the Potomac became possessed with the idea that the infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia was at Culpeper, whereas, in point of fact, Lee had on the 12th left Culpeper. Meade was, through circumstances which he could not control, largely in the dark as to the position of Lee's forces. Gregg, who had been sent with his cavalry to watch the roads leading to Warrenton and those leading to the gaps of the Blue Ridge, had been prevented from communicating with him by the interposition of the enemy's cavalry. Sykes, commanding the infantry of the rearguard, and Pleasanton, commanding its cavalry, were firmly fixed in the idea that the main body of the enemy was at Culpeper. Meade, who was desirous of giving Lee battle, although not upon the terms of seeking him when he might be really marching elsewhere, brought the movement toward Warrenton to a stop, and sent the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, with Buford's cavalry, back towards Culpeper to bring on an engagement. Herein lies the error to which allusion was made in the first part of this chapter. It was not absolutely certain that Lee's army was at Culpeper. Buford's discovery did not warrant that explicit belief. Under these circumstances the proper course to take would have been to let the army remain where it was for a few hours, until positive knowledge could be obtained of Lee's dispositions. If Lee's army proved to be at Culpeper, a few

hours would have made no difference in advancing on it, for he would not have come there to retreat. But the confidence of the generals of his rearguard was so great as to Lee's being near Culpeper, that General Meade was led to countermarch the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, with Buford's cavalry, towards Brandy Station, with the result of ascertaining positively that Lee was not at Culpeper.

At ten o'clock in the night of the 12th a despatch arrived from Gregg, that Lee's army was crossing the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo. The pickets of the Third Corps, which had remained with the First on the Rappahannock, began to be driven in, and the whole army, that part which had remained in position, and that which had been countermarched, began a race with Lee's army for the goal of Centreville Heights. Humphreys, chief of Meade's staff, says, in his "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," that on the evening of the 13th, when the Army of the Potomac was once more concentrated, the question of what should next be done was the subject of long examination and discussion between them. As we know now, neither Meade nor Lee knew exactly the position of the other. They were both striving to pursue the same general line towards Centreville Heights, in a territory about seven miles wide, bounded on the west side by the Warrenton Turnpike, and on the east by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The plan of halting on Broad Run, near Milford, was discussed by General Meade and his chief-of-staff, but discarded. Humphreys says in a note, in "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," that it would have been fortunate for Meade if he had adopted it, that both leaders would then have had what they sought,—a general engagement. It may, as matters turned out, be regarded as unfortunate that this did not happen, but from all the data then in his possession, General Meade decided upon what was the wiser course.

The relative positions of the armies in this race for the possession of Centreville Heights led incidentally to the battle of Bristoe Station, an action so brilliant on the part of the Second Corps, under the leadership of Warren, who now commanded it in the absence of Hancock, gravely wounded at Gettysburg, that it has elicited even the outspoken admiration of the officers who were engaged in it on the other side. Humphreys says that, had General Meade known the position of Lee's infantry on the night of the 13th, and been correctly informed before midday of the 14th, of the character of Hill's movements, he could have assembled the army near Bristoe Station, and have attacked Hill before Ewell arrived there. In other words, instead of being encountered only by the Second Corps as a rearguard, Hill's corps would have been met there by the whole concentrated Army of the Potomac. All this, however, being totally unknown to Meade in the night of the 13th, when he was discussing with his chief-of-staff the various aspects of the situation, the conclusion reached was the right one as derived from the premises of then existing knowledge. On his side Lee also was acting under a false impression of the dispositions of the army of Meade.

The forces of General Meade were retiring towards Centreville Heights in the order of the First, Sixth, Third, Fifth, and Second Corps, although not by exactly the same routes. The Second Corps was therefore the rearguard. On the morning of the 14th of October, the Third, Fifth, and Second were moving along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Their order of march is particularized because, in being noted by the reader, it will make clear what is to follow. Before, however, we reach the morning of the 14th, it is necessary to mention the general situation of the evening before, leading to the complications of the following

day. When the weary troops of the rearguard bivouacked on the night of the 13th, it was with no suspicion that, to meet the conditions existing, more was required that night than the usual pickets, or the next morning, more than the usual flankers. Yet the situation was different, and almost unprecedented, for Stuart had been hemmed in by interposing columns of marching and now reposing infantry, and lay all night with his cavalry in the woods, without a bivouac fire, and awaiting anxiously the dawn, but meanwhile sending a message to Ewell describing his situation; and so he passed the long, anxious night, uncertain what the morrow would bring forth.

We are in imagination retiring northeast with General Meade towards Centreville, the Orange and Alexandria Railroad running in that general direction at this point, and are with the rearguard, the Second Corps. The road which it had pursued towards Cedar Run from Warrenton Junction brought it to the place where it bivouacked on the night of the 13th, nearly at that stream. At dawn, on the morning of the 14th, all the troops were astir to cross Cedar Run at the ford a short distance ahead, which had been impracticable the evening before from occupation of the crossing by the Third Corps. The route which the Third Corps had taken after crossing the stream lay in the same general direction as that which the Corps had been pursuing, but the one which the Second Corps was to take to the right, to reach the railroad at Catlett's Station, was at right-angles to it from their common point of departure. As the Second Corps crossed Cedar Run, it threw Caldwell's division ahead to the left on the road which the Third Corps had pursued, which division occupied a bare ridge on the right of the road, to guard against the possible advent of the enemy in that direction, which was the rear with reference to the now divergent line of march of the Second

Corps, while Hays's division turned sharply towards the right, on the right-angular extension of the road towards Catlett's Station.

The troops, safely across Cedar Run, began to prepare breakfast, when suddenly Caldwell, to the new rear, was assailed with a shower of shells from the direction of Catlett's Station, the very road by which he was to march towards the railroad. This was Stuart's artillery, brought to bear upon the division of Caldwell, perfectly secure in its own estimation in occupying the strong position held towards the new rear, and, to cap the climax, Stuart's guns became the signal for Ewell to press forward with his infantry simultaneously on that point. But, just as Caldwell had been perfectly unaware that Stuart's or any other hostile force could be occupying ground towards Catlett's Station, so Stuart was unaware, as he soon learned to his cost, of the fact that Hays's or any other Federal division was between him and Caldwell. Hays formed and pushed forward his line of battle, flanked by cavalry, towards Catlett's Station, and Stuart was soon in full retreat, after having thus fallen through accident into one of the most dangerous of situations, and having extricated himself from it by a rare combination of caution and audacity. In the other direction, Caldwell, acting as rear-guard, held Ewell at bay, while the rest of the Second Corps pushed on for Catlett's Station, Ewell finally releasing Caldwell by continuing his march towards Greenwich on the same road that the Third Corps had taken on the previous evening.

No incident of the war contains so many strange elements as those combined in the night preceding the battle of Bristoe Station; the corps of the two contending armies enshrouded in darkness, ignorant of their relative positions, reposing near each other while awaiting another struggle for mastery; the adventurous cavalry-leader, Stuart, lying

perdu in the woods beyond overlapping infantry; the commander of the Federal forces near by in slumber recuperative of his fatigues. The conflict of the early morning caps the climax, when Stuart suddenly appears in a position which, although single, was both front or rear; front, if considered with reference to the temporary line of march of the Second Corps, rear, if considered with reference to the general direction towards Centreville; while Ewell presses on from the direction which was either front or rear, depending upon the same considerations. The day will come when, in the lapse of time, "the light which never shone on land or sea" will illumine this episode and passage of arms with all the charm that perspective lends to historical romance.

Without a map, or puzzling over the matter, the reader cannot possibly see, without some explanation, how the Second Corps could be retiring on Centreville and yet be marching towards Catlett's Station, in a direction at right-angles to the direct line of march northward of the Third Corps. The explanation of the fact is, however, simple. The various corps pursued, as is usual, different routes, in order to avoid encumbering a single one, and to effect proper dispositions with reference to the possible movements of the enemy. The road which the Third Corps had pursued was towards Centreville, by the way of the detour of Greenwich, and the somewhat opposite direction of it, which the Second Corps pursued, is at right-angles with reference to it only until Catlett's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, is reached, when the line of the railroad itself, which from that point was to be followed by the Corps, runs almost directly towards Centreville. Thus it came to pass that, when the enemy, under Ewell, attacked the Second Corps as it was about, for a short distance, to take the sharp turn to the right to Catlett's Station, Ewell's infantry may

be said to have been in its rear, and Stuart's cavalry on its front, as previously stated. But, with relation to the whole field of retirement of the army from the Rappahannock to Centreville, the hostile forces were partially on each other's flanks, perforce of the fact that the Army of the Potomac was striving to reach Centreville, and Lee, acting from the rear, was endeavoring to interrupt the march of its last two or three corps. So placed, with the advance of Lee projecting somewhat beyond the rear of Meade, and with converging roads, collision between the forces became inevitable along the general line of retirement of the Army of the Potomac from the Rappahannock towards Centreville. When the Second Corps had reached Catlett's Station, it headed directly along the railroad, going northeast, towards Centreville, the Fifth Corps having fallen in ahead of it, and the Third Corps ahead of that, the order, resulting from the different routes taken, making, as before, the Second Corps the rearguard.

The Second Corps, having reached Catlett's Station, turned, as indicated, sharply to its left along the line of the railroad running northeast. While on the road from the point where it had diverged from the direction taken on the preceding night by the Third Corps, Warren received from Humphreys, General Meade's chief-of-staff, information that he might be attacked by the enemy at Bristoe Station, a few miles in advance, who might direct a column from Gainesville, on the left, to that point. The same despatch informed him that Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps, the next in advance, would remain at Bristoe Station until he had arrived there. The dispositions towards the rear of the Army of the Potomac and those of the advance of the Army of Northern Virginia may be easily imagined as slightly overlapping each other. The Third, Fifth, and Second Corps, in the order mentioned, were heading northeast on the line

of railroad. The Third Corps was not to advance further towards Centreville until the heads of column of the Fifth Corps were arriving, and, in turn, the Fifth Corps was not to follow its march until it saw the heads of column of the Second Corps arriving. Thus the three corps towards the rear of the Army of the Potomac were by orders to remain within supporting distance of each other. Ewell's corps, of the Army of Northern Virginia, had, as we have seen, converged on the rearguard of the Second Corps before it had turned off to the right for Catlett's Station, and that corps had now resumed its direct march towards Bristoe Station.. Hill's corps will previously converge from the left on Bristoe Station.

The troops of Warren were fatigued. They had undergone unusual stress from constant marching and the recent encounter, which had looked at first as if they were surrounded. They were plodding wearily along towards Bristoe Station, and had nearly arrived there when a heavy discharge of artillery was heard ahead, for which fact there was no other apparent solution than that the Fifth Corps was engaged with the enemy. The men started on the best resemblance to the double-quick that they could muster, as Warren put spurs to his horse, and, followed by his staff, dashed ahead towards Bristoe Station. Crossing Kettle Run, a branch of Broad Run, running close beside it on the south, Warren found himself in the open, and took in at a glance the main facts of the field, that the enemy had been firing at the retiring columns of the Fifth Corps, probably under the impression that it was the rearguard, and that he had to rectify promptly dispositions of his own troops which had been made. Sykes seems to have become so possessed with the idea that he must hasten forward at all hazards towards Centreville as to have been oblivious of the necessity imposed upon him by orders to wait for the arrival of

the Second Corps. He was a sturdy, but not particularly bright officer, and what took place happened just because he had that peculiar persistency which is at the mercy of a single thought.

Webb's division, of the Second Corps, is marching along the left of the railroad, and Hays's division on the right. Webb, approaching the enemy posted near Bristoe Station, whose attention was directed towards the Fifth Corps, crosses to the right of the railroad. The enemy now concentrates his whole attention on the heads of column of the arriving Second Corps. Before Warren reached the advanced troops, Colonel Morgan, inspector-general of the corps, had begun to make disposition of them on the ridge back of the railroad. Warren saw and rectified the mistake that had been made in the relinquishment to the enemy of the earthwork formed by the line of railroad in cut and embankment. Instantly the whole force was ordered forward and rapidly took position while the enemy was advancing to capture the same line. In between Broad Run and Kettle Run, behind the railroad embankment, and in the shallow cut, the troops rapidly formed from right to left as they arrived on the ground, the action not delayed a moment for the arrival of those still pressing onward from the rear. The final dispositions of the Second Corps were the divisions of Webb, Hays, and Caldwell, from right to left. Back of the right were Ricketts's guns on the ridge. Back of the centre were Arnold's guns. Miles's brigade was stationed in support between the batteries. Gregg's cavalry, which had been actively engaged during the day in skirmishing with Ewell's advance, was off to the left. Hill's corps, on the other side of the railroad, confronted the Second Corps, outnumbering it more than two to one. Anderson's division was on the right, and Heth's division on the left, while Wilcox's

division was in reserve in the rear. Ewell had given the right of way to Hill, but there was no saying how soon he might not be marching on to the field of battle through the more difficult track of by-roads which he had taken. The suddenness with which the Second Corps captured the railroad saved the day. It was all as sudden as if the combatants had dropped from the skies. General Francis A. Walker, then assistant-adjutant-general of the Corps, who was present, gives a graphic description of the early part of the battle. He says, "Already they [the enemy] have reached Dodd's house, near the track, without halting or breaking, and still they come on. Warren, Webb, and Hays, with their staffs, among whom are conspicuous Mitchell, Bingham, and Haskell, gallop up and down along the track, encouraging the men with cheers mingled with imprecations,—which, let us hope, the troops hear, and the recording angel judiciously does not."

Urgent despatches were sent after Sykes, now too far away to be of any assistance by countermarching, unless to assist in bringing off the Second Corps in case it should meet with disaster. Measuring his military tact by a line or two of a despatch of his to Warren, saying that if Lee's army were on his left, two corps would be but little better than one, we can readily understand that it was only superior orders that finally countermarched him. We may believe that, even if he had learned (and saying, as he did, that he did not, we may rely upon it that he did not hear the sound of cannonading) that Warren was attacked, he would not have returned of his own motion. The action in which Warren was engaged was severe. The Second Corps, with two of its brigades absent, numbered only eight thousand men. The losses of the Confederates were heavy, however, compared with those of the Second Corps. As evening was approaching the advance of Ewell began to enter the action on the

left. Night, however, came on without Lee's uniting corps making any concerted attack. Under cover of the darkness the Second Corps, enjoined to the most scrupulous silence in its movements, quietly resumed the line of its march, and crossing Broad Run, moved forward towards Centreville. It had covered itself with glory, and its commander had won a national reputation.

It now became evident that Lee relinquished the operation which had resulted in the battle of Bristoe Station, giving up all hope of reaching Centreville before the arrival of the Army of the Potomac there. He virtually stopped his advance at Bristoe Station, sending merely heavy detachments as far as Bull Run, behind which Centreville, as regarded from the south, is situated. What Lee had attempted had been anticipated and amply provided against by the orders of General Meade, but his orders had not been carried out. Their intent had been defeated by the kind of thing against which even the gods contend in vain. General Meade was undoubtedly, from the first, aiming to occupy the heights at Centreville. Humphreys says that he had reluctantly come to that conclusion. If, however, Sykes had not moved forward when he inopportunely so did, thereby causing the Third Corps, ahead of him, to move forward, both corps, returning immediately to Bristoe Station, would have been followed by General Meade's orders to the First and Sixth Corps also to countermarch. This is stated by the remark of Humphreys, speaking of the action at Bristoe Station, in his "Gettysburg to the Rapidan." "As soon," he says, "as General Meade received intelligence of the enemy's appearance at Bristoe, and that the Fifth and Third Corps were not in connection with the Second, those corps were ordered back to its support. It was too late, however, to concentrate the whole army there in time for a general engagement."

General Humphreys thinks that there was an error committed antecedently to the countermarch towards Culpeper, for he says, in his "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," that "the Army of the Potomac should have remained quiet, or have been concentrated at or near its central point, Culpeper Court House, except such parts of it as were necessary to make the enemy show his hand." But, apparently, the enemy had shown his hand. That upon which General Meade must have based his action seems conclusive. He had not heard from his cavalry on the Rappahannock on his right rear. He knew that no movement was taking place on his left. He had also ascertained that the movement going on was not towards Richmond. This, in sum, seems positively determinative of the question whether or not Lee's movement was on his right flank. These bases seem all-sufficient to determine the action which General Meade took. The confirmation of the justness of his decision lies in the fact that Lee appeared near Culpeper only a few hours after the Army of the Potomac had retired to the Rappahannock. Had Meade lingered at Culpeper for final developments, Lee would to a certainty have secured the advance. Therefore it would appear from evidence both before and after the event, that General Meade's retirement was timely, and that it did not constitute an error antecedent to that made when, after having secured the advance to the Rappahannock, General Meade made a partial countermarch, under the belief that the commanders of his rearguard of cavalry and infantry could not well be mistaken in thinking that the main body of the enemy was near Culpeper.

We must now pass cursorily over the operations which took place between the time when the Army of the Potomac reached the Heights of Centreville and General Lee relinquished his attempt to outflank it, and the time when,

on the banks of the Rappahannock, the next serious engagement occurred. On the 15th of October the army rested in quiet, but for some skirmishing along Bull Run with the advance of Lee. The main body of his troops remained in the rear in accordance with the enforced change in his plans. On the following day a heavy rain set in, Bull Run booming with such a high stage of water that its fords became impracticable. On the 19th the army began its return march southward in columns directed to Gainesville on the right and Bristoe Station on the left. During this period cavalry combats ensued, in which the enemy obtained the advantage, his cavalry being twice as numerous as that possessed by the Federal army. In a combat that took place near Buckland Mills, where Broad Run crosses the Warrenton Turnpike, the enemy facetiously termed the finale of the encounter the Buckland Races. Lee while retreating availed himself of the opportunity in passing over the ground to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Bristoe to Rappahannock Station on the Rappahannock.

Continuing to advance, General Meade, on the 21st of October, came into position athwart the country from the vicinity of Warrenton, on his right, across the railroad, on his left. From this position he proposed to Halleck to make a rapid march by the left flank, occupy the Heights of Fredericksburg, thereby seize a short line of communication with his new base, and necessarily cause the falling back of Lee. As Lee was entirely off his guard at the time, not for a moment imagining that the Army of the Potomac would, late in the season, adopt measures so vigorous, and as the movement could hardly have failed of success, in view of the fact of Lee's position being in the fork of the Rappahannock and Rapidan, Halleck of course disapproved of the movement. Compelled to adopt some other plan of ad-

vance, General Meade, on the 7th of November, moved towards the Rappahannock, and an engagement ensued in which General Lee was taken completely by surprise, and defeated with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Lee was on the south side of the Rappahannock, Meade on the north side. Lee's army was disposed with Ewell's corps on the right and Hill's on the left, crossing the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Just above the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station he had a pontoon-bridge across the river, protected on the south side of the river by lines of earthworks, and on the north side of it by a *tête de pont* with defensive wings running along the ridge and lower bank of the river. He was thus what is militarily called *à cheval* across the river, that is, astride of it, in a position threatening any attempt by Meade to divide his forces for a flank attack by a march either to the right or left. The Army of the Potomac, constituted as two columns, one composed of the First, Second, and Third Corps, under General French, and the other of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, was encamped in the vicinity of Warrenton. Both columns marched at daylight of the 7th of October down the Rappahannock, Sedgwick to Rappahannock Station and French to Kelly's Ford, five miles below. General Meade had ordered Sedgwick to come into position opposite the enemy's works protecting the pontoon-bridge near Rappahannock Station, capture them, and then cross the pontoon-bridge and capture those on the south side of the river, and thence advance on Brandy Station in concert with General French; while General French had been ordered to pass over Kelly's Ford, capture the enemy's works opposite, assist the direct advance of Sedgwick across the river by pushing for the enemy's rear, and then, when the whole preliminary movement had been successful, advance with Sedgwick upon Brandy Station. The

cavalry was to cross the Rappahannock beyond both flanks of the Confederate army.

French's column arrived at Kelly's Ford about the same time that Sedgwick's arrived at Rappahannock Station, about noon, and he threw a brigade across the river before the enemy, who had been quite taken by surprise, could offer very serious resistance, captured some earthworks, pushed the other troops rapidly across, began building a pontoon-bridge, and came into position. Lee, on his side, reinforced there Johnson's division of Ewell's corps with Rodes's division, and night fell with the opposing forces drawn up against each other, Johnson and Rodes forming a line resting with its left on the Rappahannock, and with its right on a stream called Mountain Creek. This Mountain Creek, sometimes called Mountain Run, an east and west branch of the Rappahannock on its west side, must not be confounded with the Mountain Run which is a southern branch of the Rapidan. Lee was perfectly certain at this time that Meade's movement would prove an entire failure. The task that Sedgwick confronted in an attempt to capture the *tête de pont* and lines of related works and a pontoon-bridge stretching to the south side of the Rappahannock, by which reinforcements to the enemy could come, was naturally not so easy as that assigned to French. The skirmishing and feeling the enemy's position was accomplished rapidly, and the Sixth Corps, on the right, and the Fifth, on the left, closed in on the works and pounded away at them with artillery until dark, without making any sensible impression upon them. Lee, meanwhile, had drawn troops from his centre nearer to the south bank of the river. Anderson's division advanced to it, and Early's was brought close to the pontoon-bridge, while Hoke's brigade was detached from it and despatched across the bridge to reinforce the troops under Hays in the *tête de pont* and entrenchments.

Lee felt just as certain of holding his own here as in the position opposite Kelly's Ford, for here as well as there night fell and no definite result had been reached by Meade. Nevertheless, the conclusion was delusive, for then ensued a *coup de main* which has not its superior in the history of the war.

It was after dusk, but from right and left the artillery-fire of Sedgwick poured scathingly by well-known ranges into the enemy's works, while amidst the dimness of the fitful illumination General Russell, in temporary command of the First Division of the Sixth Corps, conducted the assault with the Second and Third Brigades led by Colonels Upton and Ellmaker. The works, defended by as many men as those who assaulted, were carried, with the loss to the enemy of artillery, small-arms, many killed and wounded, and numerous prisoners. The enemy had been so completely taken by surprise that at first those on the other side of the river could not credit the statement of the event. Holding the southern end of the bridge in force, they soon learned the whole truth of the disaster; that Hoke's brigade, commanded that day by Colonel Godwin, had been cut off, that Colonel Ellmaker was in possession of the northern end of the bridge, and that the few who had escaped over it represented all that would be recovered of the force which had defended the northern bank of the river. The bridge was immediately fired by the Confederates, and so consumed as to prevent any attempt on the part of General Meade to cross the river at that point. This serious encounter caused General Lee to loosen his hold on the Rappahannock. Instead of attempting to push French back from the lodgment which he had made on his right, and running the risk of Sedgwick's speedy reinforcement of the column there, when he would have been obliged to fight a pitched battle, Lee began his retreat during the night to a position near the mouth of

Mountain Creek, but afterwards continued it to the entrenchments which he had previously occupied along the southern bank of the Rapidan.

The following morning, the 8th of October, opened with so dense a fog that Sedgwick could not at first discover whether or not the enemy was still in position opposite to him on the south bank of the Rappahannock. A column to the left moved up from Kelly's Ford, five miles below, on the opposite side of the Rappahannock, to clear Sedgwick's front by holding the southern bank of the river while he was engaged in constructing a pontoon-bridge across it. The Fifth Corps moved before daylight and crossed at Kelly's Ford, leaving only the Sixth Corps in position at Rappahannock Station, on the north side of the river. The railroad bridge there being destroyed, a pontoon-bridge had to be laid to supply its absence. The pontoon-bridge was finished by the time that the sun had in the early morning dispersed the fog that had lain densely over the river-bottom. The Federal army, now released, swept forward towards Brandy Station, and took up a position from Willford's Creek, on Hazel River, to the right, to Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, to the left, Lee lying perdu opposite to it behind the woods and hills south of the Rapidan. Thus the two armies found themselves once again in substantially the same positions which they had occupied at the beginning of their late active campaign, in the fruits of which the Confederates had nothing to equal in comparison with the brilliant affairs of Bristoe and Rappahannock Stations, and the increased prestige of the Federal commander and his army.

During the time when the region between Centreville and the Rappahannock had been reoccupied by General Meade, the repairing of the railroad destroyed by the enemy had been pushed forward vigorously, and had now reached

Modified, to suit the Gener. al reader, by R. Meade Bache.
SKETCH
showing the Positions of the
UNION and REBEL FORCES
as situated on the
30th of November, 1863.
IN THE
VICINITY OF MINE RUN,
IN
ORANGE COUNTY, VA

completion, thus making the army in its present position secure as to its supplies. The supervening condition of security and ease by no means, however, satisfied the ever-active and enterprising mind of General Meade, always anxious, if the balance inclined to chance of success, to take the initiative, but constantly hampered by the sluggish Halleck, whose military views and plans would have best fitted in with the years of Methuselah and an unmilitary people of some bygone age. The plan of action which General Meade now adopted, known as the Mine Run Campaign, had in it all possible elements of success. Had not one of the instruments with which it was to be carried out proved wholly unequal to the enterprise, it would in all human probability have succeeded. It is true that the plan could not have involved, as intended, a surprise, for it was not easy to surprise Lee. It was, however, sufficiently of the nature of a surprise to make it impossible that Lee could concentrate to advantage; that is to say, the plan, if it had been executed in accordance with design, involved a severe blow which, despite Lee's seeing it to be inevitable, it would have been impossible completely to ward off.

The army of Lee lay seemingly secure in its position south of the Rapidan, from a little beyond Barnett's Ford, on his left, to a little beyond Morton's Ford, on his right, a stretch of some eighteen miles. Above and below his continuous entrenchments along the Rapidan, commanding the fords there, other fords were well watched by his cavalry. From Barnett's Ford above, to Morton's Ford below, the Rapidan runs, with but slight windings in its course, about northeast, and for some distance below Morton's Ford a little south of east, its course thus making at the latter point an obtuse angle looking north. On its course below Morton's Ford, about five miles below the Ford, the Rapidan is entered from the south by two small affluents having

their mouths close together. The westernmost one, called Mountain Run, runs nearly parallel with the trend of the Rapidan from Morton's Ford to Barnett's Ford. The easternmost one, called Mine Run, running off nearly at right-angles to the Rapidan, forks about three miles from its mouth, the eastern, main stream constituting Mine Run proper, and its western branch, Black Walnut Run. Availing himself of this conformation of country, Lee had made his lines run, as indicated, from above Barnett's Ford to below Morton's Ford, and they thus swept across Mountain Run, whence they flexed abruptly so as to pass for some distance along the west side of Mine Run, trending there south. When active operations began, this latter line did not extend much, if at all, beyond Bartlett's Mill on Mine Run, but, as will be seen, it was rapidly increased towards the south as emergency arose. About four miles below Barnett's Ford the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the Rapidan, and about four miles below that point is Robertson's Ford, five miles above Raccoon Ford, which, in turn, is three miles above Morton's Ford.

In the relative positions of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia Lee's left flank was twice as far away as his right flank was from the centre of the Army of the Potomac. Therefore, although he was stronger on his right than on his left, his right, not being absolutely impregnable, gave the best opening for attack, making it not only probable but certain, that the attack would be successful if orders were duly obeyed. The conditions being those already described, involving the impossibility of Lee's reinforcing his right with his left within the time requisite for the Army of the Potomac to assail his right, success for the latter army was certain, if its movements were executed in a demonstrably practicable interval of time. The Army of the Potomac failed, however, to secure the advantage in time

which it had with reason counted upon, but not through remissness on the part of its chief. Greater pains were never taken by any general to ensure the success of a movement, through having his subordinates equal to their appointed tasks. But, alas, men can no more rise above their level than can water above its level; every existing thing has its appointed range! As of old, so now, so for all time must endure the law that no one by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature, whence certainly no one else can add to it. We have it on the indisputable authority of General Humphreys, chief-of-staff, that General Meade had all the corps-commanders summoned to his headquarters, where, with maps distributed, each received his orders for the contemplated march, and he even adds that General French received explicit instructions that, when he reached on the line of his advance a house known as Morris's, where there is a fork in the road, he was to take the left-hand turning. This it is well to say incidentally, leaving what remains to add to the time when we in imagination shall reach the same fork in the road. Whatever General Humphreys says is as conclusive as to fact as anything can humanly be. His was a mind conspicuously gifted with just perception, in the luminous play of whose facets one scarcely ever fails to find the pure gleam of central truth as it might be viewed from various standpoints.

Hill's corps occupied Lee's entrenchments from Barnett's Ford to Robertson's Ford, below the railroad, and Ewell's corps, then under Early, from Robertson's Ford to Morton's Ford and beyond, and thence across the country, as previously described, as far as Bartlett's Mill. General Meade's plan of operations as finally adopted, after slight variations, was to advance as follows: The Third, followed by the Sixth Corps, was to cross the Rapidan at Jacobs' Ford, about five miles below Morton's Ford, and push ahead to

Robertson's Tavern, a place called by the Confederates Locust Grove. This was General French's column, and, as already mentioned, he had been instructed to take the left-hand fork of the road upon reaching Morris's house. The object of these instructions was to avoid the danger which he would incur, through taking the right-hand fork, of being struck in flank while marching, and of being thus prevented from reaching Robertson's Tavern in time. The First and Fifth Corps were to cross the Rapidan at Culpeper Mine Ford, five miles below Jacobs' Ford, and march thence to Parker's store, which would bring them on to the ground four miles east of Robertson's store, within easy march of that place. The Second Corps was to cross the Rapidan by itself at Germanna Ford, a ford between Jacobs' and Culpeper Mine Fords. The cavalry in part guarded the trains and the fords, and in part covered the left flank of the advance.

The march began early on the morning of the 26th of November. Lee soon learned of it from his signal-stations and from his cavalry, but nothing could have frustrated the initiative of the Army of the Potomac but the ensuing delay of General French. Some loss of time was incurred through the inexcusable fact that pontoons were deficient in number, the recurrence of which, or entire absence of them, during the war was one of its constant surprises. Difficulties were also encountered in the ascent by artillery of the high and steep banks south of the Rapidan. Other difficulties were met as they arose, war being the science of overcoming difficulties existent and suddenly brought into existence; but all those mentioned may be incidental to any campaigning. The one which French introduced is incidental only to an incapacity marvellous in a corps-commander, so gross that it led to his being relieved from duty with the army. All other obstacles were surmounted, but this was insuper-

able. It led to the loss of a great success for the Federal arms.

The minor obstacles to progress in the march brought it about that, when night fell, none of the troops had reached the place of rendezvous. The next morning, the 27th, the movement was resumed with every prospect still favorable. It had been intended and so ordered that the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, the army, in short, in order duly announced, should close up on New Verdiersville and Old Verdiersville, cavalry moving in advance. The Third and Sixth Corps, however, remained stationary, and the whole army was brought to a stand, so far as its initiative was concerned, as completely as though it had been stuck in the mud. Meanwhile Lee's troops, off on his left, miles away, were availing themselves of the opportunity to present themselves in force along the threatened line of Mine Run. Lee, with his usual vigilance, had been on the alert, and now, with his usual promptitude and determination, was about to attack.

At ten o'clock in the morning, near Robertson's Tavern, the first collision between the two hostile forces took place. The head of the Second Corps, under General Warren, met the head of Ewell's corps. The enemy were so well persuaded of the relatively greater strength of the Federal position that, after the first encounter, he awaited reinforcements. But, as it happened, the reinforcements expected had been met and brought to a halt by the unexpected firing of the Third Corps upon them while on the march, the Third Corps having been halted by its commander near the forks of the road by Morris's house; in doubt, despite his instructions, whether he should take there the right-hand or the left-hand branch of the road, and notwithstanding that General Prince, one of his division-commanders, insisted upon it that the left branch was the proper

one to take. Had French, however, taken either immediately upon his arrival at the point, he would have passed through without contact with the enemy, but taking neither, he had not only neutralized his own corps, but also the Sixth Corps in his rear, brought to a stand by his halt.

Despatches now began to be sent to French to hasten him forward with the Third Corps, and to instruct Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth, to push forward, closed-up with him, and to march by any route to the left by which they could reach the position of the Second Corps. No general-commanding was ever placed in a more trying situation than this, victory within his grasp if two corps had but continued *en route*. Victory is not to be compelled, and therefore failure amid the clash of arms is philosophically borne by the greatest generals, but failure through inaction of forces directed with consummate forecast on a certain point, and these, not like those of Grouchy, miles away, but those upon which the commander feels that he can almost lay his hand, is intolerable. Had French continued to advance when he reached Morris's house, Ewell's corps would have been met by the Second, Third, and Sixth Corps, instead of by the Second Corps alone, and would have been overwhelmed. But the missing of this single opportunity does not represent the full extent of French's insufficiency for the occasion. The fatal error of halting at Morris's house went on in ever-widening circles of included events, compassing in sum the failure of the main design of General Meade. French got into a small battle of his own, and hope that at first was high, that things might be at least in a measure righted, grew fainter and fainter as the day wore on, until by nightfall it had died away. At last, between eleven and twelve o'clock, noon, a despatch was received by General Meade from French, mentioning where his head of column was, and saying that he was waiting for

the Second Corps. It is said that General Meade was by this time fuming. What wonder if he were! This despatch had been sent by French a little after nine o'clock, before he had reached Morris's house, where he was, as he continued to be, blocking the road of the Sixth Corps, which had not been even able to start. The obvious answer was sent, that he had not been ordered to wait for the Second Corps anywhere, that it was at Robertson's Tavern where he was awaited. The despatch ended with a summons to push rapidly forward to that place. Just before two o'clock in the afternoon another despatch, written just before twelve, reached General Meade from French, saying that the enemy was attacking him on his right. There was now no help for it but to let him remain and fight. Accordingly, General Meade despatched to him to attack the enemy, but to connect his left with the Second Corps, at Robertson's Tavern, that being the object of his being allowed to attack. The action on French's front became more vigorous, the Sixth Corps supporting the Third with two divisions, which, however, were used by French only as reserves. Outnumbering the enemy vastly, French remained wholly on the defensive, without fully availing himself of the presence of the Sixth Corps. The situation was this. French, with two corps, confronted only one division of the enemy, while Warren, to his left, with only a single corps, confronted two divisions of the enemy. Naturally General Meade could not advance Warren against these, and French was entirely beyond his control. In the mean while, during the afternoon, the First Corps, under Newton, had reached Parker's store, in the rear of Robertson's Tavern, and the Fifth Corps, under Sykes, New Hope Church, on the left of Robertson's Tavern; the First Corps being finally ordered to Robertson's Tavern, arriving there by nightfall. During the afternoon the enemy, finding that

the Second Corps was disposed to be unaggressive, made an attack with skirmishers upon it, resulting in the feint of a counter-attack by Warren, in which the enemy was repulsed with some slight loss. French was now regarded as so hopelessly stalled that during the afternoon orders were sent to the Sixth Corps, still in his rear, to move forward to Robertson's Tavern, and for the Third Corps to follow by night.

This sketch of the operations up to this point is now sufficiently complete, in conformity with the rest of this work, as to make it only requisite to add, that on Meade's left, Hill's corps having now advanced in full force from Lee's former extreme left on the Rapidan, had reached the line of the upper part of Mine Run on the afternoon of the 27th, where some of it came into contact at New Hope Church with the Fifth Corps and cavalry of the Army of the Potomac before that corps was ordered to Robertson's Tavern. Hill then formed on the right of Ewell's corps, and the enemy was then in position along the west side of Mine Run. This military situation on both sides naturally concludes the first chapter of the operations at Mine Run. What was done could not be undone. It might be possible, however, for General Meade still to retrieve, through a different channel, the failure which had taken place, and for which he was in nowise responsible. That he evidently thought so, is proved by his promptly executed subsequent movements, through which it is seen that he pertinaciously clung to the hope that success might still reward a final effort.

It must not be forgotten by the reader that it was said that the line of Lee's entrenchments along the Rapidan did not at first pass much further south than Bartlett's Mill, on Mine Run, but that, from the arrival of the Confederates on the ground, they began to extend the

line along the west side of Mine Run. Necessity, the practical character of the American, and the nature of the soil in Virginia, had all conspired towards working a certain change in the methods of fighting in the opposing armies. The individual soldier, and the soldiers collectively, now fell as naturally to entrenching against infantry for the needs of a few minutes, or for those of a protracted encounter, as if they had belonged to that class in nature of burrowing creatures which, either for predatory or defensive purposes, takes to mother-earth for aid, whether on dry land or on the bottom of pond or sea. The Confederates now had a night before them, a night to be devoted freely to the purpose of defence, incapable of producing a palace with a roc's egg in the centre of the dome, but serving every purpose as a citadel of life. In consequence, when at daylight, on the morning of the 28th, the Army of the Potomac advanced in line of battle with the First, Second, and Sixth Corps in front, and the Third and Fifth in reserve, Lee had a new line of entrenchments thrown up for a long distance on the ridge of the west side of Mine Run. This formidable line stretched away right and left, strengthened by abattis, and held by infantry and artillery. No troops could live through the gust of fire that would, if Meade advanced, sweep from the western crest of the hills beyond Mine Run across the little valley through which flows its stream. The force of the enemy was smaller than that of the Army of the Potomac, although that fact was not then known, but as the defenders of entrenchments, his actual force more than equalized superiority of opposing numbers. Brought to a halt here by insuperable difficulties, Meade did not relinquish his intention to obtain some success commensurate with the efforts that had already been made. Rightly judging that the enemy's entrenchments could not extend indefinitely to the left, he despatched

Warren, with the Second Corps, with a portion of the Sixth, and some cavalry, to make a night march to the left, and on the morning of the 29th, endeavor to find a point where, by a turning movement, he could with advantage attack, while the commanders of the other corps were ordered to reconnoitre during the 29th the lines immediately in front of them, and seek to discover some weak point for assault. As the result of this quest, Newton and Sykes, of the First and Fifth Corps, reported unfavorably to success on their fronts, while a favorable report, afterwards changed, was made as to its front by the Third Corps. Wright's division, of the Sixth Corps, on the right, and the Second Corps, which, with a portion of the Sixth, had penetrated to the left, opposite the head of Mine Run, reported favorably. Two divisions of the Third Corps were finally added by night-march to Warren's turning column on the left, which, upon the basis of his enthusiastic report, was ordered to assault the enemy's line the next morning, while, on the right, the Fifth and Sixth Corps were to assault, and the First Corps, with the third division of the Third Corps, in the centre, were to make strong demonstrations, to be converted into real attacks in case that either the attack on the right or that on the left should prove successful. It must not be supposed that the line was unbroken. Warren was off some distance to the left. General Meade, secure in his position, confident in the stanchness of his troops, and in the ability of the left to sustain itself, until, if it were needed, reinforced, had had the enterprise to detach Warren so far as to weaken the centre of his general line of battle. Warren was, however, not so far off as represented by a singular mistake of General Humphreys, who states the distance as five miles, whereas the whole line of battle from right to left was only a little over six miles. However, Warren being somewhat off to the left, special dispositions had to

be made to recognize that fact. These, in general terms, consisted, while thinning the centre, of leaving it strongly supported with artillery.

During the night of the 29th the several corps adjusted their positions with reference to the contemplated assault, the initiation of which was to be the advance of Warren, preceded by artillery-fire along the lines for an hour from the right and centre, when the Fifth and Sixth Corps, on the right, were to assault, and the First and Third Corps, on the centre, to convert a feint of advancing into a real attack, if circumstances permitted. The weather had been frightfully cold, followed by a rain-storm in the night of the 28th. The suffering of the troops from cold was intense, especially those on the left, intensified by the necessity of latterly dispensing with camp-fires, which would have revealed their exact position to the enemy. Men were frozen to death on their posts, and morning dawned upon troops with determination to do or die, but with the desperation of hopelessness. On the stroke of eight o'clock in the morning the skirmishers of the First and Third Corps darted across Mine Run, repulsing the enemy's. From the right towards the left the cannonading of the enemy's lines began and continued with uninterrupted roar. The time of one hour, allotted for its duration, had nearly elapsed. Suddenly the whole plan of battle collapsed, and with it, shortly, the battle itself. Sedgwick was in the act of preparing to assault on the right with the Fifth and Sixth Corps, when a staff-officer from Warren reached General Meade in fiery haste, and reported that Warren judged the enemy's entrenchments opposite the left to be impregnable. The enemy had pushed off to his right along his line, with reserves in rear, and during day and night a line of earthworks had mantled the hillsides in front of Warren's contemplated line of advance. There was barely time, ten

minutes, to countermand Sedgwick's assault on the right, and thus ended the second chapter of the military history of Mine Run.

General Meade went through the form of going to the left and scanning the ground there, but he would have been fatuous indeed, had he, in the teeth of a decision based upon reconnoissance, concluded blindly to make the assault on the left. Had Warren decided in favor of that course, had Meade decided in favor of it, they would have gained a little cheap fame, but neither was a man to attempt a stroke reckless of its cost and an undue risk of its failure, war being a game of destruction in which relatively less cost must be considered. Warren did his duty in declining to justify by his decision the risk of assault, Meade did his by accepting the morally inevitable. He had gone as far to secure victory as any general could in conscience go. Grant never went further in hazardous enterprises than Meade had ventured to secure success upon this field. There is something still to be added, to give a correct view of this episode. The whole plan of battle was based upon Warren's confidence in success on the left. Sharing his confidence, from his report, Meade increased his force in the night of the 29th, so that it in sum amounted to between twenty-five and twenty-six thousand men. Assuming then, as we have a right to do, what General Meade himself did not dispute, that on the morning of the 30th the enemy had become too strong to be attacked, there still remains an undiscussed condition, involved in the question why Warren should have been so confident as to a matter subject to such sudden collapse. General Meade states very mildly in his official report what relates to this portion of the failure at Mine Run, where he says, "but for the unfortunate error of judgment of Major-General Warren," his [General Meade's] first plan of attack, in three columns, would prob-

ably have been successful, or at least would have been tried. French, here at Mine Run, failed him lamentably; and although Warren did not belong to the same class of men, as Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, and other places attest, yet he had not that forecasting mind which is equal to judgment beyond immediate emergency. Rare is the gift in any one; it is that of the highest military order of mind. To have the slow pulse of Napoleon, combined with the brain in which instant impression of present and future are blended in future probability, is a military type which is a single product of the centuries. Warren's hopes at Mine Run overclouded his judgment, and, after the failure of French, neutralized the last chance in the attempted operation by ignoring the possibility of just what occurred in a night by the Confederates' making the position on their right impregnable.

Lee had been preparing in the night of the 1st of December for a stroke on the left of Warren, but the whole of Meade's army, retiring across the Rapidan that same night, involved the intention, as well as any other project which the Confederate commander may have had, in the limbo of things unaccomplished. The enemy made some attempts to harass the rear of the retiring columns, but it was not effective. The cavalry of the army, having well executed its duty to the left of the army in position, and by watching the fords, now concluded it by covering Meade's left flank and rear as his columns retired towards the river. If General Meade had been allowed to take his own course at this point of time, he would have fallen back to Fredericksburg, just in his rear, instead of recrossing the Rapidan, but the timorous Halleck would have none of it. He could not for a moment think of letting the army take up a position anywhere a few miles off on the Confederate flank. It must lie right across the track to Washington of the lion Lee. Yet, had the army then been allowed to fall back

upon Fredericksburg, the campaign that opened in the spring would have been spared the dreadful sacrifices of the Wilderness.

The Army of the Potomac, once again across the Rapidan, and the Army of Northern Virginia back in its old position along the river, both similarly affected in operations by the season of the year, sought in the repose of their hutted winter-quarters renovation through rest, the arrival of new levies, of wounded men returning well, and the return of comrades who had been detached on military service. General Meade, however, although he naturally kept his ulterior purposes closely within his own breast, had not relinquished the idea that it might be possible to take Lee at a disadvantage some time during the winter, owing to the circumstance that the necessities of subsisting Lee's army and placing it in good quarters would require long intervals between the cantonments of its different parts. This intention was, however, defeated by instructions from Washington, ordering an operation which inevitably drew the attention of the enemy to the feasibility of the very project contemplated by General Meade. During General Meade's absence for a few days on leave, and when Sedgwick was in command of the army, Halleck supported a request of General B. F. Butler's, then near Fort Monroe, to make, on the 6th of February, a strong demonstration against the Confederate army in support of an attempt by Butler to capture Richmond with a mixed force of cavalry and infantry. The demonstration was accordingly made with great spirit; indeed in one place with such exceeding vigor, through a misapprehension, that the attack became real, and so successful as to prove that the plan that General Meade had entertained would, but for this imprudent diversion, have had fair prospects of success. But the enterprise, in the interest of which the demonstration had been

made, proved entirely unsuccessful. Butler despatched the troops mentioned, to the number of about six thousand, under General Isaac J. Wistar, upon the contemplated expedition, intended to release Union prisoners, but the enemy, forewarned through a deserter, was on the alert, had concentrated troops in advance of the menaced point, and the expedition entirely failed. The success of the demonstration by the Army of the Potomac had, however, been so great that the enemy was fully apprised that he had better be on his guard against a serious enterprise.

The winter comprised, by express order of the Government, a cavalry raid towards Richmond, with the view of disseminating Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of amnesty, and including an attempt to capture the city by a *coup de main* and release the Union prisoners there. Through the inefficiency of General Kilpatrick, under whose command the expedition was, it proved unfruitful; and not only that, but it was associated with an accusation by the enemy against Colonel Dahlgren, commanding a body of horse, involving alleged violation of the code of civilized warfare. This led to an interchange of letters between Meade and Lee, in which General Meade disavowed all privity of his own or of the Government's in the alleged action of Colonel Dahlgren. As, however, Dahlgren had paid the penalty of death at the hands of the enemy, in the course of a skirmish, it was not possible to bring to the test of trial the charge made against him, which, despite its fair seeming, those who knew him best affirm to this day must have been susceptible of exculpating explanation. This movement of Kilpatrick's was supported by a strong demonstration on the left by the Army of the Potomac, and with this episode ended the active operations of the army for the winter. To both armies flocked, during the remainder of the season,

visitors distinguished and undistinguished of both sexes. Such cheerfulness as can pervade the inhabitants of huts in wintry weather prevailed. The *morale* of the army left nothing to be desired, waiting with its wonted stanchness for the renewal with spring of active operations.


MAP
OF THE
BATTLE-FIELD
OF
THE WILDERNESS, VA.
Brig. Gen. A.A. HUMPHREYS,
Chief of Corps of Engineers U.S. Army,
Brvt. Brig. Gen. N. MICHLER, Major of Engineers,
1867.
Union
Confederate
RAPIDAN RIVER
RAPIDAN RIVER
Modified, to suit the general reader, by R. Meade Bache

CHAPTER XX.

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, SPOTTSYLVANIA, AND THE NORTH ANNA.

A GREAT change suddenly came over the Army of the Potomac. A new star had risen in the western firmament, before whose lustre in the zenith the light of others was to pale. Fortune had so willed it, that the army, although diminished in numbers since Gettysburg, yet, having held in check the army of Lee, and even taken against it the offensive, had been the means of indirectly assisting towards Grant's gathering new laurels at Chattanooga. Now, when he appeared on the eastern theatre of war, the army had been increased to almost unprecedented force in numbers and material of war, all ready to the conqueror's hand. On the 26th of February, 1863, the grade of lieutenant-general had been created and Grant appointed to the place. On the 8th he arrived in Washington from the West, and the next day received his commission. The day afterwards he had a conference with General Meade at Brandy Station. Going back immediately thereafter to the West for final understanding with General Sherman as to plans of campaign, he returned to Washington on the 23d of March, whence he went almost at once to the field at Culpeper, and there established his headquarters. It is therefore in place here to mention incidentally, that he had expressly stated that, as being in command of all the armies in the field, his proper place was in Washington. Although, it is true, his presence on the hither side of the Rapidan made no essential difference at first, yet, when he thence

entered upon and continued to direct on the ground the campaign from the Rapidan to Petersburg, destined to last a year, his departure from the line of conduct which he had laid down as the duty of the commanding-general of all the armies to follow was absolute, and led, especially in the Valley of Virginia, to the very consequences which his originally announced intention had been intended to preclude.

There were other consequences that followed this reversal of intention on the part of Grant. But for his immediate presence, the army would have emerged from the conflict, from the battle of the Wilderness to that of Cold Harbor, in far greater strength than was possible under his tactics, in which, had he been the mighty Thor himself, his weapon would have shattered on the steel of the opposing front of war. He persisted too long in the continuous attrition and hammering which he declared in advance to be his system of encountering the Army of Northern Virginia. Still another consequence of his determination to have his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac lay in a divided command, lessening the value of administration represented by a single centre of authority which, in all activities, is the condition of the highest degree of efficiency. It led also, on account of Grant's tendency to favoritism, to detriment to the service, through that propensity which, willingly or unwillingly, allows well- or ill-placed affections to be enslaved. The same consequences, it might be urged, the tendency being conceded, would have manifested themselves, had he established his headquarters in Washington. This is undeniable, but it should be remembered that the field, the immediate scene of critical events, introduces dangers from such indulgence far exceeding those possible to incur in cabinet direction of affairs; and in this case, as will in due time appear, they did not fail to manifest them-

selves as working injury to the military service, and therefore to the cause which it sustained.

General Meade had seized an opportunity at his first interview with General Grant to say to him that if he would prefer another man for his position, not to hesitate for a moment in expressing his wish to that effect. Grant, however, knew too well the value of General Meade to relieve him from duty as the commander of the army. But the situation thereby accepted led to consequences of far-reaching import, probably contemplated by neither at the time. One has already been noted as a result, in the imperfect co-ordination of orders. It was told by an officer of undoubted veracity that when, in the middle of the night, he once carried a written order to Warren, he began to swear as he read it, when, glancing at the signature, he resumed his calm, as he remarked, "I might have known it was from Grant." The position of General Meade, as commander of the army, with General Grant's headquarters near him in the field was anomalous, and led for him personally to many trying situations. If any signal success attended the operations, it was almost invariably set down to the credit of Grant, but if any check or disaster, to the disparagement of Meade. I well remember one affair near Petersburg, directed in person by General Meade, as to which the papers had laudatory accounts of General Grant's presence on the field, when, as I afterwards learned, he was far away from the scene of action. Taking it altogether, there never was in history, so far as I am aware, any case so detrimental as Grant's presence in the field with the real commander of the army, except that of a king, or a prince of the blood, who was formerly often there, as an inspiring influence, or from military aspirations, and from whatever motive, generally a hindrance instead of a help to military operations. The actual case seems most like that

of Blücher, whose chief function was enterprise, a function not to be despised, but one which by itself is dangerous in the extreme, and which with him was tempered by the knowledge of an accomplished staff.

The winter had passed with the Army of the Potomac in cantonments. The scheme of Butler, approved in Washington, and the consequent diversion by the Army of the Potomac to assist the raid made on the Peninsula towards Richmond, precluded, as had been anticipated in the army, any real advance by it over the Rapidan before the opening of the spring. Recruiting, drilling, and reviewing went on apace on both sides during this season of enforced cessation from hostilities. It was not surprising that, at this point of time, on the eve of so vast an enterprise as the advance towards Richmond, it should have been deemed desirable to divide the Army of the Potomac into three corps of infantry. That had for a long time been the organization of the Army of Northern Virginia; and in some respects the military administration of the armies of the South had been superior to that of those of the North, notably in the case of filling up regiments on the basis of their original *cadres*, instead of raising entirely new regiments, and in that of always apportioning rank suitably to command. General Meade once said to me, when a boy, and we sauntering along together and discussing things in general, that there was not an officer in the country who could creditably march twenty thousand men into a certain designated place and get them out again. But with changed experience he had long known that a hundred thousand men had been repeatedly marched into and out of most intricate ways, and now, under Grant's orders, he was about to direct the march of a hundred and fifteen thousand men across the Rapidan into the Wilderness, from which he, under Hooker, had been obliged with other corps-commanders to beat an

inglorious retreat. The die was cast in favor of the consolidation of the infantry of the army into three corps, and amid much heart-burning the intention was consummated. Meade's recommendation to that effect had been made on March 4th to the War Department. The First Corps was incorporated in the Fifth Corps. Two divisions of the Third Corps were incorporated in the Second Corps. A third division, lately attached to the Third Corps, was incorporated in the Sixth Corps. Thus the infantry of the Army of the Potomac was made to consist of the Second Corps, the Fifth Corps, and the Sixth Corps. These were respectively commanded, as in the order named, by Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick. The cavalry, consisting of three divisions, was under Sheridan. The chief-of-staff was Humphreys, the chief-engineer, Major Duane, the chief-of-artillery, Hunt, and the chief-quarter-master, Ingalls. The corps of Burnside, the Ninth, returned from Knoxville, East Tennessee, had since recruited its numbers at Annapolis, and had now reached the Rappahannock, *via* Washington, making the whole force of all arms available for Grant's advance about a hundred and fifteen thousand men, while Lee's, at the greatest possible estimate, did not exceed sixty-two thousand. At the outset, the troops of Burnside, although acting in line of battle with it, formed no part of the Army of the Potomac, but this preposterous arrangement, leading to great confusion, as should have been anticipated, was rectified within a few days by the consolidation of the forces. Out of the depths of my memory here rises a trivial incident connected indissolubly with the pending advance. Happening to be in Philadelphia at the time, I was passing the house of Mr. Adolph E. Borie, afterwards Secretary of the Navy under Grant, when he drew me mysteriously aside, to be out of earshot of the passers, and whispered, "Grant is starting

for Richmond with two hundred thousand men." I imagine that I was among the earliest who had the news. General Grant and Mr. Borie afterwards became intimate, and to the house of the latter the General sometimes came as a lion, but, as became him then, "roared as gently as a sucking-dove."

To attempt to discuss here the strategy of the campaign now about to open, comparing one possible mode of procedure with another, would take far more space than is at my disposal, and would perhaps tax far more than warrantable the patience of the reader. Briefly, then, I will essay to give an idea of the plan actually adopted, and to indicate what it seemed to Grant to prescribe. The expression that Grant uses in his memoirs, as purporting to give an idea of the military situation, that Sherman represented the right flank, the Army of the Potomac the centre, and Butler, on the James, the left flank, is an illustration of the most strained character.

That, having adopted the line of overland advance from Washington to Richmond, Grant should make it by the right flank of Lee, instead of by the left, was entirely a matter of necessity, seeing that it could not possibly be made by Lee's left, because by that route the army could not have been supplied. When Grant finally found himself south of the James, he was unable to compel the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg by the single stroke of destroying their lines of supply or of capturing them by assault. He had to resort to gradual encroachment on the lines of supply to Petersburg and Richmond by the extension of his left flank, until worn out by siege, loss by desertion, and abatement of the warlike spirit of the South, the remnant of the grand Army of Northern Virginia was forced to succumb to the inevitable. Grant had so overweening a confidence in his persistence to overcome obstacles, so full a conviction in his belief that the Army of the Potomac had never been fought

to its uttermost, so great confidence, growing out of its numerical superiority to that of the enemy, that he went into the last campaign of the war with the fullest belief that Lee's army would be irretrievably crippled on the line of march from the Rapidan to Richmond. The event told another tale, and what is mostly to be deplored as that which might have been otherwise, is the loss of life that might have been avoided if the lessons that were learned at last through sacrifice had not been needed to instruct.

The positions of the opposing armies have been sufficiently indicated by the descriptions in the last chapter. The advance by the left was determined upon. Lee's entrenchments, on his right, now stretched along Mine Run from Bartlett's Mill, and thence to the source of the stream near Antioch Church, south of the plank road from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg. His headquarters were at Orange Court House. Grant was now in supreme authority. He gave instructions to General Meade to supply the details. Grant's will was now law, on the field and in Washington. He could now address the great Halleck, his former commander in the West, who had behaved most unjustly to him, as "chief-of-staff." All things now bent to the will of Grant, all but the Army of Northern Virginia.

The line of march by the right of Lee, turning his flank, was superbly executed. But it is a disputed question to this day, whether Grant should not have pushed forward or to the right before making his first halt, thus by either course clearing the Wilderness. The reader will observe that the army is marching between the line of Mine Run on the west and Chancellorsville on the east, in the heart of the Wilderness. Robertson's Tavern, which was at the front in the Mine Run advance, is now to the right of the advance, and Chancellorsville, where the fiasco of Hooker

occurred, a short distance off to the left. That the halt was made where it was called is easily accounted for. The reason assigned was that the main body must not move too far in advance of the trains and Burnside's position in coming up with his corps from the Rappahannock and isolatedly crossing the Rapidan; but it would seem from all the evidence at hand, that the chief predisposing influence towards halting where the halt actually took place was that Grant did not think that Lee could arrive in time to attack the army there. Had Grant realized that the army would be so attacked, in a place so unfitted as the Wilderness for battle, on ground with which the enemy was more familiar than was the Army of the Potomac, we may well believe that in a choice, were it only regarded as one between two evils, the risk, if any there were, to the trains and to Burnside's isolated corps, would have been accepted, and the main body of the army would, before a halt was ordered, have been allowed to emerge from the Wilderness.

Let us, for the sake of economizing space, especially as the army has once before in this narrative crossed the Rapidan at this point, imagine it to have crossed, and to be situated as the following description will indicate. The three infantry corps, after starting at midnight of the 3d of May, from their cantonments of the winter, and after crossing three fords of the Rapidan on five pontoon-bridges, the Fifth, under Warren, on the right, followed by the Sixth, under Sedgwick, found themselves on the south side of the Rapidan, each column preceded by a heavy body of cavalry, and long before night in bivouac at the end of their march. The Second Corps, on the left, had arrived, at 1 P.M., first at its destination on the ground of Chancellorsville, the Fifth Corps, at 2 P.M., at its destination, on the right, at Wilderness Tavern, while the Sixth Corps, in the rear of the Fifth, had halted not far from Germanna Ford, where it had crossed

the river, in order to prevent the enemy from swooping into the rear and making a descent in flank upon the trains. But as the trains, excepting the fighting-trains with the respective corps, were crossing at Culpeper Ford and Ely's Ford, several miles below, and Grant was on the right flank of Lee's army, which stretched miles away to the west, and could not have begun to move until daylight had revealed the march of the Army of the Potomac, and as, on the 4th, Burnside's corps was advancing rapidly from beyond the Rappahannock towards Germanna Ford, and besides, the trains were covered by cavalry, and had with them a special grand detachment from each corps, and therefore could be successfully assailed by no very large body of the enemy, if indeed any could be spared to reach them, it would seem that this precaution, which led to the army's not extricating itself that day from the Wilderness, and therefore to all the consequences that flowed therefrom, was most unwise; that it was most unwise not to have advanced four or five miles further with the army, towards Mine Run or towards Spottsylvania, so as to clear the Wilderness.

In the early morning of the 5th of May the army resumed its march, Warren on the right, Hancock on the left: Sedgwick was still in the rear of Warren. The line on which they were was from Wilderness Tavern to Chancellorsville. Beyond, to the right, where Robertson's Tavern is, is the western edge of the Wilderness; beyond, to the left, where Chancellorsville is, is the eastern edge of the Wilderness. Its southern edge reaches down to the Rapidan. It was intended that, on the day mentioned, the Fifth Corps should march towards Parker's Store, and the Second towards Shady Grove Church. The growth amidst which the Fifth and Sixth were to march was a stunted one of mixed character, with thickets of brush almost impervious to the sight in places, and occasional small swamps

along the streams among the hills. The region was intersected by a few main roads, and numerous tracks ran their devious course of communication among them, all much better known to the enemy than to the Federal army. Acquaintance with such is especially useful for attack and defence in so blind a region as that in which the army now found itself. Hancock off to the left, was not only on the eastern outskirts of the Wilderness, but in his advance came upon more and more open country as he proceeded. An idea of the relations of the main roads to one another is indispensable to an understanding of the tactics of the battle about to be fought, called the battle of the Wilderness. From Lee's position towards the west, where his entrenched line had lain northeast by east and southwest by west, fronting north, come the two main roads, the Orange Turnpike, on the north, and the Orange Plank Road, to the south of it, running from southwest by west to northeast by east, at varying distances from each other, until they unite for a short distance at Chancellorsville, to diverge again as they proceed eastward to Fredericksburg. The crossing of the Orange Plank Road by the Brock Road takes place nearly at right-angles, and the Brock Road is the most direct one to Spottyslvania Court House, towards which the Second Corps was marching by that road.

Lee, when apprised of the movement of the Army of the Potomac, had left his lines lying east and west along the Rapidan, and with Grant on what had been his right flank, was about to present his front athwart the two main roads running east and west, forcing Grant to face to the west before continuing his march. But, so dense, so almost impenetrable to sight and ordinary sound was the mixed growth of trees and underbrush, that when, on the morning of the 5th of May, the Army of the Potomac found itself checked a mile or so from its bivouac of the night before,

neither Grant nor Meade thought that he had in face of him an enemy in great force. Warren opened the battle, or rather, more strictly speaking, the enemy anticipated him in opening it. As he was marching by a wood-road towards Parker's Store, he pushed Griffin's division, on his right, along the Orange Turnpike, to guard his flank. But neither column had proceeded far when it encountered the enemy, —the heads of Ewell's and Hill's corps coming eastward along the Orange Turnpike and the Orange Plank Road, Ewell following the former, Hill the latter direction. Griffin on the right, on the Turnpike, having been reinforced, and the advance on the left, towards the Plank Road, having been withdrawn, a vigorous attack was made by Griffin, which drove Ewell from his position to take up one slightly to the rear of it. All this time, however, Ewell's troops were gradually arriving on the ground, and he in turn took the offensive, and somewhat disrupted Warren's right flank. An advance by Warren on his left resulted unfortunately, the denseness of the woods and underbrush there preventing co-operation among the different bodies of troops. Warren fell back to a line slightly to the rear. The Sixth Corps was not yet up, and it became very evident at this time that, but for the apprehension of danger leading to its retention towards the Rapidan, the advance would not have been thus summarily checked and the field of the Wilderness have been decreed upon as the scene of a pitched battle. Despite the adverse popular notion, nothing is better for proof than certain kinds of circumstantial evidence. Nothing can better demonstrate the fact that Grant did not expect to fight a pitched battle where he found himself, than the circumstance that, on the far away left, Hancock was marching, under orders, ten miles in advance.

Upon the abrupt check to the advance of the Fifth Corps, Hancock was recalled from the point that he had reached

beyond Todd's Tavern, and ordered to take up the position along the Brock Road where, as just mentioned, it intersects the Orange Plank Road. But, as the reader will remember, Hill's corps was advancing along that road towards this same intersection. As it was one of the few artificial strategic points of the region, this complicated the situation so much that General Meade despatched a division of the Sixth Corps, under Getty, to occupy the point in advance of Hancock's possible arrival. But for that the enemy must have secured the point, and thus have interposed between the right and left wings of the army. The enemy did in fact attack Getty vigorously, but he stoutly held his position until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the head of the Second Corps appeared and formed in double line of battle along the Brock Road to and beyond its intersection with the Orange Plank Road. All became safe in that quarter of the field, and Hancock was at once ordered to assume the offensive. Getty led off, and Hancock soon followed in repeated assaults upon the almost imperceptible lines of the enemy, sheltered in the umbrageous fastnesses of the field. None but a sportsman or a naturalist can realize the value of protective color in such a place. Any one, however, who belonged to the Army of the Potomac soon realized the difference between the gleam through bushes from blue ranks and those of the neutral tint of the Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate soldiers lay concealed on the dull ground amid the leafage, like elemental creatures of the earth, earthy, faintly appearing, if at all, and disappearing, undistinguishable from the face of nature. So desperate was the resistance of the Confederates on the left, and so fatal to all skilled tactical movement was the entanglement of the woods and underbrush on Hancock's front, that a heavy column under Wadsworth having been ordered from the Fifth Corps, on the right, to

advance and feel for the left flank of Hill, reached its destination with the greatest difficulty only by nightfall, and therefore not in time to assist in the desperate efforts Hancock had been making to push back the enemy's line. This circumstance of Wadsworth's penetrating with difficulty to the left flank of Hill shows incidentally that the lines of Ewell and Hill were not continuous, and the same thing was also true of the lines of Warren and Hancock. With some hard fighting on the right, in the afternoon, the battle there, as well as on the left, ended for the day. Two battles had in fact been fought side by side, having from beginning to end but little influence on each other, the division and brigade led by Wadsworth from the right having failed to influence the action on the left. The advantage had been with Hancock and Getty against Hill, when night was falling on the field. When darkness impenetrable had finally set in, the combatants remained in the positions in which they then found themselves.

From Gordonsville, nearly thirty miles to the southwest, Longstreet had had to move for junction with Lee. From beyond the Rappahannock,—at the farthest point, Manassas Junction, over forty miles distant, Burnside had had to move for junction with Grant. As soon, on the 4th, as the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were fairly across the Rapidan, the Ninth Corps, some of whose divisions were already *en route*, was telegraphed to expedite its march. Burnside and Longstreet reached the ground about the same time, Burnside rather in advance, his nearest troops having reached Brandy Station, but as will shortly be perceived, Longstreet's immediate impress on events eclipsed the movements of Burnside on the ground. As a result of the day's fighting the corps of Hill had been disrupted, and good observers were of the opinion that, with an hour or two more of daylight, he would have been driven

from the field. But, as has been mentioned, night fell and he had not been, and although Burnside was coming up, Longstreet, too, was coming. The plan for the next day's battle was for the Sixth, Fifth, and Second Corps, in the order from right to left, to attack the enemy on their fronts at five o'clock in the morning, while Burnside now near the field, was ordered to fill with two divisions and one in reserve the gap between the Fifth and Second Corps, and to attack simultaneously with them. Here were two great armies in which, when finally drawn up against each other, with lines in a stretch of over five miles, the troops could only at rare intervals be seen.

In the early morning of the 6th of May the enemy slightly anticipated by his attack that which had been intended by Grant for the renewal of the battle. Out of the thicket of mixed dwarf-timber of scrub-oak, clustered pine, and underbrush, Lee made an attack from his extreme left on the extreme right of the Sixth Corps, an effort easily repulsed by the advance that met it, for it was only a feint, Lee's real design being to overwhelm Grant's left flank, towards the accomplishment of which but one thing seemed to him needed—the arrival in force of Longstreet. The attack by Lee on the right was followed almost immediately by Warren's and Hancock's attacking along their front. In consequence, the attack which Lee had purposed making had to be postponed, until what remained of Hill's corps should have arrived and Longstreet should have appeared, for he had not anticipated the vigor of Hancock's onslaught. Hancock had advanced his two right divisions, amply supported, while the troops led by Wadsworth, which had lain all night on Hill's former left flank (no longer existing, because the enemy's lines were now continuous) swept partly across the front of the Second Corps. Hill's troops gave way in every direction, and poured pell-mell towards

the rear for over a mile. They were being pursued by Hancock, when suddenly the tide of battle was reversed through two conspiring causes,—a halt necessary to rectify the confusion produced among the victorious troops by their passage through the dense growth of trees and bushes, and the arrival on the field of the heads of Longstreet's columns.

Thenceforth, to the end of the day, no field ever better illustrated the immense share that chance bears in every battle. Had there not been on the Federal side every reason to believe that Longstreet would attempt to come in on the left flank, as in fact he was first ordered to attempt, and had begun to attempt; had there not been a misunderstanding between Hancock and Gibbon, through which the division of Barlow was withheld at a critical juncture; had it not happened that, owing to this, the enemy was able to avail himself of the cut of an unfinished railroad from which his masked advance pushed forward at that juncture on a naked flank, all would have gone well for the Federal side. If, on the other hand, Longstreet had not been dangerously wounded by his own troops and borne from the field at that same critical juncture, his success must have been much greater than it was, although by no means so great as he at one time thought possible, and indeed certain.

Longstreet had been marching under orders to attack Hancock's left and rear, when the pressure to which Hill was being gradually more and more heavily subjected caused his march to be reversed, and he arrived on the right of Hill in time to save him from final rout. Hancock could not, of course, have ascertained the fact of Longstreet's recall. On the contrary, warnings that he had received from headquarters as to the direction of Longstreet's march towards the left, coupled with deceptive sights and sounds from that quarter, contributed to assure

him that the attack upon him was to come thence. Consequently, he clung with his extreme left to the Brock Road, and the advance of his divisions on his right made a short flank. Despite this, there would have been no danger of his being successfully assailed, if only Hill were to be reckoned with, but in addition to the fact that Longstreet had been recalled to succor Hill, Barlow's division had, as Hancock said he had told Gibbon to order it, not been advanced on the left. Otherwise, even with Longstreet's entering on the scene, what happened would not have occurred. Gibbon said that he did not receive the order mentioned, and this being added in justice to him, let us fall back on the most important facts in this connection, that the railroad cut was there, Barlow's division was not, and that the enemy took advantage of the weak point in the Union line.

All the troops that had advanced so gallantly and successfully early in the morning began to feel the combined weight of Hill's and Longstreet's pressure. By eleven o'clock Burnside had been able to do nothing on Hancock's immediate right to relieve that pressure. A division of the Ninth Corps had, however, been early sent to Hancock, and later, other detachments were made to him from the Fifth and Sixth Corps. But, owing to the fact that Barlow's division was not in position on the left, and the existence of the cut of the unfinished railroad (running about parallel with the Orange Plank Road, and after a curve, about parallel with the Brock Road), four brigades of the enemy marched by the right flank to the railroad cut, and there forming and facing northwardly, rolled up the advanced line of Hancock on the left, the whole line falling back in the best order it could preserve to its original position along the Brock Road. Now fortune as suddenly turned the balance against the Confederate side, as it had at first thrown its in-

fluence in favor of that side. Longstreet was seriously wounded by his own men, and a welcome respite was afforded for restoration of order along the left wing of the Federal army. During this pause, which lasted four hours, the brigade of the Ninth Corps which has been mentioned as stationed with Hancock, cleared his whole front from left to right without any molestation from the enemy. Reinforcements from the right reached Hancock, and he was prepared to renew the conflict. The enemy also had made ample preparations for its renewal.

Hancock was to attack at six o'clock in the evening, when at half-past four the enemy's attack opened. The movements of Burnside, on Hancock's right, were expected to afford some relief from the pressure upon him, but did not produce an appreciable effect on the action that followed. By five o'clock in the afternoon a portion of Hancock's line had given way. It was fighting under great disadvantage, the woods in its front, and even the breastworks of logs were afire, sending their heat and smoke drifting into the faces of the men. For a few minutes parts of the breastworks were occupied by the enemy, who was, however, soon brushed away and the line restored.* The enemy was finally driven back from Hancock's front, which remained

* Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Chamberlin, in his History of the 150th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, says that Hancock acknowledged that he had made a mistake in his report in ascribing to Carroll's brigade, of his own corps, the recapture of that portion of his line which the enemy had invaded; and that the troops which, under Hancock's orders, restored the line were the remnants of Roy Stone's brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Irvin, of the 149th Pennsylvania (Roy Stone having been hurt by a fall from his horse), and Rice's brigade, commanded by Colonel Hoffmann, of the 56th Pennsylvania, both of Wadsworth's division, of the Fifth Corps. This is substantially what is stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Chamberlin, except that he inadvertently assigns Rice's brigade to Robinson's division instead of to Wadsworth's.

thenceforth unassailed; but owing to the lateness of the hour and lack of sufficient ammunition, Hancock was not able to advance in his turn. While he, however, remained unengaged for the rest of the day, the right of the Sixth Corps, on the extreme right, had been attacked by Generals Gordon, Johnston, and Pegram, who achieved a partial success there, driving back some brigades and making numerous prisoners.

The losses on both sides in the battle of two days' duration had been very heavy, and in one place horrible, owing to the incidental burning to death of wounded men lying in front of the Second Corps when the woods there took fire. The loss on the Federal side in killed, wounded, and missing was about fifteen thousand, while that on the Confederate side was about eight thousand. Many gallant, meritorious, and distinguished officers of both sides here surrendered up their lives in this jungle, which had been for two days swept by the scythe of death in forms concealed and unusual on a field of battle, but common on this field, on which bushes and trees and dense thickets sputtered, or volleyed, or crashed, with the dropping, the concerted, or the blended storm of musketry, amid which lines of troops on both sides jostled each other in efforts to advance or fall back, smothered in a tangled wilderness, to which not even fire was lacking to increase the mysterious horrors.

Were it attempted here to follow the intricacies of the events now following one another in rapid succession, this campaign alone would require for its description more than the space allotted to the whole work. It is therefore necessary to omit such mention of details as concern the enemy's cavalry hovering around the left, and withdrawn upon the approach of the cavalry of Sheridan. One incident, however, connected with the renewed advance,

cannot be omitted in a memoir relating to General Meade, because it represents the appearance of the cloud that, at first, no bigger than a man's hand, gradually overshadowed his career. Sheridan, before the campaign had begun, had intimated to General Meade that he ought to be allowed to act independently with the cavalry, to which General Meade had properly responded that he thought otherwise. Badeau tells the story, and Sheridan himself tells it in his memoirs, adding the commentary, ominous in the light of subsequent events, that he knew General Meade would be compelled sooner or later to change his mind. If the reader will, before passing final judgment on the merits of the case, take the pains to collate what Grant, Sheridan, Badeau, Humphreys, Major Carswell McClellan, and what orders on the field all exhibit, he will find that, with reference to the advance which now took place, Sheridan and his advocates have misstated the facts; that Sheridan did not properly clear the front of the advancing army, and moreover, that he tried to impute the blame which was his own to General Meade. He will find that, when the infantry had come up at last, and General Meade had expressed his opinion of occurrences very plainly to Sheridan, that, within an hour or two, Sheridan received orders, suggested by himself, for an enterprise against the enemy's cavalry. The meaning of this move was in the line of intention to give Sheridan independent command, an event the coming of which he had so significantly predicted. And if the reader will still further critically pursue the course of events through the accounts of those who were making history at that time, and through official documents, he will reach the conviction that this episode mentioned was the first sign of a favoritism on the part of Grant which culminated in Sheridan's elevation to the highest rank in the army. He will, if he pursue his studies still further into the intricacies of the events then

shaping or formed, see Grant and Sheridan painted by themselves as to traits here indicated. Those who come after us will read one day the statement of the historian, when he says that the worst feature of Grant's character was favoritism at the expense of justice, and one of the worst features of Sheridan's, the recklessness with which he pursued his own personal aggrandizement at the expense of his devoted friend and the forfeiture of claim to fair dealing. The fact becomes more and more apparent from the Wilderness to Appomattox. It receives after the war its final testimony and seal in the overslaughing of General Meade in behalf of Sheridan.

Possessed of the seven-league boots of the historian, we may omit description of the logistics of the route to Spottsylvania Court House. It having become apparent to Grant that even the most continuous hammering could not dislodge the enemy from his position in the fastnesses of the Wilderness, the movement of the army by the left flank to Spottsylvania Court House, towards the southeast, was begun by the trains early in the afternoon of the 7th of May, followed by the three corps just after dark. The Fifth Corps moved directly for the place by the Brock Road, while the two other corps marched by different routes. The object in view in the direct march of Warren was to surprise and occupy the position. A pleasant little fiction here appears in most of the accounts of this event, which, as so strange, one could wish were true. It is that, growing out of the uncomfortableness of Longstreet's corps in woods afire, the march on Spottsylvania of his corps, then under the command of General Anderson, was begun earlier than had been contemplated, and thus it, by the merest chance, came to pass that Anderson intercepted the Fifth Corps at that point. The fact is that Anderson did start much earlier than had been at first intended, but


MAP
OF THE
BATTLE-FIELD
OF
SPOTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, VA
Compiled from Surveys made under the direction of
Bvt. Maj. C. W. HOWELL,
Capt. of Engineers
1867.
Union
Confederate
Works generalized
by R. Meade Bache
Scale

that Lee, after having ordered him to march at daybreak, sent a special messenger to him to instruct him to march at once, in consequence of which he started at eleven o'clock at night. Thus it came about that when the head of Warren's corps, arriving by the Brock Road, was nearing Spottsylvania, Anderson's troops, who had had a less distance to march, and along an unobstructed way, were coming into position at Spottsylvania. Warren had been delayed by the cavalry of Fitzhugh Lee, which, had Sheridan done his duty, would not have impeded the way. Sheridan had, in fact, cleared the region in advance of hostile cavalry, on the immediate route of the advancing Fifth Corps, but had then fallen back and bivouacked near Todd's Tavern, letting the enemy again occupy the zone in front of the advancing columns. Sheridan himself was not on the ground when General Meade arrived at midnight at Todd's Tavern, and General Meade was obliged, in default of his presence, to issue orders to the cavalry. Nevertheless, Sheridan has attempted to prove that General Meade's action, conflicting with his own orders, injuriously affected the cavalry movements, when the official and other records clearly show that General Meade's action was strictly in conformity with the situation at the time when he arrived at Todd's Tavern, and that the way which should have been kept open by Sheridan was obstructed. At the very time when Sheridan's orders were issued he had allowed every avenue of approach to Spottsylvania to be blocked by his own and by the enemy's cavalry. Sheridan had declared to General Meade, on the occasion when he claimed independence for the movement of the cavalry, as most conducive to military success, that advancing infantry should look out for their own fronts, and what he did not do on this occasion, with twelve thousand mounted men to the enemy's eight thousand, was strictly in accordance with

this unmilitary dictum. Yet in the face of this occurrence there are to be found eulogists of Sheridan who claim for him unwonted appreciation of the most effective employment in combination of the respective military arms.

Grant and Meade both arrived at Todd's Tavern, five miles from Spottsylvania, about midnight of the 7th of May. By daylight the head of Warren's column appeared to the westward of that point, where Merritt's cavalry had begun to clear the way for the further advance to Spottsylvania. From this point to Spottsylvania the road was barricaded at intervals and held by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, so that it was impossible to make rapid progress along it even with the aid of the infantry, soon brought into requisition for the purpose. Meanwhile Anderson was establishing himself firmly in position at Spottsylvania. Upon the Brock Road, and another deviating from it as a fork and rejoining it nearer Spottsylvania, Warren advanced, and finally, after the usual vicissitudes entailed by pushing through scattered woods, reached about noon a position which he entrenched, the Sixth Corps beginning to support him.

Here, with the ever-present need of condensation, must be rejected any temptation to give further details of march by which the corps on both sides found themselves in the position which they finally occupied. Merely mentioning that the Second Corps arrived at Todd's Tavern about nine in the morning, where it halted and temporarily entrenched, and omitting entirely the route of march of the Army of Northern Virginia towards the same battle-field, let us, now that the Federal army is virtually on the field, consider its movements covered by a description of the lines finally assumed by the troops of both sides. The general reader imagines that lines of entrenchment are entirely determinable by the lay of the land, and this is true when two armies are not actively opposing each other in

the occupation of ground. When, however, they are so engaged, the lay of the land is only one of the two chief factors in the determination of the eventual conformation of temporary military lines. The other is the relative strength of the physical and moral forces on each side under the direction imparted to them by commands. Looked at merely as a matter of physics, the contour of any general lines of two armies striving for the occupation of a given terrain, is simply the resultant of forces acting against each other upon eccentricities of surface. The final entrenchments of the Confederates produced by conformation of ground and mutual opposition of forces at Spottsylvania brought it about that their lines bore a rude resemblance to the fore part of a monster-turtle, with rugged, angular head protruding towards the north. At the point where, on its right, the carapace ended, the river Po flows. At the end of what one might conformably imagine as the outer edge of an immense left fore-flipper, the left touched on the same stream. The colossal head, amidst woods, a mile long by half a mile wide, was eventually crossed at the neck by a formidable line of entrenchments. The left flank was eventually made to cross the Po and to extend some distance beyond.

Conformably to this contour of the enemy's works, Warren took position on the right, Sedgwick on his left, and Burnside on Sedgwick's left, while later, Hancock, who had been for a while retained at Todd's Tavern, lest Lee should make an attempt on the Federal rear, came up and took position to the right of Warren, Hancock thus holding the right flank and Burnside the left. It was well that General Meade had taken the precaution of retaining Hancock for a while near Todd's Tavern, for Hill's corps, at that moment commanded by Early, directed on Spottsylvania by Lee, came upon Hancock's troops thrown out to the west, and

recoiled further to the right. The army having assumed on the 9th its general position, without any regular engagement, and without having incurred in the mean time, on the 9th, any serious loss but that in the death of General Sedgwick, a victim of sharpshooting, a movement was made in the afternoon which, according to military rules, was wrong. Those rules prescribe that no important move shall take place so near sundown that it cannot be prosecuted. Barlow's division, of the Second Corps, was pushed across the Po, around the extreme left flank of the enemy, followed by Birney's and Gibbon's divisions. Three pontoon-bridges were laid to establish communication with the hither bank, and night fell with the troops successfully advancing. But as they could not further advance by night over the ground between the Po and a branch of it called Glady's Run, the enemy had all that time in which to prepare to meet the manœuvre on the morrow. The manœuvre, continued the next day, still seemed to have good prospect of success, despite the fact that the enemy was ready to meet it, and Hancock was preparing to carry by storm a bridge over the Po, leading fairly to the rear of the enemy's lines, when he received orders to withdraw his force, because two of his divisions would be needed at five o'clock in the afternoon to join in with an attack from the centre on the enemy's front. The withdrawal of two of the divisions over the Po led to a vigorous attack on the remaining one, under Barlow, but his retirement was executed with the most beautiful precision, the first troops across commanding the river with their artillery, the last repulsing with slaughter the enemy arriving in force, and finally passing in their march to the river through woods that had caught afire as the result of the combat. It was a gallant feat of arms, hard to relinquish with this hasty mention of the skilfulness, endurance, and

coolness with which it was accomplished. As gallant deeds were done elsewhere before the day's battle came to an end, but single combat and all that is analogous to it has a peculiar charm for the imagination.

At eleven o'clock a reconnoissance in force had been made at the point opposite Warren by two brigades of the Second Corps and two of the Fifth, and now an assault in far greater force of the same position was contemplated for five o'clock in the afternoon. One cannot but think, however, that if Grant and Meade had commanded a bird's-eye view of the whole field they would, instead of withdrawing the three divisions of Hancock from the turning movement of the enemy's left, have reinforced them and made them execute the main attack, while a comparatively feeble one was made on the front. The point that Hancock had gained took the enemy's left flank completely in reverse. But on the extended field, densely covered with woods in places, no extended view and exact knowledge could be obtained of what was taking place beyond the immediate range of vision and through aides despatched in every direction. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that neither general then realized what a sacrifice the recall of Hancock involved. The general aspect of the field, possible to obtain only from a bird's-eye view or a map, was formed of the enemy's lines passing over hill and dale, through bush and brake, over the cleared land of farms, broken by streams, half-concealed, half-revealed in the varied landscape, the Union lines sweeping hither and yon around the huge citadel formed by nature and art.

The time originally appointed for the attack from the centre was, upon a favorable report from Warren, anticipated by orders at half-past three from General Meade to attack at once. Hancock had been ordered to return to the right to take charge of the extrication of Barlow's division from

its dangerous position on the other side of the Po. By four o'clock Warren and Wright, now commanding the Sixth Corps in Sedgwick's place, were in the full tide of assault on the enemy's works, situated behind a dense growth of low timber, passing which, amid artillery and musketry fire, they reached open ground in front of entrenchments, only to be met by a withering fire under which they reeled and partially recoiled, some few of the troops reaching the abattis of the works, but all finally falling back into the woods, decimated and defeated. The repulse was so complete that it is wonderful that the attempt there was repeated, but it was. At seven o'clock Hancock renewed the attack with two divisions of the Second Corps, the Fifth supporting, but with the result of proving again that the enemy's lines at that point were impregnable.

Off to the left of the Fifth, where the Sixth Corps was stationed, General Wright thought that he had discovered a place where an assault might be successful. This extended from the sharp point of the salient, the beak, as it were, of the turtle-head formation there (the so-called east angle of the salient, although it would much more properly be called the northern angle) to the so-called west angle, a very obtuse and therefore ill-defined one. Upton was selected to make the attack with two brigades and four regiments of the Sixth Corps. Further to the left, Mott, of the Second Corps, temporarily assigned to Wright's command, was ordered to make a simultaneous attack with that of Upton upon the north angle of the salient. Upton's assault, made about six o'clock in the evening, was perfectly successful. Artillery fire, brought to bear to enfilade the enemy's line on the west front of the salient, preceded his charge, which resulted in his capturing the works before him and a second line beyond them; but Mott did not arrive to his assistance, and

reinforcements for the enemy being poured in, Upton, after clinging desperately to his prize until ordered to retire, loosened his hold upon it, bringing back prisoners and colors. The loss of the Union side was, however, twice that on the Confederate side. It would appear that the failure of Mott to come to the support of Upton was owing to his troops being obliged to form in the open, whereby the enemy's attention being concentrated upon them, they were prevented by artillery-fire from organizing for attack, whereas the success of Upton, apart from the gallantry of his troops, was owing to his preparation and forward movement being masked by the forest.

The 11th of May was passed in preparation for a determined onslaught on the enemy's works at the salient. Ewell's corps was stationed in this salient of a mile long by half a mile broad, or half a square mile in area, the outskirts of which were densely covered with trees. The enemy rendered it impossible to make a minute reconnoissance of the ground opposite the apex, that from which Mott had vainly attempted to assault. Two-thirds of a mile to the north of the salient, in the darkness of night, the troops of the Second Corps formed, partly in a clear stretch of land, from four to five hundred yards wide, and partly in the woods on the right of the aforesaid clear ground, which made a long, slight curve to the eastward before the view opened to the head of the salient. With vanishing fog and lingering darkness of night still brooding over the landscape, the charge was sounded in muffled tones by the first dawn of day. Rushing forward, some in swift movement over open ground, some plunging over obstacles of surface and through trees hindering and breaking up the lines and masses of the assaulting columns, those in the open stretch of land, pushing around the curve of the woods on the right, suddenly came into full view of the salient, when,

giving a joyous cheer, and breaking into the double-quick, all sped forward amid a flank fire from the enemy's skirmishers, and tearing away the abattis in front of the earthworks, captured and crowned with their colors the parapet along both sides of the apex of the salient. The troops had captured a mile of the salient, overlapping the so-called east and west angles (the north and west angles). Many of the enemy were killed or wounded by bullet or bayonet, and four thousand prisoners, several pieces of artillery, and numerous stands of small arms were the prizes of the victors.

Hancock ordered up his reserves. Confusion reigned in the victorious ranks. Broken up and irregularly massed, owing to their struggle over the ground in their advance, and carried away by enthusiasm, they had precipitated themselves without formation into the salient and swept away before them the troops of the enemy which offered resistance. The Confederate general, Gordon, however, reformed his troops behind the incipient line of earthworks which then crossed the neck of the salient, about a mile from its apex, and then, advancing in good order, pushed back the Union masses which were surging towards the south. General Meade, learning from Hancock that he had obtained a foothold in the salient, ordered Wright, commanding the Sixth Corps, to send in two divisions on Hancock's right, where he relieved the troops of the Second Corps along that line, and although soon wounded, remained in command of his troops. The situation was now extraordinary. The enemy rallying, and reinforced from their lines to the south, had pushed forward compactly into the salient, and sweeping it clear of the besiegers, recaptured a portion of his entrenchments, while a portion remained held by both besiegers and besieged, face to face, within a few yards of each other, engaged in places in hand to hand conflict. At

the west angle of the salient the most desperate and deadliest close fighting of the war took place.

The artillery of Hancock poured a rapid fire from the north into the woods amidst the traversed works of the enemy. Close up, some of his guns, shotted with canister, were brought to the very parapet at the north and west angles of the salient. The adversaries clung tenaciously to each other through the long hours of the 12th of May, the embracing lines writhing like fiery serpents in smoke-covered contortions. From the right of the Sixth Corps to the left of the Second endured through those long hours a strife that beggars description, where woods were killed outright by sheets of artillery and musketry fire tearing through their trunks and branches, and men bayonetted men over the breastworks or dragged them over as prisoners. No such long, determined, and desperate conflict is known to history since the use of improved deadly weapons. To complete the wretchedness of the scene, nature contributed by a cold, drenching rain a raw atmosphere, despite which the strife went on with ardor unquenchable. It was, in fact, a combat of which the German word for battle, "*schlacht*," gives a far better idea than any other term. Here was nothing of glamour, but unmitigated slaughter, a golgotha without a vestige of the ordinary pomp and circumstance of glorious war. And so it endured through those long hours of the spring day, now falling in intensity, now rising into furious gusts of destruction, until night closing in on the scene diminished the capacity to destroy and wholly obscured the sights of havoc. It was not, however, until long after midnight that the struggle finally ceased, the enemy withdrawing behind his improvised line of entrenchments across the neck of the salient, and thus excluding the whole of its area from the rest of his entrenchments.

Early in the morning, simultaneously with the advance of the Second Corps, Burnside had attacked on the left, had had a partial success, and had then been pushed out of the entrenchments which he had captured. Subsequent efforts to make a lodgment proved fruitless, Burnside's troops and the enemy's alternately advancing and retiring. Burnside succeeded in connecting with the left of the Second Corps, but his operations were effective only in occupying the enemy's attention upon his own front. On the right, early in the morning, Warren had opened on the enemy with his artillery, and a little after nine o'clock he had, under orders to that effect, assaulted the line in front of him, but unsuccessfully. Thereupon he had been ordered to send troops to reinforce Wright, which duly arrived in their assigned position.

When, on the morning of the 2d, the enemy was discovered by Hancock and Wright to have relinquished his occupation of the salient, and to have retired to the line of new works across its neck, an advance was made along the salient towards the south, resulting in the abandonment of any attempt to drive him from his strong position. He was now stronger than when in possession of the salient.

A movement by the left flank, to attack the enemy's extreme right, was now determined upon by Grant. Henceforth, until the end of the siege, for it was essentially that, the troops marched and countermarched enormous distances around the enemy's lines, over ground sparsely provided with roads, deep with mud from recent rain, and under cumulative difficulties leading almost to exhaustion. Several days were now passed in warily approaching nearer and nearer to the enemy's right by lines of contravallation. It was becoming more and more apparent that the position of Lee's army was impregnable. Troops were finally sent with great secrecy from the left towards the right, to make

an attack on the works across the salient, upon the supposition that they might be taken by surprise. But an attack there, on the 18th of May, by the Second and Sixth Corps, seconded by the Fifth and Ninth, soon brought the conviction that all idea of success from further assault there must be relinquished. The attack was so gallantly made by the Second and Sixth Corps as to prove that it would be madness to attempt to prosecute it. It was made, too, in the face of surroundings which daunt many a man who fears neither wounds nor death. Over the ground of their late victory, in which Lee had lost ten thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, lay remains of their brothers-in-arms in state so changed as to be abhorrent to the sight.

From the 13th to the 17th of May the time had been fruitlessly spent in marching and countermarching and advancing works on the left, and now this bold essay of the 18th of May had proved entirely futile. Grant meanwhile had concluded that the only resource left was to flank the enemy out of his position by a march past his right. The enemy, perceiving movements off to his right which indicated that Grant was withdrawing his army for a further march towards the south, Ewell was despatched by a circuitous route to his left, now about to become the rear of Grant's position with relation to his retiring columns. Here a very lively encounter took place with troops that were there in position, assisted by reinforcements sent by General Meade, and others consisting of troops which happened to be on their way to join the army.

We must leave this field to find time for the description of others, with only the baldest account of the marches towards the south. In the night of the 20th of May Hancock led the van with the Second Corps, marching by the way of Bowling Green, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, where he crossed the Mattapony and en-

trenched. The army in its renewed movements is marching now nearly due south. The march and assumed isolated position of Hancock was a bait thrown out to Lee. It was imagined that he might be led to attack the Second Corps, in which case the other troops would be brought up in time to support Hancock, and a battle on open ground (for the country was becoming more open now) might be precipitated before the Confederates would have time to entrench. But Lee did not take the bait; perhaps, in the midst of his own plans, did not perceive it. Hancock being secure in position, the other corps marched in the same general direction. On the 22d Lee's army, too, was in motion, marching towards Hanover Junction, where the two railroads passing south to Richmond meet, engaged in interposing again between the Federal army and Richmond. Nearly concentrated there on the 22d, he awaited Grant's final movements. About noon of the 23d, as the leading Federal column approached the north bank of the North Anna, could be seen the heads of column of the enemy beginning to take position on the southern bank. The position finally assumed by Lee proved to be a most remarkable one. At this point the Virginia Central Railroad meets the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad at Hanover Junction, at an angle of about seventy degrees. Northward of the Virginia Central, varying from one to two miles, and, excepting bends, somewhat parallel to it, lies the stretch of the North Anna with which we are here concerned. Here the river has a sharp bend in it towards the south, bringing it at that point only a little over a mile from the Virginia Central, with a stretch of river there, straight for nearly a mile. Lee was therefore able to throw his left wing, refused, to the southwest, so as to rest on Little River, three miles in his rear, and his right wing, gradually more and more refused as the Army of the Potomac ad-

vanced, so as to cover Hanover Junction and a river-road, called the Telegraph Road, leading towards his lines, while his centre formed a short front of about three-quarters of a mile in length on the south bank of the straight stretch of the river. We have seen from the experience at Chancellorsville how vicious a narrow front with sharply refused wings is for the disposition of an army, how vicious it proved, even with entrenchments, to Lee at Spottsylvania, but this case of a narrow front was entirely exceptional, introducing difficulties for the attacking side and eliminating them from that of the attacked. As Lee's narrow front rested for three-quarters of a mile on the very river bank opposite the enemy, he had there a citadel, with a river for a wet ditch, thrust into the face of the enemy, making combination between the two wings of the attacking force impossible, save at the expense of twice crossing the river in front of him, and thus neutralizing any concerted action between those wings.

Warren led the right column, and reached the North Anna at Jericho Ford, four miles west of the point where, about two miles north of Hanover Junction, the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses it. Hancock, who led the left column, reached the river at the point of its intersection by the railroad, and also at the point where the Telegraph Road crosses the river at Chesterfield Bridge, about a half mile further west than that of the railroad-crossing. Warren's column passed the river, partly by fording, partly by pontoon, and advanced unmolested, the enemy's preparations being at that place still incomplete. Hancock, on the contrary, had to capture some works which defended Chesterfield Bridge, which was handsomely done by assault. Warren, however, although crossing unmolested, had a severe engagement after he had begun to advance, whereas Hancock, after the resistance overcome at

the bridge, ascertained the next morning that the enemy had swung back his right, and then advanced without heavy fighting and took position opposite Lee's right wing, with which, on the 24th, he had a spirited engagement.

The Sixth Corps, coming up the next morning, followed the lead of Warren, but all attempts of the troops on the right to join hands with those on the left were frustrated by the enemy's occupation of the river bank along the short front already described. On the 24th Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, attempted the passage of the river at Ox Ford, between the place where were Warren and the Sixth Corps, on the right, and Hancock with the Second Corps, on the left, but was obliged to desist from the attempt, finally sending a division to co-operate with Warren in a movement to break through the enemy's line along the southern river-bank, so as to connect with Hancock. It was useless. Lee was exactly in the position to defy attack from across the river, because the short front there could not be directly engaged in face; and to defy attack from the same side of the river, because either of his refused wings could readily reinforce the other. Why proceed further in description of the situation? It was a deadlock. There was no help for it but to retire from a position which could not have been foreseen. Accordingly, after closing in somewhat on Lee's left wing, and finding the enemy strongly entrenched there with traversed works, the withdrawal of the army from a most dangerous position was skilfully effected. Even Grant had begun to see the desperate character of assaults on earthworks manned by troops of such mettle as those of the Army of Northern Virginia. Napoleon lays great stress upon the neglect, up to a certain period in European war, of simple entrenchments; but unless all signs fail, Grant had never read Napoleon's military comments attentively, certainly not as to this particular. Humphreys, in one place, puts the

efficiency of such works as numerically equivalent to more than a third increase of troops, and in another, to more than quadrupling them, a statement, doubtless, inadvertent.

Moving by night, the Army of the Potomac had, by daylight of the 27th of May, regained the northern bank of the North Anna. Southeast was the direction of the renewed line of march. A division of the Sixth Corps, followed by the rest of the Sixth Corps, and then by the Second, both preceded by two divisions of General Sheridan's cavalry, and followed by one division of it as rearguard, while the Fifth and Ninth followed roads further to the left, represents the first order of march adopted for the renewed advance. Now the aim of the advancing army is to cross the Pamunkey. We have passed going south the western branches of the Mattapony, the Ny and Po, the Ta and the Mat. As the army, having crossed and re-crossed the North Anna, is now about to cross the Pamunkey, which is formed by the confluence of the North Anna and the South Anna, it is evident that it is sidling off towards the southeast between the Mattapony and the Pamunkey.

The cavalry, preceding the advanced division of the Sixth Corps, arrived in the morning of the 27th of May at Hanovertown, crossed the Pamunkey there and uncovered the fords in the vicinity. Before noon of the 28th the Fifth Corps crossed at the same place. Soon after noon of the 28th the Second Corps and two divisions of the Sixth crossed the river four miles above Hanovertown. The Ninth Corps crossed at Hanovertown, but not until the middle of the night of the 28th. Lee having been moving on parallel lines with Grant, was now again athwart his path on the roads to Richmond. Here occurred battles along Totopotomoy Creek and at Cold Harbor, the account of which

will be postponed while following for a moment the course of closely-related simultaneous events, traced in outline in the next chapter; events which had either the effect of influencing from a distance the fortunes of the past battle-fields and the approaching one, or of bringing personally upon the present scene actors who have not before appeared.


Modified, to suit t
reader, by R. Mea
6
THE BATTLE-FIELD
OF
TOTOPOTOMOY, VA.
From Surveys under the direction of
Bvt. Brig. Gen. N. MICHLER, Maj. of Engineers
and Bvt. Major C. W. HOWELL, Capt. of Engineers
BY COMMAND OF
BVT. MAJ. GEN. A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Brig. Gen. and Chief of Engineers,
1867.
Surveyed and drawn by Maj. J. H. WEYSS,
assisted by E. THEIBRUH, J. STRASSER
and G. THOMPSON
MECHANICSVILLE
HANOVERTOWN
Scale
Mile

CHAPTER XXI.

CO-OPERATIVE COLUMNS.

ACCORDING to prearrangement, the armies of Banks in the Southwest, of Sherman in the Middle States, of Sigel in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and of Butler on the James, had started with the Army of the Potomac at virtually the same time, the 4th of May, generally at exactly the same time. No extended reference to Banks's and Sherman's armies is permissible here, but the operations of Sigel's and Butler's armies, being intimately related to those of the Army of the Potomac, must at this point receive notice. Butler's force, called the Army of the James, consisted of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, respectively commanded by Generals Q. A. Gilmore and Wm. F. Smith, commonly known as "Baldy" Smith, and of a cavalry corps, commanded by General A. V. Kautz. Why these men, or indeed any military men, should have been under the immediate command of General B. F. Butler is explicable only by the fact of Butler's political influence, and that political influence, irrespective of individual merit, is the funeral pyre of modern society, upon which is sacrificed at intervals the highest interests of nations.

Under orders, Butler concentrated his infantry at Yorktown and Gloucester, on the York River, as a feint of going up that river to join Grant's army moving south. In the night of the 4th of May, the same day that the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, Butler's troops slipped down the York River on transports, and under escort of a naval force, under Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, passed into and

up the James River, and landed near, but chiefly at Bermuda Hundred, a narrow neck of land between the James and Appomattox Rivers. Here Butler was joined by a few other troops from the Peninsula between the James and the York. On the morning of the 6th Kautz, starting from Suffolk, towards the south, with the cavalry, made for the nearest line of railroad south of Petersburg, with the view of preventing the passage of troops through that place for the reinforcement of Richmond, and of severing one of the sources of supply of the enemy, and the infantry at Bermuda Hundred advanced to a point a few miles beyond the area described between the James and the Appomattox, and took up a position there. At this time the approaches to Richmond were only feebly held, but Beauregard, who had been ordered to take command of the place, was rapidly approaching with troops from the South. The precious time for that purpose, if it were possible to effect the capture of Richmond, was wasted through Butler's military incapacity. The naval vessels on the James found it impossible to ascend the stream so as to co-operate in the attack by assailing the principal river-defences south of Richmond. Butler rejected a plan proposed to him of crossing the Appomattox and capturing Petersburg, only about eight miles distant. The end virtually came when, time having been lost in futile movements, Beauregard took the initiative, when Butler had advanced with his right near to Drewry's Bluff on the James. After a severe engagement Butler was forced to retreat into the little peninsula previously described as at Bermuda Hundred, where he remained bottled up and corked, as was said at the time, in substantially the same words, by General Barnard, in his report of the situation to Grant. Even this lame and impotent conclusion to the first operations of Butler, which accomplished little but some railroad destruction, might have been a great deal worse,

for it seems hardly doubtful that, had General Whiting, of the Confederates, fulfilled his part of the plan of battle directed at Drewry's Bluff against Butler, the Army of the James would have suffered a severe defeat. As it was, with the incubus of Butler in command, the Army of the James did all that could legitimately have been expected of it, General Smith especially signalizing himself by ready perception of the situation and adoption of means to meet it. It was on the 16th of May that the battle of Drewry's Bluff took place. On the following day Beauregard followed Butler's retreat, and entrenching lines in front of the narrow area corresponding to the neck of the bottle to which General Barnard had likened the little peninsula, there held Butler's forces neutralized, so far as direct influence on the capture of Richmond or Petersburg was concerned. Here Butler was left to ferment for many days, never reaching the ripeness of knowledge, however, that he was not a born general.

The principal column moving from the direction of Washington was commanded in person by Sigel, and passed up the Shenandoah Valley. To the west of it General Couch had a column in West Virginia operating near the line of communication by the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. That of Sigel principally interests us as having intimate relations with the advance of the Army of the Potomac. Both columns moved on May 1st, and Sigel's was defeated at Newmarket, on the 15th, leading to great alarm in Washington. When finally Grant had been communicated with, after the delay caused by his presence with the Army of the Potomac, and he was able to take action, he relieved Sigel from command of the Army of the Shenandoah and gave it to General Hunter, who, being ordered to capture Lynchburg, if possible, met the enemy, weakened by a detachment to Lee, on the 5th of June, and badly defeated

him. On the 8th of June Hunter was joined by a cavalry force under Generals Crook and Averell, and moved on Lynchburg. Here, in the position clearly shown by the Confederate maps of the defences of Lynchburg, and at the disadvantage of the enemy's having received heavy reinforcements from Lee, then in Richmond, he was obliged, on the 19th of June, to abandon the project of the capture of Lynchburg, and to retire by a line further to the west, to avoid having his retreat towards Washington cut off by the enemy. Almost destitute of supplies, a stock of which in his rear had been so imperfectly guarded as to permit its destruction or removal by the enemy, he struggled through the rugged country through which he was obliged to take his course north, and for the second time within a brief interval of time the line towards Washington was uncovered and the whole country north put in a state of alarm. The valley through which Hunter had advanced now lying open to invasion, Early, who had brought up part of the reinforcements to Lynchburg which had caused Hunter's retreat, soon began his celebrated raid on Washington, necessitating the sending of the Sixth Corps by water from the Army of the Potomac, then across the James, to the relief of Washington from the impending attack. This, and the opportune arrival there at the same time of two divisions of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans, ensured the safety of the city when, on the 12th of July, the enemy was about to assault its works. The incidents of Early's invasion, the defeat of General Wallace on the Monocacy, and other details, would make too long a story for these pages. It should, however, be mentioned in conclusion, that Hunter had done all that was possible with the means at his command. The cause of his ill-success lay in the expectation of the Lieutenant-General, conveyed to General Hunter, that he would advance as far as Lynchburg, at which place

became demonstrated dangers which ought in conception to have been so manifest as not to have been incurred. The latter part of this account, the reader will perceive, of course anticipates in time the events as related to our main narrative.

Having thus disposed of the expeditionary columns within a short range of the Army of the Potomac, it remains to speak last of the raid of General Sheridan, which was begun simultaneously with the opening of the battle of Spottsylvania Court House. Like Cervantes, in one modest respect, I despatched one of the characters of my tale, and brought him back again without the slightest apology to the reader. The explanation is that I should not have been justifiable in interrupting the torrent of events from the Wilderness onward to Cold Harbor, to introduce a swirl of the agitation tending elsewhere. The cavalry under Sheridan was composed of three divisions, commanded by Generals Gregg, Merritt (Torbert's division), and Wilson. They were intended to accomplish, if possible, the defeat of the enemy's cavalry, the capture of Richmond by surprise, and communication with Butler at Bermuda Hundred. Stuart was on the alert, and permitting Sheridan, almost unmolested, except by harassing his flank and rear, to pursue his route, he gathered his main body of cavalry in advance for a determined stand. Sheridan passed over the North Anna, and after repelling a slight attack upon him at Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, he engaged in destroying tracks and rolling stock. Again, at Ashland Station, Sheridan engaged in similar work of destruction on the Fredericksburg Railroad, so that Stuart had ample time to concentrate his forces near Yellow Tavern, about five miles north of Richmond. Here Sheridan, continuing his march, after doing all possible damage at his last halting-place, found Stuart in position. The result of the encounter, in which Stuart's force was

very much smaller than Sheridan's, and in which Stuart was killed, was the defeat of the Confederates and the opening of the way to Richmond. But the main works there proved upon reconnoissance too strong to capture, and so Sheridan, after taking a portion of the outer ones, and finding it impossible to reach Butler by passing between Richmond and the Chickahominy, turned back towards the Chickahominy. Merritt (temporarily commanding Torbert's division) passed it, after repairing Meadow Bridge, near the crossing of the stream by the Virginia Central Railroad. Wilson's and Gregg's divisions tried to cross it about two miles below, near Mechanicsville Bridge, where the direct road from Richmond to Mechanicsville crosses it, but being opposed by the enemy, had to cross it above that point, after having thrown off the attacks of the enemy. Once more in the open, free from assailants, Sheridan took his way along the north side of the Chickahominy to Bottom's Bridge, where he crossed it, and on the 14th reached Haxall's Landing, on the northern side of the James, just opposite to Butler's position of Bermuda Hundred, on the south side, where he received supplies, remained three days, and then returned towards the Army of the Potomac. This he did by repairing the bridge over the Pamunkey at the White House and crossing there, thus placing that stream between him and any possible attack from the Confederate army, for it must be remembered that he could not know what had taken place since his departure from Spottsylvania Court-House. The White House was now about to be once more the base of supplies of the Army of the Potomac. Masked by the Pamunkey, Sheridan rejoined the army at Chesterfield Station, on the 24th of May, and in pursuance of the constant effort at railroad destruction, almost at once Wilson's division was thrown out on Lee's left flank, to work that sort of havoc, and as a feint, to delude Lee into the belief that

the new line of advance of the Army of the Potomac would be by its right flank instead of by its left, and therefore in a different direction from the one upon which Grant had resolved. The reader will now understand how the main body of cavalry, under Sheridan,—Gregg's and Torbert's divisions,—came, on May 27th, to be leading the advance of the army, and Wilson's division to be guarding the rear on the way from the North Anna across the Pamunkey to Totopotomoy Creek.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLES OF BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR.

We left the Army of the Potomac just after it had crossed to the south side of the Pamunkey. The Pamunkey and the Mattapony, as has been mentioned, form, from their point of junction, the York River. South of the Pamunkey, about thirteen miles above that junction, is the White House, the depot of supplies during the Peninsular Campaign, which, now that the Army of the Potomac has advanced from the North Anna to within a march of it, again serves that purpose.

The Pamunkey, just back of where the major part of the Army of the Potomac had crossed it, lies in a southeasterly direction. Flowing into it near there, with their mouths six miles apart, are, in the order from north to south, Crump's Creek and Totopotomoy Creek, lying in a general way in a southwesterly direction, enriched through their courses and at their heads by numerous affluents and corresponding swampy bottoms. About four and a half miles down the Pamunkey from the mouth of Totopotomoy Creek is the mouth of Matadequin Creek, the general course of which, being about west, its head-waters approach near to those of the Totopotomoy, with the same characteristics of numerous affluents and swampy bottoms. Further south than these three streams, running southeasterly in its upper course, and therefore parallel there to the Pamunkey, is the Chickahominy, flowing into the James River, and passing in its upper course between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond, and lying, when the army was in its

final position, five miles beyond its centre, to the southwest. On the north side it has numerous affluents with swampy bottoms. These, flowing in a general way from north to south, have their headwaters in direction athwart the course of the Matadequin. Consequently, the whole country in which the two armies are now operating is seamed with swamp-confined watercourses running in various directions and preventing uniform advance of hostile lines and ease of movement within each from flank to flank. Just to the westward of this intricate formation of ground lies the Virginia Central Railroad, running north from Richmond to Hanover Court House, distant fifteen miles.

When, about noon of the 28th of May, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac found themselves across the Pamunkey, they drew up in a position about two miles south of it. The right of the Sixth Corps rested beyond Crump's Creek, enclosing the road to Hanover Court-House; the Second Corps, forming the centre, lay from northwest to southeast, with its left in the rear of Hawes's Shop, and the Fifth Corps continued the general line until its left reached the point where the Old Church Road to Hawes's Shop crosses the Totopotomoy. The Ninth Corps, as previously mentioned, did not get across the Pamunkey until midnight. Wilson, with a division of cavalry, was on the north side of the Pamunkey, protecting the transit of the trains. Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, was off to the left front. No one knew, from ocular demonstration, the exact position of the enemy. All that had been seen of him since leaving the North Anna was a brigade of his cavalry, which had had a slight encounter with the advance of the Army of the Potomac crossing the Pamunkey. But there are in war demonstrations other than ocular ones which determine the general position of an enemy. The direction of Richmond from the position

of the Army of the Potomac, and the direction of the roads leading thereto, coupled with the nature of the ground, determined the general position in which Lee's line of battle must eventually be. The problem to be solved was to ascertain, at the least expenditure, its exact position. On the 28th Sheridan had been ordered to move two of his divisions of cavalry beyond Hawes's Shop towards Richmond. He had not advanced far when he encountered the main body of the enemy's cavalry, under Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, and held the place after a hard fight lasting until dark, before which time he was reinforced by two brigades of Torbert's division of cavalry, in the rear at Crump's Creek, rendering the tenure of the position secure.

There is a simple plan by which to bring the respective positions of the hostile armies to the apprehension of the reader. Let him picture to himself that the Totopotomoy runs south of east from near Atlee's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, for about five miles, and there bends and runs thence north of east to its mouth at the Pamunkey, and that the Chickahominy, at a point about five miles south of this upper reach of the Totopotomoy, runs about parallel with that reach. Now, if these directions and distances are clearly held in mind, it will be seen that the production of the enemy's line of battle from left to right along the upper and southeast reach of the Totopotomoy would, after leaving the lower, northeast reach, beyond the bend of the stream, bring up a few miles off on the northern bank of the Chickahominy. And it will be equally apparent that, as all the roads north of the Chickahominy leading to Richmond from the northeast are intersected about at right-angles by the line described, that that was necessarily the line of defence adopted by the enemy. The line of the enemy therefore faced northeast, and the line of the Army of the Potomac must have faced southwest. The two, rep-

resenting attack and defence, simply shifted along from northwest to southeast.

On the morning of the 29th of May the infantry of the Army of the Potomac moved in the following manner,— the Sixth Corps, on the right, in the direction of Hanover Court House, whither it marched to feel for the enemy on that flank, finding nothing but small bodies of cavalry hovering around; the Second Corps, to the left of the Sixth, closing in on the Totopotomoy; the Fifth, to the left of the Second, crossing the Totopotomoy and advancing along the Shady Grove Church Road. The Ninth Corps was held in reserve between the Second and Fifth. The order for the next day, the 30th, was for Wright to try to outflank the left of the enemy; for Hancock, on his left, to co-operate with Wright; for Burnside, on Hancock's left, to push forward on his front; and for Warren, on his left, across the Totopotomoy, to continue to advance along the Shady Grove Church Road. The Sixth Corps became tangled up in the swamps of the head of Crump's Creek, and could not arrive in time to carry out its part of the programme with the Second; the Second had considerable success on its front, but without being able to disrupt the enemy's line; the Ninth crossed the Totopotomoy at the expense of some heavy skirmishing; and the Fifth, coming up in front of Bethesda Church, had a severe engagement, which grew in intensity as the day went on, the left of the corps, in the afternoon, being overlapped by the pivoting of the enemy's right flank across the head of Beaver Dam Creek, notable as the one which, near its mouth, on the Chickahominy, had witnessed the first of the series of battles that ended with McClellan's withdrawal from the Peninsula. The brunt of the preliminary battle had thus to be borne by Warren, the nature of the ground rendering it impossible for Hancock, the most available on his right, to come directly to his assistance.

An attempt, however, was made to relieve him indirectly, through orders from General Meade to Hancock, who put Barlow in on his own front. It will be perceived that the positions of the two armies will shift to the left as viewed from the Army of the Potomac. Wilson's division of cavalry was on the right flank of the army near the head of Crump's Creek, engaged in covering that flank, and preparing for railroad destruction, including the demolition of the railroad bridges over the South Anna. Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, held on the left, watching the roads beyond Hawes's Shop to Richmond. At Matadequin Creek, where it is crossed by the road to Cold Harbor, he dislodged cavalry of the enemy posted there.

Other actors for the coming drama, to whom allusion was made in the last chapter, are approaching the scene of conflict by landing near the White House. Before leaving Spottsylvania Court House, Grant had ordered Butler to keep as many troops as might be necessary to hold his lines at Bermuda Hundred, and to send the remainder to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. Lee had acted similarly with regard to stripping the lines opposing those at Bermuda Hundred, and the two hostile contingents had joined, or were in the act of joining, their respective sides on the Totopotomoy. As the enemy's contingent had first left the position at Bermuda Hundred, its troops had gradually reached the battle-ground, while those destined for the Army of the Potomac were just beginning to appear, as it were, in the distance. These, consisting of four divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, about sixteen thousand strong under the command of General William F. Smith, came by water from Bermuda Hundred, down the James and up the York and the Pamunkey, on the bank of which last stream they had landed by the 31st of May near the White House.

It was undoubtedly only through General Grant's action that this contingent could be ordered from the Army of the James to join the Army of the Potomac. But its further movement ought to have been under the immediate direction of General Meade. It is unfortunately, however, an almost irresistible tendency in any but the most philosophic minds to enter abruptly into a train of events which others are conducting. The propensity is well illustrated by the proverbial soup, to which each person passing through the kitchen contributes a pinch of salt. The result, in this instance, of Grant's taking immediate direction of Smith's movement was that he was ordered to march, instead of, to Cold Harbor, for a wrong place, to Newcastle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, near the mouth of the Totopotomoy, several miles back of the lines of the Army of the Potomac as they were expected to lie, and did lie, on the 1st of June. In consequence, after a long, hot day- and night-march, on the 31st of May, Smith's column reached Newcastle Ferry, only to march the next morning for Cold Harbor, his troops reaching there unfit, through heat and fatigue, for the immediate action desired, which had to be postponed until a later hour.

On the 31st of May the two armies were in close contact, but largely debarred from action by the line of the upper reach of the Totopotomoy. The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was kept, with skirmishers in advance, pressed up against the enemy, but made no general attack anywhere, as it was now perceived that, if it were possible to break through the opposing lines, it would be necessary to move from right to left some of the force then along the upper reach of the Totopotomoy. The day was therefore passed by the infantry in skirmishing and making feints of attack. The cavalry was, on the contrary, very active during the day; Sheridan, on the left front, capturing and

holding the enemy's position at Old Cold Harbor, finally relinquishing it under heavy pressure, and then, by orders from General Meade to hold it to the last extremity, making a successful stand there.

Sheridan's holding Old Cold Harbor was the turning-point in the preliminary tactical movements of the Army of the Potomac. It was soon able to extend towards the left, with its line between Old Cold Harbor and New Cold Harbor, stretching thence southeast to the Chickahominy. The Sixth Corps was, during the night of the 31st, marched to the left, Sheridan meanwhile holding on with difficulty against the force brought to bear against him on the morning of the 1st of June. The Sixth Corps, however, began to arrive between nine and ten o'clock, and relieved the cavalry for other duty on the left flank. Wilson's cavalry division, on the right, had an engagement near Hanover Court House, and destroyed the two railroad bridges over the South Anna. In the course of the morning Smith came up from Newcastle, and was posted on the right of the Sixth Corps, Warren being on his right. The enemy, upon observing the coming up of the Sixth Corps to take position on Grant's extreme left, pushed Longstreet further to the right. The two armies are now effectively closed in on each other. The line of the upper Totopotomoy is no longer the scene of the main threats and attacks. The focus of the combat is to be at Cold Harbor, covering some of the most direct roads to Richmond and the Chickahominy. From left to right the corps now lie in the order of the Sixth, the four divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, the Fifth, the Ninth, and the Second. The final battle contemplated for the morning of the 2d of June had to be delayed until the afternoon, partially on account of the necessity of affording an interval of rest for Smith's jaded troops. Meanwhile, at six o'clock in the evening of the 1st the action began by an

attack from the front of the Sixth Corps and that of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps. From the left of the Sixth Corps to the right of Smith the following was the order of the troops for the designated attack. The Sixth Corps,—Getty's division, Russell's division, Ricketts's division. Smith's troops,—Devens's division, Brooks's division, Martindale's division. The whole of Ricketts's division, in the centre, the right of Russell's and of Getty's, Devens's, and part of Brooks's, came into fierce contact with the enemy, Martindale's division, on the right, and Neill's brigade, on the left, being refused, and holding the roads in those places. The result of the fighting was the loss of two thousand men within a brief space of time, and the gain of portions of the advanced line of the enemy. Ricketts's and part of Russell's division captured the enemy's second line on their front, but were finally driven out of it. The troops entrenched on the ground which they had gained. With only the force present on the left, no further progress could be made, and the struggle will intensify more and more towards the left. The Second Corps was ordered to make a night march from the right, and the Sixth and the three other corps on the left, to attack early the next morning while the Second was coming up on the left of the Sixth. After a heavy night march over difficult ground Hancock arrived early in the morning of the 2d of June with his troops very weary. Smith's troops, too, had not completely recovered from their fatigue, having gone into battle still wayworn. Besides, the vicissitudes of their march had resulted in their being deficient in ammunition. The attack was therefore postponed until five o'clock in the afternoon.

Without going into the minutiæ of the new dispositions on the left, let it be stated in general terms that the Army of the Potomac was now resting with its left on the Chickahominy, lying in the following order from left to right,—

the Second Corps, the Sixth, parts of the Tenth and Eighteenth, the Fifth, and the Ninth; the Fifth holding a line about three miles in length, so covered in parts by swamps that it was difficult there to attack or be attacked. The enemy continued, conformably with the opposite movements, to draw down reinforcements from his left to his right. The attack was again postponed. Instead of its taking place at five o'clock in the afternoon, it was ordered for half-past four on the morning of the next day, the 3d. This was necessitated by various causes, the great heat, the fatigue from the late night marches, and the general inadequacy of general preparation for the previously appointed time of five o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. Nothing therefore took place on the 2d of June more serious than skirmishing along the lines, except that the enemy, conceiving that the right might have been unduly weakened, made an attempt upon it, resulting in some success, as it unfortunately found Warren and Burnside, on the extreme right, in the act of making a change ordered, by which Warren was, by extending his left, to close up on Smith, and Burnside was to mass his corps in reserve in the rear of Warren's right.

The coming battle is popularly believed to have been one in which there was a simultaneous assault all along the line, but this was in places impossible. What in a general way took place remains to be recounted. It was almost precisely on the stroke of half-past four in the morning of the 3d, the appointed time, when the cavalry on the left quiescent, the cavalry on the enemy's right-rear active, that the infantry between, over a stretch of six miles, attacked wherever the enemy's lines were approachable. The army, free to approach the enemy from any position, barring Warren's and Burnside's, and represented by the Second and Sixth Corps, and the divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth, advanced


MAP
OF THE
BATTLE-FIELD
OF
COLD HARBOR, VA.
From Surveys
under the direction of Bvt. Brig. Gen. N. MICHLER, Major of Engineers,
and Bvt. Lieut. Col. P. S. MICHIE, Capt. of Engineers,
By Command of
Bvt. Maj. Gen. A.A. HUMPHREYS, Brig. Gen. and Chief of Engineers.
1867.
Surveyed and drawn by Maj. J.E. Wiyas,
assisted by F. Theilkuhl, J. Strasser and G. Thompson.
Scale
Union
Confederate
Modified, to suit the gen-
eral reader, by R. Midde
Bache.

simultaneously, captured many of the enemy's rifle-pits amidst a storm of direct- and cross-artillery fire, and overrunning them, rushed forward to within a short distance of his main entrenchments, where the fire became so scathing that the troops, not being able to proceed farther, sought every accident of ground for shelter, and began, with whatever implement happened to be at hand, to throw up some slight cover of earth. Although all the troops behaved with exemplary gallantry, suffering during the unusually short period during which the fighting lasted, a loss of four thousand men in killed and wounded, the only serious lodgment in the enemy's works was made by Barlow's division of the Second Corps, which, happening to strike a salient of the enemy's main line, carried it. But unfortunately, his supporting second line did not arrive in time to confirm his hold, and he was swept out of the works by the enemy's reinforcements at that point, which rendered the position thereafter secure. Another portion of the enemy's entrenchments was captured, but had to be relinquished, as in the case cited, through failure to support in time the first assault. The hopelessness of further attack under the conditions of the terrible direct-fire, and also cross-fire coming from the right of Smith, and searching the lines of the Sixth Corps as well as those of his command, and even reaching the left of the Second Corps, having become apparent, the respective corps-commanders were directed to hold the ground gained, and to proceed by regular approaches.

While this was happening on the left of the army, Burnside, on the right, captured rifle-pits along the line in front of him, which had been stripped by Lee to reinforce his right; and he was, at one o'clock, about to move finally upon the enemy when the order suspending attack reached him. Warren, on Burnside's left, had acted in concert with Burnside, both being engaged with Early, temporarily com-

manding Ewell's corps. Warren's corps, however, being strung out in a thin line, and having in front of it unfavorable ground, could take the offensive to so little advantage that Birney's division of the Second Corps had been sent to hold his left, when the order suspending further attack arrived. With a slight attack by the enemy, about dark, on a portion of the Sixth Corps, the battle of the 3d ended.

This represents, omitting minute details, the battle of the 3d of June at Cold Harbor. The total loss on the Union side in pitched battle on the 1st and 3d of June was very nearly ten thousand, of which the greatest was sustained by the Second and Sixth Corps and the divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth. The total loss after crossing the Pamunkey was very nearly thirteen thousand. The loss on the side of the Confederates has never been ascertained. It was probably not more than a fifth of these numbers.

On the 6th and 7th of June Lee took the offensive against the right flank and rear of the army. But the attempts failed, the enemy in his turn experiencing the difficulty of making long advances through a country cut up by numerous streams with their bordering swamps. Grant resolved, despite the suggestion of Halleck to invest Richmond on the north side, to carry out his original project of shifting as an eventuality from the north to the south side of the James. How he could have done otherwise is not apparent, seeing, as we have observed, that he could not force Lee's lines defending the ground leading to the north side of Richmond. On the 9th and 10th of June the preliminary steps for the withdrawal of the army were taken, and it began to retire in the night of the 12th and move towards the James. Before this took place, however, Sheridan had marched. On the 7th of June he had moved north of Richmond on a pathway of railroad destruction, instructed to join Hunter at Charlottesville, northwest of Richmond,

who was expected by that time to have captured Lynchburg, a little south of west from Richmond, and after having destroyed valuable war-material there, to be in a position where, reinforced by Sheridan, they would be able together to combine their forces and join the Army of the Potomac. But, as we have already seen in the chapter on co-operative movements, things had fallen out differently from expectations. Another movement besides Sheridan's had been initiated about the same time. On the 9th of June, while comparative repose reigned in the Army of the Potomac and that of its adversary, an expedition of infantry and cavalry started from the lines of Bermuda Hundred, seeking to capture Petersburg by surprise. The attempt was unsuccessful. General Beauregard, in command of the lines of Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred, sent reinforcements to the town, and the affair ended like a mere reconnoissance in force.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CHANGE OF BASE AND ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG.

THAT, from the movements which were to a certain degree under his observation, General Lee should not have known that they indicated crossing the James, is not extraordinary. The visible movements were precisely those which would have been made, had they been intended, after the army's crossing the Chickahominy, to culminate in an advance on Richmond from the southeast, over the Charles River, Central, and New Market Roads. When, on the morning of the 13th of June, Lee had learned that the Army of the Potomac had retired from his front, he had to meet what was apparent, but falsely so, by the countermove of marching a portion of his army towards a position where his right would rest near Malvern Hill, his centre at Riddle's Shop, and his left on the White Oak Swamp, and there await the initiative of the enemy in a direct advance towards Richmond. The extraordinary feature of the event is, not that Lee did not penetrate Grant's design, but that the eventuality which was now taking form had been kept throughout the whole campaign secret.

It behooves us now to examine what the Army of the Potomac was doing when, on the morning of the 13th of June, Lee discovered that it had retired from his front. It was engaged in an operation, in strategy well conceived, and in tactics admirably executed,—the crossing of the James. Unhappily, an incidental project of Grant's failed through his own remissness. Yet, despite this, two distinguished writers on the war have been found to lavish praise upon

him for his strategy here, oblivious of the fact that they had not forgotten to note the serious lapse through which his incidental plan of taking Petersburg by surprise signally failed. But, just as the strength of a fortification is its weakest point, so also is the strength of a plan its weakest point. The operation intended by Grant may be regarded as he, in fact, regarded it at the time, as a single one; but so imperfectly was it executed as to one portion, that it remained virtually two operations, of which only one succeeded. The march of the army and the crossing of the river were unexceptionable. They could not have been otherwise with such a master of logistics as Meade, with such a chief-of-staff as Humphreys, with such corps and division-commanders as those of which the army was possessed. But, first of all, Grant's instructions to Warren had to be corrected, or things would have gone terribly amiss, and then his omitting to communicate to Meade his project of surprising Petersburg rendered that part of his design abortive. Honor to him to whom honor is due, but not beyond the honor that is due.

Had the Army of the Potomac attempted to cross the Chickahominy just below its left flank at Cold Harbor, it would have become almost immediately engaged with the enemy while its movement was in process of execution. Moreover, upon getting across the Chickahominy, it would have become tangled up in the region between the Chickahominy and its parallel affluent, the White Oak Swamp. It would finally have been in precisely the same position as McClellan's, marching over precisely the same lines over which McClellan made his retreat to Malvern Hill. But Grant had advantages far superior to those enjoyed by McClellan. He had a veteran army, and the whole of it was concentrated north of the Chickahominy. Having the start of a whole night, the trains, strongly guarded, wend-

ing their way in the rear from the White House towards two crossings of the Chickahominy, Coles's Ferry, ten miles from its mouth, and Windsor Shades, eight miles above the Ferry, the Second and Fifth Corps pushed for Long Bridge, four miles below where the White Oak Swamp empties into the Chickahominy, and there, upon a pontoon-bridge, crossed that stream. The Fifth, turning to the right after crossing the bridge, and marching west along the Long Bridge Road, halted in line of battle short of Riddle's Shop, with its right resting on White Oak Swamp, in the rear of the road passing it by White Oak Bridge, lest the enemy should attack to advantage by passing over the swamp by that bridge. The Fifth Corps, thus posted across the roads leading to Richmond, masked all that was going on below on the Chickahominy and the James.

At Jones's Bridge, three miles below the place where the Second and Fifth Corps crossed the Chickahominy, the Sixth and Ninth crossed it. The Second, crossing at Long Bridge, and the Sixth and Ninth at Jones's Bridge, these three corps then marched south, going by roads in the general direction of Charles City Court House. The rendezvous was on the James, at Wilcox's Landing, where a pontoon-bridge was to be laid across the river to a narrow projection of land called Windmill Point. In all this manœuvre the trains, several miles in the rear, masked by the Fifth Corps and the marching columns, eventually found themselves assembled with the army two or three miles below Harrison's Landing, and ten miles below Malvern Hill, both famous in the Peninsular Campaign. The division of cavalry remaining with the army actively performed its duties during this operation. In the rear there were going on desperately forced marches, while Warren, with the Fifth Corps, at the front, was the shield behind which the manœuvre proceeded. When Warren,


RICHMOND
Petersburg
CITY POINT R.R.



preceded by Wilson's cavalry, had, on the morning of the 13th taken his designated position to cover the passage of the other corps over the Chickahominy, he pushed out some force on the three main roads leading from his position to Richmond, on which he had some skirmishing with the enemy. His mission being fulfilled by night, he fell back a short distance, and the next day marched towards Wilcox's Landing, reaching there on the 14th at midday. The cavalry, however, was left in observation for a little while longer near the lines vacated. The Second Corps reached Wilcox's Landing on the afternoon of the 13th, but the Sixth and Ninth Corps did not reach there until the 14th. In the middle of the night of the 14th, under cover of the guns of the naval vessels and position taken by the Sixth Corps, Wilson's cavalry, and the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Corps of infantry began to cross the pontoon-bridge of over two thousand feet in length that spanned the James, kept from swaying by being made fast to craft anchored above and below in the stream; and about the same time in the night of the 16th had safely made the transit of the river with all their artillery, munitions, and trains. The Second Corps, forming an element in Grant's unrevealed project to capture Petersburg by a *coup de main*, having collected all the available boats, had crossed the James early on the morning of the 15th, under orders from General Meade to wait where it landed, at Windmill Point, until rations were received from General Butler, now near by on the lines of Bermuda Hundred, after having received which, the corps would march for Petersburg. Hancock knew nothing beyond this of what was expected of him, Meade knew nothing of Grant's intentions. Grant had to neither communicated his particular design. The consequence was, that Hancock, having waited in vain for the rations, began to move forward at half-past ten in the

morning, but feeling no urgency for what seemed merely to contemplate his taking up a position in front of Petersburg. The Ninth Corps went first over the pontoon-bridge. The Fifth Corps next passed over, partly ferrying its troops across the river. The Sixth Corps retained the position in which it had been placed to cover the movement. That accomplished, two of its divisions were transported by water to the lines of Bermuda Hundred for service there.

The wheel within the wheel which did not move smoothly in the beautiful operation of changing the army's base by crossing the James failed entirely through General Grant. Twice, in close succession, he misconceived a particular situation. Had Warren, after crossing the Chickahominy, taken up the position as ordered by Grant, he would have been in a bad way, for his corps would have been open to attack in the rear. Fortunately, Grant's orders were so altered at Meade's headquarters that they fitted in with the tactical requirements of the case. In the case of Grant's other remissness, the account of which we are now approaching, there was no opportunity afforded for the avoidance of its consequences, because Grant left the commanding-general of the army completely in the dark as to his ulterior purpose. Space does not admit here of introducing passages from the despatches, reports, and statements bearing upon the subject, but if the reader will carefully examine official matter relating to it, and the statements of Meade, Humphreys, Hancock, William F. Smith, Francis A. Walker, and Carswell McClellan, he will reach a conclusion only too sadly confirmed by the evasion of Grant himself and his accredited historian, Badeau, through all of which is unmistakably to be seen that the truth about this particular affair lying at the bottom of a well would receive no illumination from them by which the obscurity around it might be dispelled. It would be ap-

parent to any candid mind, from examination of the official and private record of the event, that Grant bungled the matter of his intended surprise of Petersburg. He had sent back General Smith, as he had come, to Bermuda Hundred. Smith was ordered to report there in person to Butler, and with all the force available to march upon and capture Petersburg. Grant personally went, on the 14th, to Bermuda Hundred, and there, in conference with Butler, the capture of Petersburg was preconcerted; and through General Meade he ordered that the Second Corps, as soon as furnished by Butler with rations, should march from Windmill Point, halting between City Point and Petersburg. But he failed to take either General Meade or General Hancock into confidence as to his design involving Hancock's agency. The first that Hancock knew of it was when he was nearing Petersburg, through an order from Grant to hasten forward, and a message from Smith in action. Consequently, the whole plan fell through, and so conscious and unwilling to bear the burden of his own dereliction was Grant, that years afterwards, General Meade then dead, he did not in his memoirs scruple to ignore what he must long before have been satisfied was true, that he had omitted to communicate to the commanding-general the purpose he had had in view in Hancock's march.

While the operations just described, beginning with the withdrawal of the army from Cold Harbor, were in progress, General Smith moved, under orders, from the White House back to Bermuda Hundred by the same route as that by which he had come. Smith's expressed conclusion, upon the basis of the fact alleged by him, that Lee's order to reinforce Petersburg was issued before Grant had conceived the idea of taking it by surprise (and therefore, necessarily, before Grant's order to capture the place was given) is, of course, intended to show that Lee must have anticipated

Grant in actually getting troops to the ground. But, from these premises, it cannot be established as a fact that the appearance of the troops themselves preceded the arrival of those under Smith. The difference of time in the issuance of orders by the respective commanders evidently produced, supposing that it existed, no material difference on the ground as to the condition there upon Smith's arrival. The circumstances influencing the final event lie entirely outside of this consideration. The brief time of the transit of Smith's troops speaks for itself. If an officer, in the night of the 12th, marched several thousand troops from the position at Cold Harbor to the White House, and there, despite the delay arising from defective transportation, shipped them on transports down the Pamunkey and York and up the James to Bermuda Hundred, and was marching thence for Petersburg at five o'clock in the morning of the 15th, and that, also, despite the fact that the general to whom he had by orders reported delayed giving him his final instructions, which had been entrusted to him for communication, he was not dilatory. This being what General Smith did, it is difficult to see how his preceding his troops, which he states would have been an advantage secured, if he had known of greater urgency than he reckoned on, would have been really an advantage. In preceding the troops he would have relinquished that force which a principal always infuses into an operation conducted under his own eye.

The failure to capture Petersburg did not hinge upon any or all of these incidents, including the fact, assuming it to be a fact, that Grant's order was issued later or carried out later than Lee's. General Smith, leaving artillery and *impedimenta* at Tunstall's Station, on the York River Railroad, to be taken along by troops marching towards the James, embarked his own at the White House, and reached

Bermuda Hundred by the evening of the 14th. Marching thence at five o'clock on the morning of the 15th, with about ten thousand infantry, accompanied by some cavalry, under Kautz, he crossed the pontoon-bridge over the Appomattox below Port Walthall, and directed his march towards Petersburg, about eight miles distant towards the south. The works to be attacked encircled the town at the distance of about two miles, thus shortening the march by that amount. He came very soon in contact with the enemy on the route itself, and, reaching Petersburg, found the enemy in position there with both direct and oblique fire of heavy artillery. The number of infantry occupying the works was unknown. With the frightful experience of recent attacks on entrenchments without previous thorough reconnoissances of the ground, Smith personally made a careful one as a preliminary to advancing, for not only was the number of infantry holding the works unknown, but the artillery-fire from them was searching. Here began to culminate the series of mishaps which, with Grant's design not to communicate, or neglect to communicate, his plans to General Meade, led to the miscarriage of the enterprise. The days, however, were long, and there would still perhaps be time between the completion of the reconnoissance and night to capture the works if it were at all practicable. But when, at five o'clock in the afternoon, Smith directed the fire of his artillery to be concentrated on a salient of the enemy's line, intending to assault the works with a cloud of skirmishers, it was suddenly discovered that the artillery-horses had, without orders, been sent to water, and his plan was thereby partially wrecked. It was, in consequence, not until nearly seven o'clock that his artillery, having opened on the designated point, his skirmish-line began to advance. Two redans, called respectively No. 5 and No. 6, were captured by the advance of the heavy

skirmish-line, whereupon the centre of the line of battle, commanded by General Brooks, carried and held the enemy's entrenchments on its front. Brooks, holding on here to what he had gained, General Martindale, on his right, and General Hinks, on his left, kept on advancing. Hinks captured five redans opposite to him, but Martindale was brought up all-standing by an impassable ditch. There remained then, on the right, near the Appomattox, four redans with their entrenchments uncaptured, and those to the left beyond Redan No. 11, uncaptured, leaving altogether an interval of about a mile and a half of the enemy's works held by General Smith by the time the fighting ceased, at nearly nine o'clock at night.

Smith thought, and naturally, that under the circumstances, it were best to let well alone, and not to tempt fortune by an advance to capture the bridges over the river, Petersburg lying on the south side of the Appomattox. Let us take the principal circumstances into consideration with which he had to deal. He had finally captured a mile and a half of the enemy's line. He had heard, hours before, that reinforcements for the enemy were crossing the James at Drewry's Bluff, between Richmond and Petersburg. He had learned, about four o'clock in the afternoon, from Grant himself, that Hancock was approaching. Humphreys says that it is probable that an immediate advance by Smith, when the enemy's salient was occupied, or at nine o'clock at night, when an assault could have been supported by two divisions of the Second Corps, would have resulted in the capture of Petersburg. But Humphreys did not positively say, for no man knew better than he the unfairness of positive conclusions after the fact, previously represented by supposititious elements, that Smith and Hancock did amiss in reaching the conclusions at which one separately, and then the two in conjunction, arrived,

upon the basis of facts then known. He merely stated, with his usual judicial calm, his conclusion as to a probable consequence of action under imaginary conditions.

Had Hancock been simply ordered to march at dawn for Petersburg, without halt, and without being informed of the purpose for which he was required there, it would not have mattered that General Meade or he was ignorant of the purpose of the march. But General Meade and General Hancock were equally in the dark. Neither was informed of Grant's intentions, and the order for the march was as previously represented. Hancock would otherwise have been at Petersburg by noon, and his troops, together with those of Smith, would have captured the town. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon when Smith learned by despatch from Grant that Hancock was only four miles in his rear. He sent instantly to Hancock to request him to hasten forward. The officer bearing the message reached Hancock at half-past five o'clock, just after he had received a message from Grant ordering him to hasten forward to the support of Smith. This was the first intimation that Hancock had received of what was intended. He at once sent Colonel Morgan, inspector-general of the Second Corps, ahead, to notify Smith of his coming. This message Smith received just after six o'clock. At half-past six o'clock, the head of Hancock's column, Birney's division of the Second Corps, had come up on the left-rear of Smith's line.

It was not until eleven o'clock that Hancock's troops, at Smith's request, on the prudential ground that some of Smith's troops were not veterans, relieved the men occupying the captured part of the line. The troops of Hancock that might have taken position on the left of Smith for the renewal of immediate attack, were not ordered to do so, because, as is believed, of the difficulty and danger of

occupying unknown ground by night. Considering, then, that Smith had sent a despatch to Hancock before he reached the ground, asking him to come up quickly and take position on his left, and this upon the basis of Grant's despatch to himself, and that Hancock came rapidly forward upon the basis of a despatch directly received from Grant, the whole pointing unmistakably to action upon Hancock's arrival, and that upon his arrival and meeting at half-past nine o'clock with Smith, he, although perforce of his seniority, the commanding-general, did not give any order or make any suggestion looking towards attack, or even attempt to come into position on Smith's left, but, on the contrary, readily acceded to Smith's request to relieve his troops on the captured line, it would seem that Hancock's action constituted tacit approval of waiting for the morning's light to attack, for which no one can assert that Smith was in any wise responsible, unless he should have the hardihood to declare that, after what had gone before, Smith should have urged Hancock to attack, notwithstanding that all that was said and done by him clearly indicated that he did not feel imperatively called upon by circumstances to prosecute the attack immediately. By midnight a despatch arrived from Grant saying that the enemy was reinforcing the town.

Hancock, ranking Smith, was from the fact of his arrival on the field the commanding-general. He might have waived his rank, as he is reported by Grant to have done, but General Smith says positively that he did not. A sidelight is thrown on this subject by General Walker in his history of the Second Corps, where he speaks of the physical condition of Hancock at that time, when he was beginning to suffer exquisite pain from the wound received at Gettysburg beginning to reopen. The fact of Hancock's relieving Smith's troops at his request, and making no pro-

position to renew hostilities, therefore admits of the consideration of two alternatives. Either Hancock's action was controlled in a wrong direction by temporary physical disability, or else, despite his condition, was the tacit expression of good judgment in the premises. In either case, however, his action constitutes full absolution to General Smith for his cessation of hostilities at the time. Whether or not Hancock was right cannot enter into the question of Smith's action, for Smith was, upon the appearance of Hancock, no longer the commanding-general. Whatever value, however, the circumstances recited may be judged to have with reference to the failure to capture Petersburg, they were all trivial compared with the share borne in it by Grant, because they would have been non-existent, had Grant not committed the egregious error of not communicating to his immediate subordinates his design of capturing Petersburg by a *coup de main*. The case has the aspect of his having wished to signalize himself by a master-stroke of strategy, of his not having forgotten to communicate to General Meade his intentions, but of his having purposely withheld from him information which should have been imparted.

The events narrated took place on the day and in the night of the 15th of June, while the main body of the army was coming up in the rear, two divisions of the Sixth Corps going to Bermuda Hundred, the Ninth Corps nearing its position on the left of the Second at ten o'clock on the 16th, followed by the Fifth Corps coming up in the rear by the morning of the 17th. The enemy, from the evening of the 15th, had been sending reinforcements from Bermuda Hundred, and before daylight of the next day General Lee in person was, with Pickett's division, on his way to the Bermuda Hundred lines; but it was not until the 17th that he was finally disabused of his idea that the whole of the Army

of the Potomac had not crossed the James. Beauregard gradually stripped his lines at Bermuda Hundred for the purpose of reinforcing Petersburg, so that at last they were so slightly held that an attack upon them had a temporary success, soon lost through the incompetence of Butler. As one of the preliminaries of the approaching siege of Petersburg, the movements here are, however, so subordinate to those, that we can well afford to pass them by with this casual mention and return to the main contest at Petersburg. The attack on the left was long delayed on the morning of the 16th, through causes which doubtless revert to Hancock's increasing disability from his old wound. The assault resulted in the capture of Redan No. 12, the next on the left of the ones which had been captured the evening before by Smith's troops. General Meade having arrived, ordered an assault for six o'clock in the afternoon. The line of battle was formed by the Second Corps in the centre, with two brigades of the Eighteenth Corps on the right, and two brigades of the Ninth on the left. This attack resulted in taking Redan No. 4, on the right, the next on the right of those captured the day before by Smith, and in taking Redans Nos. 13 and 14, on the left of the one captured by Hancock's morning assault. This ended the fighting for the day, in which both Union and Confederate armies suffered severely. At daylight on the 17th General Potter's division, of the Ninth Corps, took by surprise and captured the defences near the building known as the Shand House. Later in the day several gallant assaults were made by General Willcox, Ninth Corps, General Barlow, Second Corps, General Crawford, Fifth Corps, and Colonel Gould, Ninth Corps, commanding Ledlie's division; and advances to close quarters, which were maintained, were made on the left by Generals Gibbon and Birney, of the Second Corps. But the enemy continued to hold from Redan No. 1 to

Redan No. 3, all inclusive, and thence by a withdrawn line of entrenchments, along the west side of Harrison's Creek, to his redans and entrenchments on the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad. The besiegers were seeking to girdle Petersburg, but so far they had not obtained a foothold beyond the eastern side of it. Their positions will be understood from the statement that the Appomattox, flowing east and west just north of the town, the efforts of the besiegers, on the east of it, were directed to investing it as an eventuality on the south and west, as well as on the east, by resting their right on the river below, and their left on the river above. The enemy's line was intact, however, from the river below to Redan No. 3, and from Redan No. 15 to the river above. The fighting over for the 17th, General Meade ordered an assault for daylight of the 18th by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps. General Hancock had now become temporarily incapacitated for duty by the reopening of his wound, and the command of the Second Corps devolved on General Birney.

The advance, on the morning of the 18th, discovered that the enemy had fallen back upon an interior line which he was entrenching, difficult of approach in places on account of interlying ravines, including the deep cut through which the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad passes south, and obstructions beyond, consisting of slashings and abattis. The attacks could not, on account of the difficulties of the ground, be exactly simultaneous, but took place without much difference between them. By the time that the various corps were able to make them effective, the enemy had been heavily reinforced. In one sense they did not succeed, for the assaults did not result in capturing the enemy's new line of entrenchments, but in another they were successful, for the ground gained by the advance was tenaciously held, and as Humphreys observes, "The two

opposing lines in this part of the ground remained substantially the same in position to the close of the war." The losses on the Union side, from the beginning to the end of the assaults on the enemy's lines, reached ten thousand. Those on the enemy's side have never been known, the policy of the Confederates having been to conceal losses; but there is no reason to doubt, from the accounts of observers on the field, that they were very great. The regular investment and siege of Petersburg now began, a siege characterized by many engagements, and lasting over so long a period, that the most cursory account of it demands its formal initiation in a special chapter.*

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* Following the events narrated, General Smith, from having been apparently high in Grant's favor, fell suddenly and unaccountably from that estate. It would have been singular if he or any one else had then been able to reach a rational conclusion as to the change among the many possible explanations of it which then offered themselves for choice. But it is remarkable that now, in the light with which documents and the evidence in General Smith's own book, "From Chattanooga to Petersburg," have flooded the subject, he should have failed to discover at least one cause of the animus to which he owed his unfortunate experience, although he says that, at the very time referred to, Grant had charged him with having, by his strictures on Meade, whipped him over Meade's shoulders. If Grant were able to conceive so great a dislike as he exhibited for Warren, merely because of Warren's objectionable habit of making suggestions to modify the plans of his superiors, it is easy to understand what deep offence he must have received at remarks which, however unintentionally, struck at the very root of his own procedures. He had a personal purpose to serve in re-exalting, after having taken steps to dispose of Butler, who had great political influence, and another in withdrawing his favor from General Smith; and deeply politic and quietly vindictive as he could on occasions be, he was able, in this case, to subserve his ends by a Machiavelian combination, which included his resentment and personal interests (then perilously at stake from the popular feeling about the army's losses), under the most convenient cloak lent by circumstances as adventitious as it is possible to imagine.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PRELIMINARY TO THE SIEGE.

As, before the Army of the Potomac can settle down to its attempt to invest Petersburg, the loose threads produced by the interaction of the contending forces have to be gathered in, so too must the historian of events relating to them attend to a description of these before the regular narrative of the siege can begin.

Immediately following the last heavy fighting on the 18th of June, in the vain attempt to carry the defences of Petersburg by assault, the two sides, as already mentioned, remained to the end of the siege in substantially the same positions on the right of the field as that in which they had found themselves when those severe conflicts had ceased. In the evening of the 19th the two divisions of the three composing the Sixth Corps, which had been sent to Burmuda Hundred on the occasion when they had crossed the James, rejoined the Army of the Potomac. On the 20th the various corps of the army were posted, counting from right to left, in the following order,—the Eighteenth, Sixth, Second, Ninth, and Fifth. On the following day the Second and Sixth were withdrawn from between the Eighteenth and Ninth, the Eighteenth and Ninth closing in together their left and right flanks respectively, while the Second marched to the left and took position there in the general line of development to the west, and the Sixth was ordered to take position, nearly at right-angles to it, facing the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, distant then from the left-extension of the Army of the Potomac by about three

miles. This movement constituted the first attempt at extension of the left flank towards the west. It implies that the right was already strong enough in its temporary works to admit of being stripped in a measure of troops for their projection towards the left. That was the general procedure to the end of the siege, looking to the capture of the enemy's sources of supplies in his railroads. The immediate objective on this occasion was the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. But so little was known at this time of the enemy's capacity of resistance, that it was hoped by General Meade that the first attempt to extend the line towards the left might result in reaching the Appomattox above Petersburg. In point of fact, however, the lines of contravallation never reached near that point. This was the critical one for the enemy. As the attacking lines passed on the south of Petersburg from east to west, threatening the railroads from Richmond and Petersburg towards the west and south, they were held off by the enemy with most strenuous exertions, as the prime condition of his being able to sustain the siege for any length of time.

The Second Corps came into position on the left of the Fifth during the day of the 21st of June, the Sixth Corps, on the left-rear of the Second Corps, during the night. During the day a division of the Second Corps made a reconnoissance in force towards the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. The enemy had a signal advantage at this period over the Army of the Potomac, from the fact that he necessarily had perfect knowledge of the country, which, being heavily wooded, was dangerous to a hostile force attempting to penetrate it. On the 22d of June the Second Corps, resting its right on the left of the Fifth, swung forward its left, to close in towards the enemy's works, at the same time that the Sixth, nearly at right-angles to it, was moving

towards the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, when, owing to the difficulty, on account of the wooded character of the country, of keeping up knowledge of the intervening space between the left of the Second and the right of the Sixth, and also on account of the left of the Second not being sufficiently on its guard against a counter-movement by the enemy, the Confederate general, A. P. Hill, bore down into the open space between the two corps with three divisions, and attacking the right of the Sixth Corps with one division, he launched the other two on the left-rear of the Second Corps. This, from left to right, was represented by the divisions of Barlow, Mott, and Gibbon, the last being next to the left of the Fifth Corps. Barlow's division, naturally the first struck, recoiled towards the position which it had held before the corps was pivoted on its right, losing a great many prisoners. Mott, having time to take in the situation, fell back to better advantage, and therefore with smaller loss. Gibbon's division, whose flank was thus left naked to the enemy's advance towards its left-rear, suffered the greatest loss in prisoners. The enemy retired with his spoils, and the Second Corps did not regain its advanced position until the next morning. The line was then finally made secure by the right of the Sixth Corps, facing the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, joining the left flank of the Second Corps, facing Petersburg. The refused part of the line was now about a mile and a half from the railroad. But the railroad still remained in the enemy's possession, and so continued for some time, as General Wilson who had, on the 22d, been sent on a cavalry raid, found to his cost in attempting at its enforced conclusion to return to the Army of the Potomac across that route.

The reader will remember that, in the chapter on co-operative columns, it was mentioned that, on the 7th of June, Sheridan had gone on an expedition to destroy the

enemy's railroad communications north of Richmond, and, if possible, to join Hunter at Charlottesville, and uniting forces with him, to return to the Army of the Potomac; but that he was unable to do so, Hunter having perforce beaten a retreat from Lynchburg north by the way of the Kanawha Valley, leaving the Shenandoah Valley open to an advance by Early, which he soon made on Washington; an advance which would have resulted in the capture of the city on the 12th of July, but for the opportune sending and arrival there of two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and that of a part of the Nineteenth, just come by sea from New Orleans. The order of precedence, growing out of priority of date in the initiation of the respective enterprises undertaken requires us to take up at this point the further movements of Sheridan until he rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

General Sheridan, with two of his three divisions of cavalry, having left the army at Cold Harbor, on the 7th of June, with ample subsistence and a pontoon-train, proceeded along the north bank of the North Anna, his intended destination being Charlottesville, and his mission the destruction of the Central Virginia and the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads and return with the army of General Hunter. On the evening of the 10th he crossed the North Anna at Trevylian Station, on the Central Virginia Railroad, Generals Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee only a few miles distant from him with their cavalry, one towards the northwest and the other towards the east. On the morning of the 11th severe encounters between the respective forces, with varying success, took place, the final advantage remaining with Sheridan. Learning by night the futility of trying to join forces with Hunter, Sheridan concluded to return to the Army of the Potomac by the way of Spottsylvania and the White House. Incidentally to so doing, he effected, on the 12th, considerable railroad destruction, and his advance

had an engagement near Mallory's Ford, on the North Anna, at which place, finding the enemy strongly posted, he recrossed the river that night at Carpenter's Ford and marched for the White House, Hampton following him up on the south side of the river. Sheridan reached the White House on the 21st, and relinquishing it as a depot of supplies, the Army of the Potomac being long since across the James, he marched on the following day, with a large train and his whole force, intending to cross the James on the pontoon-bridge opposite Butler at Bermuda Hundred; an operation in accordance with original orders, but one which had become impossible of success in a situation, certainly unanticipated, where Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were opposing him with all their cavalry, and against infantry which could readily have reinforced them from Richmond. He crossed the Chickahominy at Jones's Bridge, the same place at which the Sixth and Ninth Corps had lately passed over that stream, and kept on, with the purpose of crossing the James, towards Charles City Court House, when his flanking column, under General Gregg, was *en route* attacked, on the 24th, by Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, who drove it after a severe fight back nearly to the Court House. This column, being now united with that which had escorted the train, Sheridan could then hold Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee in check, and so, cavalry and train moving further down the James, to Douthat's Landing, were, on the 25th, transported across the river at Mingen's Ferry.

It proved very unfortunate that Sheridan, although Grant, not he, seems to have been to blame, had not continued to give Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee full employment on the north side of the James; for on the 22d General Wilson, in command of Sheridan's third division of cavalry, had been sent from the Army of the Potomac to destroy the railroad communications of the enemy to the west and the

southwest of Petersburg, and Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, being now released by Sheridan's withdrawal over the James, were able to concentrate their attention upon Wilson. General Meade had foreseen this eventuality, and had tried to impress upon Grant the importance of Sheridan's having full scope to detain Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee on the north side of the James. All he could now do he did, by ordering Sheridan to the left flank of the Army of the Potomac, to aid Wilson in any possible embarrassment in his return. This mention brings us to the situation in which Wilson actually found himself in the progress of his foray.

Just before daylight of the 22d of June General Wilson had, under orders, moved with his division of cavalry, to strike for a point fifty miles away to the west, at Burkesville Junction, where the Richmond and Danville Railroad and the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad intersect. The instructions to Wilson contemplated the destruction of railroads. As the names of the railroads mentioned, and the fact of their intersection at Burkesville indicate, the destruction of them about that point would sever communication west between Richmond and Petersburg, with Lynchburg on the one hand, and with the southwest on the other, the only remaining southern communicating line in the hands of the Confederates being then the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, running due south, and very close to the left flank of the Army of the Potomac; so close that there was reason to believe when Wilson started on his raid, that it would soon be captured and permanently held. Wilson, striking the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad some fourteen or fifteen miles out from Petersburg, destroyed most of the track as far as Burkesville, and then turning south along the Richmond and Danville Railroad, destroyed it as far as Staunton River. Arriving there, Wilson's column found its passage barred at the bridge.

Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee having, on the 25th, been relieved from the necessity of further occupation of the Peninsula below Richmond by the transfer of Sheridan's column to the south side of the James, had been ordered by General Lee to cross the James at Drewry's Bluff, and were now on the track of Wilson, preceded by the cavalry division of General W. H. F. Lee, with whom Wilson had had an engagement before he reached Staunton River. Cut off, through the enemy's holding the bridge across Staunton River, from passing further south, Wilson started, in the night of the 27th, and marched northeastwardly, crossing the Meherrin and Nottoway Rivers, reaching a point, by midday of the 28th, about twenty-five miles southwest of Petersburg, and about eleven miles northwest of Jarratt Depot, which is on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. At the beginning of his raid, Wilson had crossed this north and south railroad near Petersburg, at Reams's Station, which he had destroyed, and he then had had, with the rest of the army, every reason to believe that the railroad would come into possession of the army before his return, but, as the reader has seen, it had not. So believing, however, and learning that there was only a small force ahead of him at Stony Creek Depot, the next one below Reams's Station, he started from the point where he crossed the Nottoway, at Double Bridges, on the direct road to Prince George Court House, which runs along the railroad two miles to the west of Stony Creek Depot, before reaching which Court House he would, if successful in taking that route, be well in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. But, in advance of him along the railroad to Petersburg, the enemy was preparing the warm reception which he received. Hampton's and one of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry divisions were at Stony Creek Depot; Fitzhugh Lee, with a cavalry division, and additionally, Gen-

eral Mahone, with infantry and artillery, were at Reams's Station. Wilson, ignorant of the dangers ahead, had to run the gantlet with what remained of his original force of five thousand five hundred cavalrymen. Arriving opposite Stony Creek Depot, he was attacked by Hampton and W. H. F. Lee, the engagement lasting until after dark. He then attempted to withdraw from the route previously followed towards the northeast, and making a slight detour towards the north by the way of the west, reach and proceed along the Halifax Road, which runs for the most part of the way here close to the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, directly towards Petersburg. Failing to get well clear of the enemy before daylight, he was rapidly followed up, and an engagement ensued, Hampton endeavoring to intercept him on the Halifax Road. Wilson's cavalry had been and continued to be acting in two bodies, one led by himself, the other by General Kautz. Wilson passed before Hampton could arrive at the place to head him off. Kautz, striking the railroad at Reams's Station, very near the enemy's left flank, entrenched and despatched an aide with an escort to General Meade, to inform him of the situation. Wilson coming up, the cavalry was now concentrated, but in the presence of a force of infantry, so it now became necessary to take prompt measures for extrication. Destroying all his *impedimenta*, of which he had had originally very little, Wilson began to retire south by the way of the Halifax Road to the Double Bridges over the Nottoway, from which he had advanced, hoping that then, by a detour first east and then north, he could finally reach the rear of the Army of the Potomac. At noon the retrograde movement began, the two bodies of cavalry being led by their respective commanders. But the enemy had crowded in closely on the position of the command of Wilson, and the enemy's infantry, supported by cavalry, attacked in flank and reverse, and

threw the rear of the retreating force into confusion. Kautz, finding himself cut off from Wilson on the Halifax Road, made a break over the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, past the enemy's left, and successfully reached the Army of the Potomac after nightfall. The enemy pursued Wilson, with cavalry and artillery, until he reached Stony Creek, but there halted. Between ten and eleven o'clock at night Wilson crossed the Nottoway, as he had come, and marched to the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad at Jarratt's Depot, At daybreak of the 30th he marched eastward across the railroad, and recrossed the Nottoway at Peters's Bridge, thirteen miles east of the railroad. At this point he was only a little over two miles west of the Jerusalem Plank Road, running directly north to the rear of the Army of the Potomac. But, to have pursued the line of this road, running near the eastern side of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, would have entailed the risk of being again intercepted on his way to the army; so he held towards the northeast for fifteen miles, crossing the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad, and by evening crossed the Blackwater at Blunt's Bridge, four miles beyond it, repairing the bridge for, and destroying it after his passage, the enemy's cavalry pursuit having been resumed and continued. From this point, twenty miles southeast of the Army of the Potomac, he was easily able to rejoin it. Sheridan, not reaching the army before the 27th, was, of course, powerless to relieve Wilson. Meade had heard nothing from Wilson since his departure on the 22d, until the aide sent by Kautz reached him on the morning of the 29th. Infantry, despatched at once to Reams's Station, of course found neither of the forces lately contending there. Thus ended two raids, individually well conducted, but not sufficiently concerted with reference to each other as to have given legitimate prospect of results commensurate with

the magnitude of the undertakings. Their defect resulted from not carrying out the requirement urged upon General Grant by Meade, represented by his proposed retention of Sheridan on the north bank of the James while the operations of Wilson were proceeding south of that river.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE AUTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

We have at last reached the beginning of the formal investment of Petersburg. And here, on that account, it becomes necessary to give the reader some general notion of the lay of the land involved in the operations, for they included not only the ground immediately about Petersburg, but that along a front extending to and beyond the eastern face of Richmond. The reader will, therefore, as a preliminary, picture to himself that Petersburg is about fourteen miles south of Richmond, and so nearly due south that it may, for convenience, be here regarded as due south of it. Having this north and south line as our guide, with Richmond at the top and Petersburg fourteen miles distant at the bottom, it will be easy to develop therefrom an accurate conception of the horizontal relations of the ground. Its vertical character is so varied that nothing but an elaborate map could afford a correct idea of the surface as to elevation. Basing our orientation upon the north and south line between Richmond and Petersburg and the termini of it as constituted by those two places, imagine that the James, flowing from west to east, close to the southern side of Richmond, thence runs due south for a third of the distance between it and Petersburg, and thence, as an offset from the north and south line, at two-thirds of the way from Richmond to Petersburg, bends towards the east five or six miles, making, with the previous reaches of the river, and with the lower straight reach towards Petersburg, of the Appomattox, from near its mouth, a

blunt little peninsula with two teat-like projections formed by sharp bends of the James. This blunt little peninsula east of the north and south line between Richmond and Petersburg is Bermuda Hundred. Running north and south across its western and narrowest width, as thus formed by the confluence of the James and the Appomattox, were Butler's fortifications, and opposite, and just to the west of them, the enemy's, which were continuous, in double lines, all the way north, after crossing the James, to and around Richmond, and all the way south, after crossing the Appomattox, to Petersburg, encircling it from the east, where they rested on the Appomattox, to the west, where they again rested on the river above the town. Southeast of the centre of Bermuda Hundred is situated City Point, on the southern side of the entrance of the Appomattox into the James. This place was the depot of supplies for the Army of the Potomac, and from it ran the military railroad constructed back of the lines of the army. At City Point were also General Grant's permanent headquarters.

This premised, it remains only to add that the coming operations of battle and siege were so stupendous, and lasted, in one form or another, over so many months of untiring activity, that it would be a mere pretence to profess to give here more than an account of the main features of the conflict, mere pictures seen by flashlight, in which the reader must fill in the dark spaces from other works, or from the resources of his own imagination.

The army was for a while no longer the imposing force that it had been when it set out from the Rapidan, nor anything like it. Its losses had been so frightful in officers and men that, depleted in numbers, and worn out with constant labors and vigils by day and night, it was neither physically nor morally for a time more than a semblance of what it had been. It had, however, this advantage over that of the


U.S. Military Railroad
PRINCE GEORGE COURT HOUSE
Blackwater Creek
NORFOLK & PETERSBURG RAILROAD
Jerusalem Plank Road
N
W
E
PETERSBURG
VA.
Miles.
0
1
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Modified, to suit the general reader, by R. Meade Bache.

enemy, that it had back of it relatively greater resources in men, subsistence, and material of war, and was buoyed up by constant faith in eventual success, whereas the enemy's impoverishment began to be manifest, and his loss of pristine confidence in ultimate triumph had sensibly diminished. General Meade's order of the 9th of July inaugurated the vigorous construction of siege-batteries, redoubts, and corresponding lines of entrenchments with rifle-pits, the beginning of an investing cordon, from right to left, with which the lines of the besiegers finally bristled.

The next important movement to that by which the left flank was somewhat advanced is known as that of the Petersburg Mine. If the reader has before him in imagination the general topography of the region, he will see that, from the area about City Point, south of the Appomattox, to the area north of the James, in the direction of the eastern side of Richmond, passing back of Butler's entrenchments on the blunt little peninsula forming Bermuda Hundred, it is a straight course, and therefore, that it needed only pontoon-bridges in the direction of this line, over the Appomattox and the James, to enable any force from the Army of the Potomac, or from the Army of the James, masked at first by the entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, to be thrown north of the James, miles away on the enemy's left, and make either a demonstration or a real attack there at pleasure. Pontoon-bridges had been placed in the direction of this line as it passed over both rivers, maintained on the Appomattox by works on the left of Butler's lines, and on the James, by a *tête de pont* and other works. The operation about to be described depended, as well as some succeeding ones, upon the facility which these bridges afforded of attacking the enemy's left remotely and unexpectedly in space and time.

While forts were building and siege-guns were being

placed in position close up to Petersburg, and the investment from the 9th of July proceeded by bombardment and regular approaches, the Army of the Potomac undertook the duplex operation of making an attack on the enemy both north and south of the James. The Second Corps was to pass over the Appomattox and the James by the pontoon-bridges previously described as to their locality, accompanied by two divisions of cavalry, and on their way be joined by cavalry and infantry from the Army of the James. The cavalry was to march, supported by the infantry, in case the cavalry succeeded in making some progress at the front near Richmond, while, somewhat later, a mine was to be sprung south of the Appomattox, opposite Burnside's entrenchments in front of Petersburg. It was hoped that reinforcements of the enemy, drawn off to meet the demonstration towards Richmond, would render the lines opposite Burnside very vulnerable. The attack on the left of the enemy was, however, to be real. On the afternoon of the 26th of July the movement back of Butler's lines to the north bank of the James took place, and by the early morning of the 27th the infantry and cavalry were across the river. Here occurred a stubborn fight, chiefly cavalry against the enemy's infantry, near Bailey's Creek, in which the troops were represented by the infantry of General Hancock, of the Second Corps, now returned to duty in command of it, and the cavalry of General Sheridan, both of the Army of the Potomac, with the infantry of General Foster and the cavalry of General Kautz, both of the Army of the James. The attempt at this point did not succeed, and that portion of the original plan which had contemplated Sheridan's destroying railroads north of Richmond was relinquished by his withdrawal thence for service on the front of Petersburg. The only thing that was distinctly gained was in having caused the enemy to

strip his lines in front of Burnside to send reinforcements to the north of the James. This gain of weakly-held lines south of the Appomattox, which would, under some circumstances, have resulted in the capture of Petersburg, proved, however, of no avail in face of the oft-demonstrated incompetency of Burnside. Notwithstanding that all military teaching lays stress upon the necessity of providing means of egress for sallies from an entrenched camp, Burnside neglected to take the most ordinary precautions to that end, made a poor selection of officers to conduct the assault, and was in default down to the smallest details of what he had been elaborately directed to do, much of which it might have been supposed that any military man would have done without any instructions whatever. The mine, after some delay in its explosion, caused by an imperfect fuse, was finally sprung. The ridge back of a large crater formed by the explosion at the point where one of the enemy's works had been, could, under competent leadership, have been taken half a dozen times during the interval available for the assault through the initial paralysis and gradual recovery from disconcertment of the enemy. But the main storming column was entangled in its own works, two of its commanders remained sheltered in bomb-proofs, and the main attack being paralyzed, the contemplated attacks by the supporting corps on the right and left shared its fate.

Amidst the disorganization produced by absence of adequate preparation and supreme and delegated control, the enemy, slowly recovering from his inertness, began to pour a cross-fire of artillery and musketry into the space where the breach had been made in his lines, which he did to singular advantage, because it had formed a re-entrant in them; and driving back the isolated bodies of troops which had penetrated beyond the crater, resumed possession of the front which he had occupied. The troops, huddled

together in the crater, into which many of them had headed as if drawn by an irresistible lodestone that swerved them from their course, attempted in squads to regain their own lines, but were for the greater part taken by the enemy. The Army of the Potomac suffered the loss in this assault of over four thousand in killed, wounded, and missing. Thus, through the ineptness of one man, disaster came upon a multitude. All had been provided for a success that should have been certain, but the failure of Burnside to execute his portion of the plan involved all the rest of it in ruin, the supporting forces right and left being debarred from their legitimate functions. If the main torrent would not flow, but remained partially dammed at its source, it could have no effect but in heaping up to dangerous reflux. With such instructions as Burnside had had, with such ample time for preparation, both sufficient for a tyro, direful failure was the portion of the army in an enterprise which had promised the happiest results. Individual heroism went for naught. The devotion of men by groups, in disbanded efforts, is, under these conditions, in vain. Here a capable man had been needed to prepare, a capable man to execute. Both faculties were normally absent in the single man to whom the task had fallen by the accident of his position in front of the lines of Petersburg. Grant testified before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, that General Meade's orders could not have been improved upon, and that if they had been obeyed, Petersburg would have been captured on this occasion. Burnside was relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac.

It was with the object of forcing Grant to release his pressure on Richmond and Petersburg, that Lee had despatched Early down the Shenandoah Valley to threaten and, if possible, to capture Washington. It was also to meet this demonstration, that Grant sent a division of the

Sixth Corps, which arrived on the 8th of July, just in time to make, with the troops of General Wallace, a partial stand in an action on the Monocacy. The other two divisions of the Sixth Corps were despatched, in the night of the 9th of July, to Washington itself, and at the same time the Nineteenth Corps, just arrived by sea from New Orleans, *via* Hampton Roads, the troops not yet disembarked, were forwarded to the same destination. As already mentioned in another connection, they arrived in time to forestall the designs of the enemy upon Washington, but the Sixth Corps, through the exigency of guaranteeing with other troops the Valley of the Shenandoah from further invasion, and also the integrity of the Capital, was not for a long while able to return to the Army of the Potomac.

The next vigorous operation of the Army of the Potomac, inspired in a measure by the situation in the Valley of the Shenandoah, where the Sixth Corps was detained, began on the 13th of August. It, as well as the preceding one, was a duplex movement. The preceding one had been just north of the James, combined with one opposite the centre of the Army of the Potomac, south of the Appomattox. This one was north of the James, and also beyond the left of the Army of the Potomac, south of the Appomattox. Just as Lee had, by sending Early to operate against Washington, sought to lessen the pressure of Grant on Richmond and Petersburg, so now, Grant instituted vigorous measures to avail himself of the weakness of the enemy in his front through his having sent reinforcements to Early in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and to prevent the sending of any more to increase the stress on Sheridan, who had been put in command of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps there, with cavalry, to hold Early finally in check from his advances on Washington.

Making a feint to send troops away by water, in the night

of the 13th of August, as if they were destined for Washington, Grant sent them up the James to the same point as that at which they had previously crossed by pontoons, a place called Deep Bottom, where they, with cavalry and artillery moving from Bermuda Hundred, landed near the mouth of Bailey's Creek; a creek running northerly and crossing three of the main roads to Richmond. The plan of operations aimed at securing the position at Chaffin's Bluff, opposite Drewry's, by advancing along the roads leading towards Chaffin's Bluff and Richmond, and turning the enemy's position at the Bluff. But a combination of causes led to the failure of this particular attempt. The enemy was in stronger force there than had been expected, and more strongly posted, the difficulties of the ground were greater, and at one point the troops did not show their wonted spirit. The operation, however, as a whole, was not a failure, save as not securing some of the results anticipated. Activity on both sides continued during the 16th. By that time, however, it had become apparent that the lines of the enemy were too strong to be broken. On the 18th there was a last outburst of the engagement that had been sporadically going on since the landing of the troops. The Second Corps, under Hancock, a part of the Tenth, now under Birney, relieved from his command of a division of the Second, and Gregg's division of cavalry, were the troops which had participated in the movement. In the night of the 20th they were withdrawn.

The movement on the left, which formed the complement to the one just described, began before daylight of the 18th by the march of the Fifth Corps, under Warren, accompanied by cavalry, in an attempt to capture and finally hold the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which operation had been postponed by the sending away of the Sixth Corps, followed by the contraction of the left flank of the army.

Warren took position on the railroad, and leaving a division at the point where he had struck it, he advanced towards Petersburg. At two o'clock in the afternoon an attack was made upon his left and repulsed. Lee having learned what was going forward, despatched heavy reinforcements from his lines north of the James to the threatened point. Similarly, during the morning of the 19th, General Meade sent three divisions of the Ninth Corps to reinforce Warren. In the afternoon the line of skirmishers which Warren had established to connect his right with the left flank of the army on the Jerusalem Plank Road was broken through, and the enemy, concealed by the woods, swept down along his right-rear, and made at the same time an attack on Ayres, on his left. The partial disaster on his right was, however, soon repaired by the admirable address of Warren, and the ground regained, the enemy in his turn suffering from the confusion into which his troops were thrown by an attack in the wooded ground. Nevertheless, Warren finding himself too much enveloped in woods to feel sure of not being attacked again to disadvantage in a place with which the enemy was more familiar than he, withdrew, on the 20th, over a mile, to more open ground, where he established his line of battle and entrenched. Lee availed himself of this cessation of hostilities to reinforce his lines still more strongly, and on the morning of the 21st Warren was attacked in his chosen position, but repulsed the enemy at every point. This contest finally ended Lee's endeavor to resist the capture of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad on the line of extension of the left flank of the Army of the Potomac, an extension by a distance of three miles thus secured for it by the advance of Warren.

The holding of a single point on the railroad below Petersburg not being, however, sufficient to prevent the enemy from still utilizing the road as a line of supply from the

south, seeing that he could supplement it as far as it remained in his possession by the ordinary highways to the west of it, its destruction as far as Rowanty Creek was determined upon. Below that the enemy could, it is true, still employ it up to Stony Creek Depot, in conjunction with the common country roads, but only at the expense of waggoning supplies for about thirty miles to Petersburg. Accordingly, on the 22d of August, Miles's division, of the Second Corps, and Gregg's division of cavalry were sent to destroy the railroad to Rowanty Creek from Warren's position at the Globe Tavern, on the line of the railroad, a little over three miles from Petersburg. On the 24th Gibbon's division of the same corps marched to Reams's Station, Mott's division of the corps being left in the entrenchments before Petersburg until it was sent to reinforce Hancock. By the afternoon of the 24th the track had been destroyed to a point three miles south of the Station, leaving still between five and six miles of it to be destroyed. Here the two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry took position in and outside of the temporary works which had been constructed by the troops which had in June marched to the relief of the cavalry of Wilson when he was in such straits. These ill-constructed entrenchments covered a section of the railroad on its west side with a long parallel face, beyond which both of the lines of entrenchments connected with that front ran east for some distance beyond it, open in that direction. With the railroad running north and south, in alternate cut and embankment, higher in the latter than the parallel line of entrenchments on its west side, with the two easterly returns parallel to each other, and only about seven hundred yards apart, and liable to enfilading and reverse fire, the enemy could not have devised defences better suited to the purpose of having his opponents at disadvantage. If there ever were a case coming well within

the device of Lieutenant John Derby (John Phœnix, by *nom de plume*) of the erstwhile Corps of Topographical Engineers, by which the enemy was to be allowed, through a peculiar plan of fortifications, to capture them, and in so doing become the sure prize of the ousted garrison, converted into besiegers, this was the one. Of all the adverse conditions on this ground, now so well known, General Meade was not aware. He doubtless thought that, with the eight thousand infantry of so stanch a corps as the Second, and the two thousand cavalry which Hancock had with him, he could easily baffle any force which Lee could afford to send against him to prevent the destruction of the railroad.

Early on the 25th a reconnoissance revealed that the enemy in some strength was present, but in what strength was not known, and the work of railroad destruction was resumed. This had not proceeded long when the enemy's force began to develop towards the south, and his resistance to further progress finally to assume so formidable an aspect as to cause the recall of the advanced troops and concentration at Reams's Station. His attacks became more and more persistent by skirmishers and by lines of battle. The first very serious one, rapidly followed by another, did not, however, take place until two o'clock in the afternoon. They were so brisk as to prove to the besieged that the contest would grow in intensity as the day went on, and they were, after an interval, followed by one more determined. The point selected by the enemy for his repeated assaults was the northwest angle of the work, formed by the north and south entrenchments parallel with the railroad and the northern one of the two east and west returns. Just after five o'clock came a furious assault, opening with artillery, whose fire, direct, enfilading, and reverse, searched the interior of the work. A heavy infantry column of the enemy

came forward with impetuosity, and launched itself upon the point where the attacks had previously been concentrated. Unhappily, even the redoubtable Second Corps had suffered from the stress to which the whole army had been put for several months in its herculean labors of march and contest night and day. With many of its bravest and best officers and men killed or disabled, the remainder fagged out with incessant toil and danger, its ranks filled up with inexperienced recruits, it had become for a while no longer the steadfast phalanx that had fronted the enemy on many a stricken field. Amidst many standing nobly to their arms for a last shot as the enemy surged into the work, the organization as a whole broke to flinders, some portions, heavily recruited with new soldiers, halting dazed by the suddenness of the event that had befallen them, only to be made prisoners before they had recovered from their stupor. But all was not over yet, and it remained for the enemy in his turn to be beaten back. The ever-ready Miles planted a line formed of some of the veteran Sixty-first New York Regiment, and what happened then is what has often happened since time immemorial when there has been a quick mind to conceive and a daring spirit to execute in war. He swept backward the enemy, who had lost the *élan* of attack, and recaptured a battery. Joined by Hancock in person, on the outside of the northern line of entrenchments, and gathering strength from squads of men rallying as reinforcements, they pushed forward on the flank of the enemy. While this was going on beyond the north return of the entrenchments, the enemy's infantry and dismounted cavalrymen were charging through the woods on the left return of the entrenchments, where was still in position, but ineffectively, the remains of Gibbon's division. Despite every exertion of their officers, the troops there did not respond to the demand of the emergency, and had it not been for the

dismounted cavalrymen of Gregg's division, who were stationed in prolongation of the southern return of the entrenchments, and enfiladed with their fire the lines of the enemy advancing there, it might have been all over with the broken command of Hancock. A fragmentary line of infantry, with a little artillery, maintained itself athwart the work, parallel to the railroad and extending beyond the northern return. Upon this slender line rested the hope of a final stand for the command. The best that it could expect was to hold the enemy in check until night fell and Willcox's division, of the Ninth Corps, and Mott's division, of the Second, marching by the Jerusalem Plank Road, should arrive and enable it safely to beat a retreat or to renew the contest. Reinforcements came, but too late for either a renewal of the contest or for covering retreat. The troops on both sides were withdrawn at night from the field, *en route* for their different destinations, as opposing each other in the lines about Petersburg. It should be added that, in sending reinforcements from Warren's corps to Hancock by the Jerusalem Plank Road, a longer distance than that by the Halifax Road, which runs here just west of the railroad, and therefore direct from the place which was Warren's position, General Meade was actuated by the same consideration expressed in one of Hancock's despatches to him, that the enemy might, on this direct road, interpose between the reinforcements sent to him by that route and the position of Warren on the railroad at the Globe Tavern. Hancock himself, as his despatches prove, did not at first realize to the full the danger of his situation. Humphreys says that the condition of Hancock's command, through the fact of the presence in it of raw recruits lately received was not known, or else reinforcements would have been sent to him early in the morning. General Meade, knowing how keenly Han-

cock must feel this experience, the first in which the Second Corps had been worsted in battle, losing both men and material, wrote him a most sympathetic personal letter, which is fortunately on official record.

The next operation of magnitude was a demonstration south of the Appomattox and a real attack north of the James, although, as it turned out, the demonstration proved quite fruitful. The last extensive movements had taken place near the end of August. The season was now rapidly approaching when the weather would prevent the possibility of rapid movements on the soil of Virginia, softened into pasty mud by autumnal and winter rains. It was, therefore, imperative that the Army of the Potomac should make quickly supreme efforts towards that end which it was seeking in the siege, or else active field-operations of magnitude would go over until the next spring. In the night of the 28th of September General E. O. C. Ord, now commanding the Eighteenth Corps, and General Birney, now commanding the Tenth, both of the Army of the James, crossed the James River, Ord at Varina, two miles above Deep Bottom, Birney at Deep Bottom, followed by the cavalry of General Kautz, of the Army of the James. Ord marched along the Varina Road, parallel with the first stretch of the river above where he landed, and Birney, on his right, along the New Market and Central Roads, the cavalry on the latter. Early in the morning of the 29th Ord came in front of Fort Harrison and its entrenchments, about a mile and a quarter from the enemy's position on Chaffin's Bluff. Less than a mile away to the north of Fort Harrison lay Fort Gilmer. Double lines of entrenchments swept towards the James on the enemy's right and towards the Chickahominy on his left. Without loss of time Ord pushed forward towards Fort Harrison and captured the work and two smaller ones, despite its being

suddenly reinforced, and occupied the entrenchments for some distance right and left of it, failing only in securing a terminal work of the line on the river bluff, consisting of a redan protected by the fire of the enemy's gunboats on the James and that of a battery in the rear, which would have made it untenable even if the work were occupied. Ord was at this moment so severely wounded that the command of his corps temporarily devolved on General Charles A. Heckman, who, advancing at that time on Fort Gilmer, was repulsed with heavy loss. While this was taking place on the left, Birney, advancing on the New Market and Central Roads, in a somewhat parallel line, off on the right, had captured the enemy's outer line of entrenchments. General Grant now arrived on the ground and ordered a simultaneous advance. Connection having been established between the two infantry corps, and between Birney's corps and the cavalry, on his right, a spirited but ineffective assault was made about three o'clock on Fort Gilmer and supporting works by a division of white and a brigade of colored troops. The colored troops, as to whose fitness for soldiers great doubts were widely expressed in those days, extorted admiration from all quarters by the intrepidity with which they mounted to the assault of Fort Gilmer. The night, and part of the next day, the 30th, were spent in securing the foothold gained at Fort Harrison, by entrenching in the rear of the Federal command. General Weitzel replaced General Ord in command of the Eighteenth Corps. At two o'clock in the afternoon of that day the enemy vigorously took the offensive, trying to regain possession of Fort Harrison. Thrice the assault was made by ten brigades with the greatest determination, but each time it was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy by the garrison of the fort and the outlying Federal troops.

Simultaneously with this real and serious attack on the

north side of the James had been proceeding the demonstration south of the Appomattox. Grant had ordered that an attack on the extreme left should be made. General Warren, commanding the Fifth Corps, and General Parke, now commanding the Ninth, took two divisions of their respective corps for the execution of the operation contemplated. First parading before the enemy an intention to march to the left, so as to prevent him from heavily reinforcing north of the James, they were, if opportunity offered, really to try to extend to the left and hold the extreme position gained, or to assault Petersburg itself. Waiting, according to orders, through the 29th, so as to allow the enemy to send away as many troops as he dared to withdraw towards his left, Warren and Parke marched on the morning of the 30th to their left, Meade in person directing this operation, while Grant in person was directing the one north of the James.

Between the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which runs virtually north and south just below Petersburg, and the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad (called also the South Side Railroad), which runs in a general direction south of west from Petersburg, that is to say, in the angle so formed, converge from the southwest towards Petersburg several important roads, which, as such, will be mentioned here. Counting from the east, there is the Halifax Road, running here close to the west side of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad; the Vaughan Road, converging upon that, by entering it about a mile north of the Globe Tavern; the Squirrel Level Road, running with various bends directly towards the west side of Petersburg; the Boydton Plank Road, similarly running with various bends to the west side of Petersburg; the Cox Road, winding to and fro over the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad. To introduce here the mention of more would but obscure instead

of rendering the description clearer. The Confederate entrenchments, well in advance of the southwest front of Petersburg, swept around in a slightly concave line from a third of a mile to a mile in front of the Boydton Plank Road, and rested their right on Hatcher's Run, a creek trending northwest, which passes the Boydton Plank Road at Burgess's Mill. There was also near Petersburg a partial line of entrenchments, somewhat parallel with the main ones, and connected with them, lying along the Squirrel Level Road.

The point of attack in this movement was the junction, off on Warren's left, at the Globe Tavern, of the Squirrel Level Road and a road called the Poplar Springs Church Road, at Peebles' Farm. The cavalry, under Gregg, was to move on the left of the two corps. If Warren and Parke should succeed in capturing the entrenchments in the locality described, they were to advance towards the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, passing the Boydton Plank Road. General Warren marched directly for the junction of the roads at Peebles' Farm, and Ayres on the right and Griffin on the left stormed the redoubt there and the eccentric line of entrenchments described, Parke coming up on the left and supporting the movement. Parke now advanced his divisions, Potter on the right, Willcox on the left, towards the enemy's main entrenchments intervening between him and the Boydton Plank Road. Meanwhile the enemy advanced a line of battle a third of a mile in front of his main line of entrenchments, and when the two divisions of Parke, coming in sight of it, still continued to advance, they were attacked and thrown back in some confusion, until Griffin's division, which Parke had expected would support his right, coming up into line, the enemy was brought to a stand. The final result was that Parke held the ground, and on the following day, the 1st

of October, Meade sent as reinforcements Mott's division, of the Second Corps, which, arriving in the afternoon, took position on the left of Parke. Upon this Parke advanced, and managed after a brisk engagement to establish himself about a mile from the enemy's main line of entrenchments, from which point the entrenchments of the Army of the Potomac were made continuous with those near the Globe Tavern on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. The Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad had not been reached, it is seen, nor had even the intervening main line of the enemy's entrenchments been broken, but, nevertheless, a distinct gain had been made in extension of the Federal entrenchments towards the west. This last, however, was destined to be the ultimate one in precisely that direction until the very end, for Lee was able for months thereafter to hold off the Army of the Potomac from further progress towards the west; its line of entrenchments stretching, from the point last secured, in a southwest, instead of in a west direction. Lee must needs defend to the last extremity the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, for the capture of that would mean the fall of Richmond and Petersburg. In the battle near Peebles' Farm General Meade made one of the narrowest of the many hairbreadth escapes of his life. While conversing with a group of officers, the enemy got the range of the party, and sent a shell at it, so well directed that it passed through their midst, grazing the leg of one of General Meade's topboots, and passing beyond, buried itself in the ground without bursting.

A few days later, on the 7th of October, there was a fight north of the James. Kautz, of whom mention was previously made as having command of the cavalry there in connection with the attacks on Forts Harrison and Gilmer, was holding on the right of the infantry detached from the Army of the James to that side of the river. Early on that

morning he was attacked on his centre and right by a heavy infantry force and some cavalry, and was obliged to beat a rapid retreat with the loss of some of his artillery. He managed, however, to extricate himself by marching across the country from the Central Road, where he had been posted, to the New Market Road, and coming in behind the Tenth Corps, which, moving simultaneously to his relief, had a brush on its right with the enemy. Active operations in this locality ceased on the 13th of October with a reconnoissance in force ordered by Butler, when an unsuccessful assault by Colonel Pond's brigade of Ames's division, of the Tenth Corps, was made on the enemy's entrenchments.

With an attempt to capture the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad the campaign closed for the autumn. General Humphreys, the highest authority as to these movements, says that, at the time, the best information obtainable indicated that the Confederate entrenchments rested their right on Hatcher's Run, about a mile and a quarter in advance of the place where the Boydton Plank Road crosses the Run near Burgess's Mill. He says that at Burgess's Mill there were infantry parapets and emplacements for artillery, but no line of entrenchments nor any further up the Run. Here I cannot do better than quote, as follows, from Humphreys himself as to the plan of the pending movement. He says:

"The general plan of the contemplated movement was to leave sufficient force in the redoubts [that is, on the immediate front of Petersburg] to hold them, and with from thirty thousand to thirty-five thousand effective force of infantry, a due proportion of artillery, and Gregg's division of cavalry, about three thousand strong, to move to our left. Hancock, with Gregg on his left, to cross Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan Road [two miles below where the enemy's entrenchments abutted on the run], move to the Boydton Plank Road past Dabney's Mill, thence by the White Oak Road to its intersection with the Clai-

borne Road, recross Hatcher's Run near there (two miles above Burgess's Mill), and then march to the South Side Railroad [the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad], striking it at a point about three miles east of Sutherland Station [coming from the Globe Tavern, and thereabouts, this force would thus make a circuit of a semi-circumference, and lodgment to the rear of the enemy's entrenchments]. General Parke, with the Ninth Corps, was first to endeavor to surprise the incomplete entrenchments near Hatcher's Run at daylight (it was thought they were thinly held), but failing in that, to remain confronting them while the Second and Fifth Corps moved to turn their right.

"General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, was to move to the vicinity of Armstrong's Mill [on Hatcher's Run, about a mile below the right of the enemy's entrenchments abutting on the run], support General Parke, and, if his attack was successful, to follow it up, moving on the left of the Ninth Corps. If General Parke did not break the enemy's line, General Warren was to cross Hatcher's Run, and endeavor to turn the enemy's right by recrossing the run above the Boydton plank-road bridge [Burgess's mill bridge], keeping on the right of Hancock and, being over the stream, to open the Burgess's mill bridge."

The three corps named, and Gregg's division of cavalry, assigned to the work, moved before daylight of the 27th of October. The Fifth and Ninth Corps, under Warren and Parke, advanced, as prearranged, upon the enemy's entrenchments, while the Second Corps, under Hancock, was making its way off to the left to cross Hatcher's Run and afterwards move towards the north. Here General Humphreys may properly be called on to speak again, especially as he was on the ground with the advance. He remarks that,

"Being on the ground, and satisfied that an assault here [on the entrenchments where they abutted on the run] should not be made, and having learnt from a despatch from General Hancock that he had crossed Hatcher's Run, and consequently that the Dabney mill road was clear for General Warren's troops to follow, and considering it important that a portion, at least, of his command should cross, and communicate with Hancock as soon as possible, I directed him at nine o'clock to cross some of them at once at Armstrong's mill, and com-

municate with General Hancock. I then rode to meet General Meade and General Grant, who were coming out, and inform them of the condition of affairs, and of the directions I had given General Warren.

"After some consultation when General Grant and General Meade got upon the ground, General Warren was directed to send a division across Hatcher's Run, place its right flank on the stream, move up it supporting Hancock (the Dabney mill road was but a mile from the run), and upon arriving opposite the right of the enemy's entrenchments, which Griffin was fronting, to attack it in flank, and endeavor to drive the enemy from the line, and open the way for the rest of the Fifth Corps and for the Ninth Corps. Crawford's division was assigned to this duty, as it was nearest at hand. Griffin, with Ayres supporting, was left on the north side of the run, Ayres sending his Maryland brigade to join Crawford. General Parke's corps set about entrenching in their front and back to our works."

The military situation was then this. On the north side of Hatcher's Run, which trends here northwest, and in front of the enemy's entrenchments threatened on the right, and resting nearly at right-angles to the Run, the Fifth and Ninth Corps had been brought to a stand, because it was deemed that the enemy was too strong there to be assaulted. The Second Corps, after overcoming at daylight some resistance in crossing the Run at the Vaughan Road crossing, had pursued a road (the Dabney Mill Road) somewhat parallel to and up the Run, and about a mile distant from it, and there striking the Boydton Plank Road, running northeast, had reached the Run again. Consequently the Second Corps, on the one hand, and the Fifth and Ninth Corps, on the other, were in rear and front of the enemy's entrenchments, but with the stream between them.

The troops of Crawford, readily passing south over Hatcher's Run from their position in front of the enemy's entrenchments, now rested their right flank upon the Run and ascended it towards the Second Corps on the Boydton Plank Road near Burgess's Mill. Thus they

were in a position to comb out thoroughly the whole wooded area in advance of them up to that road. But one side proposes, and the other side, sometimes aided by unforeseen material circumstances, has something to do with disposing. The ground in front of Crawford was densely wooded, and crossed in places by affluents of Hatcher's Run. It was between twelve and one o'clock when Crawford was marching two of his brigades with their right on the Run, and one brigade in reserve, towards Burgess's Mill. A branch of the Run, mistaken for the main stream, caused the troops to swerve for a while from their true course, and additionally, the perennial difficulty of keeping troops advancing through the woods in true alignment was encountered. Added to these difficulties were those created by the enemy in slashings of trees, inundations from the damming of the main stream, and opposition by skirmishers. On account of the difficulties of the ground Crawford did not reach the point opposite the enemy's entrenchments on the other side of the Run until four o'clock in the afternoon. There was still a mile of pathless forest ahead of him before he could reach the Boydton Plank Road where it crosses the stream at Burgess's Mill, where Hancock was. The Second Corps, with the cavalry, had reached the Boydton Road crossing of the Run about one o'clock. The Corps occupied the ground south of Burgess's Mill, and engaged with artillery the enemy posted on its front and left, on an east and west road called the White Oak Road. Egan's division drove some scattered troops of the enemy across the Run at Burgess's Mill, beyond which the enemy was in force. Mott's division advanced towards the White Oak Road. At this point of time Hancock received orders from General Meade to pause in his advance. Hancock then posted De Trobriand's brigade fronting towards the Claiborne Road, a north and south

road which crosses the Run two miles above the Burgess Mill crossing. Egan's division was posted across the Boydton Plank Road where it is entered by the White Oak Road, two of his brigades on the right of the road, and one on the left; and when Major Henry H. Bingham, of Hancock's staff, reported Crawford as being only three-quarters of a mile off on the right, Hancock sought to connect with him by extending his right by two regiments. Upon hearing the report of Major Bingham, Generals Grant and Meade, who had come up, left directions with Hancock merely to hold his ground. It had become evident that the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, still six miles away at the nearest point, could not be reached that day, for at that time of year the days were short. Hancock had therefore been ordered to maintain his ground for the night, and to retire on the following morning by the route by which he had advanced. But as to the details of his retirement the enemy was to have something to say. Hancock, left to his own devices to make himself as secure as possible, deemed it best to capture and hold the ridge just beyond the Run, at Burgess's Mill. His line faced northwest on the left, and north on the centre, whence it trended off towards the east. De Trobriand's brigade was on the left of the Boydton Plank Road, with Kerwin's brigade of dismounted cavalry on his left, both facing towards the bridge at the Claiborne Road crossing of the Run. On the right of the Boydton Plank Road, on a ridge, was Metcalf's section of a battery, supported by Pierce's brigade, facing towards the Run. Egan, supported by McAllister's brigade, was ordered to capture the bridge at Burgess's Mill and the ridge beyond the Run. Crawford was not up nor likely to be. At four o'clock Egan's division was storming the bridge at Burgess's Mill.

The danger that had been impending for some time,

through the fact that there had been no connection yet made by Crawford with the position of Hancock, now suddenly took form. Mahone's Confederate division having crossed the Run between Hancock and Crawford, burst out of the woods on the rear of Metcalf's section of artillery and its supporting brigade, which had furnished the two regiments that had been drawn towards the right. The battery had barely time to discharge its pieces three or four times when it was overrun, while the brigade, essaying to change front to the rear, was driven back to the Boydton Plank Road before it could reform. But this success, as so frequently happens in war, was short-lived, and served but more completely to bring about the discomfiture of the enemy. Had Egan been so far advanced as to have already pushed his troops beyond the bridge, and to have reached the ridge beyond it, instead of being, as he was, only in the full tide of success in the enterprise, he would not have been in position to retrieve the day; but being just where he was at the bridge, and realizing from the direction of the sights and sounds of battle, exactly what had happened, he disengaged himself at once, before orders on the way from Hancock reached him, and reversing his course, precipitated his troops on the naked flank of Mahone's division, while some of the troops on the left of the Boydton Plank Road simultaneously bore down upon it, driving it in rout from the field. While this attack and repulse were occurring, the enemy's cavalry, under Hampton, had been pressing Hancock's left and rear, a move successfully met by the cavalry of Gregg.

The next day, the 28th, the troops withdrew without molestation. General Humphreys justly observes that the mistake in the operations was in not ordering the whole Fifth Corps, as originally contemplated in the plan, to follow the Second at once along the Dabney Mill Road, and thus

having two-thirds, instead of one-third, of the strength of the force at the point which would necessarily be that of greatest opposition.

During the advance there had been a partial assault by Miles, of the Second Corps, on the lines at Petersburg, capturing a redoubt and some prisoners. As his division belonged to the Second Corps, it is but just to mention the incident here as relating to a moment when the Second Corps chiefly was engaged.

It was deemed best for the Second Corps to retire, because, through expenditure, its stock of ammunition was dangerously low, and because there were no means of immediately replenishing it. It therefore withdrew from its position on the 28th of October, and thus ended for a time open-field campaigning, marching and countermarching to turn the enemy's flanks. Now came perforce, not by any means a season of repose, but one free of extensive marching from place to place.

On the 26th of November Hancock bade farewell to the Second Corps, going North on the special mission of recruiting for service in the spring a corps of veterans. He was succeeded by General Humphreys, well worthy as a soldier of being the successor to such a one as Hancock, and intellectually his superior.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE WINTER'S SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

THE lines held by the Confederates at the beginning of the winter of 1864–5 reached from their right, resting on the north side of Hatcher's Run, about a mile and a half above the Vaughan Road crossing of the Run, and about a mile below Burgess's Mill, on the Boydton Plank Road crossing of the Run, to and around the south of Petersburg, and then north, in front of Bermuda Hundred (crossing the Appomattox and the James), and were thence prolonged until their left rested on White Oak Swamp. That long, eccentric curve, varying constantly in direction, northeast, east, and north, had also an offset covering the west of Petersburg. The general line, in its final swing towards the north, fulfilled the purpose of covering the town on the east, and in fact was there at its strongest. The fortified line, divergent from that of the entrenchments towards the west, covered the west of the town. The lines of the Army of the Potomac during the winter were shorter than those of the Confederates, for the attempt at outflanking the enemy having ceased for a while, there was no object in extending them towards either right or left. Even the Confederates, who, as being on the defensive, had to keep sedulous guard on their flanks, had merely troops in observation on the extreme ends of their entrenchments. They, however, during the winter, made, in anticipation of the renewal of active movements, very important additions to the works on their right. Whereas, as we have now seen, their entrenchments originally reached on the right only to Hatcher's Run, they were finally extended across and up the

Run. Turning from the point where they had stopped on the north side of Hatcher's Run, about a mile below Burgess's Mill, they were made to pass west, by detached works and entrenchments, along the south side of the Run, so as to cover a portion of the east-and-west White Oak Road to the north-and-south Claiborne Road, and passing beyond the latter, towards the north, to cover it additionally, until, by their circuit, they rested again on Hatcher's Run.

The organization of the forces operating against Richmond and Petersburg underwent in December various changes, of which only the principal ones can be noted here. General Butler made his unauthorized attack on Fort Fisher in North Carolina, the consequence of which to him personally was that he was relieved from duty with the Army of the James. He had been instructed by Grant to send General Terry to capture Fort Fisher, but had suppressed knowledge of that part of the order, and had gone personally in command to the scene of operations, making there an exhibition of incompetency of which there could be no doubt. General Terry was, in January, despatched to the place, and captured the fort there which had controlled the entrance to Cape Fear River in the interests of the Confederacy. Two of the corps of the Army of the James with which the reader has become acquainted in the course of this memoir, the Tenth and the Eighteenth, were disbanded, and out of them, with an addition drawn from the Ninth Corps, of the Army of the Potomac, two new corps, the Twenty-fourth, of white, and the Twenty-fifth, of colored troops, were formed. During the first half of December the Sixth Corps gradually returned by detachments from the Shenandoah Valley, which had been so devastated by orders of Grant to Sheridan, that it no longer afforded a convenient granary for the enterprises of the enemy in advancing towards Washington.

The Petersburg and Weldon Railroad was destroyed towards the south for forty miles. This virtually neutralized it as a source of supply for the Confederate army. But as it was now known that the Confederates began to be in great straits for provisions, this perhaps had its share in originating the report that they hauled rations by waggoning from Meherrin River, the point to which the railroad had been destroyed, all the way to Petersburg, and this in turn led to the first engagement that took place after active operations in the autumn. The Boydton Plank Road, previously mentioned as running from the southwest towards Petersburg, starts for that place from Dinwiddie Court House, which is about nine miles south of west from Reams's Station on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. Gregg, of the cavalry, pushed out on the road, on the 5th of February, 1865, from Reams's Station, under orders to patrol the road and intercept any trains of supplies that he might find on it. The Fifth Corps, under Warren, took position midway between Hatcher's Run and Dinwiddie Court House. The Second Corps, under Humphreys, was ordered to take position at the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher's Run, and the Armstrong Mill crossing, about a mile above, to the right of Warren, and in connection, so as to support him. Humphreys was therefore east of the entrenchments of the enemy where they rested their right on the stream, and at Armstrong's Mill, where he had posted a division north of Hatcher's Run, within a thousand yards of the new ones.

The enemy's movements at the latter place being suspicious, Humphreys reinforced it, and received an additional division from General Meade. Humphreys' prescience had not been at fault, the enemy attacked there and was repulsed. Two more divisions were sent by General Meade during the night, but the enemy had finally desisted from his attack.

Gregg, with the cavalry, towards Dinwiddie Court House, ascertained that the Boydton Plank Road was not nearly so much used by the enemy for waggoning as had been reported. In the afternoon of the following day, the 6th, Warren, in making reconnoissances in force along the Vaughan and Dabney Mill Roads (the latter at right-angles to the Vaughan), with Gregg towards the south, had a sharp engagement, in which he at first pressed back the force opposing him, when the enemy, heavily reinforced, in turn drove him back, but was finally checked.

In anticipation of the time when, with the spring, more active campaigning would take place, when it would be necessary to begin movements from the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac, its entrenchments were extended until the left rested at the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher's Run, opposite the point where the enemy's had formerly terminated. Thus, in these operations, the winter wore away, the major part of the fighting taking place in the immediate vicinity of the lines about Petersburg, where they were only a short distance from those of the enemy, in one place only about a hundred and fifty yards.

On the 26th of March General Sheridan with his cavalry rejoined the Army of the Potomac. The reader will doubtless remember that, in August, General Sheridan had been placed by Grant in command of the Army of the Shenandoah, to resist, and if possible to destroy Early's constantly invading army. During his absence from the Army of the Potomac, the character of the operations had not required a large body of cavalry. Sheridan's connection with the later history of the Army of the Potomac was so close, and the bearing which his operations, although away from it, had upon it was so intimate, that it is necessary here to devote a few lines to the significance to that army of his absence in the Valley of the Shenandoah. In response to a very marked,

although mildly expressed, remonstrance from Mr. Lincoln to General Grant, regarding the confusion incidental to his attempting from the position at City Point to control events in the Shenandoah Valley, when his orders had to filter through the official changes of Halleck, Grant precipitately left the army for the scene of disorder needing his presence. The remonstrance to which allusion is here made is embodied in the following telegram from Mr. Lincoln:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Cypher, 6 P.M. WASHINGTON, D. C., August 8, 1864.

LT.-GENERAL GRANT,
CITY POINT, VA.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death," in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. A. LINCOLN.

The occasion was that shortly succeeding Hunter's having been obliged to retreat from Lynchburg by the Kanawha Valley, when Early had advanced, retired, and again advanced across the Potomac. Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, had been fired on the 30th of July, and Hunter's troops, after a mountainous circuit, had just appeared on the Monocacy, and headship of a very different kind from Halleck's was imperatively needed. Grant acted at once with the promptness which always characterized him when nothing personal stood in the way, and here something personal beckoned him on. Here three things conspired

to make him bend his energies to the accomplishment of a single purpose; his own future quietude in the place of his predilection with the Army of the Potomac; the opportunity, long-desired, which he afterwards characterized by the expression that he had given Sheridan, as he also gave Sherman, an opportunity to acquire a separate military renown; and lastly, the final holding of the Valley, the previous military administration of which had begun seriously to reflect upon his own management. If one imperfectly acquainted with these events be inclined to think that General Grant's own account of his action here indicates that he at first contemplated Hunter's remaining in command of the Army of the Shenandoah, the answer is, that his account of it obviously intends to make it so appear, but as obviously does not succeed in convincing any careful reader that the case exhibits anything but questionable *finesse* for the purpose sought and accomplished. The easiest of all ways for authority to secure a desired resignation is through exhibited indifference to or tacit approval of its being tendered. One word from Grant, when he suggested to Hunter his relinquishing field-operations in the Shenandoah Valley, and when Hunter replied deprecatingly with reference to representing even the headquarters of the Department, on account of Halleck's want of confidence in him, would, from the man who himself had no confidence in Halleck, have sufficed; the one word, that Hunter should have his support, the support which he gave Sheridan and which made him independent of any one but Grant himself. But, to tell Hunter, as Grant says he told him, with his orders for the field in hand, immediately on entering upon the subject, that he had better make his headquarters in Baltimore or elsewhere, and relinquish the command in the field to Sheridan, was as clear a case of confessing to the wish to shelve a subordinate as any that can possibly be

cited. As a matter of fact Hunter's displacement, as will now appear, had been resolved upon and settled some days previously, and General Grant's aim now was simply to make it appear that Hunter receded of his own free, uninfluenced, will.

Sheridan's account, in his memoirs, of his taking command of the Army of the Shenandoah differs from Grant's account in his memoirs. In Grant's account the displacement of Hunter to that end is presented as if it had been a happy afterthought of his at the instant on the ground. In Sheridan's account, on the contrary, it appears as a preconcerted arrangement between Grant and himself.* To begin at the beginning, the idea of Sheridan's appointment, as

* Grant says, in his memoirs:—"I then [on August 5th, at Monocacy] wrote out General Hunter's instructions. I told him [orally of course, there is no such thing in the instructions] that Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in, that he thought somebody else ought to be there" . . . . [then follows a compliment to Hunter's patriotism, as shown by his self-abnegation]. Resuming, Grant adds:—"I told him, 'very well, then,' and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there," . . . . etc. Sheridan, speaking in his memoirs of the same occurrence, says:—"On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander [commander of the Army of the Shenandoah], and in obedience to his telegraphic summons, I repaired to his headquarters at City Point. In the interview that followed, he detailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac, telling me that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operate against Early, but that General Hunter, who was at the head of the geographical department, would be continued in his position, for the reason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct or consolidate the different districts," . . . . etc.

Mr. Lincoln's telegram just quoted shows, originated with General Grant, not with the War Department or with Mr. Lincoln. Sheridan says that he was summoned to City Point on the 31st of July, went there, and it was then and there understood with General Grant that he wished him to have command in the field of the Army of the Shenandoah. Grant's despatch to the War Department, August 1st, followed this. Mr. Lincoln's telegram in cipher, August 3d, followed that. Grant, in his official report, says that, on the 2d of August, he ordered Sheridan to report in person to Halleck in Washington. Yet we find Grant, on August 5th, delivering to Hunter instructions clearly implying his command in the field of the Army of the Shenandoah, and coincidently placing him in a position well calculated to force him to deprecate his acceptance of it and even of the charge of remote headquarters. This happened just before Sheridan's appointment, which was made on the 7th of August. Grant, in his memoirs, puts the occurrence as if among things unexpected, as if he had merely availed himself of a suggestion from Hunter in answer to a suggestion from himself. Sheridan, in his memoirs, puts it still more widely from the fact, as if Hunter had made the suggestion of his own entirely unprompted motion. "Hunter," he says, "had asked that day [August 6th] to be wholly relieved."

It had previously been understood from General Grant by General Meade and General Hancock, that the former was to have command of the Army of the Shenandoah and the latter of the Army of the Potomac, and neither ever knew why there had been a change in the apparent intention. It was some time in July that General Meade had been informed by General Grant that he was to have command of the Department of the Shenandoah. In the light of this review, primarily based upon original documents and co-

incidences of dates with events, it is, however, to be plainly seen that every consideration yielded to placing Sheridan where he might be able to achieve a "separate military renown." General Grant, it must be admitted, had a perfect right, and it was strictly his duty as general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, to place men as he thought for the best. The point here indicated is that in this instance the method was beneath the dignity of a general-in-chief. As to any change in his intentions with reference to Generals Meade and Hancock, common courtesy called for explanation. If, however, due courtesy be not extended, no one can demand it in any relation of life, its omission being simply a reflection upon the social training of one who abstains from extending it; but straightforward dealing between superior and inferior in rank, as well as in equal relations, is of far higher moral obligation.

Sheridan's appointment to the command of the recently created Middle Military Division was dated August 7th, 1864. General Grant says that he gave him about thirty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry. He had soon, however, fifty-four thousand troops of all arms, and except during one short period, always largely outnumbered the enemy. He defeated Early at the battle of the Opequon, on September 14th, 1864, at the battle of Fisher's Hill, on September 22d; at the battle of Cedar Creek, on October 19th. In this last battle, about which the most has been popularly made, many military men were of the opinion at the time, and still are, that even if Sheridan had not come upon the field, arriving from Washington by the way of Winchester, the event would have been essentially the same, Wright having everything well in hand again at the moment of Sheridan's advent. Yet the inspiration of the Federal troops, through the presence of Sheridan, after having been surprised by an early morning attack, and driven back a

long distance, and now advancing under his leadership, is not to be left out of account in the retrieval of the day. Nor ought it to be left out of account, in summing up events, that great numbers of the Confederates, convinced that the rout of the Union forces was final, had remained in the rear plundering the captured camps. Had this not taken place, final success for the Union arms would have been problematical. As it fell out, however, it was a signal victory for the Union side, in securing which, under most adverse circumstances, many officers shared. Meade, always more generous to Sheridan than he to Meade, wrote Grant:—"To achieve such results, after having met the reverse he describes, is one of the most brilliant feats of the war."

On February 27th, 1865, Sheridan moved up the Valley of the Shenandoah with his cavalry, and defeating a small force under Early, at Waynesboro', destroyed the railroad around there, crossed the Blue Ridge, going towards Richmond, destroying the James River Canal for some distance in that direction, and passing around to the north of Richmond, he continued on to Ashland, where he brushed aside some opposition in force, and finally reached supplies at the White House, collected there for his needs, and thence, on the 26th of March, rejoined the Army of the Potomac. There was one blot upon his escutcheon and on Grant's in Sheridan's late military achievements in the Shenandoah Valley. If Marshall Turenne, as long before as 1674 had awakened the horror and protest of Europe by laying waste the Palatinate, the progress of humanity in two hundred years ought to have witnessed amelioration in hostile practices, instead of a renewal of an obsolete form of warfare. There can be no excuse now for the consumption or destruction in time of war of anything but that which has relation to the immediate needs of the armed victors or to the im-

mediate detriment of the armed vanquished. To destroy crops, barns, mills, instruments of husbandry, in one indiscriminate ruin, as possibly helpful to the enemy, is inhuman from the present standpoint of civilization. The Government approved the devastation, but within the limits of the rules of civilized warfare. Sheridan executed some of it with barbaric ruthlessness.*

As there has not been up to the present point, and will not be in the rest of this memoir, any other opportunity so

* GENERAL GRANT: August 26th.—"Do all the damage to railroads and crops that you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste." GENERAL SHERIDAN: September 9th.—"My cavalry drove the pickets of Breckenridge's corps from Opequon Creek, burned four flouring mills, and captured," etc. October 1st.—"I have devastated the Valley from Staunton to Mount Crawford, and will continue," etc. October 7th.—"I have destroyed over two thousand barns, filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills, filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over four thousand head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops, not less than three thousand sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and Little Fort Valley, as well as the main valley. A large number of horses have been obtained, a proper estimate of which I cannot now make. Lieutenant John R. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this atrocious act all the houses within an area of five miles were burned," etc. October 11th. —"I have given you but a faint idea of the cleaning out of the stock, forage, wheat, provisions, etc., in the Valley," etc. Later on, east of the Blue Ridge, in Loudon County, the previous devastation (made in the Valley of Virginia, west of the Blue Ridge, on the plea of destroying subsistence for Early's army) was continued, on the plea of destroying subsistence for Mosby's independent cavalry command, and making the surrounding inhabitants suffer, coupled with the following expression from Sheridan of righteous indignation. November 26th. —"I will soon commence on Loudon County, and let them know there is a God in Israel," etc. It was ascertained long afterwards that Lieutenant Meigs had not been murdered, but had been killed by a member of a scouting party of the enemy.

appropriate as this for defining the relations between Grant and Sheridan, which had so injurious an effect on the public career of General Meade, it needs no apology, but merely this explanation, for here casting a side-glance at them. It cannot be supposed that the mere fact of Grant and Sheridan's having originally belonged to the Fourth Infantry gave them any sentiment for each other. It would seem that the cause of the sentiment must be sought for in those inscrutable psychical depths which declare for affinity of being. The obvious line of demarcation, however, to be drawn for love or liking when they coincide with either public or private affairs excludes the vice of favoritism, a vice which has sapped the happiness of families and wrecked the strength of empires. How egregiously this defect of character was manifested by Grant with reference to Sheridan appears in a multitude of forms. In his memoirs he says, "As a soldier there is no man living greater than Sheridan. He belongs to the very first rank of captains, not only of our army, but of the world. I rank him with Napoleon and Frederick and the greatest commanders of history." It would be hard to find a single phrase containing more errors than this. To say that, as a soldier, no man living is greater than Sheridan, implies that there may be at least one man living as great as a soldier, a proposition coinciding with the statement in the second sentence, that he belongs to the first rank of captains of the then present world, but conflicting with the statement in the third sentence; for, except von Moltke, the captains living at the time when Grant was writing could not justly be compared with the great captains of history. Besides, to speak of ranking Sheridan with Napoleon and Frederick and the great captains of history implies that Napoleon and Frederick do not belong to the class of historical captains. One should suppose, moreover, that if a military man

had wished to speak of warriors on the same plane with Napoleon, he would have been constrained to mention Hannibal and Cæsar. But it is the fate of indiscriminate eulogy to fall into all sorts of contradictions: they are here only emphasized by the narrowness of Grant's world-view. Sheridan was, in fact, an excellent cavalry officer and an excellent infantry officer, but not superior in merit to perhaps a dozen men that might be mentioned as belonging to those branches of the military service of the United States and the Confederates States during the Civil War. His own field operations, his own enunciation already mentioned as preceding the Wilderness Campaign, his raid immediately following that, subsequent raids compared with those of other officers, his letters on military matters from Europe, his self-confessed tendency to insubordination, his whole military career, considering the large means always placed at his disposal, the revelations of his personal memoirs, do not mark him out as the prodigy in war, confusedly described by Grant, and stamped by him subsequently as such by the gift of the lieutenant-generalcy of the Army of the United States. Grant, in reviewing the character and capabilities and service of those who had fought under him did not do it from the point of view of the stern virtue which did not love Cæsar less, but Rome more. With all his great and admirable qualities, he had not the love of truth for its and his own sake which is the very core of loftiness of soul. He had, moreover, the art of suppression so much at command, he was so deft in the stroke of his chisel in producing a life-like effect, that it takes a connoisseur to discern that the product sometimes stands on feet of clay.

Sheridan's arrival at City Point on the 26th of March found there the President of the United States. On the next day General Sherman arrived from Goldsboro', North Carolina, whence he had come by sea for conference with

Grant as to the final movements for closing the campaign. Sherman's personality and movements, however, having only the most remote relation to a memoir of General Meade, the briefest mention of his operations with reference to those of the Army of the Potomac will suffice here.

Following the practice heretofore pursued in these pages of noting important occurrences outside of the zone of operations of the Army of the Potomac, mention of some of the most striking events beyond it is here continued. On the 17th of July, 1864, Mr. Jefferson Davis had committed the folly of displacing General Joseph E. Johnston and putting General Hood in command of the army opposing Sherman besieging Atlanta, Georgia. Admiral Farragut captured Mobile Bay, Alabama, on the 5th of August, 1864. On September 1st Sherman occupied Atlanta, while Hood marched away to his rear only to be grievously defeated by Thomas at Nashville, Tennessee. On November 16, 1864, Sherman started from Atlanta on his celebrated March to the Sea. Reaching it, he captured, in co-operation with the navy, the city of Savannah, Georgia, on the 22d of December, 1864. In January, 1865, Johnston was restored to the command of the army opposing Sherman. On February 1, 1865, Sherman began to move north to join Grant and Meade before Petersburg. On February 22d, 1865, General Schofield captured Wilmington, North Carolina. As Sherman marched north the ghosts of secession flitted away before his progress, and desolation reigned in their places. Columbia, South Carolina, was evacuated and fired on February, the 17th, by which side is not settled to this day. Charleston, South Carolina, which had previously suffered from bombardment, was evacuated on the 18th. And now, towards the end of March, as mentioned above, Sherman was with the Army of the Potomac, arranging plans for the co-operation of his forces with it in

the endeavor to hem Lee in on every side. As the event proved, however, Sherman's army was able to take no part in the final events ending with the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The toils were fast closing in on that devoted army. Lee, as was suspected at the time, and as we now know, fully appreciated the situation, and made preparations to meet it and to avoid the final calamity. He was only awaiting the time when the roads would be fit for retreat, when he intended to cut loose from the leaguer which he had so long endured and march for the open country towards the south and west, where haply he might make junction with Johnston vainly attempting to stem the tide of Sherman's invasion sweeping up along the coast. To enable him to do this to the best advantage, it would be necessary to make such a heavy onslaught on Grant's right as would cause him to recoil from the strong lodgment on his left, and this he soon essayed with the greatest audacity. Grant, too, was waiting only for better roads to enable him to move to advantage around the right of Lee's entrenchments. He had appointed the 29th of March for the essay, and with his usual resoluteness of purpose kept faith with himself.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE END OF THE WAR.

On the 25th of March, 1865, the Ninth Corps, under General Parke, was resting its right on the Appomattox, east of Petersburg, occupying an entrenched line of seven miles in length terminating at Fort Howard, at the Jerusalem Plank Road, about a mile east of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. On its left was the Sixth Corps, occupying a salient of the general line, at Fort Fisher. On the left of that, resting its left on Hatcher's Run, was the Second Corps. In the rear of the Second Corps was, in reserve, the Fifth. The army, it will be seen, had concentrated towards the left, and this gave Lee his apparent opportunity to gain free passage for his retreat, so he furiously delivered the first stroke towards that end. Withdrawing nearly half his force from outlying entrenchments, he concentrated it on the east of Petersburg, where the lines were so scant a distance apart that an active armed man could scour across the space between them in less than a minute. Here, before the dawn of the 25th, the pioneers of Gordon, the general in command of the contemplated assault, aided by an order permitting Confederate deserters to bring their arms with them to the picket-posts, captured some of them, and pushing forward to clear away the abattis and other obstructions from the opposing lines, were closely followed by the columns assaulting Fort Stedman and its outlying redoubts. General Meade happened to be at City Point at the time, and was communicated with as soon as the telegraph wires, cut by the enemy's skirmishers, were restored, but Parke proved

equal to the emergency. Batteries Nos. 9 and 10, about half a mile apart, on the right of Fort Stedman, Fort Stedman itself, and Batteries Nos. 11 and 12, close together, near the left of Fort Stedman, were assaulted by the enemy, who captured Battery No. 10 and Batteries Nos. 11 and 12, and also Fort Stedman itself. In the almost pitchy darkness reigning at first over the field, General Parke promptly withdrew Willcox's troops, on the right, near the Appomattox, to recapture the part of the line taken, supported by the reserves under Hartranft, and by the artillery, under Tidball, on the ridge in the rear. The enemy, marching right and left to capture other works, was repulsed. Day dawning, artillery was concentrated on the captured fort and supplementary works, and soon Batteries Nos. 11 and 12 were retaken, and soon after that Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. The troops of the enemy, largely unable to return, on account of the artillery- and musketry-fire that searched the open space between the hostile lines, were captured in droves, although many also lost their lives or were wounded in trying to escape. By eight o'clock the affair here was over.

This assault on the right had its reflex action on the left. Humphreys says that General Meade, as soon as the telegraph worked, sent orders to Warren and Wright to support Parke. Of himself Humphreys says that he got the Second Corps under arms, telegraphed General Meade and Parke, whom Meade had by telegraph put in command of the field, advanced upon the enemy in his immediate front, and captured and retained the picket-entrenchments there. As a matter of fact he did not wait for a reply, but put his corps in at once without hesitation. I happened to see him a few days afterwards, and asked him, when referring to the event, whether the noise on his right admitted of any doubt in his mind as to what was occurring, and he replied, "not

a particle," or words to that effect. Wright similarly advanced on his front, to the right of Humphreys, and also captured the enemy's entrenched picket-line there, but, like Humphreys, could make no impression on the works in the rear of it. Humphreys remarks as to this advance, that the capture of the enemy's advanced line at this point was what enabled the Sixth Corps, on the 2d of April, to carry the enemy's main line along that front.

The maturely prearranged final movement on the enemy's right flank began on the 29th of March. The entrenchments of the Second Corps, on the left, were to be held by two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, a division of colored troops, of the Twenty-fifth Corps, and a cavalry division, all of the Army of the James, under the command of General Ord, while the Second marched out of them by the Vaughan Road to the south side of Hatcher's Run, and the Fifth Corps, passing beyond to the west, was to form a line southwestwardly, facing at an angle the enemy's previously described winter extension of his entrenchments towards the west. Sheridan, with between thirteen and fourteen thousand cavalry, was to push for Dinwiddie Court House, several miles to the southwest of the positions occupied by the Second and Fifth Corps. About midday the Fifth Corps, in swinging forward its left up the Quaker Road, a branch to the south of the Boydton Plank Road, brushed away a force of the enemy's, wholly unable to cope with it.

It is impossible for the reader, without examination of a map on a large scale, to obtain here a precise idea of the ground involved in the present movement. The sketch accompanying this volume will sufficiently serve the purpose of following the movements understandingly. Such slight indication as a verbal description may afford, is, however, not to be neglected. The first plan for the movement looked to the cavalry's cutting off Lee's lines of supply and

retreat. The first point of attack was to be the nearest vulnerable one, the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, running there south of west from Petersburg, and beyond that, the Richmond and Danville Railroad, running southwest from Richmond and crossing the other at Burkesville Junction. The White Oak Road, running east and west, is four or five miles south of the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad at the point here in question. Five miles south of the White Oak Road is Dinwiddie Court House, at the apex of an angle, open towards the north, formed by the Boydton Plank Road and the road leading from the Court House to Five Forks, on the extension of the White Oak Road to the west. General Parke, with the Ninth Corps, now holding from the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac to Fort Sedgwick, on the Jerusalem Plank Road, was at the proper time to extend his flank to the left, to hold the line to be vacated by the Sixth Corps when ready to move from its entrenchments. The enemy was now concentrating on his right to meet these movements. During the 29th the plan of operations was modified. Sheridan's orders to make for the railroads at once was countermanded, and he was instructed to get on the enemy's right-rear. Heavy rain on the night of the 29th delayed movements of artillery and trains while the roads were being corduroyed. On the 30th Sheridan was advancing from Dinwiddie Court House towards the enemy's entrenchments at Five Forks. The whole line was pivoting on its right,—the Second Corps, the right, the Fifth Corps, the centre, Sheridan's cavalry, the left,—from a line drawn southwest to a line drawn east and west. The Second and Fifth Corps were in position on the night of the 30th, on the left of the enemy's entrenchments, with the intention of capturing and holding the White Oak Road there, which operation, if successful, would cut off communication between the enemy at this

point and his force holding the entrenchments at Five Forks, four miles off to the left. During the day Sheridan had made a considerable advance towards Five Forks, opposed only by cavalry, the enemy's infantry not arriving there in force until nightfall.

On the morning of the 31st the enemy marched out of his works to attack Warren on his left flank, just as he was advancing with a reconnoissance in force. Humphreys, on his right, detached Miles with two brigades, which attacked the enemy on his left flank, and followed him up with two other brigades of Miles's, the enemy in his turn retreating, as Warren's advance also had been obliged to do. Further to the right, at the Boydton Plank Road crossing of Hatcher's Run, unsuccessful attempts were made by the Second Corps to carry the enemy's works there. Between two and three o'clock the Fifth Corps, now well in hand, renewed its attempt to take possession of the White Oak Road on its front. In this it proved successful, driving the enemy into his entrenchments. In the mean while the enemy was slowly pressing Sheridan back towards Dinwiddie Court House from the direction of Five Forks. The enemy had both cavalry and infantry, but Sheridan only cavalry. Here Grant says that Sheridan displayed great generalship. So far, however, as can be discerned at this day, the generalship consisted of nothing more nor less than that frequently exhibited by himself and other cavalry leaders during the war, when they advanced or stubbornly held a position, or slowly beat a retreat with the aid of dismounted cavalrymen. The cavalry was a fine body of troops, finely officered, from the commanding-general down, but as there was no special opportunity for the display of anything more than the tactical skill which was amply possessed by Sheridan and his subordinates, one may be permitted to doubt if there was on the occasion display of great

generalship. Bodies of Sheridan's cavalry attempted to hold on his left the crossings of a creek called Chamberlain's Run, but were finally dislodged, and had to reach Sheridan by the detour of the Boydton Plank Road. When night fell Sheridan was neutralized at Dinwiddie Court House, with the enemy's infantry, flanked by cavalry, between him and Five Forks, in a line extending between two and three miles across his course towards Five Forks. General Meade at once sent orders to relieve him by pushing infantry along the Boydton Plank Road to the Court House. Unfortunately, however, the nearest infantry, Warren's, was stopped at Gravelly Run, from the circumstance that the bridge over the stream on the line of the Boydton Plank Road had been destroyed. Warren, to insure the safety of his left and rear, endangered by the advanced position of the enemy towards the Court House, was ordered to fall back to the Boydton Plank Road, and Humphreys to swing back his left to accord with Warren's change of position.

Here arose an embarrassment, growing out of difficulty of communication among commanders and Warren's using his own judgment instead of obeying an order of General Meade's. Had Warren acted as finally directed by Meade, he would have come well into the rear of Pickett, who was commanding the Confederate troops, and would have been in a position to relieve Sheridan at once, and to damage the enemy retiring towards Five Forks. As it was, the merest accident had the effect of causing the enemy's unmolested withdrawal to Five Forks. Bartlett's brigade, of the Fifth Corps, which, as a partaker in the movement of the Fifth Corps by which it was swung back by Meade's orders to the Boydton Plank Road, had fallen back from the White Oak Road to a place just off the direct line from Five Forks to the Court House, and was taken by the enemy to be the advance of the Fifth Corps, causing the

immediate withdrawal of Pickett. The infantry sent by Warren arrived at the Court House early the next morning, long after the enemy had retired during the night towards Five Forks.

It seems, from all the evidence attainable, that Sheridan made a false estimate of the position of the eastern return of the enemy's works along the White Oak Road at Five Forks, when he, on the afternoon of the following day, the 1st of April, assaulted them, and that his instructions to Warren, based upon that misconception, misled Warren in making dispositions ensuring that his advancing line should strike the eastern return of the works in the manner prescribed by the orders of Sheridan. The cavalry, under Custer and Devin, were to attack on the left of the infantry, and under Mackenzie, of the Army of the James, to make a circuit from a point far away to the right, so as to come in on the enemy's left-rear. The infantry was to advance towards the eastern return of the enemy's works, and parallel with the White Oak Road, and pivot on its left, so as to face the return, striking it with the right-centre, in such a manner that the left would necessarily be in the position to attack the works in front, and the line to the right, the eastern return of the enemy's entrenchments. But as the eastern return had been supposed to be much further to the east than it proved to be, the advance went wild of the position to be attacked. That the position of the return was much further to the west than had been estimated became for the first time known when the advancing infantry line received on its left the fire of the enemy. The anticipated primary condition being non-existent, and the advance continuing at first blindly to push forward upon the false theory upon which the line of battle had been formed, Warren plunged into the woods on the right, pushing hither and thither to bring the right, pivoting on the left, quickly into

position. One of the charges which Sheridan afterwards preferred against Warren was that he did not see him on the field. He did not see Warren because he was well-nigh ubiquitous on the right, seeking to rectify the direction of the lines there which had entered the woods. The confusion entailed by the disadvantage at which Warren's line was taken through its having advanced upon a false idea of locality, for which he was not at all responsible, was soon rectified. Crawford's division, on the extreme right, swung around into the left-rear of the enemy, Griffin's, on his left, also swung around on the enemy's left-rear, while Ayres's division, coming up in face of the return, carried it by assault. The enemy was completely enveloped in front and on his left flank by cavalry and infantry, and partially in the rear by infantry. Right through the middle of the White Oak Road entrenchments ran a north and south road, called the Ford Road, and right and left of this, other roads pursued the same direction, all crossing Hatcher's Run, which flowed here about a mile and a half in the rear, parallel with the White Oak Road. Hemmed in in the manner described, with but slight means of egress, the enemy's shrift was short, but he behaved with heroism. Forming a line north and south, instead of his former line east and west, he made a bold stand against the oncoming flood. The Fifth Corps coming up, and checked for a moment by the opposing array, halted in line, when Warren, mounted, seized a flag, and dashing to the front, led his troops against the enemy's last stout resistance, and assisted on the left by Custer's cavalry, swept him from the field.

This is the stirring story as I believe the truth warrants that, without exaggeration, it shall be told, and not without its painful sequel. A few minutes thereafter Warren was relieved by Sheridan from the command of his

corps. The ground of action was negative. He had thought Warren indifferent in preparation for the action. He did not catch sight of him during the action. He acted under a provisory order from Grant, unsolicited, as he afterwards said. Grant had conceived a great dislike for Warren, and this he had evidently communicated to Sheridan, whom circumstances had doubtless conspired to prejudice in the same direction, and who, from his constitution of mind and training was utterly incapable of understanding a man like Warren. General Meade knew perfectly well Warren's limitations, his tendency to try to amend the plans of his superiors, but they were not such as to warrant placing in the power of any one, as Grant did, a concealed weapon that might be unscrupulously used. Grant himself subsequently expressed regret that the thing had happened, but so indifferent did he prove as to the occurrence that, through his subsequent two terms of the Presidency, he allowed Warren vainly to appeal for trial of his case, using his influence to that end only after he had ceased to hold the office of Chief-Magistrate. In his writings he proves how lightly the affair rested in his mind, for in one place he speaks of Warren's being relieved before, and in another, after the battle. If any offence had been committed before the battle, such action as Sheridan's would have had some semblance of justification, for Warren had been clearly wrong in his failure, under orders, of the night before. Even then, however, the fact would not have justified the sentence as within Sheridan's province to impose, but solely as within Grant's. But even admitting, for the sake of argument, adequate dereliction before the battle for the punishment decreed, the sentence passed, without trial or permitted explanation, would have been most unjust in view of any man's rights, but especially so in those additionally derived from Warren's previous valuable and brilliant services. Passed

and executed after the battle in which Warren had so signalized himself, it looked as if antagonism between men of different mould, awakened long previously by the course of events, had at last found vent in Sheridan, that he indulged in the opportunity to injure for antecedent as well as present sources of dissatisfaction in the unfortunate outcome of an enterprise for which he, if any one, not Warren, was responsible. At any rate, by whatever motive Sheridan was actuated, nothing can extenuate the award to Warren for his untiring zeal in his country's cause, of being stricken down by his temporary chief on the field which he had largely helped to win, and being sent into the retirement of a blighted career.

Sheridan and Griffin, the latter now in command of the Fifth Corps, were in full possession of the field at Five Forks; but lest the enemy should strip his lines farther to the east, along the White Oak Road, and concentrating troops near Five Forks, finally repulse Sheridan, Grant ordered the Second Corps, off to the right, to press the enemy on its front that very night. Artillery on both sides opened there heavily. Humphreys sought for a weak point in the enemy's line, but finding none, under orders sent Miles's division to the left to reinforce Sheridan. These operations represent what was passing on the left of the Army of the Potomac during the night of the 1st of April. The enemy had received a fatal thrust, but his lines of retreat were still intact. The plan for the immediately pending movement was for Sheridan, with his cavalry and the Fifth Corps, to sweep northward, cutting the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad. The Twenty-fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Corps, in order from left to right, were to assault the works on their respective fronts. In the course of the 2d of April, the Fifth Corps, after some preliminary fighting near the White Oak Road, reached a point west of Suther-

land Station on the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, Sheridan's cavalry off in the same direction. Humphreys was still held for a while, on the 2d, by orders to that effect, in the position which he occupied. In Parke's position, with his right resting on the Appomattox, opposite the eastern and southern defences of Petersburg, he had bombarded them nearly all of the night of the 1st, resuming the fire early on the morning of the 2d. Here he captured some important works, but an interior line of the enemy's proved impervious. On his left, the Sixth Corps, which operated with the advantage previously noted of being in possession of the enemy's outer entrenchments, attacked the inner ones, opposite the Lead Works, southwest of Petersburg, capturing the whole line on that front. The Sixth then swept down the enemy's line to the left towards Hatcher's Run. Nearing the Run it met the Twenty-fourth Corps, which had had success on its front, and was then advancing towards Petersburg, when the Sixth faced about, and marching right and left of the Twenty-fourth, pursued the same direction. Informed, at six o'clock in the morning of the 2d, by General Meade, of the success of Parke and Wright on their fronts, Humphreys advanced the Second Corps to the attack of the enemy in front of his position and carried everything before him. Orders again reached Humphreys from General Meade instructing him to close up with the other troops marching towards the west of Petersburg. His advanced division, under Miles, came upon the enemy at Sutherland Station. Leaving Miles there, Humphreys continued with his two other divisions towards Petersburg. At Sutherland Station, after a contest of varying fortunes, Miles managed to dislodge the enemy from his position, when the enemy beat a retreat thence, partly over the Appomattox, and partly up that stream towards the Richmond and Danville Railroad. The Sixth, the Twenty-fourth, and two [illegible] of the



Second Corps were marching towards the western defences of Petersburg, one division of the Second being countermarched to reinforce Miles if it should prove necessary. The two main defences on the west side of Petersburg were Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth, which were captured after gallant assaults, and the enemy's line of works in that quarter fell into the hands of the besiegers. The fiat had gone forth that Petersburg must be evacuated, of which Mr. Jefferson Davis had received notice while at church on that fateful Sunday morning of the 2d of April. Preparations were hastily completed for the retreat, and at dark the Confederate troops began to file out on the roads, from Richmond and from Petersburg, leading to Amelia Court House, just south of the Appomattox, on the prospective line of retreat to Danville. The unrelenting retreat and pursuit were beginning. When, on the morning of the 3d of April, the troops in front of Petersburg could discern objects by the early morning's light, the place was found to be evacuated.

We are here again brought to consider, if we would form any clear idea of subsequent events, the general lay of the land over a far larger surface than any with which we have had to do with reference to previous tactical movements. We are now about to follow in imagination a rapid advance of seventy-five miles in retreat and pursuit, but longer in fact, because the march could not be made in a straight line. As previously mentioned, Richmond and Petersburg lie about fourteen miles apart on a virtually north and south line. From Richmond, the Richmond and Danville Railroad runs about southwest. From Petersburg, the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad runs first a little south of west, then a little north of west, then northwest, and then west. The two railroads intersect at Burkesville Junction, about forty-five miles west of Petersburg. The

Appomattox, passing to the west, close to the north side of Petersburg, makes a considerable sweep to the north and west, the bend terminating just east of a place called Farmville, northwest by a few miles of Burkesville Junction. Here, just east of Farmville, the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, passing over the Appomattox, and bending around north and then southwest, repasses it at the town, which is on its south bank, and thence takes a westerly course to Lynchburg, through Appomattox Court House, the upper trend of the river meandering along just north of this last stretch of the railroad. The shortest line of retreat for Lee's forces converging from Richmond and Petersburg upon his only two possible lines of retreat, to Danville or to Lynchburg, was at Amelia Court House, on the Richmond and Danville Railroad, just south of the north loop of the Appomattox previously described. There, accordingly, they converged, in the hope of being able to make their escape in the direction of the road to Danville, and thus to form a junction with the army of General Joseph E. Johnston confronting Sherman near there. How this intention was frustrated by the vigorous pursuit of the Army of the Potomac will now appear.

Only two lines of retreat being open to the enemy, the plan of pursuit was, of course, based upon that knowledge. Sheridan, with his cavalry, the Fifth Corps following him up, was to feel and attack the enemy constantly during his advance upon the point of convergence of the two railroads. The Second and Sixth, corps-commanders Humphreys and Wright, under the immediate leadership of General Meade, marched towards Amelia Court House; the corps-commander of the Ninth, Parke, kept hold of the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, to bar, at the railroad junction at Burkesville, Lee's passage across it by the Danville route. The two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and the divis-

ion of the Twenty-fifth, will be accounted for later. The first severe encounter, following skirmishing, took place near Deep Creek, an east and west affluent of the Appomattox. Here Fitzhugh Lee was towards dark attacked in a strong position by Sheridan, the Fifth Corps nearest, followed by the Second and Sixth Corps, approaching rapidly from the rear. Sheridan, on the 4th, reaching Jetersville, on the Richmond and Danville Railroad, was informed that Lee was already concentrated at Amelia Court House. It was a false report, but Grant and Meade, not doubting its correctness, made every effort to reach the advanced position of the Fifth Corps with the Second and the Sixth, but were twice detained by Sheridan's cavalry coming in from the right upon their line of advance, being obliged to give it precedence. Sheridan, in his memoirs, speaks of their slowness in coming up, but with his usual disingenuousness omits to mention this cause of their retardation. The enemy's concentration at Amelia Court House was really not effected before the 5th.

On the 5th Lee's advance from Amelia Court House towards Jetersville began, but hearing that Sheridan, supported by infantry, held the place, he sheered off to his right from the general line which he had been pursuing along the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and sought by a night-march to pass the three corps marching under Meade, the Fifth having now joined the Second and Sixth. With a considerable body of troops under Longstreet, Lee, by daylight of the 6th, reached a point near Rice's Station, beyond Jetersville; but Anderson was still on the road, followed by Ewell, at Amelia Sulphur Springs, between six and seven miles from Amelia Court House, with Gordon acting as rearguard. The vanguard of these troops was somewhat ahead of the main bodies of troops in direct pursuit, and this difference in position was slightly increased

by the first movement of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps on the morning of the 6th, under the conviction that Lee was still in position at Amelia Court House. On the morning of the 6th these three corps, under Meade, facing northeast, began in fact to march away from the enemy, when Humphreys, on the left, discovered lines of the enemy's infantry moving westward, and the signal officers of General Meade brought word that they were perceptible far beyond, moving in the same general direction. General Meade ordered the troops at once to face about and march in pursuit of the retiring columns of the enemy. With reference to the point of destination where the future determined it to be, at Appomattox Court House, the Twenty-fourth Corps was nearly up even with the van of Lee's army in space, and a little more than even in time, for it had reached Burkesville Junction, a few miles southeast of Rice's Station, in the middle of the night of the 5th, whereas Lee did not reach Rice's Station until early on the following morning. From this position, at the Junction, it was intended that Ord, in command of the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, a division of the Twenty-fifth, and some cavalry, should destroy the bridges over the Appomattox. Besides the bridges at Farmville, there were, below them, the railroad bridge, called the High Bridge, and a common bridge near it. Should Ord destroy these bridges before the enemy could reach them, Lee's line of retreat to Lynchburg would be cut off, and he was already estopped from taking the road towards Danville by Ord's presence at the railroad junction at Burkesville. But, as we have seen, Lee's advance reached Rice's Station early in the morning of the 6th, and the cavalry and infantry which Ord despatched to destroy the bridges could not accomplish their mission, the small body of cavalry coming unawares upon Lee's advance and meeting a most unhappy fate in its gallant attempt to

resist overwhelming odds. The final event of Lee's escape or surrender still lingered in doubt, for the bridges, so far, all remained intact.

The Second Corps, on the morning of the 6th, apprised by what was seen taking place in plain sight, soon confirmed by General Meade's orders, pushed, by wading over Flat Creek, after the rear of the Confederates, they having destroyed the bridges after passing. The Fifth Corps was ordered by General Meade to move on the right of the Second, and the Sixth to keep to the line of the railroad through Jetersville, which would bring it on the left of the Second. The Second Corps, after wading Flat Creek, came up soon with the enemy's rearguard under Gordon, moving forward after it as the enemy continued retreating. While Humphreys was thus pressing with infantry the enemy's rearguard, Sheridan was striving to cut in on the enemy's line of march at Deatonsville, but here he found himself thwarted in his intention, having struck it opposite Anderson with Ewell coming up just in his rear. Nevertheless, hereabouts Sheridan accomplished in one place considerable destruction of the enemy's trains. The first serious engagement of infantry took place when the Second Corps pursued Gordon for several miles, leaving an immense amount of material behind him, making finally some stand at Perkinson's Mills, at a crossing of Sailor's Creek, an affluent of the Appomattox. The capture here by the Second Corps of flags, arms, and other trophies was large. While this was taking place in the centre, the Fifth Corps on the right had found no enemy to oppose its advance, while the Sixth Corps, passing through Jetersville, and closing up just to the left of the Second, was apprised by the cavalry that the enemy was in position ahead, and turning off by the left fork of the road of which the Second Corps had taken the right one, soon formed line of battle.

The enemy proved to be Anderson and Ewell without artillery. The Sixth Corps rapidly advanced, and came into position and assaulted, while Sheridan charged the enemy on his right and left flanks. Ewell, being partially enveloped in the rear by cavalry, and soon in front and on right and left and partially in rear by infantry, surrendered the remnants of his corps, which had, counting stragglers lost on the march, been virtually annihilated, while the loss sustained by Anderson also was very great. The loss of the enemy in both commands, including prisoners, amounted to six thousand. In other contests during the day he had lost two thousand. It had become evident that he would not be able to bear much longer the successive drains on his resources in men and material. These last contests described constituted the battle of Sailor's Creek.

Lee, with Longstreet, had halted all day near Rice's Station, vainly waiting for the sorely harassed corps of Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon, encumbered in their movements by the trains in their charge. Night of the 6th coming on after Humphreys had driven the corps of Gordon over Sailor's Creek, and the country in advance of the Second Corps being unknown, he was, although he crossed the creek at once, obliged to wait for the morning of the 7th before he was able to proceed. The Sixth Corps, on the contrary, off slightly to the left, on more favorable ground, was able after the engagement to advance two miles further towards Rice's Station.

In the night of the 6th the advance of Lee, under Longstreet, marched from Rice's Station for Farmville, and crossed the Appomattox on the bridges there, and on the morning of the 7th began to string out on the stage-road towards Appomattox Court House. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry marched with Longstreet, leaving a detachment on guard near Farmville. Early on the 7th the rearguard,

under Gordon, crossed the Appomattox below Farmville by the two bridges previously described. Sheridan's cavalry was off on the extreme left, south of the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, marching with, and in advance of, the Fifth Corps, the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth, and the single division of the Twenty-fifth, to confine the enemy to the direction towards Lynchburg. General Meade had ordered the Fifth Corps to Prince Edward Court House, to the southwest of Farmville, just south of the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, to add to the force of infantry marching west on that line towards Appomattox Court House. The two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, followed by Wright, with the Sixth Corps, at first marched directly towards Farmville. But the enemy, after securing his passage there, burned the bridges behind him. Only High Bridge, and the other near it, below Farmville, where Longstreet and Gordon eventually crossed, remained for crossing the Appomattox.

Had it not been for the promptness of Humphreys and Barlow, and the remissness of the enemy, Lee's army would now have made good its retreat to Lynchburg. The Second Corps, however, having been marching since early morning of the 7th from Sailor's Creek, came on the ground near High Bridge and the waggon bridge below Farmville, beyond which could be seen, on the opposite side of the Appomattox, the enemy marching away without having made proper provision for the destruction of the two bridges. Although the enemy now made an attempt to fire them, he was too late to repair his oversight. Barlow seized them and drove off their sparse defenders, and the Second Corps began at once to cross the river. A division of the enemy was seen drawn up on the high ground beyond the river, while a column also was seen threading its way along the railroad. The enemy's attitude of opposition, however, soon changed, and

the halted division withdrew towards the west. It was a weighty question which Humphreys now had presented for his decision,—the conclusion as to the direction in which the main body of the enemy had marched. He wisely concluded to cover the contingency of his making a mistake by despatching Barlow's division to follow the enemy's troops marching along the railroad, while he, with his two other divisions, pushed to the right for the stage-road running some distance north of the river through Appomattox Court House.

Barlow pursued the enemy along the railroad, while Humphreys marched away towards the right in his design of striking the stage-road to Appomattox Court House. By the burning of the bridges at Farmville itself, the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Corps were now cut off from the Second on the other side of the Appomattox. It was impracticable to ford the stream at Farmville with infantry, and the bridges below could be reached only by a long detour. Just after noon Humphreys found his surmise to have been correct, as he caught up with Lee's retreating column in position on the stage-road and the plank-road to Appomattox Court House. General Meade, not knowing that the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Corps had been cut off from the Second by the burning of the bridges at Farmville, ordered them to the support of Humphreys. Barlow had pushed so far ahead along the line of the railroad, inflicting considerable damage on the enemy, that he could not possibly join Humphreys before nightfall. The best that could be done Humphreys did, pressing the enemy closely and magnifying by the activity of their movements the deficiency in the number of his troops. The infantry action was carried on on both sides with spirit. Humphrey's aggressive attitude had the desired effect of compelling Lee to lose time by keeping his force deployed. Cavalry, under Crook,

forded the river at Farmville to reinforce Humphreys, but was driven back with loss. The situation at this critical period of the retreat and pursuit cannot be better expressed than in the words of Humphreys describing it:

"By the detention until night at this place, General Lee lost invaluable time, which he could not regain by night-marching, lost the supplies awaiting him at Appomattox Station [near the Court House Humphreys means, there is another Appomattox Station near Richmond], and gave time to Sheridan with his cavalry, and Ord with the Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps, to post themselves across his path at Appomattox Court House. If no infantry had crossed the Appomattox on the 7th, he could have reached New Store that night, Appomattox Station on the afternoon of the 8th, obtained the rations there, and moved that evening towards Lynchburg. A march the next day, the 9th, would have brought him to Lynchburg. Ord's two infantry corps did not reach Appomattox Court House until ten o'clock in the morning of the 9th of April."

Grant, learning that the enemy had been brought to a stand, lost no time in demanding of Lee the capitulation of his army. It was about half-past eight o'clock in the evening of the 7th, just after the fight just described was over, when Humphreys received, he says, a letter from Grant, to be delivered to Lee. A truce for an hour being declared, to facilitate negotiations between the commanders of the respective armies, in about an hour Lee's reply was received and transmitted to Grant through Humphreys' lines. Grant's missive had stated that, in view of the obvious uselessness of prolonging resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, and in the interest of sparing further effusion of blood, he called upon Lee to surrender. Lee's reply included the usual diplomatic fence, coinciding in principle with Grant's declaration of desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and deprecating the conclusion as to the hopelessness of further resistance, but tacitly conceding it by asking information as to the terms to be offered for sur-

render. So ended for the moment the interchange of protocols.*

On the following morning, the 8th, Humphreys straining every nerve on the march after Lee, who had, of course, decamped during the night, received for transmission to Lee Grant's rejoinder to his reply. It was sent through Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, then acting as the enemy's rearguard, and the reply to it was received at nightfall, during a halt of the Second Corps near New Store, about midway between High Bridge and Appomattox Court House. Grant's second letter had specified the terms of surrender to be disqualification for again taking up arms against the United States, and expressed his willingness to meet Lee personally, or to designate officers to meet others appointed by Lee, who would jointly settle upon the terms of surrender. Lee's reply to this was distinctly a recession from his former obvious intention to surrender. He indulged still more manifestly than before in diplomatic fence when he told Grant that he had not intended to accede to the proposition to surrender, but merely to ask for the terms proposed in their bearing on peace; which was by implication a direct contradiction of the whole proceeding and of the express terms of a portion of the language used in it. Lee concluded by remarking that, to be frank, he did not think that the emergency had arisen to call for the surrender of his army. This again was qualified by the expression of his willingness to meet Grant on the following day between the picket-lines of the two armies, in the interest of ascertaining how far Grant's proposal might affect the forces under his command and the restoration of peace. Surely, if he saw no reason why he should surrender, any

* See Appendix for the full text of the letters leading up to and accompanying the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. The last two of the series were interchanged at their meeting, in the personal presence of Generals Grant and Lee.

proposals that Grant might have to make would be purposeless. Generals Grant and Meade received this last note about midnight of the 8th of April, at Curdsville, where they had halted for the night. At that same time of night Humphreys, who had been instructed from headquarters to keep on the march, found his men, in attempting it, he says, dropping out of the ranks from sheer exhaustion from fatigue and hunger, the supply-train of the corps not reaching it until the following morning.

With the next morning, the 9th, came Grant's continuation of the correspondence with Lee, in a letter which, as before, reached Lee promptly through Humphreys' lines. Lee as promptly replied, transmitting his letter through the same channel of communication between the moving columns in retreat and pursuit. In this letter of Grant's he simply states that he has not authority to treat of peace, but merely of the surrender of the armed force opposing him, and he speaks of the desirability of saving further loss of life and additionally of property, emphasizing the sentiment in the last line of his letter by an aspiration that the "difficulties" may come to an end without the loss of an additional life. Lee's reply was briefly that he had received Grant's letter on the picket-line, whither he had gone to meet him with reference to the surrender of his army, and that he now requested an interview in conformity with the offer to that effect in Grant's letter immediately preceding the one just received.

Everything was in the most perfect train for the accomplishment of what should have been sought with the single-mindedness which Grant in his correspondence had expressed himself as entertaining,—the ending of the contest without the loss of another life or further sacrifice of property. Humphreys, with the Second Corps, was within three or four miles of the enemy's rearguard, the Sixth Corps

(which had managed to get across the Appomattox, in the night of the 7th, only by bridging the river) was closing up on the Second, not far to the rear. Ord's infantry,—the Fifth Corps, the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth, the division of the Twenty-fifth,—was, thanks to the retardation of the enemy by Humphreys, gaining the time necessary to pass around to the left and come into position athwart Lee's line of retreat at Appomattox Court House, on the road to Lynchburg. Nothing more dramatic in the annals of warfare has taken place than the scenes of the surrender at Appomattox Court House. Even as one of the chief actors in the drama, Lee, sat dictating the last-mentioned reply to Grant's last communication, in which he expressed his regret at not having, as he had expected, met Grant at the picket-lines, the fanfares of Sheridan's cavalry were blaring in his front, and the sound of artillery-firing there reached his ears, confirming the tidings that he had already received that he was surrounded. The whole of the scenes occurring from this time onward to the signing of the terms of surrender have been described by so many eye-witnesses, and therefore from so many points of view, and are despite the fact so accordant, that we may place implicit faith in their truthfulness.

Lee had mentally advanced as far as circumstances had permitted him towards a solution of what Grant had in one of his letters called the existing "difficulties." In expressing his regret that he had not met Grant, as he had expected, he did but express by circumlocution his belief that nothing remained but their meeting to bring about a solution of the difficulties. How came it about, then, that Grant, who had so warmly expressed his desire to put a stop to further effusion of blood and the destruction of property, was not so far advanced toward those ends as was Lee, who had assented to their desirability. Within striking distance from his own moving headquarters to those of the enemy,

Grant had suddenly left the line by which he had heretofore so successfully corresponded with his adversary towards a speedy understanding which was to be the end of the war. The implacable foe of his better self, favoritism, led him abruptly to quit the direct line of pursuit of the enemy, on which he could soonest arrive at an accommodation with Lee, and strive to reach the position of Sheridan, in order that through his lines the final act leading to the surrender should take place. Grant, without awaiting the reply to his last letter to Lee, had suddenly left the advance near New Store, and had struck off by a circuitous route to the left to reach Sheridan at Appomattox Court House. He had left the rear of the Second Corps through which he had heretofore successfully carried on his correspondence with Lee, and had taken the devious route to Lee's rear, which would be sure seriously to delay his receipt of Lee's reply to his last communication. By going to the rear of Lee he had put himself out of touch with the Second Corps, whose commander he had nevertheless instructed to continue his pursuit with unabated energy.

It was nearly midday before an aide, riding with fiery haste, was able to hand Grant the reply of Lee for which he had not waited. Then the best thing that he could do was to continue to push forward towards Sheridan, although the instructions to Humphreys to pursue the enemy relentlessly still remained unrescinded. Reaching Sheridan, Grant's reply was soon transmitted to Lee through his lines. This note stated that he had not received Lee's communication until 11.50 A.M., and that he would push forward from the point which he had now reached in passing to the left from the stage-road, and would meet Lee wherever he might wish the interview to take place. General Humphreys who, being the man that he was, and in the advance as he then was, is the highest authority extant as to this

affair, says that had Grant remained on the route of the Second and Sixth Corps, the surrender would have taken place before midday. But, as we have seen, he did not, and therefore soon arose what the most ordinary unblinded perspicacity would have foreseen, the danger of a calamity which, in any other case, Grant's prescience would have put beyond the bounds of possibility. About half-past ten o'clock in the morning of the 9th of April the Second Corps, followed closely by the Sixth, began to overtake the troops of Lee, famished for want of rations, and weary with continuous marching and conflict. Lee, knowing how close inevitable surrender was at hand, sent twice with a flag of truce requesting Humphreys not to press him, because negotiations for surrender were proceeding. But, as has been noted, Grant had not recalled his orders to make no abatement in the strenuousness of the pursuit, and Humphreys was a soldier, with whom the orders of his superior allowed of no qualification by himself. So he declined to be guided by the representation which he had every reason to believe to be true, from the character of Lee, and from what he personally knew of the correspondence that had been going forward. He had been expressly instructed that this correspondence was in no wise to interfere with the military movements then proceeding, so he was obliged to decline all overtures from the enemy for a temporary cessation of hostilities. Grant was miles away, and Humphreys had been left to his own resources. The situation was a painful one, but Humphreys in his decision abided by his duty.

At eleven o'clock, Longstreet, having concluded to make a stand, entrenched just as the Second Corps was approaching Appomattox Court House. The Second Corps at once deployed, the Sixth deploying on its right. At this most critical juncture, General Meade arrived on the ground just as the two corps were about to assault Longstreet's lines,

and thus happened to be averted the most frightful, because the most needless bloodshed. General Meade had, it seems, read Lee's letter of that morning before forwarding it to Grant, and had, of course, seen at once from its terms that there could be no question that Lee intended to surrender. He at once sent through Humphreys' lines a letter to Lee, granting a cessation of hostilities for the arrangement of preliminaries to surrender, and also sent a despatch to Grant notifying him of the action that he had taken.

During the night of the 8th, Ord's infantry, the Fifth Corps, under Griffin, which had halted to rest at Prince Edward Court House, and the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, under Gibbon, the single division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, under Birney, with Sheridan's cavalry, were making their way south of the Appomattox and the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad. Previously cavalry had been pushed, as we have seen, to the right. It had also been pushed to the left front, towards Prince Edward Court House, to ensure Lee's being confined to the Lynchburg route. Now the situation was different, Lee being on the Lynchburg route, and the aim being to head him off at Appomattox Court House. Accordingly the cavalry assembled early on the following morning, the 9th, west of the Court House, right on Lee's only remaining line of retreat to Lynchburg. Ord's infantry, however, could not get there until nearly eleven o'clock. The Ninth Corps, under General Parke, had, on the 3d, followed the march of the Sixth Corps from Petersburg, and thenceforth, until the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, at which it was not present, had been engaged in scouting and picketing north of the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, extending all the way along the railroad from Sutherland Station to Farmville, thus commanding all egress of any fraction of the enemy's forces along that line in a southward direction.

When Lee sat at nine o'clock on the morning of the 9th dictating to Colonel Marshall of his staff the despatch of which we know, in which he expressed his regret at not having already met Grant, and his wish to meet him as soon as possible, he had learned that escape was almost beyond the bounds of possibility. Even in the midst of his dictation an officer hurriedly delivered to him a private message which doubtless confirmed the conclusion which had already been reached that morning in a conference with his generals, that surrender was inevitable. The cavalry of Fitzhugh Lee, no longer acting as rearguard, was now in advance, halted beyond Appomattox Court House. It had been drawn up early in the morning to try to force a passage through Sheridan's cavalry in opposing line of battle, while behind it had filed out on the road to Lynchburg, and taken position, the advance-guard of Lee's infantry. At the point of time when Lee's cavalry and infantry began to move forward, there was still hope among his veterans that a passage might be forced, as it certainly would have been, had the sequel proved that the gathering war-cloud would have nothing to contend with but the cavalry of Sheridan barring its burst towards Lynchburg. But time had been passing, and the infantry of the Army of the Potomac and of the James had been forcing its march around the left of Appomattox Court House. When the moment of serious collision had arrived in the attempted advance of the enemy's cavalry and infantry to break through the opposing lines, the encircling cordon of Sheridan's cavalry parted, like curtains drawn asunder, and revealed the lines of infantry in its rear. It was the last scene in the military drama which we have been witnessing as it drew near its *dénoûment.*

In the afternoon of the 9th of April, in a little house, historic and memorable evermore, Grant and Lee met, and

agreed upon and signed terms honorable to both,—simply the accordance of the honors of war in return for the pledge no longer to bear arms against the United States. Grant acted with great delicacy towards General Lee, who said afterwards that, although it was customary to receive and immediately restore the tendered sword, Grant had not touched his. One thing only was lacking to the spectacle in the last scene of the nation's salvation. The man who had won the greatest battle of the war, who, since then, had commanded the army by which it was won, through two years of almost continuous battle and siege, was not present, and was not invited nor intended to be present at the surrender of the opposing army by its great chief. Happily, however, for his peace of mind, he had served but in the cause of justice in his country's time of direst need for higher recognition than that within the power of man to give. Some twenty-eight thousand men, the mere remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia, were on the rolls as surrendered. As that army ceased to exist, the Confederacy, as though freed from a magic spell, crumbled to fragments and toppled from its base, not without a cloud of dust, obscuring for a time clearness of vision, but with a mighty subsidence that, echoing and re-echoing to the ends of the earth, witnessed to a fall so mighty that all men knew it to be final. As in Samson's riddle, however, "out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came sweetness."

That the mental wounds of the war time would heal had long been evinced by the way in which the soldiers of the opposing armies had fraternized on many an occasion. Now, on this last field on which they had met in enmity could be seen, despite harrowing memories, even then a gleam of the future that was in store for a united people. On that last field not only were the hungry fed from the public sup-

plies, but the haversacks of the private soldiers were freely opened for the relief of their late antagonists. On the following day Generals Grant and Lee had an interview on horseback between the lines of the armies. General Meade, on the following day, paid a visit of courtesy to General Lee, and officers of the Army of the Potomac freely extended their sympathy to their late foes. If bitterness still for a long while lingered, it was least to be found among those who had met each other in battle. No words of praise were ever finer than those with which Humphreys concludes his volume on the campaign :—" It has not seemed to me," he says, " necessary to attempt a eulogy upon the Army of the Potomac or the Army of Northern Virginia." He would be callous indeed who could not feel for Lee in this, his hour of trial, in this supreme moment of his life, when the shackles forged for him by his affections, which he could not rend, dropped from the man with the last stern demand of duty as greatest champion of a causeless cause in the frenzy of a people. Who should forget in his favor, that throughout all those days when he had shown most conspicuously in the eyes of men, he had not, like most successful generals, as Tacitus says, become insolent with success, but had never failed in gentle courtesy to his officers, in boundless tenderness to his men, in humanity to all, and in word and deed had proved himself the rarest type of soldier and gentleman !

Strictly speaking, the terms in full which Grant accorded General Lee were so liberal as to transcend the military prerogative, and thereby to trench upon the civil power. The theory of rebellion had, without formal disclaimer, gradually merged, through many acts, into recognition of the status of revolution, the right of which is recognized. Under either theory, however, Grant's terms were beyond the military authority ; but they were doubtless derived as

to their spirit from knowledge of Mr. Lincoln's general views, and perhaps from his direct instructions immediately before the retreat of the enemy began. At any rate, confirmed as they were by universal acclaim, they stand justified in a generosity which should remain graven in memory as a monument to the magnanimity of a victorious general, a great government, and an enlightened people.

Behind them, on the 3d of April, the troops of the hostile armies, marching westward, left Richmond in flames. Forgetting that there is no prudent conflagration, the enemy had set fire to warehouses to destroy his valuable stores of cotton and tobacco. The Confederate troops fired the city, the Federal ones extinguished the flames. Before dawn on the day of the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond, while one of the armies was beginning its retreat and the other was still in position awaiting day, reverberations had rolled along the hills in response to the explosion of one of the enemy's magazines and his war-vessels lying in the James. It was the first positive evidence that the long siege was over. The President had, in anticipation of the great event, remained near Petersburg, aboard the steamer on which he had come from Washington a few days before. Under Warren, left in charge of the troops remaining near Petersburg, the town was occupied early in the morning of the 3d of April, the President and Grant shortly afterwards entering it. Richmond, off to the right, was, later in the morning of the 3d, formally surrendered to General Weitzel, of the Twenty-fifth Corps, of the Army of the James. The President entered the city late on the following day. The flag of the United States was hoisted on the Capitol as the token of victory, but more truly, as in fullest sense, the harbinger of peace.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

FINAL SCENES.

IMMEDIATELY after the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Army of the Potomac was concentrated by General Meade at Burkesville Junction. Sherman learning, on the 11th of April, of the surrender at Appomattox Court House, made a truce with Johnston, who surrendered on the 26th. As soon as certain preliminaries, growing out of the repudiation by the United States of the terms which Sherman had made with the enemy, were adjusted, his army marched northward and encamped near Richmond. Sheridan, first despatched with his cavalry and the Sixth Corps, to join Sherman, returned at once through the removal of that necessity by the surrender of Johnston. He was then sent with troops to Texas, where some show of armed force still remained, but soon surrendered; and after that, to Texas again, in observation of the French occupation of Mexico, which ended in 1867 with the execution of Maximilian of Austria. Long before many of these events had had time to take place, and indeed within a few days, came a national calamity well calculated to shatter the faith of those who believe in a special providence rather than in God's working by larger and more inclusive law. The joybells had scarcely ceased ringing throughout the land, when, on the 14th of April, the man of all men best fitted for restoring harmony among the dismembered States and mutual love among their citizens in a reunited people was stricken down by a madman whose degenerate brain saw glory for himself and salvation for the Southern cause in

an act which was the heaviest misfortune it experienced and one which met the universal execration of mankind. The President, the Vice-President, the officers of the Cabinet were by the plot to be assassinated, and Grant, too, might have been included in its attempted execution, but for the chance that he was absent from the play to which he had been invited to accompany the President. The plot failed with all but the loftiest mark that drew the lightning. Lincoln, the wretched man whose wayworn path had had for the last four years no pleasant turning but in occasional indulgence in the quaint humor with which he had relieved his gloom, whose wan face and bent form had touched every generous heart, whose whole soul was more than ever bent on charity and love for all men, now, in one of the brief moments which a hard fate had decreed, seated peacefully at a play, in the relaxation which he so sorely needed, in the plenitude of his goodness, of wisdom born in him and ripened by experience, of his enormous power for good for a whole people, was done to death by the hands of an assassin. It is almost too pitiful to contemplate, this ending of a life so noble, at such a time, by such a hand, a country dwarfed in an instant by one caitiff stroke.

The dark catafalque took its way through the cities through which Lincoln had passed to his inauguration as President of the United States, bearing his remains to Springfield, Illinois, pausing a few hours in each place, where they lay in state, if that can be so called which brought a mourning people to pay its tribute of affection at his bier. No *fête* day celebrated the victory of which he had paid the penalty in death. The people little recked of victory but as swallowed up in peace, and now saddened, withdrawn into themselves in grief, took in the terrible lesson of national life, of which what they witnessed was the last seal and covenant with which it remained with them for

the future to abide. Through Philadelphia, where in the early morning of Washington's Birthday, the 22d of February, 1861, Lincoln had with his own hands raised the national flag on Independence Hall, saying in his address delivered there, in the shadow of sudden death which even then brooded over him, that he would rather be assassinated than prove false to his duty to the country, towards the same spot, sanctified as the birthplace of the Republic, his remains now passed to lie in state on their way to their final home.

The reins had fallen from Lincoln's nerveless grasp into the hands of one in whom few felt entire confidence, and, as time was to prove, one who deserved the least. Passionately partisan, he seemed to be little fitted for leadership in the political regeneration of the nation. His conduct of affairs at first recognized only the North as having national rights; nothing was too severe for the South in zeal to make treason odious. When, however, through place and power, he came to know that he could shift his position for personal advantage, his stalwart virtue vanished as by the touch of an enchanter's wand. It may well be believed that the political pendulum thus hanging and swinging made the varying time of world-history presented ill accord with the view of correctness of the sober common sense of the people. Congress then made its mistake by impeaching the President, and as the people foresaw the action came to naught. But all this erratic conduct of affairs was fraught with serious consequences to the country in the disorders engendered in the South, enduring through the first term of the following Administration. Evils had grown apace, through the immutable law that wrong multiplies wrong in ever-increasing ratio, and strange, apart from mere mob impulse, were some of the products of those times, now happily almost buried in the ocean of oblivion.

Not until the 24th and 25th of May did the armies of Meade and Sherman, marching on two successive days through the streets of Washington, in the grand final review, present to the nation in that pageant, and in their marvellously quiet return to the arts of peace, the last visible token that the war was over and abiding peace had begun to reign. The war ended, General Meade virtually disappeared from public affairs, save in so far as his able civil and military administration of the departments committed to his care are concerned, and the occasional discussion of his nomination for the Presidency of the United States. He had no political affiliations, however; he never had had any. It was not in his nature or in his training to care aught for these, to seek by extraneous means to buttress or to increase his fortunes. The measure with which justice had been meted out to him was different from that with which it had been meted out to many others. Sherman imprisoned a correspondent of "The New York Herald" on a boat in the Mississippi, that paper declared him insane, and there the matter ended. General Meade punished a correspondent of "The Philadelphia Inquirer," and a number of papers made a compact never to mention his name favorably in their despatches, and this for an act which Grant himself approved. Grant concedes in his memoirs that he, with his headquarters at City Point, had shut General Meade off from the full recognition which he would otherwise have received from the country as the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Remaining at City Point, and thus overshadowing General Meade, he was also absent from the place where, by his own confession, he should have been as commander of all of the armies of the United States, and yet under these conditions where, if ever, *noblesse oblige*, he sent many a despatch from City Point in which the actual commander of the Army of the Potomac received not the

slightest mention. General Meade knew something of Spanish, and may have met the proverb, "*Uno tiené la fama, y otro carda la lana.*"* At any rate he thoroughly knew life and its grim teachings. He pursued the even tenor of his way, bending to no power but obedience to his superiors in authority and to his conscience. Devoted to his military tasks in every rank, wise in his civil administration of affairs, happy in his domestic relations, cheerful in his social ones, silent in the face of the indignity put upon him by the appointment of another to the rank which he should have held, he repined at nothing, sought no favor, inspired by the noblest of all convictions, that he had always done his duty, and perhaps, let us trust, harbored the thought that, when he had passed away, due credit might in the distant future be accorded him by the people whom he had loyally served for the longest time, and victoriously, as the commander of the noble Army of the Potomac.

* "One gets the credit, while another cards the wool."

CHAPTER XXIX.

GENERAL MEADE'S PERSONALITY.

THERE are three interesting aspects of eminent men, without knowledge of all of which their portraiture is felt to be incomplete. These are their relations to family, to the society in which they move, and to the public, whether the last of these be confined to a community, to a nation, or embrace the whole outlying world. And contemplating the inconsistencies exhibited by human beings, knowing, as history and daily life prove, that conduct in one of the spheres of action mentioned may be entirely incongruous with one or both of the others, it is inevitable that the world should feel that it does not fully know a man as he is rounded off by nature and education unless it knows him in all the aspects in which are included his dealings with his fellow-men.

My first recollection of General Meade was when he was a young man who, as a second-lieutenant, had lately resigned from the army, and was acting as the escort of a party from Philadelphia to Washington, of which I was a member at seven years of age. When they stopped at Baltimore, as was always the case in those days, prior to being hauled in the cars hitched to horses through the streets of the town, they stopped for dinner at a hotel near the station, Lieutenant Meade commissioning me to go to the office and order luncheon to be brought up on trays to the parlor, including a glass of ale for each of the party. Pondering as I went down stairs that he had omitted me, and probably intentionally, in the order for ale, and anticipating Bismarck

by many years in the audacity which he showed in producing segars in the presence of the Austrian commissioners, as an assertion of equality with them, I added to the order for ale a glass for myself. Reappearing in the parlor with the waiter and the whole jingling paraphernalia of the luncheon, I remember well the young lieutenant's surprise at finding that I had asserted my dignity so promptly, and had I been a little older I should doubtless have seen that quizzical twinkle in his eyes which I came to know so well in later years, as he settled the unities of the drama by drinking the extra ale himself.

In these pictures of the past main facts stand out in bold relief, while unimportant details are buried in oblivion. In consequence, the next picture that presents itself to me is at breakfast in Washington, the next morning, with Lieutenant Meade seated at table at his mother's right hand. In travelling he had evidently been in some ordinary attire, for his dress had not struck me one way or another, but now, young as I was, and used as I was to see fashionably-dressed people in Philadelphia, I was struck at once with his costume and general appearance. He wore his hair down to the nape of his neck, as was the fashion of the day, and for long afterwards, and that being the fashion, did not of course attract my attention; but what did attract and fix it was the new experience to me of a man with long ringlets, looking as to his head like a cavalier of the time of Charles I. He was, in a word, a dandy, to which what I had seen of the same order of being in Philadelphia was only the faintest approach. Without being particularly good-looking in face and figure, he was tall and slender and graceful, with an air of the highest breeding. But beyond all this there was something which engaged my attention, and but for which I should doubtless, from my rude, boyish point of view, have regarded him with contempt, as a

young man of twenty-two who had curls. That circumstance was his demeanor to his mother. As I have said, he sat at his mother's right at breakfast, and then, and whenever he occupied that place, his air of tenderness to her was so blended with indescribable deference and courtesy, that had she been a queen-mother, instead of the widow of a citizen of a democratic-republic, her son could not have shown her more princely respect. Not unused as I was to see courtesy in the family life of the society in which I moved, this I recognized as beyond anything that I had ever witnessed, nor have I to this day ever again seen its like; and such as it was when I first saw it, it endured to the day of his mother's death. The curtain then rose to me upon other scenes, Lieutenant Meade departing, and I remaining for several months at school in Washington.

Flitting about the country from north to south, during several years of civil-engineering and surveying, during which time I had been recalled to Philadelphia, Lieutenant Meade again rose prominently before my mind through his marriage, in 1840, with Margaretta, the eldest daughter of the Hon. John Sergeant, distinguished in many public and private capacities. Shortly thereafter he re-entered the army, and was assigned to duty with my father, Major Hartman Bache, his brother-in-law, which had the effect for some time of throwing the families much together. Establishing his home in Philadelphia, he naturally felt that he was settled for some time at least, when the Mexican War occurred. I can see him now, as the news that he was ordered to Mexico was broken to him as gently as possible by his immediate chief, and he could not avoid showing that it was far from agreeable to him, for he had not been settled in Philadelphia quite two years, and the war with Mexico was not one, I imagine, that could have awak-

ened his enthusiasm. How he actually regarded it, always remained unknown to me. It was his habit to avoid discussion of the disagreeable and self-evident, unless things touched him to the quick, and here was a case concerning him as a soldier, and he was every inch a soldier, and must not repine, and he did not, but after a momentary sadness cheerfully went to his appointed duty, and did it well.

For some time after his return to his quiet home and domestic habits, the chief fruit of his absence being a brevet for service, making him a first-lieutenant, he led a relatively secluded life, so far as general society was concerned. He was in that interim which generally comes to married men of the world, when society holds forth no special inducement to frequent it much until the time arrives, as it did in due course with him, when children grown-up are to be introduced into its precincts. It was at this period, fallow to Lieutenant Meade, except for the performance of routine duties and pleasant reading and study, that at seventeen years of age, I was able, in intimate association with him, to rise for the first time to some real appreciation of the man. In his modest house there was a little room dignified by the name of study, in which there was a wood-fire, or in which one could be quickly kindled, as I often found out by actual experience. In front of this, during a leisure hour of winter, he loved to sit and *tissoner*, in French fashion, or what is rarer still, to let a friend do it. In that genial glow it was, that he fought over his battles of the Mexican War with me. But, so far as he seemed to appear in the operations, he might as well have been at home; and yet I know from the terms of his brevet, and from the testimony of brother-officers, that he was not an idle spectator of the battle-fields of the war. He had the gift of clear statement, and I can remember well now how a certain gun was placed at the

battle of Resaca de la Palma at a critical juncture of the fight. Nor were the events of the previous Seminole War forgotten, although he was, through the breaking down of his health, debarred from continuing with his command until the end of the campaign. These are pleasant memories of flickering firelight, interspersed with those of discussions, in which we covered topics of peace as well as of war; occurrences in connection with the survey of the northeastern boundary of the United States, on which he had served; matters of civil-engineering in which the future was to bring him much further experience; the complications of Europe, what not. He was an excellent *raconteur*. He had the rare, inestimable gift, of ignoring the irrelevant, of treating his subject with sprightliness, and of maintaining its parts in due proportion. As I discovered later in life, when ability to appreciate was conjoined with some knowledge of the world, he was an excellent talker, who, although fond of argument, reserved it for proper occasions, and in general conversation touched his subject lightly, with trifles that relished because they were not expanded. Moreover, a rare trait, he never impended vainGloriously over youth, but encouraged its frankness to speak without offence, if only what it said were honest. His thrust was keen, if he thought a lesson needed, but he always took a *riposte* with as good humor as he made the assault. To poke fun at people on account of some peculiarity was a favorite amusement of his; but always executed genially; but again, and this is the rarest of traits, he stood treatment of the same kind without a shade of resentment, and as though he positively enjoyed it. Let it be understood, however, that reference is here made to intercourse with his intimates, for he would have been a very rash man who should have presumed to come within those invisible, but impenetrable lines with which, at varying

distances for the world at large, the personality of a gentleman is girt about. It is to be regretted that the man sitting by that fire, which we have left for a moment of brief discursiveness as to his character, did not, as general, write some memoir of the greater military affairs in which he was engaged in later years. But perhaps that is a selfish wish; he rests well, and his chiefest laurels are yet to come.

An occurrence of about that time threw (to me) so much light upon his kindness of heart and his indifference to discomfort, when duty was concerned, that I introduce it here in illustration of those features of his character. The light-house on the Brandywine Shoal, at the mouth of Delaware Bay was to be built. It had been planned in the office to which Lieutenant Meade was now again attached, and he naturally formed one of the party of officers who went down the Bay on the schooner "Alexander Mitchell," to fix upon the site of the light-house on the long shoal there, and to establish the platform from which the screw-piles to support the structure were to be driven. It was an event in those comparatively quiet days. The screw-pile had been invented by the Englishman, Alexander Mitchell, and this time was the first occasion on which it was to be used in this country. With the operations ensuing within the next week we have naught to do, these preliminary statements having been made simply for the purpose of accounting for the circumstance that, at the end of that time, Lieutenant Meade found himself with two other persons, of whom I was one, on his return to Philadelphia in a collier. I had had no previous notion that anything in the world could be so dirty, nor that any such discomfort could exist in the midst of civilization. Even the cabin of the vessel was ground-in with dirt, not by any means impalpable, for it felt gritty. Dinner announced, the three passengers sat down to table. The cloth was beyond anything that

could have been conceived of in the way of a palimpsest record of departed meals. The chief dish was one of execrably boiled rice, flanked by a small piece of salt-pork, and without a condiment to use by way of disguise for the food. Not a sign, however, did Lieutenant Meade, delicately as he was nurtured, give, that he was not dining sumptuously, although he was free to make it in the absence of the captain, who did not preside at table, and of the grimy cook, whose duties ended with the delivery of the repast. Worse still, he ate with avidity the soggy rice and rusty pork before him, and laughed merrily at my discomfiture, predicting that the future would bring its lesson of resignation to even this condition of the *cuisine*. Here was a man who, at his own table, was ever on the lookout for tidbits to share with an appreciative guest, and now he was eating a mess fit for a savage, and apparently relishing it. Strange as it may seem to say, it must be recognized as a soldierly accomplishment. That night I saw him in another and a very different *rôle*. Our fellow-passenger fell ill. It is trying enough to be ill anywhere, and to nurse anywhere, but to be ill or to nurse in the cabin of a collier, illuminated with a single miserable candle, is wretchedness itself. Lieutenant Meade, however, at once set to work as the cheerful attendant of our fellow-traveller, as sympathetic and helpful as though he had possessed nothing but feminine accomplishments.

Within this period the house of Lieutenant Meade had long been a centre of enjoyment to both great and small, particularly to the youth of the day with whose fathers and mothers his family were intimate. His own children had been growing apace, and his kith and kin gathered more and more about him. There were occasions when music was the attraction of the evening, and the concerted pieces of his musical wife, on the piano, led by the first violinist

of Philadelphia society, gifted even when compared with professional musicians of the first rank, brought responsive silence for the enjoyment of the time. But there were other evenings entirely different, in which battles-royal with boxing-gloves and sofa-pillows took the place of music, and the shouts of the victors and vanquished, and the cry of the hostess in alarm for her household gods of bric-à-brac, filled the rooms but lately devoted to the strains of Beethoven or Spohr, and Lieutenant Meade, as one of the most boyish of the noisy gathering, called for truce only when he thought it would otherwise soon be demanded by the neighbors. The capacity for fun is undoubtedly one of the signs of a healthy mind. When enjoyment of wit and humor and innocent ebullitions of spirits ceases, we may be sure that decadence has set in, and this capacity of enjoyment Lieutenant Meade did not to his latest day outlive.

A few more years passed, and we departed in different directions, to see each other in future only at infrequent intervals. On one of these occasions in which we casually met, it was at Key West, where Lieutenant Meade (now Captain) was on his way to inspect a light-house which he was building on Sand Key, a few miles beyond, and the southernmost point of the United States. He took me over there one night in his vessel, and we spent the next day there together and alone, except for the workmen. Then came his charge of the Lake Survey, and invitation to me by detail to supervise the topographical branch of the work, which proposition fell through, as such things often do in the course of that official routine which is known as red-tape. And then there was a very long period during which we saw very little of each other. Going from north to south, and south to north, I heard the extremists of the North, under its sectional appellation, speak of their black brethren, and those of the South, similarly under the

sectional view of things, speak of the same beings as ones who had been saved from savagery, christianized, and otherwise much blessed through the beneficence of slavery. Observing, however, that some of the hardest taskmasters were Northern men, and having some knowledge of where manumission had taken place, and where it had not, and that the beneficence of slavery held most obvious relation to the cultivation of cotton, which the laborer did not own, and that much of the philanthropy extant was attributable to living under different conditions, I came early to the conclusion that, if for a brief space, the Northerner could live in the South, and the Southerner in the North, the views of each would be essentially modified. I regarded the matter as impossible to be argued about from two so different standpoints as those occupied by North and South, where on both sides passions and ignorance formed the chief basis, and with the thoughtlessness, or perhaps the sublime indifference of youth, awaited a gradual self-cure of the body politic by a sort of *vis medicatrix naturæ*, little suspecting that, below the quiet crust on which the dwellings of the country rested, were fires which, after portents dire, were to burst forth and ravage the land. I had heard, long before, in a casual visit to Washington, the oratory of Webster, Clay, Calhoun, and Benton on the question of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and many a time afterwards the mutterings of discontent; but yet, not until within a year of the occurrence of actual war, had I imagined, amidst the factitious serenity of the time, that it was possible.

Captain Meade, always conservative, both by nature and training, and indifferent, as most army officers of the time were, to many of the movements of politics, probably had no more idea than the majority of his fellow-citizens that a woful time betided. When the war broke out he was at Detroit, in charge of the Lake Survey, where he had been

stationed for some time. All officers of the regular army must have then been anxious as to the position which would be assigned to them in view of the prevalence of a new sort of rank called "political general." What he may have feared in this direction I never ascertained amid the rapidly shifting scenes of the times. What I heard him say, however, among a group of friends, was that he would not give up his captaincy in the corps of Topographical Engineers merely for the command of a regiment. The regular army had been very small in numbers, and now, although the resignations from it had been comparatively few, still, as the originally small numbers of officers had thereby been reduced in numbers, every one of those remaining had a right to think that he would take precedence of civilians, especially if he had had actual experience in military operations. It must have been in June, 1861, when I met him in Philadelphia, and heard him casually make the remark mentioned. If that be so, he must have been either on his way to or return from Washington, where, in the latter part of June, he went to see if he could not get some increased rank in the new regiments of the regular army, then being organized for active operations. He was promised in Washington that something, not specified, should be done, and thereupon returned to Detroit. Time sped on while he heard nothing, until the first battle of Bull Run took place, when he was offered the colonelcy of the First Michigan Volunteers, and determined, if need were, to accept it, even at the expense of resignation from the Topographical Engineers. Early in August, however, while absent at Lake Superior on his special duty, orders arrived for him to repair to Washington and take command of one of the new companies of topographical engineers, just authorized by law. Hardly, however, had he reached Detroit, on his return from Lake Superior, and when he was preparing to go to Washington

to undertake the designated duty, when he received his appointment as brigadier-general of volunteers, dated Aug. 31st, 1861, with directions to report to General George B. McClellan. Sending in his last report on the Lake Survey, dated Aug. 31st, he went through at once to Washington, without stopping in Philadelphia, and proceeded to organize and drill his brigade, the Second, of the Division of General George A. McCall, Pennsylvania Reserves, then stationed at Tenallytown, Maryland.

Again our paths in life separated, General Meade going to his duty with the Army of the Potomac, and I to St. Louis, from which place I did not return for eighteen months, hearing then first of the battle of Gettysburg, or rather of some battle in progress, nameless then, from the refugees who flocked into the cars as far off from the scene as Pittsburg. As the narrative of the preceding pages covers General Meade's rise from brigadier-general of volunteers to major-general in the regular army during these troublous times, no mention of any detail of it has any proper place here, and so we will in imagination pass on to the time when, the war having ended, he was first stationed in Philadelphia, in charge of the military division of the Atlantic; afterwards, with some changes in the definition of its boundaries, officially known as the Department of the East; whence he was ordered for a time, during the unsettled condition of civic affairs, while the reconstruction of the government of Southern States was going on, to the command of the Third Military Division, headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia; whence again he returned, and finally, to his former command of the Division of the Atlantic.

Here, relieved, for the first time for years, from the strain of grave responsibilities, the careworn lines of his face, and the extreme spareness of his figure, records of many a tented field, departed, and once more he entered into the

Geo. G. Meade

gayeties of society, and in response to the wishes of his fellow-citizens took part in forwarding municipal improvement. And thus, after the turbulence of his later life, his days seemed to glide pleasantly along in the enjoyment of well-earned repose, filled with agreeable duties and pleasurable relaxation, until we find him, at the height of health and enjoyment of life, so suddenly called away, that it seemed at first incredible. Only two weeks before he died he had called at the house of his brother-in-law, mentioned as his former chief in engineering duty, and expressed to me great surprise when I told him that I thought the patient very ill. He then asked if it would be unwise to see him, to which I replied that, on the contrary, I thought that a visit from him would be beneficial. Accordingly, as I had anticipated, his visit had a cheering effect, but not to the extent of making the patient believe that he would recover; for he plainly told General Meade that he knew his time had come. Most tenderly General Meade tried to dislodge this fixed idea, until, feeling that he should take his departure, he rose, and bending over his old friend, they kissed each other in what proved within a few hours to be a final farewell; and thus were severed the bonds of mutual pleasure and pain which had joined them all their lives. So near then was General Meade's own unexpected end, that his last official act was the announcement by letter of this death of his brother-officer to the War Department.

And now we reach the period at which, within a few days of the occurrence which has just been recounted, he was suddenly called upon to leave all that he held most dear on earth, and when he was to so master his spirit that, with a perfectly clear mind, he treated dying as loftily as he had treated life. A singular fatality had brought it about that, although I sometimes saw nothing of him for long years,

I seemed to be always present at critical junctures, and was now. Within a few days after the event just recorded, I met him at his headquarters, about eleven o'clock in the morning of the day in which he was stricken, when he was never in better spirits. At about three o'clock in the afternoon I met a person who told me that he had been taken home desperately ill. Not long after we had parted, and when he had gone out with a party of friends, he had been seized with double-pneumonia, promoted by his old wound, had sent for his son, George, and later, had given all his instructions for what he regarded as the inevitable event, with a surety of knowledge in which the dying often excel in judgment the most skillful physician. To the usual well-meant remonstrances against thinking himself desperately ill, he replied, in effect, that he knew better, that there was no time to lose, for he had his final instructions and wishes to communicate. He was right, for, as the event proved, he had not many hours to live. The funeral services took place at St. Mark's Church, and the procession passed through the streets of Philadelphia to Fairmount, whence his remains were borne on a steam-barge on the Schuylkill, on whose banks the crash of regimental musketry and the dirges from bands resounded as the boat slowly passed on its way to Laurel Hill. The clods loudly fell on the coffin, and the last thing that I remember is the face of General Sheridan looking into the grave, while General Humphreys stood for a moment aside to await his turn of paying his last respects to the dead, whom he had dearly loved in life.

Necessarily few as are these outlines, they fairly represent the man. A few more strokes to complete the sketch, and then the portraiture will be sufficiently complete. We have thus far seen General Meade as son, relation, and genial friend and acquaintance and companion, as a domestic

husband and a cheerful father, sharing with his children even in the frolicsomeness of youth. It remains to show that, in other spheres of life, he was equally estimable. His sentiments towards his brothers and sisters were always tender. Dependents were always sure that they could secure the full measure of sympathy and aid from him which they deserved, and he was able, with justice to others, to bestow. For enemies he had no time or heart for more than casual condemnation, and the severest weapon that he used was ridicule. His *savoir faire* was included in so comprehensive a condition of *savoir vivre*, that his decisions on matters of social propriety bore the stamp of infallibility. Liberal in his views, far beyond the average officer of the army, ready, at a moment's notice, to accord praise where he deemed it due, he would boldly face prejudice at a moment's notice, and speak out his mind frankly in the interest of truth. I remember well an incident illustrative of this, which occurred during a conversation at his headquarters in Philadelphia a few years after the war was over. An army officer said to him, as nearly as I can recollect, in the following words:—"You know, after all, General, that none but officers of the regular army amounted to anything in the war." To this General Meade promptly replied, saying that he could not coincide with that opinion, and added, "What do you say to Terry?" mentioning others whose names I have forgotten. And this he did with such a burst of interest and overwhelming statement of fact, that the officer of whom I spoke was fairly silenced. If General Meade had a fault, it was in the excess of his ardor of truth-telling; that is, regarding the practice from a politic point of view. In consequence, he would often, in scorn of the danger, when the case was one of chivalric demand for the truth in the cause of justice, run all risks of having his words injuriously repeated. From the worldly point of view, he was often im-

prudent in outspokenness to his interlocutors, in both forgetfulness and defiance of the fact, that the great majority of men like unpleasant truths to be considerably diluted. As, moreover, some of the world is basely, as well as some of it imprudently constituted, he was therefore often the victim of mention of what should never have been repeated. At best it is impossible, even with good intentions, to repeat remarks not intended for the general ear. They lack the interpretation of the tone of voice, the expression of face, and the whole setting in which they are uttered, and not least, the stimulus which drew them forth. In speaking, however, of this fiery advocacy of the truth to which General Meade was addicted, it would be unfair not to couple with it that, if he allowed himself free scope to speak his mind, he was equally liberal to the man who opposed him with an opinion which clashed with his. I have known but few men who had, equally with him, the power to cast aside for the moment all prepossession and argue a case afresh, as if it had just arisen, simply upon the evidence and its merits.

He was as open as the day in all that belonged of right to the knowledge of others, and dark as night when the repository of what it was proper to conceal. He was not disposed to jump to conclusions, despite the quickness of his perceptions and the general ardor of his temperament. On the contrary, he was accustomed, from his earliest youth, to weigh carefully the arguments on each side of a question which was to lead to an important conclusion, and to cast the balance deliberately. But when once he had cast the balance, it could not be changed, except upon new evidence; and so, whether he were acting in a civil or a military capacity, he was never vacillating, never tortured as some men of infirm minds are, who only need to make a decision and take a course, to be assailed with

doubts, and to wish it were other than it is, and if reversed, to feel in the same uncertainty.

The most stupid charge that was ever made against General Meade was that there were occasions during the war when, although he was a religious man, he had been known to swear as terribly as the army in Flanders. It is difficult to discuss this accusation with the gravity which, from its frequent repetition, has been evidently supposed to be its due. But, as it has been so treated, the duty is imposed of treating it here with equal seriousness. The degree of obliquity of the act depends upon the motive and the occasion. Any man would rather be sworn at than prayed for by his enemy, and his sanctimonious enemy sometimes takes advantage of knowledge of the fact. I never heard General Meade swear, which proves at least, that he was not covered, as the Scriptures say, with swearing as with a garment. Therefore, his swearing must have occurred only on occasions. Why, then, when we know that men under stress may and do swear, that the Old Guard swore at Waterloo, that Washington and Jackson and many others on occasions swore, should the offense have been so heinous in General Meade, especially when driven by excitement, and when that excitement grew out of intense leadership in battle? In such a tide an oath that drives the energies of men together for concentrated effort is, as much as prayer, born of the sense of duty seeking to achieve its end. When General Meade broke his sword to fragments by striking with its flat the renegade soldier falling back when his comrades were sweeping forward in a charge on the enemy's position, the action was only a form of concentration of purpose. There are times for all things, and this was not one for prayer. What we should see under either manifestation, prayer or oath, is the heart's desire for victory, while the banner floats towards

the front, or maintains its hold upon the stricken field. The same man, all vehemence in battle, was as calm as a priest when, one night on the Chesapeake, the boat on which he was, run into by another in the dark, and thought to be sinking, he passed around among the passengers with helpful words. The same man who could rage like a lion on the field, and lead his men impetuously to storm an embattled line, was cool in council, and could have sat as calmly as the dying Bayard at the rout of Rebec, at the second battle near Marignano, with his sword thrust into the ground, so that his eyes could rest for the last time on its cross and upon the advance of the victorious enemy.

Good horses, as the English say, go in all forms. Even good men are moved to action, and in action, simply according to their constitution. In all my acquaintance with General Meade, where I lay under the disadvantage with him of being his junior in years, and for a long time his inferior in experience of life, I encountered in him but one ebullition of temper, and that slight, and it was he who afterwards sought that it should be forgotten. It ought to be evident, then, from this fact, and from others similar of which I know, that, although it is here freely conceded that he was irascible on occasions, the defect in that direction could not have been egregious. Not only is this so, but any vent which his irascibility might unreasonably make, was always coupled with regret and cordial desire, if he had been wrong, to make amends. Such explosion in him, great or small, had generally no *arrière pensée* back of it, but was simply temperamental. Not differing in degree from that of which many men are constantly guilty, prominence has been given to this trait by the distinction of General Meade, and by the ulterior motives of adversaries, thus bringing it into the most exaggerated light, when it should have been almost lost to view from the fact of its evanes-

cence in action and memory, and from observation of the generosity of nature with which he recognized its existence, strove to master it, and earnestly sought to repair its consequences. He did not even require to be met half way towards restoration of pleasant relations, but was ever ready for it by word or deed or delicate ignoring of the past. Indeed, such was the real kindness and unsuspiciousness of his nature, that he was led on occasions to trust men unworthy of his confidence, so fearlessly did he bear his heart upon his sleeve for daws to peck at.

We have now glanced at the career of General Meade from early manhood until the day of his death, some of the military details of which are to be found in the preceding pages. He must have come fully to realize the truth of the dictum of Cæsar;—"As in ordinary affairs, so too in war, chance is potent."* Chance bore a large share in both his military and his civil life, and still bears a share in the neglect to which his memory has been partially consigned, until now, when there are signs of the breaking light which will not only rescue it from that partial oblivion, but will raise him in the estimation of posterity to the rank which he deserves as one of the saviors of his country. His was a symmetrical character, fitted for social life, the cabinet, and for active engagement in the most stirring of civil and military events. The way in which he viewed and met every crisis could not be better typified than by the quaint old-French motto of the coat-of-arms of his family,—TOUJOURS PRÊST.

* *Multum quum in omnibus rebus, tum in re militari potest fortuna.* —*Cæsar, de Bello Gallico.*

APPENDIX.

THE LETTERS THAT PASSED BETWEEN GENERALS GRANT AND LEE PRECEDING, THE LAST TWO ACCOMPANYING, THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

No. 1.

APRIL 7, 1865.

General: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

No. 2.

APRIL 7, 1865.

General: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE,
General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

No. 3.

APRIL 8, 1865.

General: Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon,

namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

No. 4.

APRIL 8, 1865.

General: I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A.M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

R. E. LEE,
General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

No. 5.

APRIL 9, 1865.

General: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.

By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.

Seriously hoping that our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

No. 6.

APRIL 9, 1865.

General: I received your note of this morning on the picket line whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday, with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE,
General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

No. 7.

APRIL 9, 1865.

General R. E Lee, Commanding C. S. A.:

Your note of this date is but this moment, 11.50 A.M. received. In consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am, at this writing, about four miles west of Walker's Church, and will push forward to the front, for the purpose of meeting you.

Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

No. 8.

APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, VA.
APRIL 9, 1865.

General: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor the private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so

long as they observe their paroles, and the laws in force where they may reside.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.

No. 9.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
APRIL 9, 1865.

General: I received your letter of this date, containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulation into effect.

R. E. LEE,
General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

INDEX.

Abercrombie, Brig.-Gen. John J., 67.
Achilles, 181.
Acklam Hall, 4.
Acquia Creek, 142, 146, 148, 157, 224.
Act of Congress, 38.
Agua Nueva, 14.
Alabama, 519.
Alabama, Florida and Georgia Railroad, 10.
Aldie's Gap, 286, 352.
Alexander's Bridge, 115, 120, 122.
Alexandria, 43, 46, 65, 74, 146, 147, 153, 157, 160, 161, 169, 173, 176.
Alexandrian War, 184.
Allen's farm, 118, 123.
Alma, the, 33.
Alps, the, 314.
Amelia Court House, 532, 533, 534, 535.
Amelia Sulphur Springs, 534.
America, 4, 5, 7, 8, 35, 37.
American cavalry, 35.
Ames, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Adelbert, 499.
Amissville, 158.
Amnesty, proclamation of, 399.
Anderson, Lieut.-Gen. Richard H., 164, 167, 182, 188, 195, 203, 235, 276, 278, 331, 333, 376, 382, 420, 421–422, 534, 536, 537.
Annapolis, 405.
Antæus, 103.
Antietam, 77, 101, 179, 185, 200, 201, 212, 214, 217, 220, 222, 256, 285, 356, 358.
Antietam Creek, 191, 201, 202, 203, 205, 208, 210.
Antioch Church, 407.
Appomattox Court House, 40, 420, 533, 535, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 551.
Appomattox River, 79, 438, 463, 464, 469, 472, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 487, 494, 496, 506, 521, 522, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 543, 546.
Appomattox Station, 540.
Arabs, 58.
Aransas Bay, 12.
Archer, Brig.-Gen. James J., 236.
Arcola, 331, 364.
Arkansas, 10, 80.
Arlington Heights, 43, 45, 179, 223.
Armistead, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A., 346, 348.
Armstrong's Mill, 500, 508.
Army of Northern Virginia, 36, 73, 153, 213, 232, 256, 285, 286, 287, 344, 353, 354, 357, 359, 365, 367, 368, 374, 375, 386, 398, 402, 404, 406, 407, 412, 422, 434, 520, 540, 541 note–546, 548, 549, 551.
Army of the Cumberland, 365.
Army of the James, 437, 439, 449, 483, 484, 494, 498, 507, 523, 527, 537, 550.
Army of the Potomac, 26, 29, 30, 61, 73-75, 77, 78, 82, 83, 103, 138, 145–147, 154–158, 172, 177, 178, 182, 213, 217, 220–223, 226, 227, 232, 241, 247, 249, 251, 253, 254, 259, 262, 265, 275, 276, 279, 284, 287, 290, 292, 303, 305, 321, 327, 335, 337, 341, 343, 345–347, 350–354, 357, 358, 361–370, 374, 375, 378–381, 386, 388, 392, 393, 398, 399, 401, 402, 404–406, 408–410, 412, 432, 435, 437, 439, 440–451, 455–457, 468, 471–479, 482–484, 486, 487, 489, 494, 498, 506, 507, 509, 511, 513, 515, 519, 524, 530, 533, 547, 549, 551, 554, 555, 566.

Army of the Shenandoah, 73, 439, 509, 511–513.
Army of Virginia, 73, 145, 147, 148, 158, 167–169, 172, 177.
Arnold, Capt. W. A., 344, 376.
Artaxerxes, 58.
Ashby's Gap, 286.
Ashland, 106, 515.
Ashland Station, 441.
Athenians, 57.
Atlanta, 519, 566.
Atlantic Ocean, 58.
Atlee's Station, 446.
Austerlitz, 364.
Austria, 351, 551.
Averell, Brevet Maj.-Gen. William W., 255, 440.
Ayres, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Romeyn B., 332, 333, 489, 497, 501, 528.

Bache, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Hartman, 12, 558.
Badeau, Brig.-Gen. Adam, 419, 460.
Bailey's Creek, 484, 488.
Bakersville, 213.
Bald Hill, 167, 168.
Bald Top, 329, note.
"Baldy," 172, 212, 334.
Ball's Bluff, 80.
Baltimore, 9, 43, 134, 144, 182, 185, 304, 306, 358, 511, 556.
Baltimore Turnpike, 296, 299, 309, 311, 325, 337, 351, 354.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 64, 182.
Banks, Maj.-Gen. Nathaniel P., 78, 103, 145, 148–153, 355, 437.
Banks's Ford, 255, 257, 258, 262, 275, 278.
Barbados, 2, 3.
Barhamsville, 89.
Barlow, Maj.-Gen. Francis C., 99, 268, 293, 415, 416, 424, 425, 448, 453, 468, 473, 538, 539.
Barnard, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John G., 74, 85, 135, 438, 439.
Barnes, Brevet Maj.-Gen. James, 165, 332, 333.
Barnett's Ford, 170, 385, 386, 387.
Barry, Brevet Maj.-Gen. William F., 53.
Bartlett, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Joseph J., 114, 526.
Bartlett's Mill, 386, 387, 392, 407.
Barlow, Col. Francis S., 50.
Battle-fields, 35.
Bay of Cadiz, 7.
Bayard, Chevalier, 572.
Bayard, Brig.-Gen. George D., 238.
Beauregard, Gen. Peter G. T., 43–49, 60, 68–71, 73, 106, 438, 439, 455, 468.
Beaver Dam, 272.
Beaver Dam Creek, 92, 93, 102, 108–111, 144, 447.
Beaver Dam Station, 441.
Beckwith, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Amos, 67.
Bee, Brig.-Gen. Bernard E., 50.
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 563.
Benton, Thomas H., 564.
Berea Church, 254.
Berlin, 359.
Bermuda Hundred, 438, 441, 442, 448, 455, 459–463, 467, 468, 471, 475, 482, 485, 488, 506.
Berry, Maj.-Gen. Hiram G., 267–269, 271.
Berryville, 285, 286.
Best, Capt., 268.
Bethesda Church, 447.
Beverly Ford, 352.
Biddle, Col. James C., 272, 276–278, 361.
Big Hunting Run, 269, 272.
Bigelow, Capt. John, 334, 335.
Bingham, Brig.-Gen. Henry H., 377, 503.
Birney, Maj.-Gen. David B, 240, 267, 268, 310, 312, 331, 333, 334, 424, 454, 465, 468, 469, 488, 494, 495, 546.
Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 556.
Black Walnut Run, 386.
Blackburn's Ford, 55.
Blackwater River, 479.
Bladensburg, 74.
Blücher, Field Marshal von, 35, 259, 404.
Blue Mountains, 180.
Blue Ridge, 25, 78, 149, 152, 179, 180, 185, 216, 217, 223, 227, 284, 286, 360, 366, 368, 515, 516 note.
Blunt's Bridge, 479.
Bolivar Heights, 180, 189, 196, 214.

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 7, 29, 33, 59, 61, 75, 77, 107, 127, 198, 200, 213, 331, 364, 397, 434, 517, 518.
Boonsboro', 186, 187, 192, 194, 200–202.
Boonsboro' Gap, 200.
Borie, Adolph E., 405, 406.
Bosphorus, 58.
Bottom's Bridge, 90, 94, 95, 102, 108, 119, 143, 442.
Bowling Green, 431.
Boydton Plank Road, 496, 497, 499, 501–504, 506, 508, 509, 523–526.
Boydton Plank Road Bridge, 500.
Brackett's Ford, 122.
Brady, Capt. James, 97.
Branch, Brig.-Gen. Lawrence O'B., 111.
Brandy Station, 283, 352, 365, 369, 381, 384, 401, 413.
Brandywine Shoal, 561.
Breckenridge, Maj.-Gen. John C., 516 note.
Bristoe Station, 159, 160, 370, 372, 374–376, 378, 380, 384, 397.
Broad Run, 159, 369, 375, 376, 378, 380.
Brock Road, 265, 266, 410, 412, 416, 420–422.
Brooks, Brig.-Gen. William T. H., 451, 464.
Brown, Brevet-Maj. Theodore F., 344.
Brownsville Gap, 182, 188, 189, 196.
Buchanan, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Robert C., 168, 171.
Buckeystown, 183.
Buckland Mills, 380.
"Buckland Races," 380.
Buell, Maj.-Gen. Don Carlos, 80, 83, 249.
Buena Vista, 14.
Buford, Maj.-Gen. John, 291–293, 297, 300, 301, 306, 307, 331, 332, 352, 356, 366–369.
Bull Run, 19, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48–52, 55, 59–62, 79, 164, 168–170, 378, 380, 565.
Bull Run, 2d, 73, 147, 160, 212, 285.
Bull Run Mountains, 153, 159, 286.
Bunker Hill, 64, 70.
Burgess's Mill, 497, 499, 501–503, 506, 507.
Burgess's Mill Bridge, 500.
Burkesville Junction, 476, 524, 532, 533, 535, 551.
Burns, Brig.-Gen. William W., 129, 133.
Burnside, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E., 49–52, 54, 63, 80, 182, 191, 200, 204–209, 220–229, 232–238, 240–247, 250, 253, 274, 405, 408, 409, 413, 414, 416, 417, 423, 430, 434, 447, 452, 453, 484–486.
Buschbeck, Col. Adolphus, 266.
Butler, Anthony, 4.
Butler, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F., 78–80, 398, 399, 404, 406, 437–439, 441, 442, 448, 459, 461, 468, 470 note, 475, 482–484, 499, 507.
Butler, Margaret Coates, 4.
Butterfield, Maj.-Gen. Daniel, 165, 277.
Byron, Lord, 19, 344.

Cadiz, 2, 5, 6, 7.
Cadwalader, Maj.-Gen. George, 67.
Cæsar, Caius Julius, 31, 183, 184, 234, 295, 331, 518, 573.
Caldwell, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John C., 136, 330, 332, 371, 372, 376.
Calhoun, John C., 564.
Canadian River, 10.
Candy, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Charles, 309, 310.
Cape Fear River, 507.
Carlisle, 290.
Carlisle Road, 293.
Carnifex Ferry, 79.
Carpenter's Ford, 475.
Carrick's Ford, 43.
Carroll, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Samuel S., 243, 337, 339, 417 note.
Casey, Maj.-Gen. Silas, 86, 90, 95, 96, 97, 99.
Cashtown Pass, 292, 356, 357.
Catlett's Station, 157, 371–375.
Catoctin Range, 183, 194, 356.
Cedar Creek, 364, 514.
Cedar Mountain, 145, 146, 149, 152, 156.
Cedar Run, 159, 371, 372.
Cemetery Hill, 293, 296, 299, 300, 308, 322, 325–327, 329, 336, 337, 339, 344, 347.
Cemetery Ridge, 296, 299, 300, 311, 324–329, 333, 334, 344, 345, 347, 349, 350.

Central Road, 119, 126, 456, 494, 495, 499.
Centreville, 43, 46–48, 52, 54–56, 60, 65, 84, 153, 169, 364, 371, 373–375, 378, 384.
Centreville Heights, 369, 370, 378, 379.
Cervantes, 441.
Chaffin's Bluff, 488, 494.
Chamberlain's Run, 526.
Chamberlin, Lieut.-Col. Thomas, 417–note.
Chambliss, Brig.-Gen. John R., 352.
Chambersburg, 216, 291, 304, 340, 510.
Chambersburg Turnpike, 292, 355.
Chancellor House, 272, 276.
Chancellorsville, 252, 254, 259, 260, 263, 264, 267, 268, 272, 274–276, 279–282, 354, 359, 407–410, 433.
Chantilly, 169, 170.
Chapman, Lieut.-Col. William, 168.
Charles I., 557.
Charles City Court House, 458, 475.
Charles City Cross Roads, 120, 121, 124, 128.
Charles City Road, 117, 121.
Charles River Cross Roads, 120.
Charles River Road, 119, 123, 456.
Charleston Harbor, 40.
Charlestown, 64, 68–71.
Charlottesville, 454, 474.
Chase, Salmon P., 9.
Chattanooga, 401.
Chesapeake Bay, 78, 79, 135, 572.
Chester Gap, 284, 360.
Chesterfield, Lord, 12.
Chesterfield Bridge, 433.
Chesterfield Station, 442.
Chickahominy River, 77, 79, 90–98, 102, 105, 108, 109, 111, 112, 115–117, 119, 120, 122–124, 142–144, 442, 444, 446, 447, 450, 451, 456–460, 475, 494.
Church of England, 4.
Cinga River, 234.
City Point, 461, 482, 483, 510, 512 note–513, 518, 521, 554.
Civil War, 13, 17, 33–35, 37, 75, 83, 518.
Claiborne Road, 500, 502, 503, 507.
Clay Henry, 564.
Cobb, Brig.-Gen. Thomas R. R., 110, 188, 236.
Coggin's Point, 141.
Cold Harbor, 402, 435, 441, 448–450, 454, 457, 461, 462, 474.
Coles Ferry, 458.
Colored Troops, 495.
Colston, Brig.-Gen. R. E., 266.
Columbia, 519.
Compromise of 1850, 38, 39.
Comstock, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Cyrus B., 278.
Comte de Paris, 138.
Confederacy, 40, 282, 351, 507.
Confederate States, 518.
Congress, 215, 553.
Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 42, 47, 72, 179, 240, 308, 309, 314, 315, 321, 329 note–341, 486.
Constitution, 18, 77, 215.
Cooke, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Philip St. G., 112, 114.
Cooper, Capt. James H., 126, 131.
Corinth, 249.
Corps of Engineers, see Topographical Engineers, Corps of.
Corpus Christi, 13.
Cortes, 6.
Coster, Col. Charles R, 296.
Couch, Maj.-Gen. Darius N., 86, 90, 95–98, 115, 136, 182, 183, 198, 201, 209, 212, 254, 271–273, 277, 278, 281, 283, 439.
Cowan, Capt. Andrew, 344.
Cox, Brig.-Gen. Jacob D., 208.
Cox Road, 496.
Crampton's Gap, 182, 188, 189, 191, 194, 196, 201.
Crawford, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Samuel W., 335, 351, 468, 501–504, 528.
Crimean War, 33.
Crook, Maj.-Gen. George, 440, 539.
Crossman, Lieut.-Col. H., 67.
Crump's Creek, 444–448.
Cub Dam Creek, 87.
Cub Run, 55.
Culp's Hill, 300, 301, 306, 324–326, 329, 334, 336, 339, 340, 350.
Culpeper, 217, 223, 232, 282–284, 286, 360, 366–369, 379, 401.
Culpeper Court House, 146, 152, 379.
Culpeper Ford, 409.
Culpeper Mine Ford, 388.

Cumberland, 512 note.
Cumberland Valley, 287, 357.
Curdsville, 542.
Curtin, Andrew G., 41, 193.
Curtis, Maj.-Gen. Samuel R., 80.
Cushing, Lieut. Alonzo H., 344, 348.
Custer, Brevet Maj.-Gen., 352, 527, 528.
Cyrus, 58.

Dabney Mill Road, 500, 501, 504, 509.
Dabney's Mill, 499.
Dade's Massacre, 10.
Dahlgren, Col. Ulric, 399.
Dallas, Commodore Alexander J., 10.
Dana, Maj.-Gen. Napoleon J. T., 133.
Danville, 532, 533, 535.
Davis, Jefferson, 24, 519, 532.
Dayton, 516 note.
Deatonsville, 536.
Deep Bottom, 31, 488, 494.
Deep Creek, 534.
Deep Run, 231, 232, 234.
Dehon, Capt. Arthur, 240.
Delafield, Brig.-Gen. Richard, 74.
Delaware and Chesapeake Canal, 135.
Delaware Bay, 135, 561.
Department of the East, 566.
Department of the Shenandoah, 513.
Department of the Susquehanna, 282.
Derby, Lieut. John, 491.
DeTrobriand, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Philippi R., 331, 502, 503.
Detroit, 564, 565.
Devens, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Charles, 451.
Devil's Den, 324, 327, 328, 331, 336.
Devin, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Thomas C., 527.
Dinwiddie Court House, 503, 509, 523-527.
Directory, 77.
Division of the Atlantic, 566.
Dodd's House, 377.
Double Bridges, 477, 478.
Doubleday, Maj.-Gen. Abner, 161, 239, 258, 292, 293, 302, 329.
Douthot's Landing, 475.
Downsville, 213.
Draft Riots, 365.
Dranesville, 80.
Drewry's Bluff, 438, 439, 464, 477, 488.
Duane, Brevet Brig.-Gen., 405.
Duane's Bridge, 115.
Dumas, Alexander, 61.
Duryea, Brevet Maj.-Gen Abram, 193.

Early, Lieut.-Gen. Jubal A., 54, 88, 229, 236, 262, 275, 276, 291, 336, 337, 339, 382, 387, 423, 440, 453, 474, 486, 487, 509, 510, 512 note–514, 515, 516 note.
East Cemetery Hill, 316.
East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, 439.
Ebro River, 234.
Edgebarton, 5.
Egan, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Thomas W., 502-504.
Elk Ridge, 180, 188, 201.
Ellerson's Mill, 110.
Ellmaker, Col. Peter C., 383.
Ely's Ford, 255, 257, 258, 261, 268, 270, 273, 409.
Ely's Ford Road, 268.
Emmettsburg, 298, 303, 323, 332.
Emmettsburg Road, 308, 311, 317, 325–329, 333, 334.
England, 4, 5, 7.
English, 33, 199, 572.
Europe, 4, 35, 36, 515, 518, 560.
European Cavalry, 35.
European Infantry, 217.
European War, 434.
Evans, Brig.-Gen. Nathan G., 49, 50, 52, 56, 167.
Everglades, 10.
Ewell, Lieut.-Gen. Richard S., 48, 49, 113, 119, 149, 160, 161, 284–287, 290–293, 300, 301, 303, 336, 339, 340, 370-373, 375–377, 381, 382, 387, 389, 390, 392, 411, 413, 427, 431, 454, 534, 536, 537.

Fair Oaks Station, 90, 91, 93, 95, 98-100, 102, 103, 108, 115, 116, 143.
Fairfax Court House, 46, 71, 169.
Fairfield, 336.
Fairfield Pass, 356, 357.

Fairmount Park, 12, 568.
Falling Waters, 53, 67.
Falmouth, 100, 144, 148, 156, 157, 170, 225, 227.
Farmville, 533, 535, 537–540, 546.
Farnsworth, Brig.-Gen. Elon J., 332, 346, 352, 353.
Farragut, Rear Adm. David G., 80, 519.
Federal Cavalry, 37.
Ferdinand VII., 7.
Festus, Porcius, 23.
Fire-Zouaves, 47, 53.
Fisher, Col., 335.
Fisher's Hill, 514.
Fitzhugh, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Charles L., 344.
Fitzsimons, Thomas, 3.
Five Forks, 524–527, 530.
Flanders, 571.
Flat Creek, 536.
Florida, 8, 9, 10.
Fontenoy, 199.
Foote, Rear-Adm. Andrew H., 80.
Ford, Col. Thomas H., 197.
Ford Road, 528.
Fort Donalson, 80.
Fort Fisher, 507, 521.
Fort Gilmer, 494, 495, 498.
Fort Gregg, 532.
Fort Harrison, 494, 495, 498.
Fort Henry, 80.
Fort Howard, 521.
Fort Magruder, 87.
Fort Monroe, 43, 79, 81, 84, 398.
Fort Sedgwick, 524.
Fort Stedman, 521, 522.
Fort Sumter, 40, 43.
Fort Whitworth, 532.
Foster, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Robert S., 484.
Fox's Gap, 191, 193–196, 200.
France, 1, 4, 7, 29, 34, 38, 61.
Franco-Prussian War, 34, 35, 266, 343, 351.
Franklin, Maj.-Gen. William B., 52, 87, 89, 90, 93, 116, 118–122, 124, 128, 129, 134–136, 149, 169, 182, 183, 188–191, 194–198, 201, 204, 209, 225, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240, 244, 245.
Frazier's Farm, 128.
Frederick, 182–186, 192, 201, 212, 213, 287, 341, 356.
Frederick the Great, 34, 124, 517.
Fredericksburg, 100, 101, 142, 144, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 157, 223–235, 242, 245–247, 250, 255–263, 274, 275, 354, 359, 380, 397, 398, 407, 410.
Fredericksburg Railroad, 441.
Fredericktown, 185.
Fremont, Maj.-Gen. John C., 77, 103, 145.
French, Maj.-Gen. William H., 99, 114, 116, 118, 206, 209, 242, 243, 263, 270, 271, 288, 340, 341, 359, 360, 381–383, 387, 388, 390–392, 397.
French, 34, 36, 58, 59, 199, 342.
French Occupation of Mexico, 551.
Frizzellburg, 303.
Front Royal, 43, 44, 360.
Fugitive Slave Law, 39.

Gaines's Mill, 111–113, 115–117, 122, 124, 126, 139, 143.
Gainesville, 160, 161, 170, 223, 374, 380.
Garland, Brig.-Gen. Samuel, Jr., 193.
Garnett, Brig.-Gen. Richard B., 346.
Geary, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John W., 267, 270, 273, 307–311, 319–322, 329, 340.
Georgia, 519, 566.
German Batteries, 126, 132.
German Cavalry, 35, 36.
Germanna Ford, 255, 257, 258, 260, 261, 368, 388, 408, 409.
Germans, 34, 36, 266, 267.
Getty, Brevet Maj.-Gen. George W. 243, 412, 413, 451.
Gettysburg, 229, 287, 290–293, 295–299, 301–308, 310–318, 324–328, 336–339, 342, 343, 351, 354–358, 362, 370, 397, 401, 466, 566.
Gibbon, Maj.-Gen. John, 161, 196, 239, 240, 258, 298, 312, 334, 347–349, 415, 416, 424, 468, 473, 490, 492, 546.
Gilmore, Maj.-Gen. Quincy A., 437.
Glady's Run, 424.
Glendale, 128.
Globe Tavern, 490, 493, 496, 498, 500.

Gloucester, 437.
Godwin, Brig.-Gen. A. C., 383.
Golding's Farm, 92, 105, 108, 115, 116.
Goldsboro', 518.
Gordon, Brevet Maj.-Gen. George H., 152.
Gordon, Lieut.-Gen. John B., 336, 418, 428, 521, 534, 536–538.
Gordonsville, 105, 149, 275, 413.
Gosport Navy Yard, 81.
Gould, Major John M., 468.
Graham, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Charles K., 331.
Graham, Major James D., 10.
Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., 80, 84, 176, 249, 355, 363–365, 396, 401–411, 413, 414, 419, 420, 422, 425, 430–432, 434, 435, 437–440, 442, 448–450, 454, 456, 457, 459–467, 470 note–475, 476, 480, 482, 486–488, 495, 496, 501, 503, 507, 509–515, 516 note, 517–520, 525, 529, 530, 534, 540–550, 552, 554.
Grapevine Bridge, 120, 124.
Gravelly Run, 526.
Great Britain, 11.
Greek Chorus, 16.
Greeks, 58.
Greeley, Horace, 215.
Greene, Brevet Maj.-Gen. George S., 337.
Greenwich, 372, 373.
Gregg, Brevet Maj.-Gen. David McN., 236, 332, 351, 352, 356, 368, 369, 376, 441–443, 475, 488, 490, 493, 497, 499, 500, 504, 508, 509.
Gregg, Brevet Maj.-Gen. J. Irvin, 352.
Griffin, Maj.-Gen. Charles, 53, 114, 243, 261, 411, 497, 501, 528, 530, 536.
Grouchy, Marquis de, 390.
Groveton, 160, 167, 170.
Guinea's Station, 229, 230, 232.
Gustavus, Adolphus, 217.

Hagerstown, 65, 186, 187, 356, 357.
Hagerstown Road, 192.
Halifax Road, 478, 479, 493, 496.
Halleck, Maj.-Gen. Henry W., 80, 84, 141, 142, 146–148, 155, 159, 164, 168, 169, 175–179, 181, 187, 197, 213, 214, 216, 222, 225–227, 249, 281, 284, 288, 289, 360, 361, 380, 385, 397, 398, 407, 454, 510, 511, 512 note–513.
Hamburg Pass, 356.
Hamilton Crossing, 236.
Hampton, Lieut.-Gen. Wade, 230, 352, 446, 474–478, 504.
Hampton Roads, 81, 487.
Hancock, 66.
Hancock, Maj.-Gen. Winfield S., 87, 88, 211, 242, 243, 246, 261, 264, 267, 270, 271, 273, 282, 297–303, 305, 307–315, 317, 319–321, 323, 328, 329, 332, 334, 337, 339, 348, 349, 370, 405, 409–418, 423–426, 428–434, 447, 448, 451, 459–461, 464–469, 484, 488, 490–493, 499–505, 513, 514.
Hannibal, 34, 61, 518.
Hanover Court House, 100, 101, 445, 447, 450.
Hanover Junction, 160, 164, 432, 433.
Hanover Street, 245.
Hanovertown, 435.
Harper's Ferry, 63–66, 68, 70, 179–182, 185–191, 194–198, 203, 207, 209, 213, 214, 216, 285, 288, 340, 360.
Harrisburg, 290, 292, 303.
Harrisburg Road, 293.
Harrisonburg, 516 note.
Harrison's Bar, 140.
Harrison's Creek, 469.
Harrison's Landing, 93, 137, 141, 141–146, 458.
Hartranft, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John F., 522.
Hartwood, 226.
Haskell, Capt., 377.
Hatch, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John P., 162, 163, 165, 192, 193, 194.
Hatcher's Run, 497, 499–504, 506–509, 521, 523, 525, 528, 531.
Hatteras Inlet, 79.
Havana, 10.
Hawes's Shop, 445, 446, 448.
Haxall's Landing, 93, 134, 135, 442.
Haymarket Road, 166.

Hays, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alexander, 267, 334, 336, 339, 346, 372, 376, 377, 382.
Hazard, Brevet Brig.-Gen. John G., 344.
Hazel Grove, 270, 271.
Hazel River, 384.
Hazel Run, 231.
Hazlett, Lieut. Charles E., 344.
Heckman, Brig.-Gen. Charles A., 495.
Heintzelman, Maj.-Gen. Samuel P., 52, 60, 86, 90, 94, 95, 98, 117–119, 121, 124, 129, 134, 135, 162, 163, 168.
Henry House, 53, 171.
Henry House Hill, 50, 51, 54, 56, 167, 168.
Henry House Plateau, 50, 60.
Hercules, 103.
Heth, Maj.-Gen. Henry, 291, 346, 347, 376.
High Bridge, 535, 538, 541.
High Knob Pass, 356.
Hill, Lieut.-Gen. Ambroise P., 110, 113, 119, 120, 130, 149, 161, 181, 182, 197, 203, 208, 210, 212, 229, 230, 232, 236, 266, 270, 282–286, 291–293, 300, 303, 331, 341, 342, 346, 370, 375–377, 381, 387, 392, 411–416, 423, 473.
Hill, Lieut.-Gen. Daniel H., 88, 95, 113, 136, 160, 184, 186, 187, 189, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 229, 236.
Hinks, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Edward W., 464.
Hinton's Mills, 160.
Hirtius, Aulus, 183.
Hofmann, Brevet Brig.-Gen. J. William, 417 note.
Hoke, Maj.-Gen. Robert F., 336, 339, 382, 383.
Holmes, Lieut.-Gen. Theophilus H., 129.
Homer, 113.
Hood, Gen. John B., 163, 168, 187, 236, 282, 283, 305, 331, 333, 346, 519.
Hooker, Maj.-Gen. Joseph, 86, 87, 90, 98, 99, 115, 126, 129, 130, 134, 141, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 191–193, 204–206, 208, 212, 225, 235, 237, 250–254, 256–264, 266, 267, 269–284, 286–289, 341, 404, 407.
Hooker—*Continued.*
House of Representatives, 60.
Howard, Maj.-Gen. Oliver O., 52, 54, 99, 243, 254, 292, 296, 297, 301, 308.
Huger, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin, 85, 95, 96, 106, 119, 120, 130, 136.
Humphreys, Maj.-Gen. Andrew A., 135, 201, 212, 243, 244, 246, 261, 310, 312, 331, 333–335, 357, 359, 369, 370, 374, 378, 379, 387, 394, 405, 419, 434, 457, 460, 464, 469, 493, 499, 500, 504, 505, 508, 522, 523, 525, 526, 530, 531, 533, 535–546, 549, 568.
Hunt, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Henry J., 123, 234, 316, 321–323, 334, 344–346, 405.
Hunter, Maj.-Gen. David, 60, 77, 439, 440, 454, 474, 510–513.
Hunting Creek, 74.
Hustler, William, 4.

Ilerda, 234.
Illinois, 552.
Imboden, Brig.-Gen. John D., 286.
Independence Hall, 553.
Indianapolis, 80.
Indians, 10
Indian Wars, 58.
Ingalls, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Rufus, 405.
Ireland, 2.
Irvin, Lieut.-Col. John, 417 note.
Italy, 34.

Jackson, Andrew, 571.
Jackson, Brig.-Gen. Conrad Feger, 240.
Jackson, Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J., "Stonewall," 43, 50, 60, 67, 94, 101, 103, 105–107, 110, 113, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 129, 134, 137, 144–146, 149, 151–155, 158, 159, 161–169, 181, 182, 184–187, 189–191, 194–198, 203, 209, 217, 223, 227, 228, 233, 236, 237, 245, 264–270, 272, 281, 285.
Jacob's Ford, 387, 388.

James City, 367.
James, G. P. R., 60.
James River, 31, 79, 85, 87, 91, 93, 106, 108, 111, 116–118, 120, 121, 123, 134, 136–138, 141, 144, 145, 254, 406, 437, 438, 440, 442, 444, 448, 454, 456, 458–460, 462, 464, 468, 471, 475–477, 480–485, 487–489, 494–496, 498, 506, 550.
James River Canal, 515.
Jarratt's Depot, 477, 479.
Jefferson, 158.
Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. Albert G., 286, 352.
Jerusalem Plank Road, 479, 489, 493, 521, 524.
Jetersville, 534, 536.
Johnson, Andrew, 552, 553.
Johnson, Samuel, 20.
Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., 44–49, 55, 62–65, 68–73, 85, 87, 89, 97, 99, 336, 337, 339, 382, 418, 519, 533, 551.
Jomini, Baron Henri, 33, 127, 128, 218.
Jones, Maj.-Gen. David R., 167, 187, 336.
Jones's Bridge, 458, 475.
Jura Mountains, 344.

Kansas, 39.
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 38.
Kanawha Valley, 474, 510.
Kant, Immanuel, 77.
Kautz, Brevet Maj.-Gen. August V., 437, 438, 463, 478, 479, 484, 494, 498.
Kearny, Maj.-Gen. Philip, 86, 87, 90, 95, 98, 115, 126, 129, 133, 134, 162, 163, 165, 166, 170.
Keim, Brig.-Gen. William H., 67.
Kelly's Ford, 156, 255, 257, 258, 381–384.
Kemper, Maj.-Gen. James L., 167, 346.
Kentucky, 80, 83.
Kerns, Capt. Mark, 126.
Kerwin, Capt., 503.
Ketland, John, 4.
Ketland, Thomas, 4.
Kettle Run, 375, 376.
Key, Capt., 207.
Key West, 563.
Keys, Maj.-Gen. Erasmus D., 52, 86, 90, 94, 95, 98, 116, 120, 124, 129, 136.
Key's Ferry, 69.
Kilpatrick, Maj.-Gen. Judson, 332, 346, 352, 353, 356, 399.
King, Brig.-Gen. Rufus, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 162, 163.
Kinglake, Alexander W., 33.
Kirby, Brig.-Gen. Edmund, 97.
Knoxville, 405.
Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 353.
Kuhn, Lieut. James Hamilton, 131.

Lake Superior, 565.
Lake Survey, 563, 564, 566.
Lane, Brig.-Gen. James H., 236.
Laurel Hill, 568.
Law, Maj.-Gen. E. McIver, 163, 305, 331.
Lawton, Brig.-Gen. Alexander R., 161, 181.
Lead Works, 531.
Ledlie, Brig. Gen. James H., 468.
Lee, Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh, 1, 202, 352, 366, 368, 421, 422, 446, 474–477, 534, 537, 541, 547.
Lee, "Light Horse Harry," 1.
Lee, Gen. Robert E., 1, 2, 61, 75, 77, 94, 99, 103, 105–107, 110, 113, 116, 117, 119, 120, 124, 129, 145, 148, 154, 155, 157–160, 164–166, 169, 172, 178, 179, 181, 183–187, 189, 190, 191, 195, 198, 200–203, 206, 208–210, 212, 213, 216, 217, 223–233, 235–237, 245, 246, 253, 254, 256–260, 262–265, 267, 271, 272, 274–276, 282–288, 291, 292, 301, 302, 305, 306, 313, 324, 326, 331, 340–343, 347, 349, 354–370, 373, 377, 378–389, 392, 393, 397–399, 401, 405–410, 413, 414, 421, 423, 430–434, 439, 440, 442, 446, 448, 453, 454, 456, 461, 462, 467, 477, 486, 487, 489, 491, 520, 521, 523, 533–549.
Lee, Rear-Adm. Samuel P., 437.
Lee, Maj.-Gen. William H. F., 229, 477, 478.
Lee's Hill, 230, 242, 245.
Lee's Mills, 85.
Leesburg, 65, 66, 68–72, 287.
Lérida, 234.

Licksville, 183.
Lincoln, Abraham, 9, 24, 25, 41, 42, 62, 77, 81, 83, 84, 100–102, 138–140, 173–177, 214–217, 222, 225, 246, 249, 281, 284, 297, 353, 360, 361, 510, 513, 518, 550, 552, 553.
Lindsay, Col. William, 10.
Little Fort Valley, 516 note.
Little River, 432.
Little River Turnpike, 169.
Little Round Top Mountain, 307, 308, 311, 317, 320, 322–329, 330 note–331–333, 335, 336, 342, 344, 346, 353.
Little Washington, 148.
Lockwood, Brig.-Gen. Henry H., 330, 334.
Locust Grove, 388.
Lodi, 364.
Logan's Cross Roads, 80.
Logistics, 31.
Long, Brig.-Gen. Armistead L., 291, 345.
Long Bridge, 60, 117, 458.
Long Bridge Road, 458.
Long Island Railroad, 9.
Longstreet, Lieut.-Gen. James, 88, 95, 113, 119, 120, 130, 159, 160, 163–169, 186, 187, 193, 217, 223, 226, 227, 232, 235, 237, 242, 245, 254, 282–286, 291, 292, 331, 341–343, 346, 365, 413–417, 420, 450, 534, 537, 538, 545.
Lookout Mountain, 365.
Loudon County, 516, note.
Loudon Heights, 180–182, 189, 196, 197, 214.
Loudon Valley, 360.
Louisiana Purchase, 38.
"Louisiana Tigers," 339.
Luray Valley, 516, note.
Lynchburg, 439, 440, 455, 474, 476, 510, 533, 535, 538, 540, 546, 547.

McAllister, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Robert, 503.
Macaulay, Thomas B., 16.
McCall, Brig.-Gen. George A., 109–112, 123–126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 144, 193, 566.
McCandless, Col. William, 335, 351.
McClellan, Lieut.-Col. Carswell, 419, 460.
McClellan, Maj.-Gen. George B., 24, 43, 60, 73–76, 81–87, 89, 95, 98–102, 105–108, 116–120, 122, 123, 125, 134, 135, 137–144, 146, 147, 149, 153, 168, 169, 173–179, 181–191, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200–204, 206–218, 220–225, 237, 249, 356, 358, 447, 457, 566.
McCoy's Ferry, 216.
McDowell, Maj.-Gen. Irvin, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51–56, 68–73, 100, 101, 103, 142, 145, 148, 149, 157, 160, 162, 163, 171, 174–176.
McGee's House, 112.
McGilvery, Lieut.-Col. Freeman, 335, 344.
McIntosh, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John B., 352.
MacKenzie, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Ronald, 527.
McLaws, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette, 182, 188, 189, 191, 195, 196–198, 203, 236, 276, 278, 282, 283, 331, 333, 346.
McLean's Ford, 55.
McPherson's Ridge, 294.
Magruder, Maj.-Gen. John B., 85, 86, 117–120, 136.
Mahone, Maj.-Gen. William, 188, 478, 504.
Malvern Hill, 93, 104, 108, 120, 121, 124–128, 128, 129, 134, 135, 137, 138, 141, 144–146, 456–458.
Mallory's Ford, 475.
Manassas, 38, 43, 44, 50, 63–71, 81, 84, 153, 154, 158, 160, 284.
Manassas Gap, 360.
Manassas Gap Railroad, 43, 65, 159.
Manassas Junction, 43–46, 64, 65, 149, 223, 413.
Manchester, 304, 312.
Mansfield, Maj.-Gen. Joseph K. F., 204–206, 211.
Marathon, 57.
March to the Sea, 519.
Marcy, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Randolph B., 141.
Marengo, 364.
Marienthal, 363.
Marignano, 572.
Marsh Creek, 355.
Marshall, Lieut.-Col. Charles, 547.

Marshall, Brevet Maj.-Gen. E. G., 150.
Martindale, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John H., 451, 464.
Martinsburg, 64, 67, 68, 70, 182, 185, 196, 212, 213.
Marye's Hill, 230, 231, 236, 241, 242, 274.
Maryland, 25, 178, 179, 181, 184, 185, 211, 213, 214, 566.
Maryland Heights, 65, 180–182, 188, 189, 195–198, 209, 212, 214, 285, 288.
Massachusetts, 10.
Massaponax River, 231, 236.
Masséna, 29.
Mat River, 435.
Matadequin Creek, 444, 445, 448.
Mattapony River, 79, 81, 90, 431, 435, 444.
Maximilian, Ferdinand Joseph, 551.
Meade, Catharine, 3.
Meade, Garrett, 3.
Meade, Garrett and George, 3.
Meade, George, 3, 4, 5.
Meade, George & Co., 3.
Meade, Col. George, 320, 338, 568.
Meade, Maj.-Gen. George G., 1, 2, 6, 8–15, 37, 101, 109, 111–114, 121, 125–127, 130–132, 134, 141, 157, 161, 167, 168, 170–172, 192–194, 205, 211, 212, 239, 240, 254, 258, 260–262, 268, 269, 272–274, 277, 278, 281, 289–291, 297–299, 301–304, 306–324, 326, 328–330, 332–341, 345, 348, 350, 354–356, 358–361, 363–371, 373, 378–385, 387, 390–399, 401, 403, 405, 407, 411, 412, 419–423, 423, 425, 428, 431, 448–450, 457, 459–461, 463, 465, 467–469, 470 note–472, 476, 478–480, 483, 486, 489, 491, 493, 496, 498, 501–503, 508, 513–515, 517, 521, 522, 526, 529, 531, 533–536, 538, 539, 542, 545, 546, 549, 551, 554–559, 561–564, 566–573.
Meade, Richard Worsam, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7.
Meade, Robert, 2.
Meadow Bridge, 92, 109, 442.
Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F., 99, 114, 116, 136.
Mechanicsville, 90, 92, 109, 111, 117, 139, 145, 442.
Mechanicsville Bridge, 92, 109, 442.
Meherrin River, 477, 508.
Meigs, Lieut. John R., 516 note.
"Merrimac," 81, 84, 106.
Merritt, Maj.-Gen. Wesley, 332, 346, 352, 422, 441, 442.
Metcalf, Lieut. Richard, 503, 504.
Methuselah, 305.
Mexican War, 13, 31, 37, 42, 63, 74, 558, 559.
Mexico, 12, 178, 551, 558.
Mexico, City of, 15.
Middleburg, 304, 352.
Middle Military Division, 514.
Middletown, 183, 194, 290.
Miles, Col. Dixon S., 55, 181, 188, 197, 198.
Miles, Maj.-Gen. Nelson A., 267, 271, 376, 490, 492, 505, 525, 530–532.
Military Academy, 9.
Milford, 369.
Mill Sluice, 231, 242.
Millwood, 71.
Milroy, Maj.-Gen. Robert H., 103, 161, 162, 171, 285.
Mine Run, 261, 364, 385, 386, 389, 392–394, 396, 397, 407, 409.
Mineral Spring Run, 263.
Mingan's Ferry, 475.
Missionary Ridge, 365.
Mississippi, 249.
Mississippi River, 11, 80, 148, 355, 554.
Missouri, 38, 39, 43.
Missouri Compromise, 38, 564.
Mitchell, Alexander, 561.
Mitchell, Capt., 377.
Mobile Bay, 519.
Moltke, Count von, 147, 517.
"Monitor," 81.
Monocacy River, 183, 216, 304, 440, 487, 510, 512 note.
Monterey, 13.
Monterey Pass, 356.
Mordecai, Maj. Alfred, 74.
Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Charles H., 376, 465.
Morrill, Maj.-Gen. George W., 90, 109, 112, 114, 136, 157, 165.
Morris's House, 387–391.
Morton's Ford, 368, 385–387.

Peninsular Campaign, 193, 444, 458.
Peninsular War, 5.
Pennington, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Alexander C. M., 352.
Pennsylvania, 1, 2, 25, 41, 184, 185, 193, 510.
Pennsylvania Reserves, 41, 80, 92, 101–104, 109, 111, 113–116, 121–128, 130, 132–134, 136, 139, 144, 157, 162, 171, 172, 192, 193, 205, 211, 239, 240, 333, 335, 351, 566.
Pensacola, 11.
Perkinson's Mills, 536.
Persian Empire, 58.
Persians, 57.
Perth Amboy, 4.
Peters's Bridge, 479.
Petersburg, 33, 402, 403, 406, 438, 439, 455, 457, 459, 460–465, 467–473, 476–478, 481, 482, 484–487, 489, 490, 493, 496–499, 505–509, 519, 521, 524, 531–533, 546, 550.
Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, 476, 496–500, 503, 524, 530–533, 538, 546.
Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad, 469, 479.
Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, 471–473, 476–479, 488, 489, 496, 498, 508, 521.
Petersburg Mine, 483.
Pettigrew, Brig.-Gen. J. Johnston, 291, 346, 347.
Philadelphia, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 41, 135, 405, 553, 556–558, 561, 563, 565, 566, 568, 569.
Pickett, Maj.-Gen. George E., 236, 305, 346, 347, 349–352, 365, 467, 526, 527.
Pierce, Col. L. B., 503.
Pipe Creek, 291, 298, 299, 302, 304, 306, 310, 314.
Pittsburg, 566.
Pittsburg Landing, 249.
Plank Road, 260, 261, 263–265, 269, 270, 411.
Pleasanton, Maj.-Gen. Alfred, 183, 194, 210, 268, 283, 286, 331, 367, 368.
Pleasant Valley, 188, 189, 191, 194–198, 200, 201.
Plum Run, 327, 328, 334.
Plum Run Ridge, 335.
Po River, 423, 424, 426, 435.
Point of Rocks, 65, 66.
Pond, Capt., 499.
Pope, Maj.-Gen. John, 73, 145–160, 162–164, 166, 169, 171, 172, 174–177, 182, 223, 283, 284.
Poplar Springs Church Road, 497.
Port Conway, 255, 257, 258.
Porter, Brig.-Gen. Andrew, 50, 52.
Porter, Maj.-Gen. Fitz-John, 89, 90, 93, 100, 102, 111, 114–116, 124, 125, 129, 135, 136, 157, 162, 163, 165–167, 171, 205, 208–210.
Port Hudson, 355.
Port Royal, 231, 254–258.
Port Walthall, 463.
Potomac River, 43, 60, 65–67, 74, 78, 81, 82, 100, 144, 147, 159, 175, 177–183, 185, 188, 190, 191, 196, 198, 201, 212–214, 216, 220, 224, 285–287, 341, 356, 357, 359, 510, 512 note.
Potter, Maj.-Gen. Robert B., 468, 497.
Powhite Creek, 111, 112.
Prince Edward Court House, 538, 546.
Prince Eugene, 49.
Prince George Court House, 477.
Prince, Brig.-Gen. Henry, 389.
Proclamation of Emancipation, 249.
Prospect Hill, 230.
Prospero, 301.
Prussians, 34, 35.
Puerto de Santa Maria, 7.

Quaker Road, 124, 125, 523.
Queen's Creek, 87.
Quitman, Maj.-Gen. John A., 13, 14.

Raccoon Ford, 386.
Randol, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Alanson M., 126, 131, 352.
Randolph, Capt. George E., 320.
Ransom, Maj.-Gen. Robert, Jr., 236.
Rapidan River, 79, 84, 153–156, 227, 228, 230, 254, 255, 257, 258, 261, 269, 272, 282, 360, 361, 364–368, 380, 384–388, 392, 397, 398, 401, 402, 404, 407–411, 413, 437, 482.
Rappahannock River, 79, 149, 153,

Rappahannock River—*Continued.* 155–158, 160, 170, 223–232, 235, 239, 246, 247, 254–259, 261, 263, 264, 269, 270, 274, 276, 278, 281–283, 360, 361, 365, 367, 369, 374, 379–384, 405, 408, 409, 413.
Rappahannock Station, 155, 156, 380–382, 384.
Reams's Station, 477–479, 490, 491, 508.
Rebec, 572.
Rectorstown, 220.
Red House Ford, 51, 52.
Reno, Maj.-Gen. Jesse L., 156, 162, 165, 168, 183, 191, 193–195, 204.
Resaca de la Palma, 13, 560.
Reynolds, Maj.-Gen. John F., 109, 112, 114, 115, 126, 132, 144, 157, 161, 162, 164–167, 170, 171, 193, 211, 238, 254, 269, 274, 277, 278, 281, 292, 298, 302–306, 331.
Rice, Brig.-Gen., James C., 417, n.
Rice's Station, 534, 535, 537.
Rich Mountain, 43.
Richardson, Maj.-Gen. Israel B., 55, 90, 98, 99, 115, 128, 136, 206, 209, 211.
Richmond, 25, 26, 43, 77–81, 84, 86, 88–92, 100, 102–104, 108, 109, 115, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 137, 141, 143, 144, 146, 149, 185, 212, 217, 224, 225, 231, 236, 256, 258, 282, 365, 367, 379, 399, 404, 406, 407, 432, 435, 438–442, 444–446, 448, 450, 454–456, 458, 459, 464, 472, 474–477, 481–484, 486–488, 498, 507, 515, 524, 532, 533, 540, 550, 551.
Richmond and Danville Railroad 476, 524, 531–534.
Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, 431–433, 474.
Richmond and York River Railroad, 90, 91, 99. 108, 117, 122.
Ricketts, Brevet Maj.-Gen. James B., 53, 148, 152, 160, 162, 163, 165–167, 193, 376, 451.
Riddle, Maj. William, 212.
Riddle's Shop, 456.
Rittenhouse, Capt. Benjamin F., 344.
River Road, 261.
Roanoke Island, 80.
Robertson's Ford, 386, 387.
Robertson's Store, 388.
Robertson's Tavern, 388, 389, 391, 392, 407, 409.
Robinson, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John C., 330, 417 note.
Robinson House, 51.
Rock Creek. 294, 325, 344, 345.
Rodes, Maj.-Gen. Robert E., 266, 336, 382.
Roman Power, 34.
Rome, 518.
Rorty, Capt. James McK., 344, 348.
Rosecrans, Maj.-Gen. William P., 79, 365, 366.
Rosser, Maj.-Gen. Thomas L., 230.
Round Top, 308, 310, 311, 320. 321, 324–329, 331, 332, 335, 342.
Rowanty Creek, 490.
Ruger, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Thomas H., 330, 340.
Russell, Brevet Maj.-Gen. David A., 383, 451.
Russell, Lord John, 351.
Russians, 33.

Sabine River, 11.
Sackett, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Delos B., 207, 208.
Sadowa, 351.
Sailor's Creek, 536–538.
Saint Joseph's Church, 3.
St. Louis, 566.
Saint Mark's Church, 568.
Saint Mary's Catholic Church, 4.
Saint Paul, 23, 83.
Salem, 159.
Salem Heights, 275.
Saltillo, 13.
Samson, 548.
Sand Key, 563.
Sanford, Gen., 68.
"San Francisco," 58.
San Juan d'Ulloa, 14.
Santa Carolina, 7.
Savage's Station, 95, 108, 117–120, 122, 123, 129.
Savannah, 519.
Scheibert, Maj. J., 36.
Schenck, Maj.-Gen. Robert C., 52, 161, 162.
Schimmelpfennig, Brig.-Gen. Alexander, 161, 293.

Schofield, Maj.-Gen. John M., 519.
Schurz, Maj.-Gen. Carl, 161, 162, 293.
Schuylkill, 568.
Scott's Dam, 261, 263, 270.
Scott, Brevet Lieut.-Gen. Winfield, 10, 14, 24, 44, 45, 60–65, 67–71, 74, 214.
Secession, 18, 40.
Sedgwick, Maj.-Gen John, 90, 97, 98, 115, 128, 133, 136, 206, 209, 254, 258, 259, 262, 264, 269, 274–276, 278, 279, 312, 356, 381–384, 390, 394, 396, 398, 405, 408, 409, 423, 424, 426.
Seminary Ridge, 294, 296, 300, 301, 324, 326, 327, 348, 349, 355.
Seminoles, 10.
Seminole War, 10, 12, 560.
Semmes, Brig.-Gen. Paul J., 188.
Sergeant, Hon. John, 11, 558.
Sergeant, Margaretta, 11, 558.
Seven Days' Battles, 108, 138, 145.
Seven Pines, 90, 91, 93, 95, 100, 108, 115, 117, 143.
Seward, William H., 42, 175.
Seymour, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Truman, 109, 110, 112, 114, 126, 130, 132, 135, 144, 168, 171, 193, 205.
Shady Grove Church, 409.
Shady Grove Church Road, 447.
Shaler, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alexander, 340.
Shand House, 468.
Sharpsburg, 201, 204, 206, 207.
Shenandoah River, 180, 188, 216.
Shenandoah Valley, 25, 44, 63, 72, 78, 101, 103, 105, 148, 151, 158, 179, 185, 212, 213, 216, 217, 223, 284–287, 360, 366, 437, 439, 474, 486, 487, 507, 510, 511, 515, 516 note.
Shepherdstown, 201, 212.
Sheridan, Gen. Philip H., 35, 36, 364, 405, 418–422, 435, 441–443, 445, 446, 448–450, 454, 455, 473–477, 479, 480, 484, 487, 507, 509–518, 523–526, 528–531, 533, 534, 536–538, 540, 543, 544, 546, 547, 551, 568.
Sherman, Hon. John, 65.
Sherman, Gen. William T., 51, 52, 363, 364, 401, 406, 437, 511, 518–520, 533, 551, 554.
Shiloh, 80, 249.
Shore Road, 120, 260, 261, 270.
Sickles, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E., 99, 136, 223, 254, 261, 264, 268–270, 277, 307–312, 317, 319–324, 326–334, 336, 351.
Sicoris River, 234.
Sigel, Maj.-Gen. Franz, 145, 148, 152, 153, 156, 162, 165, 167, 437, 439.
Simmons, Col. Seneca G., 126, 130, 132.
Simpson, Brevet Brig.-Gen. James H., 67.
Sinclair, Col. William T., 240.
Skinker's Neck, 229, 230, 232, 233, 255.
Slocum, Maj.-Gen. Henry W., 90, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 128, 130, 136, 209, 214, 260–262, 308, 310, 311, 319, 345.
Smith, Gen. Edmund Kirby, 54, 60.
Smith, Maj.-Gen. Gustavus D., 95, 97.
Smith, Maj.-Gen. William F., 86–90, 116–118, 128, 136, 209, 437, 439, 448–453, 460–468, 470 note.
Snicker's Gap, 286.
Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, 4.
South Anna River, 79, 435, 448, 450.
South Carolina, 519.
Southern Cavalry, 36.
Southern Confederacy, 18, 20, 24, 26.
South Mountain, 179, 180, 183, 185, 186, 188–194, 200, 204, 214, 287, 355, 358.
South Mountain Range, 187, 190, 192, 195, 196, 201, 202, 292.
South Side Railroad, 496, 500.
Spain, 2, 3, 5–8, 234.
Sperryville, 148.
Spohr, Louis, 563.
Spottsylvania, 409, 420–423, 433, 474.
Spottsylvania Court House, 410, 420, 441, 442, 448.
Springfield, 552.
"Squatter Sovereignty," 39.
Squirrel Level Road, 496, 497.
Stafford Court House, 226.

United States—*Continued.*
365, 518, 541, 548, 550–552, 560, 563.
United States' Ford, 254–259, 261, 263, 264, 268, 270, 272, 273, 277.
Upperville, 352.
Upton, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Emory, 333, 426, 427.
Urbanna, 81, 84.

Valley of Virginia, 285, 301, 402, 516 note.
Varina, 494.
Varina Road, 494.
Vaughan Road, 496, 499, 501, 506, 508, 509, 523.
Veale, Major, 310.
Vera Cruz, 14.
Vermont Regiments, 85.
Vicksburg, 80, 355.
Victoria, 13.
Vincent, Brig.-Gen Strong, 332.
Vionville, 35.
Virginia, 26, 36, 43, 78, 79, 82, 177, 212, 393, 494.
"Virginia," 81.
Virginia Central Railroad, 109, 149, 432, 441, 442, 445, 446, 474.

Wadsworth, Brevet Maj.-Gen. James S., 277, 292, 300, 340, 412–414, 417 note.
Walker, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Francis A., 377, 460, 466.
Walker, Maj.-Gen. John G., 182, 189, 203.
Wallace, Maj.-Gen. Lew., 440, 487.
Wallenstein, Count of, 217.
War of 1812, 63.
Ward, Brevet Maj.-Gen William T., 331.
Warren, Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur K., 167, 268, 278, 298, 301, 317, 319, 329, 330 note–332, 370, 374–377, 389, 391, 392, 394–397, 403, 405, 408, 409, 411, 413, 414, 420–423, 425, 426, 430, 433, 434, 447, 450, 452, 453, 457, 458, 460, 470 note–488–490, 493, 496, 497, 500, 501, 508, 509, 522, 525–530, 550.
Warrenton, 46, 156–159, 170, 217, 223, 225, 227, 255, 284, 367, 368, 380, 381.
Warrenton Junction, 160, 223, 371.
Warrenton Turnpike, 48–51, 54, 55, 157, 161, 165–167, 169–171, 369, 380.
Warwick River, 85.
Washington Artillery, 236.
Washington, D. C., 8–11, 25, 29, 30, 40, 42–44, 48, 55, 60, 63–65, 67, 72, 74, 78–82, 84, 100, 101, 141, 144–147, 149, 153, 156, 159, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 182, 185, 201, 216, 222, 223, 225, 226, 228, 246, 249, 250, 278, 281, 283, 284, 286–288, 304, 306, 358–360, 364, 366, 397, 398, 401, 402, 404–407, 439, 440, 474, 486–488, 507, 512 note–513, 514, 550, 554, 556–558, 564–566.
Washington, Gen. George, 4, 363, 571.
Waterloo, 35, 312, 571.
Waterloo, Va., 159, 160, 223, 369.
Waterloo Bridge, 149, 152, 157.
Watertown Arsenal, 10.
Watts's House, 112.
Waynesboro', 515.
Webb, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alexander S., 348, 376, 377.
Webster, Daniel, 564.
Weed, Brig.-Gen. Stephen H., 268, 332.
Weitzel, Maj.-Gen. Godfrey, 495, 550.
Wellington, Duke of, 1.
West India Squadron, 10.
West Indies, 3, 4, 10.
Westminster, 303, 304, 332.
West Point, 9.
West Point, Va., 87, 89, 90.
West Virginia, 43, 76, 79, 439.
Wheat Field, 336.
Whipple, Maj.-Gen. Amiel, 243, 267, 268, 275.
Whisky Insurrection, 1, 2.
White House, 89, 90, 92, 93, 102, 123, 143, 442, 444, 448, 458, 461, 462, 474, 475, 515.
White Oak Bridge, 458.
White Oak Road, 499, 502, 503, 507, 524–528, 530.

White Oak Swamp, 91, 93, 95, 116, 119–124, 128, 129, 135, 144, 456–458, 506.
White Oak Swamp Bridge, 119, 122.
White Oak Swamp Creek, 93, 122.
White Plains, 159.
Whiting, Maj.-Gen. William H. C., 89, 113, 439.
Wilcox, Maj.-Gen. Cadmus M., 167, 346, 347, 349, 376.
Wilcox, Maj.-Gen. Orland B., 468, 493, 497, 522.
Wilcox's Landing, 458, 459.
Wilderness, 33, 261–263, 398, 402, 404, 407–411, 420, 441, 518.
Wilderness Tavern, 408, 409.
Willard, Col. George L., 334.
William the Conqueror, 1.
Williams, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alpheus S., 267, 269, 270, 330.
Williams, Brig.-Gen. John S., 336.
Williamsburg, 85–89, 91, 93.
Williamsburg Road, 90, 95, 99.
Williamson, Capt., 268.
Williamsport, 43, 44, 64, 67, 103, 182, 213, 216, 356, 357, 359.
Willford's Creek, 384.
Willoughby Run, 292–294, 355.
Wilmington, 519.
Wilson, Maj.-Gen. James H., 206, 441–443, 445, 448, 450, 459, 473, 475–480, 490.
Winchester, 43–45, 63–65, 67–72, 103, 212, 213, 223, 284–286, 514.
Winder, Brig.-Gen. Charles S., 149.
Windmill Point, 458, 459, 461.
Windsor Shades, 458.
Wise, Brig.-Gen. Henry A., 129.
Wistar, Brig.-Gen. Isaac J., 399.
Woodbury's Bridge, 115.
Woodruff, Lieut. George A., 344, 348.
Woodstock, 64.
Worsam, Henrietta Constantia, 3.
Worsam, Hon. Richard, 3.
Worth, Brevet Maj.-Gen. William J., 13.
Wright, Maj.-Gen. Horatio G., 394, 426, 428, 430, 447, 514, 522, 523, 531, 533, 538.
Wrightsville, 291.

Xenophon, 58.

Yellow Tavern, 441.
York, 290, 304.
York River, 79, 85, 87, 89, 90, 437, 438, 444, 448, 462.
York River Railroad, 462.
York Road, 293.
Yorktown, 84–86, 89, 100, 437.
Young's Branch, 50, 51.

Ziegler's Grove, 344.
Zoar Church, 260.
Zook, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Samuel K., 99.