


HISTORY
OF THE
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

BY
JOHN H. STINE,
Historian of the First Army Corps.



SECOND EDITION.



COPYRIGHTED, 1893.

BY J. H. STINE.

GIBSON BROS.,
PRINTERS AND BOOKBINDERS.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dedicated
TO
THOSE WHO FELL
TO SAVE
THE UNION.

637502

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. FIRST BULL RUN	1
II. DRANESVILLE. THE FIRST VICTORY	30
III. PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN	42
IV. FROM FIRST TO SECOND BULL RUN	99
V. SECOND BULL RUN	118
VI. SOUTH MOUNTAIN	154
VII. ANTIETAM	176
VIII. FROM ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN	221
IX. FREDERICKSBURG	244
X. CHANCELLORSVILLE	309
XI. FROM FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK	415
XII. GETTYSBURG	447
XIII. FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK	555
XIV. MINE RUN	581
XV. THE WILDERNESS	593
XVI. SPOTTSYLVANIA	613
XVII. SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE JAMES	629

CHAPTER	PAGE
XVIII. PREPARING TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF RICHMOND.	637
XIX. COLD HARBOR	645
XX. CAVALRY TRANSACTIONS FROM THE NORTH ANNA TO THE JAMES	650
XXI. THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG	660
XXII. WILSON'S RAID ON THE SOUTH SIDE AND WELDON RAIL- ROADS AND BATTLE AT REAM'S STATION	682
XXIII. DEEP BOTTOM AND WELDON RAILROAD	689
XXIV. CAVALRY OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC .	693
XXV. FIVE FORKS	699
XXVI. LEE'S FINAL STRUGGLE AT PETERSBURG AND FLIGHT— SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX	707
XXVII. MISCELLANEOUS	712
ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF THE FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC	750

ILLUSTRATIONS.

	FACING PAGE
J. H. STINE	Frontispiece.
General JOHN S. McCALMONT	32
Col. JOHN H. TAGGART	40
Gen. GEO. B. McCLELLAN	42
Gen. DARIUS N. COUCH	95
Gen. S. VAN VLIET	106
Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS	113
Gen. FRANZ SIGEL	123
Hon. A. R. BUSHNELL	136
Gen. RUFUS KING	140
Gen. LOUIS WAGNER	149
Ex-President R. B. HAYES	165
Capt. JAMES THOMPSON	184
Gen. A. J. WARNER	191
Col. B. F. COOK	199
President A. LINCOLN	247
BURNSIDE and his Generals	245
Gen. W. COOPER TALLEY	267
Gen. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD	280
Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER	308
Gen. DANIEL E. SICKLES	332
Gen. WILLIAM J. SEWELL	365
Gen. GEO. G. MEADE	447
Gen. J. B. CARR	448
Gen. J. F. REYNOLDS	453
Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY	454
Gen. SOL. MEREDITH	486
Gen. R. R. DAWES	461
Capt. L. E. POND	464
Col. GEO. N. REICHARD	468
Capt. J. H. COOPER	470
Gen. JUDSON KILPATRICK	472
Gen. ADRIAN R. ROOT	474

	FACING PAGE.
Gen. W. W. DUDLEY	480
Lt.-Col. W. W. GROUT	484
Brevet Col. A. J. SELLERS	500
Gen. J. H. KIDD	509
Col. R. BRUCE RICKETTS	518
Gen. H. J. HUNT	523
Col. JOHN N. CRAIG	525
Gen. GEO. J. STANNARD	529
Gen. ALEXANDER S. WEBB	531
Capt. MICHAEL WIEDRICH	536
Gen. JOHN NEWTON	515
Gen. D. McM. GREGG	545
Col. REDFIELD PROCTOR	550
Gen. U. S. GRANT	595
Col. JOS. A. MOESCH	600
Col. S. J. WILLIAMS	602
Gen. E. S. OSBORNE	606
Capt. P. DE LACY	608
Gen. L. A. GRANT	611
Col. CHARLES E. PHELPS	616
Hon. W. H. HARRIES	623
Gen. JAS. A. BEAVER	665
Gen. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN	668
Gen. D. B. BIRNEY	670
Gen. H. G. WRIGHT	672
Gen. GEORGE H. CHAPMAN	684
Col. D. B. DAILEY	692
Gen. JOHN A. KELLOGG	701
Capt. JOHN PALMER, Past Commander-in-Chief, G. A. R.	702
Col. NORM. G. COOPER	714
Lieut. A. J. BUCKLES	722
Gen. EBENEZER DUMONT	726
Capt. J. V. HADLEY	728
Hon. C. E. COON	729
Gen. HORATIO C. KING	736
Gov. O. P. MORTON	739

PREFACE.

THIS work is presented to the public with extreme diffidence, even under the circumstances which directed me to write it. The First Corps elected me as its historian without my solicitation, or knowledge thirty minutes beforehand, that such a position had been provided for by the Committee. Without time to consider its great responsibility in a session of the corps, and no opportunity to consult with friends, I accepted it with an inward feeling of mental reservation. I would have gladly nominated another. Then I began studying over the work before me, and decided to visit the battlefields in company with the prominent actors on both sides. As these were the only historical visits ever made to the battlefields, and were participated in by the officers and veterans of all the corps, I was urged by many to broaden the scope and write the "History of the Army of the Potomac." Generals H. J. Hunt, John Newton, L. A. Grant, W. S. Rosecrans, J. C. Robinson, Abner Doubleday, E. B. Fowler, D. E. Sickles, Geo. J. Stannard, Lucius Fairchild, E. S. Bragg, Slocum, *Wright, Ayres, and many other officers and soldiers on our side, including Hon. A. G. Curtin, Pennsylvania's war governor, gave me fully and freely what they knew of the movements on the different battlefields in which the Army of the Potomac was engaged.

On the Confederate side Longstreet, Heth, Mahone, Fields, Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Eppa Hunton, Kemper, Hagood,

Beauregard, Wright, and numerous other officers and Confederate veterans have assisted me. With the aid of those who were active participants in the two contending armies, and the guidance of the completed Rebellion Records, I have endeavored to submit a history free from bias, and as justly correct as I could. Where a point was in dispute, I have carefully weighed all the evidence, to give honor to whom honor was due. And in many cases I have given the different statements, so the readers can decide in their own judgments.

With these frank statements, I have only to say that I have honestly performed my duty to the best of my ability, and if I have fallen short of what ought to have been expected of me, I have to beg an indulgent public to let me have the benefit of the "mantle of charity" which so frequently has to shield frail humanity.

J. H. STINE.

INTRODUCTORY.

IN writing this introduction to the History of the Army of the Potomac, the causes which led to the late war will merely be alluded to, as the people are fully conversant with them.

When the colonies declared their independence and prepared for war to gain it, they laid the foundation of a new system of government in which the will of the people should be supreme.

Although the colonies united in a common defense against England, yet in several instances they acted, in a certain sense, on an independent line, and some jealousies arose which caused bickerings. When their independence was achieved, delegates assembled to form a Constitution to govern as a whole. There were strong differences, which were hard to reconcile, but the steady hand of Washington, as President of the Convention, controlled, and a Constitution was adopted which was finally ratified. Jealousy of the power of the monarchical governments of the Old World, perhaps, bred the doctrine of "state rights," which has had a strong following in this country, and which had its effect in bringing on the war.

Slavery, countenanced by the Constitution in a limited form, proved the great barrier between the North and the South after it had ceased in the North. But a gradual

emancipation could have set all the slaves free in due time, had ambitious men not used it as a pretext to increase their power and popularity in the South.

That slavery was profitable and congenial to the southern climate is a fact beyond dispute. The escaping of enterprising slaves into the North to obtain their freedom wrought a bitter feeling between the two sections. But the great cause of the war was the overvaulting ambition of John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. Calhoun was greatly embittered against President Jackson because the latter would not allow him to be placed on the ticket with him the second time "Old Hickory" ran for President. Calhoun knew full well that Jackson's second Vice-President would, in all probability, be his successor in the White House. Calhoun had no superior in ability, and wanted to be President.

Then began a bitter war between Jackson and Calhoun, the latter springing his noted "nullification" doctrine, which, of itself, was poison to the Union of the States, and charged with danger. Jackson rigorously laid his heavy hand upon it, and threatened Calhoun. It, apparently, had no vital strength; but the frequent presidential elections afforded fresh opportunities to increase the ill-feeling between the sections. Washington was wise in declining a third term, and had the Constitution, at any period previous to 1860, been changed to one term of six years, the war might have been averted for a time; but it was bound to come, for Jefferson Davis, ambitious, and voicing the disturbed feeling at the South, was fully resolved to establish a Southern Confederacy, based upon the corner stone of slavery. He left the Senate of the United States to put this resolution into effect.

He was a graduate of West Point and had great influence over the army officers coming from that section. Up to this time the South had a large share of the officers of the army and the navy; who, while they were officers of the General Government, were more in sympathy with the doctrine of state rights, and held their duty to be, as between the two, first with the State.

Had Jefferson Davis been merely a politician he could not have headed so formidable a rebellion as occurred from 1861 to 1865. His will was obeyed in the South, notwithstanding Virginia and North Carolina were opposed to secession. The momentum of its power coerced all into line, and in Virginia, which had cast a heavy vote against secession, was located his future Capital, and the State itself made the principal theater of war. Here his best equipped and best officered army met, and after four years was destroyed by, that of the Government, which had its base of operations on the Potomac, whence it derives its historic name, the Army of the Potomac, which will live in history until the end of time.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST BULL RUN.

THE history of the first battle of Bull Run naturally belongs in the history of the First Corps, for various reasons ; although the corps were not distinctively arranged until some time after that. General McDowell was its first commander, and organized it, and the first battle of Bull Run was wholly his, so far as the Federal side was concerned. In fact, the names of McDowell and Beauregard will be known in history principally in connection with that battle. When Sumter was fired on, and war was a reality for the new administration to face, it was extremely difficult to find officers who had experience in handling large commands.

General Scott was then too far advanced in years (nearly eighty) to take the field, but he well knew the great work to be performed. It had been given out by prominent men and officials that it would be a short war ; Secretary Seward placed its duration at sixty days, therefore the first volunteers were called for ninety days only. The zeal of the Crusaders did not surpass the activity in both sections, and thousands enlisted through the recruiting officers, and regiment after regiment was formed, officered, equipped, and dispatched to the front with wonderful rapidity.

Soon large armies were facing each other. Butler at

Fortress Monroe was met by Magruder ; at Harper's Ferry Patterson and Johnston were organizing large commands. In the mountainous region of West Virginia several commands were menacing each other for the mastery. The Confederate forces were pressed to within a few miles of Washington, while Alexandria was a rendezvous—in fact, their rear guard was just leaving when Colonel Ellsworth's command entered the city on the fatal morning when Jackson shot him dead for hauling down the Confederate flag.

The work of receiving and assigning the regiments to their places around Washington was done, almost exclusively, by Major Irwin McDowell.

In the mean time Congress had been convened by the President on the fourth of July. It was decidedly appropriate for that body to meet on that day ; if there was anything that would warm them up in the South it was the remembrance of the day designated by an illustrious son of the South as Independence Day ; it was the olive branch kindly extended by President Lincoln.

To meet the great emergency, a bill, providing for three major generals and additional brigadier generals, was passed and signed at once by the President.

The first thing to be done was to select the major generals.

Salmon P. Chase, who was Secretary of the Treasury, was the most active and, at that time, one of the most powerful members of the Cabinet. He not only controlled the finances, but he gave a large share of his time to military matters.

When the Cabinet met to select the three major generals (I now repeat what General McDowell said to Major E. P. Halstead and myself, which fact will give one substantial witness to its correctness) Secretary Chase sent a letter to Major McDowell to come to the White House immediately. He was then absent assigning new troops to their temporary quarters. When he returned to the War Department, he found Secretary Chase's note. He went at once to the

White House, and sent his card up to Mr. Chase, who came down and told him that the Cabinet was then in session for the purpose of selecting the three major generals, and that he (Chase) intended to present his (McDowell's) name as one of them.

To this proposition McDowell stoutly demurred, saying that it would create great jealousy, and that he feared it would be greatly against him. McDowell explained to us that he never had any hope of attaining a rank higher than colonel, and even that was beyond his expectation; he said he was glad to start early in the war with the rank of brigadier in the regular army, and, as he said to Chase, he preferred that rank.

He then suggested to Chase as the three major generals McClellan, Halleck, and Frémont. But the evidence before me is quite clear that Chase did not select the major generals, although it is said that he was strong enough afterwards to name Hooker as the commander of the Army of the Potomac. I am greatly indebted to General Schuyler Hamilton, who was General Scott's military secretary, and who saw Lincoln then, on official business, more than any other man in Washington, for valuable information, which is given in his exact language. He says: "In regard to the appointments of Frémont, Halleck, and McClellan, General Frémont as a defeated candidate for the Presidency, and a soldier by profession, did not need anybody to urge his claim to be major general. General Halleck owed his appointment as major general to a letter, written by him from San Francisco, setting forth the condition of affairs on the Pacific coast. This letter was laid before General Scott, and by him submitted to President Lincoln. It impressed both greatly. General Scott remarked that in thinking of men suitable for the position of major general, they had omitted one of the trump cards in the pack. Within twenty-four hours General Halleck was notified by telegraph of his appointment as major general." He added: "McClellan was also selected by General Scott." When Colonel Schuy-

ler Hamilton took the news to the President of the great victory at Rich Mountain, he added a word in McClellan's favor.

In the mean time the three months' volunteers would soon be out of the service, and nothing really practical had been done—only a mere beginning.

Butler was holding Fortress Monroe. His name was a tower of strength at that time to the Union cause, for the reason that in the Charleston convention he had voted (twenty-seven times) for Jefferson Davis as the nominee of the Democratic party for President.

In answer to a question in regard to his vote he sent me the following :

BOSTON, November 3, 1890.

DEAR SIR :—I have your letter in which you say you have put into your book that I voted for Jefferson Davis twenty-seven times. You have made a mistake ; I voted for him fifty-seven (57) times.

Yours truly, BENJ. F. BUTLER.

J. H. STINE, Esq., 323 C Street, S. E., Washington, D. C.

But when Davis attempted to disrupt or destroy the Union, Butler marched at once to stamp out the treasonable action of the man who had had honor thrust upon him by the Nation, and who had taken an oath as an army officer, Secretary of War, and Senator that he would support the Constitution and obey the laws. His action at Baltimore gave additional value to his name. But the enemy was committing heavy depredations all around him. The navy yard opposite Norfolk had been destroyed, and the enemy's flag floated triumphantly near him. But Butler was not supposed to conquer the enemy at once. At Harper's Ferry General Patterson, an officer of the Mexican War, was in command. Great deeds were prophesied of him, and it was said that he would soon advance on General Johnston and drive him from the valley. Every day added to the confidence of the South, as no battle was forced on them. Their old idea, that the true military men of the Nation were born in the South and that on the field of battle one

Southern man was equal to four Northern men, was beginning to be the settled opinion in their armies.

Beauregard, with his headquarters in the Weir house, near Manassas Junction, was evidently aiming to repeat some of Napoleon's strategic moves, for he mapped out a plan by which he was to receive reinforcements enough to hurl the Union army back on Washington, then unite with Johnston, pounce on Patterson—merely lunch on him—rush on the Union forces in West Virginia, and drive them from the State. This programme was a nice one, and would have well-nigh freed the Confederacy; but it was suddenly spoiled in West Virginia, very unexpectedly and unceremoniously, by an officer who had served several years as a professor at West Point, and was an able engineer.

When the base of Rich Mountain was touched his eagle eye took in the situation, and he at once asked General McClellan to permit him to make a detour of the mountain which would place him in the rear of the enemy.

General Rosecrans having obtained that permission from General McClellan, set out on his perilous march, following the guide who lived near the camp of the enemy. After a difficult march he finally reached the desired point and threw forward his brigade (the Nineteenth Ohio, and the Eighth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Indiana) in line of battle. The result of that strategic move and bold assault was the first substantial victory of the war. The brilliant campaign of General Rosecrans, of only one day, had the effect of paralyzing the enemy in all that mountainous region. The news was hailed with delight and joy throughout the North, while the South adroitly concealed its mortification over the result.

As the soldiers are dying off so rapidly, and every day lessens the opportunity to secure and preserve valuable history, the following letter, giving Scott's opinion of Rosecrans is here inserted :

THE ARLINGTON,

Washington, D. C., February 12, 1887.

DEAR SIR:—About May 19–22, 1861, General Rosecrans called at the official headquarters of General Scott. He was in Washington to procure the money to pay for clothing, &c., for the Ohio three months' volunteers. We met; he mentioned his object; we conversed awhile. I mentioned General Scott could not at that moment receive him, but begged him to wait for a short time. Presently I informed him General Scott would be glad to see him. They had quite a detailed conversation. General Scott put to him many incisive questions, and gave his views about gunboats, and an army of iron, &c., &c. Very shortly after General Rosecrans left President Lincoln entered. Presently General Scott repeated to President Lincoln the important points of General Rosecrans' information. He added, "Mr. President, he ought to be made a brigadier general of the regular army. He is a graduate of West Point, an accomplished officer of engineers. He is full of the rough vigor we so much need. He is a rough diamond, sir, but a diamond all the same."

General Rosecrans was very shortly afterwards appointed a brigadier general of the regular army—viz, June 16, 1861.

Yours truly,

SCHUYLER HAMILTON,

Major General.

J. H. STINE, Esq.

Immediately on the heels of that victory the Northern press, reflecting the excited and anxious feeling of the people, not only clamored, but virtually demanded that the army in front of Washington move forward to victory, and repeat the crushing defeat of the enemy at Rich Mountain by Rosecrans.

There were but two officers presented to command the army in front of Washington—McDowell and Mansfield. A choice must be made without delay. General Hamilton, who knows more about this than any man, said: "General Mansfield, when Jefferson Davis was Secretary of War, had been preferred for inspector general of the army as against Henry L. Scott, General Scott's son-in-law, who was adjutant general of the army under Scott in Mexico. Though there were the kindest relations between Generals Scott and Mansfield, that caused the weight of Scott's influence in favor of McDowell.

"McDowell had been on Scott's staff for several years in New York City. He was taken on Scott's staff as assistant adjutant general, which brought his wife near her kin, he having married the daughter of Mr. Borden, the great ironmaster of Troy, and therefore knew McDowell well."

Mansfield was given the command of the troops in the city of Washington. McDowell entered on his new and responsible duties with great alacrity, working night and day to prepare his command for the approaching conflict. He realized the fact that his troops were not prepared for battle, and so stated, but he was met with the reply that the enemy was equally as green. That statement was not true. Lincoln, who will live in history and in the hearts of the people perhaps next to Washington, was an eminent lawyer and statesman. Jefferson Davis was a military man, having served in the Mexican War, and had been Secretary of War for four years under Pierce, which gave him great military advantages. Besides, almost every prominent man in the South possessed a military training, which, at that critical moment, was of great value, so that the retort that the South was as green as the North was not true in a military sense, and the fact that the bold Stonewall Jackson wanted to invade the North immediately after the first Bull Run was a true gauge of their military training.

McDowell was laboring at a great disadvantage—drilling and preparing his troops as best he could—under the heavy pressure from the North to deliver battle to the enemy in his front.

Secretary Chase was the champion, in the Cabinet, of the intense feeling in the North that the war should be pushed at once, with a vigor that would end it soon; that was a correct view if the army had been prepared to advance and hold its ground.

There is no doubt that General Scott was weakened with the administration, for the reason that he did not be-

lieve in the prevailing opinion that a few days would crush the rebellion ; and the more the old hero insisted, or faithfully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the opinion of those who hoped and said it would end speedily.

At the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamilton says : "General Montgomery Blair said he would march to Richmond with ten thousand men, armed with lathes." "Yes," said General Scott, "as prisoners of war." Continuing General Hamilton's statement of the events which occurred prior to the battle and during its progress, he says : "On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull Run, Scott directed me, his military secretary, to say to McDowell that he wished him to dine with him without fail. At the dinner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell from fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then existing condition of public affairs. Reminding him even of the personal obligations he (General McDowell) was under to him (General Scott) in the matter of appointing him on his staff, previously referred to, he stated that it was his intention and wish that he (General McDowell) should organize in the vicinity of Xenia, Ohio, an army of iron of not less than one hundred thousand men, while in the mean time, iron gunboats were constructed suitable for the waters of the Ohio and the Mississippi, by combination of which land and naval forces the rebellion should be enveloped on the one hand, by the iron serpent of gunboats, while the army of iron penetrated the interior. He then begged General McDowell to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, and aid him (General Scott) in preventing a forward movement at that moment ; one of the arguments used by General Scott being that the Union sentiment of the South had been surprised by the suddenness and promptitude of the movement in favor of secession ; that he (General Scott) was well advised that the Union sentiment was recovering itself, and gaining head in the South ; that from the moment blood was shed the South would be made a unit.

General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. A few moments after his retirement General Scott said to me, 'Did you ever see such a man of stone? He was not moved by any of my appeals.' He added: 'Put on your sword and follow General McDowell, and say to him, he must either go to Secretary Chase and do what I have urged, or he must report to me by midnight that he is at Arlington. I will not leave that army on the other side of the Potomac without a commander. General McDowell will say that he has no staff. Tell him that I have ordered you to accompany him to General Mansfield to supply him with as many young men who have just arrived from West Point as he may desire, as staff officers. And further, direct General Mansfield that he see that those young men are furnished with horses and all necessary equipments for the service.'

"I overtook General McDowell on Seventeenth Street, just near the old War Office, and communicated General Scott's orders. He declined to use his influence with Secretary Chase, as General Scott requested. He also declined, on some private misunderstandings between Mansfield and himself, to call upon General Mansfield as General Scott had directed he should. I urged upon him that private misunderstandings could not be allowed for a moment to interfere with great public interests; that I knew my duty, and however painful it might be, I should be constrained to do it—that was, to order him (General McDowell) to report to General Scott in arrest, because of his positive refusal to obey General Scott's orders, communicated by me. On this presentation of the matter, General McDowell reconsidered his determination, accompanied me to General Mansfield, and was furnished with the staff of young men from West Point indicated by General Scott. He reported by telegraph at midnight that he was at the Arlington House in command of that army. In the course of the succeeding week General McDowell reported to General Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon the

wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions indicated by General McDowell as those he intended the forces under his command should occupy. After General McDowell had gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had finished, General Scott remarked, 'General McDowell, that is as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper.'

"General McDowell said in reply: 'General Scott, the success of this whole plan depends upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check at Winchester.' General Scott remarked that General Johnston was a very able soldier, that he had a railroad at his command with which to move his troops, and if General McDowell's plan of battle, which had just been presented to him, depended upon General Patterson holding General Johnston in check, his plan was not worth the paper it was drawn upon."

That ended that interview. In regard to the condition of the troops, as to the proximate determination of their enlistment, the following circumstances are mentioned:

"The time of the Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran's regiment, had actually expired, or was on the point of expiring, before the battle of Bull Run was fought, and it was so uncertain that they would move forward, that General Scott sent me to that regiment with the message that if the Sixty-ninth refused to move forward, it was the first time in history that Irishmen had ever been known to turn their backs on friend or foe. This determined that regiment to go forward. Other regiments, not remembered, were appealed to in a similar manner, and all went forward."

General Hamilton is mistaken wherein he states that all the regiments appealed to, whose time had expired, went forward. The Fourth Pennsylvania positively refused after an earnest appeal, and the Colonel, John F. Hartranft, refused to return home with his command, but volunteered as an aid and went into the battle. Afterwards he became major general, Governor of Pennsylvania for two terms,

and held many other high positions of honor and trust. It was the turning point in his life.

McDowell considered that his chances were good to succeed, and, if he did, the dazzling star of fame was rising near enough to him to be seen without a field glass.

General Scott did his duty sternly, and General Schuyler Hamilton, the grandson of Alexander Hamilton, displayed an executive capacity and nerve that were worthy of his illustrious grandsire.

The fiat had gone forth that the army must offer battle, and the order was issued to march. So, on the morning of the seventeenth of July the army left Arlington Heights, opposite Washington, for Bull Run. On the eighteenth the vanguard reached Centerville, from which place the enemy had retired, as Beauregard had selected Bull Run as his line of defense. McDowell organized his army into four divisions, commanded respectively by Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, and Miles.

From Centerville there are three roads running in the direction of Bull Run ; that on the right hand crosses it at the famous Stone Bridge, the middle road at Blackburn's Ford, which leads direct to Manassas, and the left-hand road crosses some four miles lower down.

It was the intention of McDowell to turn Beauregard's right flank and take him in reverse and rear.

He sent Tyler forward to feel the enemy, and make a reconnoissance, which was a fatal error, as that gave due warning to the enemy, though the right was already guarded with their best officers.

But especially was that true of Tyler, for he was an ambitious officer, without sufficient discretion. Instead of being contented to obey orders, and merely reconnoiter, he advanced opposite Blackburn's Ford, and, after shelling the enemy, advanced his infantry to the edge of the stream and opened a fusillade, expecting to scare them, and declaring that he would go to Manassas that night. He was not aware that he was annoying General Longstreet, who proved

to be the Ney of the Confederate army, as the war developed, and became interesting. Longstreet advanced his infantry and severely punished Tyler for his rashness.

In fact his left, the Twelfth New York, was thrown into confusion by a force of the enemy crossing the stream lower down, and pouring in an enfilading fire. This compelled a hasty retreat, which had an exceedingly bad effect on our troops. They were surprised by the flank movement, and suffered from it.

The news flew over the country, and Beauregard claimed a victory, declaring it was a battle.

This reverse led McDowell to change his plans, and seek to turn the left flank, which it was decided by the engineers could be done. Therefore, on the morning of the twenty-first, at two o'clock, the order was given for the army to begin its circuitous march around the enemy's left, crossing Bull Run at Sudley's Ford, nearly a mile above the extreme left of the enemy. That was an admirable move, and took the enemy completely by surprise. At the ford is the Sudley Mill, antiquated in its appearance; also a spring and church by the same name. The church stands in a little grove, quite a distance from the stream, near the edge of the brow of the hill.

[It was at this place that the party lunched in October, 1883, when we were reviewing the battlefield. Among those present were Generals Rosecrans, Longstreet, and Hunt; Colonel Frey, the Swiss Minister; Generals Fairchild and Dudley; Colonel Wood, Hon. C. C. Matson, Mr. Becker, of *Frank Leslie's Magazine*, and many other newspaper men, and veterans. This historical visit was made under the auspices of the Society of the First Corps, with General Rosecrans as president, in the interest of the present history.]

The Confederate forces were drawn up along Bull Run as follows: Ewell's brigade was on the extreme right near Union Mills, with General Holmes' brigade in reserve. General Jones' was on the left of Ewell, with Early's bri-

gade as a support. Then came Longstreet, with Bee's and Barton's brigades in his rear, lapping over to McLean's Ford. Still farther in the rear was Barksdale's Mississippi regiment. Benham was supported by Jackson. Cocke's brigade was between Benham and Evans, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery in reserve. Evans held the extreme left of their line, coming down to the Stone bridge, and also covering a small ford some distance above, and farther up the stream. Hampton's legion of infantry had arrived on the twentieth, the day before the battle, and was stationed near the Lewis House. Walton's and Pendleton's batteries were in rear of the center, or nearly so. It will be observed that General Johnston was already with Beauregard, and a part of his command had arrived before the battle, as Jackson's brigade was a part of it. General Patterson had been urged by General Scott to either engage Johnston, or to threaten him strongly enough to prevent, if possible, his reënforcing Beauregard. That could be done only by throwing his left well forward, and strongly feeling the position of the enemy; then he could tell, perhaps, if troops were being sent away. Patterson's movement was more to the right, while Johnston moved all of his army away, but a mere skeleton, which was left as a blind to detain Patterson. McDowell had to contend with more than the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston, as Holmes, who was supporting Ewell, had been ordered from Aquia Creek, thus stripping the Potomac, in response to the urgent requests of Beauregard, who had sent several staff officers to Richmond to explain the situation and urge that more troops be sent to him.

The burden of McDowell's fears was that Johnston would detail a part of his command and reënforce Beauregard.

On the morning of the twenty-first, at two o'clock, Tyler was to move his division forward to the Stone bridge, and earnestly engage the enemy, as if he intended to force a crossing there. He was placed in the advance to cover the

movements of Hunter and Heintzelman, who were to take a blind country road which, in a circuitous way, finally crossed Bull Run at Sudley's Ford. At Cub Run Hunter left the main road, with Heintzelman closely following, and Miles, in reserve near Centerville, was, if possible, to engage the enemy's center and right to further shield the movements of Hunter and Heintzelman. Tyler behaved quite well that morning, for he made a vigorous attack at six o'clock, the time designated to begin, and which was the hour fixed for Hunter and Heintzelman to arrive at Sudley's Ford. Tyler's division was tardy in starting, however, and that wasted much precious time, but the troops were new, and could not be handled like veterans; and as Tyler did such good work when he arrived in front of the enemy, it seems hardly fair to charge him with the delay during the night. He pounded the enemy hard, but it was a long time to keep up the deception, for the head of Hunter's column did not reach Sudley's Ford until half-past nine—three hours and a half of heavy strain on Tyler.

It is now said Beauregard claims that he knew of McDowell's change, yet it was not until nearly ten o'clock that Evans changed his front to meet Hunter's forces, and dispatched an aid to Beauregard notifying him of the threatened danger on their left, and called for assistance that he might make disposition to meet the advance. There was not even a vedette at or near Sudley's Ford. Our troops crossed it as did Cæsar the Rubicon, unopposed. Hunter was still marching in column, and, as he advanced, Evans placed batteries in position to enfilade him. Burnside's brigade was heading the column, and was not deployed in line of battle until the open fields were gained, when it had to be done at great disadvantage and sacrifice. Colonel Porter's brigade deployed and formed on Burnside's right, with Sykes' regulars on his left. This was a splendid line of battle, and the enemy, after an hour's hard fighting, was forced back across the Warrenton turnpike and Young's Branch.

This movement uncovered the Stone bridge, and Tyler ordered Sherman's and Keyes' brigades to cross Bull Run, pass to the rear of Hunter, and form on his right.

It was at this exciting moment that Sherman displayed the tact which made him a distinguished general afterwards. He had seen a horseman that morning cross the stream quite a distance above the Stone bridge, so when he received the order to advance, he took his brigade to that point and found a good ford, and at once rapidly advanced to the line of battle assigned to him. The Second Wisconsin was in his command there, and the boys are very proud of their first brigade commander. That regiment won a position in history second to none in the army. Ricketts' battery was by that time in position on the right of Sudley's road (which crosses the Warrenton turnpike not far from the noted Henry House) and was doing splendid service. At noon McDowell was in possession of the plateau south of Young's Branch; the central point on that plateau being the Henry House, which like the cluster of trees at Gettysburg, was the prominent mark to be gained in the Pickett charge.

The enemy had been forced back a mile and a half and was in great confusion. Bee's troops were in full retreat, when he, seeing Jackson's brigade of five regiments in line of battle, some distance back, in front of the pine woods, said, "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall." Jackson came forward only to receive a very severe punishment, his brigade being badly cut up; the Federal right swept around to the Henry House, and the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts were brought up near there.

Then came a lull in the action on the part of the Federals; the men were tired and thirsty, and they went back to the branch for water. This suspension proved fatal to the Union cause and to the star of McDowell. A little more good work at that moment and the Confederate army would have been in full retreat toward Richmond. But now came one of the most unfortunate events of the

day. Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries were necessarily posted in close proximity. Griffin had two guns on the right of Ricketts, and was playing on a battery not more than three hundred yards away, when he saw a regiment come out of a piece of woods not very far from his right. He suspected it to be a Confederate regiment, and ordered his guns double-shotted to give them a volley, when Major Barry rode up and said: "Captain, that is your support." (He thought it was the Fourteenth Brooklyn.) Griffin insisted that it was the enemy. "But," said Major Barry, "I know." The commander of the regiment was apparently making a speech to his men. The regiment was then moved by the left flank along the edge of the woods, then advanced to within fifty yards of the batteries, where a murderous fire was opened, killing and disabling the horses of both batteries, and strewing the ground with the killed and wounded, not only of the batteries, but the supports; it was a terrible disaster to our arms, and was never really recovered.

Beauregard and Johnston had both arrived on the field, and were inspiring the men to hold their lines until fresh troops could arrive. The Fourteenth Brooklyn, which had been well on the right all day, had behaved with a gallantry worthy of the Old Guard of Napoleon. They had been attacked in a piece of woods by the Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments, and had held their ground heroically. In supporting the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin, Colonel A. M. Wood was severely wounded; it was thought mortally. Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. Fowler then assumed command, and was distinguished during the war as the commander of that gallant and heroic regiment.

The Federal forces, after the loss of Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries, were driven back across Young's Branch and the turnpike, when they rallied and made a determined dash to retake the batteries; again our flags were planted on the plateau. But the battle had swayed to and fro with success first on one side, then on the other, until more of

Johnston's troops arrived, and, falling on the right flank of the Federals, decided the fate of the day. General Schenck's brigade had been ordered up, but did not reach the field in time to strike the enemy opposite the Stone bridge, which was his left engaged; Schenck had been skirmishing during the forenoon across the stream.

A squadron or so of their cavalry made a charge up the Sudley road, which did great damage, and won for them a wonderful name over the country as the Black Horse Cavalry, which was a terror for a long time. Our troops retreated mainly by Sudley's Ford, some crossing above and some below.

It was evidently Beauregard's intention to entirely destroy McDowell; for in the morning he ordered his right, under Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet, to advance across Bull Run and proceed in the direction of Centerville, so as to intercept and cut off his retreat. It is claimed that the orderly sent with the order was killed; at least, it was never received; so the Confederate extreme right stood still all day, faced by Miles' division of perhaps equal numbers.

There is no doubt, from all the evidence, that the Confederates had more men engaged there than the Federals.

On page 129 of Colonel Roman's *Life of Beauregard*, the following order will be found:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Manassas Junction, July 7, 1861.

The General Commanding directs that you take prompt and effective measures to provide forthwith, at your depot near these headquarters, ample provisions, including cattle, for 25,000 men for two weeks, and that amount at least must be constantly maintained on hand, subject to requisition, until otherwise ordered.

THOMAS JOURDAN, A. A. G.

Captain W. H. FOWLEE.

What was the necessity of this order if he had not about that number of men?

Holmes' brigade from Aquia Creek, and the larger part of Johnston's army from the Shenandoah, added to his command, made Beauregard formidable enough to receive McDowell.

For new troops our men performed herculean work.

After the break came, and the Union line was driven back, the terrible enfilading fire poured in on our right flank by the fresh arrivals from Johnston's army made retreat inevitable. The troops were mixed, and in great confusion. Many prisoners were captured at that time, the Second Wisconsin and Fifteenth Massachusetts suffering heavily in that way. It seemed that the Fifteenth Massachusetts was doomed to bad luck early in the war; the regiment was in the Ball's Bluff disaster later in the year.

In the mean time Colonel Wood, of the 14th Brooklyn, was lying on the ground shot through the body. His faithful friend, H. L. Cranford, who afterwards distinguished himself as a staff officer, decided to take the colonel from the field, or remain with him and share his fate. He succeeded in placing him in an ambulance. When they arrived at Bull Run, the driver was directed to cross and follow the regiment. Cranford, who was an officer of the Fourteenth Brooklyn, thought the colonel was entirely safe, and hastened forward to join his command, believing he might be needed. Suddenly there was a great jam at the ford, the ambulance was forced aside and Colonel Wood was captured. He was taken to Charlottesville, where the surgeon of the regiment attended him until he was removed to Richmond as a prisoner of war.

The United States had captured the "Savannah," a privateer, and Smith of that vessel was convicted and sentenced to death. In retaliation the Confederates prepared to select an officer to be executed. Others were also selected at the same time for other privateers, already captured by the United States, whom they feared would be similarly dealt with. On the 10th of November, General Winder, accom-

panied by his staff, entered the officers' quarters, and taking a central position, addressed them by stating that he had been directed to execute the order he held in his hand, which he then read.

The order is as follows :

C. S. A., WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, November 9, 1861.

SIR :—You are hereby instructed to choose by lot from among the prisoners of war, of highest rank, one who is to be confined in a cell appropriated to convicted felons, and who is to be treated in all respects as if such convict, and to be held for execution of the prisoner of war Smith, recently condemned to death in Philadelphia.

You will also select thirteen other prisoners of war, the highest in rank captured by our forces, to be confined in the cells reserved for prisoners accused of infamous crimes, and will treat them as such so long as the enemy shall continue so to treat the like number of prisoners of war captured by them at sea, and now held for trial in New York as pirates.

As these measures are intended to repress the infamous attempt now made by the enemy to commit judicial murder on prisoners of war, you will execute them strictly, as the mode best calculated to prevent the commission of so heinous a crime.

Your obedient servant, J. P. BENJAMIN,
Acting Secretary of War.

To Brig. Gen. JOHN H. WINDER.

After the order was read, he gave Colonel W. R. Lee, of the Twentieth Massachusetts, six slips of paper on which were written the names of the colonels. At first Colonel Lee declined, then took the slips and examined them. He then folded each one carefully, placed them in a tin box, about a foot in depth, and just large enough to admit a hand. After General Winder had shaken up the ballots well he requested the Hon. Alfred Ely, a member of Congress from New York, to draw the lots. Mr. Ely was captured near Centerville, while looking at the battle, and was taken to Richmond and confined in the officers' prison. This gave him great notoriety, North and South, at the time. Mr. Ely was loath to make the selection, but, being urged by the officers to do so, consented. Colonel

Michael Corcoran had been sent to Castle Pinckney, but, during his stay in Richmond he and Ely were messmates. The first slip drawn by Ely, when opened, was found to contain the name of Colonel Corcoran, who was thus selected for execution in retaliation for Smith of the "Savannah." The other colonels drawn were Lee, Wilcox (afterwards General Wilcox), Cogswell, Wood (of the Fourteenth Brooklyn), and Woodruff. After Colonel Wood returned from imprisonment General McDowell said: "A braver man never lived than Colonel Wood;" and he took him to the War Department and introduced him to Secretary Stanton, saying: "Mr. Secretary, if all my officers and men had fought as well as Colonel Wood and his men, the day at Bull Run would have been different."

The lieutenant colonels who were drawn were Bowman and Neff. The majors were Potter, Revere, and Vogdes. The captains were Rockwood, Bowman, Kieffer, Roswell A. Fish, and Arthur. Captains Fish and Arthur were selected in retaliation for the execution of Mumford, who was hanged by Butler at New Orleans for hauling down the American flag. They were confined at Salisbury. Fish was on crutches; he was wounded when captured. The time of their execution was fixed, and they had given all of their personal effects to their friends, as they fully expected to meet their fate, when the death sentence was countermanded just two hours before the time at which it was ordered to be executed. Our Government had notified the Confederate authorities that for every Federal officer executed in retaliation for the hanging of Mumford, ten Confederate officers in our hands would be similarly dealt with, and to this decisive action our officers owed their lives.

Each rank was drawn by itself. When the names of the captains were placed in the box, Mr. Ely drew Captains J. B. Ricketts (afterwards General Ricketts), J. K. Rockwood, and H. W. McQuade. Ricketts was badly

wounded when in command of his battery, and was then at the hospital, where his faithful wife was taking care of him, with little hope of his recovery. When Ricketts' name was announced, Captain Thomas Cox, of Ohio, stepped forward and asked that his name be put on the list, in place of Ricketts, as he was at the hospital, badly wounded. The next day General Winder came to the prison and said that he was directed by the Secretary of War to exempt all wounded officers, so the names of Ricketts and McQuade were stricken from the list, and the next drawing resulted in the selection of the officers previously named. After the battle of Bull Run was over the news came that Captain Ricketts was severely wounded and a prisoner of war.

His young wife, then only twenty-three years of age, went to General Scott and requested a pass through our lines to join her husband. The excitement was at such a high state, and the undertaking so great, that General Scott hesitated, but she pleaded so hard that the General said to her: "You are a woman of good judgment. I have known you from infancy, and held you in my arms when you were christened. I cannot well refuse you." The pass was soon made out, and she hastily bought a light double team, and started at once for the battlefield.

In his article, in the *Century Magazine*, General Beauregard claimed that when he learned that Ricketts was wounded he sent his chief of staff to him to see what could be done for him, and endeavored otherwise to assist him. The armies were commanded on both sides by graduates of West Point, and they were generally ready to extend brotherly assistance, if an officer, whom they formerly knew in the regular service, fell into their hands wounded. Although Captain Ricketts was almost mortally wounded, he was in full possession of his mind, and he lay by the side of his guns—as fine a battery as was ever commanded. He had a full right to the expectation that Beauregard would gladly befriend him in his helpless

condition, as they knew each other well in the regular service.

When Beauregard rode up to him, Ricketts asked him to protect him, as there was danger of his being pinioned to the ground by the soldiers, who were greatly infuriated because the battery had made sad havoc in their ranks, and the first families of the South had suffered. Beauregard replied : " You will receive the same treatment that our privateers in New York receive ;" and then ordered his men to put Captain Ricketts in an army wagon drawn by mules, in which was a Confederate soldier badly wounded in the head and delirious, who rolled and fought over Captain Ricketts in his dying agonies ; after being twice pitched out of the wagon Captain Ricketts was laid on the porch of the Weir House, surrounded by the dead and dying, and was there found the next morning by a volunteer surgeon, Dr. Lewis, of Wisconsin, who carried him to the small room occupied by Colonel Wilcox, commanding Michigan Volunteers, and five other officers who were wounded prisoners, where he remained until taken to Richmond, some weeks later. Both General and Mrs. Ricketts remember this incident distinctly, and were greatly astonished to see Beauregard's article appear with the statement " that he kindly cared for Ricketts." Mrs. Ricketts has a rare memory. She can call to mind incidents which occurred at that time as if they had happened but yesterday ; and she is positive about this matter. Captain Ricketts was so badly wounded that when he arrived at Richmond he was taken to an almshouse used for a hospital. Mrs. Ricketts was given a cot by the side of her husband. The room was full of the wounded. There Mrs. Ricketts had to stay all day and sleep at night. The only protection given her was made by cutting down the legs of her cot, which made it lower and shielded her a little from view, which was done by the other prisoners, who highly esteemed her. There she remained for six months and a half, faithfully watching her husband.

Never did a wife's devotion shine with brighter luster. She washed her clothes in that room (what little she had, for she took no extra suits with her; she thought only of her husband and his condition,) and dried and ironed them on her bed by sleeping on them at night; a rough experience indeed. A charming-looking woman came in one day, and in a low, sweet voice asked Mrs. Ricketts if she was well supplied with clothing. Mrs. Ricketts replied that she had brought nothing extra, because she expected to return soon. Her visitor said that she was closely watched, but that she would bring her some; in a few days she came with a small parcel, and silently dropped it on Mrs. Ricketts' bed. After awhile it was opened, and was found to contain a nice calico wrapper and other articles.

The fare was pretty severe on the wounded, nothing but browned rice for coffee, and a scanty meal of bread and meat. For dinner rice soup and a piece of bread, with a very small piece of meat. For supper rice soup, a piece of bread, and a small piece of meat.

The visitor referred to called one day, and said she had permission to bring something on Sunday mornings for their breakfast. Mrs. Ricketts thanked her, and divided it among all in the room, although it really was intended for herself. Every Sunday morning they looked anxiously for the welcome basket of good things, brought to them by a colored man. Months rolled away, but the constancy of this good Samaritan never flagged in the least; every Sunday morning she sent the basket filled with the best in the land. Mrs. Ricketts said she never saw a handsomer woman or one with more charming ways.

There was no exchange of prisoners, but Mrs. Jefferson Davis had a relative (Captain Lee Langel) who was captured in West Virginia, and there was an understanding that Captain Ricketts and he were to be taken out into the middle of the James River, and be virtually exchanged, though it was not called that. In the mean time Mrs. Ricketts had had a faithful friend in the surgeon of the

hospital, Dr. Charles Gibbon, a son of the noted Dr. Gibbon, whose works on surgery are high authority. He was a Philadelphian, and knew Major Ricketts, her uncle. Mrs. Ricketts was a Miss Lawrence, but was related to the Ricketts family, and was a fourth cousin of her husband. Dr. Gibbon had quietly befriended her for his early associations, and said nothing.

As the time for their departure was drawing near he asked her to step into his office. In that farewell conversation, among other things, he asked Mrs. Ricketts if she knew the person who had been so constant and faithful. Mrs. Ricketts said she did not.

"Well," said the Doctor, "she is the mistress of a noted gambler in Richmond. The Sunday morning breakfast you receive is what is left Saturday night." He then added, "That night the official cares are laid aside, and many high officials, among them Judah P. Benjamin, go down there, and during the evening have an elegant supper. The remnants are saved by that lady for you next morning." He added: "She was the wife of a prosperous man in the North. He took her and their little child to Cape May; there she met Mr. T., of Richmond, and fell desperately and blindly in love with him. She deserted her husband and child and eloped with him; that was just before the war broke out."

But this lady had another visit to pay to Mrs. Ricketts, and perhaps had the doctor break the ice for her. She wanted to send letters North by Mrs. Ricketts, to inquire after her child.

When she came she fell on her knees, and was crawling toward Mrs. Ricketts, who sprang to help her up, but she would not rise; hiding her face in the folds of Mrs. Ricketts' dress, she said she was unworthy to see her, but that she had endeavored to atone for all her sins by doing all she could for the wounded prisoners, and hoped that Mrs. Ricketts would go and try to find her child.

Mrs. Ricketts said it was a new cup of sorrow filled to

overflowing; her burden before had been heavy, she thought, but there before her was an object of unconsolable pity, as handsome and charming a woman as she had ever looked upon, inwardly dying with grief for her wayward and misguided course.

Mrs. Ricketts took the letters and promised to find her child, if possible. She brought her husband North, and then, after he was comfortably situated, she set out on her mission to find the deserted child. The family were readily found, for they were prominent people in a prosperous city. They were almost heart-broken over their relative's conduct, but were pleased to receive a visit from Mrs. Ricketts.

Nothing more was heard of Mrs. Ricketts' prison visitor until the fall of Richmond. As the Sixth Corps entered that city a colored boy handed General Ricketts a note from a priest, from which he learned that this woman, deserted by every one, was in a dying condition. The General called immediately on the priest, and was taken to her bedside. As the Sixth Corps was ordered forward to Danville, and would march at daylight, the General could not remain, but he gave fifty dollars to the priest for the funeral expenses.

Thus was closed by death one of the most thrilling chapters of the war.

One of the saddest incidents which occurred in the prison, was the death of Calvin Huson, Jr., of Rochester, N. Y., who was the democratic candidate for Congress against Mr. Ely. They went out together in the same carriage, in company with Senator Foster, of Connecticut; at Centerville they became separated, and Ely and Huson were captured and taken to prison.

The South was greatly infuriated over the presence of members of Congress near the battlefield to encourage the troops.

Senator Henry Wilson, and Representative John P. C. Shanks were there, and it is said that John A. Logan fought in the ranks.

Mr. Ely was given a long imprisonment for his rashness ; he had to pay the debt of all the members, as he was the only one captured. But poor Mr. Huson was a private citizen. Mr. Ely stated the facts in his case, and begged the authorities to release him. Mr. Huson was well known to many of the high officials at Richmond, and time after time his release was promised, but it never came from his captors. He was finally taken with typhoid fever, which soon released him from prison. It was a hard lot indeed, and there was no apparent excuse for it, unless it was to make an example of him, and thereby deter noncombatant citizens from visiting battlefields where their presence might inspire the troops to greater deeds of valor.

Turning now to the army as it retreated toward Centerville—there was confusion, it is true, for General Stannard, who was then a lieutenant colonel, said to me : “The commands were badly mixed before they reached the stream of Bull Run, but the enemy was not hotly pursuing.” An army of observers had followed and were greatly frightened when our soldiers began to retreat. They soon managed to turn the retreat into a panic, and the road from Centerville to Washington presented a wild pandemonium. The First New Jersey (3 years) Infantry marched from Vienna that afternoon, and when but a short distance from Centerville met the van guard of the retreating army. The colonel, William A. Montgomery, an officer of the old army, who had served in the Mexican War, halted his regiment, and throwing Company G, which was on the right at that time, across the road, endeavored to check the retreat.

The scene presented at this point was one which cannot easily be forgotten. Soldiers and civilians, army wagons, ambulances, and private conveyances were coming up the broad turnpike in dire confusion. Wounded men were hobbling along, some stopping by the roadside to tighten the bandages around their wounds, while others quenched their thirst with the muddy and blood-tinged water from

the ditches along the way. The greater part of the men on foot, who were unhurt, climbed the fences on either side of the road, and taking to the fields went on unmolested toward Washington. The colonel and his staff officers succeeded in halting some of the fugitives, and heard from them only the most discouraging accounts of the battle; the burden of their story being that our army was not only beaten, but was almost destroyed, and in full retreat.

Among the civilians who told this tale was "Bull Run Russell," the valiant (!) correspondent of the *London Times*. Finding it impossible to stay the tide of retreat, Colonel Montgomery marched the regiment to Centerville, where it arrived about sundown, remaining until after midnight and was among the last of our troops to leave the place.

Dr. Taylor, the surgeon of the regiment, remained at Centerville in charge of the wounded; he was, of course, captured the next day, sent to Richmond, and was afterwards exchanged.

There is also testimony to prove that a part of our troops, at least, made that retreat in good order and without confusion. In this connection Major Roswell A. Fish, who was captured August 13, 1861, while skirmishing near Fairfax Court House, says:

"The retreat was not an entire rout. Miles' division had not been engaged during that Sunday, and when the retreat began, Miles having mysteriously disappeared some time during the day (he was drunk before twelve o'clock, noon), the colonels of the regiments, having no brigade commander, marched their commands off toward Alexandria as they felt inclined, most of them hurriedly; but Colonel Matheson, of the Thirty-second New York, known also as the First California, who was killed in 1862 at Crampton Gap, took position about five p. m. near Centerville with the Eighteenth Massachusetts, a Maine regiment, and his own regiment, formed a line of battle, and checked the enemy. Those regiments remained in that

position until about three p. m. next day, when they retired in perfect order to Fairfax Court House. While taking our coffee at six a. m., in the grounds of the Ladies' Seminary in that village, we saw the enemy coming over the brow of the hill leading into the village, when the Thirty-Second left, and halted at the intersection of the old Braddock road and Alexandria pike, about one mile from Fairfax Court House, where it stopped and supported two guns of Green's battery. The Confederates were checked here by this movement, and finding opposition, and not being aware of its strength, made no regular advance beyond Fairfax. The Thirty-second, in the afternoon of that day, Monday, 22d, leisurely marched to its old encampment, near Katt's Tavern and Fort Ellsworth, where its tents had remained pitched since the 16th of July, in possession of a sergeant and guard, as we had a notion when we left that we might want their shelter again. The next day the Thirty-second was marched into Alexandria, except one company, left in charge of camp, where it did provost guard duty for several months."

The first battle of Bull Run seemed to mark an era in the history of the country, for the North was there duly notified that it meant a hard struggle, and, as Major Rittenhouse says: "It was the best thing that could have happened—the defeat of our troops there—for it gave us to understand that the South intended to fight."

I will close this chapter with a quotation from General Schuyler Hamilton's description of the scene at Scott's quarters while the battle was going on that evening. He says:

"At three o'clock, on Sunday, July 21, a victory in favor of the Union army was reported at General Scott's quarters, President Lincoln and several members of his Cabinet being present. Very shortly afterwards the news came that the panic that General Scott had indicated in the Cabinet meeting previously referred to as likely to ensue had taken place, and the supposed victory had

turned into a stampede of the Union forces. That night General Scott's quarters were filled by the President, members of the Cabinet, Senators, Representatives, and Governors of States. There was a good deal of trepidation among them. General Scott said to Mr. Lincoln: 'There is terror in high quarters. It is needless; with the aid of the gunboats stationed in the Potomac, and the troops under General Mansfield, which I have reserved here for just such a contingency, the enemy cannot cross either the Long Bridge, or the Chain Bridge. I would get into my cabriolet and head the troops myself, were it necessary. But, Mr. President, the enemy have not wings, and I am assured that they have no transportation.' At that moment some person in high official position said: 'Our soldiers behaved like cowards.' General Scott immediately spoke out: 'That is not true! The only coward, Mr. President, is Winfield Scott. When I was urging that this untoward battle should not be fought (at the Cabinet meeting to which I have referred), I should have insisted that my resignation be accepted rather than the battle should be fought.'

"Winfield Scott was the only coward!"

CHAPTER II.

DRANESVILLE—THE FIRST VICTORY.

THE battle of Dranesville resulted in the first Federal victory south of the Potomac, and was of great importance to the Union cause. The people of the North were gloomy and discouraged; on the other hand, the disloyal sentiment throughout the entire country was rapidly increasing. The South was confident and boastful; the sympathizers with the "cause" elsewhere were defiant; therefore, this victory, though not great in regard to the numbers engaged, was, notwithstanding, most decisive and important to the Union side and correspondingly depressing to the Confederate. It reanimated the people of the North and restored confidence to their troops. A history of the First Corps, or any other history relating to the actions of the Army of the Potomac, would be incomplete without reference to Dranesville—the bright morning of our success—the beginning of the end.

General McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, consisting of three brigades, commanded by Generals John F. Reynolds, George G. Meade, and E. O. C. Ord, was in camp at Langley, called Camp Pierpont. This division as yet had never crossed swords with the enemy. They were untried in battle, though officers and men had been selected with the greatest care, and had been closely examined as to age, health, and efficiency, for a campaign of three years; also, they had been thoroughly drilled in the art of war for six months by officers among the best in the country. All the generals, and a number of the field officers and staff, were graduates of West Point, and all of

whom highly distinguished themselves during the great conflict. Of course the bravery and success of the volunteer officers and men of that celebrated division are notorious and historical facts, of which I have written elsewhere in this history.

On the morning of December 20, 1861, General McCall directed General Ord, with the Third Brigade, to move out on the Dranesville road at daylight. Before Ord started, McCall thus addressed him : "The object of the expedition is twofold. In the first place, to drive back the enemy's pickets, which have advanced within four or five miles of our lines, and have carried off two good Union men and threatened others ; and secondly, to procure a supply of forage."

In case an engagement of any magnitude should be brought on, the First Brigade, under General Reynolds, was to be in readiness to support Ord, and the Second Brigade, under General Meade, held in reserve.


Ord's expedition consisted of the Bucktail Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Kane, to be employed as skirmishers ; The Tenth Regiment, Colonel McCalmont ; the Sixth, Lieutenant Colonel Penrose ; the Ninth, commanded by Colonel Jackson, and the Twelfth, Colonel Taggart ; together with a detachment of cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Higgins, and Eastman's battery, consisting of two 24-pound howitzers, and two 12-pounders. On the march each regiment threw out two companies of flankers to prevent a surprise. One who was there says : "The march was as regular and as prompt as that of a body of old veterans." When the head of the column arrived at Dranesville, and while awaiting the regiments in the rear, General Ord disposed of what troops he had, by posting in advantageous positions the cavalry and artillery, supported by the Ninth Regiment, and a portion of Kane's regiment. Sypher, in his History of the Reserves, says, and doubtless he received his facts from those who took part in the engagement, which are therefore accurate, that : "The

presence of the enemy, mounted men on the slopes behind a wooded hollow south of the road, and also the appearance of a broad mass of smoke in the direction of Centerville, convinced General Ord of the enemy's presence.

"To meet an attack from the Centerville road, the brigade was faced southward, and Lieutenant Colonel Kane was sent with his regiment to occupy the roads in the rear, on which it was believed the enemy had a considerable force. The Tenth, Colonel McCalmont, followed by the Sixth, Lieutenant Colonel Penrose, and the Twelfth, Colonel Taggart, which formed the rear guard, closed up promptly. Colonel Taggart's flankers discovered the enemy on the south side of the Leesburg pike. General Ord had dispatched a messenger to General McCall to inform him of the situation in front, and McCall immediately proceeded to Dranesville, and arrived about the close of the battle. He approved of the disposition and conduct of battle made by General Ord.

"Believing the enemy would attack simultaneously on both sides of the turnpike, Ord directed Colonel McCalmont to place his regiment on the north side of the road in the woods, and bring it forward into line and attack the enemy if he advanced on that side of the road. Colonel Jackson was ordered to occupy a corresponding position on the south side of the road. The Bucktails were placed between these two flanking regiments, with orders to defend the column against an attack in the rear. The cavalry formed in the road west of the Bucktails; the artillery was placed in the center, and the Sixth and Twelfth Regiments were on the turnpike; and when the brigade faced the south toward the Centerville road it formed the left of the line. This, it appears, was the formation of our lines of battle in order to meet the enemy.

"General Stuart was in command of the Confederate forces, which consisted of the Eleventh Virginia Regiment, Colonel Garland; the Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant Colonel Secrest; the Tenth Alabama, Colonel Forney;



GEN. JOHN S. McCALMONT.

the First Kentucky, Colonel Tom Taylor; the Sumter Artillery, Captain Cutts, and Ransom's and Radford's Cavalry.

"Stuart arranged his lines as follows: The Eleventh Virginia and Tenth Alabama Regiments on the right of the Centerville road; the Sixth South Carolina and First Kentucky Regiments on the left; the artillery was advanced in the road between the columns of infantry, and the cavalry regiments covered the flanks. In this order General Stuart moved his command forward until he encountered our troops.

"General Ord immediately ordered the cavalry to the left flank; and selecting a position for the artillery, directed Captain Eastman to open on the enemy's battery. The battery came down the pike in a full gallop, capsized one gun, placed the others quickly in position, and Captain Eastman opened on the enemy with three guns, and shelled the woods, taking aim at the rising smoke, as the enemy's battery could not be seen. The third discharge exploded one of the enemy's caissons, killing a number of men and horses, as was seen after the battle. It was first thought the enemy would attack on each side of the road, but instead, his whole force was on the south side. General Ord quickly made the necessary change of his troops. Colonel McCalmont was ordered to the support of the battery. Colonel Jackson faced his regiment to the front, and with Kane's Rifles on his left, was formed in the woods on the right, west of the Centerville road, moved up the hill; the men required no urging forward, but were restrained by the officers from rushing upon the enemy in a double-quick charge. Captain Eastman's gunners soon demolished the Confederate battery.

"The Ninth Regiment came close upon the enemy in the woods, but the undergrowth rendered it difficult to distinguish foe from friend. An officer in the bushes called to Jackson that the troops in his front were the Bucktails; he therefore reserved his fire, until just as Captain Galway was

reporting that they were the enemy, he received a volley from the First Kentucky. The Ninth promptly returned the fire and charged upon them and drove them from the woods. The Bucktails engaged the enemy from both sides of the road, and drove the Confederates back and hotly pursued them, led by Colonel Kane, who was soon shot in the face and fell to the ground, but quickly rose, bound up his wound, and joined his command.

"Meantime the Sixth Regiment moved forward, between the Centerville road and the Alexandria pike, and engaged the Confederate regiments that were advancing to turn the left of Ord's position.

"The Twelfth received the order to advance with cheers to capture the battery, but the enemy hurriedly withdrew his guns beyond the reach of the advancing regiment. General McCall ordered the whole line to advance against the enemy, who was giving way in every part of the field; the retreat soon became a rout, and the enemy fled, leaving his dead and wounded, and a large number of arms with ammunition, and clothing on the field."

The battle lasted an hour and a half. The casualties on the Union side in this battle, were 6 killed and 61 wounded. The enemy reported Stuart's loss at 43 killed, 143 wounded, and 44 missing.

General Ord detailed several companies of his command to accompany the forage wagons. General McCall, in his report of the victory, says: "Last, but not least, I brought in sixteen wagon loads of excellent hay, and twenty-two of corn."

Colonel John S. McCalmont, who was one of the heroes of Dranesville, gives the following in regard to the battle:

"You ask me to give you, in brief, my recollections of the engagement between the Union forces under command of General Edward O. C. Ord, and the Confederate forces under command of General J. E. B. Stuart, at Dranesville, Va., on Friday, the 20th of December, 1861.

"Perhaps it would be as well to take a short survey of

the operations of the brigade which General Ord commanded prior to that time, and with which I was connected.

“The regiments composing the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, were ordered to Washington immediately after the first battle of Bull Run. The Tenth Regiment, which I commanded, encamped for a few days east of the Capitol building, near Lincoln Park. When General McClellan arrived at Washington and assumed the command of the Army of the Potomac, the regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps were moved to Tennallytown, where they took position; were formed into a division, called McCall's division—after General McCall, who commanded it, and which division was divided into three brigades, commanded, respectively, by Brigadier General John F. Reynolds, Brigadier General George G. Meade, and Colonel John S. McCalmont. The command of the latter was but temporary. I understood from General McCall that he wished a Pennsylvania general to command the Third Brigade, and that he had requested, or intended the appointment for General John G. Parke, then with Burnside's expedition to North Carolina.

“McCall's division remained at Tennallytown, occupied in drilling, picket and grand guard duties, building forts and reconnoissances to Great Falls and other points, until between the 3d and 13th of October, 1861, when the division was ordered to advance and to take position at Langley, Va., where the camp of the division was named in official orders, ‘Camp Pierpont,’ in honor of the then Union Governor of Virginia.

“Previous to the advance of McCall's division, the Army of the Potomac had been held mostly on the defensive; drilling and building the fortifications; the line south of the river, I believe, being scarcely connected, and the right of it resting on Chain Bridge. After the advance in October, McCall's division occupied the right of the line, and the alignment of the whole Army of the Potomac, or

that part of it south of the river, was completed and some miles in advance of its former position.

"There was very little to engage the attention of the troops, except drilling and picket duty and the usual routine of the camps, until about the 20th of October, when McCall's division was ordered to make a reconnoissance to Dranesville. The division marched on the 19th, and returned to camp on the 21st.

"The orders given General McCall were not to proceed beyond Dranesville. On the 19th or 20th, General McClellan visited McCall's advance, and found that McCall had gone somewhat beyond Dranesville, and, as I understood from some one at the time, found fault with him. General McCall excused himself by saying that he did not see any town on the way. As there were only a few straggling houses in Dranesville General McCall did not know when he was passing through the town.

"The advance brigade of the division on this reconnoissance was the First, commanded by General Reynolds. Meade's brigade rested a few miles in the rear, and the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel McCalmont, of the Tenth Regiment, rested a few miles nearer camp, at Difficult Creek. On the 21st, the latter received orders from General McCall, through General Meade, to return to camp, left in front, as the object of the reconnoissance had been accomplished.

"In the Third Brigade all was quiet, and on the 20th no sound of cannon was heard. It was with some surprise, therefore, when it returned to camp, that the news was learned that a reverse had happened to some of the forces of the Army of the Potomac, and that the brigade should not break ranks, but should hold itself in readiness for a night's march. After some hours a dispatch came from General McClellan to General McCall that Stone's command at Ball's Bluff had succeeded in recrossing the river, and therefore the march of the division was ended and the men returned to their tents.

"This disaster at Ball's Bluff, following after the rout at Bull Run, coupled with the manifest disposition to avoid forcing a general engagement of the armies, had a depressing influence upon the officers as well as the men. The men were beginning to express, if not to entertain, the belief that they would not be ordered into battle. But if any in the Third Brigade had such ideas they were soon awakened from the delusion.

"In November, when I—to drop the third person of the pronoun and assume again the first—was on a short leave of absence, I found on my return to Camp Pierpont that Brigadier General Ord had been assigned to command the Third Brigade; and I found him in possession of brigade headquarters, the tents of which he had pitched near my regiment, and I returned to my old command.

"My relations with General Ord were of the most agreeable kind. He was a frank, communicative, considerate, and very gallant officer. On the evening of the 19th of December he sent for me, to communicate the orders for the regiment to march with the brigade the next morning by daylight, on a reconnoissance toward Dranesville. The object of it was to cover a foraging party of the brigade that was to be detailed to gather hay, corn, etc., from some farmers near the Potomac. The foraging party was to be guided by a man by the name of Sherman, who was said to be a Union man, having knowledge of the country and in the confidence of General McCall.

"Early on the morning of the 20th of December, 1861, it being Friday, and a very pleasant, sunshiny day—the atmosphere being somewhat hazy, but dry—the Third Brigade marched. Two of my companies were on picket duty. On the march General Ord detailed three of my companies, under charge of Lieutenant Colonel Kirk, to make up the foraging party. The arranging of the foraging party took some time, and thus threw the Tenth—or what remained of it—as well as the Sixth and Twelfth Regiments of the Reserve, which were in the rear of it, some distance behind

the cavalry, Eastman's battery, and the Bucktails (or 'Rifles') and Ninth Regiments, which were in the advance.

"Within a mile or so of Dranesville we were met by Lieutenant Sharp, General Ord's aid, stating that there were symptoms of an attack, and for us to hurry forward. When I arrived at Dranesville, at the further end of the town, on a hill where is a little church, General Ord had two of the four guns of Eastman's battery in position, pointing on a road toward the southwest, where a few horsemen appeared, as if Confederate vedettes, at a halt across the road.

"After looking some time and observing no motion, General Ord said to me it was time to return to camp, and for me to get ready to put my men in motion; so returning to them in the lane in the hollow of Dranesville, just as I was about giving them some orders, General Ord passed me on a gallop, saying, 'Colonel, we are attacked; put yourself under cover and await orders.' Looking to our rear up the hill, I observed a confusion as if men were being scattered by a fire, and at that moment the cavalry had halted directly in our rear, and the two pieces of artillery, with their caissons, came rapidly toward us from the front to pass. The lane being narrow between the fences, it seemed for the moment as if we would be crushed between our own troops. I had a splendid pioneer corps. They were provided with their axes, and in a moment they cut down panels of the fence and we marched through and along the inside of the fence toward the fire. When we got to the intersection of the Leesburg and Alexandria turnpike with the road we were on, at the entrance of Dranesville, we marched right through the line of fire from the enemy's guns, which were placed within easy rifle shot of us. At that moment General Ord, who had been putting his artillery in position very rapidly, seeing me, ordered me to take position on the left of the guns. My regiment were the only troops—except the cavalry—on the left of the artillery. I detached Captain McConnell's company as

skirmishers on the left to watch their opportunity and to see that our position was not turned by the enemy.

"The captain placed his men in some natural rifle-pits on the left, and very close to the enemy's troops, two regiments of which were deployed immediately in front of him. He kept up, with his men, a constant fire during the whole of the engagement.

"The artillery on both sides kept up a rapid and concentrated fire on each other ; but soon the Union guns got the advantage. A shot through the house behind which the enemy was sheltering, and another which served to blow up a caisson, together with their losses from Captain McConnell's firing, seemed to decide the day, and the enemy, taking advantage of the thick woods that covered his retreat, was soon beyond pursuit. The engagement lasted less than two hours.

"From the position I occupied during the firing, very close to the left piece of artillery, the aim of whose gunner I at one time directed, I could see the movements on the roads in front, and advance of the Bucktails when the cannon ceased firing, but could not see the Ninth, Twelfth or Sixth ; nor did I see General Ord, nor Captain Eastman after the battle rightly opened, until the close of it. They were on the right of the field and I on the left. My impression is that the Ninth Regiment, after becoming engaged in the beginning of the battle, and with the Sixth, and other regiments on the right of the line taking their part under the eye of the general, were hidden from my view by a hillock or ridge between where I was and their respective positions.

"General McCall and his staff came up before and near the close of the battle. They had heard the firing at Camp Pierpont and made haste to come to our aid. General Reynolds also came up on a gallop in advance of his brigade. But as the enemy had gone beyond pursuit, General Ord, after firing, near dusk, a random shot or two, ordered the troops to return to camp.

"The Union loss was so small, the Confederate loss so great, and the victory so decisive, in a contest of about equal forces, that the march of the troops back to camp was with a light step; and though late at night, after a long day of marching and fighting, they seemed to be fresh and invigorated by the success of the battle."

The loyal people of the country were greatly rejoiced, especially those of Pennsylvania. Letters of thanks and congratulations poured in upon the victorious brigade from every direction. Among others, the following was received from the Secretary of War:

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 28, 1861.

Camp Pierpont, Virginia.

GENERAL:—I have read your report of the battle of Dranesville, and, although no reply is necessary on my part, yet as a citizen of the same Commonwealth as yourself and the troops engaged in that brilliant affair, I cannot refrain from expressing to you my admiration of the gallant conduct displayed, both by officers and men, in this their first contest with the enemy. Nearly all your command upon that occasion are either my personal friends, or sons of those with whom, for long years, I have been, more or less, intimately associated. I feel that I have just cause to be proud that, animated by no other motive than patriotism, they are among the first to revive the glory shed upon our country by the men of the Revolution and soldiers of the war of 1812. It is one of the bright spots that gives assurance of the success of coming events; and its effect must be to inspire confidence in the belief that hereafter, as heretofore, the cause of our country will triumph.

I am especially gratified that a Pennsylvania artillery corps, commanded by officers who have necessarily had but limited systematic instruction, have won, not only the commendation of their friends, but an unwilling compliment from the enemy, for the wonderful rapidity and accuracy of their fire.


I wish I could designate all the men who, nobly discharging their duty to the country, have added to the glory of our great Commonwealth. Other portions of the army will be stimulated by their brave deeds, and men will be proud to say that at Dranesville they served under McCall and Ord.

I am, General, your obedient servant,

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War.

Brigadier-General G. A. McCALL. Commanding Division.



COL. JOHN H. TAGGART.

Governor Curtin hastened to Camp Pierpont to provide for the care of the wounded soldiers, and to congratulate the Reserves for the honor they had conferred on the State. He issued the following order :

The gallantry of our troops in the late affair at Dranesville, demands a public acknowledgment.

Their courage, conduct, and high discipline are honorable to the Corps and to the Commonwealth by whose forecast it was raised and formed, in anticipation of the exigencies of the country, and whose sons fill its ranks.

General McCall and Brigadier General Ord, and the officers and men who were engaged under their command, may be assured that Pennsylvania is not insensible to their martial virtue, and from them and their fellows confidently looks for as many further illustrations of it as there shall be opportunities afforded them.

A. G. CURTIN,

Governor of Pennsylvania.

A. L. RUSSELL, Aid-de-Camp.

The colors of the regiments that were engaged in the battle were taken to Washington, and on each flag "Dranesville, December 20, 1861," was painted in golden letters.

CHAPTER III.


PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

PRELIMINARY.

WHEN, on the 13th of March, 1862, the council of corps commanders called by order of the President in Washington, mapped out the plan of operations which they confidently expected would result in the defeat of the Confederates and the capture of Richmond, and adopted Fortress Monroe as a base of supplies, it was expected by the council that the four army corps then composing the Army of the Potomac, viz, the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps, would be employed as a solid mass in addition to the 10,000 men then at Fortress Monroe, under command of General Wool, that post being thought to be amply protected by the naval force in its vicinity, so that it might safely be left with a small garrison.

At the same time the coöperation of the navy was desired and expected in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and James Rivers, for the protection of our flanks and of the transports bringing troops and supplies to the army. With these expectations General McClellan began the embarkation of troops and supplies at Alexandria, Va.

It was intended at this time to embark McDowell's corps in mass and land them near Yorktown or on the Gloucester side of the York River; but circumstances which McClellan could not control seemed to balk his efforts from the start, and McDowell's corps, as a whole, was not permitted to join the main army until just before the second battle of Bull Run.



GEN. GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

On the 17th March Hamilton's division of the Third Corps embarked, and on the 22d Fitz John Porter's division of the same corps followed. On the 1st of April General McClellan started for Fortress Monroe, reaching there on the 2d. On the 3d they were at the base of supplies and ready to move two divisions of the Third Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, one division of the Second Corps, four regiments of cavalry, and Hunt's artillery reserve; in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns. Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of Second and Third Corps had not arrived, and Casey's division (Fourth Corps) was unable to move for want of wagons.

At the time General McClellan left Washington the War Department had issued an order placing Fortress Monroe and dependencies under his control, and authorizing him to draw from the troops under General Wool 10,000 men to form one of the divisions of the First Corps, which was then supposed to be embarked and on its way down the Potomac.

During the night of the 3d, however, McClellan received a severe set-back through a telegram from the War Department revoking the order placing him in control over Fortress Monroe, and ordering him not to interfere with General Wool or his command, and forbidding him taking the 10,000 men stationed there.

About this time the naval flag officer, Goldsborough, declared that the James River was closed to the operations of the Union vessels by the combined-influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confederate war vessels, particularly the "Merrimac," all the efforts of our naval vessels being concentrated in Hampton Roads in an endeavor to destroy that ship. All this was contrary to what General McClellan declared he had been told before leaving Washington, and it seriously and materially affected his plans, for he had hoped by a series of rapid movements to capture the enemy on the Peninsula or drive them before him, open the James River, and press on to Richmond

before they could be heavily reënforced from other parts of their territory.

He then determined to move the two divisions of the Fourth Corps *via* Newport News and Williamsburg road, to take position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while two divisions of the Third Corps moved direct upon Yorktown, the reserves to move to support either corps should it become necessary, designing also to land the First Corps (should the works at Williamsburg or Yorktown offer serious resistance), on the York or Severn Rivers, and move it on to Gloucester and West Point in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula and compel them to abandon their positions.

Another thing that seriously hampered McClellan at this time was the want of accurate topographic information. Correct local maps were not to be had, and though the general features of the locality were known, the only papers to which he had access were found inaccurate in essential particulars. Reconnoissances proved to be the only trustworthy means of information, as events subsequently proved.

On the 3d and 4th of April the divisions of the Third and Fourth Corps moved as stated above, and on the afternoon of the 4th General Keyes, commanding the Fourth Corps, obtained information that a heavy force of the enemy was stationed in a strong position at Lee's Mill. General McClellan, at that time not knowing that this position was the key to the Warwick, instructed General Keyes to attack and carry it upon coming in front of it.

Early in the afternoon of the next day (5th) the advance of each column was brought to a halt; that of Heintzelman in front of Yorktown, after some severe fighting at Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge, while Keyes was unexpectedly brought to a stand before the enemy's works at Lee's Mill, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses the Warwick River. The progress of the army had been

retarded by incessant rain on that day, which made the roads almost impassable for infantry, while only a small portion of the artillery could be brought up, and the ammunition, subsistence, and forage trains could not move at all.

When the Fourth Corps reached Lee's Mill their left flank was assaulted by a heavy artillery fire from the opposite side of the Warwick River, and on approaching the vicinity of the mill they found it stronger than was expected and incapable of being carried by assault. All the troops in each column were under a warm artillery fire during this afternoon, even the right column being engaged when covering reconnoissances.

Just at this time and during this engagement General McClellan received the following dispatch from the War Department :

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
April 4, 1861.

General McCLELLAN :

By direction of the President General McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War.

L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General.

Though McClellan had been promised 10,000 men from Blenker, and that order had been rescinded, as well as the order placing the 10,000 men of General Wool's command under his orders—this last revocation was the heaviest blow he had yet received. He was then in front of the enemy, and only waiting for McDowell's corps in order to inaugurate a series of operations which the withdrawal of this corps rendered futile. The loss of 30,000 men was a calamity he could not overcome, and he was compelled to adopt another and less effective mode of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. With these preliminary remarks we will now proceed to the record of his operations on the Peninsula, which began with the siege of Yorktown and the battle of Williamsburg, and ended with

the reëmbarkation of the remnants of his army at Harrison's Landing three months afterwards.

SIEGE OF YORKTOWN AND BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

On April 4, Porter's division (Third Corps) with the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry moved to Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, and Cockletown, repairing at Big Bethel the bridge destroyed by the enemy and clearing the road, being detained four hours by this cause. On reaching Howard's Bridge they found two pieces of artillery in position, supported by a small cavalry force and about four hundred infantry. After firing a few shots this force retired, and Porter sent forward Morell's brigade and Griffin's battery with a squadron of cavalry to Cockletown to occupy the junction of the Yorktown and Ship Point roads, thus cutting off the garrison, in case there was one, at Ship Point, and enabling him to control the avenue of communication between Warwick Court House and Yorktown, while Averell's cavalry was dispatched to Ship Point to ascertain the character of the defenses and garrison. Averell returned in the evening and reported them abandoned. The rest of the division encamped at Howard's Bridge.

On the 5th the division united at Cockletown and moved toward Yorktown over a marshy road, rendered almost impassable by heavy rain. When the skirmish line reached the junction of the Warwick Court House and Yorktown roads they became engaged with that of the enemy. Cavalry and artillery were moving in advance, and close at hand were extensive defenses of the Confederates, from which they were immediately saluted with a warm artillery fire. Skirmishers were at once advanced to drive back the enemy's troops, find out what was in front, and cover the deployment of Morell's brigade, which quickly formed on both sides of the road, so as to resist attack or advance, should a favorable occasion arise. Weeden's and Griffin's batteries were posted by the latter to shell the Confederates, who, as the mists arose, were seen crowding the ramparts.

Shots from both batteries were fired with skill and judgment, and the enemy driven from their camp and ramparts to seek shelter in the timber in the rear of their works. The Confederates warmly returned the fire, but their artillery, though of superior caliber, produced no effect upon Porter's well-served pieces, which soon drove their artillerymen to cover, and at the same time Berdan's sharpshooters did good service in picking them off whenever they showed themselves.

Martindale's brigade now moved to the left to relieve Morell, while Butterfield's brigade and the cavalry were held in reserve to support either Martindale or Morell should they need it.

At this time a reconnoissance showed Porter that a marsh intervened between the Confederate works on the left and Martindale's brigade, and that they dare not cross it to attack his forces. Porter's division camped on the ground it had been directed to occupy.

Smith's division of the Third Corps also moved on April 4 toward Young's Mills. After crossing Watts' Creek, his skirmishers frequently encountered the enemy's pickets who retreated as he advanced. On reaching Young's Mills they deserted their works, and his forces occupied them, having only one man wounded during the operations. On the 5th the division moved toward Williamsburg, the Second Brigade watching the road to Deep Creek, the Third Brigade in the center, and the First Brigade watching the right. On arriving at Warwick Court House, the Third Brigade moved across the stream with Wheeler's battery, while the rest of the division remained in the open fields on the opposite side of the creek. Soon afterwards the division was again moved about two miles, when the fortifications around and about Lee's Mill appeared in full view. Davidson's brigade was at once deployed out of sight along the edge of the woods with orders to hold the front. Hancock's brigade covered the right flank, and Brooks' brigade was brought up about half way through

the woods and held in reserve; they held these positions till the 7th, when they were retired about a mile back, still maintaining the same relative positions.

Porter's division still occupied the position taken by it on arrival before Yorktown, namely, one brigade in the woods skirting the upper part of Wormley's Creek, one brigade in the rear just west of the milldam on that creek, and the third brigade in the angle between the roads to Yorktown from Fortress Monroe and Warwick Court House; while batteries were attached to each brigade and posted to sweep all approaches and the front of each command. He remained in this position till the 10th, being all the time in range of the enemy's guns, when the division was moved to the south of Wormley's Creek, and ordered to picket from York River to the Yorktown road, where they were joined by the pickets of Hamilton's division, which had arrived in the mean time. Hooker's division came up soon afterwards and encamped on Porter's left, and, closing the gap between him and Hamilton, completed the line from the Warwick to York River.

From this time till the close of the siege the troops were engaged in building the necessary approaches and bridges, batteries, etc. It was intended to have all the batteries in readiness to open fire on May 5; but on the night of the 3d, the Confederates hastily evacuated and abandoned their works on the Warwick and Yorktown, and the Union forces took possession without having to undergo the terrible ordeal of battle. On the night of May 1, one of Porter's batteries had opened fire on the town and wharves, driving away vessels that were apparently landing troops and ammunition; and it is believed that the destructive effects of this battery and the knowledge of the enemy that but a few days must elapse before the other batteries would open, caused the abandonment.

As soon as it was discovered that the works had been abandoned, the cavalry division was ordered forward to harass the rear guard, and Hooker's division was ordered to

follow and support the cavalry. Cooke's cavalry division pushed forward and engaged the enemy about two miles below Yorktown; here they had an encounter with the rear guard, who were forced to retire, leaving a spiked howitzer. On reaching a strip of swampy woods, Cooke learned that to his right and beyond the woods there were field works, which, however, were found on investigation to be abandoned. Receiving word that there was another road to the left, and by carrying which he might turn the left flank of the Confederates, who had once more made a stand, Cooke sent the Sixth United States Cavalry, under Major Williams, up that road to attack their left flank. Gibson's battery now opened fire at the outlet of the road, they warmly returning it from a battery perhaps 1,000 yards to the left front. Everything now looked as though the Southerners were trying to bring on a general engagement. Cooke was forced to advance to open ground where he might use both cavalry and artillery to advantage. The enemy now reoccupied the works on his right front, and opening a new battery from a fort not over 400 yards away, their cross-fire of shell and shrapnel was very destructive, as they got an accurate range, killing and wounding many horses and a number of officers and men. In the mean time the Sixth Cavalry, who had gone to attack the left flank, had suddenly found themselves at the enemy's works, where they were confronted by a vastly superior force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and were compelled to retreat after hard fighting, the rear squadrons suffering severely from the fire of the Confederate cavalry. In this skirmish the cavalry lost 35 killed and wounded. Finding that Hooker did not come up to support them (it was subsequently learned that he had been stopped by General Smith), and learning that the enemy had sent a large force to endeavor to surround them, the cavalry retreated to the open ground.

About four o'clock p.m. of the 4th of May, Sumner's corps arrived at the position Stoneman held and found he had been

engaged with the enemy ; after a conference with Stoneman, Sumner moved Smith's division forward in two columns, but after advancing a short distance and finding that the underbrush was so thick that it entangled his lines, and night coming on, the division was halted and ordered to lie on their arms. One of the reasons given by Sumner for not pushing forward his troops was that Smith's division had marched without rations and he had to wait till the subsistence train came. On the morning of the 5th, after a careful reconnoissance, two of the forts on their left were found to be unoccupied and Hancock's brigade was ordered forward with ten pieces of artillery to seize and hold them, so that Sumner might force their left. This led to an attack upon Hancock by a superior force of the enemy which he repulsed in splendid style. He placed the artillery on the crest of a hill in front of the Confederate fort in short range and deployed the Fifth Wisconsin, preceded by skirmishers and followed by the Sixth Maine in column of assault across the dam and into the work, and finding it abandoned moved forward to the rear of work in open field in line of battle, with the artillery in the centre. A fort about 1,200 yards in his front commanding his position, he sent to General Smith for reinforcements, being determined to take it at all hazards. Smith sent word that he would send four regiments and a battery of artillery immediately. On this Hancock advanced his line sufficiently to drive the enemy out of the two works nearest to his front, and also to make a diversion in favor of the forces at that time engaged with the Confederates in front of Fort Magruder. Seeing that his present position was a very important point, giving him space enough to develop his front and entirely command the plain between him and Fort Magruder, Hancock placed three companies of the 33d New York in the redoubt, with his artillery on the right and left, moved his skirmish line 1,000 yards in advance, covering the whole breadth of the plain, and so continued to Fort Magruder.

On arriving at the second redoubt, and the skirmishers still advancing, he found that the enemy were uncertain as to what troops were in front of them. In answer to signals from the enemy he ordered the national flag to be unfurled on the parapet, on seeing which the opposing force deployed their skirmishers and began firing. Hancock's skirmishers were then but a few hundred yards distant. The enemy were soon driven off and Hancock's skirmishers took up their position at a line of fence separating them from the Confederates and extending across the plain.

At this time Wheeler's battery joined Hancock, and without waiting for further reënforcements he advanced his line 600 yards beyond the second redoubt, and ordering his infantry to lie down opened an assault on the redoubts in front of him. The Confederate infantry now lined the parapet of the two redoubts in front of him and poured a galling fire of musketry into his line and then opened upon the Union forces with artillery. Hancock's artillery replied, and finally, after hard fighting, drove them out of their works, his skirmishers killing many as they debouched from the gorges on the right side of each work as they stood in regard to them. Had the promised reënforcements arrived the Union troops would have encountered no serious obstacles in taking and holding these works, but at this juncture Hancock received an order from General Sumner to fall back to his first position, as he could not be reënforced on account of movements on the left. Hancock sent back a message showing the advantage he had gained, the bad impression it would make on his troops, and the inspiration it would give the enemy should he fall back, and again asked for reënforcements. While awaiting an answer the crisis in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have arrived, and Hancock aided our troops by pouring an effective fire of artillery into the fort. This annoyed the enemy so much that they brought two pieces of artillery to bear on Hancock's line and exploded shell within the line of his skirmishers, in one instance reaching the battery, killing

and wounding a number of his men. Hancock's artillery, however, was superior in efficiency to theirs, and perceiving this they soon ceased firing. It was now after five o'clock p.m. and receiving no answer to his message, and the rain pouring in torrents and drenching his troops, Hancock was about giving orders to fall back and occupy the crest on which the first redoubt was situated, when he observed that the enemy were throwing infantry into the redoubts on his front and firing on his skirmishers. At the same instant a column of Confederate cavalry appeared in the woods on his right. The skirmishers kept up a constant fire on the cavalry, doing good execution at 400 yards distance.

The enemy still persisting in an attempt to form, preparing for a charge on the artillery, Hancock shelled them for a few moments and then ordered the artillery to retire rapidly piece by piece to his second line. At this time he was informed that a Confederate regiment had gone in the woods on his left with the intention of flanking him there, and seeing their infantry break through the woods in front of the right flank of his advanced line, he ordered the two regiments on the left of the battery to fall back in line of battle to the crest on the left of the redoubt, which they did in as good order as though on dress parade. The Fifth Wisconsin, on the right of the battery, seeing the cavalry debouch from the woods, formed square to repel assault. The Confederate cavalry having been checked, and a brigade of infantry having broken through the woods and deployed, the Fifth fell back in line of battle fighting. The last piece of artillery having thrown several charges of canister into the enemy when within a hundred yards, now retreated as rapidly as possible.

The line of infantry now being reformed on the crest, and the artillery being retired to a third position between them and the dam, and the advance of the enemy being within thirty paces of his command, Hancock ordered an advance movement to the crest.

The whole line advanced cheering, and on arriving there fired two volleys, doing great execution ; they then charged down the slope and advanced in line of battle. A few of the enemy were bayoneted ; the remainder broke and ran. The column was halted and fifteen or twenty rounds fired with terrific effect. The plunging fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right, and the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that it seemed after the firing had ceased and the smoke cleared away that no man had escaped unhurt who had advanced within 500 yards of his lines. The enemy were completely routed and dispersed.

The Confederate assault was of the most determined character. The Fifth North Carolina was annihilated ; nearly all its superior officers were killed or wounded. The Twenty-fourth Virginia was about as badly cut up. The Fifth Wisconsin captured a Confederate battle flag. For 600 yards in front of Hancock's lines the whole field was strewed with Confederate dead and wounded. Shortly after the engagement was over the Third Vermont arrived, then General Naglee's brigade followed, and soon after the Forty-ninth and Seventy-seventh New York Regiments, and these were followed by Ayres' and Mott's artillery. That night they bivouacked in the rain on the ground they had won.

Hancock in this engagement had but 1,600 men, as he had to detach many at various points to protect his flanks. The enemy in his front consisted of six regiments, numbering about 5,000 men, under the command of Early.

While the battle had been going on as related above, Hooker's division had its share. This division was ordered to support Stoneman and aid him in cutting off the retreat of the enemy. They moved from in front of Yorktown toward Williamsburg, and, after marching five or six miles, learned that Stoneman had fallen on the rear of the enemy and was waiting for the infantry in order to attack them. Hooker proceeded to the front, some six miles in advance

of his column, and found that Smith's division was in his lead, and that his column must wait till Smith had passed. Finding that Smith's support would be sufficient to aid Stoneman, Hooker moved his column on to the Hampton road, which intersected the one on which Stoneman had halted at the point the Confederates occupied. Once on this road they pressed forward in order to come up with the enemy before morning. Owing to the roads being in frightful condition, and the men exhausted from want of sleep and from labor in the trenches the night previous, this was found to be impossible ; the troops were halted about eleven o'clock, rested till daylight of the 5th, when they again advanced and came in sight of the enemy's works in front of Williamsburg about half past five o'clock p. m. Here the column was halted in the woods while Hooker rode to the front to find what could be learned of the enemy's position. At the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton roads was Fort Magruder, and on each side was a cordon of thirteen redoubts extending, as far as could be seen, across the Peninsula from the York to the James River.

Grover's brigade began the attack by sending the First Massachusetts as skirmishers into the felled timber on the left of the road on which they were standing, and the Second New Hampshire to the right with directions to skirmish up to the edge of the felled timber and there turn their attention to the occupants of the rifle-pits and the enemy's sharpshooters and gunners in Fort Magruder, while the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania formed on the right of the Second New Hampshire, and also advanced as skirmishers.

Webber's battery was thrown forward in advance of the felled timber and brought into action on the right of the road about 700 yards from the fort ; as soon as it emerged from the timber the four guns from the fort opened on it, and before it reached its position they received the fire from two more, two officers and two privates being shot before they had a chance to fire a single gun and the cannoneers

were driven away in spite of the sharpshooters picking off the Confederate gunners. Volunteers were called for to man the guns now in position, and the officers and men of Osborn's battery jumped in and manned the battery and in a few minutes had the guns well at work. Bramhall's battery came into action on the right of Webber's, and by nine o'clock had silenced every gun in the fort and all the troops in the plain had dispersed. The guns in the fort were not again heard of till late in the afternoon. The Fifth New Jersey, of Patterson's brigade, supported these batteries during the day. The remaining regiments of Patterson's brigade moved through the forest on the left of the road in anticipation of an attack from that quarter. Bodies of Confederates were seen drifting in that direction, and heavy musketry fire showed that many others were flocking there whom the dense forest (near a mile wide here) prevented the Union forces from seeing. Patterson now had a heavy force of the enemy in his front and was actively engaged, and the First Massachusetts, Seventy-second and Seventieth New York came to his aid.

It was now after one o'clock, and the battle had increased till it was of gigantic proportions. The left had been reënforced by the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth New York, and all were desperately engaged.

Three times the enemy advanced to within eighty yards of the road which was the center of Hooker's operations, and as often were they forced to retreat with great slaughter. Each time their advance was made with fresh troops, and each succeeding one seemed to be in greater force and determination. The Eleventh Massachusetts moved to the left, while the Second New Hampshire was withdrawn from its advanced position in front to where they could look after the front and the left at the same time. About this time the enemy was reënforced by Longstreet's division. His troops had passed through Williamsburg on the retreat from Yorktown, and were recalled to strengthen their lines in Patterson's front. No sooner had they joined than

they moved forward to drive in his left. After a violent and protracted struggle they were repulsed with great loss. Simultaneous with this movement an attack was made on Hooker's front and an attempt made to seize the batteries by the troops from Fort Magruder aided by reënforcements from the redoubts on the left. The withdrawal of the supports invited this attack, and it was at this time that four of Hooker's guns were captured. Between four and five o'clock General Kearny's division arrived and took up position in Hooker's front, while his division retired and was held as a reserve till dark. Kearny's division kept up a strong and unrelenting fire on the enemy but were unable to advance further than the position first taken by them when relieving Hooker. The Thirty-eighth and Fortieth New York were ordered to make a charge on the rifle-pits and a battery in their front, which they did with great gallantry, and turning their flank got in the rear of the enemy and caused them to relinquish their cover. This silenced their light artillery and the battle was won.

On the right, Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, got into action about twelve o'clock ; he had five regiments and two batteries. The One hundred and second Pennsylvania was deployed on the right of the road while the Fifty-fifth New York was deployed on the left and was afterwards moved further to the left to support a battery ; to the left of the Fifty-fifth, the Sixty-second New York was placed in position, where it found cover and held on till its ammunition was expended. A movement was made against Peck's front by a large body of Confederates who displayed Union colors and under heavy fire pressed his line back. At this juncture the Ninety-third Pennsylvania moved to the left center and by its steady fire and splendid execution he was enabled to recover the ground from which he had been forced to recede. The enemy then moved to the right opposite to the One hundred and second Pennsylvania, where they tried repeatedly to get into the woods and secure a permanent lodgment. After repeated onslaughts

the One hundred and second was forced to give way to superior numbers and retired for some distance, but soon reformed. At this crisis the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania came forward to the right and front and the enemy were quickly repulsed along the whole line. Before night General Devens came up with the Seventh Massachusetts and Second Rhode Island, and shortly after General Palmer with two regiments and General Keim with three regiments came to the support of Peck. His supply of ammunition being exhausted six of these later regiments relieved his brigade and prepared to resist a night attack in case it should be made ; his pickets were thrown out in front and extended on the right to those of General Smith, but could not connect on the left with those of Hooker. His brigade also recaptured the four guns which had been taken from Hooker, as mentioned above.

At three o'clock a.m. of the 6th the enemy abandoned their position before Williamsburg, leaving the Union troops in possession.

WEST POINT.

On May 7, about two o'clock a.m., Franklin's division of the First Corps landed on York River near West Point, and at daylight discovered the woods surrounding the plain on which they landed was full of Confederate infantry and cavalry. Extraordinary precautions were at once taken to prevent a successful attack—large trees were felled, sentinels posted thickly, and the woods thoroughly watched. Franklin was unacquainted with the country, and in company with General Newton made a reconnoissance of the position, which convinced him that his right and left flanks and front were protected by creeks, and that the only dangerous point was a space 200 yards wide at the right of his left flank. The road from the interior entered the plain through this space and was flanked on both sides by thick woods. There was a dam in his front, but this he protected by a strong picket.

About nine o'clock firing began on the picket line in the vicinity of the road entering the plain from the interior. Hexamer's battery at once moved to that point, where it did excellent service; but by eleven o'clock the pickets and reconnoitering parties were driven in and two regiments of Newton's brigade moved forward to reinforce them; at the same time he moved into the woods in the right front four regiments with directions to feel the enemy and hold their ground at all hazards. General Slocum's brigade held the left of the line, but not being actively engaged, sent the Fifth Maine and the Sixteenth and Twenty-seventh New York to Newton's support. The fight raged with great fierceness from nine a.m. till three p.m. The Thirty-first New York charged the enemy in the woods and drove them till they gained an advantageous position, which, supported by the First New Jersey, they kept till the close of the action. The Thirty-second New York made a brilliant advance, driving superior forces with the bayonet for a considerable distance till their progress was arrested by the enemy's reserves and artillery, when they retired in good order to their position. The Eighteenth New York, Fifth Maine and Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania did excellent work, the Ninety-fifth bringing on the action and keeping the enemy well in hand during the fight. The Union loss in this fight was 200. The enemy were not only repulsed in their attempt on Franklin's position, but at the end of the day he held a position in advance of that occupied by him when the battle began.

From this time till the 27th there were no important engagements, the period being taken up in armed reconnoissances, in which several skirmishes occurred without much loss.

HANOVER COURT HOUSE.

On the morning of May 27 Porter's corps broke camp and started to clear the Upper Peninsula of the enemy and destroy the railroad and other bridges over the South Anna

and Pamunkey Rivers and thus protect the right flank of McClellan's army on the road to Richmond; also to prevent the enemy getting in his rear from that direction, and lastly to cut the line of his communication between Richmond and Northern Virginia.

The Fifth New York, First Connecticut, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry and Weeden's Rhode Island battery were brigaded and posted at Old Church under Colonel Warren, of the Fifth New York, from which point they engaged in destroying all means of communication over the Pamunkey as far toward Hanover Court House as was deemed prudent without coöperation of a large force. At the same time Morell's division of the Fifth Corps (Porter's) started from New Bridge with an advanced guard of two cavalry regiments and a light battery, under command of General Emory. Morell's command was to take the enemy in front, while Warren, taking the road along the Pamunkey, was to fall upon his flank and rear. The command, through a pelting rain, deep mud and water, pushed its way to Peake's Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, about two miles from Hanover, when they came in the presence of the enemy. The Twenty-fifth New York and Berdan Sharpshooters were at once thrown forward to engage the enemy's skirmishers and hold them in check till Morell's division could be brought up and deployed under the protection of Benson's battery, which was thrown into position to sweep the road. In the mean time a squadron of cavalry, and a section of artillery supported by other cavalry, was sent to the left on the Ashland road to guard his flank and destroy the railroad and telegraph at the crossing, where they soon became engaged with a portion of the enemy who were attempting to outflank the main body. At this point they were reinforced by Martindale's brigade (Twenty-fifth New York, Twenty-second Massachusetts, Second Maine and Martin's battery). The Twenty-second Massachusetts marched in line of battle, till they came in sight of the railroad and found a train of cars there with the enemy in great force. Martin-

dale at once advanced his artillery to the line occupied by the Twenty-second Massachusetts and opened fire upon the enemy. They at once responded from a masked battery near the junction of the highway and railroad, but this was soon silenced by Griffin's battery. The Second Maine in the mean time had torn up part of the railroad. Martindale now perceiving the enemy on his left, and that they were superior in numbers to his force, sent to Porter for a couple of regiments to help him, and formed his brigade on the Hanover road in the hope that he could form a rear guard sufficiently strong to protect not only the battery but his line of communication. Not being able to get the reinforcements he expected, and in order to prevent the enemy getting in his rear, Martindale ordered the Twenty-second Massachusetts to go through the woods to the railroad and follow it up, and the Second Maine to protect the battery and the column in rear. The Twenty-second had hardly turned the corner of the woods when information was received that the enemy were advancing and had reached the position where the battery had first been planted. This was within 700 yards of the rear of his position. The Second Maine at once changed front and then marched back across the road from New Bridge and halted, throwing out skirmishers. The Forty-fourth New York now coming up from New Bridge, joined Martindale and formed under cover of a ravine toward the woods on the left of the open ground in front, and threw skirmishers into the woods. Martin's battery was placed on the left of the Second Maine, and the skirmishers being engaged with the enemy, the battery at once opened fire. It being reported that his hospital, about a mile to the rear, was in possession of the enemy, one wing of the Forty-fourth New York was sent to relieve it. Hardly had they passed out of sight, when a Confederate regiment deployed in line of battle before the Second Maine and opened fire on them. The Second responded with terrific effect, and the enemy at once retreated into the woods in the direction the Forty-fourth had taken. About 150 of the

Twenty-fifth New York, together with the Forty-fourth New York (which had been recalled) formed a line of battle on the left toward the woods, where the fire of the enemy now crossed on them and the battery. The firing was so hot that Martindale's center was forced to give way, and the Twenty-fifth retreated as well as the Forty-fourth. At length Martindale succeeded in reforming his line on the colors of the Twenty-fifth. The Second Maine, however, still held their ground on the right, though assailed by four times their number. The battle had lasted over one hour when reënforcements arrived, the Fourteenth New York coming to relieve the Second Maine, while the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty-second Pennsylvania deployed into the woods on the right, assailing the enemy in the rear, while the Fourteenth New York held them in front and on the flank. This move routed the enemy and ended the battle, though the Thirteenth New York, which went to the relief of the Forty-fourth, advanced so as to catch the last volleys of the enemy and drove them from the shelter of the woods in that direction.

While Martindale was engaged as above described, Butterfield's brigade arrived on the field and took position where Benson's battery was in action, having in his first line the Seventeenth New York on his right, and Eighty-third Pennsylvania on the left, with skirmish line in front; on his second line the Twelfth New York was in rear of the Seventeenth, while the Sixteenth Michigan was in rear of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania. Finding the enemy drawn up in line near the house and orchard afterwards used by Porter as headquarters, he at once moved his command in that direction in the order stated above, the rapid firing of his skirmishers greatly hastening their movements. Here they charged on the enemy and drove them back, capturing one of their cannon, with caisson and ammunition, then pursuing rapidly, captured many prisoners, and completely routed them. Shortly afterwards, Martindale being strongly pressed, Butterfield pushed forward to assist

him, and came up on the flank of the enemy in time to help in driving and capturing many of them, and found himself in front of the Ninth Massachusetts, with his line perpendicular to theirs.

Night now came on, and, with the enemy routed and beaten at all points and retreating, the battle was won.

FAIR OAKS OR SEVEN PINES.

This battle was fought by the Second, Third and Fourth Corps, and the part they each took will be related in the order stated above, commencing with Sumner's corps.

On the 31st of May Sumner received orders from McClellan to be prepared to move at a moment's notice. He at once advanced Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions to the two bridges they had built across the Chickahominy, and ordered them to halt there, with heads of columns on the bridges, till further orders. When these came, in the afternoon, the columns were ordered forward to support Heintzelman, and rapidly moved to the field of battle by two roads. Sedgwick, marching by the shortest road, reached there first, and found Couch's division and Kirby's and Brady's batteries. These were drawn up in line of battle near Adams' house. June 1 the brunt of the battle was borne by Richardson's division. On the night previous this division had been placed parallel with the railroad, and the enemy advanced across the railroad to attack them. This was an obstinately contested fight, lasting over four hours, and here Richardson's men showed the greatest determination and gallantry, and at length succeeded in driving the Confederates from the field. Richardson's division consisted of Howard's, Meagher's and French's brigades, and three batteries of light artillery, all of whom were actively engaged; the battle raged so fiercely that the Confederates changed their regiments five different times in the first hour and a half in order that they might replenish their ammunition.

French's brigade was in the front line at the beginning

of the fight on the morning of the 1st of June, and the enemy opened attack on him at the distance of fifty yards. Although this attack was bold and sudden, his men held their line with great steadiness, and did not swerve, but fired coolly and deliberately, repulsing the enemy. After a few minutes' pause the heads of the several columns again threw themselves upon the spaces between the regiments to the right and left of the Fifty-second New York, making the most desperate efforts to break his lines. The left of the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania time and again repulsed them. The Fifty-second New York finding their left flank was being turned threw back three companies to receive them and repulse them there. At this time, French's men finding themselves short of ammunition, Howard came up with the Sixty-first, Sixty-fourth, and Eighty-first New York and took their places, and immediately moved forward into the woods with them. The fire of the Confederates was rapid and fatal. General Howard here lost his arm and Colonel Parker took command of his brigade, pressing back the enemy to and across the old road which General Casey's division had held the day before, and advancing to within thirty yards of their line found them in superior force here.

The Fifth New Hampshire were on the edge of the woods, where they were actively engaged, and had taken quite a number of prisoners when the command of the brigade fell upon Colonel Parker. Finding the other regiments of the brigade had been severely handled, he ordered them to move out of the woods and form in rear of Meagher's brigade, while the Fifth New Hampshire moved forward to occupy their ground. While moving forward in line of battle, they encountered the enemy about 300 yards from the railroad and a fierce fight began. Twice the Fifth advanced, and each time the enemy fell back; the firing was very close and deadly, the opposing forces being not over thirty yards apart. The brigade fought with great courage during the entire engagement, making two successful

bayonet charges and driving the enemy from the field, leaving their killed and wounded behind. Meagher's brigade was in the third line on Sunday morning, when a brisk firing in the woods, in front of which they were bivouacked, informed them of the immediate presence of the enemy. The brigade was drawn up in line of battle when Meagher received orders to throw the Sixty-ninth New York upon the railroad a little below where it was drawn up. Shortly afterwards the Eighty-eighth New York moved by flank to the left and occupied the railroad to the left of the Fifth New Hampshire, which regiment was on the left of the Sixty-ninth New York. A countermand was given to the Eighty-eighth New York during this movement, and, through the whole of the regiment not understanding it, some confusion occurred, the two leading companies deployed on the railroad, and received a brisk fire from the enemy, till, the countermand being recalled, they were vigorously supported by the balance of the regiment. While the Sixty-ninth and Eighty-eighth were thus deployed to the right and left of the railroad, Howard and French were maintaining their positions in front and holding the enemy in check. The Sixty-third New York was detached the night previous to help the batteries in the rear that were stuck in the mud and could not be brought up without assistance.

While Richardson's division was doing its part, as above stated, Sedgwick's division was no less actively engaged. On May 31 they broke camp near Tyler's house and marched for Fair Oaks Station as follows: Gorman's brigade with Kirby's battery, Burns' and Dana's brigades, with Tompkins', Owen's and Bartlett's batteries. With much delay and difficulty they succeeded in crossing the Chickahominy and pushed on the point near which they understood Heintzelman and Keyes were fighting. The First Minnesota, the leading regiment, formed into line of battle under a sharp fire and was posted on the right of Abercrombie's brigade, the balance of Gorman's

brigade formed on Abercrombie's left, where they became instantly and hotly engaged, and after sustaining, without wavering, repeated and furious charges of the enemy, in turn finally charged them at the point of the bayonet with such vigor and impetuosity as to drive them from their position. Just before this charge Kirby's battery was run up within 100 yards of the Confederates and opened a terrific fire with case and canister which materially helped to rout them. Dana, with the Twentieth Massachusetts and the Seventh Michigan, pushed on to the front on Gorman's left, where they immediately went into action and participated in the brilliant and decisive charge just spoken of, driving the enemy from point to point. Burns, with two regiments, took post on the right of the First Minnesota, holding the balance of his brigade in reserve; fighting continued all day, the troops retaining their position and resting on their arms. On Sunday (June 1) parts of Gorman's and Dana's brigades, with a section of Bartlett's artillery, were again engaged with the enemy. No sooner had they come within 150 yards of the Confederate lines than they became engaged in a deadly conflict; the whole line along the railroad for nearly a mile seemed one constant blaze of musketry. After withstanding, as on the previous day, repeated charges of the enemy, they had the satisfaction of seeing them abandon the field and precipitately retire toward Richmond, leaving their dead and wounded. The Third and Fourth Corps were placed under charge of Heintzelman on May 25, and he ordered Keyes (commanding Fourth Corps) to advance to Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg road, while he crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge and moved to occupy a position two miles in advance of it. Casey's division, on May 31, occupied the advanced position of the army, about three-quarters of a mile from the crossroads at Seven Pines, where he had rifle-pits and a redoubt thrown up, and an abattis began in front of the pits. About twelve o'clock he received word that the enemy in force were approaching on the Richmond

road, and ordered a regiment forward to strengthen his picket line. Believing that they intended to bring on a general engagement, he immediately ordered the division under arms and at once prepared to give them battle, disposing of his forces to the best advantage. The Confederates now advancing, attacked him in large force on the center and both wings, and a heavy fire of musketry commenced along the whole line on both sides, his artillery throwing canister into the enemy's ranks with great effect. Repeated requests for reinforcements having been ignored, and finding at length that the enemy were threatening both his flanks, and that their columns still pressed on, in order to save his artillery Casey ordered a bayonet charge by the four supporting regiments in the center, which was executed in a brilliant and successful manner under command of General Naglee, the Confederates being driven back. When the charge ceased, as the troops reached the edge of the woods in their front, a terrible musketry fire began. The enemy again advanced in force and threatened Casey's flanks so severely that he was forced to retreat to his works. Here the fighting continued with great fierceness, his troops stubbornly contesting every step of the way, till, the rifle pits being enveloped by the enemy, he was again forced to retreat to his second line in possession of Couch's division. Two pieces of artillery were placed in the road between the two lines, which did good execution on the advancing enemy. Arriving at the second line he succeeded in rallying a portion of his division, and, with Kearny's assistance, who had arrived at the head of one of the brigades of his division, attempted to regain possession of his works, but could not do so, Couch's division being also driven back, though reinforced by the Third Corps. General Naglee received four wounds in this engagement. General Casey ascribes his defeat in this engagement to the fact that eight of his regiments were raw men who had never been under fire, but says that, notwithstanding the fact that he had only 5,000 men in his first line of battle,

they withstood for three hours the attack of an overwhelming force of the enemy without any reënforcement; and concludes his report of the engagement by saying: "If a portion of the division did not behave so well as could have been wished, it must be remembered to what a terrible ordeal they were subjected. Still, those that behaved discreditably were exceptional cases. It is true that the division, after being nearly surrounded by the enemy, and losing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of war had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer. In my humble opinion, from what I witnessed on the 31st, I am convinced that the stubborn and desperate resistance of my division saved the army on the right bank of the Chickahominy from a severe repulse, which might have resulted in a disastrous defeat. The blood of the gallant dead would cry to me from the ground on which they fell fighting for their country, had I not said what I have to vindicate them from the unmerited aspersions which have been cast upon them."

Couch's division moved up to support Casey, Peck's brigade being ordered to the left, Devens' brigade covered the road leading to his center, Miller's, Flood's and McCarthy's batteries were in position covering the same roads and flanks, Abercrombie's brigade was to the right of Devens, on the crossroads leading from Couch's center to Fair Oaks, which was three-fourths of a mile to the right and front, through a mass of thicket and heavy woods; the First Long Island lay in rifle pits, supported by Miller's battery, then came the Twenty-third and Sixty-first Pennsylvania, while the First United States Chasseurs and Thirty-first Pennsylvania lay at Fair Oaks with Brady's battery. The Twenty-third Pennsylvania was ordered up to feel the enemy (Casey's troops being in front), which they did with great vigor, twice repulsing them and then retired to their first position. Keyes now ordered the Fifty-fifth New York into some rifle pits to support Casey's

center, Casey's right at this time being forced back on Couch's right and being opposed by a vastly superior force. Couch advanced with two regiments from the right and attempted to overthrow the Confederate left, which caused his artillery to cease firing on that flank. Pushing forward, they at once came upon a large force of the enemy's reserve, apparently moving toward Fair Oaks, in the edge of the woods. They immediately engaged but were finally compelled to retire, bringing in a few prisoners. In twenty minutes' time the Confederates had passed over the road leading to Couch's center, cutting off the advance at Fair Oaks, now reënforced by two more regiments that had been ordered up by Keyes. Being now separated from the main body of his division, and deeming it suicidal to attempt to cut through and rejoin them, and perceiving that large masses of the enemy were moving across the railroad to the right and front, with intention of surrounding and capturing his force, Couch, with Abercrombie, the four regiments and prisoners moved off toward Grapevine Bridge for a half a mile and took position facing Fair Oaks. Here word was brought that Sumner was at hand. On receiving this information Couch at once sent word to Heintzelman and Keyes that he would hold his position till Sumner came up. Sumner soon arrived and, as related before, drove back the enemy with great slaughter. The balance of Couch's division during this time were heavily engaged. Peck's brigade was placed on the principal road connecting the Richmond stage road with the Charles City road to hold the left flank. The Ninety-third Pennsylvania was detached from this brigade when the engagement began and placed on left of Casey's division, but returned with flying colors in the afternoon. Later Peck received word that the enemy were assaulting the right flank, and he at once moved to its support across the open field under a concentrated fire of artillery from numerous batteries and heavy musketry from the right. The brigade came into line, however, as coolly as though on parade, and used their best efforts to

sustain their comrades who were contesting inch by inch the advancing foe. During an hour his lines swayed forward and backward repeatedly, till at last, unable to withstand the pressure from successive reënforcements of the enemy, they were compelled slowly to fall back to the woods across the main road. Pushing forward to the road leading to the sawmill Peck endeavored to rally his men and reform his line, but was ordered by Kearny to retire his force by way of the sawmill to the entrenched camp and rifle pits. Here, finding nearly all the forces, he took position in the rifle pits with Berry's brigade, and rested during the night.

Devens' brigade was moved forward to the crossroads leading to Fair Oaks, where they took position about 1:30 p. m., when the Tenth Massachusetts was moved forward to the left side of the Richmond road, supporting Flood's battery, and the Thirty-sixth New York thrown forward on the right side of same road in front of Fair Oaks road; the right of this regiment was screened by some rifle pits but the left suffered terribly. About four o'clock, Casey's line having been driven in, and an ineffectual attempt to recover a portion of the ground having been made by the Fifty-fifth New York, the Tenth Massachusetts was ordered to advance up the Richmond road through the felled trees and endeavor to hold the ground in front. Moving by the flank, as directed, they soon found themselves assailed on the left flank and rear by heavy volleys of musketry, showing that the enemy had outflanked in considerable force the position held by them. They struggled, however, to hold their position, but the fallen timber entirely covering the ground on which they stood rendered this impossible, and they were soon thrown into confusion by the heavy fire from the enemy thus advantageously posted in regard to it. Devens now directed them to retire, but so much confusion ensued from the fire in the rear, and the left wing of the regiment being badly broken, that they retreated precipitately and fled to some distance behind the Fair Oaks road before they could be rallied and

reformed to move to the position indicated for them to take. Reënforcements soon arrived and were at once engaged in opposing the advance of the enemy. The attack becoming very heavy in front of the troops to the right of his brigade, Devens started to support it, but soon returned to his own regiments on the Richmond road where he was severely wounded, and Colonel Jones took command. Within a few minutes Jones received an order to retire to the intrenched camp, which he did in good order.

Kearny's division had quite a share in this battle, though a number of his regiments were taken from his command and ordered to positions to help out the other divisions. Jameson's brigade (three regiments) had moved up the Richmond road, and Heintzelman detached one of his regiments to assist Peck ; with the other two regiments he filed off through the woods to the left of the road and meeting Kearny was ordered to clear the abattis on both sides of the road of the enemy who were then entering from the opposite side in force ; this they succeeded in doing after a sharp fight lasting near two hours. Soon after the brigade had become engaged, the enemy's heavy firing on his right showed Jameson that they were pressing hard at that point, and shortly after the line began wavering and the Union troops on the right of the abattis, in the rifle pits, broke and ran. Jameson spurred toward them and attempted to rally them, but to no purpose, as they appeared to be panic-stricken. By this time the Confederates had succeeded in turning the right of the line and the Union troops were all running from the field. Seeing this, Jameson returned with great difficulty to his own command whom he found charging the enemy through the camp in front of the abattis. They were at once ordered to fall back and to the left, which they did with much difficulty. Before they succeeded in withdrawing, one of the Fourth Corps batteries began shelling the abattis and camp they were occupying, thus subjecting them to the fire of both friend and foe.

Birney's brigade (3:15 p. m.) was moved to the rifle pits on the Williamsburg and Richmond road, being Kearny's second line, and was deployed on the railroad, Casey's troops pouring through them in a demoralized condition.

Birney attempted to stop them and reform the line, but was unable to do so. At four o'clock the brigade was moved, by order of Heintzelman, up the railroad to support Keyes' corps. After advancing about a mile up the road the Confederates opened a scattering fire on them from a wood that ran to the railroad, and the brigade was deployed into line of battle.

Finding that the firing on the left was getting more to the rear, Birney advanced with two regiments into the woods and succeeded after a sharp fight in repulsing the enemy in their attempt to turn the right flank of the Union lines. Word came at this time from Couch that his command had been cut off but if Birney could hold the railroad and prevent the enemy cutting him off he could extricate himself. At the same time Heintzelman sent him an order to advance still further up the railroad. This he did, advancing till his lines reached the woods near Fair Oaks, when the foe began shelling him obliquely from the right. He now received orders from Sumner to connect with French, commanding his (Sumner's) left, and advance with him ; at this time the Seventh Massachusetts was sent to reënforce his brigade, as the position held by him was deemed very important. Upon connecting with French (ten p. m.) the brigade was posted behind the railroad embankment and bivouacked for the night. At daylight next morning Birney was, by Heintzelman's order, relieved from command and placed under arrest [when tried by court-martial there were no charges made and he was restored to his command] and the command of the brigade turned over to Col. Hobart Ward. About nine o'clock on Sunday morning the enemy opened in the woods to the right and front of the brigade, and Ward changed front diagonally to meet it. As the enemy advanced on him and their volleys

increased he gave orders to fire and then charge. This was brilliantly executed, and they drove the Confederates before them, who, retreating to the opening beyond, were met with a destructive fire by two regiments of the brigade still stationed on the railroad. The enemy made an attempt to rally shortly afterwards, but failed—it was a complete rout. The brigade lost heavily, but succeeded in capturing many prisoners.

Berry's brigade was ordered to position in rear of the intrenchments as a reserve (May 31); but had hardly reached their station when the Third Michigan was moved to the woods on the left of the Williamsburg road in their front, and within a few minutes the balance of the brigade was ordered to the front. The Fifth Michigan advanced, and by hard fighting drove the enemy about a mile to the left of the woods into and through the slashings. Berry now relieved the Third with the Fifth Michigan, and placed the Third in reserve to the Fifth. About an hour afterwards parts of regiments of other brigades coming up, Berry formed them on the left of his brigade into the timber, and drove the enemy so far that he had serious fears that his troops would be flanked by them, as they were driving the Union troops down the road and plain as well as on the right of the road. At this time Berry's troops were in the woods, his line extending from the edge of the slashings below up the woods and on the left of the camping-ground of Casey's division, completely commanding his old camp and the earthworks. Here they held the enemy in check, and could have driven them back farther had the center and right of the Union line been able to hold their position. About six p. m. Berry began falling back, and retired in good order to the intrenched camp.

Hooker's division was not engaged on the 31st; but on Sunday morning Sickles' brigade was ordered to follow Patterson's brigade along the stage road to the front. Hardly had they moved 300 yards when they were ordered by Heintzelman to form in line on the right of the road in

a large field with thick oak undergrowth, being part of Snead's plantation. The column had hardly got into position when two of the regiments were ordered to the left of the road in an opening bordered on the left and front by woods; the balance of the brigade were already in line on the right. While making these movements, the enemy's skirmishers and sharpshooters in the woods in front kept up an annoying fire on the brigade, their object being to pick off the mounted officers.

Skirmishers were thrown forward to silence this, and the brigade moved forward briskly under a heavy fire, the regiments immediately to the right and left of the road receiving the worst of it. After receiving two volleys, these regiments were double-quickened across the field, and with a loud cheer charged into the timber, the Confederates flying before them. The right of the brigade was now advanced, and, penetrating the timber and crossing some swampy ground, found the enemy in an open space and drove them back across the clearing at the point of the bayonet until they disappeared in the woods beyond. The brigade having advanced beyond the line Sickles had been directed to hold, they were recalled. The enemy having retired, Sickles was ordered to send two regiments to support Richardson, who was then hotly engaged on the right in the direction of the railroad; this was done, and after helping to drive the enemy from that part of the line, they returned to the brigade, which now moved forward and occupied a portion of the battle-ground of the day before at Seven Pines. Here they remained during the night, resting on their arms. During the night the Confederates fell back a mile or more toward Richmond, moving their artillery and wagons on a road leading from the left of Casey's camp. Two regiments of Patterson's brigade, under command of Colonel Starr (Patterson being sick), supported Sickles during this fight, and in the charge upon the Confederate lines were led by Hooker in person, losing heavily in officers and men. The remainder of this brigade,

as well as Grover's brigade, had been left at Oak Bottom swamp and the rifle pits at Bottom's Bridge to defend those places in case of attack, and so were not present during this battle. The Union loss in killed, wounded and missing was 5,031 ; Confederate loss, 4,283.

OPERATIONS JUNE 2-25, 1862.

After much importunity on the part of General McClellan, McCall's division of the First Corps was detached from McDowell in the early part of June, 1862, and sent to reënforce the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, where it arrived on the 12th and 13th. They were immediately placed under Fitz John Porter, and became the Third Division of the Fifth Corps. At this time McCall's division consisted of three brigades of infantry (the Pennsylvania Reserves), four batteries of light artillery, and the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The First Brigade, comprising the 1st, 2d, 5th, 8th and 13th Pennsylvania Reserves, was commanded first by Brig. (afterwards Major) Gen. John F. Reynolds (who was afterwards killed while in command of the First Corps, on July 1, 1863, at Gettysburg), who was captured at Gaines' Mills ; then by Col. S. G. Simmons, who was killed June 30, 1862, and lastly by Col. R. Biddle Roberts. The Second Brigade was composed of the 3d, 4th, 7th and 11th Pennsylvania Reserves, and its commanders were Brig. (afterwards Major-General in Command of the Army of the Potomac) Gen. George G. Meade, who was wounded June 30, 1862, and Col. A. L. Magilton. The Third Brigade consisted of the 6th, 9th, 10th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, commanded first by Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, who succeeded to the command of the division when Gen. McCall was taken prisoner, and then by Col. C. F. Jackson. The artillery consisted of Light Batteries A, B, G, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, and Battery C, 5th U. S. Artillery ; this, with Childs' (4th Pennsylvania) cavalry, completed the organization.

Nothing of importance occurred between June 2 and 23, the time being taken up in reconnoissances, skirmishes, etc., among which was the daring cavalry and artillery raid made by Stuart on June 13, which came around the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, attacked and drove in the picket guard at Old Church (two squadrons of cavalry), then proceeded to a landing three miles above White House, where they destroyed some wagons and burned two forage schooners; from thence they went to Tunstall Station, on the railroad, where they fired into a train of cars killing several. Shortly after they left Tunstall's (about midnight), Reynolds' brigade of McCall's division came up, and about noon of the 14th, Warren's brigade, of the same corps, made its appearance with the cavalry division under Cooke, but as Stuart had disappeared twelve hours previous there was nothing for them to do. June 15, Casey made an armed reconnoissance to New Market; and the same day there was a heavy skirmish on the picket line at Seven Pines. On this day also a parley was held between Colonel Key and Howell Cobb to make arrangements for exchange of prisoners. June 18, there was a skirmish between the 16th Massachusetts and the enemy near Fair Oaks, while the former were making a reconnoissance. June 19, there was a skirmish between the enemy and the 20th Indiana on the Charles City road. On the 20th there was an artillery duel near New Bridge, Va., and on the 22d Casey made a reconnoissance to White Oak Swamp. 23d to 26th of June, skirmishes near Ashland, at Atlee's Station, at Meadow Bridge, and at Point of Rocks. In advancing the picket line at Oak Grove a battle ensued, that object being accomplished with heavy loss of life on both sides.

OAK GROVE.

On the night of June 24 orders were received, through General Heintzelman, from McClellan to push forward the picket line covering the advance of the army before Rich-

mond, and early on the morning of the 25th the First and Second Brigades of the Third Corps were ordered to establish their line of battle immediately in rear of the picket line preparatory to beginning the movement. Sickles' (2d) brigade was drawn up across the Williamsburg road, with Grover's (1st) brigade on its left extending to the south, while Carr's (3d) brigade was posted behind Hooker's lines of defense, to hold them or furnish support for Sickles or Grover as might be required.

A belt of swampy soil surrounded by a heavy forest was situated about half a mile in front of Hooker's position on which the picket line was posted, and from the great difficulty in relieving the picket line at this point, in many places waist deep, this swamp had tacitly become regarded as the advanced picket lines of the opposing armies, and any invasion of it was looked upon as an aggressive encroachment to be repelled, if possible, at once. At eight o'clock the advance began along the entire line by sending forward skirmishers while the brigades followed within easy supporting distance. Grover's skirmish line became engaged at once, and as the enemy's fire increased they were strengthened from time to time to insure a vigorous and successful advance, one of Carr's regiments rendering good service in this movement. Sickles' brigade was slower in coming up with the enemy, but soon the musketry in his front showed that he had found them, and that they were also resisting his advance. They still pressed forward and had almost reached the edge of the woods, when the increased fire from the Confederate forces showed Hooker that Sickles was outnumbered. Carr at once sent a regiment to support him, and again the whole line pressed forward under a galling fire from the enemy. Grover, on the left, had fought his way up to the line and established his picket. It was now eleven o'clock, and, owing to some misunderstanding of Hooker's true condition at general headquarters, he received orders to withdraw his command from the contest, and although General Birney tendered the services of

his brigade at this juncture to Hooker, he was, under his instructions, compelled to decline them, and the division was returned to its camp. As they reached camp McClellan appeared, and on learning the true state of affairs, ordered Hooker to resume and finish the duty given him the night before. Another regiment of Carr's brigade now took the place of the one that had been withdrawn during the suspension of operations, and the line again moved forward under a severe fire from the enemy and established itself on the line it was to occupy. At this time Palmer's brigade, of Couch's division, arrived, and soon after a section of De Russy's battery, which being brought into action by that officer, opened to the right and left of the Williamsburg road and literally swept the jungles of the enemy; a part of Palmer's brigade supported the battery, while the remainder of the brigade deployed and took the advance of the infantry in this part of the field and immediately moved forward to the outer edge of the woods. As soon as the undergrowth had been cleared of the foe the artillery opened with great effect on their encampment on the side of the field opposite their position. This continued till seven p.m., when Hooker's command was withdrawn and Palmer's brigade left to defend the position for the night. Birney's brigade of Kearny's division again came up in the afternoon, but the principal fighting had been done before they arrived, and in the evening they relieved Grover and took up his position and remained till two a.m., when they were withdrawn and moved to various positions to strengthen the picket line. Robinson's brigade, Kearny's division, also moved forward for the purpose of extending the line of pickets in conjunction with those of Hooker, and his skirmish line had a sharp encounter with the enemy, whom they steadily drove back until they came abreast of Hooker's line, when they rested till about six p.m., when the Confederates made a desperate assault on his left flank with a heavy body of infantry. The 20th Indiana was ordered to the left for support, and while advancing received repeated

volleys from the enemy, which they met by a charge, and, pouring a deadly fire on them in return, sent them flying from the field. At this time some one called out that the Confederates were bringing a battery to bear on the left, when the 87th New York became panic-stricken and broke and fled, and though their commander tried in every way to rally them, he was unsuccessful, and they did not again appear on the field. The 20th Indiana was now hard pressed by reënforcements of the enemy, and was forced to give way and retreated a short distance, but soon reformed and again advanced to the attack. At this time Kearny appeared with Birney's brigade, and with this support they succeeded in driving the enemy from the field, after which Birney's brigade was withdrawn and relieved Grover, as before stated. Robinson's brigade remained in this position during the night, when the enemy made another attack upon him, which he easily repulsed.

We now come to the series of great battles that ended with McClellan abandoning the Peninsula, beginning with the battle, on June 26, of Mechanicsville, or Beaver Dam Creek:

MECHANICSVILLE, OR BEAVER DAM CREEK.

On June 19, the First and Third Brigades of McCall's division moved from Gaines' Farm, where they had been encamped, to Beaver Dam Creek, about a mile from Mechanicsville, then the extreme right of the army, and relieved Taylor's brigade of Franklin's division. The position selected on the creek was naturally a strong one. The left resting on the Chickahominy and the right extending to the thick woods beyond the upper Mechanicsville road, which they occupied. The creek, however, was not fordable for the greater part of the front of the line, and there was but one road, that crossing at Ellison's Mills, over which it was practicable to move the artillery. Here an epaulement for a section of artillery was hastily thrown up, while rifle pits capable of holding a regiment were dug in front of each

brigade. Cooper's battery on the right, and Smead's battery on the left, commanded the approaches from the upper road, while DeHart's battery, stationed near the front center, commanded a more distant view of the same road as well as the lower direct road to Mechanicsville; at the same time Meade's brigade was held in reserve at Gaines' Farm, so as to be in readiness to support Reynolds and Seymour, or to oppose the enemy's crossing at New Bridge, should they attempt it.

In this position the Reserves awaited any movements the Confederates should make. Howell Cobb's legion was encamped in full view across the Chickahominy, while A. P. Hill's division lay about half a mile in the rear of Cobb, and had an extensive line of rifle pits and two redoubts overlooking the river.

Quiet prevailed until the 26th, when the Confederates were discovered to be advancing, and about noon McCall's pickets were driven in at Meadow Bridge. As their head of column approached, Meade's brigade was ordered up from Gaines' Farm and formed in the rear of the line, where they would be within supporting distance of any part of the field. At this time the division's line of battle was: On the extreme right six companies of the 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, next, six companies of the 1st, then the 5th, 8th, 10th and 9th, the 12th being on the extreme left, while, as stated above, Meade's brigade was in reserve, together with Easton's and Kern's batteries.

About three o'clock p.m. the enemy formed in front of McCall's division, and, throwing out skirmishers, rapidly advanced on his lines, keeping up a brisk fire. They were in heavy force and were commanded by Gen. R. E. Lee. They attacked McCall's entire position from right to left, but he soon saw that they were concentrating their greatest efforts on his extreme right. Their efforts, however, were frustrated, though the battle raged at that point for quite a while with great fury, for Kern's battery had moved up to that place, supported by the 3d Re-

serves, and the accurate and deadly fire of the battery caused them to retreat with a fearful loss. At the same time the Georgians rushed with almost resistless energy against the 2d Reserves, only to be slaughtered like sheep in the shambles by the gallant Pennsylvanians.

For a time the enemy retired from close contest on the right, but they kept up during the balance of the day a heavy general fire both of artillery and musketry ; this, with the rapid and steady firing of McCall's men, sounded at times like peals of never-ending thunder. Soon, however, they rallied again, and launched down the road to Ellison's Mills, where they made a determined effort to turn McCall's extreme left (Seymour's brigade) and flank him by crossing the stream below the mill. The 7th Pennsylvania now came to Seymour's rescue, and once more the Reserves sustained their character for steadiness in splendid style. Hour after hour they stood there, never flinching, never losing a foot of ground, hotly contesting the battle with the enemy's finest and bravest troops fighting under the eye of their most distinguished general. Yet it was noted that though the Union artillery dealt death unremittingly and to an awful extent, the greatly superior force of the enemy enabled them to throw against McCall column after column of fresh troops, while his men were almost exhausted. About sunset Griffin's brigade, with Edwards' battery, arrived and was placed on McCall's extreme right, but as the enemy had advanced before they could all get into position only a portion of the brigade got into the action. Then, shortly before the engagement closed, the 4th Michigan relieved the 5th Pennsylvania, whose ammunition was exhausted. Edwards' battery having been left in reserve by Griffin, it was, late in the evening, turned over to Seymour and placed on his left. About nine p.m. this engagement closed, by the enemy withdrawing with heavy loss. At one a.m. McClellan ordered McCall to withdraw his forces to the rear of Gaines' Mills, but it was daylight before he received it. Meade's brigade was the first withdrawn, but before it was

completed the enemy opened fire. Their fire was promptly returned, and soon the action became general all along the line. Griffin's brigade and Edwards' battery followed Meade and then Reynolds' brigade retired, keeping up a scattering musketry fire and firing one piece of artillery. Seymour's brigade was the last to retire, and was brought out in handsome style. McCall buried his dead, sent off his wounded, saved all his artillery, and his brigades filed off the field as steadily as though leaving a dress parade, and it was some time before the Confederates discovered they had left, as they did not follow immediately. McCall's division marched leisurely, and reached their designated position at ten a. m. of the 27th, where we will leave them for the present.

Morell came up to Mechanicsville with Griffin's brigade between five and six o'clock p.m., and found McCall engaged on the defensive, with Reynolds severely pressed, and he at once stationed Griffin and ordered him to support Reynolds and take care of the gap between him and Martindale, who was near Richardson's division. Martindale was in position on the Hanover Court House road about three-quarters of a mile from Mechanicsville (to repel any approach from that quarter) and near McCall, ready to resist any effort to turn his right and assail him in the rear. The 8th Illinois Cavalry was stationed at this place and had been skirmishing with the enemy during the entire day. The battle had opened on Martindale's left, and he sent two regiments to support Reynolds, and with the rest of his brigade waited demonstrations in his front, where the enemy's artillery opened on him, without, however, doing any damage. At one o'clock a.m. he received orders to withdraw his brigade and retire before daylight, which he did in good order, and reached his camp in the Chickahominy Valley about one mile from New Bridge, shortly after daylight.

Butterfield's brigade received orders at three a.m. of the 27th to remove, by hand the heavy guns in battery near Hogan's house to a point on the hill, near Adams'

house, east of Gaines' house, and guard them with his brigade, taking up position on the hills east of Gaines' house across the ravine during the passage of McCall's and Martindale's troops to the rear, and having accomplished this, by order took up a new position in the rear of the one last mentioned, with his left resting on the Chickahominy Valley, leaving the battery on the hill, where it had been stationed till the passage of all the troops and flying artillery had been effected, after which he brought the battery back and destroyed all the bridges.

GAINES' MILL.

On the morning of June 27, Porter's (5th) corps was disposed in a semicircle, having its extremities resting on the Chickahominy, while part of his front was covered by the ravine of the Gaines' Mill stream, covered with trees and underbrush which partially masked his force and screened his reserves. By this disposition the roads from Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor were covered and defended.

On the front as formed were Sykes' and Morell's divisions, each brigade having two of its own regiments in reserve, while their artillery was posted to sweep the avenues of approach. McCall's division formed the second line in the rear of the woods skirting the ravine, Reynolds being on the extreme right, to cover the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge. Cooke's cavalry were at the same time posted under the hill in the Chickahominy Valley to watch the left flank, and, should he have a chance, to strike the enemy on the plains.

The dust from the immense columns of the enemy could be seen for miles, and Porter's scouts and pickets warned him that they were approaching along his entire front. About twelve o'clock p.m. they began to attack from the direction of New Cold Harbor on Morell's right, which was handsomely repulsed by Griffin's brigade. Again advancing, the Confederates made a second attack about 2:30, and again about half past five, each time extending along the entire

front of Morell's division, and each time being repulsed. At 6:30, however, they made a final attack, coming in irresistible force, throwing themselves against his center and left, and swept Morell's division from the ground, compelling them to retire. As Morell retired the artillery opened on the enemy from the left and rear, but the pressure was so great that his troops could not be rallied except in small bodies to support the artillery. Besides, Cooke's cavalry, having been repulsed in a charge on the Confederate right, added confusion to the Union line by riding at full speed obliquely through a large portion of the artillery, carrying men and horses along with them. The cavalry, however, reformed under the hill, beyond the reach of the musketry, and, advancing to the vicinity of Adams' house, imparted some steadiness to the retreating infantry near them; at this time they received an order from Cooke to retire from the field, and rode briskly to the rear. The infantry followed and, finally rallied in the valley near the hospital, while Butterfield's brigade crossed the Chickahominy and bivouacked with Smith's division of Franklin's corps.

I think the weight of evidence is that General Cooke's cavalry charge at Gaines' Mill was made at the opportune moment, and arrested the advance of the enemy after the infantry supports had fallen back and left the guns of the several batteries exposed to inevitable capture.

It is difficult to see how the capture could have been avoided, with the enemy within fifty or sixty yards of the guns, and their infantry supports in retreat.

No doubt a repulsed cavalry charge would create some confusion, but in this instance it created sufficient confusion among the advancing enemy to enable the unsupported artillery to get away, and accomplished just what cavalry are intended to do in emergencies.

The weight of evidence is also that the cavalry were the last troops to cross the river. (See "Battles and Leaders of the War," vol. ii, page 344.)

Sykes' division was on Morell's right; his troops oc-

cupying the crest of a hill in an open field partly covered by a fence, and partly by the inequalities of the ground, McGeehee's house, in rear of his right center, being the commanding point of his position, while his front was masked 400 yards distant by heavy timber bordering a ravine. Buchanan's and Warren's brigades were deployed to the right and left, while Lovell's brigade was in reserve.

About eleven a.m. the Confederates appeared in his front, and, with their artillery, tried to shake the center of his line, and from that time till two p.m., with successive battalions of fresh troops, assailed his center and flanks, and were as often repulsed. About noon Weed's and Tidball's batteries took position on Sykes' right, and so effective and deadly was their fire that they broke up every attack of the enemy on his right flank, and finally drove them to their main body on his left. From this time until night the battle raged furiously, attack after attack being met and repulsed, till the center of Porter's army was pierced, the troops in his front driven in, his left flank exposed, and his position no longer tenable, when, out of ammunition and thoroughly exhausted, they sullenly retreated, meeting with Meagher's and French's brigades about half a mile to the rear of the field. These had been sent to relieve Sykes, but arrived too late to take part in the battle. At midnight the division retired across the Chickahominy and bivouacked on the heights commanding the approaches from the river. At 3:30 p.m. Meade's and Seymour's brigades, of McCall's division, were ordered up to support the front line, and soon after Reynolds' brigade followed, and the whole division became warmly engaged, while his batteries also advanced and shelled the enemy over the heads of the men in line. The action soon became general, and the fire in front of this division, which was near the center of the battle, increased to a deafening roar of musketry, above which, the artillery, at times, could scarcely be heard. The Confederates were drawn up in five lines at this point, and one line after another was thrown forward on his

front as fast as the preceding ones recoiled from the murderous fire of the Pennsylvania Reserves, or at such short intervals that their overheated muskets had no time to cool. In this way this division was under steady fire over three hours, when on the left one of Meade's regiments was driven in. They soon reformed, however, and resumed their place in the fight. Reynolds' men were now forced to retire from the right for want of ammunition, and soon the whole division was ordered to retire, which they did, crossing the Chickahominy and destroying the bridge (opposite Trent's Hill) upon which they crossed, and encamped for the night. The next morning the enemy captured General Reynolds of this division, they having got in his rear when he retired to the woods, where he passed the night. At three p.m. Slocum's division of Franklin's corps crossed to the left bank of the Chickahominy to support Porter, and at once moved up to the front line, where Newton's brigade was placed on the right of the line and Taylor's New Jersey brigade on Newton's left, while Bartlett's brigade took position on the extreme left on the road leading from Gaines' house to Alexander's Bridge. On arriving at his position Bartlett supported Sykes' troops, who were nearly overpowered by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and remained in action at this point till the battle was over. Newton's brigade advanced in two columns to the woods in their front, which were then occupied by the enemy in strong force, and maintained their position over two hours, under a galling fire and against greatly superior numbers, until their ammunition was expended, when they retired to the rear and formed a new line. Taylor's brigade was also advanced into the woods, the 4th New Jersey being detached from the brigade and ordered to an advanced position in the woods, where, being cut off from the rest of the troops, the greater part of the regiment was captured. The rest of the brigade maintained their position, doing deadly execution, till their ammunition was all

appeared and opened fire on the commands of Franklin and Sedgwick. Parts of Caldwell's and Meagher's brigades, with Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries, were detached from Richardson and went to their assistance, while French's brigade prepared to resist an attack in their immediate front toward which a heavy body of the enemy was reported to be moving, while the remaining portion of Meagher's and Caldwell's brigades, Richardson's second and third line, and one brigade of Smith's division formed on his right. The enemy, however, did not attack his front, and they were held in reserve, while in Sedgwick's front the enemy attacked again in strong force but more impetuously, but was gallantly resisted and driven back, the engagement lasting till dark. In the mean time Smith's division of Franklin's corps, on the 28th, while changing their position in order to get out of range of the Confederate artillery, who were firing on them from Gaines' Hill, found themselves shelled from Garnett Hill, though but little damage was done, and they had just evacuated their works, when two Confederate regiments attempted to occupy them, but were repulsed with great slaughter by his picket line, assisted by Mott's battery, which threw shrapnel into the enemy's ranks with terrific effect. At daylight on the 29th, the division formed in line of battle at the Trent house, covering the retreat of the wagon train and preventing the enemy crossing the Chickahominy by the bridges in their front, and then fell back to the front of Savage Station, where, finding both his flanks unprotected and the enemy in force in his front, Smith retired to the back of the station, formed junction with Sumner, and formed line of battle. Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right to hold the railroad, Brooks' brigade was placed in the woods on the left, while Davidson's brigade (under command of Colonel Taylor, General Davidson having had a sunstroke) was held in reserve. Brooks soon engaged the enemy and fought them till dark, and remained with the brigade, though wounded, and at ten p. m. the division moved to White Oak Swamp.

WHITE OAK SWAMP—GLENDALE—NEW MARKET.

Slocum's division received orders to move across the White Oak Swamp, and marched to a point on the Long Bridge road about one and one-half miles beyond the swamp, where they relieved Couch's and Peck's divisions (on the morning of June 30) who were under orders to proceed to the James River, and then took position on the Charles City road not far from its junction with the Long Bridge road and about a mile from Brackett's Ford, and blockaded the road as much as possible, getting into line of battle, placing artillery in position with infantry supporting the flanks of the batteries, and then destroyed the bridge near Brackett's Ford. About eleven a. m., the enemy drove in his pickets on the Charles City road and appeared in force in a large field in his front, opening on his line with two batteries, which were replied to by his artillery, and which was kept up till nearly dark. Word coming at this time that the left of the line (Heintzelman's corps) was being severely pressed, Slocum ordered Bartlett's brigade to advance to the front and endeavor to gain possession of the field on which the enemy had appeared in the morning. They at once encountered the enemy in strong force drawn up in line a short distance beyond a creek separating the opposing forces. Upton's battery was at once moved up to support Bartlett, and, opening on the enemy with canister, soon caused them to retreat. Taylor's brigade was ordered to the support of General Kearny, on Slocum's left, with his left (Robinson's brigade) posted on the New Market road, and Birney's brigade on the right, with Berry's brigade in reserve. The enemy began their attack on Kearny about four o'clock p. m. They charged on his lines repeatedly, but were repulsed principally by the fearful execution of Thompson's battery, which mowed them down by scores, seemingly, however, without much effect, as the gaps were instantly filled and the advance continued till they were almost up to the muzzles of the battery, when

the 63d Pennsylvania and 37th New York coming to the support of the battery, with determined charge and repeated volleys drove them back in confusion. Three times the enemy advanced, each time being repulsed with great slaughter, till finding they could not break Kearny's line, they retired a short distance and kept up a rapid musketry fire on the troops. McCall's division having been overpowered and having abandoned their position on the left of Kearny, Taylor's brigade took their place and held it till the battle was over; while Caldwell's brigade, after firing one volley, charged on the enemy and drove them through the open field, capturing a stand of colors, and, after fighting till their ammunition was exhausted, took position on the right of the field and remained there till withdrawn. On the morning of June 30, McCall's division (reduced to about 6,000 men from his losses at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill) formed in position on the New Market road, just in advance of where a lane turns off to Quaker Church, and it was at this point that they withstood for a time the combined onslaught of Hill's and Longstreet's divisions (from 18,000 to 20,000 troops). The Second Brigade was on the right of the road, the Third on the left and the First in reserve. The division was hardly in position before the enemy's artillery attacked the left of his line. The pickets were driven in upon the main body, which at short range delivered their fire on the advancing foe, cutting one of their regiments to pieces. The position of the 3d Reserves being in the way of the artillery range, it fell back and was unfortunately fired upon by some of their own regiments and retired in confusion, reforming only late in the day. The enemy pressed forward, however, on the left of McCall's line, and though for a time it resisted the advance, was at length compelled to give way before the overwhelming avalanche the enemy brought to bear at that point. As soon as the Parrott battery was subjected to the musketry fire they were withdrawn and caused much confusion, which was added to by

the cavalry doing the same. They soon reformed further in the rear, but not in position to do any further service. Cooper's men stood by their guns till there were so few of them left that they could not get them from the field and they were abandoned, while Anderson only retired his battery when their ammunition was exhausted. On the right, Meade's brigade met a severe attack, but the excellent firing of Randol's and Thompson's batteries for awhile kept the Confederates at bay. At last they made a determined attack on these batteries, which Meade met, keeping his men well to the ground till close at hand, then firing, followed by a bayonet charge—a desperate hand-to-hand encounter—till by overwhelming force—Meade being severely wounded—the brigade gave way. Just at this moment a part of Richardson's division came to their relief. McCall in trying to reform his troops and make a new stand, rode forward to where he supposed a portion of his line was stationed, but it unfortunately happened to be a Confederate regiment, and he was taken prisoner.

Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was in reserve on the left of McCall's, and when McCall's division gave way, it brought Burns' brigade directly to the front (Dana's and Sully's brigades had been sent to help Franklin), and they at once gave battle to the foe, while Dana and Sully were recalled and came at the double-quick, and at once dashed against the enemy. The entire division was now hotly engaged, and not only did they meet and repulse the attack of the enemy, but were forced to withstand the demoralizing influence of the panic of the men of the first line, who, in many instances, broke through their lines in their haste to move out of reach of the enemy's fire.

Hooker's division took position about nine a. m. on a crossroad leading to the Williamsburg road near St. Paul's Church, his right resting on this road and running parallel with and a mile in advance of the Quaker road, a forest covering the area between his position and the road, and his division being on the right of Sumner's corps, and

McCall on his right and stretching off in an obtuse angle with the direction of his own division. When McCall's line gave way, the enemy pursued them until brought to a halt by the destructive fire poured into them from Hooker's right wing, which now advanced, and after a hot contest drove the enemy toward Sumner, who punished them severely in passing and threw them over toward Kearny's front, where the firing was kept up till a late hour of the night.

On June 29 Porter had been ordered to move the whole of the material of the army to a position on the James River near Turkey Island. He moved his command at sundown, and succeeded in reaching his destination about nine a. m. of the 30th, and took up a position on Malvern Hill west of Turkey Bridge, posting his two divisions, thoroughly covering the River road and all the debouches from the New Market, Charles City and Williamsburg roads, Warren's brigade of Sykes' division being posted in the valley of the creek across the river road to prevent the left flank being turned by an advance from Richmond along that road. The supply trains of many of the divisions passed safely through the lines as well as the reserve artillery, which all reached a place of safety by four p. m.

About this time the enemy appeared in Porter's front, began feeling the strength of his position, and about five o'clock showed themselves in force and attempted to turn his left flank; under cover of the woods skirting the River road, the enemy planted their artillery to engage Porter's main body on Malvern Hill, while his infantry with some artillery moved direct on Warren's brigade, with whom they were soon engaged. These demonstrations soon brought upon them the concentrated fire of Porter's thirty guns and the infantry fire of Warren's brigade, the destructive effects of which caused them to immediately retreat. The Confederate force making this assault was under Gen. H. A. Wise, and numbered 15,000 men, being part of the division of General Holmes. This fight is known as the battle of Turkey Bridge.


MALVERN HILL.

On the morning of July 1 McClellan had concentrated his entire army on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with the view of making Harrison's and Haxall's Landings, on the James, his base of supplies, as he could there be aided by the gunboat flotilla under command of Commodore Rodgers. This design was successfully carried out, his entire wagon trains reaching Haxall's in safety, and the army being placed in position to offer battle to the enemy should they attack him again. The troops were placed from left to right as follows : On the left, occupying an admirable position on Malvern Hill, was Porter's corps ; Sykes' division, with the reserve artillery being on the crest of the hill, and ten siege guns posted to control the river road and sweep the left bank, placed at such elevation as to fire over the heads of Porter's men and reach the enemy advancing on the Charles City road, while on his right was Morell, then Couch's division, Keyes' corps, with the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, under General Seymour, in reserve to them ; then the divisions of Kearny and Hooker, of Heintzelman's corps ; then Sedgwick and Richardson (Sumner's corps) ; then Smith and Slocum (Franklin's corps) ; while on the extreme right was Peck's division of Keyes' corps, with their right resting nearly on the James, and on the James itself the flotilla of Rodgers. Though an extensive line for such a force, McClellan felt that he must there meet the enemy and fight him regardless of the cost of life. His position on Malvern Hill was naturally a strong one, and the right of the line was strengthened by felling trees and blocking the roads. This done McClellan awaited the attack which he foresaw was imminent.

Magruder's corps, about one p.m., appeared in Porter's front and opened up along his whole line with artillery and a strong skirmish line ; this continued till about four o'clock, inflicting, however, but small loss on Porter's troops, when

the firing stopped and the skirmishers withdrew to their main body. About 5:30 p.m. Magruder made a determined attack on the right of Morell's and left of Couch's divisions, while a portion of the Confederate troops stealthily made their way along the valley, concealed by a growth of bushes and a mist prevailing at the time, to attack Morell's left and rear. Martindale's and Butterfield's brigades were at once placed in position to meet them, and after a sharp engagement, in which the enemy were three times repulsed, at last succeeded in driving them away from his left and rear, and they did not again renew the attack in that quarter. At the same time they attacked his rear Magruder's troops also made a powerful attack on Morell's left front. They advanced in great force from the woods, and notwithstanding the destructive fire from the batteries on the crest of the hill moved steadily forward till they arrived near the batteries, when the supporting regiments (the 4th Michigan, 9th Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania) gallantly sprang forward and repulsed them. The enemy, however, being constantly reinforced by fresh troops, who extended their lines right and left, these supports were compelled to fall back to their first position, which they held till they were out of ammunition, when they were relieved by Butterfield's brigade, supported by Martindale's brigade, who continued the fight against treble their numbers, until they in turn were relieved by part of Sykes' division and Meagher's brigade, which latter was led into the fight by its own commander and General Porter. The Confederates, constantly reinforced, advanced to the attack on Morell's front time and again, each attack being repulsed, and fought with great obstinacy and determination, continuing the struggle till after dark, when, exhausted, they sullenly retired, leaving the field in his front in Morell's possession.

Couch's division was posted on the right of the James River road, looking westward, with Kingsbury's battery on his left front, Porter's corps being on his left on the opposite side of the road. Palmer's brigade was in a wooded



GEN. DARIUS N. COUCH.

ravine on the right of the battery, while one regiment of Howe's brigade was in a peach orchard to the rear, between the battery and Palmer. On Palmer's right was a sloping oat field bordered on the right by a tangled marsh and wooded bank. The balance of Howe's brigade held this position with part of Abercrombie's brigade and was the right of Couch's line, connecting with the left of Kearny's division. About three p.m. a Confederate brigade broke through the woods in front of Palmer and Abercrombie (making a feint attack to draw these troops to a disadvantageous position) but Kingsbury's battery and the steady firing of the infantry, together with a charge by the 10th Massachusetts (in which they captured the colors of the 14th North Carolina), drove them back in confusion, rendering their attempt unsuccessful. The Confederates now massed heavy columns of troops in Couch's front, and kept up an incessant cannonading on his lines, which continued till about 4:30, when they pushed forward a large column from their right to assail Griffin's (of Morell's division) position. The fire of three batteries was concentrated on them, but they kept on, constantly reënforced, until they came within the range of Griffin's muskets, when they stopped and formed line.

The battle now becoming general, Couch assumed command of the whole front line for a time, ordered up the reserves on the left, placed in position regiments falling back, and halted those bravely moving forward, as many of them had already masked the fire of his batteries. On seeing the Confederate advance on the left, both Abercrombie and Palmer pushed forward their brigades in front of the artillery in order to drive back the foe. The enemy constantly reënforced their column of attack and advanced heavy reserves in support. Palmer and Abercrombie became engaged on their right and left. Caldwell's brigade having been sent by Sumner to help Couch, joined his division and became fiercely engaged. Heintzelman sent Seeley's battery, which was posted with Howe's brigade, and it, too, went into the

fight doing its whole duty. Shortly after six o'clock Hooker came up with three regiments and led them into the action, relieving some of Couch's troops who had exhausted their ammunition, while about seven o'clock up came the gallant Irish Brigade, under Meagher, advancing with rapid step and displaying their colors, marked by an alacrity and enthusiasm which found expression in frequent cheers, and had the effect of rallying several fragments of regiments that had, after bravely sustaining themselves under an overpowering fire, been forced to retire from the front. As they came under fire they were met by General Butterfield, who, grasping the distinctive green flag of the leading regiment of the brigade, exhibited the ardor of a leader personally interested in its honor, thereby reëxciting and renewing the spirit of the advance. The two leading regiments (the 60th and 88th New York) on coming into contact with the foe poured into them such an oblique incessant and murderous discharge that it had the effect of silencing for some moments a fire that seemed overwhelming, retaining the position they had taken till the enemy retired. The second line of the brigade also maintained their position, though under a heavy fire from the enemy, which they were not in a position to either return or resist, while the 63d New York was sent to support a battery, relieving another on the line which had exhausted its ammunition.

Sickles' also reported to Couch, and proceeded to relieve with two of his regiments two regiments posted in an open field in front of a belt of woods, behind which a battery was posted, and they were at once engaged with the enemy, while another was posted about 100 yards to the rear and left of the road in advance of another battery and far enough to its left to unmask it; the fourth regiment supported another battery on the right, while his last regiment relieved the U. S. Chasseurs, and the whole brigade thus placed gallantly fought the enemy till the close of the battle. The brigade remained in these positions during the fight, a detachment being engaged in supplying Couch's troops with fresh ammunition.

Caldwell's brigade (of Richardson's division) also came to the support of Couch between five and six p.m., the 5th New Hampshire supporting a battery on the right and the other three regiments engaging the enemy on the extreme right of Couch's division, under the immediate command of Colonel Barlow, fighting steadily and pouring a most destructive fire on the enemy until their ammunition gave out, and then held their position without flinching, receiving the enemy's fire though unable to return it.

A portion of Birney's brigade (the 4th Maine and four companies of 3d Maine) held the wooded ravine in front of Kearny's division, and when Couch's right flank was in danger of being driven back by a furious onslaught of the enemy, gallantly came to the rescue and aided him in driving them back.

The positions occupied by the divisions of Sedgwick, Hooker, Richardson (his brigades sent to Couch's assistance have already been mentioned), Peck, Slocum (with exception of Caldwell's brigade already mentioned), Smith and the Pennsylvania Reserves, were not assailed by the infantry of the enemy, although at times the artillery fired at them, doing little damage. The flotilla also poured a deadly fire of shells into the enemy's reserves and advancing columns.

During the day the heavy artillery on the line of Sykes' division, ranging far up the valley toward the enemy, assisted greatly in holding them at bay, and toward night Buchanan's and Lovell's brigades marched on to the field. These brigades were posted to cover the left of the line, and were not discovered by the enemy, who were advancing for a last attack on the Union lines, until their left flank was completely exposed, when they poured into them a well-directed and effective fire, which so completely shattered their lines that they were thrown into confusion and retreated precipitately and in disorder. This ended the battle, leaving the Union troops in possession of the field, the Confederate forces not again attacking McClellan in force while he remained on the Peninsula.

Between the 25th of June and the 2d of July the Union losses were, in killed, wounded and missing, 15,849, while the Confederate losses were 16,872.

From this time forward to the 24th of August, McClellan's army was engaged in reorganizing, recuperating and being forwarded to Alexandria and Aquia Creek, McClellan himself arriving in, and taking charge of the forces around, Alexandria on the evening of August 26, where we will leave him for the present.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND BULL RUN.

OUR defeat at the first battle of Bull Run was the signal for the retreat of our armies to the front of Washington, and the news spread over the North and filled it with consternation. This result, so unexpected, shattered the hopes of many who were watching the battle with great anxiety, while it suddenly awoke the Government to the pressing needs of the hour. One of the first of these was the selection of a new commander, on whose ability and courage the country could rely, to relieve the National Capital of its new dangers. It was well understood that if the Confederates captured the city, though they held it no longer than the British in 1814, the effect on the loyal States might be disastrous; and in addition, it might furnish the coveted opportunity to certain European powers to interfere in the Union cause at the outset, or to recognize the Confederacy.

General Scott seemed favorable to McClellan; and Schuyler Hamilton, Scott's military secretary, who had to go to the White House probably two or three times during the night, concurred in Scott's opinion. McClellan was accordingly called to Washington by telegraph a few days after to assume command of the defeated army which required a man at its head who had confidence in himself, and was able to imbue the men who were to serve under him with his own spirit.

At that time Washington had but one railroad connecting with the North, viz, the Baltimore and Ohio; while Baltimore had three, viz, the Baltimore and Ohio; the Northern Central; and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and

Baltimore. New regiments, however, came pouring into the city and neighborhood for "three years or during the war;" and the work at once began of organizing that grand army into brigades and divisions. The locations of these troops as they arrived cannot be given with any certainty, and even if they could it would be of little value to history, as their positions were so rapidly changed. But some of the regiments became a part of the history of the places where they were stationed. Pleasonton's headquarters were at the Park Hotel, on 7th Street, just north of the city; there also the famous cavalry general prepared his command for future service.

The 2d, 6th and 7th Wisconsin and the 19th Indiana, lay on Kalorama Heights, then a quiet place north of Washington. The heights occupy a bend in Rock Creek, on the east side of the stream, and are deeply fringed with a forest of oaks, presenting a beautiful picture to the visitor. There these regiments were formed into a brigade, and Genl. Rufus King, of Wisconsin, was placed in command as brigadier general. This was afterwards known as the "Iron Brigade," and served in the First Corps until that corps was abolished by Meade.

General Augur's brigade lay at Upton's Hill, Virginia, nearly four miles from Washington, and in the vicinity of Munson's Hill and Bailey's Cross Roads. McClellan had a review of the troops where the pretty village of Mount Pleasant now stands. It is to Washington what Glendale is to Cincinnati.

Of the number of generals present there were McClellan, McDowell, Marcy, King, and probably "Baldy" Smith; this was the first time the soldiers had the privilege of seeing a general, and they were much interested in the review, although it was a rainy, miserable day. Then came the drill—squad, company, regimental, brigade and division.

In the mean time a circle of fortifications had to be built around Washington for its safety. There were only

two before the war, and these were at the south end of the Long Bridge, which leads into Virginia, but neither was manned.

Necessarily the army was kept busy and, when not employed at drill, men were put to work on the forts which pressed for completion. King's brigade was marched across the Chain Bridge into Virginia and was first under General Hancock. Here an exciting event occurred. A soldier named Scott, of the 3d Vermont, fell asleep on his picket post, which was supposed to be near the enemy. His commanding officer preferred charges against him; he was court-martialed and sentenced to be shot. He was confined in a little, old log house, perhaps a smoke house, only a few rods from where the 19th Indiana lay. He was a short, thick-set boy, of somewhat stolid disposition, though an honest, noble youth. Being new to the service, it was very exciting to see a soldier bound hand and foot while preparations were being made for his execution. Finally the hour came to remove him to the place where he was to be shot. Lieut. D. B. Castle, Co. B, 19th Indiana, had charge of the guard. Young Scott was taken out, seated upon his coffin, with his hands clasping a Testament. Three sides of a hollow square were formed. The charge and findings of the court-martial, as well as the order for his execution, were read. The guns were handed to the guard, half of them being loaded, so that no one knew whether he was to fire a blank cartridge or a ball. The order was given to "shoulder arms," and in less than a minute more he would have been in eternity. In the mean time a devoted sister had come from Vermont to plead with the President for her brother's life. President Lincoln was not the man to turn a deaf ear to the maiden's prayer. He listened favorably and signed a reprieve, which was given to a courier mounted on a fleet horse. When the order was given to the guard "shoulder arms!" the head of the courier's horse could just be seen coming up the hill. He was forcing the animal to its

utmost speed, and it seemed as if he came like a bird through the air. Thousands of soldiers were standing looking on in breathless silence. The officers seeing the courier coming so rapidly delayed the execution until his arrival; he came into the square on a "dead run," and stopped his horse in a manner that might have led to a tragedy. Taking from beneath his belt a large envelope, he handed it to an officer, when the President's pardon was read. The prisoner was instantly released, and many, including the officers, very cordially shook hands with him, and not a few shed tears of joy. He was granted a leave of absence, and returned home with his loving and delighted sister to Vermont.

This event created quite a sensation throughout the country. Scott promised Lincoln that he would be a good soldier, and he was the first in the works at Williamsburg, where he gave up his life that the nation might live. Gen. George J. Stannard, then lieutenant colonel of the regiment, frequently told me that Scott ought not to have been court-martialed, and that the colonel was not justified in preferring charges against him.

The next incident of any moment was a reconnoissance toward Lewinsville by Lieutenant Colonel Stannard. McClellan directed him to reconnoiter the enemy's position and report to him. The enemy met us with five batteries, and for new troops, unaccustomed to war, it was an important event. In fact, the firing became so heavy that several regiments were sent out, the 19th Indiana being among the number, this being the first time that regiment was under fire. McClellan came from Washington, fearing that it would result in a general engagement, as Longstreet was in command of the Confederate forces.

King's brigade was then moved lower down the Potomac, and built and garrisoned Fort Baker, named in honor of Colonel Baker, a Senator from California. Colonel Baker exhibited true patriotism. While others went to the bat-

tlefield to fight their way to the Senate, he left the Senate to assist in saving his country.

McDowell soon moved his headquarters to Arlington, and King's brigade recrossed the Potomac at the Chain Bridge, and marched to that place, where he made his quarters for the winter, and created the famous cemetery on part of the Lee estate by the interment of the soldiers of that brigade, several of whom died there. The first soldier buried at Arlington was laid to rest on the bank of the ravine, opposite where George Washington Parke Custis and his wife were buried.

The next important service was preparing the field for McClellan's grand review near Bailey's Cross Roads. That was done by King's brigade, under the immediate supervision of McDowell.

An amusing though somewhat startling incident occurred on the afternoon before the review. The brigade had been marching from Arlington for several days. The soldiers complained of the weight of the cartridge boxes; therefore tacit permission was given them to remove the cartridges. McDowell had the brigade marched in review before him, in order that he might ascertain, as he alleged, whether the field was adapted for the review of 120,000 troops the next day.

After the brigade had performed that service, and "stacked arms," the enemy's artillery attacked the picket line, perhaps a mile and a half away. General McDowell ordered General King to take his brigade to the assistance of the picket line at the front. Then came the "tug of war." There was no dodging the fact that the brigade was without ammunition. General McDowell gave the order to General King in the presence of the troops.

General King turned to the colonels and repeated the order. Lieut. Col. Lucius Fairchild — afterwards commander-in-chief of the G. A. R. — studied a moment, then replied to General King, "I am informed that the 2d Wisconsin is without ammunition." Immediately the colonels

of the 6th and 7th Wisconsin, and the 19th Indiana, made a similar report. General King appeared displeased, though I believe he knew it, but could not, of course, at the time confess it.

General McDowell was in a great rage, and ordered the brigade to quarters with a sharp rebuke, and sent a staff officer post haste for Augur's brigade, which came forward at a double quick. We passed them not far from the cross-roads. They were simply swearing mad at us, and did not hesitate to express themselves as they passed.

General Johnston had serious intentions of interfering with the review, but upon the approach of Augur's brigade his force retired, and quiet was restored along the lines.

McClellan had taken command of the Army of the Potomac shortly after the disaster of Bull Run; the country had been waiting with bated breath to hear of a forward movement, hoping that a crushing defeat of the enemy would be the result, but that feverish hope was destined to receive a terrible chill.

McClellan wanted to learn the strength of the enemy at Leesburg, and accordingly, on the 19th of October General McCall, who commanded the Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered to make a reconnoissance on Dranesville, to assist in shielding the move on Leesburg. In the afternoon Gorman's brigade was sent to Edwards' Ferry to make a display of his force there, while Colonel Devens, with the 15th Massachusetts, was sent to Harrison's Landing on the Potomac. He sent out a scouting party which reported a small encampment near Leesburg. Colonel Devens was ordered to take five companies, cross the river, advance under cover of the night, surprise the enemy at daybreak, and destroy their camp. When he arrived he was unable to find the camp as reported. He therefore concealed his men in the woods, as he knew the enemy was near. About eight o'clock in the morning the enemy discovered his position, and he retired in the direction of Balls Bluff, but again advanced in the direction of Leesburg.

Colonel Evans, who was in command of the Confederates, was a skillful military officer; it was he who bore the brunt of Hunter's advance at Bull Run. He presumed, in all probability, that Colonel Devens had no means by which to recross the Potomac, and that he was in a trap unless well supported. He accordingly advanced with four regiments—one thrown forward to feel the way.

In the mean time General Stone, whose headquarters were at Poolesville, Maryland, had directed Colonel Baker to assume command there. Baker, knowing that Gorman was at Edwards' Ferry, decided to risk an attack, but as there was no concert of action on the part of the Federal forces, he received no assistance, and the result was a terrible disaster to our troops. Baker fell mortally wounded, which greatly disheartened his men, who retreated down the bluff, only to be followed by the enemy, where no resistance could be offered. By this time the four Confederate regiments were lined along the bluff, pouring a well-aimed and deadly fire into the remnant of Colonel Baker's troops, who rushed into the few imperfect boats, which were filled but to sink and drown the occupants. Some attempted to swim the river, but at that point the current was so swift that many met a watery grave. The few who succeeded in reaching the Maryland shore of the Potomac presented a sad sight indeed. "It was perfectly sickening," said a soldier to me, "to see our men suffer from the fire of the enemy on the other shore."

The news was received in Washington with mortification and chagrin and the excitement over the disaster was at fever heat.

Senator Sumner was seriously opposed to Gen. Charles P. Stone, and perhaps his influence greatly determined the Government to imprison him in Fort La Fayette, as accountable for this disaster, as General McClellan kept silent on the subject. The battle at Balls Bluff was a heavy blow to the Union cause. It was not a defeat but a disaster.


The eyes of the country were now fixed on the Army of

the Potomac. Time wore away, but no forward movement was made. Finally McClellan was taken sick, which had a depressing effect upon the troops and upon the country financially. Lincoln became so distressed that he went to McClellan's house to see him, but the general was too unwell to be seen, therefore the President was denied an interview. Alarmed at the condition matters were in the President sent notes to Generals McDowell and Franklin, asking them if they could safely leave their commands to come to the White House that evening at eight o'clock.

Seward, Chase, and the Assistant Secretary of War were there, beside Generals McDowell and Franklin. It was evident, from what McDowell told me, that the President was greatly troubled over the situation of affairs; but the simple fact that he called McDowell and Franklin to the White House for consultation was abundant evidence that he was seriously alarmed.

General McDowell said he advised advancing again in the direction of Bull Run. He also recommended that the army be divided into four corps. He had four divisions at Bull Run, and suggested that the right should rest near Vienna, the center at Fairfax Court House, the left at Fairfax Station. It was McDowell's opinion that that was the route to follow. He said Franklin favored approaching Richmond by the way of the Peninsula. As no decision had been reached, the President arranged that the consultation should be renewed the following evening. The next morning McDowell and Franklin called upon Secretary Chase, Colonel Kingsbury, Chief of Ordnance of the Army of the Potomac, General Van Vliet, Chief Quartermaster, and Major Shiras, Commissary of Subsistence, for information to be laid before the Executive.

It occurred to General Franklin that they, McDowell and himself, ought to report to McClellan the nature of the work in which they were engaged. To that McDowell dissented and urged that they were obeying the orders of the President, the Commander-in-Chief. Finally they agreed



GEN. S. VAN VLIET.

to obtain the views of Secretary Chase, which was done, and they received a decision, which accorded with McDowell's, "that as they were ordered by the President to do that work, there was no necessity for reporting to McClellan."

In the evening Postmaster General Blair came in. He was decidedly opposed to the "McDowell forward movement," and intimated that it would be "Bull Run" over again. He advocated making the York River or Fortress Monroe the base of operation. His favorite idea was for our army to move to Suffolk. That would cut off Norfolk, and endanger the enemy's southern communication.

Secretaries Chase and Seward favored McDowell's plan. They were of the opinion that a victory at one place was as valuable as at another, and that it would take considerable time to reach Suffolk. General Meigs thought it would take from four to six weeks to get the transportation ready. As yet there was nothing definite decided upon. Each line had strong and earnest advocates. It was evident from McDowell's statements that Lincoln reserved his judgment.

In a day or two McClellan was well enough to again assume command, and on the 13th of January there was another consultation at the White House, which was attended by General McClellan. It was then that he became aware of all that had transpired, which was a strong intimation that he must make a forward movement soon. At last, March 10, 1862, the day fixed for McClellan to advance, dawned upon the world; and early that morning the columns were ready to move. Nothing unusual occurred until we arrived at Fairfax Court House. There McClellan with several generals held a short consultation as they sat mounted. It was a novel spectacle to see a consultation of war held on horseback, and it inspired the troops with fresh hopes that the war would soon be over.

After a short halt that magnificent army again took up its line of march with quickened step; the men expecting to meet the enemy and crush him in a single battle on the

following morning. Such was the faith which sustained their courage.

The troops commenced going into camp shortly after leaving the historic village of Fairfax Court House, which was nothing in comparison with the large and wealthy cities of the North, as there were so few houses around it. There is where Lord Fairfax lived and George Washington transacted business, events which gave it its historic interest, even antedating the Revolution.

It was soon learned that the enemy had evacuated his position and retreated behind the Rappahannock, and the long-expected battle was deferred.

Great disappointment ensued, as the larger part of the army had sacrificed comfortable homes, and left lucrative business to go to ruin for the sake of defending the Union.

After an absence of five days McClellan marched his force back in the direction of Washington. What this act meant was shrouded in mystery.

Soon a heavy rain began, one of the worst which veterans ever experienced in the service, and continued all that day and well into the night. The next day, Sunday, found the whole army hovering around Alexandria. Then word came that McClellan would advance by way of the Peninsula, to save his troops from marching, for which consideration he received great credit; but in less than a week the men would not have complained of any route to Richmond.

The excitement of sailing down the Potomac and on the Chesapeake was thrilling beyond degree. The ground where the British armies were defeated in the Revolution was to be the scene of another conflict between two great armies. But Washington was to be protected, and McDowell's command, the First Corps, was designated to remain. On the 12th of March, 1862, the President relieved McClellan as commander-in-chief, and assigned him to the command of the Army of the Potomac. The next day, the 13th, the First Corps was officially designated, and McDowell assigned to the command of it. It was composed of

three divisions, Franklin's, McCall's and King's, and he was ordered to report direct to the War Department. As McClellan had decided to take the Peninsular route, he could not protect Washington, so McDowell was given an independent command for that purpose to be directly under the orders of the Secretary of War. The first natural military line being the Rappahannock, McDowell was directed to proceed to Fredericksburg, make his headquarters there, and picket the river to prevent a flank movement by General Anderson's force in his front, which was also acting as a corps of observation to prevent McDowell from uniting with McClellan's right and closing in on the city of Richmond. Occasionally a force would be sent out to feel of the enemy and ascertain its whereabouts; yet there was nothing of great importance the corps did until it was ordered to join Pope at Cedar Mountain; then began its great work on the battlefield, lasting until the surrender of the Confederate army at Appomattox. It was a difficult matter to keep so constant and vigilant a watch day and night of so extended a front. Its position on the Rappahannock was highly necessary to protect Washington, which the Confederates were eager to take, for two reasons: first, it would give them possession of the great military stores, of which they were so much in need, and dishearten the people of the Northern States who were loyal to the Union; likewise it would have been a plausible excuse for foreign recognition of the Southern Confederacy, which, as yet, was not acknowledged as a nation, only an attempted revolution to form one. Then, again, but for the First Corps holding the Rappahannock, McClellan could not have made the Peninsular campaign. It was a sore disappointment to the First Corps not to be allowed to accompany McClellan, but McDowell started for Fredericksburg, to hold the line of the Rappahannock.

McDowell was said to be able to "safely cover Washington from Fredericksburg." He could cover Washington from that position and aid McClellan, if an opportunity

was presented, which was seriously contemplated, and greatly feared by the enemy ; in order to prevent such support by McDowell, Jackson made a raid into the valley, slashing everything before him, as if he was in earnest in trying to capture Washington.

McDowell really advanced as far as Bowling Green, only twenty-seven miles from McClellan's right, under Porter. Lincoln fully intended to assist McClellan with McDowell's command, having due regard to the safety of Washington ; he gave him Franklin's division, which was a magnificent body of men, composed of four brigades.

Slocum commanded the 5th Maine, 16th and 27th New York and the 96th Pennsylvania. The personnel of the brigade was excellent, exhibiting conspicuous gallantry which, perhaps, increased the fame of its commander.

Phil. Kearny commanded the First New Jersey Brigade, composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th New Jersey Regiments, which imbibed at once their commander's military spirit, as all through the war that brigade marched only to the sound of battle, seeking the hottest parts of the contest, until their decimated ranks were relieved by the close of the action. The State should present a medal to the survivors of the brigade, stamped with the impress of the hero of Cherubusco and Chantilly.

General Newton commanded the 18th, 31st, and 32d New York, and the 95th Pennsylvania Regiments. These were made up of the best citizens of the Empire and Keystone States. If Slocum and Kearny were ever in a fight, Newton and his brigade could be depended upon to arrive and contest for the first fire.

The President again robbed the corps to aid McClellan when Fredericksburg had been reached. This time the Pennsylvania Reserves were withdrawn, but they were welcomed back again shortly after the Seven Days' fight, under the command of that model soldier, Gen. John F. Reynolds, who soon prepared to take an important part in the second battle of Bull Run.

In addition to the President taking two divisions of the First Corps to send to McClellan on the Peninsula, the following letters breathe the spirit of true friendship on the part of the great man who sat in the White House during that trying and perilous period. If McClellan had enemies, or those who were opposed to him, Lincoln was not one of them. The simplicity of his noble character is fully portrayed in these letters:—

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 23, 1862.

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment of infantry, two companies of cavalry, and putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridge across the two banks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges?

McDowell and Shields both say they can and positively will move Monday morning. I wish you to move continuously and safely. You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatches to us on the 21st.

A. LINCOLN,

Maj. Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.

President.

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 24—6:24 p. m.

In consequence of General Banks' critical condition, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy is making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Frémont's force and part of General McDowell's on their rear.

A. LINCOLN,

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

President.

Again, he more fully telegraphed McClellan :

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 25, 1862.

Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely, crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed on to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout.

Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is near Front Royal, with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks, also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare as we are here, we will do all we can to prevent their crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces marching back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg, both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear. One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry, the rest of his force remains for the present at Fredericksburg.

We are sending such regiments and batteries from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry to supply their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We have also eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation. If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensive of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, have always been my reasons for withholding McDowell's force from you.

Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.

A. LINCOLN,
President.

Major General McCLELLAN.

How kindly he talks to McClellan, even gave Shields to McDowell, to swell his command to assist him before Richmond.



GEN. W. S. ROSECRANS.

Blenker's division had been withdrawn from McClellan, and ordered to Frémont.

General Rosecrans was ordered to Washington, and he was directed by the Secretary of War to take Blenker's division to its destination, and while he was there to see General Banks, and make such suggestions as he deemed of advantage to the service.

After looking over the situation of the different commands, it occurred to General Rosecrans that if they were all united in one, including McDowell's, it would make an army of about 85,000. It could then in a short time sweep down to Gordonsville, where it could unite with McClellan's right, and blockade the entrance to the Shenandoah Valley, which would then be in their rear. General Rosecrans called upon General Banks and told him of the idea. He at once agreed with Rosecrans, and hoped it would be done, and added, "It makes no difference to me who commands."

General Rosecrans sent the plan to Secretary Stanton, who replied, "It is now too late to adopt it;" which answer admitted the excellence of the proposed military movement.

As McDowell advanced on Fredericksburg he attempted to surprise the enemy—perhaps for various reasons—to save the bridge over the Rappahannock, and capture their stores before the dawn of day. The Harris Light and the 3d Indiana Cavalry were followed closely by the 14th Brooklyn Infantry, and Battery B, of the 4th U. S. Artillery. A cavalryman stated that the 14th Brooklyn Infantry kept well up with the cavalry, which was marching splendidly.

The night advance was anticipated, and a barricade was made across the road, some two miles northeast of Falmouth, which is a little town almost opposite Fredericksburg on the east of the river. The cavalry charged, and were thrown into confusion for a moment, when they struck the obstruction. The enemy were in the woods close by, and poured in a well-directed fire upon the cavalry in the road, but were compelled to beat a hasty retreat in the direction of Falmouth.

They had prepared the bridges for destruction, and when the Union forces arrived, early in the morning, it was only to find that the wagon bridge leading over from Falmouth, the railroad bridge, and several steamboats in the river, were all burning at the same time. But McDowell's advance was not materially checked, as pontoon bridges were put down, over which a whole army could cross. The corps remained there for some time. The railroad bridge was rebuilt, and the railroad to Brooks' station, at Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, was repaired and put in running order.

While at Fredericksburg, on the Fourth of July, an amusing incident occurred in the 2d Wisconsin. The boys had resolved to have some fun. They organized a plan to capture the officers' coats, which were to be donned by a full set of new ones for the occasion. It was not long until they appeared in regular uniforms. Then the regular officers were all arrested and compelled to do police duty. They all submitted gracefully except one. The quartermaster took umbrage at it, and refused to be arrested. Lucius Fairchild was the lieutenant colonel. He took it quite good naturedly, and worked well. Gen. Rufus King was greatly taken with the joke, and said that if he had known it he would have permitted them to capture his coat, sword and sash, and permitted them to arrest him; but he would not take off his coat on purpose.

The only time General Bragg (then major of the 6th Wisconsin) went to church was one Sunday while in Fredericksburg; he was accompanied by Captain Marsh. The usher invited them into the gallery; Bragg looked up and saw none but colored people there. Said he to the usher: "The gallery is for 'niggers,' ain't it?" The usher answered in the affirmative. "Well," said Bragg, "show me the minister's pew." That frightened the usher, so that he at once conveyed them to the dominie's reserved seats, and the two officers sat there and listened to the service and greatly enjoyed it, as the guests of the pastor.

New combinations were forming, and the corps ex-

pected hot work. There had been so many disasters in front of Washington and on the Shenandoah, that the President resolved to bring a general from the West, who had been very successful every time he met the enemy, and place him in command. He was a personal friend of the President, and had accompanied him to Washington when he came to be inaugurated. So General Pope was given a command, with powers similar to those suggested by General Rosecrans, though Frémont's command was not included.

Pope saw that Gordonsville was a great military key to the Confederates, and he at once advanced in that direction, with Banks, followed closely by Ricketts' division of the First Corps. King's division, at Fredericksburg, was ordered to join the main body at Culpeper. McDowell's headquarters were at Fredericksburg, and he rode with the division on the forced march.

Before reaching his destination, however, Banks had marched some distance beyond Culpeper, where he was met by Jackson, who was aware that General Hatch had been ordered to Gordonsville to tear up the railroad track. Jackson had advanced in the direction of Culpeper to checkmate Hatch's move, who, having only a brigade, stopped at Madison Court House on learning that Jackson was at Gordonsville with his whole corps.

When the forces under Banks and Jackson suddenly faced each other, both generals prepared for battle. Banks, as Governor of Massachusetts and as Speaker of the House of Representatives, had a national reputation before the war. His unfortunate assignment to the Shenandoah, where so many disastrous raids had been made by a superior force under Jackson, chafed him, and he was aching for a favorable chance to face the enemy on a fair field. Hence, when he met Jackson at Cedar Mountain, he at once resolved to make a stubborn fight.

Men who were engaged in the battle said: "Banks was present everywhere on the field, cheering the men. At

one place he rode his horse in the line of battle. It greatly nerved the men to see such courage in their commander, and the result was they fought and really worsted double their number under Jackson."

The Comte de Paris says that it was in truth a victory for the Federal side. The Union forces fought with such desperation that, in order to keep his line from breaking, Jackson had to rush on the field at the head of his old troops.

Augur and Geary were both wounded and General Prince was taken prisoner. Col. James A. Tait, of Washington City, commanded a brigade on the extreme left of the Union line, where he greatly distinguished himself for coolness and bravery.

Ricketts hearing the battle, pressed forward with his splendid division to assist Banks, "but the contest was ended when he arrived," says the Comte de Paris. About one o'clock that night King's division arrived on the battlefield ready for work. Sigel was there also, and had begged permission to lead the attack in the morning.

Every command was ready by the dawn of day, but as the fog cleared up, and the site of the enemy's former position could be seen, there were no troops in view. Jackson had received such a pounding from Banks that he was glad to avail himself of the night to escape, and sent in a flag of truce asking hostilities to cease until the dead could be buried.

As this chapter is made up of miscellaneous incidents which occurred, and is not intended to be a regular narrative, some Confederate matters are here given.

Being one evening in company with General Heth, I asked him what was the cause of the coolness between Jeff. Davis and Joseph E. Johnston? He said: "It originally began when General Jessup died. Davis wanted Floyd to appoint Albert Sydney Johnson quartermaster general, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of General Jessup. Joseph E. Johnston was successful in his efforts to succeed

Jessup. Then, when the Confederate Congress provided for five generals, Davis appointed them in the following order: S. Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnson, R. E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnston. The latter was the quartermaster general in the United States Army when the war began; S. Cooper was colonel and adjutant general; Albert Sidney Johnson was colonel, and R. E. Lee was lieutenant colonel of cavalry. Putting Johnston fourth greatly displeased him, and he expressed his dissatisfaction to Davis very plainly. Davis replied that as quartermaster general he had no power outside of that department, and declined to rectify it.

"It was evident he was not held in high esteem by Mr. Davis, for I was tendered his command in the west by the President; but some of the Senators objected to me on the ground that I was a Virginian, and there were so many Virginians occupying prominent places in the army—Lee was in command of the largest and most important army in the Confederacy. I did not want it, and Hood of Tennessee succeeded Johnston.

"That reminds me that one day Davis sent for me and said: 'Heth, how much rank do you think you can stand?' I replied: 'I do not think I can stand very much.' He then said: 'I was thinking of giving you command of the troops west of the Mississippi, in place of Price.' The western Senators learning of it, raised an objection to me on account of my being so young. They did not want Price removed. As I did not want the place, I went to the Secretary of War, and said: 'Mr. Secretary, I do not desire to supersede Price in his command, and I hope my name will not be further considered in connection with it.'

"That ended the matter, and I remained with Lee's army."

CHAPTER V.

SECOND BULL RUN.

AFTER the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a great rebuff to Jackson, who, with double the number of troops, compelled Banks to retire his line; but the stubborn resistance made by the Federals, and with Ricketts and Sigel on the field ready to renew the conflict in the morning, made it advisable for him to retire behind the Rapidan, or, perhaps, to draw Pope on. Ricketts came up just as the battle was closing, and his troops were engaged a short time. Jackson then retired to Gordonsville, and called for more troops, while Lee was greatly perplexed as to what military move was to be executed. Was it a wily deception on the part of the Federals for Pope to boldly throw his army forward to Culpeper, as if threatening Richmond from that direction—while McClellan would pretend to retreat, and then, if Lee supported Jackson with any material numbers, and weakened the force at Richmond—so that McClellan could suddenly head his columns for Richmond, and either capture the Confederate officers or compel them to fly for safety?

General Pleasonton found the forces around Richmond so weakened, when Lee was sending troops to reënforce Jackson against Pope, after the former was hurled back on Gordonsville, when the battle of Cedar Mountain was fought, that he dare not advance, and therefore Pleasonton wrote the following letter to Gen. R. B. Marcy, chief of staff:

GENERAL:—Your note of this date received. There are moments when the most decided action is necessary to save us from great disaster. I think such a moment has arrived. The enemy before us

is weak. A crushing blow by this army at this time would be invaluable to disconcert the troops of the enemy to the north of us. That blow can be made in forty-eight hours. Two corps would do it, and be in position to go whenever they may be ordered by that time.

From all I can learn there are not 36,000 men between this and Richmond, nor do I believe they can get more before we can whip them. I have guides ready, and know the roads sufficiently well to accomplish anything the general wants.

I write this as a friend. I shall willingly carry out the general's orders, be they what they may, but I think he has an opportunity at this time few men ever attain. Destroy this, and whatever I have said shall not be repeated by me.

Very truly yours, A. PLEASANTON.

This remarkable letter is dated Haxall's, August 11, 1862. It is published on page 369 in the third part of volume eleven of the "Rebellion Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies." It must have been sent to the War Department with the papers of General Marcy, as it was out of Pleasanton's possession, and by him requested to be destroyed.

General Pleasanton was in Washington. I called on him, and asked him if the light of a quarter of a century still supported that letter of his. He said most assuredly, and more clearly now than then.

McClellan telegraphed it to Halleck the next day at four o'clock p.m., but these two generals were not in hearty accord; they distrusted each other, and Halleck made no response to him. It has been suggested to me by a prominent officer, that if Pleasanton had sent his dispatch direct to Halleck he would have ordered an advance on Richmond.

From the following correspondence it is plain that Lee was apprehensive of that move:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
August 12, 1862.

GENERAL:—It is reported to these headquarters that the enemy is advancing by the way of Malvern Hill. General Lee directs me to say that he desires you to proceed at once to New Market, and

make such disposition of your troops as may be necessary to oppose the enemy and drive him back.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. L. LONG,

Colonel and Military Secretary.

Maj. Gen. G. W. SMITH, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

August 13, 1862.

GENERAL:—Having received information that Burnside's forces have left Fredericksburg to join Pope, unless you know to the contrary I desire you to march at once with your command to Gordonsville and report to General Longstreet.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

Brig. Gen. JOHN B. HOOD, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS NEAR RICHMOND, VA.,

August 14, 1862.

GENERAL:—Your letter of this date received. From every indication it appears that McClellan's forces on the James River are being withdrawn and sent to reënforce Pope. Under these circumstances I think it will be necessary to withdraw R. H. Anderson's division from Drewry's Bluff and send it in the direction of Gordonsville. Colonel Gibbs' regiment and the 57th North Carolina, Col. H. C. Jones, had better be ordered for the present to that point. In case Anderson is removed these troops will serve for the defense of Drewry's Bluff; and since they are new, they can be drilled and accustomed to camp, &c.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, Secretary of War.

It is quite plain that Pleasonton was right.

Had our army advanced and captured Richmond and liberated our prisoners confined in Libby and Belle Isle, it would have been a great victory. McClellan would have been in Lee's fortifications and in a position to cut off his supplies from the South. If he could not have followed Lee, he could have held Richmond and destroyed the railroad between Gordonsville and Lynchburg, the only way for relief from the southwest.

Pope and Burnside had within a few thousand as many men as Lee. So, if Lee had paid no attention to McClellan's occupying Richmond in his rear, and marched for Washington, with Pope and Burnside in his front, it would have taken him ten days or more to force his way there.

There were 12,000 troops at Harper's Ferry; Washington and Baltimore could have added 10,000 more; then our army in front of Washington would have lacked 13,000 of being equal in numbers to Lee's, with Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Harrisburg, and Cincinnati to draw from to make up that difference, with over a week to do it in.

Besides, McClellan could have sent a corps to Washington and still held Richmond, as the fortifications around Richmond were equal to 20,000 troops.

But it was thought advisable to withdraw McClellan from the Peninsula, and unite the two armies in front of Washington, with the Rappahannock as the line.

There were enough of McClellan's men who never fired a gun at the Second Bull Run to have captured Richmond and held it. Franklin and Sumner never reached the field.


Pope had camped on the battlefield of Cedar Mountain ever since the battle on the 9th. Why, no one could tell. The stench was very offensive from the dead horses; and the Confederate dead were scarcely covered up in many instances, although they were supposed to have been buried under a flag of truce. Jackson sent in a flag for the purpose of burying their dead; with all the advantage in our favor, the proposition for hostilities to cease until the dead could be buried was agreed to. If Jackson had been granted the same advantage on the second morning that Pope had, there would have been more dead to bury before that solemn act was performed. In other words, Jackson never stopped for anything when he had a chance to win a victory. The battlefield was full of soldiers from both armies while the dead were being buried. The Confederate soldiers repeatedly said that the next evening they expected

to eat their supper in Culpeper; a genteel way of boasting that they expected to win the next battle. During the suspension of hostilities the two armies lay almost two miles apart, concealed in the woods. When the truce expired, and our army advanced, there was no enemy there. Ricketts' division moved forward to the Rapidan, and marched up the river for some distance in the direction of Gordonsville. Captain Smith, of the 97th New York, said: "One night the colonel called the officers aside and said to them, 'We are in a trap, and must retire quietly;' and then added, 'Give your commands in a low tone until we get out of this.'"

Jackson had been reënforced by Longstreet, and they were weaving a net around Ricketts; but he was too wary an officer to be caught that way. Sigel's command followed Ricketts to the front. Pope was notified of the advance of Longstreet and Jackson by a staff officer, who returned from Ricketts and Sigel. No doubt Pope had his reasons for remaining on the field. I heard him remark "that it was twenty-six miles before we would be under McClellan." That would indicate that at that time the orders to McClellan might be revoked, and both generals push on to Richmond.

Three days' rations were cooked and served for a forward movement. A letter of Lee's had been captured, giving all the information regarding the disposition of their commands, with the probable strength of each. Such letters are frequently lost purposely, to mislead the enemy. It is certain that Pope did not act on that letter at once, as it was captured on the 16th. Our cooked rations came in good on the retreat to the Rappahannock, whither we started very soon, without stopping on the way to gather daisies and sweet williams; we left them for the country maidens and children of that region.

Pope crossed the Rappahannock on the left side, and placed his army as follows: McDowell at Rappahannock Ford; Banks at Rappahannock Station; Reno at Kelly's



GEN. FRANZ SIGEL.

Ford on the left; and Sigel on the extreme right. Such was the position of Pope's army when he faced again to confront the advancing foe. The majority of McClellan's troops were to land at Aquia Creek, on the Potomac, twelve miles north of Fredericksburg, where Burnside was then in command. From Aquia Creek they could be conveyed by rail to Fredericksburg, where they would take the route up the Rappahannock; the last command all the time serving as Pope's left.

This was a dangerous move; the line was entirely too long, reaching from Fredericksburg to Sulphur Springs, opposite Warrenton; the line was weak and liable to be pierced at any point by either Longstreet or Jackson; but that was the plan decided upon by Halleck, and orders from him had to be obeyed. He was managing the battle from his office at Washington. It was frequently observed by military men that he ought to take command in person on the field.

On the 21st the forces of Longstreet and Jackson lined the right bank of the Rappahannock. Soon cannonading commenced, and was continued for some time, but no strong attempt was made to cross the river. There were one or two advances, as if they intended to force a passage, but subsequent events proved that they were simply feeling our position. On the 22d Longstreet extended his lines up the river to cover the space which Jackson occupied the day before, Jackson having already begun his flank movement of Pope's army. At Hazel River Milroy attacked his rear, but did not delay him much. Finding Freeman's Ford well guarded, he passed on to Waterloo Bridge, where only a light guard was posted; this was brushed aside by General Early, who crossed to the same side with Pope, who had anticipated that move, and really welcomed it, for he wanted a part of their forces to get far enough over to crush them before they could receive assistance.

In the mean time Pope changed his mind, and was going

to cross to the right side of the Rappahannock and attack Longstreet while Jackson was seeking a crossing higher up the river. He thought there were enough troops coming from Washington to take care of Jackson, as Halleck had written him on the 21st: "Do your best to keep possession of the Rappahannock. To-morrow large reenforcements. Defend every inch of ground; fight like the devil until we can reenforce you. In forty-eight hours you shall have all the troops you want."

On the night of the 22d a terrible storm raged in that part of the State. The Rappahannock is a short river at best, and the two armies lay at the foot of the mountains on either side of the river, so that in a few hours the rushing torrents from the mountain sides began to swell the quiet little river into a roaring stream of power and force. It struck the Waterloo Bridge and swept it away; which left Early in a bad predicament. He could neither get back, nor could they assist him. If Pope could grapple him before the river fell he would have been captured; but Pope had arranged his forces with reference to crossing the river and attacking Longstreet; so it took some time to countermand the orders and have them march on Early. Sigel was ordered to Waterloo Bridge to cut off his retreat, or prevent any assistance being rendered him by Jackson. Reno and Banks were to closely follow him, while McDowell and Reynolds were ordered to Waterloo.

Sigel had the hardest part of the work to perform, as his route was parallel with the river, and he was compelled to cross its tributaries, which were so swollen that it greatly retarded his progress. Jackson knew Early's perilous position, and hastily constructed a trestle bridge, by which communication was reestablished between the forces during the night, and at daybreak Early recrossed the river.

Buford arrived there a few hours later, only to meet with a sad disappointment. But there was a superabundance of that on hand during that campaign. It was just then learned that Stuart was at Catletts Station, and had

captured General Pope's papers, which contained information valuable to the enemy. It sent a shudder through our forces, for there seemed to be lurking in every move some disaster to our armies. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad had to furnish our supplies, and Stuart, as a matter of course, would tear up the track, and destroy the telegraph, leaving us completely cut off from Washington. It was a gloomy state of affairs, yet the soldiers kept in good spirits, hoping for the best.

We were yet holding on to the line of the Rappahannock with powerful tenacity, anxiously looking for the promised reinforcements Halleck said would arrive within forty-eight hours.

The Rappahannock was still very high, and the artillery of both armies kept up a constant fire without producing any material results.

On the 24th, Pope's command was as follows: Sigel at Waterloo Bridge, with Banks on his left; Reno at Sulphur Springs, Ricketts was east of Waterloo Bridge, and King was near Sulphur Springs. Porter's corps was marching up the river from Fredericksburg, while Heintzelman, who landed on the 22d at Alexandria, sent forward Kearny's division to Manassas by rail. The next day the remainder of his corps, and a division under General Sturgis, followed Kearny.

The Stuart raid, in Pope's rear, caused great consternation; the trains were cautiously run, fearing at any time to suffer from Stuart's removing a rail to wreck and capture them.

Jackson was aware of the great alarm that Stuart had caused, and knew his cavalry would be defeated if met by the Federal forces; he therefore hurried forward to assist in the great destruction in Pope's rear, following the Hedgeman River (the Rappahannock assumes that name above Waterloo) until he reached Hinson's Ford, where he crossed and passed through Orleans.

The range of the Bull Run Mountains lay between him

and the Federal forces, though he was much farther in the direction of Washington, and twenty miles from Thoroughfare Gap, which was the nearest place he could cross the mountain. It is a great wonder that Halleck did not send a division forward from Washington to block that gap, knowing how passionately fond Jackson was of such military moves. McClellan's troops were already arriving, and his work must be done at once. Jackson took his infantry across fields, through woods, and bypaths, pushing forward as rapidly to the front as possible, his soldiers eating their scanty rations while marching.

The artillery and the wagons were left to come up as best they could, there being no enemy in or near the gap, it made no difference where the artillery was.

Passing through the gap unmolested he took the shortest route to reach the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which was the feeder of Pope's army. What damage Stuart hastily did it he feared would soon be repaired and of little consequence.

Pope was not aware that Jackson, with his entire corps, was directly between him and Washington. The water of the Rappahannock was falling, and Pope feared an attack from Longstreet, who could then cross the river.

On the evening of the 24th he decided to form a line of battle along the railroad, with Aquia Creek at his back, in order that reinforcements could reach him either from Alexandria or Fredericksburg. The order was not delivered to Sigel correctly, and he remained at Waterloo all day of the 25th. In the evening he learned that all the rest of Pope's army had moved, and that he was occupying an isolated position, so he made a night march, and joined McDowell at Warrenton.

Pope now fully aware that Jackson was in his rear, destroying his line of communication with Washington and attempting to prevent troops from joining him from the Capital, decided to march on him at once, before Longstreet could form a junction, which was now evident that he

would attempt, by taking the same route through Thoroughfare Gap. The order was given for the different commands to fall back in the direction of Washington.

The pike running through Thoroughfare Gap and crossing the railroad at Gainesville, which connects with a road leading to Warrenton, made it the strategic point on the Second Bull Run battlefield. If Pope had captured and held that point it would have prevented Longstreet from joining Jackson, who was posted along and behind the old railroad bed which has never been finished to this day.

There was a heavy fall in front of a part of his line; while immediately on the right of the fall was a deep cut, making a splendid position for defense, and which could not be assailed without great loss.

The left wing, as it moved north, was commanded by McDowell. Two corps, comprising Sigel's command and his own, composed of three splendid divisions—Ricketts', King's, and Reynolds' (the Pennsylvania Reserves)—had rejoined the corps under the command of General Reynolds.

Kearny and Reno went to Greenwich. Pope came with the right wing, along the railroad, with Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, while Porter was to remain at Warrenton Junction, and was to move forward as soon as Banks came up to relieve him.

Near Bristoe Station, Hooker's division came up with Ewell's division of Jackson's corps. The rear guard of Ewell and the advance of Hooker's forces at once began firing; Hooker heard it, and rapidly rode to where he supposed General Pope was. He soon found Pope with other general officers, and asked him about the firing. Pope said he did not know what forces were engaged. Hooker then said he would ride forward and ascertain. When he came up with his command he at once observed a force of the enemy in his front.

Ewell had resolved to make a stubborn resistance to

Hooker's advance, and soon the battle raged all along Hooker's front with terrific fury.

Pope came forward and witnessed the battle, saying afterwards that it was a grand thing to see General Hooker ride the line on his white horse at almost full speed. It was the first time he had ever met Hooker, and he was greatly impressed with his commanding manner in battle.

Ewell was compelled to retire in the direction of Manassas, where Jackson was resting with the remainder of his corps. That fight took place on the evening of the 27th, and it seems that it had the effect to mislead Pope, he supposing that Jackson would remain at or near Manassas Junction to give him battle, which would give McDowell a chance to encircle him by the way of Gainesville.

Reno and Kearny moved forward from Greenwich, and Porter and Banks followed Hooker. On the 27th McDowell moved north through Warrenton, and encamped about ten o'clock that night at New Baltimore. Ricketts' division had been sent to Thoroughfare Gap, to impede the advance of Longstreet, while McDowell hurried forward to Gainesville, to occupy the key of the field, where the conflict was soon to take place.

King's division started early on the morning of the 28th, and marched steadily all day, until about four o'clock, when it halted to rest and to make coffee. There is no doubt but that while resting there, a Confederate spy dressed as a Federal cavalryman came to the 19th Indiana, and casually made an observation of the strength of the command, then retired as if going to the front, then posted off to the enemy and reported. Only Gibbons' brigade was in sight; the others were shielded from him by woods. He had to make an excuse for coming to us, so he said Jackson was posted just beyond, and that we would soon encounter him. A prominent staff officer of the division has since informed me that we had no cavalry where he came from then. It

was evidently Jackson's intention to fight our commands in detail.

The march was soon resumed in the following order: Hatch led, followed by Gibbon, Doubleday, and Patrick. Hatch drew out first upon the road about half an hour in advance of the other brigades. General Gibbon, with his brigade, had just straightened out on the pike, when the head of Doubleday's column reached the road, and found General Patrick watching a group of horsemen upon a slight elevation, a few hundred yards to the northwest.

After a brief consultation it was decided that they were Confederate officers, taking observations of our position and numbers. They almost instantly opened fire from a battery.

General Gibbon halted his column, faced toward the enemy, and placed his brigade behind the fence, along the pike in the woods. General Doubleday hastened forward, his brigade marching along the pike, until he reached General Gibbon, who informed him that General King, the division commander, not being present, and General Hatch, the ranking brigade commander, a half an hour's march in advance, that he was the senior officer present, and asked what should be done. Doubleday's reply was: "What are the troops opposed to us?" Gibbon said he thought there was a force of cavalry, with a light battery. Lieutenant Brooks, of the 6th Wisconsin, who was then serving on Pope's staff, had just arrived with an order. He and Gibbon had been in consultation before Doubleday rode up, and they were of the impression, as stated above, that the forces were only cavalry and a light battery. The pickets fired on Brooks as he came up the pike to deliver the order.

Doubleday then said to Gibbon: "I think we ought to charge them, but we have officers superior to us on the field and it is for General King or General McDowell to say what shall be done." "Very well," said Gibbon, "give the order, and I will put my brigade in."

General Doubleday accordingly gave the order to charge. Gibbon replied, "By heavens, I will do it," and ordered the 2d Wisconsin in under Colonel O'Conner. I did not know, and Gibbon I think did not know, that McDowell had left the field, and the Iron Brigade, already in line of battle, moved forward like veterans, led by General Gibbon in person. They were immediately engaged with an overwhelming force of the enemy—infantry and artillery. Doubleday's brigade, consisting of three regiments, were ordered by him (Doubleday) to assist Gibbon—the 56th Pennsylvania and 76th New York forming a part of Gibbon's line, while the 95th New York supported Battery B, 4th Regular Artillery. Gibbon sent for Battery B, and posted it on the right of the line, keeping the 95th New York in reserve.

This was one of the most stubborn and sanguinary conflicts of the war, considering the short time the battle lasted.

As the above expression seems pretty strong, I support it by the testimony of a disinterested witness, who has written a work on the late war.

On p. 285, 2d vol., Comte de Paris says: "An artillery battle had just commenced between King and Jackson, when the latter was informed by Stuart that his right flank was not menaced by the enemy at the Gainesville road.

Finding himself then free in his movements, he ordered Ewell to bring his and Taliaferro's divisions to the attack, and to fall upon the flank of the Federals, who were seen marching in column from the other side of the road.

Stuart's brigade of Taliaferro's division, supported by the fire of three batteries, advanced first as skirmishers; but the Federal guns soon silenced those of the Confederates. The other divisions, supported on the left by two of Ewell's brigades, came up to restore the fortunes of the fight. Galantly led by their chiefs, the six brigades rushed furiously upon the two Federal brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday, posted in a large orchard. Both sides defended their positions with great stubbornness; the two Confederate division

commanders were severely wounded. Ewell lost a leg, while charging at the head of his soldiers. The latter, however, despite their efforts and numerical superiority, could not succeed in dislodging their adversaries. Night alone put an end to the battle."

Accepting this statement of a foreigner, who had no jealousies to warp his judgment, it is not only complimentary to Generals Doubleday, and Gibbon, but it gives great credit to their military skill. If every battle had been fought as well, the war would not have lasted so long. They were both artillery officers when the war broke out. Doubleday directed the first gun fired by our batteries at Sumter, in response to the Confederate guns from Charleston; while Gibbon was captain of Battery B, 4th Artillery. When he was promoted to brigadier general, his old battery remained with him, and this is the one the Comte de Paris says, silenced three batteries of the enemy.

Mr. John Johnson, who was a member of the battery, and present in that action, says: "Our cannoneers soon got the range of the enemy's batteries, and poured in an enfilading fire on them until they were silenced."

While Gibbon was captain of the battery, he filled it with recruits from the brigade, which was composed of the 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana.

The officers and men vied with each other in pressing forward when the order was given to charge. Many suggestions were made in the ranks, which from an officer would have been a command. The 19th Indiana was on the extreme left, and suffered terribly from Taliaferro's flank movement. It was a terrible contest. The lines of battle were close enough to do effective work. The regiment held its position until Major May gave Capt. W. W. Dudley, of Company B, an order to take his own and Company G, and charge a battery, which had taken position in advance of their extreme right and a little to the front, so that their fire enfiladed the center and right of the 19th Indiana and the left of the 7th Wisconsin.

When Dudley charged the battery their infantry advanced, and attempted to fill the gap. The regiment greatly felt the loss of those two companies, and swung back a little. In the mean time General Gibbon came over to the left, and assisted Dudley until he got back in line; for he had to force the enemy's infantry back to assume his place in line with the regiment.

General Gibbon tied his sorrel horse to a peach tree limb, examined the ground to our left, and waited for some support to come in on his left from General Patrick, whose brigade lay back beyond the pike, less than half a mile from the battle.

Gibbon's horse became so frightened that he broke loose and ran away, leaving the general in a dangerous and exposed position. Col. Solomon Meredith met with a serious accident in the fight. His horse, "Old Roan," was shot in the neck, and fell on the colonel's leg, but the horn of the saddle saved it. He was taken off of the field by Lieut. Col. A. O. Bachman, and Captain Dudley.*

Capt. L. B. Wilson, of Company E, had no sword, but he led his company into action—standing there with his arms folded, he looked every inch a soldier. Sergt. William E. Murray was wounded in the ankle, which disabled him from active service.

Lieutenants Cook and Newman, of Company C, were both wounded, and the company was taken off the field by Corporal Nelson Pegg.

The 2d Wisconsin sustained heavy losses—74 were killed in the action, as against 43 at Gettysburg, Colonel O'Conner, commanding the regiment, a graduate of West Point, being among the number. That afternoon, when he dismounted to go into battle, I thought I never saw a hand-

* General Patrick informed me at the Dayton Home, after the war, that he declined to put his brigade in there on Gibbon's left, for the reason that he disapproved of Gibbon's making the attack without more consideration and knowledge of the strength of the enemy.

somer man. It was not long before he was mortally wounded, and the command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Fairchild, whose reputation as a soldier and an officer is well known all over the country.

The 6th Wisconsin had hot work. It had not been engaged long when Colonel Cutler was severely wounded, and Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg took command. The regiment was getting a heavy fire from the front and oblique.

Bragg in his report says: "I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of both officers and men during and subsequent to the engagement. It was hardly possible to be placed under a hotter fire, but there was no confusion, no faltering. The regiment fought as brave men only can fight. The wounded went to the rear without a murmur, or died where they fell without a groan. The list of casualties is as follows: Colonel Cutler severely wounded; Lieut. J. B. Johnson, Company E, wounded and a prisoner; Capt. J. F. Marsh, slightly wounded. Enlisted men wounded, 61; killed, 8; missing, 3; total, 72. Total engaged, 504.

"In conclusion, I cannot refrain from referring especially to Corporal John H. Burns, and Private Harry G. Drum, of Company E, and Sergeant William Campbell, Company K, who left the ambulance upon the sound of the first fire, procured muskets and ammunition, and joined the regiment and fought to the last."

The 7th Wisconsin, under Col. W. W. Robinson, did heroic work that afternoon. The valor of the regiment was that day put to the test, and stood it well.

Lieut. Col. Charles Hamilton, who went into the fight mounted, was wounded through the thighs early in the action, but maintained his seat in the saddle with his boots full of blood, and limbs about paralyzed, and had at the close of the engagement to be lifted from his horse, and carried to the hospital in a swooning condition.

The 56th Pennsylvania did valuable service in that engagement. There then occurred a curious incident: the left wing of the brigade had been forced back quite a dis-

tance, and the Confederate right advanced to within a few feet of our first line, where the writer lay wounded. One of our regiments was coming on the field, when the Confederates said: "The 56th Pennsylvania!" and ran back to the position they had previously held. It is said the enemy knew the regiment by Hofmann's voice, which was one of the best in the service.

There were four captains wounded (Captain Corman died), two lieutenants, and 55 enlisted men.

The 76th New York, under Colonel Wainwright, acquitted itself well. Colonel Wainwright threw Captain Grover forward with eight men—Whitney, Knapp, Fox, John W. Seever, Ripley, Moore, Marvin Maynard, and Norman Maynard, as skirmishers.

They advanced a short distance to a fence, close enough to hear the commands given by the enemy, which they communicated to General Doubleday, and the information greatly assisted him in arranging the lines.

This small skirmish line also did another gallant deed; they commenced and kept up a brisk fire on the enemy's line of battle, loading on the ground, and then rising and firing, which was so annoying to the enemy that it drew the fire from the 76th New York.

Judge A. P. Smith, who was quartermaster of the regiment, in his history of the regiment, says, "Captain Grover and two of the skirmish line were severely wounded." Noble band of heroes; I wonder where they are now. (Grover was made lieutenant colonel, and was killed at Gettysburg, his next battle.)

During a lull in the action, a body of men were seen moving on the extreme left flank. As they came forward they shouted, "Don't shoot our own men." It was at first uncertain who they were, but it was soon perceived that they were trying one of their tricks at the first battle of Bull Run.

The colonel gave the command, "By the left oblique! Aim! Fire!" It was at short range, and it seemed as if

every bullet did its work, for the ground was literally covered with the wounded and dying. At some places the distance between the two lines was scarcely the width of a street. The line of the enemy was melting away on the left front of the 76th New York.

Colonel Wainwright wanted to find the rest of the brigade. He decided to let them remain where they were, and send some one to find General Doubleday. If he moved his regiment he might march right into the enemy's line, and all be captured, as it was then dark.

Corporal (afterwards) Captain Bartholomew, of Company C., and Private Redman, of Company I., promptly and coolly stepped forward and tendered their services.

Judge Smith says: "Bartholomew was afterwards killed in the Wilderness, on the 5th of May, 1864. Private Redman was an old soldier, having served twelve years in the English army, and was present at the attack upon Sebastopol, during the Crimean war." His wife went along with the regiment, and was a great favorite. He further says: "Though Ann did not shoulder a musket, she should be set down as much more useful to the army than many who did."

In the mean time Captain Halstead withdrew the regiment from the field by the direction of General Doubleday.

There were several cases of heroism so deserving that they are here recorded, although the chapter is lengthening out wonderfully, and the whole is not told by any means.

William H. Miller, 76th New York, was wounded in the foot, so badly that he could not stand; he lay upon the ground and loaded his gun, then raised up and fired. John L. Wood, of Company C., who was not quite eighteen, had his thumb shot off, but continued in the fight until he was mortally wounded.

Daniel McGregor, of Company C., received a wound in his thigh, from the effects of which he died. He continued to load and fire, resting upon the other knee, until, from loss of blood, he was unable to load or hold his gun.

Sergeant Laurence M. Baker, of Company F, fell mortally wounded. On hearing of it his brother Isaac went to him. He had scarcely got there when the bugle sounded, indicating that a new movement was to be made. "Leave me and rush to the front!" shouted the dying sergeant; and in a short time he was numbered with the dead.


The roll of honor of the 76th New York is quite lengthy, and I will content myself with giving some of their names: Thomas H. Hoffman, Albert Olin, James J. Card, Captain Fox, Captain Sager, and Captain Swan, are among the noted ones; though there was scarcely a member of the regiment who was not a true soldier, deserving of honorable mention. The firing ceased, after dark, almost simultaneously, and both armies occupied the ground upon which they fought until half-past ten o'clock. General Hatch, hearing the firing, returned to ascertain the cause, and like a true soldier went to the sound of battle. He reached the field about the time the action was over, having counter-marched his brigade.

Gen. John F. Reynolds, who commanded the Pennsylvania Reserves, heard the firing and came to us, attended only by an orderly. He said he would return and bring up his division. General King in the mean time had assumed command and called a council of war on the side of the pike in the evening perhaps between nine and ten o'clock, at which the four brigade commanders were consulted as to what should be done.

General Gibbon being the junior brigadier, was first asked his opinion. He decided that General King should withdraw from the field towards Manassas Junction.

General Patrick was then asked for his opinion, who inquired what General King's orders were. On being informed that they were to move to Centerville, by the way of the pike, said "Then I should go to Centerville, sir."

General Doubleday expressed himself decidedly of General Patrick's opinion. General Hatch said in 1892, "that



HON. A. R. BUSHNELL, M. C.

he did not understand it was a regular council of war, but that they got together and gave their opinions. He says he advised King to go to Centerville by the way of Manassas for the reason that he would avoid a heavy force of the enemy and obtain rations at Manassas." McDowell was in command of Pope's left wing; he did not delegate his powers to King or any other officer when he rode ahead to consult Pope, so King had no authority to act except as he did. McDowell did not return to his command until ten o'clock the next day, then Longstreet was arriving on the field and McDowell's opportunity forever gone.

If McDowell, who had ridden on ahead, had returned like Hatch when he heard the battle commence, he could have held his ground, and not only have fought Jackson, but have won a victory over him. Only six of his regiments had been engaged against six brigades of the enemy, and the Comte de Paris says, "They held their ground until darkness put an end to the conflict."

It is true those two brigades, with the exception of the 95th New York, were badly cut up. But there were Patrick's magnificent brigade and Hatch's; neither had been engaged, and they were in splendid condition. The Pennsylvania Reserves were close at hand.

Sigel's Corps opened the fight next morning at half past six, with Reno and Heintzelman at Greenwich to be hastened forward, as they never lagged when there was a chance to engage the enemy. McDowell was in good condition to go at his work next morning. Here is McDowell's view of it. At a conference at the Riggs House, after the war, when Major Halstead told him of the council of war, the night of the 28th, and what transpired at it, he turned to Halstead with a look of surprise and indignation, and said "Major, this is the first I ever knew that King called a council of war, and I never knew before why the division went to Manassas Junction. I always felt very hard at my brigadiers, who were all West Point graduates for leaving the field unless they came to Centerville according

to orders. I feel aggrieved that Gibbon should have disappointed me so, after I promoted him from captain of a battery and made him a brigadier, and otherwise greatly supported him, which " McDowell said " was a permanent benefit to Gibbon." I listened closely when this conversation took place, and took note of it at the time, so as to give McDowell the benefit of his statement.

No officer or veteran will be written up or down in this work ; it shall be as correct, after years of study, as I can make it. This was but a short time before McDowell died, and he seemed to be greatly hurt over Major Halstead's statement. From that conversation he gave us to fully understand that he did not presume the division would leave its position after the battle that evening. He said : "Two brigades had held their ground against two of Jackson's divisions and, at the close of a severe action were in good spirits. We were feeling for Jackson, and when his real position was developed that evening, the division should have remained there and renewed the battle early next morning."

While McDowell felt thus toward his generals, for leaving the field after the battle on the 28th, which resulted, as he said, in King's division abandoning the position, which was the key of the whole field, yet he was just ahead of Hatch when the firing began, and said to me that he distinctly heard it, yet he kept on, although he was in command of the left wing, two-thirds of Pope's army. It certainly was his bounden duty to return and assume command.

The enemy had thrown two out of three divisions on Doubleday and Gibbon, and were badly handled. Hill's division alone had not been engaged.

If McDowell* had returned, on the evening of the 28th, and assumed command of his troops, and directed

* In answer to my question, if he heard the battle of Gainesville, he said he did. I asked him where he was? "Not far from the Stone Bridge." In answer to my question why he did not return and assume command, he said he wanted to see Pope.

Ricketts to fall back slowly in front of Longstreet, contesting every inch of ground, and hurled Hatch, Patrick, Reynolds, and Sigel at Jackson, he would have flanked him and driven him out of his hiding place behind the old railroad embankment and sent him flying to the mountains.

If he had thrown himself on Jackson and defeated him before Longstreet arrived it would have retrieved his fortunes shattered in the first Bull Run.

We will now turn to Ricketts, at Thoroughfare Gap, who, upon nearing the Gap, learned that Longstreet's advance was already occupying it. Ricketts hoped by a desperate move to force them back, and he threw forward the Third Brigade, supported by the First, Second, and Fourth.

Colonel Stiles, of the 80th New York, commanded the advancing brigade. Ricketts had excellent artillery with him, but the road was full of timber, and it was difficult to get a position for the artillery to play upon the gap.

General Ricketts learned that heavy columns of troops were crossing the mountains north and south of him and would soon gain his rear, so he retired in the direction of Gainesville, but having learned that King had forsaken that point, he took a road leading to Bristoe to avoid being crushed between Jackson and Longstreet.

In 1883, when we were looking over these fields, Longstreet said to me "that the time for the Federals to win the battle was to attack and defeat Jackson before he arrived." If King's division had held its ground and assisted Sigel, on the morning of the 29th, the victory would have been ours.

When Longstreet arrived he formed his left near the pike, with his right resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad, which formed an obtuse angle. If he had simply formed on Jackson's right, extending his line, it would not have been difficult for Pope to advance and attack. The angle put our troops in a dilemma; if they advanced against Jackson, Longstreet's artillery had a converging fire over the ground upon which our attack had to be made.


On the morning of the 29th, Sigel made an attack on

Jackson's right; the fighting was stubborn on both sides, Milroy and Schenck having brought their commands in. The fight had already lasted for a considerable length of time, and Schurz's division was pressed hard; although the Confederates were forced back, Schenck attempted to assist Schurz, but receiving a vigorous attack, was unable to do so. Kearny came up and formed on the right of Sigel, while Hooker arrived soon after and put his division in front of A. P. Hill's division, which rested on the Sudley Springs. Reynolds came up with his Pennsylvania Reserves and formed the extreme left. There was no one on the field to order a general assault, and Jackson contented himself with keeping them at bay, by a heavy cannonade, assisted by infantry, until Longstreet could get into position, and rake the Union line with his artillery.

Pope, in the mean time, had arrived and ordered Hooker to charge; which he objected to, but Grover's brigade made a charge, and penetrated between the brigades of Gregg and Thomas. The rest of Hooker's division came to their assistance; but General Early advanced and repulsed them. Kearny took the place of Hooker; he charged the Confederate right, and rolled it up on the center, but that move was not supported, and all the ground gained was afterwards lost.

King had not been well for a number of days, and General Hatch had taken command of his division. Just after Kearny had been forced back, Hatch arrived upon the field. Major Halstead was sent to McDowell to inform him that the division was ready for action. His reply was: 1 'The enemy is retreating, pursue them at double quick, 2 did gobble all the prisoners you can. Go tell your general that, and go at double quick.'

2^d Hatch charged with three brigades, Doubleday's, Patrick's, and his own. The firing was so heavy from the left that General Hatch directed Major Cranford to order his old brigade, then commanded by Colonel Sullivan, to face obliquely to the left, and meet the heavy fire



GEN. RUFUS KING.

coming from that direction. An attempt was made by the enemy to steal upon Colonel Fowler, in the uniforms of the 14th Brooklyn, which they had captured at Manassas a few days before. But that was foiled by Fowler, who commanded that regiment, and knew that it must be a deception. They shouted: "For God's sake don't fire on your friends." But few of the alleged 14th Brooklyn were taken prisoners there.

The Comte de Paris says: "They returned to the charge several times, but in vain; they could not make these fresh troops falter."

The Confederates knew that this was the division they met the day before, and they advanced to meet it with several lines of battle. The 2d Regiment of Berdan Sharpshooters went forward as skirmishers. The enemy did not respond to their fire, though it was galling and severe.

After a desperate fight, the attack was repulsed with considerable loss. When Kilpatrick saw the division of which his regiment constituted a part until a few days before, suffering so, he begged of General Bayard to be allowed to charge with his regiment, the Harris Light Cavalry. This being accorded, he charged with a squadron, supported by the regiment. They cut their way through the enemy's lines, and attempted to rejoin our forces by going around the left flank of the enemy, but were captured. Every man of that squadron was either killed or wounded. Over fifty of them were buried there the next day.

Hatch's adjutant general, Capt. J. A. Judson, and Captain Garrish of the 1st New Hampshire Light Battery, artillery, were captured. They were splendid officers, and the service suffered by their capture. Garrish lost one gun. Maj. H. L. Cranford, of the 14th Brooklyn, took the place of Captain Judson as adjutant general on Hatch's staff.

Our troops were repulsed, which ended the contest for that day, with Jackson holding the position behind the old railroad bed and Longstreet well posted on his right

ready for work in the morning. The position of the Confederate line was as follows: A. P. Hill commanded the left division of Jackson's forces, while the center was commanded by Lawton, as Ewell had been wounded in the leg, which was amputated upon the field.* Starke commanded the right division in place of Taliaferro, who also had been wounded the day before.

The Federal line was as follows: Kearny and Hooker upon the extreme right, then Reno reaching toward Sigel; Hatch's division, of McDowell's corps, was upon Reynolds' right, and in advance of Sigel. Ricketts had gone to Kearny on the right. Porter had been brought up and passed in front of the Federal line, halting on the left of Hatch, to be ready to charge. In the mean time the Federal left had opened, about one o'clock, a sharp musketry fire. It must be remembered that all the Federal forces were massed in front of Jackson; not a single command yet faced Longstreet.

The charge was made by Porter's corps in the center. They were supported by Hatch on the right. As Porter's troops moved forward over the field in front of the railroad bed where Jackson's men were concealed and waiting, Longstreet ordered his artillery to open on them with an enfilading fire. This was a severe ordeal—in fact it was too much; the skeletons of the regiments were hurled back on Sigel. Hatch and Sigel held their own remarkably well.

Ricketts' division was hurried from the right to their assistance. Grand old man; his troops were kept flying from one point of the field to the other, wherever the storm of battle raged with the greatest fury; soon you find them over on the left helping Reynolds, with his Pennsylvania Reserves, stay the advancing columns of Longstreet.

The only wonder is that a charge was not made

* The author saw it taken off.

on the extreme right by Kearny, and then rolled along toward the left. In such case victory might yet have crowned the work of the Federals. McDowell, seeing heavy columns of Longstreet's troops advancing to envelope and turn our left, had ordered Reynolds to checkmate it. Two great generals faced each other when Reynolds and Longstreet met.

Porter's charge has passed into history as being the charge of that battle, as Pickett's was at Gettysburg.

Not wishing to pluck one single honor from the brave boys of the Fifth Corps, I still think that there never was a grander charge made on any field of battle than the Pennsylvania Reserves made to save the Warrenton Pike.

Colonel Talley, 1st Pennsylvania Reserves, says, in speaking of the battle :

Immediately after the defeat of our troops, and while in rapid retreat, Gen. John F. Reynolds saved the Union Army from an overwhelming disaster, if not from utter ruin. When our forces were in rapid retreat, and the enemy in hot pursuit, General Reynolds discovered that the latter's aim was to seize the Warrenton pike in rear of our broken masses. He at once threw his division of Pennsylvania Reserves in the breach and saved the army. He galloped to the artillery on the crest, sighted each gun, gave orders to the officers and cannoneers, mounted, dashed along his line, and called upon his men to charge upon the advancing foe. The brave Reserves immediately charged with a cheer and yell across an open field, and met the enemy advancing in great numbers. The contest was desperate. Sypher states, and I know it to be true, that the "1st and 2d Regiments of Reserves were engaged in an almost hand-to-hand encounter; the left was pressed and the right gave way. At this critical moment the gallant Reynolds, observing that the flagstaff of the 2d Regiment had been pierced by a bullet and broken, seized the flag from the color-bearer, and dashing to the right, rode twice up and down his entire division line waving the flag about his head and cheering on his men. The Reserves, inspired by the intrepidity of their leader, rent the air with cheers, plied their tremendous musket fire with renewed energy and vigor, and in a few moments the ranks of the Confederate regiments gave way before the steady and unrelenting volleys poured upon them." Night came on and put an end to the contest, but the famous Stone

Bridge over Bull Run was, by the genius and heroic daring of General Reynolds, and the valor of his brave men, preserved for the use of the national army. The enemy, thus beaten back, retired beyond the range of our guns, appalled at the havoc they witnessed in their ranks, and confounded by their failure to reach the turnpike. The sun was now setting and the battle had ended. John F. Reynolds was my beau ideal of an officer and a soldier. No braver man lived, and he was as able and patriotic as brave.

The fighting became so desperate that the Pennsylvania Reserves were being mowed down like grass. The 1st and 2d Regiments were engaged in an almost hand-to-hand conflict. The left was being turned, and the troops on the right of the Reserves were being forced back. Just then Reynolds saw that the colors of the 2d had been shot from the staff as his lines were melting away, and weakening in the face of the furious attack of Longstreet's troops. He seized the colors, and waving them, as he rode the line of his division, urged his men to save the pike. As he rode up and down the line, with the colors in his hand, the boys cheered him, and rushed at the enemy with renewed determination to hold their ground; then occurred one of the most sanguinary struggles of the war. The enemy fired volley after volley at Reynolds as he carried the colors along the line, but Providence saved him to perform deeds of valor until he reached his native State, where, early in the action at Gettysburg, he received his death wound.

So thoroughly am I convinced of the great valor of the work performed by the Reserves there, that Reynolds' report is here quoted:

On the morning of the 30th I was directed to take post with my division on the left of the pike, near the Henry House, and ordered by Major General Pope to form my division in columns by company, at full distance, with the whole of my artillery on the left; that I would be the first in that attack which Porter's corps was to make on the enemy's right, then supposed to be on the pike and in retreat. Having formed my division in the position indicated, and opened with my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first

ridge, the skirmishers advanced and the attack by Porter's corps commenced. When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods opposite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regiment was deployed to support them, and finally a second; in all three regiments.

The advanced skirmishers were the 1st Rifles, Colonel McNeill, and the 1st Infantry, Colonel Roberts, supported by the 7th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Henderson. The 6th Regiment, Colonel Sinclair, was thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becoming convinced that the enemy was not in retreat, but was posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond; and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly stationary, evidently making a column of the enemy, formed for attack on my left flank when our lines should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing one of my orderlies who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground and directed me to form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed.

Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the commanding general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately started my division in the direction indicated; but before the rear of my column left the position the threatened attack of the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, was obliged to form on the ground on which they found themselves, to oppose it. Passing across the field to the right, with Meade's and Seymour's brigades and Rosecrans' battery, my course was diverted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the retreating masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzelman's corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division, and scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the division was sustained, both in men and material, Kern losing

his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field. Colonel Hardin, commanding the 12th Regiment, was here severely wounded.

The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on front and flank maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new positions wherever the advantage of ground permitted. The two brigades and battery of artillery under my immediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved, by the direction of an officer of General Pope's staff, to a position to the right of the Henry House, which position was most gallantly maintained by the commands of Meade and Seymour, and Ransom's battery, for nearly two hours, when they were relieved by the division of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan.

The report of General Hatch has so many valuable points in it that it is given in full :

CAMP NEAR FREDERICK, MD.,
September 13, 1862.

CAPTAIN :—I have the honor to submit the following reports of the movements of the First Division, Third Corps, temporarily under my command during parts of the 29th and 30th days of August :

Late on the afternoon of the 29th ultimo I was ordered by General McDowell, in person, (who was at the time stationed near the Stone House, on the turnpike from Gainesville to Centerville) to move the division on the Gainesville road in the pursuit of the enemy, who, he informed me, were retreating.

Gibbon's brigade had been detached to support some batteries. With the three other brigades of the division, and Garrish's battery of howitzers, I proceeded with all the speed possible, hoping by harassing the enemy's rear to turn their retreat into a rout. After marching about three-quarters of a mile the 2d Regiment of U. S. Sharpshooters was deployed to the front as skirmishers, the column continuing up the road in support. The advance almost immediately became warmly engaged on the left of the road. Two howitzers were then placed in position, one on each side of the road, and Doubleday's brigade was deployed to the front, on the left of the road, and moved up to the support of the skirmishers. We were met by a force consisting of three brigades of infantry, one of which was posted in the woods on the left, parallel to and about an eighth of a mile from the road. The two other brigades were drawn up in line of battle, one on each side of the road. These were in turn

supported by a large portion of the Confederate forces, estimated by a prisoner, who was taken to their rear, at about 30,000 men, drawn up in successive lines, extending one and a half miles to the rear. Doubleday's brigade moved to the front under a very heavy fire, which they gallantly sustained; but the firing continued very heavy. Hatch's brigade, commanded by Colonel Sullivan, was also deployed, and moved to the support of General Doubleday. Patrick's brigade, which had been held in reserve, took up a position on the opposite side of the road, completely commanding it. The struggle, lasting some three-quarters of an hour, was a desperate one, being in many instances a hand-to-hand conflict.

Night had now come on, our loss had been severe, and the enemy occupying a position in the woods on our left, which gave them a flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the order for a retreat. The retreat was executed in good order, the attempt of the enemy to follow being defeated by a few well directed volleys from Patrick's brigade.

On the afternoon of the 30th ultimo I was directed to report with the division to General Fitz-John Porter, who, as I was informed, held us as a reserve to support the attack on the enemy's center. I found General Porter's troops formed in the rear of a piece of woods about one-half mile to the right of the front, at which the division had been engaged the day previous. On reporting to General Porter, and informing him of the order under which I came, he directed me to post the division on the right of his own troops, and to make the attack simultaneously with himself.

The division was drawn up in seven lines, composed as follows: First and Second, Hatch's brigade; Third and Fourth, Patrick's brigade; Fifth and Sixth, Gibbon's brigade; Seventh, Doubleday's brigade; the 2d U. S. Sharpshooters being advanced as skirmishers in the woods. At the word given by General Porter the division advanced, with an interval of fifty yards between the lines. The enemy were very strongly posted behind an old disused railroad embankment where, according to their own statement, they had been awaiting us for two days. This railroad embankment, which runs parallel to the edge of the woods where we entered in front of our right wing, bears more to the rear on reaching a piece of open ground in front of our left wing.

After passing through the woods and reaching the open space the left wing of the first line was obliged to make a partial wheel to the right, to enable them to approach the enemy. This movement was executed under a heavy fire of artillery on the left and of musketry from the woods directly in our front.

Seeing the great disadvantages under which the first and second

lines labored, the others, as they came up, were ordered to oblique more to the right, to enable them to attack the troops behind the railroad embankment, and also to get a partial flank fire upon that portion of the embankment which crosses the open field. The contest for the possession of this embankment was most desperate. The troops on both sides fought with the most determined courage, and I doubt not that the conflict at this point was one of the most bloody of the war. Having myself received a wound which disabled me, I was forced to leave the field before the struggle terminated. * * * * General Doubleday exhibited the greatest gallantry in leading on his brigade under a terrible fire on the night of the 29th, and with his aid-de-camp, Maj. U. Doubleday, and Capt. E. P. Halstead, assistant adjutant general, did much of reckless daring toward keeping this brigade from giving way when hard pressed.

Capt. Robert Chandler, assistant adjutant general, (King's staff) and Capt. J. A. Judson, assistant adjutant general (who was taken prisoner while carrying an order on the field), were distinguished for their good conduct on the 29th.

* * * * *


Lieutenants Bennett and Lyon are also noted for their gallantry on the field.

JOHN P. HATCH.

Capt. R. CHANDLER.

On the morning of the 30th, General Ricketts was ordered to send two brigades to the assistance of Kearny on the right. Taking the First, under Duryea, composed of the 97th, 104th, and 105th New York Regiments, and the 107th Pennsylvania, and the Fourth Brigade under Colonel Joseph Thoburn, composed of the 84th Pennsylvania, 110th Pennsylvania, 1st West Virginia, and 7th Indiana, he immediately marched to Kearny's assistance.

Colonel Thoburn's brigade relieved a portion of Kearny's command, while Duryea advanced on his left, through the woods, attacking the enemy along the old railroad excavation. His command, as it neared the enemy's position, received a very severe fire from artillery and infantry. Duryea received a wound from a piece of shell, but remained in command. At this critical time in the battle, Captain Fisher, of Ricketts' staff, had his horse shot under him, and was taken prisoner.



GEN. LOUIS WAGNER.

While the First and Fourth Brigades were thus hotly engaged (Kearny never called for assistance except in great need), the Second and Third Brigades were advanced on the left, under the command of Gen. Z. B. Tower. The Second Brigade, which was Tower's, was composed of the 26th and 94th New York, and the 88th and 90th Pennsylvania Regiments. The Third Brigade (Hartsuff's) had the 12th, and 13th Massachusetts, 83d New York, and 11th Pennsylvania. These two brigades fought with a valor and heroism never excelled on the field of battle.

Quite an incident occurred in the 88th Pennsylvania. Two officers, Louis Wagner and R. B. Beath, were both wounded. They were devoted friends, and both have been Commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic. Not only are they held in high esteem by the ex-soldiers, but they are eminent and useful citizens.

Hall's and Leppien's Maine batteries were engaged on Tower's left. While Ricketts' division was thus disposed, he was ordered to advance on the road leading from Sudley Springs to New Market, and follow along the road, "in pursuit of the enemy." He gave the order and reported to General Heintzelman as directed. Ricketts finding his division was being hard pressed by the enemy, reported it to McDowell, when the order was revoked.

Thompson's battery was moved to the right of the line to assist in checking the enemy, but was outnumbered in guns, so it was withdrawn and ordered to the right of Stevens' division to assist Matthews' battery.

Ricketts' division had fought most gallantly, but the tide of battle was setting in against the Union troops, and a retrograde movement was gradually being made all along the line.

Longstreet was forcing Reynolds back off of Bald Hill which uncovered McLean's brigade on the right. Sigel seeing the perilous position of McLean sent Milroy's brigade to his assistance, but the latter, failing to close up on McLean, left a gap through which the enemy poured,

and threw our line into confusion. Sigel again seeing the necessity of holding Bald Hill directed Koltes' brigade to go to their assistance. He made a gallant charge in which he surrendered up his life, but the hill was not retaken. General Schenck was wounded while leading a charge.

As our troops came back, Longstreet attempted to take possession of the hill where the Henry House stands, turn our left, and get possession of the road to the Stone Bridge, but was thwarted by Buchanan's Regulars, assisted by the two brigades under General Tower.

Reynolds here reformed his lines with those commands which formed a nucleus for other troops to rally round, and checked the great tidal wave of Longstreet's troops.

Pope had left the field and put Hooker in command, who directed General Gibbon to cover the retreat. He (Gibbon) then gave the order to retire. When the troops of Gibbon's brigade arrived near the Stone Bridge, Kearny rode up to Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, and directed it to hold that position until he gave orders for it to be relieved. Companies B and G of the 19th Indiana, under the command of Capt. W. W. Dudley, supported the battery, and destroyed the bridge after all the troops had crossed. It was then well into night, and confusion again began to reign as it did a year previous when the first Bull Run was fought.

The commands of Sumner and Franklin lay within a few miles of the battlefield on the 30th, and that, too, right in rear of Jackson's corps. If these troops had been hurled on Jackson he could not have maintained his position a single hour; and there was ample time for their arrival on the field, as the last assault began about half-past four in the afternoon and continued until the Union Army gave way. If they had attacked as late as five o'clock defeat would have been changed into victory.

While the Confederate army was following up the retreating columns of the Union forces, General Lee was seated on a log, in company with some officers, when his

horse got frightened, and so badly hurt or sprained the general's arm in his attempt to hold him that he could not ride on horseback, and was compelled to go in an ambulance until he arrived at Sharpsburg just before the battle of Antietam.

That there was rank jealousy against Pope, everyone in the army knew. In speaking of that matter to me, Pleasonton said that Pope came from the Western army to take command at a time when misfortune, more or less, had attended our operations; that already the spirit of jealousy was exhibiting itself at home, but to have a foreign officer, so to speak, come and to take command, even if he had had success in the West, was more than our officers could bear. He said he declined service in the West on that very account.

Pleasonton was a clear-headed officer, who seldom exhibited jealousy against other officers, and never in but one instance did I ever hear him so speak during the time that he assisted me in this work, and then in no unkind manner.

There was one element that was always loyal to every commander, and that was the rank and file—they wished everyone a victory and did all in their power to accomplish that end. A more patriotic and intelligent army I do not think was ever organized, and many of them have since occupied positions on the bench—two from the 19th Indiana—Gibson and Buckles stand high as judges in California, while others have been governors of States; W. W. Brown, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, served four years in Congress where he made his mark. Their loyalty to the Constitution and their country has never flagged. Many of them were the descendants of the soldiers of the Revolution, and the country with one flag will ever be safe in their hands either in peace or war.

Pope's army lay around Centerville on August 31, Sigel on the south, Franklin immediately around the village, and Porter at the north.

On September 1 Pope, learning that Jackson was men-

acing his right and rear, hastily moved his army to Fairfax Court House.

Hooker was again placed in command and took the Little River road. In marching in the direction of Chantilly he passed through Germantown, with McDowell and Franklin taking position to his left and rear, at the angle of the roads.

Reno formed on Hooker's left, with Heintzelman's corps supporting, Kearny's division leading. Ricketts' division, of the First Corps, and a part of King's division, acted in conjunction with Reno.

Patrick's brigade was pushed forward in the direction of Chantilly, and the 20th New York (Ulster Guard) was especially detailed to report to Hooker, who directed Colonel Gates to take possession of a piece of woods and hold it near where the enemy appeared to be fixing to place a battery in position. Colonel Gates deployed the regiment, and held the position until relieved.

As Jackson marched in the direction of Fairfax, he struck Hooker, and opened his artillery without effect. In the mean time he had formed his corps to the right of the road, with Starke's division first, then Lawton's, and finally A. P. Hill's. The latter opened the battle, with Brockenborough's and Branch's brigades upon the Union left. These forces made no impression upon Reno who, in turn, drove them back in disorder. Hill at once ordered Thomas, Pender, and Gregg, with a part of Lawton's division, to their assistance.

The second attack fell heavily on Stevens' division, which gave way when its gallant commander was killed.

Here a sad occurrence took place. As the battle raged with desperate fury, Stevens took the colors of a regiment and was in the act of riding to the front with them, when he was informed that his son, who was on his staff, had been mortally wounded on the left of the line. He turned to a chaplain, and asked him to go to his son. He had scarcely finished his request when he was killed.

This movement forced back Reno. Kearny coming up with the advanced division of Heintzelman's corps, ordered Birney's brigade into the gap made by Stevens' division. Then Kearny rode forward to examine the situation at the front, when he soon found himself right up to the enemy's lines, who ordered him to halt. Turning his horse suddenly to retrace his steps, a volley from the enemy mortally wounded him. Thus ended the life and military career of an officer booked for fame. As an officer of dash, coolness, decision, and military spirit Kearny was not excelled, and his death was a great loss to the Union cause.

This battle was fought while a thunderstorm was raging with a madness that seemed livid with its fury.

The next morning Pope's army moved on unmolested to its destination in front of Washington, where the different commands took their old quarters, while their chief, General Pope, reported to the War Department, and asked to be relieved, which was speedily done, and his army vanished from existence as if it had never been created. So ended one of the distinctive events of the war, remembered in history for its bright prospects and monumental failure.

CHAPTER V.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

THE Army of the Potomac had again suffered defeat on the same inglorious field of Bull Run, and that stream had proven itself bitter waters to the Union forces. The defeat of the second Bull Run was more severe than the first, for that was fought at the beginning of the war ; both armies had been seasoned and disciplined with the Peninsular Campaign, and having met after that, were more fully prepared for war in the second.

After the first battle our troops were not pursued much this side of Centerville, but Chantilly was fought after the second, where we lost Kearny and Stevens.

Lee had pursued the Union Army almost to Washington, where it rested inside of the fortifications.

What should he do? Wherever the two armies had met the Confederates had decidedly the advantage, and now he was pausing only a few miles from Arlington, his old home, which came to him from Colonel Custis. Lee married his granddaughter.

Victorious he could not retire to Richmond without confessing a weakness or timidity. If he remained where he was he might be flanked with a heavy army, and suffer defeat, which would neutralize his former work.

Maryland was a slave State, and there were many bitter secessionists in it who were loud in their professions of that fact. The State was rich in many respects ; no army had marched through it to consume its fine products. Her pastures were filled with fat cattle and splendid horses.

Lee's army was hungry and poorly clad. Lee had strong hopes that he would recruit his wasting army with the Southern sympathizers, who perhaps had had no favorable opportunity to enlist.

That he also had an idea of making Pennsylvania pay tribute is undoubtedly a fact, for Chambersburg will soon testify to that fact. If he still continued successful in battle Harrisburg was in easy reach, where the Pennsylvania and Northern Central Railroads could have been destroyed and the rich coal fields of that part of the Keystone State fired, which would have greatly crippled the Union cause.

On that subject Gen. Bradley T. Johnson says:

General Lee's purpose, then, in transferring the seat of the war to the north of the Potomac was: 1st. To relieve Virginia from the pressure of the contending armies and delay another invasion until the next season. 2d. To inflict as great an injury—material and moral—to his enemy as was practicable. 3d. To reënforce the Confederacy by the alliance of Maryland, which could have been certainly secured by a permanent occupation and by an exhibition of superior force. 4th. As a consequence, the occupation of the Federal capital, the evacuation of it by the Federal Government, the acknowledgment of the Confederate Government as a Government *de jure* as well as *de facto* by France and England, and the necessary achievement of the independence of the Confederate States. During the summer of 1862 the Emperor of the French had been openly in sympathy with the cause of the Confederate States, and under the name of sometimes mediation, sometimes recognition, had always been anxious to intervene in their behalf. He was pressing the English Government without ceasing to unite with him in acknowledging the existence of the new government, and recognition, as all the world knew at that time, meant independence. Therefore when Lee crossed the Potomac he was playing for a great stake.

This is what one of Lee's generals said in Richmond in October, 1864, before the Virginia division of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia.

No doubt General Johnson was one of the men who insisted on his marching into Maryland, as he had lived there before the war.

Lee put his army in motion for Leesburg on the 3d of September. He knew his purpose would not be understood until he had ample time to throw his whole army into Maryland, for it might be supposed he was going back to the Shenandoah, which would put the mountains between the two armies and give him a chance again to rush through some gap and pounce on the Union Army while marching by the flank, and give it a stunning blow. It had never been hinted that he had designs of a Northern invasion, hence his movements were not understood in Washington.

On the 5th of September Jackson crossed the Potomac at White's Ford near Leesburg—he was then in "*my Maryland.*"

Marching toward Frederick, which is in an easterly direction from South Mountain, he halted his command on the right bank of the Monocacy to prevent a surprise or an attack from Washington. But it took some time to reorganize the Army of the Potomac, so there was no danger from that source.

General Pope had requested to be relieved from his command and McClellan had again been restored, to the great joy of the majority of the officers and men.

McDowell was relieved of the command of the First Corps and it was placed under General Hooker,—an excellent selection.

Sumner remained in charge of the Second and also the Twelfth under Mansfield, which was the center grand division; Porter had the Fifth and Franklin the Sixth Corps, composed of the divisions of Generals W. F. Smith, Slocum, and Couch. The Ninth (Burnsides' old corps) was given to Reno, and Burnside placed in command of the right wing. Gen. H. J. Hunt was assigned to the command of the artillery and General Pleasanton the cavalry.

The troops were now ready to march up the left bank of the Potomac to meet the enemy then known to be in

Maryland; though their position was not definitely known, it might well have been easily surmised, for General White with 4,000 troops had been compelled to retire from Martinsburg to Harper's Ferry, when he swelled Miles' command to nearly 12,000 with immense stores, greatly needed by Lee's half clad and hungry army.

Although Jackson had crossed below Harper's Ferry on the 5th of September, Lee did not expect Halleck would attempt to hold that position, for, though a very strong military point, it was then utterly worthless as a key or even an ordinary position with the whole of Lee's army weaving itself around it—it was a great stake to play for indeed. It was more than Lee hoped for—rashness beyond degree to leave the troops there; and it was the worst military blindness for Miles to remain there, for he knew the enemy had crossed between him and Washington, and cut the wires, and there was no way to communicate with him but by courier, and also great danger of important dispatches being lost.

Gen. George J. Stannard, then commanding the 9th Vermont, was at Harper's Ferry. Just before his death he gave me a full account of it, and made an engagement to go up there to see where he formed his line of battle with his regiment, and kept the enemy at bay for 24 hours, all the time begging Miles to follow Davis out, who had crossed the Potomac along the Maryland Heights, and, evading the right wing of McLaws, continued up the left bank of the Potomac until near Sharpsburg, then marching northward struck and captured Longstreet's train.

But we must now turn our attention to Lee. He had received positive information that Miles was still holding Harper's Ferry, and he resolved to capture that prize, for he could make prisoners and parole about 12,000 men, one-eighth of the Army of the Potomac, and they could not fight him again that year, besides which he would capture nearly \$1,000,000 worth of stores.

So far, his reception in Maryland had been cold. It

was not close enough to Baltimore to breathe the secession air as it was borne on the breeze up the Chesapeake from the South. Nearer the Federal Capital there was a good wholesome Union sentiment largely in the ascendancy, while the neutral men were stolid and gave no expression, leaving the secessionists alone to their glory—they, seeing the ragged and jaded condition of the soldiers of the Confederate army, decided to stay at home yet a little while and take care of their families.

Lee was not slow to observe the cold manner in which he had been received.

If he had crossed the Potomac at or near the Chain Bridge, and passing around closely to Washington, marched rapidly on Baltimore, compelling its surrender, he might have induced many to join his standard. Simply to enter the State at one side, and march only one day toward the interior was not enough evidence that he was master of the situation. But his immediate move was to capture Harper's Ferry.

The Comte de Paris says: "He (Lee) determined to take advantage of this strange imprudence." Strange, I should say, with no hope but certain capture if our troops remained there; it was a key to the door which had been left open!

Accordingly Lee issued the following order to capture Harper's Ferry before McClellan's army could attack him:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
September 9, 1862.

This army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and after passing Middletown with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, and by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such of the enemy as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro, where it will halt with the reserve supply baggage trains of the army.

General McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, and take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance and supply trains, etc., will precede General Hill; General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may be left behind. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing the object for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro or Hagerstown. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagon, for use of the men at their encampments to procure wood, etc.

By command of Gen. R. E. Lee:

R. H. CHILTON, Assistant Adjutant General.

Major General D. H. HILL, Commanding Division.

McClellan's army arrived at Frederick on the 13th; the Twelfth Corps, under General Mansfield, encamped on the same ground occupied by Gen. D. H. Hill. First Sergeant John M. Bloss and Private B. W. Mitchell, of Company F, 27th Indiana, an excellent regiment, found Lee's order wrapped around three cigars. It was taken immediately to McClellan, and gave him full knowledge of Lee's intentions and movements.

Burnside was on the right, in command of the First and Ninth Corps, under Hooker and Reno, Sumner in the center, with his own—the Second Corps—and the Twelfth under Mansfield, Franklin, with the Sixth Corps, was

forging his way up the river, on the left, while Hooker, with the First Corps, was on the old national road on the extreme right.

Lee's orders exploded Halleck's theory that Lee was perhaps making a feint in crossing the Potomac into Maryland, and that his real intention was to draw McClellan as far away from Washington as possible, and then recross the Potomac, make a forced march and capture Washington before the Army of the Potomac could be counter-marched to checkmate the move. McClellan claimed that he was moving very cautiously to suit Halleck's fears.

But he was in possession of Lee's plans on the 13th, and there was no more danger of Washington than there was of Boston. Furthermore Lee had divided up and distributed his army to suit McClellan's wishes as much as if General Marcy (his father-in-law and chief of staff) had made the arrangements. Jackson had to march from the vicinity of Middletown to Martinsburg, then move back on Harper's Ferry, approaching it so as to prevent an escape of the troops there up the left bank of the Shenandoah—which would compel him to throw a part of his command around south, and let his right sweep the bank of the Shenandoah, hugging it closely. That was a long distance, and much of the road was rough and difficult to march over.

Walker was directed to occupy Loudon Heights, McLaws marching on Maryland Heights, Jackson off in Virginia, marching around to come in the rear of Bolivar Heights, Longstreet directed to Hagerstown, and D. H. Hill near Boonsboro—a mile or so west of the base of South Mountain on the old national road. This placed Lee's army in the best possible condition to attack. A single blow at any of these commands might be fatal to Lee.

This was McClellan's golden opportunity to place his name by the side of Napoleon's. The distance was not very far from Frederick to Harper's Ferry. The army was in good condition and spirits, and marching on South

Mountain. Franklin was bearing on Crampton's Gap, while Reno was taking the old Braddock route through Sharpsburg, crossing the mountain at Foxe's Gap. Hooker was on the old national road which crosses the mountain at Turner's Gap. Near its base he left it, and took the old Hagerstown road, which makes a deflection from the national road north, and again comes into it at the Mountain House, a romantic country inn on the top of the mountain, where the weary traveler could rest and enjoy one of the most fascinating landscapes in America.

Mrs. Admiral Dalghren has purchased it since the admiral's death, and fitted it up in an elegant manner for a summer residence. It was the headquarters of Generals Hill and Colquitt during the battle of South Mountain.

Hooker formed his line of battle as follows: Gibbon's brigade on the pike—but that brigade was temporarily detached from the First Corps to support and assist Reno's right, as he was meeting with stubborn resistance.

After leaving Washington, on its march toward Rockville the Iron Brigade was pretty thoroughly reorganized and many new recruits joined the different regiments—especially the 19th Indiana—having been forwarded to them after the battle of Second Bull Run, to fill up their decimated ranks.

Quite a halt was made at Rockville and the company officers were very busy getting up their muster rolls and performing duties necessary after a long and arduous campaign.

After leaving Rockville the column moved very steadily and rapidly across the Monocacy River through Frederick, and on Sunday morning, the 14th of September, it passed over the eastern range of the Blue Hills and had spread out before it the purple fields of Pleasant Valley beyond which the South Mountain range loomed up, and upon which the brigade knew the enemy had formed his lines to dispute its farther progress westward. The spirit of the men was never better; and the enthusiastic loyalty exhibited by the

citizens of Frederick, as they passed through, did much to fill the brigade with ardor for the fight they knew was before them and the necessity for repelling the invasion of Lee. About three o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, they were halted upon the western side of the valley near the foot of the hills, their line stretching on either side of the national road. The noncombatants were sent to the rear, and the word came that their task had been assigned them, viz. : to carry Turner's Gap, through which the national turnpike passes. Far off to the left and on the right they could see the troops advancing to the attack, and about five o'clock came the word for the Iron Brigade to move forward. The 2d Wisconsin was placed in the rear of the other three regiments, which were in line of battle, the 6th and 7th Wisconsin on the right of the turnpike and the 19th Indiana on the left. After moving forward across a creek through an orchard, Company B of the 2d Wisconsin passed through between the 19th and 7th, and moved rapidly to the front, deploying as skirmishers, the line halting in the mean time, while Captain Caldwell developed the skirmishers of the enemy in their front. Very soon the firing commenced along the skirmish line, and as the line of battle moved forward, the skirmishers preceding the Confederate line of battle moved a little back toward the base of the hill, the 6th Wisconsin skirmishing with the enemy among the large bowlders on the side of the mountain on the right hand side of the pass. About this juncture Captain Caldwell sent back word to the 19th Indiana that the enemy were preparing to concentrate the fire of several batteries upon our line, and suggested that Battery B, 4th U. S. Artillery, be brought as close as possible to the line of battle to respond. We had now come within easy rifle range of the base of the mountain, and the Confederate sharpshooters were beginning to annoy the Union line very much by their marksmanship in picking off officers in the line of battle. At this time Captain Caldwell, who was a magnificent looking soldier, fell mortally wounded, and his

line retired while the line of battle pushed still farther forward. As the gorge contracted it became necessary to change the formation somewhat, and the command was given by Colonel Meredith, "By the right of companies to the front." While marching forward in this formation they were subjected to a ricochetting fire of solid shot, which fortunately did but little damage, owing to the peculiar front presented, the shots, most of them, passing through between the companies; but it was evident, as the artillery fire was increasing and as they should meet with the line of battle of the enemy, that the column formation must be abandoned and the lines of battle resumed. On our right Colonel Bragg, commanding the 6th Wisconsin, had met with the same conditions, and to meet it had thrown his line, owing to the narrowness of the field through which he was advancing, into the form of column by wing, and as his right wing advanced his left wing halted, and when the right had delivered its volley it halted and the left passed over it.

This formation was quickly adopted in rotation by the brigade, and they were soon pressing the enemy by successive wing volleys to a point beyond which to retire on their part meant a rout; they consequently made a stand at what was known as the "stone wall" line, which ran across the gorge and up the right side of the defile—the only opening in it being that made by the national road turnpike. Here the two wings were deployed, and the single line of battle formed by moving the 19th Indiana well off to the left in the field, and the 7th Wisconsin following it, leaving a gap between the turnpike and the 6th Wisconsin which was immediately filled by Colonel Fairchild, who moved the 2d at once into action. It was now getting dusk, and the contest over the stone wall was very severe, our men forcing their way to one side of the wall while the Confederates held the other with a courage worthy of a better cause. It became necessary to flank them out of this position, and the darkness made it easy to

do so. Colonel Meredith ordered Companies B and G, under command of Captain Dudley, to withdraw from the line of battle, and gave him instructions to move rapidly to the extreme left of the gorge, climb the side of the mountain and press far enough forward to get an enfilading fire upon the western side of the wall. This movement was accomplished without encountering any of the enemy; and very soon our fire seemed to have the desired effect, for with a shout our men soon had the foe in full retreat up the side of the mountain, and the battle of South Mountain was over.

I should have spoken of the work done by two guns of Battery B, which at Colonel Meredith's request were, by order of General Gibbon, following the line of battle to the road behind us; and while we were suffering from the fire of the sharpshooters located in the frame building to the west side of the defile, he planted a few well-directed shells into the building and put a stop to that pastime; for immediately after the shells had struck the roof the Confederate riflemen deserted the building and made good haste in climbing the hill to get out of the way of Stewart's shot. A little spherical case followed the shells, and our left was relieved from the galling fire of their marksmen. When we occupied the ground we found several of them wounded in the house, and could easily see what terrible havoc had been done by the well-directed fire of Stewart's guns.

Skirmishers were at once thrown forward to follow the retreating enemy; they gained the crest of the mountain, and the brigade rested upon its laurels about ten o'clock at night, gathered up the wounded and slain and gave them proper attention, relieved the agonies of our fallen enemies as far as possible, and bivouacked upon the field that night. The next morning at daybreak we started in pursuit, and from the Mountain House, which is located at the side of the turnpike at the summit, to Boonsboro, and off to the left to Keedysville and Antietam Creek, the command



EX-PRESIDENT HAYES.

moved very rapidly, hardly stopping to gather up the prisoners, who, having thrown everything away, were lying along the roadside, apparently glad to be captured. The enemy who opposed the Iron Brigade on the night of September 14 were found to be Georgia troops under command of General Colquitt, afterwards United States Senator from that State.

Hatch's division, composed of Patrick's, Doubleday's and Col. Walter Phelps' brigades, were on the right of Gibbon, the Pennsylvania Reserves forming the extreme right under General Meade. Governor Curtin, anticipating an invasion of Pennsylvania, had called for 75,000 volunteers to defend the State, and General Reynolds was ordered to Harrisburg to command them, while General Meade was placed in temporary command of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division.

Now let us turn from Hooker's line of battle, formed near the base of the mountain on the north side of the pike, and see how the gallant Reno is faring south of it, up the old Braddock route. Gen. J. D. Cox, commanding the Kanawha Division of Reno's corps, directed Colonel Scammon to feel the enemy with his brigade, and Colonel Crook followed with his brigade in supporting distance.

General Cox sent word back to Reno that he was advancing with his whole division, and that if a severe engagement took place he wanted Pleasonton to command until he (Reno) could come up.

Col. R. B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States, was directed to take the 23d Ohio and turn the enemy's right if possible.

The fighting was severe; if the Confederates were repulsed then the command of McLaws could scarcely escape capture, and that would ruin Lee's army. South Mountain was a good defensive position; a few hours would be sufficient to pile up a stone wall behind which troops could pour a deadly fire into the lines of battle as they advanced up the side of the mountain. Besides, it was a

grand position for artillery, while the Union artillery could do but little effective work. The only thing that operated against the Confederate artillery at short range was to get its guns depressed enough.

General Garland commanded the enemy at that point. He was a determined and brave officer, and fought with great desperation. The mountain has two crests there; our troops gained and held the first one by noon.

Garland, in a bold assault, was mortally wounded, which depressed his men, and they gave way, but soon the brigades of Anderson, Ripley, and a part of Colquitt's reinforced them.

In the mean time Wilcox's division of Reno's corps arrived and formed on Cox's right, and with Harlan's brigade of Rodman's division extended well over to the National road. Fairchild's brigade of Rodman's division had been sent to the left to help Colonel Hayes. Sturges' division supported Wilcox.

The Comte de Paris, on page 321 of his second volume, says: "Hill's right, which defended the ridge south of the pass, only consisted of Garland's brigade; its numerical inferiority, however, was fully compensated by the defensive advantages of the ground it occupied."

When Wilcox was forming he was attacked so severely by Longstreet's men, who had hurried forward to save Hill, that his command was thrown into confusion momentarily, and the gunners of one of the batteries retreated on seeing that the enemy sprang forward to capture them, but the 79th New York and 17th Michigan made a sally, drove back the enemy and restored Wilcox's line.

When the advance was made Meade ordered Lieutenant Colonel Clarke, commanding the 3d Regiment, to move to the right and occupy an eminence to protect the right flank, and also observe the movements of the enemy.

The Bucktails were thrown forward as skirmishers, followed by the 2d as a support. The Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Magilton, was on the left, the

Third, commanded by Colonel Gallagher, was in the center, while on the extreme right was the First Brigade, commanded by General Seymour. In this formation they advanced over the uneven ground. It was utterly impossible to keep any alignments—in fact each brigade was almost an independent command, except as they could tell where the others were by the firing. The enemy took advantage of hiding places in ravines, behind bowlders, on the side of the mountain, stone walls, or anything that would shelter them.

That gallant and fearless regiment, the Bucktails, was firing and advancing as if they were going to take the crest of the mountain itself. Suddenly they came to a cornfield where the enemy were thickly posted. A terrific fire soon brought the skirmish line to a halt. General Seymour, seeing his work clear, directed Colonel Biddle Roberts of the 1st to charge up the mountain. Observing Colonel Fisher of the 5th coming up with a splendid line of battle, Seymour said: "Colonel put your regiment into that cornfield and hurt somebody." "I will, General, and I'll catch one alive for you." This repartee between General Seymour and Colonel Fisher so amused the men that they scaled the stone wall and soon captured eleven, which they sent back to the general. A cheer went up along the whole line, and the 2d Regiment, under Captain Byrnes, and the 6th under Colonel Sinclair, went forward to gain the crest before the 1st or 5th if possible.

Colonel Gallagher, commanding the Third Brigade, fell badly wounded while leading the charge of his brigade, and Colonel Anderson of the 9th took command of the brigade. The 11th, under command of Col. S. M. Jackson, was ordered to drive the enemy from a deep ravine. As they advanced, a single volley from the concealed enemy played sad havoc with the officers; one-half had fallen, but the regiment, infuriated by their loss, rushed on them, and drove them up the mountain. The Second Brigade, on the left, moved up the slope over toward the pike. They

had heavy work, and moved slowly up the mountain. The 8th, on the extreme left of the brigade, suffered heavily, losing more than all the rest of the brigade. Meade feared his right flank would be turned, and called for help.

Duryea's brigade of Ricketts' division was sent to his assistance. It had a very rough road to travel to reach that part of the line. When Duryea reported it was a little late, and he was directed to go in on the left of Seymour, who was holding his position, and in fact pressing back the enemy. Ricketts' division was supporting Hatch and Meade.

The losses of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division are as follows:—The 1st, commanded by Colonel Roberts, 3 officers and 7 men killed, 3 officers and 27 men wounded; in the 2d, commanded by Captain Byrnes, 7 men killed, 1 officer and 9 men wounded. The 3d, on the plank road, not engaged. The 4th, commanded by Capt. F. B. F. Fisher, 5 men killed and 22 wounded; in the 5th, commanded by Colonel Fisher, 1 man was killed and 12 wounded; in the 6th, commanded by Colonel Sinclair, 12 men were killed, 1 officer and 39 men were wounded; in the 7th, commanded by Colonel Bolinger, 5 men were killed, and Colonel Bolinger and 11 men were wounded, leaving Maj. C. A. Lyman in command; in the 8th, commanded by S. W. Baily, 1 officer and 13 men were killed, and 1 officer and 36 men were wounded—when Colonel Anderson took command of the brigade, Capt. Samuel B. Dick assumed command of the regiment; in the 10th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Warner, 4 men were killed, 1 officer and 18 men were wounded; in the 11th, commanded by Lieut. Col. S. W. Jackson, 2 officers and 10 men were killed, and 5 officers and 24 men were wounded; and in the 12th, commanded by Capt. J. A. Boler, 6 men were killed, and 1 officer and 19 men were wounded. In the Bucktail Regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil, 1 officer and 15 men were killed, and 2 officers and 32 men were

wounded. The artillery could not be used, and suffered no loss.

The casualties among the officers were as follows:—In the 1st Capt. Thomas P. Diven, and Lieuts. John H. Taylor and John D. Sadler were killed, and Lieuts. Joseph Taggart, F. McManus, and H. N. Minnigh were wounded. In the 2d Lieut. Richard Clendenning was wounded. In the 6th Capt. C. D. Roush was wounded. In the 7th Colonel Bolinger was severely wounded. In the 8th Lieut. William M. Carter was killed, and Lieut. Samuel McCandless was wounded. In the 9th Lieut. William Hope was wounded. In the 10th Lieut. H. I. Howe was wounded. In the 11th Capt. E. R. Brady and Lieut. W. F. Jackson were killed, and Col. Thomas F. Gallagher, Capts. Evard Rierer and Nathaniel Nesbits, Quartermaster H. A. Torrence, and Lieut. J. S. Kennedy were wounded. In the 12th Lieut. E. Kelly was wounded. In the Bucktails Lieut. Charles Bitterling was killed, and Capt. E. A. Irvin and Lieut. Samuel A. Mack were wounded.

General Meade gives the following report of this battle:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves under my command during the action of South Mountain Gap, on the 14th inst. :

The division left its camp on the Monocacy early on the morning of the 14th instant, and marched to Middletown and beyond, where it was halted about one p. m. of that day, General Reno's corps being in front and engaged with the enemy. About two p.m. this division was ordered to the front to his support. The enemy was disputing our passage over the turnpike through the South Mountain, and had been attacked on the left by General Reno. After some consultation with the general commanding the right wing and the corps, I was directed to move the division on a road leading off to the right of the turnpike and toward the enemy's left. After advancing for over a mile on this road, the division, which was in advance of the corps, was turned across the field to the left and moved in an advantageous position to support Cooper's battery, which it was proposed to establish on an adjoining eminence. The enemy perceiving these dispositions, opened on the column from a battery on the mountain side, but without inflicting any injury.

Captain Cooper's battery of three-inch ordnance guns was immediately put in position on the ridge above referred to, and at the same time, by direction of the general commanding the corps, the regiment of 1st Rifles of the division was sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy.

Being well satisfied from various indications that the enemy occupied the mountain in force with his infantry, the general commanding the corps directed me to advance my division to the right, so as if possible to outflank him, and then to move forward to the attack. A slight description of the features of the ground is necessary to properly describe the movements of the division. The turnpike from Frederick to Hagerstown, in crossing the mountain, takes a general direction of northwest and southeast. The mountain ridge occupied by the enemy was perpendicular in its general direction to the road; parallel to the mountain was another ridge, separated from it at the turnpike by a deep valley, but connected at the upper end by a very small depression; over this second ridge there was a road, along which I advanced Seymour's brigade of the division, directing him to push forward and feel for the enemy. Soon after advancing General Seymour reported that he could take the crest of the first ridge along which ran the road, and could then advance across the ravine to the second ridge, which I immediately directed him to do; at the same time I deployed Gallagher's Third Brigade and also Magilton's Second Brigade on the same line, but down in the valley, and when the line of battle was completely formed, directed a general advance of the whole. Seymour soon gained the crest of the first ridge, and then moved in the same direction as the other two brigades. Anderson and Magilton advanced steadily to the foot of the mountain, where they found the enemy's infantry; in a short time the action became general throughout the whole line. Steadily the line advanced up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from whence he was slowly but gradually dislodged, Seymour first gaining the crest and driving the enemy to our left along the ridge, where he was met by the fire of the other two brigades. Soon after the action commenced, having reason to believe the enemy was extending his left flank to outflank us, I sent to the general commanding the corps for reinforcements, which were promptly furnished by sending General Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts' division. Owing, however, to the distance to be traveled to reach the scene of action, Duryea's did not arrive on the ground till just at the close of the engagement. His men were promptly formed in line of battle and advanced on the left of Seymour, but only one regiment had an opportunity to open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened.

The conduct of the division on this occasion was such as to uphold its well-earned reputation for steadiness and gallantry, and fortunately was witnessed by the general commanding the corps, as well as others. I am greatly indebted to Brigadier General Seymour for the skill with which he handled his brigade on the extreme flank, securing by this manœuvre the great object of our movement, viz, the outflanking the enemy. To Colonel McNeil, of the 1st Rifles, who with his regiment has always been in advance, I was indebted for ascertaining the exact position of the enemy. Colonels Magilton and Gallagher, in command of the Second and Third Brigades, formed their men and carried them to the summit of the mountain in the most creditable manner. I regret to report that Colonel Gallagher, while gallantly leading his brigade, received a severe wound, and was compelled to leave the field. To my personal staff, consisting of Capt. E. C. Baird, assistant adjutant general; Capt. J. Adair, commissary of subsistence; and Lieuts. William Riddle and A. G. Mason, 5th Pennsylvania Reserves, acting aids-de-camp, I am indebted for the prompt execution of all my orders, carried under a severe fire across rocks, stone walls and the most rugged country I almost ever saw.

The command rested on their arms during the night. The ammunition train was brought up and the men's cartridge boxes filled, and every preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the next morning, should the enemy be in force; unfortunately the morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view of the country being obtained. So that it was not till seven a.m. that it was ascertained the enemy had retired entirely from the mountain.

GEO. G. MEADE.

Gen. John P. Hatch, who had commanded the First Division of the First Corps from just prior to the second battle of Bull Run, was ordered by Gen. Joseph Hooker with three brigades to advance by a detour to the north of the old United States turnpike and dislodge the enemy from the mountain. These brigades were commanded by Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday, Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick, and Col. Walter Phelps. The First Brigade, Phelps', was composed of the 22d, 24th, and 30th New York, the 14th Brooklyn (New York Militia), 84th New York Volunteers, and the 2d U. S. Sharpshooters; the Second Brigade, Doubleday's, of the 56th Pennsylvania Volunteers, 76th and 95th New York Volunteers, and 7th Indiana; the Third Brigade, Pat-

rick's, of the 20th, 21st, 23d, and 35th New York Volunteers. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, with his (Iron) brigade of the 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin Volunteers and the 19th Indiana Volunteers, with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, of Hatch's division, received orders from Major General McClellan to move up the United States turnpike and carry the pass, which he did by advancing the battery along the turnpike and his infantry north and south of it. General Hatch was a brave and skillful soldier, possessed of indomitable energy and dash. He moved from the turnpike to the north, along a narrow wagon road at the base of the South Mountain about half a mile, then turned to the westward and ascended the mountain where it was so steep in places that his officers were obliged to walk and lead their horses. When he reached a bench about three-quarters of the way up toward the summit, he formed his brigade in three lines, with Patrick's in advance as skirmishers, then Colonel Phelps', with Doubleday's in the third line of battle. The lines were formed on the eastern edge of the wood which covered the side of the mountain to near the top, and with his usual impetuosity he ordered General Patrick to charge and uncover the enemy. After waiting some time and hearing little or no firing from Patrick, who had gone to the left of the enemy, he became impatient and ordered the second line to advance and clear the mountain, directing the charge himself. Phelps' men responded with alacrity, as they always did, went forward rapidly, and drove the enemy from what seemed almost an impregnable position. In this charge Phelps lost some men killed and wounded, but held the ground taken. General Hatch was severely wounded in the calf of the leg, which kept him from the field nearly a year, and he never entirely recovered from its effects. The loss of his services was sorely felt, he being one of the best officers in the corps. When wounded and compelled to leave the field, he went quietly and alone to avoid attracting the attention of his troops.

As soon as he was gone Capt. H. L. Cranford, his acting adjutant general, rode rapidly down the mountain and ordered General Doubleday, in the name of General Hatch, to advance. His troops being in line awaiting orders, General Doubleday instantly gave the command "forward," and rode with his staff in advance of his line until he had passed through the woods to the edge of a clearing and occupied the line held by Colonel Phelps' brigade, which he ordered to fall back ten paces and have his men lie down, holding himself in readiness for any sudden emergency.

On the way up the mountain General Doubleday was informed that General Hatch had been wounded and left the field. He at once assumed command of the division, which he held till after the battle of Fredericksburg in December, 1862, when he was assigned to the command of the Third Division of the Corps.

When General Hatch was wounded he left no orders for the division, but Captain Cranford at once assumed the responsibility of ordering up General Doubleday in General Hatch's name.

It was nearly dark when General Doubleday received the order, and the enemy fought so stubbornly that it was after nine o'clock at night before the firing ceased. Some time after nine o'clock, when General Doubleday's brigade had nearly exhausted its ammunition, General Ricketts came groping his way through the woods in the direction of the firing, and when he arrived said: "Doubleday, I thought you were having a hard time here and might need help; I have brought my division here without orders." Doubleday ordered his men to lie down and General Ricketts moved his men over them, fired a few volleys, and the victory was ours. General Ricketts' division went into the action on the right of Doubleday, and General Meade's division on the extreme right of our line of battle. This movement flanked the enemy out of the pass, and the old United States turnpike was free to our advance. General

Ricketts' noble conduct in this instance needs no comment ; it reflects greater glory upon him than any words can do. General Doubleday continued in command of his brigade until the battle was over, when he formally assumed command of the division. The fighting was stubborn and severe. Colonel Wainwright of the 76th New York was wounded in the arm and left the field, which left Doubleday's old brigade in command of Lt. Col. J. Wm. Hofmann, of the 56th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, a gallant and efficient officer.

Among the brave men who fell in that action was one who deserves special mention, Charles E. Stamp of the 76th Regiment, New York Volunteers, a lad of immature years, tall and handsome, with a smooth face, full of resolution, and who seemed inspired with patriotism at the second battle of Bull Run. When the color-bearer was shot down—as several had been before him—young Stamp stepped out in front of the line and asked General Doubleday to let him carry the colors ; his request was granted, and he bore them with great pride and apparent satisfaction. At this battle the regimental line, while charging up through the woods, became somewhat broken in passing so many trees ; seeing this irregular line, and mistaking it for a lack of courage in the men, Stamp stepped forward into the clearing a few feet or yards, put his standard on a rock, turned to the regiment, and said : "Boys, come up to that !" The regiment assumed a correct alignment on the colors as if by magic ; but the spirit of the young hero had fled, a minie ball having pierced his brain.

An incident worthy of note occurred on the day following the battle, September 15 ; Corporal Benjamin Van Valkenburg, of Company I, 76th New York Volunteers, who had been detailed as an orderly at division headquarters, was sent out in search of provisions for the mess, when, on coming to a small mountain stream in the road, he suddenly discovered five Confederate soldiers filling their canteens. Van said he was frightened nearly to death, but

knew if he ran they would kill him, so drawing his revolver he rushed at them and demanded their instant surrender; there was some little hesitation, but as he threatened to shoot, and some of them had laid down their guns, the others followed suit, and all came in and were marched back to headquarters.

CHAPTER VII.

ANTIETAM.

WHEN the heavy mist on South Mountain tardily cleared away on the morning of the 15th of September, it was ascertained that the enemy had retreated down the western slope.

McClellan knew, from Lee's own order, where the enemy was, as well as the Confederate commander himself did. Longstreet and D. H. Hill were near Boonsboro, a small town on the old national road, not far from the western base of the mountain. But it possessed a military advantage from the fact that there were several roads diverging from it to points in that vicinity. The national road runs northwest to Williamsport; one leads south to Rohersville; while another, in a southwesterly direction, passes through Keedysville, crossing the Antietam midway between that little railroad village and Sharpsburg, thence across the Potomac, where it greets Shepherdstown on the West Virginia side.

Jackson's corps was to take a circuitous route so as to invest Bolivar Heights, his left resting on the Potomac, with his right on the Shenandoah. Walker's division was to occupy Loudon Heights, and McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's divisions, was to move up in the rear of Maryland Heights and invest them.

Thus McClellan had a full and perfect knowledge of the movements of the whole of Lee's army, and that, too, before he fought the battle of South Mountain. The mountain range is rent in twain by the Potomac, while

two high peaks—Maryland and Loudon Heights—are the natural military fortifications of that place.

Harper's Ferry is an amphitheater at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah, hundreds of feet below these two majestic points. McClellan could either throw his army to the left, and fall on the two divisions of McLaws on Maryland Heights, where he was isolated from Jackson and Walker entirely, without any hope of aid from Longstreet and Hill. It is quite evident that McLaws would have been a sure prey to McClellan, if he, McClellan, had boldly assaulted him with his army, except the First Corps, which was on the extreme right and held the national road, and would have prevented Longstreet and D. H. Hill from returning from Boonsboro.

Besides the attack on McLaws it would have been a notice to Miles to "hold the fort" a little while longer, until he could be relieved.

With McClellan's army surrounding McLaws on three sides, there was but little hope of more than a short resistance on his part with a mere handful of men in comparison to McClellan's army.

It is true that McLaws would have made those heights famous in a desperate struggle to hold them, but it would have been a short and bloody conflict.

McClellan's army was massed too far to the right. Three corps and one division remained idle on the 14th, the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth, and Couch's division. Fitz-John Porter, in his report, says:

On the morning of the 14th of September, I reported in person to the major general commanding the Army of the Potomac and troops engaged in the defense of Washington, and resumed command of Sykes' division and that portion of the Reserve Artillery not distributed to the corps. This portion of the command was held in readiness to take part in the battle of South Mountain, but so gallantly and successfully were the enemy driven from the heights by Burnside and Sumner that its services were not called for.

The First Corps carried the heights known as Turner's

Gap, through which the national road passes, while the Ninth Corps followed Braddock's route more to the left or south of it. McLaws, fearing he would be hemmed in, sent a force back to Crampton's Gap with orders to hold it if the "last man was lost in the endeavor."

Not only did McLaws have fears of Crampton's Gap, but of Brownsville, about a mile south of it, and his troops were stationed on the mountain to be ready to march to either or both as necessity might require.

But Weverton Pass, near the Potomac, afforded another approach to Maryland Heights that McClellan might advance through and at once relieve Harper's Ferry, as it was on the river but a few miles below, and if that point was attacked and carried, McLaws would be compelled to abandon his siege on Maryland Heights. Then again, if a heavy force of the Union Army had appeared at Weverton Pass the battle could have been distinctly heard at the ferry above and greatly delayed the surrender.

Gen. George J. Stannard, of Vermont, whose record on the field of battle shines with a golden luster, was a colonel then, under the command of General Miles. His statement to the writer, just before he died, was that the sound of battle seemed to die away, instead of growing nearer, which would not have been the case if Weverton Pass had been attacked. Stannard advised Miles to follow the cavalry out and abandon the ferry, leaving only the stores for the enemy to capture. If this advice had been followed McLaws would have been in a still worse condition, for Miles' force would then have constituted the right wing of the attack on the morning of the 15th.

Weverton Pass was occupied by two brigades of Anderson's division—Wright's and Pryor's. If the Twelfth Corps, under Mansfield, had been left as a reserve to Reno and Hooker, and the Second Corps sent to Weverton Pass on the afternoon of the 14th and attacked Wright and Pryor, those two brigades must have yielded to the superior force of the veterans of that corps. Then Fitz-John Porter's

corps, assisting Franklin's at Crampton and Brownsville Gaps, would have swept the enemy from those two points, and placed McLaws, on the morning of the 15th, at the mercy of three corps and Couch's division. That would have left two corps, the Ninth and Twelfth, within easy reach if needed.

The effective force of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps and Couch's division was too overwhelming for McLaws to have successfully resisted. But for him Harper's Ferry was in no danger, and he is entitled to the credit of its capture. If he had retired, as directed by General Lee, there would have been, in all probability, no surrender. Walker's artillery, on Loudon Heights, did but little damage, and even if Jackson had strongly pressed the works, Miles could have retired to Maryland Heights and saved his command but for McLaws' presence. Besides, Jackson could not have compelled a surrender until McClellan's army, tardily as it moved, came to its relief.

Lee was fearful that a copy of his order was in McClellan's possession, and he was greatly distressed for McLaws' safety, as evidenced by the dispatch, received by courier during the night of the 14th by McLaws, from General Lee's headquarters, signed by R. H. Chilton, adjutant general, which reads as follows :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
September 14, 1862—8 p. m.

GENERAL :—The day has gone against us, and the army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position to-night. Send your trains not required on the road to cross the river ; your troops you must have well in hand to unite with this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers to explore the way and ascertain the best crossings of the Potomac, and if you can find between yourself and Shepherdstown any road for the command, send an officer to report to me, on the Shepherdstown road, where you are and what crossing you will take. * * *

Respectfully yours,
R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Later in the night he received another dispatch from General Lee :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
September 14—11:15 p. m.

GENERAL :—In addition to what has been said relative to the abandonment of Weverton * * * I will mention that you might cross the Potomac below Weverton into Virginia. I believe there is a ford at the Point of Rocks at Berlin below, but do not know if it is accessible to you. The enemy from Jefferson seems to have forced a passage at Crampton's Gap, which may leave all on the river clear. This portion of the command will take position at Centerville, commonly called Rittersville, two and one-half miles from Boonsboro, on the Sharpsburg Road, with a view of preventing the enemy, that may enter the gap at Boonsboro, from cutting you off, etc. If you can pass the river hard by Harper's Ferry, or pass the mountain below Crampton's Gap, toward Sharpsburg, let me know. I will be found at or near Centerville. * * *

By order of General Lee :

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant General.

He also received the following, sent him by Colonel Munford :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
September 14, 1862—10:15 p. m.

COLONEL :—Hold your position at Rohersville, if possible, and if you can discover or hear of a practical road by which McLaws, at Weverton at present, can pass over the mountains to Sharpsburg, send him a messenger to guide him immediately to Colonel Munford, Rohersville.

By order of General Lee :

R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lee's official orders, quoted above, fully give McLaws the credit of the capture of Harper's Ferry. If he had abandoned the heights on the 14th, as directed, Franklin's command would have arrived in time to prevent the surrender, as there would have been no enemy in his front to retard his march. The fact of the evacuation of Maryland Heights would have been enough to have assured the officers and soldiers of Miles' command that McClellan's army was so near at hand that McLaws was compelled to retreat. Besides, Franklin's advance would have soon

made its appearance on the Maryland side, if McLaws had withdrawn during the night of the 14th, as directed by General Lee.

As it was, the firing did not cease until ten o'clock a.m. of the 15th, and then began the usual preliminaries for a surrender, which occupied considerable time. Then the officers began their work of paroling, and the disgraceful surrender was completed.

If McClellan had pressed his army well to the left, and forced McLaws to surrender, he would have saved the troops at the ferry. Then Lee would have been compelled to retreat back into Virginia in a very damaged condition. One of Lee's generals—Longstreet—said to me: "If he (McClellan) had attacked and captured McLaws, it would have been hard for him (Lee) to have effectually reorganized his army."

General McLaws, a graduate of West Point, was a very able officer, and a man of candor—whose opinions on that battle are the best authority, hence the length of my quotation from him. He further said:

If General Jackson had failed in the assault, no one who will consider the condition of the Confederate forces, scattered and separated from each other, those with General Lee pressed by a largely superior force, with General Jackson across the river from him, near to a large force that had repulsed his assault, ready and in position to attack in his rear should he attempt to join General Lee; with my two divisions between the force in Harper's Ferry and Franklin, and no way to join General Lee, or to receive aid from him; and Walker's division across both the Potomac and Shenandoah, with the force in Harper's Ferry between him and General Lee, you will see that the situation of each of the scattered commands would have been precarious in the extreme. The hoisting of the white flag upon the outer works was not regarded as a request to cease firing until it had been hoisted over the town as well; and it was ten o'clock before the firing ceased. This cannot be refuted. General Franklin certainly did not know anything about it, and had done nothing to inform himself as to the condition of affairs in Harper's Ferry. It, therefore, cannot be accepted as an excuse for not advancing against me on the morning of the 15th, when he says, "that Harper's Ferry

surrendered at eight o'clock," quoting General McClellan as authority, who wrote what was quoted after the battle of Antietam, and who was more ignorant upon the subject than Franklin, as he was five miles more distant; Harper's Ferry did not surrender at eight o'clock, nor did the Confederate cannon cease firing upon the town until ten o'clock, for the reasons heretofore given, and it was not until after the firing had ceased that a white flag was received, acknowledged by General Jackson, and a conference agreed on. And then the preliminaries before the interview, and the interview itself, must have taken some time, and the terms offered, I suppose, were submitted to the consideration of a council comprised of the ranking officers of the command. Therefore, I think it reasonable to suppose that the actual agreement to surrender did not take place before twelve o'clock on the 15th, and that up to eleven o'clock nothing positive had been done. General White says that General Miles at or about nine o'clock called a council of the officers commanding brigades and conferred with them upon the propriety of surrendering. This took some time. Then, after it was determined to hoist the white flags, they were hoisted on the lines outside the city, more than a mile distant. After this was done General Miles was wounded by the cannonade which was still kept up. So I think that the time stated when the firing ceased against Harper's Ferry, at ten o'clock, is correct and confirmed by Federal reports. My object is to show that General Franklin had ample time, on the morning of the 15th, to advance his forces and engage mine, which were in line but a mile and a half distant from Crampton's Gap, and that the sound of his cannon would have been a notice to the garrison in Harper's Ferry that relief was coming, and as his guns would have been fired directly towards Harper's Ferry, which was not three miles distant, in an air-line, they would have been doubtless heard by the garrison. Even if it should have so happened that Franklin had not advanced until negotiations had been actually commenced, the sound of his cannon would have changed the possibilities of extrication from the surrounding fire that the garrison would have had a right to obtain, and certainly it was reasonable to ask for more liberal terms than could be expected when there was no likelihood of rescue. They could have asked that they be allowed to march out with arms in their hands and with colors flying, or they would stand an assault and defend the place *a l'outrance*.

If General Franklin's orders contemplated the relief of the besieged garrison in Harper's Ferry, he would have effected it with more chances of success if he had made Weverton Pass his point of attack, for a mere demonstration there would have made known to the garrison that McClellan's forces were coming and that they

must "hold the fort." And it would have diminished the chances for the escape of my command should Harper's Ferry not surrender. But by going to Crampton's Gap, although he feared it, a way was left for me to retire through Weverton to the ford at Point of Rocks, below at Weverton. General Lee's anxiety was from the belief that McClellan would send reënforcements to Franklin with orders to press me at once, and accordingly presented front to McClellan at Rohersville and trailed him away from me, leaving Franklin without reënforcements. Having done this he apparently felt no longer any anxiety on my account so far as Franklin's forces were concerned, but formed line of battle against McClellan at Sharpsburg in order to keep him where he was, on the Antietam, intending probably to carry out his original intention to cross the river at Sharpsburg, should McClellan push him before General Jackson arrived. But McClellan not doing so, and Harper's Ferry in the mean time having surrendered, Jackson's force was free to join the main body ; but I suppose that General Lee, then believing that he could reunite his forces in time to offer battle with his whole army, determined to try it. I think that enough has been taken from the Records of the War of the Rebellion, to show that the campaign of 1862 really hinged on Harper's Ferry ; that General Miles, by holding on to the town, as he was most positively ordered to do, gave the opportunity to McClellan to engage General Lee's forces in detail, each separate force with a vastly superior one, and that McClellan failed to avail himself of it, although he had been made aware of the scattered condition of Lee's army by finding a copy of Special Order, No. 191, heretofore given, which was picked up in the camp of one of General Lee's commands at Frederick, Maryland, and handed to General McClellan when his army arrived there, following General Lee, wherein the position of each division was given.

It will be observed that General McLaws fully confirms my view that McClellan should have reënforced Franklin heavily, as he positively knew the position and location of the whole of Lee's army.

Mansfield's corps was a sufficient reserve to the forces under Hooker and Reno against D. H. Hill and Longstreet. As Fitz-John Porter said in his report, the reserve force was not called into action, as Hooker and Reno carried the mountain without assistance. Franklin had also been successful on the extreme left.

Gen. Howell Cobb, who was directed by General Mc-

Laws to return with his brigade and assume command, said in his official report :

When I reached the gap I found both General Munford and Colonel Parkham active and energetic in the discharge of their duty, which continued to the end of the fight. Shortly after the lines were broken, and I was endeavoring to rally the troops, General Semmes appeared on the field, and, at great exposure and with great coolness and courage, gave me his cordial aid and coöperation.


If it had not been wisdom to place Sumner with the Second Corps at Weverton Pass, and Fitz-John Porter with Franklin in the beginning of the action, undoubtedly the proper thing would have been to reënforce Franklin with at least two corps the moment the whole of South Mountain was carried.

The Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps, which had not been engaged, could have marched on the 14th to the assistance of Franklin and arrived there shortly after dark. Then McLaws could have been attacked early on the morning of the 15th with four corps and Couch's strong division.

McLaws formed a line of battle in Pleasant Valley early on the morning of the 15th with his whole command, except one regiment left on Maryland Heights. Suppose the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps had borne down on him by nine o'clock, could he or any other general have withstood such an overwhelming force, and would not only McLaws' command have been compelled to surrender, but Miles, in Harper's Ferry would have refused to capitulate, but on the other hand would have likely followed and attacked Jackson in his retreat.

Then, instead of a battle at Antietam, the fight with McLaws would have ended the campaign in Maryland, for Lee would have retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown, while Walker and Jackson would have retired up the valley sadder but wiser generals. Lee then could have been rapidly forced up the valley and could not have defended Richmond.

The following, from General Rosecrans, explains itself :



CAPT. JAMES THOMPSON.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, REGISTER'S OFFICE,

July 23, 1889.

DEAR SIR :—I have read your manuscript chapter of the operations of the Army of the Potomac on the 14th and 15th of September, 1862.

It demonstrates that we lost a garrison and a great opportunity to do irreparable injury to the Confederate army under General Lee.

Yours truly, W. S. ROSECRANS.

J. H. STINE, Washington, D. C.

Maj. C. A. Richardson, of the 126th New York Regiment, is under the impression that the surrender took place earlier than McLaws states. That regiment was stationed on Maryland Heights until the abandonment of that strong military position by the order of Colonel Ford. The regiment had just entered the service when it was ordered to Harper's Ferry at that perilous moment. It received an uncalled-for, unsavory record, through the statements of the acting adjutant, S. A. Barras, who fled to the rear when the firing began, and reported to Miles and Ford, and to a correspondent of the New York *Tribune*, that he was there to stop the cowards from the 126th New York Regiment from running away. This false and sensational story was believed at the time and widely published, especially in New York State. It greatly damaged the record of the regiment, and caused the major to be dismissed from the service; but on the War Department learning that Adjutant Barras' statements were false, Maj. William H. Baird was restored to his rank and served until in front of Petersburg, where he was killed.

When Maryland Heights was abandoned the 126th New York was ordered to occupy Bolivar Heights. The regiment was in no sympathy with the idea of surrendering. To such extent were they opposed to it, that when Colonel Trimble was carrying the white flag one of our batteries fired four or five shots more, and the Confederate batteries again opened on the whole line.

Capt. Truman N. Burrill, of the 126th New York, says "that just at that juncture General Miles walked up and

directed Captain Phillips, of the 126th New York, to get something white and wave it. Captain Phillips said "I shall do nothing of the kind ; I never played the coward's act and I shall not commence it this morning." Miles said, "Do you know to whom you are talking?" Phillips replied, "I suppose I am talking to Colonel Miles ; I know I am talking to a d—d traitor."

General Miles intimated to Captain Phillips that "he would prefer charges against him when the battle was over." The above is the statement of Captain Burrill, who was only a few feet away.

Major Richardson, who was then a lieutenant, says : "When General Miles was shot on Bolivar Heights, September 15, he was in my rear about 40 feet distant. He had ordered Captain Phillips to raise something white, which Phillips refused to do. When Miles was shot Phillips said aloud, so that Miles' staff must have heard it, 'Good ;' we all felt it, if we did not say it, and the feeling of the men was so bitter against Miles that it was difficult to find enough who were willing to carry him from the field. The remark of Captain Phillips was well known to have been made and was published, but no attention was ever given to it by superior officers or any friends of Miles."

Captain Burrill said : "Immediately after the colloquy between General Miles and Captain Phillips, Miles received his mortal wound, only a short distance from them." Whereupon Burrill, and he thinks Phillips, joined with him in directing him (Miles) to be taken off the field to the hospital, where he was attended to by the surgeon of the 126th New York, Dr. Fletcher M. Hammond.

Thus sadly ended the military and earthly career of one who, if he had placed nearly all of his batteries and a strong force of men on Maryland Heights, would have sent his name thundering down through the corridors of time as a military genius of great renown. If McClellan had attacked McLaws, that battle would have been the Austerlitz of America, and McClellan's fame would have shone as brightly in America as Napoleon's or Wellington's in Europe.

Headly says: "When it is remembered that just one month had elapsed since Napoleon took command of the Army of Italy at Nice, that only sixteen days had intervened between the time when his headquarters were at Savona and when they were at Cherasco, that in that interval the combined armies of Austria and Sardinia had been severed, and one driven in confusion and disgrace toward Milan, and the other annihilated; that the haughty and selfish Kingdoms of Piedmont, Sardinia and Savoy had been precipitated into the dust; that the Alps had been passed, and the immortal battles of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego and Mondovi had been fought," is it surprising that had McClellan done half such work as Napoleon did in Italy on that campaign it would have so seriously crippled Lee, after South Mountain, that he would have never crossed the Potomac? But it seems that the enemy rather presumed that McClellan would follow Longstreet and D. H. Hill, so Jackson hastily left Harper's Ferry, with the divisions of Starke and Lawton, for Sharpsburg. These divisions were commanded at Gainesville by Ewell and Taliaferro, who were both wounded there.

Longstreet and D. H. Hill fell back on the 13th across the Antietam; Longstreet formed on the right of the road before described, coming from Boonsboro through Keedysville, and tracing across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. It was important for them to guard that road with more than jealous care, for it was their only route of retreat if a great reverse happened. Longstreet's line stretched well down the Antietam, below bridge number 3, known as the Burnside Bridge. D. H. Hill formed on the left of that road, with his left resting in the direction of the celebrated Dunker Church, which is on the road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, perhaps a mile from Sharpsburg. The Army of the Potomac pursued with Richardson in the advance, followed closely by Hooker, Sumner and Mansfield.

When Sykes struck the Antietam he filed to the left, while Richardson formed on the right of the road leading

from Keedysville to Sharpsburg. The other two divisions of Sumner were massed behind Richardson, while Hooker formed the First Corps on the right of Richardson, with Pleasonton's cavalry on his flank, and Mansfield supporting him. It was late in the afternoon of the 15th when the two armies were again facing each other across the sluggish waters of the Antietam. The Comte de Paris says, in his second volume: "Thus McClellan had in hand thirteen divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, raising the nominal effective to 66,000 men, no less than 45,000 or 50,000 of whom were certainly ready for battle. Lee, who had scarcely more than 25,000 men to oppose him, had confined himself to rectifying his line of battle."

It must be remembered that the Comte de Paris, who is an eminent military scholar, came over from France and was appointed an aid on McClellan's staff so he could fully understand our war. This explanation is made to show that he was personally friendly to McClellan. If he was partial to any of our generals it was "Little Mac." But he would not sacrifice the truth; that would ruin his work, and reduce it to the scale of fiction.

Lee was not wishing "for night or a Blucher," but for night or a Jackson.

McClellan occupied the whole of that afternoon in making observations and studying the battlefield without advancing. Both armies rested near each other expecting that at the dawn in the morning another great battle would begin. To their great disappointment all was quiet along the line, which was, however, ascribed to a heavy fog that lingered in the valley, as if warning the combatants that they had no right to commence the work of death and destruction there.

It was not until one or two o'clock on the 16th that McClellan fully decided how he was going to fight the battle. The Antietam is a quiet stream, but difficult to ford with infantry and artillery.

Where the national cemetery is, Lee placed all of his


available artillery. It is a high point just east of Sharpsburg on the right of the road to Keedysville. From that position he could sweep Richardson's and Sykes' front, and greatly annoy Burnside's right down to our extreme left. That disposition of his artillery was made to enable him to rob the center of infantry to reënforce the left, where he anticipated McClellan would make his main attack. Their troops, after the first day, were well concealed until the action began, while all of ours, except on the extreme right, were in full view. Lee was an able general, and studied the ground where he was going to give or accept battle.

By the time McClellan ordered an advance, on the afternoon of the 16th, Jackson had formed on D. H. Hill's left, Hood holding the extreme left in the woods around the Dunker Church.

About two o'clock on the afternoon of the 16th General Hooker received orders to advance and turn the left flank of the enemy under Hood, the corps, as indicated above, marching in columns until the right division under Doubleday reached nearer to the Hagerstown pike. The skirmish line of this division was thrown forward west of the pike, in the direction of the Potomac, by E. P. Halstead, adjutant general of the division. It was a critical work to perform in view of the fact that Meade's pickets were so hotly engaged during the night that more than once a battle was quite imminent. It was not until after midnight that Halstead considered it safe to leave the line and return to report to Doubleday, whom he found sleeping under his blanket in the midst of his men. Hooker directed a squadron of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry forward to develop the enemy. In the meantime General Meade, who was in command of the Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered to cross the main stem of the Antietam and engage the enemy—the divisions of Doubleday and Ricketts moving abreast, with Meade's division formed in columns of attack, with the artillery well closed up, as the enemy was evidently massed but a short distance in his front.

General Meade directed Colonel McNeil to deploy his regiment of Bucktails as skirmishers, and Captain Byrnes, commanding the 3d Regiment, was also directed to advance four companies as skirmishers to occupy the woods on the right. The skirmish line met with such a stubborn resistance that General Seymour, commanding the First Brigade, was ordered forward to their support with Cooper's battery. Here the 1st Rifles (Bucktails) met with a severe loss—Colonel McNeil was killed while leading forward his regiment. Col. R. Biddle Roberts, of the 1st Regiment of the Reserves, was assigned temporarily to the command of the brigade, and Capt. W. Cooper Talley was placed in command of the regiment at midnight by General Warren. Immediately upon assuming command, Captain Talley doubled the picket line in front of his regiment, and in person advanced it a distance of from 50 to 100 yards and drove back the enemy's pickets. The decided vantage ground thus gained was maintained during the engagement.

Meade put Ransom's battery in position, supported by Magilton's and Anderson's (Second and Third) brigades. Simpson's battery was posted in the rear, and played effectively on a battery of the enemy that was attempting to drive back Seymour's brigade. The enemy was concealed in a cornfield near the Dunker Church, which at first gave him a great advantage, until the corn was partly mowed down by the artillery; then he retreated to the woods around the Dunker Church, where a great portion of Lee's left wing was well protected by ledges of rocks and timber. But an army acting on the defensive has the advantage of choosing positions which are aimed to be as detrimental to the attacking force as possible, and that was especially Lee's idea on his extreme left at Antietam, for McClellan had been on the left bank from the afternoon of the 15th, and given ample notice where he would deal the heaviest blow. Lee did not care whether Longstreet had more than one light brigade to defend the whole of his line from the center of Sharpsburg to his extreme right or not.



A. J. Warner.

Everything was devoted to the left center and extreme left. The two picket lines were so close to each other, during the night of the 16th, that the firing several times seemed as if a battle was imminent. Hooker and Meade were both called to the front from the Poffenberger barn, where their headquarters were that night, to see the condition of affairs.

Doubleday had arranged his division for the conflict, with General Patrick's brigade on the extreme right in a piece of woods, Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann's brigade on his left connecting with Meade's right, holding the brigades of Gibbon and Phelps massed in the rear as reserves.

On the left of the corps Ricketts had thrown forward the Third Brigade under that gallant soldier, General Hart-suff; with the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. Wm. A. Christian, toward the left of the Third, and the First Brigade, under General Duryea, in reserve. When day began to dawn in the east both armies were ready for their deadly work.

The enemy made a heavy attack not only on Meade's front, but along the line of the First Corps. Meade had placed Magilton and Anderson on the right of Seymour, so that his whole division was engaged with the exception of the 10th Reserves, under Lieut. Col. A. J. Warner, which was detached and sent to the right to resist an anticipated flank movement by the enemy. In the action there Warner did such valuable work that Meade highly recommended him for promotion.

Hooker was overhopeful that morning; he was never himself unless he was riding the line of battle almost at full speed. He courted danger and laughed at fear.

When the battle opened that morning four generals, Hooker, Meade, Doubleday, and Ricketts, whose names are household words, were on the line of battle before the stars had fairly disappeared from the heavens.

As Ricketts moved forward he encountered the three brigades of D. H. Hill, while Meade in the center struck

Starke's division, and with the aid of Doubleday's left, after an hour's desperate fighting, swept Starke back on the Dunker Church.

Meade was well advanced into the cornfield and attempted to cross the Hagerstown road near the Dunker Church. Early in the morning Doubleday on the right had rearranged his division, giving Gibbon the advance, supported by Phelps' brigade and Patrick to follow in twenty minutes.

Hofmann's brigade, by order of Hooker, was left to support the batteries and prevent a flank attack from the right, with his brigade facing west.

Gibbon advanced the 2d and 6th Wisconsin Regiments as a heavy skirmish line, supported by the 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana. Quite an amusing incident occurred as the skirmish line was advancing through the woods in the rear of Miller's house. Gibbon sent his compliments by Lieutenant Haskell, of his staff, to Lieut. Col. E. S. Bragg, commanding the 6th Wisconsin, "to advance as far as it was safe." Bragg said to Haskell, "Give General Gibbon my compliments, and tell him it has been d—d unsafe here for the last thirty minutes;" and pulling his hat down over his face said, "Forward, 6th Wisconsin!" The two regiments on the skirmish line forged ahead until they reached the edge of the cornfield so noted in history; then the 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana were deployed in line of battle on the right, when the Iron Brigade moved forward on Meade's right, facing a deadly fire from the front, and suffering heavily from an enfilading fire from the woods on the right, where General Stuart, with a battery of horse artillery, and a body of Confederate cavalry was well posted for work.

The 2d and 6th Wisconsin, on the left of the Iron Brigade, were under equally as heavy fire as the right wing, and Phelps' and Patrick's brigades; many brave boys from those two Wisconsin regiments surrendered their lives for the perpetuity of the Union. Lieutenant Colonel Allen of

the 2d, and Lieutenant Colonel Bragg of the 6th were both wounded.

The 19th Indiana lost heavily in a gallant but ill-advised charge, ordered and led by Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Bachman, to capture a section of artillery posted in the cornfield to the front and left. This battery was supported by a Texas regiment that suddenly rose up and delivered a most fatal volley into the 19th Indiana when it was charging. Bachman was mortally wounded, and the regiment almost annihilated.

Capt. W. W. Dudley then assumed command of the regiment, and ordered his command to fall back to the regular line of battle, the 19th Indiana being far in advance.

Sergeant W. W. Macy ordered John Yost, Thomas, and Henry Kirby to bring back Lieutenant Colonel Bachman, who was dying. While Sergeant Macy was caring for Bachman in his expiring moments he (Macy) was hit in the head. He had to make his way through Patrick's brigade. As he went back all covered with blood, General Patrick turned to his command and said: "Make way and let that brave man through."

General Gates, in his excellent history of the Ulster Guard, relates the following: "Passing back again through the woods, two Confederate colonels and one brigadier were found on the ground, and interspersed with the multitudes of their fallen, there were so many of those National uniforms that at a glance one might see how fearful was the cost of the victory. Upon one dead body was found a large black dog that had been killed from some chance shot which had struck him whilst stretched upon his master's breast.—W. J. Pollock of the Ulster Guard."

When the left of the 20th New York made a charge under Major Hardenburgh to help save the 6th Wisconsin, (the enemy were so determined to capture Battery B, Jackson had ordered it taken at any sacrifice), the two lines were so near to each other that Isaac Thomas, of the Ulster Guard, shot the color-bearer and captured the flag.

General Doubleday was fearful of a flank movement from the right, and therefore ordered the Second Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann, to hold a position near the Hagerstown pike, in the rear of the line of battle, to checkmate any movement of that kind. No army in the world ever had a better brigade commander than Hofmann. Always on the alert, there was no danger that the enemy would steal a march on him. The magic of his voice in battle has thrilled the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac on more than one battlefield. The 95th New York was detached by Hooker to support a battery near the front, leaving the 7th Indiana, 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania under the direct command of Hofmann.

Ricketts was so sorely pressed that Hooker directed Meade to send him a brigade. To comply with the request would leave a gap in his line, yet he must obey the order, as Hooker knew the whole line better than any other officer, and was handling his corps with great skill.

The following letter from General McClellan will fully substantiate the above statement :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Sharpsburg, September 20, 1862.

MY DEAR HOOKER :—I have been very sick the last few days, and just able to go where my presence was absolutely necessary, so I could not come to see you and thank you for what you did the other day, and express my intense regret and sympathy for your unfortunate wound.

Had you not been wounded when you were, I believe the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the Confederate army, for I know that with you at its head your corps would have kept on until it gained the main road. As a slight expression of what I think of your merit, I have requested that the brigadier general's commission, rendered vacant by Mansfield's death, may be given to you. I will this evening write a private note to the President on the subject, and I am glad to assure you that, so far as I can learn, it is the universal feeling of the army that you are the most deserving in it.

With the sincere hope that your health will soon be restored, so that you may again be with us in the field, I am, dear general, your sincere friend,

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major General.

Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER, Commanding Corps.

When Meade took Magilton out of the center and directed him to go to Ricketts' assistance, the enemy made a dash and filled the gap, with the hope of piercing our center. Meade saw that it was a critical condition, and that soon our line would be broken unless the enemy was repulsed at once. He directed Ransom to turn his battery on their advancing column in the gap, and also ordered Seymour and Anderson to pour in an enfilading fire, that compelled them to retreat into the cornfield.

Ricketts seeing Meade's dangerous position came to his assistance. Doubleday's Third Brigade, the First (Phelps') and the Fourth (Gibbon's) were already engaged. Patrick's was a solid New York brigade: 21st, under Colonel Wm. F. Rogers; 23d, commanded by Colonel Henry C. Hofmann; the 25th, Colonel Newton B. Lord, with the 80th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gates; the last regiment is known in the history of the Empire State as the Ulster Guard. The latter was ordered to support Battery B; the left was thrown forward to strengthen the 6th Wisconsin. When Patrick arrived at the front he was directed to advance his brigade to the right of the turnpike. As he moved up he discovered a force of the enemy moving around our right flank, and attempting to gain our rear. He notified General Doubleday, who directed that the 30th New York be sent to checkmate the move.

Patrick, stripped of two of his regiments, moved forward with the 21st and 35th New York Regiments to assist Gibbon and Phelps. At this juncture our troops in the cornfield were being forced back on Patrick's left.

Colonel Hofmann had been relieved from his work on the right and reported to Patrick, when he (Patrick) directed the 21st, 23d, and 30th New York, 19th Indiana, and 7th Wisconsin to make a dash on the advancing enemy to help save Gibbon's left and Battery B. The 35th New York, under Lord, dashed forward and captured the colors of the regiment that was trying to take Battery B.

The enemy rallied again, forced our line back, and at the same time renewed the attack on our right flank, which compelled Patrick to take advantage of a line of rocks, which he held; in the mean time Doubleday ordered Hofmann to put his brigade in to assist Gibbon, who had suffered so severely, but Hooker revoked Doubleday's order, and said he wanted Hofmann to remain where he had been posted.

The troops in that small space swung to and fro like a pendulum, for three corps, the First, Twelfth, and Second, all fought over the same ground, only to have it held later in the day by Franklin until night put an end to the conflict.

The best way to convey a correct idea how the Pennsylvania Reserves suffered in that battle, will be to take the 9th Regiment, as the sheet of leaden hail greeted the whole division about the same. Sergeant Blanchard was wounded with the colors; Walter Beatly had scarcely raised them up when he fell mortally wounded; Roberts next took them, but no time had elapsed until he was killed; then Edward Doran gave a splendid illustration of the genuine rich character and presence of mind, by seizing the colors, and lying on his back, held them up until the line was relieved by the Twelfth Corps. For that gallant and heroic act Doran was made a noncommissioned officer on the field.

The Iron Brigade, under Gibbon, was melting away under the steady fire in front and the raking, enfilading fire from the right, so General Doubleday ordered Col. Walter Phelps, Jr., to bring up his brigade, composed of the 22d New York, under Capt. John D. O'Brian; 30th New York, under Col. William M. Searing; 14th Brooklyn, under William H. de Bevoise, and the 2d United States Sharpshooters, commanded by Col. Henry A. V. Post.

When Colonel Phelps moved up the fire from the right was so severe that he ordered Colonel Post to take his Sharpshooters and dislodge the enemy in that direction if possible. No regiment in the service went to the front with more

alacrity than the Sharpshooters. Col. Post gave the command and the gallant boys were soon at their work. Phelps soon observed that the Sharpshooters were fighting against great odds, and he assisted them with the remainder of the brigade. In the mean time Colonel Post was wounded. Although these two brigades were holding their ground, they were failing from great losses, and Gen. Marsena R. Patrick was ordered by Doubleday to bring forward Lieutenant Stewart, of Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, who advanced with one section and took position in front of Miller's barn, just to the right of the road, followed shortly by Captain Campbell with the other four guns, going into battery on Stewart's left, and commencing to fire canister at the enemy in the cornfield on the east of the pike, at fifteen or twenty yards distance.

The loss of the battery whilst in this position was 1 captain wounded, 3 sergeants, 4 corporals, 32 privates killed and wounded; 26 horses were killed and seven wounded; one of Stewart's pieces had only two men left—Packard and Johnson.

Ricketts' division was formed, the Third Brigade in the center, with General Hartsuff supported on the left by the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. William A. Christian, with the First Brigade on Hartsuff's right.

The division moved forward closely followed by Battery F, 1st Pennsylvania, under Captain Mathews, and Captain Thompson's Independent Pennsylvania Battery, each consisting of four three-inch rifled guns. Both batteries succeeded in getting into position and opened an effective and deadly fire on the enemy.

Hartsuff's brigade was formed with the 12th Massachusetts on the right, the 11th Pennsylvania next, then the 13th Massachusetts, with the 83d New York on the left.

The other regiment of the brigade, the 16th Maine, was guarding a railroad, hence not in action. The 12th Massachusetts selected Sergt. George Kimball to furnish data for that regiment. Since the war he has been serving on the

Boston Journal. His account of the regiment in that battle is used in full, as it really represents the brigade :

The 12th Massachusetts Volunteers (Webster's regiment) reached Keedysville about noon of the 15th.

At South Mountain it had been its good fortune to be pitted against a portion of Garnett's (afterwards Pickett's) Confederate division—the very troops that had made a successful flank attack upon the 12th and other regiments of Ricketts' division at the Second Bull Run—and the issue this time had proved most satisfactory and creditable to the Massachusetts men. Consequently the *esprit de corps* of this fine body of troops was now particularly high. The men felt that if any shadow of discredit had attached to them on account of the disaster at Manassas, it had been swept away by the brilliant flank movement at South Mountain.

The regiment was under command of Maj. Elisha M. Burbank, Col. Fletcher Webster having been mortally wounded at Bull Run August 30, and Lieut. Col. Timothy M. Bryan, Jr., being absent on sick leave.

It numbered (nine companies) 325 officers and men. One of its companies (H), Capt. James L. Bates (afterwards Colonel Bates), was at this time detached as provost guard at brigade headquarters. During the afternoon and night of the 15th the regiment lay in an open field just beyond the town of Keedysville, awaiting orders.

Early on the morning of the 16th the men were awakened by heavy firing in front, and preparations were immediately begun for a move. Rations were issued and cartridge boxes replenished. The men knew that a great battle was pending and were ready to do their whole duty. Besides the forty rounds that the cartridge boxes contained, each man put twenty rounds more into his haversack. After a hasty breakfast, the regiment marched with its brigade toward the right of McClellan's line of battle. A wide detour was made to screen the movement from the enemy and to avoid his artillery fire.

Antietam Creek was crossed by the bridge known as Number 1, and the column then filed sharply to the left, soon coming out into a large cornfield near Joseph Poffenberger's house. Here the brigade halted, formed line of battle, and began preparations for supper. The march had been a short one, but much time was consumed in waits and measures, and the day was far spent.

The men were comparatively safe in this position, as only occasionally did shells burst in their midst and they were out of range of the enemy's infantry.

Not so, however, with Meade's brave Pennsylvania Reserves and



COL. B. F. COOK.

the other troops whose lot it was to be nearer the foe. All through that long, cold, dismal night the crack of rifles greeted the ears of Hartsuff's troops. Occasionally Doubleday's artillery thundered out its defiance, only to be answered by the heavy roar of the enemy's guns as they savagely belched forth their acceptance of the challenge.

Everything betokened a desperate battle on the morrow, and no one who lay that night among Hartsuff's men will ever forget the terror, the anxieties, and the discomforts of his experience. Hooker, before going to sleep, is reported to have said: "To-morrow we fight a battle that will decide the fate of the Republic."

With the first gray streaks of coming day, that memorable 17th of September, the men of the 12th Massachusetts were awake and ready for any duty—any sacrifice their country might require of them. The battle began in earnest. From the extreme right, held by Doubleday, all along the front the fighting raged with a ferocity born of desperation.

Hartsuff's brigade was compelled to remain for some time inactive, but finally, it becoming apparent that Jackson's division was advancing, and Hooker seeing that more troops were needed, and that it was necessary to make a grand heroic effort to check this Confederate onslaught, dispatched Colonel Candler of his staff with orders for Hartsuff to advance. The men never obeyed a summons with greater alacrity. They moved forward as if on parade. At the foot of the little rise of ground upon which they had been standing, a double row of fences, inclosing a farm road, was encountered, the rails passing through the posts. It was impossible to throw them down, and there was therefore no recourse but to climb over. The Confederate skirmishers had already gained the large cornfield on the opposite side; bullets were flying. Many of the 12th were killed or wounded while climbing the fences. On the other side the line was reformed. Companies K and E were thrown out as skirmishers, under Capt. B. F. Cook, and the regiment moved forward again. It was soon discovered that one company of skirmishers was sufficient, and Company E returned to the line.

On they swept through the waving corn, reaching far above their heads, the bullets of the enemy doing deadly work at every step and shells bursting all about them, while the yells of the foe, more exultant because of their easy victory at Harper's Ferry, pierced every Union ear and nerved every loyal heart—on, on they pressed, closing up every gap made by the enemy's missiles, their noble leader riding personally behind them and encouraging them forward. As they passed General Hooker his handsome face was wreathed in smiles, and he remarked to one of his staff: "I think

they will hold it." Jackson, too, was moving forward. His skirmishers had been checked by ours, but the main line was still in motion. The 12th at last reached the other edge of the cornfield. Here another fence was encountered, but this one was easily removed. Beyond this point the ground rose slightly, culminating in a small knoll some fifty yards from the fence.

When the men of the 12th reached the summit of this knoll, they found themselves actually face to face with the enemy. They needed no order, for their duty was a plain one. Every musket was leveled at once and fired simultaneously, and the effect was distinctly noticeable. So near was the foe it is undoubtedly true that every bullet did its work. The enemy wavered and recoiled before this fearful storm of lead, but soon rallied and returned the fire, and the men of Massachusetts met their onslaught with a fortitude not excelled on any battlefield of the war.

For three hours it was give and take, with no thought on the Union side of giving up the contest so long as a man was left. Stewart's battery, to the right of the 12th, did murderous work. The Massachusetts boys were falling by the score, but still they fought on, and kept closing up on their colors as fast as gaps were made in their line—Hooker and Hartsuff were both wounded. The latter, while being borne to the rear, begged of those who carried him not to tell his brave men of his mishap, feeling that their love for him and their confidence in his leadership might perhaps create a temporary feeling of discouragement.

Major Burbank fell mortally wounded, and every officer of the 12th Massachusetts but three was either killed or wounded. But the enemy's advance was checked and victory for the Army of the Potomac made possible, for had it not been for the heroic resistance of Hartsuff's brigade to Jackson's advance, who can predict what the result would have been at Antietam? This grand result, however, was not secured without frightful losses. Out of the 325 officers and men of the 12th Massachusetts who entered the fight, 47 were killed and 166 wounded—a total of 213.

It is doubtful if any Union regiment in the battle of Antietam can show a larger percentage of loss than the 12th, and it was certainly not many times exceeded on any battlefield of the war. The officers killed or who died of their wounds were Maj. Elisha M. Burbank, Asst. Surgeon Albert A. Kendall, First Lieuts. William G. White and Lysander F. Cushing, and Second Lieut. George W. Orme. When relieved by the brigades of Crawford and Gordon, of Mansfield's corps, but a handful were left. The colors of the 12th were toward the close of the fight flying from their poles while the latter were stuck in the ground. As the regiment started for the

rear Lieut. Arthur Dehon picked them up from where they had fallen. They were literally covered with dead heroes—those who had been killed beneath them or had been wounded and crawled upon them to die. It was only with difficulty that Dehon could get possession of these sacred emblems of patriotism and valor. The young lieutenant was made a captain for his bravery, and while serving as an aid upon the staff of General Meade at Fredericksburg was killed. When the regiment reached the rear it numbered but thirty-two, but these were even still willing to render further service, as was evidenced by their voluntarily going forward again to support a battery. A number of the men left the ranks when the regiment fell back to help off wounded comrades. None of the men were captured by the enemy.

The circumstances were in no way exceptional. It was not an ambushade. The 12th Massachusetts did not fall into a trap. It was one of the fairest tests of bravery upon any battlefield of the war. It abundantly proved the regiment to be possessed of the highest discipline and to have the best of fighting qualities. They honored themselves and reflected immortal honor upon the First Army Corps at Antietam. Two-thirds of their number was their percentage of loss.

Thus Sergeant Kimball graphically describes the part taken by the 12th Massachusetts in the bloody battle of Antietam—the Borodino of America.

Though such heroism was displayed by the 12th Massachusetts, the other three regiments of the brigade—the 11th Pennsylvania, 13th Massachusetts, and 83d New York—fought with as much valor, and would have sacrificed the last man to save the nation. To be a member of Hartsuff's brigade is a proud distinction that of itself ought to be a passport even in foreign lands.

To support this famous brigade Ricketts ordered the Second Brigade, under Col. William A. Christian, on its left, which formed line of battle with the 26th New York on the left, the 94th New York next; then the 88th Pennsylvania and the 90th Pennsylvania on the right of the brigade, and on the left of the 83d New York.

Lieut. Col. R. H. Richardson commanded the 26th New York, Lieut. Col. Calvin Littlefield, the 94th New York, Maj. George W. Gill the 88th Pennsylvania, until he was

wounded, then Capt. Henry R. Myers assumed command of it; the 90th Pennsylvania was commanded by Col. Peter Lyle.

Colonel Christian was a brave officer, and had a brigade second to none in the service, and on that field it added another star of great brilliancy to its glory.

On the right of Hartsuff was the fighting brigade of Abram Duryea, composed of the 97th New York, under Maj. Charles Northrup; 104th New York, commanded by Maj. Lewis C. Skinner; 105th New York, led by Col. Howard Carroll, and 107th Pennsylvania, commanded by Capt. James Mac. Thompson. General Ricketts, in his report, says: "I commend the general good conduct of the division," and among those he personally mentions are General Duryea, Colonel Coulter and Capt. John W. Williams, his assistant adjutant general.

"When night had stilled the battle's hum" Ricketts had the supreme pleasure of knowing that his division had crowned itself with glory that day, while his command at night was a mere handful, yet his heroes lay thick on the line of battle.*

* A singular coincident occurred to the 13th Massachusetts. At the second battle of Bull Run the regiment lost their knapsacks, having filled them before going into action, and as our army retreated the knapsacks fell into the hands of the enemy. At South Mountain many of these knapsacks were recovered, having been left in haste by a Georgia regiment, as the Confederate force retreated. Some of them had not been disturbed in the least.

Another similar coincident in that regiment's history occurred there. In the early days of the war the regiment had seen service on the upper Potomac, and the boys knew every ford in the Potomac, from Sandy Hook to Hancock. It had been camped in nearly every grove, had marched over every road, had visited every village and hamlet, and had become acquainted with many of the people. Their winter camp in 1861-'62 was at Williamsport, but they had spent considerable time in camp at Sharpsburg during the fall of 1861. It was their mission, during these months, to picket the river, guard the fords, see that no hostile bands disturbed the Maryland side. They were well acquainted with the Antietam

Several histories have it that Hooker, in his extreme anguish, cried out to Doubleday to send him his best brigade, when Hartsuff was dispatched to him. Hartsuff never was under the command of Doubleday. As will be seen in this chapter, he (Hartsuff) commanded a brigade in Ricketts' division.

When he was ordered to Meade's assistance the other two brigades of the division gallantly supported him.

In that movement Hartsuff was severely wounded, and taken from the field; whereupon the brigade was commanded by Colonel Coulter of the 11th Pennsylvania. The artillery did valuable service in that great battle, being skillfully and ably managed.

Gen. H. J. Hunt had command of the artillery of the army, with Capt. J. Albert Monroe in charge of that of the First Division of the First Corps.

Hooker directed Company L, 1st New York Artillery, Capt. J. A. Reynolds, to take a position on the left of Thompson's battery, which was busily engaged in administering canister in heavy doses to the enemy advancing on Duryea's brigade, then being forced back. Reynolds could not select even a swell in the ground enough to operate his guns on, and he moved his battery farther to the right, where he went into action, and silenced a battery of the enemy on the west side of the pike. Then General Gibbon directed him to move to the right still farther, and with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, to shell the

Creek, with the South Mountain range, with Pleasant Valley, and all the country. On the 17th of September, 1861, the regiment had a skirmish at Lockport, a station on the canal just below Sharpsburg. The enemy was engaged in throwing up an earthwork on the Virginia side, and had one cannon. The 13th Massachusetts had a rifled 12-pounder which was drawn into position in order to conceal it. Suddenly the Union boys surprised the Confederates by firing two shells into their midst. Then came a brisk musketry skirmish across the river. It seemed rather strange to the members of that regiment that one year from that day they should be participating in a heavy battle in the same locality.

woods. Both of these batteries were then retired to the ridge in the rear to receive ammunition and rearrange, as both had lost heavily in men and horses.

Hooker directed Captain Monroe, Company D, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, to advance to the edge of the corn-field; Lieutenant Edgell and 1st New Hampshire Battery to follow and take position about 100 yards in the rear. A battery of the enemy opened on them at once, but the fire was not returned. Monroe observing a column of their infantry retreating, and only about 125 yards distant, the captain directed one section to play on them, throwing them into great confusion; the other four guns opened with canister upon a large force of the enemy advancing in front. The New Hampshire Battery directed a well-aimed and heavy fire on the same column of the enemy. The combined fire of these two batteries compelled the enemy to fall back.

After the most stubborn fighting from early dawn until eleven o'clock the corps, infantry and artillery, having suffered frightful losses, and nearly expended their ammunition, retired from the position which they had taken and held in front of the Miller house to a position just north of the Poffenberger barn.

To cover that retrograde movement General Gibbon was directed by General Doubleday to form a line in the skirt of woods through which the corps had passed in going into the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann was thrown forward on to the rise of ground west of the Hagerstown pike. These precautions were deemed necessary to prevent the enemy from making a flank attack. The First Division of the corps held the extreme right of the line of battle from the commencement to the close, and was not replaced by any other troops. The Twelfth and Second Corps, in their advance, passed over the ground which had been occupied by Meade's and Ricketts' divisions. There was no further fighting on the extreme right after the corps retired to the heights on the Poffenberger farm.

As the artillery did such heroic and valuable service, it is but simple justice to the gallant officers and men to give as full an account of them as possible, consequently I have decided to quote from the able and clear report of J. Albert Monroe, commanding artillery, First Division, First Army Corps. He says :

In an extraordinarily short time all the division batteries, except Company B, Fourth Artillery, were in position on the ridge upon which they had been during the night, and which ran nearly parallel with the position occupied by the enemy's guns, and about 800 or 1,000 yards from it. Before the enemy's batteries were silenced, which was done in about one hour and a quarter, Company L, 1st New York Artillery, was ordered through the woods at the left into the plowed land beyond, leaving in the position but Company D, Rhode Island Artillery, commanded by myself, and the 1st New Hampshire Battery, Lieutenant Edgell. But two batteries from another division came up and took position on the right.

Company B, Fourth Artillery, Capt. J. B. Campbell, accompanied General Gibbon's brigade through the woods to the open ground beyond, where Lieutenant Stewart's section was detached from the battery, and ordered to a position near the turnpike, to shell the woods beyond. Here the section suffered severely in men and horses, but it did excellent service, throwing a body of the enemy, 400 or 500 strong, into considerable confusion, so that they partially broke and ran through a hollow, gaining the cover of some fence rails.

About this time Captain Campbell placed his other four guns in position on the left of Lieutenant Stewart's section. In the mean time the enemy had crept into a cornfield near the battery and on the left of the turnpike, and opened a murderous fire, which was replied to with canister with good effect. Captain Campbell was here seriously wounded in the shoulder, and the command of the company devolved upon Lieutenant Stewart. The battery was supported by General Gibbon's brigade and 20th New York. Being very much weakened, General Gibbon directed Lieutenant Stewart to change position to the right, out of range of the enemy's musketry, and to shell the woods in front; but only one section went into position, on account of the great number of wounded men and horses in the other two sections. Company L, 1st New York Artillery, Captain J. A. Reynolds, after moving through the woods, was ordered to move forward into the plowed ground, where it took

position and opened upon one of the enemy's batteries in the field beyond the turnpike, silencing it after sharp fire for some time.

From this position Captain Reynolds was ordered by General Gibbon to move to the right and shell the woods in front, with Company L and the section of Company B on the left of Company L. Soon after both of these batteries were ordered to the rear. Captain Reynolds went back to the advance train to obtain a supply of ammunition, and upon his return was ordered to the extreme right, where he had no opportunity to use his guns. Lieutenant Stewart retired to the rear of the woods through which he had advanced, moved his disabled horses, and regulated his men and horses throughout.

Shortly after the enemy's batteries upon the hill were silenced, and about the time Company B, 4th Artillery, and Company L, New York Artillery, were ordered to the rear, Company D, Rhode Island Artillery, commanded by myself, was ordered through the wood, and immediately after the 1st New Hampshire Battery, Lieutenant Edgell, was ordered to follow, General Hooker directed me to move forward beyond the second cornfield, if possible, and take position as near the woods as the ground would admit.

I advanced, followed by Lieutenant Edgell, 1st New Hampshire Battery, and went into battery about 50 yards from the wood, the New Hampshire Battery taking position about 100 yards in the rear. A battery of the enemy here opened upon me, but no attention was paid to it, and its fire was perfectly ineffective; but the battery with one section opened upon a body of the enemy, which was seen retreating at the left of their front, and about 120 yards distant, throwing them into great confusion. The other four guns opened with canister and case upon a large force advancing through the woods in front, which were very open, and with the assistance of the other section, which had accomplished its object by a few shots, and the 1st New Hampshire Battery, checked the enemy, and he retired out of sight.

While engaged forcing the enemy in the woods, a body of sharpshooters had, unobserved, crept along under a little ridge that ran diagonally to the front of the Rhode Island Battery and opened a most unerring fire upon it, killing and disabling many horses and men. As quickly as possible a section was directed to open upon them with canister, which, though it caused them no injury, they lying down under the ridge, kept them almost silent, they firing but an occasional shot without effect.

While this section was keeping the sharpshooters silent, the other four guns, with the guns of Lieutenant Edgell, opened upon the battery that was still firing, and soon silenced it. I then or-

dered my battery to limber to the rear. The sharpshooters took advantage of the opportunity thus offered, and opened most briskly, severely wounding a number of men and killing and disabling a large number of horses. My own horse was pierced with six bullets. All the horses but one lead horse of one piece were either killed or disabled, and the piece had to be drawn away by hand by means of a prolongé. The timber was left, but was subsequently recovered. The New Hampshire Battery left its position at the same time, and went back to its original position. After securing the piece that was drawn away by hand to its caisson, I moved my battery into the lot between the second cornfield and the plowed land beyond the first cornfield, and went into position with five guns, and shelled the woods beyond the turnpike. After firing a short time I retired to my original position, when the disabled piece was sent to the rear.

The battlefield of Antietam, besides being the bloodiest in the late war, presented as many deeds of heroism as any battle recorded in history. Generals leading their commands rode to death in the face of the enemy, but it was left to a mere youth to quietly and fearlessly exhibit a spirit of valor that astonished officers of the regular army who were veterans of the Mexican war. He modestly rode up to General Hooker and requested to be assigned to duty as an aid on his staff. The battle was raging with great fury at the time. Wherever the daring and intrepid general, on his white horse, rode to cheer his men, there was this youth. After a little all of Hooker's staff were either absent taking orders or wounded, so he had no one to assist him, and seeing the coolness of the youth he appointed him a volunteer aid on his staff in the midst of the battle, and at once gave him orders to deliver on different parts of the field.

The Comte de Paris in his work has severely criticised Hooker for not taking Allen's Hill, where J. E. B. Stuart had his artillery stationed near our right flank. It was the key of the field; once in the hands of the Union forces, the enemy's line was untenable.

Hooker had opened the battle where he was directed. He was then only commanding the First Corps, and did

not have the general management of the battle. With their field-glasses at headquarters those in common could see Hooker in the midst of the fight, and should have ordered Mansfield to his right, or Sumner, who went in third. When the First Corps was ordered forward, the desperation with which the enemy pressed it made it almost imperative for Hooker to cheer his men with his presence, so he dashed to the front and rode his horse at great speed along the line, which greatly encouraged the soldiers and did much to make that part of the field famous.

Notwithstanding the fact that Hooker was chained down to a particular work, yet he grasped the situation that the hill on our right, the point above alluded to, needed attention, and proceeded to examine it with this volunteer aid, who proved to be George W. Smalley, the correspondent of the New York *Tribune*, and since the war its London correspondent. He had dismounted to go a little farther to the front to make a more careful examination, and on returning just after he mounted he was wounded. In a few minutes he swayed unsteadily in his saddle from the loss of blood. Then turning to Mr. Smalley Hooker said: "There is a regiment to the right. Order it forward! Crawford and Gordon are coming up. Tell them to carry those woods and hold them, and it is our fight." But Mr. Smalley had to assist the general from his horse before he could deliver the orders, as he was rapidly losing strength and liable to fall at any minute. Thus a youth unaccustomed to war made a most valuable staff officer.

When Hooker was wounded Meade was placed in command of the First Corps, and ably managed it until the battle was ended. He remained in command of the First Corps for twelve days, until Reynolds returned and assumed command, and Meade returned to the command of the Pennsylvania Reserves.

Mansfield arrived with the Twelfth Corps, composed of two divisions. General Williams commanded the right division and Green the left. Williams was a very keen,

observing officer, and at once saw that he must flank the Dunker Church and take it in reverse. Lee was promptly advised of this movement, and D. H. Hill was moved to the left to face Green, while Hood, who was in reserve, was ordered to the extreme left to meet Williams. Hood had his men well ensconced behind stone walls and ledges of rock, so Williams was in heavy luck.

Green, on the left, had forged his way well up to the Dunker Church, but General Mansfield, who accompanied the left, had been mortally wounded, and General Williams was placed in command of the corps. Crawford took command of Williams' division. The losses were heavy on both sides. Starke, who commanded one of Jackson's divisions, had been killed, and Lawton, who commanded another, was wounded. As they were bearing away Hooker and Mansfield from the field, it was announced that Hartsuff and Gordon were also wounded. Death and destruction seemed to reign supreme. There appeared to be a lull; from sheer exhaustion neither could advance, but both anxiously waited for reënforcements, for it was almost impossible to hold the lines much longer.

General Sumner arrived with the Second Corps, and it seemed as if victory was going to perch on our banners with the troops of that corps, that had been almost invincible in the presence of the enemy. When the Second Corps arrived on the field Green and Williams were holding their ground with two small knots of soldiers, instead of divisions. Sedgwick was the first on the field. He at once advanced, soon passing Green and Williams, driving Hood back beyond the Dunker Church, and the nearer he approached the enemy the more he quickened his pace. The Dunker Church and the woods around it was taken, the key to Lee's left, and the Confederates were retreating in the direction of the Potomac.

But here comes another simoon. French's and Richardson's divisions of Sumner's corps have not arrived on the field. Sedgwick's flanks are exposed, and McLaws and

Walker are both advancing on him, and many of Hood's men have taken fresh courage and have returned to the attack. McLaws, in command, saw there was a gap between Sedgwick's left and Green's right, and he pushed Renshaw's brigade into the unoccupied space. Falling on Green's right, he was compelled to yield ground, while Sedgwick's left, under Howard, was taken in reverse and thrown into confusion ; at the same time Crawford's brigade, which was supporting Howard, yielded to the confusion and gave way ; the other two brigades of Sedgwick, supposing their rear was being gained and that they might be surrounded, abandoned their position around the Dunker Church, notwithstanding Sedgwick did everything in his power to prevent the disorder. Although he had been wounded three times, he remained in his saddle, trying to regain the ground he had captured only a short time before.

Williams then ordered Gordon to take his brigade and attempt to carry the Dunker Church. The brigade advanced under cover of the dense cloud of smoke until it penetrated the woods near the church, when it was compelled to retire before a concentric fire of the enemy.

If French and Richardson had only appeared on the field when Sedgwick did, Sumner would have greatly changed the conflict. McLaws did not follow Sedgwick, but contented himself in holding his position around the Dunker Church. It was a defensive battle on their part. McLaws pretended to follow him, but a few shots from our batteries sufficed to quiet his nerves, and he returned to the shades of the church—perhaps to worship. The next one who went to church was French, taking with him Max Weber, Morris, and Kimball. To his utter astonishment, while he found McLaws at church, yet he had serious doubts about his pious intentions, for he at once assailed his right and attempted to mash it, which was not a Christian act, to say the least of it.

Max Weber moved straight forward. Morris was exposed to an enfilading fire and his troops had seen but little

service, and were thrown into confusion, but the veterans under Kimball passed them and deployed on Weber's left, while Richardson advanced still on the left of French, with Meagher in front, supported by Caldwell and Brooks. Richardson swept past the Roulette farm, over the first range of hills toward Piper's. Between these ranges of hills winds a deep ravine, meandering from the Hagerstown pike to the Keedysville road. That ravine had been connected with a country road, known before the battle as the Sunken road; since then it is called "the Bloody Lane."

Meagher met a heavy force of the enemy; that only increased his determination, and dashing forward, his Irish Brigade was only too glad to follow him, no difference where he led them. Meagher was wounded, and the command devolved on Colonel Burke, who proved himself worthy to command the brigade that Meagher had led in battle so often. The contest at this point in the line amounted to desperation; the enemy had massed his forces and attempted to break our lines, but the Irish Brigade, although it suffered greatly, maintained a splendid line. Finally it was relieved by Caldwell's brigade.

The enemy was safely posted in that sunken road where neither artillery nor infantry fire could annoy them.

Col. Francis C. Barlow, commanding two regiments in Caldwell's brigade, took the hollow in flank, compelling them to hastily abandon that position, though not without great loss, including 300 prisoners and three flags.

Just before that flank movement, there was one of the most gallant and admirable feats performed that occurred on the field. The 4th Alabama stuck their colors in the ground. Maj. Theodore W. Greig, serving under Colonel Barlow, saw the flag flying; he sprang forward, captured it, and returned to his regiment unharmed, though immediately after that flank movement he was severely wounded in the neck. He received a medal of honor for capturing the flag.

General Caldwell rallied the 7th New York, which was

suffering under such a deadly fire it seemed they would give way, but when Caldwell offered to lead them in person, they fought with great determination. The enemy attempted to turn Caldwell's left by moving behind a ridge in a cornfield. Colonel Cross, of the 5th New Hampshire, instantly changed front forward and met the advancing foe with a well-directed volley, which checked and drove him back. But rallying, he made another attempt to still farther turn our left, when the 81st Pennsylvania moved to the left to assist the 5th New Hampshire, and the enemy was finally repulsed at that point with great loss. In the last conflict the 5th New Hampshire captured the colors of the 4th North Carolina.

These two regiments were drawn so far to the left to prevent the enemy from turning that flank, that quite a gap was made in Caldwell's brigade, which was filled with a regiment from Colonel Brooke's brigade.

There was no enemy then in the front of Caldwell, and as they had attempted to steal around the left flank under cover of a ridge in the cornfield, Barlow's suspicions were aroused, and making a hasty examination, he found they were attempting to turn the right in the same manner they had just previously the left. Moving his two regiments obliquely to the right, about 300 yards to a hill, he opened a severe fire on them, which compelled them to break and hastily retreat.

Then an attempt was made to force Caldwell's center; as soon as the heavy firing indicated that the battle was renewed there, Barlow immediately moved to the left, and uniting with the rest of the brigade, moved forward, driving the enemy out of the cornfield and through the Piper orchard.

While leading his men forward Barlow was dangerously wounded by a grape shot in the groin. French's left was being forced back, when Brooke moved his brigade to the right to check the enemy's advance in that direction. Richardson had driven back the brigades of Rodes and

G. B. Anderson, of D. H. Hill's division, at the point of the bayonet beyond the Piper house, and was nearly to the Hagerstown road, and very close to Sharpsburg, and would have pierced Lee's line, gained the rear of his left wing, and at the same time have taken Lee's reserve artillery in reverse and rear had he succeeded. French on the right was held back by the artillery of the enemy at the Dunker Church, but Richardson had almost broken the center. "Can't you go a little farther, general? Pleasonton is on your left with three batteries of artillery, and fully believes the center is failing." As Van Manning's regiment moved to the left, Pleasonton's artillery struck it in column, wounding many and killing quite a number, but Van Manning moved steadily forward to his position. There, brave boys! they have gone as far as they can without assistance. Fitz-John Porter is just across the Antietam, and has not fired a shot. If he will only rush down the Keedysville road, in thirty minutes the victory will be ours. No support comes and Richardson's heroes are compelled to fall back and form a line in the rear.

The Comte de Paris has this to say on that point: "But Richardson could not follow up his advantage alone. On the right Sedgwick was mixed up with the débris of the corps of Hooker and Mansfield. French was arrested by the enemy's batteries posted in the vicinity of Dunker Church, which enfiladed him every time he attempted to advance. Porter remained in reserve at the very time when he should have come to attack the troops opposed to Burnside in the rear. In short, this latter general had not yet emerged from his fatal immobility."

It was then about one o'clock. General Richardson was mortally wounded, which was a severe blow for the Union side; his soldiers had great confidence in him in battle. McClellan immediately ordered Hancock to take charge of his division—a good selection. He was not only making a reputation on every field where he fought, but his presence inspired the men and aroused in them fresh

enthusiasm. But the action was mainly over in that part of the field; it was only necessary to hold their lines intact and be prepared to meet a new attack. That the enemy was very weak is beyond question. I heard General Longstreet tell General Rosecrans that he held Richardson back for quite a time with a section of artillery supported only by one North Carolina regiment. The general held the horses of two of his aids while they handled the guns.

Genl. D. H. Hill says in his report:

Gen. G. B. Anderson still nobly held his ground, but the Yankees began to pour in through the gap made by the retreat of Rodes. Anderson himself was mortally wounded and his brigade was totally routed. Colonel Bennett, of the 14th, and Major Sillers, of the 30th North Carolina Regiments, rallied a portion of their men. There were no troops near to hold the center except a few hundred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the old road which we had occupied in the morning and occupied a cornfield and orchard in advance of it. They had now got within a few hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg and our rear. Affairs looked very critical.

The enemy received reënforcements on the left and made another desperate struggle, forcing back Richardson's division, and pressing French so hard that Brooke's brigade of Smith's division, Franklin's corps, was ordered to his assistance.

Swinton says: "The arrival of Franklin was opportune, for Lee had now accumulated so heavily on his left, and the repulse of Sumner's right under Sedgwick had been so easily effected that the enemy began to show a disposition to resume the offensive, directing his efforts against that still loose-jointed portion of Sumner's harness between his right and center."

The losses of Sumner had made it impossible for him to present a solid front to the enemy. As Smith came on the field with his division Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, of Sumner's staff, informed him that a battery on the right center was unsupported. He sent two regiments of Hancock's brigade to support it, and soon ordered the remaining regi-

ments of the brigade and two batteries to that point. The enemy was well massed there and attempted to pierce that point in the line. Col. W. H. Irwin, commanding the Third Brigade, was ordered to charge the enemy. The fury of that charge hurled him back until the brigade advanced far enough to receive an enfilading fire from the woods on the right, which threw the 37th and 77th New York into confusion that lasted only for a moment, when they faced by the rear rank, poured a well-directed fire into the enemy, and drove him back in that direction. A battery of the enemy advanced and opened fire on the 20th New York, raking its entire front. Sharpshooters on the right and extreme left opened a deadly fire on Irwin's brigade, which made the position perilous. In order to relieve his front he ordered forward the 7th Maine, under Maj. Thomas W. Hyde.

That regiment fixed bayonets and charging, forced the enemy back a quarter of a mile, flanking them on the left in an orchard, where they broke and ran, while those in front hastily retreated, leaving their colors. The regiment dashed forward up a hill in hot pursuit, until a regiment of the enemy rose up behind a stone wall and delivered a volley at short range and then double quicked around to the left to cut off their retreat. Those in front seeing that move returned to the fight, and it seemed as if the 7th Maine would be captured.

Colonel Irwin's orders were so positive that he could not rescue them, nor the other regiments of the brigade, nor could the right regiment of Brooke's brigade assist them without orders. Colonel Hyde, seeing his critical position, marched his regiment by the left flank, delivering a volley into the troops that were attempting to cut him off, and then faced those pursuing in front. He finally succeeded in reaching the orchard; by that time the enemy was advancing on him from three opposite directions. A battery at short range was firing canister but the trees in the orchard shielded them partially, and in a short time he man-

aged to rescue the brigade. There was great joy in the brigade over the return of that regiment, for they expected those who were not killed or wounded would be captured. The battle lulled on that part of the field and was taken up on the left under Burnside. It is said that Sumner was afraid to throw Franklin's corps in there, as it was the only one that had not been cut up in the fight, and he held that command for an emergency, in case the enemy attempted to turn the right flank or make another attack.

The situation was desperate on both sides. More men had been lost on that field than any other in the great internecine war. It challenged the noted battles of Austerlitz, Marengo, and Waterloo for heavier losses.

Although virtually a drawn battle, Lee was severely punished and several times stood that day on the brink of ruin. Their victories had placed an artificial value on their valor, with a corresponding depreciating one on ours. Although posted on the side of a stream which at the time was thought to be too deep to be crossed except at the bridges, which gave them great advantage, yet at the Dunker Church, where the two forces met, the modest yeomanry of the North met the dashing chivalry of the South in such a soldierly manner, that argued we were one people, each possessing courage, honor, and pride that the world would admire, and which we could not afford to waste in such a war. May never such occur again.

Burnside is opposite Bridge No. 3, below Sharpsburg, with the Ninth Corps. Jacob D. Cox at that juncture of the battle was in command. When McClellan moved from Washington he gave Burnside command of a grand division, the First Corps, under Hooker, and the Ninth, under Reno. The brave Reno was killed at South Mountain and General Cox took command of the corps. When Hooker was moved to the right at Antietam Burnside did not relieve Cox from the command of the Ninth Corps. Burnside, however, gave direction how it should be placed in position, with General Crook's brigade of the Kanawha Division on

the right, supported by Sturges' division; Rodman's division on the left, supported in the rear by Ewing's brigade of the Kanawha Division.

The troops were far enough away to be well shielded from the enemy's artillery, which opened at early dawn, and was replied to by Benjamin's and Durell's batteries. About seven o'clock Burnside ordered an advance to the ridge nearest the Antietam, to be in readiness to carry the bridge by storm.

The right, under Longstreet, was posted on the high cliffs on the right side of the stream—a natural Gibraltar. General Cox thus describes it:

The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with stone parapet above, this parapet to some extent flanking the approach to the bridge at either end. The valley in which the stream runs is quite narrow, the steep slope on the right bank approaching quite to the water's edge. On this slope the roadway is scarped, running both ways from the bridge end, and passing to the higher land above by ascending through ravines above and below; the other ravine being some 600 yards above the bridge, the turn about is half that distance below. On the hillside immediately above the bridge was a strong stone fence running parallel to the stream. The turns of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks, made of rails and stone, all of which defenses, as well as the woods which covered the slope, were filled with the enemy's infantry and sharpshooters. Besides the infantry defenses, batteries were placed to enfilade the bridge and all its approaches. Longstreet had displayed great capacity in handling his artillery at the first, and especially the second, Bull Run, where he placed his command on Jackson's right so as to form an acute angle, that would enable his artillery to plow the attacking columns of the Union army and break them before they could reach the infantry. Here he was provided with another natural fortification that he could defend against great odds, and we will again see his ability equal to the occasion, although he is opposed by such officers as Cox, Sturges, Rodman, Hartranft, Wilcox, and Crook—the name of the latter to-day is a full guaranty that he knows but one kind of warfare, and that is to whip the enemy. One might as well accuse General Wayne of toying with the Indians as to breathe a suspicion that Crook would not fight to the utmost capacity of the command. The names of these generals are referred to in this manner because McClellan had a fear that

Burnside sold him out, as he (Burnside) was his successor in command of the Army of the Potomac in so short a time, Swinton and the Comte de Paris both sympathize with McClellan's view of it; but there were too many officers engaged in that corps who would have spurned an intimation of that kind, besides Cox was in command of the corps, and not Burnside.

I have carefully studied that bridge and its approaches. I wonder it was taken at all; but it seems to me strange that Rodman, down on the left, supported by Ewing's brigade could not cross the ford, yet I would not do the memory of that gallant man any injustice by even breathing it, for he sacrificed his life on that field. "Speak lightly of the dead."

In order to protect the assaulting column, Durell's, Clark's, Muhlenberg's, Crook's, Benjamin's and one section of Simmond's batteries were placed in position to open on the enemy when the infantry were ready to charge.

The First Corps, on the extreme right, had suffered terribly, and McClellan was anxious for the Ninth, on the extreme left, to cross the Antietam and relieve the heavy pressure on the right.

About nine o'clock the 11th Connecticut, under Colonel Kingsbury of Rodman's division, was deployed as skirmishers, followed closely by Crook's brigade and Sturgis' division.

The stream where the bridge crosses is slow, and too deep to be forded by infantry. The 2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire charged with fixed bayonets, but the heavy concentrated fire on the bridge compelled them to fall back. These regiments again and again attempted to take it, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Then the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania were ordered up, and about one o'clock carried the bridge, planting their banners on the opposite bank. The remainder of Sturgis' division then marched over, when he deployed one brigade to the right and the other to the left. Advancing, they carried the heights. Crook immediately followed Sturgis and formed on his right. Rodman carried the ford below at about the same time, which placed the Ninth Corps on the

right bank of the Antietam, though with but little ammunition, which the stubborn fighting had well nigh exhausted. As Sturgis had borne the brunt of the fight all day, Cox sent a request to Burnside to move forward the division of Wilcox to take the place of Sturgis.

Cox says: "It was three o'clock when the necessary changes in the line of battle were completed, and the command to advance was given. Wilcox had no trouble in forcing the enemy back on the right until the village of Sharpsburg was nearly reached. Rodman was ordered to move in the same direction, bringing his command *en echelon* on the left of General Wilcox."

Rodman made desperate efforts to clear his front and preserve his connection with Wilcox, but his extreme left was being crushed by the enemy attacking his flank. While attempting to change front of a part of his command he fell severely wounded.

A. P. Hill arrived at half past two, and formed his division facing the Antietam, connecting with the right of Jones' division, which was facing Wilcox.

The brigades of Archer, Gregg and Branch formed Hill's left, while Pender and Brockenborough were on the right; this long line overlapped Rodman, and gave Hill a splendid opportunity to fall on his flank with Archer, Gregg and Branch.

Cox, seeing that he could not hold his position, with the left so sorely pressed, withdrew the line to a ridge along the Antietam. The enemy did not pursue, so that virtually ended the great battle.

Lee's, Jackson's, A. P. Hill's and Longstreet's headquarters were at Mr. Grove's house in Sharpsburg, an old-fashioned brick house with large halls and rooms. Longstreet wanted to see his lines, and was consequently late reporting to Lee. All the other generals were there, but no word came from Longstreet. Lee began to be quite uneasy about him, and wondered if he had been wounded or killed. None of the generals had seen him since the battle. Just

then Longstreet rode up in the dark, and dismounted in front of the house; no one recognized him for an instant. When Lee realized who it was, he said, "Here comes my old stand-by." The next day both parties lay in front of each other, but as McClellan did not advance, the next night Lee retreated across the Potomac. Major A. J. Sellers of the 90th Pennsylvania, who was on picket, learned of Lee's retreat, wrote it on a shingle and sent it to McClellan.

The First Corps lost in that engagement 417 killed and wounded and 122 missing. The Second Corps had 15,000 on the field and lost 883 killed, 3,859 wounded, and 396 missing. The Ninth Corps had 438 killed, 1,796 wounded, and 115 missing. The Twelfth Corps had 12,300 on the field, and lost 275 killed, 1,386 wounded, and 85 missing. The casualties in the other corps were comparatively light.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM ANTIETAM TO RECTORTOWN.

ON the morning of the 18th of September, 1862, the soldiers of McClellan's army fully expected a renewal of the battle. Burnside was across the Antietam on the left, with Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, ready to assist him. Hancock, who had succeeded Richardson in command of the left division of the Second Corps, was holding his ground, which gave Porter a splendid opportunity, with his fresh corps, to move forward and attack Lee's center; French's and Sedgwick's, the other two divisions of Sumner's corps, were badly used up; but Franklin's corps had suffered but little, except Irwin's brigade. The First Corps, on the extreme right under Meade, was in excellent spirits and condition. Hofmann's brigade, of Doubleday's division, had been in reserve, and consequently suffered but few casualties.

Hofmann would leave a banquet any time to fight a battle, and his brigade had greatly acquired his nature. Couch and Humphreys arrived in the morning with their divisions. They were in excellent condition, and commanded by two such generals they would have struck a fearful blow to the enemy.

With two full corps, two divisions, and one brigade, which had not been engaged the day before, McClellan was in prime condition to renew the contest. But it seems that Sumner stubbornly opposed a renewal, although in his report he does not even allude to it. McClellan feared he was fighting a greater number of the enemy than he

really was—though, in my opinion, Lee had more troops in that battle than he had credit for.

Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, stated that question the best. After the war was over he was down South, and they told him of the size of their armies in this and that engagement. "Well," said the general, "where were your men? They were too brave to shirk a battle, yet when your reports were made, there were only a few present for duty."

Along Jackson and D. H. Hill's front there were repeated rumors that an armistice had been declared to bury the dead and to care for the wounded. That was an old trick of Jackson's when he got worsted; he always mourned for the wounded and the dying, but, strange to say, when his colors were advancing he never thought of them.

The enemy approached General Hancock's front with a flag. The general sent out to see about it, and on finding that it was accompanied by General Pryor, he sent General Meagher out to meet him. But it was soon learned that it was not a flag of truce; Pryor said if Hancock would send a request to care for the wounded and bury the dead, he thought it would be honored. Of course it would, for they were simply wearing the day away in the most plausible manner, so they could retreat under cover of the night. Hancock very properly sent word that he had no occasion to make such a request; that the majority of the wounded lying between the lines were Confederates. Longstreet became alarmed at the critical condition of affairs, and wrote a note to Lee to get ready to retreat across the Potomac at early candle light, and be sure to not light the candle either. Longstreet knew they would be crushed if an attack was made. Lee in the mean time came to Longstreet's headquarters, which then were with his corps, for Burnside was menacing him all the time, and at any moment might make an attack.

That night they silently stole away, and when the

morning sun shone on Sharpsburg the "Grove's Mansion," where Lee and his generals had had their headquarters, "knew them no more forever."

When it was learned that Lee had retreated across the Potomac into Virginia, McClellan ordered Porter to pursue; accordingly Griffin, with his own and Barnes' brigade, crossed the Potomac, and encountered the rear guard under Lawton, and after a sharp action, drove him and followed him in his retreat. Lawton lost four guns, which fell into Griffin's hands.

Griffin's success elated Porter very much who next morning pressed on after the enemy.

Jackson was given the position of bringing up the Confederate rear, with instructions to watch the advancing foe, for the country was full of disabled men from the Confederate army, who would join their commands in a few days if not captured; the number is even put as high as 30,000. They never crossed into Maryland. Citizens of Shepherdstown fully confirm this.

Learning that the Confederates established a hospital in Shepherdstown during the battle, I visited that place subsequent to the war to hear the citizens' statements. They said every house and barn were full of men who had been compelled to fall out of ranks to rest and seek food, in addition to the wounded from the battlefield. The ladies said they were baking for days, and taking the utmost care of the disabled soldiers, so they could return to the army. Hence Lee must keep McClellan on the Maryland side of the Potomac to give him (Lee) time to collect together one-third of his army, which was straggling and certain to be captured if McClellan forced him up the valley. For that reason Lee placed Jackson in the rear, knowing that he would make desperate efforts to prevent his forces being pursued.

Lee placed his command behind the Opequan, a tributary of the Potomac, and was thus lying in wait, with A. P. Hill's division in broad view in front, while Early was con-

cealed in ambush where he could strike any advance movement on the flank.

When Porter came up Hill opened with a vigorous fire to draw him still closer, so that Early could enfilade his flank. In due time Early opened a murderous fire from his concealed position, and Porter was driven back across the Potomac. In this engagement the Corn Exchange Regiment—a magnificent body of men of Philadelphia—suffered severely. Lee had succeeded in accomplishing just what he wanted to—prevent an advance for a few days, as he might then gather up his straggling soldiers and feed his half famished army on the abundance of that rich, bountiful and beautiful country—the Shenandoah.

It was a golden opportunity, for the country was as the "Land of Goshen," and the citizens gave with alacrity as a rule, for they were intensely Southern in their sympathies.

On the 19th General Stuart recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport with a heavy force of cavalry and infantry, supported by a few field pieces. General Couch was ordered to go in pursuit of him. But Stuart had performed the task assigned to him and avoided a battle, although he sustained losses.

The authorities at Washington, urged on by an impatient press in the North, were unceasing in their endeavors to have McClellan make a forward movement.

Although Lee had collected his stragglers and again possessed a large army, yet if he could keep McClellan from advancing a little longer it would be too late for a fall campaign, and the Confederacy might receive foreign recognition by spring. He was not only playing the part of a shrewed general, but that of a skillful diplomat.

On the 6th of October the enemy appeared in force in the valley of Sir John's Run. Waiting to see the effect of that move, Lee soon received the glad tidings that Averell had been ordered post haste to that point.

Pleasanton was weakened by the absence of Averell, and Lee knew that Stuart could then undertake a circuit

of McClellan's army, which would alarm the North, and perhaps retain McClellan where he was awhile longer.

So, on the 10th of October, Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, under Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and Jones, set out on that perilous march and crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry. He evaded Cox's division on its way to West Virginia, and hurried forward, as his work must be done quickly, or his whole command would be sacrificed, as Averell was returning with all speed possible, in accordance with an order from McClellan. Avoiding Hagerstown, which Stuart feared was well defended, he pressed on to Mercersburg, continuing in a northeasterly direction, and arrived at Chambersburg the same evening. This bold movement had already caused great alarm and anxiety, as the following correspondence will show:

HARRISBURG, PA., October 10, 1862.

I am just informed that a body of rebel cavalry have occupied Mercersburg, said to be 3,000 strong. They have cut the telegraph wires, and are thought to be advancing on Chambersburg. The Anderson Cavalry are at Carlisle, and we have 2,500 cavalry unarmed, none of them mounted.

Will you not order Anderson's Cavalry up to Chambersburg, and send arms for them here? The rebels have taken all property they could move, but have not taken life.

A. G. CURTIN.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

HARRISBURG, PA., October 10, 1862.

The following is just received from provost marshal :

CHAMBERSBURG, October 10, 1862.

About 15 on horseback, in town, with carbines and a flag of truce. Want to see the principal men of town. Have large force about one mile from town. Will enter in an hour.

F. M. KIMMEL, Provost Marshal.

ANDREW G. CURTIN.

The Anderson Cavalry should be ordered at once, and the troops in camp here. We can't get Chambersburg by telegraph.

A. G. CURTIN, Governor.

HARRISBURG, PA., October 10, 1862.

The people have surrendered Chambersburg.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.

A. G. CURTIN.

HARRISBURG, PA., October 10, 1862.

I have a dispatch from Shippensburg, 11 miles from Chambersburg, saying that Chambersburg surrendered at 7 o'clock p. m., and is now in possession of rebels. No doubt they will retire before we reach there with troops from Carlisle, and am preparing all here for service.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK.

A. G. CURTIN, Governor.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

October 10, 1862.

Communicate with General McClellan and General Wool, and use any troops within your reach to cut off the rebels at Chambersburg. I have telegraphed to General McClellan, but am uncertain about his getting the message. H. W. HALLECK,

Governor CURTIN, Harrisburg, Pa.

General-in-Chief.

BALTIMORE, October 10, 1862.

I have received a dispatch from Governor Curtin that the rebels are in force at Chambersburg. I will send several regiments from this city, and I will be at Harrisburg as soon as possible.

JOHN E. WOOL, Major General.

Maj. Gen. MCCLELLAN, Knoxville, Md.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

October 11, 1862, 4 a. m.

Your dispatch of 10 p. m. of last evening is received. I cannot find out where McCoy's Ferry is, but presume it is near Hancock. I shall therefore move towards Hagerstown, and make inquiries as I proceed. My command is very small, from the fact of many horses being unshod, and shoes could not be had. The 8th Pennsylvania has not been able to obtain horses to replace the old ones of the Peninsula, now used up. Shall, however, do the best I can under the circumstances. Very respectfully,

A. PLEASANTON,

Brigadier General, Commanding Cavalry Division.

General R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,

October 11, 1862, 11 p. m.

GENERAL:—General Reynolds directs that you send a brigade of your troops out to-night, and occupy that strip of woods on the

Sharpsburg turnpike at the Dunker Church, near the center of the battlefield. We have a few cavalry out to picket that road toward Hagerstown, and they are the only forces on the immediate approach to our rear in that direction.

This force is desired to occupy the position indicated that it may protect the batteries from an attack of cavalry in the event of an attempt to cross towards Mercersville.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. B. LAMBORN,

A. A. A. G.

To Brigadier General DOUBLEDAY, Commanding First Division.

(Indorsed :) HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,
October 11, 1862.

Colonel Hofmann will forward with his brigade and battery to comply with the within orders and directions.

By command of Brigadier General Doubleday.

E. P. HALSTEAD,

Captain and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
October 13, 1862.

The general commanding having received information that the rebel cavalryman Stuart arrived near the mouth of the Monocacy yesterday about noon, directs that you recall brigade from the Sharpsburg road.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. B. LAMBORN,

A. A. A. G.

Brigadier General DOUBLEDAY, Commanding First Division.

COLONEL:—You will withdraw your brigade immediately.

By command of Brigadier General Doubleday.

E. P. HALSTEAD,

To Colonel HOFMANN, Second Brigade. Captain and A. A. G.

There were some State militia stationed at Chambersburg, but they had never been under fire, and the night being dark and gloomy added, perhaps, to the confusion; but they offered no resistance to the entry of the Confederate cavalry—the first on Northern soil.

They conducted themselves well, as no pillaging was allowed. The men promenaded the streets in the most

orderly manner, with the intention, no doubt, of creating a favorable impression on the minds of the people. However, the depots of the Government were destroyed. They took a great many horses from the farmers, leading away many of their own jaded animals.

Before daylight next morning Stuart was off, taking the Gettysburg road to deceive his pursuers; but soon turned to the right, passed through Emmittsburg, continued southward, and kept the South Mountain range between him and McClellan. As all the telegraph wires were cut, no news could be received as to the direction in which he was marching. Finally, however, news was received by McClellan that he was taking the eastern route. Pleasanton was immediately ordered to Mechanicsville; Burnside, then in Pleasant Valley, was ordered to occupy the railroad bridge across the Monocacy; Cox was to halt and guard the upper Potomac; while Stoneman, at Poolsville, was to distribute his troops so as to protect all the lower fords of the Potomac.

Stuart followed down the right bank of the Monocacy until near Frederick, when fearing that troops were detained there, he turned suddenly to the left, crossed the Monocacy, and continued in the direction of Monrovia. Although night had overtaken him while near Frederick, there was no time to be lost for the reason that thousands of Federal soldiers were in pursuit of him.

When Pleasanton reached Mechanicsville he learned that Stuart was not more than an hour in advance. Believing that Stuart would attempt to cross the Potomac as early next morning as possible, Pleasanton pushed forward, reached the mouth of the Monocacy about eight in the morning of the 12th, where he found a regiment of infantry, but no tidings could be learned of the Confederate raiders. At daylight Stuart passed through Hyattsville, took the road to Barnesville, and continued in the direction of Poolsville, where Stoneman had his headquarters.

Just before he reached the town he threw his command

into the woods, passed around it, and struck the Georgetown and Hauling Ford road. While Pleasonton was moving on that road down the Potomac, his advance soon struck the Confederate cavalry, but were too few in numbers to make much impression upon the enemy, as they were four times as many.

Stuart formed a line of skirmishers, then made a detour to the left and crossed the Potomac at White's Ford. When he reached the Virginia shore he saw Pleasonton's whole column arrive; also a brigade of infantry from Poolsville that was expected at that point much earlier in the day. It was fortunate for him that he reached that ford so early in the morning. Every move he made from the time he left Chambersburg showed the work of a guide thoroughly posted, who could lead him around the towns where troops were stationed.

Nothing more of interest occurred until the army was ordered to move. On September 29 Gen. John F. Reynolds, having joined the army from detached service, was assigned to the command of the First Army Corps.

General Meade took command of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division. Although he had commanded the First Corps only twelve days, yet their confidence in him on the field was great, and they were proud of him when, later in the war, he commanded the Army of the Potomac.

The First Corps had two of Pennsylvania's illustrious soldiers in it—Reynolds commanding the corps and Meade the Pennsylvania Reserves. That division had suffered so severely that Governor Curtin endeavored to have it returned to the State to be recruited to its maximum, and accordingly addressed the following letter to the President on that subject:

PENNSYLVANIA EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Harrisburg, September 30, 1862.

SIR:—I have the honor to refer to some of the topics of our conversation last week, at which time you were pleased to say, that you desired the Governors of the loyal States present to put their suggestions in writing.

I proposed, at that time, to fill the regiments in service most reduced by the casualties of war, by retiring a given number from the more active service with the armies in the presence of the enemy, and having filled them and obtained a perfect reorganization, return them to the field and retire others until they were all filled to the standard established by the Government, in the mean time supplying their places in the field with new regiments. I named ten regiments as the number to be retired at each time from this State. Most of our regiments that have participated in the recent battles are reduced to mere skeletons, and although we have furnished about fifteen thousand recruits for regiments from this State, no efficient strength has been given to any of them.

The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, numbering thirteen regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one of artillery, with a numerical strength of fifteen thousand seven hundred and sixty men, were taken into the service of the United States in July, 1861, immediately after the first battle of Manassas.

The thirteen regiments of infantry did not muster four thousand men after the battle of Antietam.

All of these regiments are much reduced in number, whilst many of them can scarcely be said to retain regimental organizations. The brilliant history of the Reserve Corps in the war, and the State pride, which has followed them since they entered the service, together with the circumstances surrounding their organization, would I have no doubt, prove such incentives to enlistment that the corps could be filled to the maximum in a short space of time.

I suggest that the corps be returned to the State, and placed in the camp at this Capital, and, if I am correct in my impression, the success would affect the minds of our people favorably and other regiments in the service could be filled in their turn promptly.

It is proper that, in this connection, I should say that the suggestion reflects the opinion of all the officers of the corps. I take this opportunity of again renewing the suggestions of all the Governors on the occasion referred to, that so far as consistent with the interests of the public service, sick and wounded volunteers be taken to the hospitals within the State in which they were enlisted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

A. G. CURTIN.

To His Excellency A. LINCOLN, President.

That was a wise proposition, but the President was afraid to drain the army of the brave old soldiers in face of the enemy. On that account Governor Curtin's request

for the Pennsylvania Reserves to be sent home, was not granted, and the regiments were reorganized as best they could be.

Colonel Roberts, of the 1st Regiment, who had won distinction on the Peninsula, and had displayed great soldierly qualities in command of a brigade, had been recommended for brigadier general, but by some failure or accident, his name was not forwarded by the War Department to the Senate. After the battle of Antietam, Governor Curtin asked General McClellan to accept his resignation, so that he could appoint him on his staff. On the urgent request of Curtin, McClellan accepted it, and he at once entered on duty in the military office of the Executive Department at Harrisburg, and served on Curtin's staff until the close of his second administration. Capt. William Cooper Talley, who had gallantly commanded the regiment at Antietam, was commissioned colonel. A worthy and deserved promotion.

In the 3d Regiment there were many changes, and the regiment hailed with delight the return of Colonel Sickles, who was a great favorite. In the 8th Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Oliphant was in such bad health that he was compelled to leave the service, and Major Bailey was made colonel. The 10th was brought into the service by Col. John S. McCalmont, a classmate of Rosecrans, Doubleday and Longstreet at West Point, but who was then on the bench which he left when the tocsin of war sounded. He was an able officer, but in consequence of his bad health, he was forced to resign in May, 1862, to save his life. The service lost a valuable man. Meade and Reynolds had great confidence in him, and both were loath to lose him. McCalmont in appearance is tall and angular, and not unlike Lincoln. He also possesses much of that quiet, quaint way of reasoning for which qualities the martyred President was so distinguished. Colonel McCalmont displayed bravery and military skill in the battle of Dranesville.

Lieut. Col. James T. Kirk was promoted to be colonel of

the regiment, but the Peninsular campaign had ruined his health, and he was also compelled to resign. In turn he was succeeded in the command of the regiment by A. J. Warner, an excellent officer, and who since has been an able and distinguished member of Congress from Ohio, to which State he removed soon after the war.

In the 12th Capt. D. N. Mathewson resigned on account of sickness, though he afterwards entered the service as lieutenant colonel of the 30th Regiment of the Pennsylvania emergency troops of 1863.

Col. J. H. Taggart resigned at Harrison's Landing, to return home to attend to business, which had been neglected during an absence of more than a year. General Truman Seymour indorsed the following on Colonel Taggart's resignation: "Colonel Taggart has rendered useful and honorable service during these last battles. At Mechanicsville his regiment occupied the post of honor on the left, and held the enemy firmly in check and behaved with great gallantry."

General McCall, in his report on the battle of Mechanicsville, thus refers to some of his officers: "Where all so gallantly supported the honor of the flag, it would appear invidious to particularize, but my thanks are particularly due to Generals Reynolds, Meade, and Seymour; to Colonels Simmons and Taggart; to Lieutenant Colonel McCandless and Major Stone, all of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, and who were zealous and active, as well as gallant, in the discharge of their arduous duties throughout this well-fought action."

In 1864 Colonel Taggart was appointed chief preceptor of the Free Military School for Officers for Colored Troops, organized in Philadelphia by the supervisory committee for recruiting colored troops, designed to instruct white officers for such troops, there being a demand for white commissioned officers. This school was under the direction and patronage of Secretary Stanton.

Col. Hugh McNeil, of the Bucktail Regiment, was

killed on the afternoon of the 16th, when he was advancing the skirmish line. The command of the regiment was given to Capt. Charles Frederick Taylor, the youngest brother of Bayard Taylor, who earned fame later in the service. In addition to the different changes and promotions the division was materially strengthened by the accession of two new regiments.

The 121st Pennsylvania, commanded by Col. Chapman Biddle, was added to the First Brigade, and the 142d, commanded by Col. Robert P. Cummins, joined the Second Brigade.

In the mean time McClellan and Lee had been using their utmost endeavors to put their armies in the best possible condition. The month of October was quietly stealing away, and as yet the Army of the Potomac had not moved. A growing impatience pervaded Washington, and the bickerings between Halleck and McClellan were ripening into bitter feelings, though Halleck also expressed the sentiments of the Secretary of War.

Finally a forward movement was decided on, and Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry, selected as the place to cross the Potomac. McClellan had decided to take the line in the valley east of the Blue Ridge range, while Lee was in the Shenandoah Valley just west of the Blue Ridge. It was evident that McClellan had chosen that line for the reason that Lincoln promised him help from Washington if he did so. Lincoln did not oppose McClellan's following Lee up the Shenandoah Valley and driving him out of it. On the contrary, he would have been glad if such had occurred, if he attacked him as early as possible.

While Berlin was selected as the main place of crossing, bridges were thrown across the Potomac and Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and the army commenced crossing into Virginia on the 26th. The Ninth Corps, under Wilcox, was the first to cross at Berlin, followed by the reserve artillery, Stoneman's division, the First and Sixth Corps. The Second and Fifth Corps crossed at the ferry. Slocum

with the Twelfth remained at Harper's Ferry. Morrell had three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry with which to guard the upper Potomac from the mouth of the Monocacy to the Cumberland.

Now that McClellan's army was marching up the valley between the Bull Run and Blue Ridge Mountains, with only the Blue Ridge between the two armies, the passes in that range suddenly assumed a value of great importance; as either army might suddenly dash through one of them and strike the other on the march and overwhelm it before it could prepare for battle. Napoleon would not have peaceably marched parallel with the enemy without attempting to take advantage of his adversary when strung out on a march. Hampton came very near defeating Kilpatrick in just such a march. All that saved him was his artillerymen raking a road in Hampton's rear, when he supposed the guns were manned by his own men, whereas they were Kilpatrick's, hid in a corn-crib to avoid being captured when Hampton made his charge. They left their guns loaded and hid in the crib when Hampton swept past them. Then they ran out to the guns and fired them down the narrow road where Hampton's victorious cavalry were charging, which compelled them to seek safety in the woods. Just then Kilpatrick came from the swamp, where he had fled for safety, and mounted on a horse without saddle, and no clothing on except a shirt, he fell on his adversary with a fury that knew no bounds, driving the South Carolina cavalier from the field.

The passes of the Blue Ridge beginning at the Potomac, are Vestal's Gap, Gregory's Gap, Snicker's Gap, Ashby's Gap, Manassas Gap and Chester Gap.

As a matter of course McClellan would have to get his supplies from Berlin, on the Potomac until he could strike the Manassas Gap Railway, running from Manassas Junction through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, and passing on through Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge. Pleasanton's cavalry marched along the east base of the Blue Ridge to clear McClellan's front, as Lee was

using his cavalry to guard the gaps in the mountain. On October 31 Pleasonton reported to McClellan that from several sources he learned there were 6,000 men in Snicker's Gap. He asked for a support of infantry, and Hofmann's brigade of Doubleday's division of the First Corps was sent to him. When Hofmann arrived he found Pleasonton engaged with the enemy in front of the town of Philmont. The Confederates were shelling him with considerable rapidity. Pleasonton immediately directed Hofmann to put two of his regiments in the woods on the left of the road. Accordingly the 56th Pennsylvania, under Major Smith, and the 95th New York, under Lieutenant Colonel Post, were directed by Hofmann to deploy in obedience to the order of Pleasonton. These two regiments having cleared their front, they were recalled, and Hofmann was directed to take his brigade and advance through the town and hold it. As the brigade was advancing Pleasonton sent for a regiment to support a battery to the left and rear; the 76th New York, under Major Livingston, was directed by Hofmann to perform that duty.

After Hofmann had passed through the town, he sent the 95th New York and two companies of the 56th Pennsylvania to take possession of a strip of woods to the left of the road, and some three hundred yards to the front. Two companies of the 7th Indiana, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cheek, were directed to picket the road into the town.

Hofmann sent back for some artillery, which Pleasonton immediately brought up in person. Pleasonton then directed Hofmann to advance again, still leaving the 76th New York on duty in the town. The enemy's artillery opened at once, one shell striking the colors of the 7th Indiana, killing the color sergeant, and wounding several others. When our artillery arrived and got into position, the enemy retired about three-quarters of a mile, Hofmann pursuing. The 56th Pennsylvania suffered in crossing a field, but the regiment never faltered, the gap was at once closed up,

and they moved forward as if on dress parade. The brigade was then shielded behind a stone wall while our artillery again played on the enemy with considerable effect. The 95th New York was ordered to go to the left to support a section of artillery; soon it was deemed advisable to reënforce that point with the 56th Pennsylvania. The enemy again retreated, and darkness put an end to the action.

Pleasanton ordered these two regiments to take possession of and occupy a hill a little to the left and front. In the morning Pleasanton directed Hofmann to bring forward the 7th Indiana and the battery, to hold the hill. While that regiment was coming up the 56th Pennsylvania was thrown forward on the right to feel the enemy in that direction in a piece of woods, which was accordingly taken and held until evening.

One section of the battery was advanced about half a mile when it became hotly engaged with a battery of the enemy, posted under cover of a large house and barn on our left front.

Finally Pleasanton decided that the position of the enemy at the house and barn would have to be carried by a charge. Hofmann ordered the 95th New York to comply with Pleasanton's order, and as soon as Lieutenant Colonel Post gave the order to advance they dashed forward in magnificent style, soon taking the position, while the enemy prudently retired.

The brigade was not advanced any farther, but Pleasanton followed with his cavalry, taking with him Lieutenant Edgell with two sections of his battery.

In the evening General Pleasanton directed Hofmann to return with his brigade to his division, and give his compliments to General Doubleday for the valuable assistance of so excellent a brigade. The boys had won golden opinions from the cavalry commander, and highly pleased their brigade commander.

It was evident to Lee that he could not hold his position in the Shenandoah Valley with McClellan moving up the

valley on the east side of the range, as he (McClellan) would soon gain his rear and cut off his communication with Richmond, and as there were about 70,000 troops in and about Washington under Banks, there was no hope of his turning suddenly and making a forced march, appearing before Washington, and demanding its surrender before McClellan could overtake him. The 70,000 at Washington would warmly greet him, and, with the aid of the artillery, be amply able to repel any assault made.

If he had again attempted to invade the North, with McClellan in his rear, the chances were that his army would have been ruined, and the Confederacy have been placed in its death throes.

So, assuming that prudence was the better part of valor, he at once commenced a rapid retrograde movement up the valley to forestall the movement of McClellan. His stores and a considerable portion of his artillery passed through Thornton's Gap for Culpeper Court House on the 1st of November, followed by Longstreet, who moved up the valley, crossed the Shenandoah at Front Royal, passed through the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, and fell back on Culpeper.

With Longstreet at Culpeper, D. H. Hill's division at Chester Gap, and Jackson in the valley at Millwood, nearly 100 miles from Longstreet, it would have been an easy matter for the Army of the Potomac to fall on and crush D. H. Hill, and then, facing down the valley annihilate Jackson. I say annihilate, for the Army of the Potomac had just been reënforced by Sigel's corps and Sickles' division. If two-thirds of the army had marched down the Shenandoah, and one-third had countermarched down the same valley it came up, Jackson would have been ruined.

It is not known what McClellan intended to do aside from the fact of making Warrenton his headquarters. Many officers and soldiers deplored his removal. Many do to this day. He had embittered Stanton and Halleck, and had more than once hurt the feelings of President Lincoln, which mortified many of his friends.

On the 6th of November McClellan's army was stationed as follows: The First Corps at Warrenton; the Second at Rectortown, on the Manassas Gap Railroad; the Eleventh, under Sigel, was at New Baltimore; Sickles' division was at Warrenton Junction; the Fifth Corps was at Snicker's Gap, and the Sixth at Upperville, bringing up the rear.

No one then dreamed of McClellan's removal, although he had had a lurking suspicion that he would be; but as he was marching, it came on him like a clap of thunder in a clear sky, when he was making every arrangement for the fall campaign.

One of his last orders was appointing General Patrick provost marshal general of the Army of the Potomac, and assigning him to duty at his headquarters.

The following is General Patrick's order communicating it to his brigade:

HDQRS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIV., FIRST ARMY CORPS,
General Orders, No. 64. Camp Barrett, October 7, 1862.

The Brigadier-General commanding having been assigned to duty at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac by General Orders, No. 161, of the 6th inst., hereby relinquishes to Colonel Rodgers, of the 21st New York Volunteers, the command of the brigade he received from him seven months ago. Only seven months ago he assumed command; yet the ties that bind those who, like ourselves, have shared each other's hardships and dangers, who have followed the standard through so many battles, and gathered around it with their ranks thinned, but unbroken, when the combat was over—such ties cannot be broken by the order that relieves your general from the command. That he must continue to take the liveliest interest in the welfare of a brigade that has never failed in the hour of peril, whether in daylight or darkness, to honor his every command, no one can doubt; and he trusts that both officers and men will touch lightly upon his faults, in the full conviction that, as their commander, he has endeavored to discharge his duties to them, to his country and to his God. He leaves you with fervent wishes for your prosperity, and the earnest hope that an honorable peace may soon be won, so that we may once more return to our loved homes by the broad rivers and lakes of the Empire State.

By order of General PATRICK.

On the evening of November 7 General McClellan was seated in his tent at Rectortown. A furious snowstorm was raging in the State that once claimed to be the mother of Presidents; now this sacred soil was the heart of a formidable rebellion to destroy the Government that George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson greatly assisted to bring into existence. While thus meditating, little did the young American Napoleon dream that he soon would be deposed from the high and responsible position he held, never again to enjoy it. It was a great shock to the Army of the Potomac, for the officers and men adored him. No one knows to this day, positively, why he was relieved. The half insinuation that he was removed for political reasons is scarcely true in the face of the fact that Grant, Rosecrans, Logan, Meade, Reynolds (who fell at Gettysburg), Hooker, Hunt (the great artilleryman), Sickles, Slocum, and other prominent generals were Democrats whom the country trusted then and honor still, certainly forever removes any such suspicion of that kind; and the candid individual or historian must look for some other reason.

McClellan had been Lincoln's favorite, and he never consented to his removal except upon what appeared to him not only justifiable grounds, but a necessity, for, so noble was Lincoln that he would not harm his bitterest enemy; and the Southern people sincerely regretted his assassination, for they knew he was sympathetic beyond degree; that his charity had enough in it to make a mantle for the whole South; while his simplicity and honesty was more Godlike than manlike.

He never wronged McClellan—he simply did his duty as President. He had his reasons, which were forced upon his convictions notwithstanding his attachment for this brilliant and popular officer.

The following orders are given in full that the public may be in possession of them, and free to form their own opinions:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, November 5, 1862.

By direction of the President, it is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take command of that army. Also that Major General Hunter take command of the corps in said army which is now commanded by General Burnside. That Major-General Fitz-John Porter be relieved from the command of the corps he now commands in said army, and that Major General Hooker take command of said corps.

The General-in-Chief is authorized in (his) discretion, to issue an order substantially as the above, forthwith, or as soon as he may deem proper.

A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY.
Washington, November 5, 1862.

GENERAL :—On receipt of this order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting, on your arrival at that place, by telegraph, for further orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

To Major General McCLELLAN, Commanding, &c.

General Orders, } WAR DEPARTMENT, Adj. Gen.'s Office,
No. 182. } Washington, November 5, 1862.

By the direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take the command of that army.

By order of the Secretary of War :

ED. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adj. General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1862.

GENERAL :—Immediately on assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, you will report the position of your troops, and what you purpose doing with them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

To Major General BURNSIDE, Commanding, &c.

These orders were given to General Buckingham, with instructions to proceed to the front and deliver them to General McClellan. As the historians do not agree about

this matter, I have decided to give General Buckingham's own statement of it :

I was at the time on special duty at the War Department, my office being adjoining the Secretary's private room. On the evening of the 6th of November, about ten o'clock, the Secretary sent for me to come to his office, where I found him with General Halleck. He told me that he wanted me to go and find the Army of the Potomac, and spent some time in giving minute directions as to the route I should take. Just before I left he handed me two envelopes, unsealed, telling me to take them to my room, and, having read them, to seal them up. I was thunderstruck to find that one of the envelopes contained two orders for McClellan—one from the President, relieving him from the command of the army, and the other from General Halleck, ordering him to report to some town in New Jersey and report by letter to the War Department. The other envelope contained two orders to Burnside—one from the President, assigning him to the command of the army, vice McClellan, and the other from General Halleck, directing him to report what his plans were. Before leaving next morning, I saw the Secretary at his home, and he explained to me his reasons for sending an officer of my rank on an errand like that. The first was that he feared Burnside would not accept the command, and my instructions were to use, if necessary, the strongest arguments to induce him not to refuse. The second reason, though a characteristic one, had very little foundation.

The Secretary had not only no confidence in McClellan's military skill, but he very much doubted his patriotism, and even loyalty, and he expressed to me some fear that McClellan would not give up the command, and he wished, therefore, that the order should be presented by an officer of high rank, direct from the War Department, so as to carry the full weight of the President's authority. He directed me to see Burnside first and get his decision. If he consented to accept, I was to see McClellan ; but if not I was to return to Washington.

I found Burnside about fifteen miles south of Salem, where his division was halted and he alone in a little chamber. Closing the door, I made known my errand. He at once declined the command. Whatever my private opinion may have been, my duty was to follow the directions of the Secretary of War, and, if possible, overcome his objections. It happened, however, knowing, as I did, that the President was resolved at all events to remove McClellan, that I felt fully satisfied that he (Burnside) ought to accept, and urged him to do so. Among other objections, he urged his want of confi-

dence in himself, and his particularly friendly relations to McClellan, to whom he felt under the strongest obligations. I met these objections by stating that McClellan's removal was resolved upon at any rate, and that if he (Burnside) did not accept the command, it would be given to Hooker, who became, in fact, Burnside's successor. He at length consented to obey the order, and I requested him to go with me to find McClellan. We returned to Salem, whence I had ridden on horseback through a snowstorm, and I had my locomotive fired up the same evening, and on it we proceeded about five miles up the railroad to McClellan's camp.

About eleven o'clock we found him alone in his tent, examining papers, and as we both entered together, he received us in his usual kind and cordial manner.

My task was not only a painful one, but particularly distasteful to me in view of my friendly feelings for McClellan. But as the blow had to come, I was glad that it was not to be given through an unkind hand, and in a mortifying way.

General McClellan has himself borne testimony to the kind manner in which I communicated the order, and I can bear testimony to his prompt and cheerful obedience.

This is Buckingham's statement of it.

The Comte de Paris, on page 555, second volume of his work, says that Burnside was in McClellan's tent "when the bearer of a dispatch from the President was announced. This was General Buckingham, an officer unknown to the Army of the Potomac, who brought him an order contained in three lines, signed by Halleck."

Buckingham has made two mistakes in his statement. He says McClellan was to report by letter, whereas the order says by telegraph; he says he found Burnside at Salem in command of a division—that is one-third of a corps. At that time Burnside was in command of a grand division—two corps.

They both agree that there was the strongest friendship existing between McClellan and Burnside, for McClellan turned the order over to Burnside with the remark: "Well, Burnside, you are to command the army." On Burnside's part, he paid McClellan the highest respect in his power—ordered the troops out to pass in review before him.

It was a just and noble act on the part of Burnside. McClellan was simply relieved from command, the same as Pope had been, and Burnside and Hooker were soon to be. He passed on hastily to Trenton, and in accordance with orders telegraphed to the War Department, which ended his military career.

A prominent general of the Army of the Potomac said :

McClellan will live in the history of his country, and occupy a very prominent place in it. He did valuable service in organizing the Army of the Potomac. He had only been a captain, when he was made a general. It was not long until he was given a command next to General Scott. He was promoted too rapidly. If he had risen more gradually he would have been surer of success. Hancock never had more magnetism than McClellan possessed.

Swinton says of him :

To General McClellan, personally, it was a misfortune that he became so prominent a figure at the commencement of the contest ; for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into account, estimating both what he accomplished and what he failed to accomplish, in the actual circumstances of his performance, I have endeavored in the critique of his campaigns to strike a just balance between McClellan and history. Of him it may be said, that if he does not belong to that foremost category of commanders, made up of those who have always been successful, and including but few illustrious names, neither does he rank with that numerous class who have ruined their armies without fighting. He ranges with that middle category of meritorious commanders, who, like Sertorius, Wallenstein, and William of Orange, generally unfortunate in war, yet were, in the words of Marmont, "never destroyed nor discouraged, but were always able to oppose a menacing front, and make the enemy pay dear for what he gained."

CHAPTER IX.

FREDERICKSBURG.

THERE were many reasons why Burnside should be the successor of McClellan. He was the acknowledged and avowed friend of the General-in-Chief, to the extent that he did all in his power to hold him at the head of the army. Burnside had been twice offered the command before, but positively refused it.

McClellan gave him the command of two corps, a grand division, in the Maryland campaign, an honor that he did not confer on any other general, and that must have given Burnside the idea of forming grand divisions, which he proceeded to do as soon as he assumed command. The warm friendship between them probably made it easier for Burnside to succeed him than any other general. He accompanied Burnside from Rectortown to Warrenton, where he bade him farewell, after reviewing the army, and proceeded to Trenton, N. J., to which place he had been ordered by General Halleck.

Burnside had succeeded well in North Carolina and, that, perhaps, gave additional confidence in him at Washington and throughout the country.

It was claimed by the friends of McClellan that he was about to strike a fatal blow to the enemy, though no one ever gave his plans to the public. Gen. J. C. Duane, his engineer, informs me that McClellan would have forced a battle in forty-eight hours if he had not been relieved.

Burnside knew the position of the Confederate forces, and there could be no delay, or else the fleet-footed Jackson would soon unite his forces with Longstreet, and



FOSTER



RENO



PARKE



RODMAN



STURGIS



STEVENS



POTTER



WILCOX



SMITH



BURNSIDE



COX



SEDGWICK



HARTRANFT



FERRERO



GETTY



WHITE



GRIFFIN

BURNSIDE AND GENERALS OF THE 9TH ARMY CORPS
1861 ★ 1865

the valuable opportunity would be lost. Would he hurl his army on D. H. Hill's division, at Chester Gap, and then turn down the valley, crush Jackson or compel his command to scatter and fly to the mountains ; or, would he march, with all possible haste, on Culpeper and attack Longstreet before he could receive assistance? He knew the authorities at Washington wanted him to make a vigorous campaign, and his plan was demanded by Halleck. Day after day witnessed his army still hovering around Warrenton, while he was reorganizing it, which he should have done in one night, and then issued orders to move the next morning by daylight. When Meade relieved Hooker the army moved on just as if no change had been made in commanders. Burnside's success depended on the celerity of his movements while the enemy was divided.

Jackson's fame for rapid marching already filled the whole land with wonder, and as he was nearly one hundred miles from Longstreet, it gave Burnside a good chance to defeat one of them, and he could take his choice. But he decided to pay no attention to the enemy, and to go on with his grand scheme of reorganization. He did not take Governor Curtin's plan, when he sent a force into Delaware to save the Dupont powder works. His attorney-general told him that it was unconstitutional to send troops into another State without a request. "Well," said the Governor, "I will save the powder, and then consider the constitutionality of it." Had Burnside fought a great battle and been victorious, he would have had plenty of time to reorganize his army, and have an admiring world looking on while the great chieftain prepared to strike another blow. But we still find the new commander hard at work arranging his commands, which, when settled, were not such great changes after all.


The army under the new régime gave Sumner the right grand division ; that was all that was new in that wing, for Couch already commanded the Second and Wilcox the Ninth

Corps. The center grand division was placed under Hooker, with the Third Corps under Stoneman, while Butterfield relieved Porter in the Fifth. The left grand division was commanded by Franklin, with the First Corps under Reynolds, and the Sixth under W. F. Smith, known as "Old Baldy." The new regiments had been assigned by McClellan before he crossed the Potomac, so Burnside had no heavy task in that matter. The 24th Michigan had been assigned to the Fourth Brigade of the First Division of the First Corps.

The 136th Pennsylvania was added to the Second Brigade of the Second Division of the First Corps. It was a valuable addition indeed, for it returned to the great State of Pennsylvania with the proud record of having valiantly fought on the field and won distinction for bravery, under its gallant colonel, Thomas M. Bayne, who has since served his State many years as a distinguished member of Congress. That regiment also furnished another able member of the House of Representatives—afterwards United States Senator—John I. Mitchell, of Pennsylvania, who was a captain in it. The 16th Maine, which had been on detached service since the 13th of September (it rejoined on the 9th), was assigned to the Third Brigade of the Second Division of the First Corps. These were all the new regiments received by the First Corps. The corps had great reason to be proud of every one of them, for their banners always floated where the battle raged with the greatest fury.

The 19th Maine was assigned to Howard's brigade of the Second Corps.

On the 9th, Burnside made a plan which was not satisfactory to the President, Secretary of War, or General Halleck, but it was decided to permit him to follow his own judgment, as he had been so successful in North Carolina. It was evidently his intention to avoid a battle until spring, and then take the old route up the Peninsula, where McClellan led the army the year before, but was compelled to retire after he had pressed close enough to see the spires in the city of Richmond.



PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Halleck went to Warrenton to consult with Burnside, but it is quite evident, from his report to Secretary Stanton, on the 15th of November, 1862, that they did not agree, for Halleck says in his report :

On reaching Warrenton, however, General Burnside proposed to give up the pursuit of Lee's army toward Richmond, and to move down the north side of the Rappahannock to Falmouth, and establish a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek or Belle Plain.

This proposed change of base was not approved by me, and in a personal interview at Warrenton I strongly urged him to retain his present base, and continue his march toward Richmond in the manner pointed out in the President's letter of October 13 to General McClellan.

General Burnside did not fully concur in the President's views, but finally consented to so modify his plan to cross his army by the fords of the upper Rappahannock, and then move down and seize the heights south of Fredericksburg, while a small force was to be sent north of the river to enable General Haupt to reopen the railroad and to rebuild the bridges, the materials for which were nearly ready in Alexandria.

I, however, refused to give my official approval of this deviation from the President's instructions until his assent was obtained. On my return to Washington, on the 13th, I submitted to him the proposed change in the plan of campaign, and on receiving his assent, rather than approval, I telegraphed, on the 14th, authority to General Burnside to adopt it. I here refer, not to General Burnside's written plan to Falmouth, but to that of crossing the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan.

* * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

To HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

General-in-Chief.

Lincoln's letter to McClellan, referred to by Halleck, is so remarkable that it is here given in full :

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, D. C., October 13, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR :—You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act

upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now waggons from Culpeper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own. You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit.

If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him

somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it were, by different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub toward the rim, and this whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meets you at all points from Washington; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.

The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 5 miles; Gregory's, 13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas, 38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53 miles. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him, enabling him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

Major General McCLELLAN.

When Burnside received Halleck's telegram, stating that the President consented to his plan, he at once put his army in motion for Fredericksburg, though keeping it on the north side of the river, contrary to the understanding that at least a large portion of it was to be thrown on the south bank above the confluence of the Rappahannock and Rapidan.

The Rappahannock is a short river rising in the mountains, meandering its way down through Virginia; it is not much more than a mountain stream until Warrenton is reached, then several tributaries assist in swelling it into a

river, the principal one being the Rapidan. At Fredericksburg it is quite deep below the falls, and cannot be crossed except by bridges. When the army started from Warrenton, Sumner's grand division was given the advance; the Second Corps arrived on the 17th at Falmouth, a little town on the left bank of the Rappahannock opposite the upper edge of Fredericksburg. They are river towns and, as a matter of course, are built facing it.

The only particular enterprise in either place consisted of numerous flouring mills, old-fashioned stone mills that had been erected there in earlier days. A conduit or canal which tapped the river at the dam wound its way back of the city, and finally emptied into Hazel Run about a mile below it. The canal had been a feeder to mills on that side of the river, about four feet deep and the same in width. This stream proved a great source of annoyance to the right and center grand divisions when charging on the heights in the rear of the city.

When Sumner arrived at Falmouth, Fredericksburg was occupied only by a small force commanded by Barksdale. As soon as the Union troops appeared on the Stafford Heights (Stafford County lies on the left bank), an artillery duel began between Pettit's battery, under the direction of General Couch, and Lewis' light battery, stationed in Fredericksburg. The enemy was soon driven from his guns; as they stood there unmanned, it was a great temptation to cross the river and capture them. Burnside's orders were so imperative not to cross the river, that even Sumner would not permit a volunteer force to go over and get them.

That night Sumner sent a note to Burnside asking permission to take Fredericksburg, if he (Sumner) could find a crossing. There is no doubt but that he could have crossed at the dam, or a few miles above it without trouble. He said afterwards that he knew where he could have crossed.

Burnside, however, declined to give the desired permission, stating that it was not advisable to take Fredericks-

burg until he had fully established his communications. That ended the matter, and the troops went into camp waiting for orders until the pontoons could be brought around from Berlin, on the Potomac, where McClellan crossed, east of Harper's Ferry.

McClellan had issued an order for their removal to Washington before he was relieved. When Halleck visited Burnside it was agreed that they were to be rapidly transported south, to be used in crossing the Rappahannock; as the bridges were burned when the army arrived opposite Fredericksburg, they were still at Washington, Burnside supposing that Halleck would forward them without delay.

Halleck returned to Washington and resumed the duties of his office, evidently not understanding that he was to charge himself with this special duty, therefore an apparent unaccountable delay occurred in forwarding them. A part of them arrived at Bell Plain, near Aquia Creek, on the 18th, but the teams to convey them to Fredericksburg were still in Washington. Had Burnside been aware of that fact he could have sent wagons from the army to haul them over, but he was entirely ignorant of their arrival. General Woodbury, who would have had them in charge when they arrived, was an officer of great zeal and intelligence, but it does not seem that he was informed of the contemplated move of Burnside (though it seems he divined it), as he suggested to Halleck that the pontoons ought to arrive simultaneously with the army, to which suggestion he received no definite reply or instructions.

As Burnside, in his march to Fredericksburg, was cut off from all communication with Washington for several days, it was impossible for him to superintend that matter, unless he delegated an officer for that special purpose, which seemed entirely unnecessary, as General Woodbury understood his business thoroughly. The only valuable service that officer could have rendered would have been to telegraph to Washington for Burnside, which he could

have done through Woodbury. If General Woodbury had been sent to Washington to superintend their transportation it would have saved much annoyance and great disappointment.

Had Burnside been able to cross on the 25th or 26th of November his chances of success would have been still quite good, as Lee was in great doubt as to what Burnside intended to do, and in fact he had not decided upon his plans. General Burns, who possessed the confidence of Burnside as much as any general, says that Burnside contemplated crossing the river at Hamilton's Crossing, while a portion of Lee's army was several miles below at Port Royal, which place was guarded by D. H. Hill's division. Jackson was still at Orange Court House waiting for developments. He could, from that point, dispute the passage of the upper or march to the lower Potomac, in case that point was attacked. Longstreet had not fortified the heights which he occupied, and if he had done so it would have been an easy matter to have flanked him, as Sherman did at Atlanta.

On the 26th Lee became so well satisfied of the ultimate intentions of his adversary that he ordered Jackson to come to Fredericksburg, which place he reached in about two days, and placed his troops on Longstreet's right, extending the Confederate line to the Massaponax, a tributary of the Rappahannock, some distance below Hamilton's Crossing. Longstreet's left overlapped the plank road, leading to Salem Church and Chancellorsville. The cavalry guarded the river above and below the city.

Thus, with a river swollen by heavy rains for the Army of the Potomac to cross in face of an intrenched enemy, seemed, as it proved, a forlorn hope; in fact disaster was waiting to attend that effort with deep chagrin and sad disappointment. In front of Longstreet was a heavy stone fence, put there before the war, behind which his soldiers could crouch and be almost out of harm's way, while Jackson prepared his pits of death in case he was attacked.

The Union armies in the West had defeated the enemy

at almost every point, while the country witnessed the Army of the Potomac still near Washington. It had valiantly fought several battles, but as yet to no purpose; the injuries it had received were greater than those inflicted on the enemy, a condition of things which caused a restless impatience at the North; and an anxiety on the part of the soldiers to again meet the foe in their front, and measure the standard of valor with them. South Mountain and Antietam had awakened their desire for another conflict, and they were anxious for the bugles to sound "to arms."

Burnside labored under the great disadvantage of being in the enemy's country, where every move he made was instantly reported to Lee. This fact was so apparent that Halleck telegraphed him not to report to Washington what he intended to do. Every conceivable and ingenious way was devised and used to secure news, which was at once reported to Lee, and the utmost diligence to prevent it was of no avail. A sutler's establishment occupied a little house at the edge of the river. On the main floor goods were kept and sold to the soldiers of the Union army. General Pleasonton conceived the idea that something was wrong there, and disguising himself in a citizen's suit one dark night, took some officers with him to investigate it.

One of them ordered something for the party, while Pleasonton examined the floor. Finding a trap-door, he ordered it opened, when he descended into a basement filled with goods to be conveyed over to Fredericksburg after night to Lee's army. In one corner sat a man at a telegraph instrument sending information to the enemy on the other side of the river. He was sending a message when Pleasonton suddenly entered the room by means of the trap-door, which had remained a secret to the alleged sutlers. Pleasonton asked him what was the message he was sending? He attempted to deny that he was engaged in that nefarious business, but he soon learned that the cavalry commander was not to be trifled with; then he owned up.

"Then," said Pleasonton, "you send this message

over"—which he did : "The great number of recruits are rapidly swelling Burnside's army, and he will soon have a larger one, and better equipped, than McClellan advanced up the Peninsula with." He sent over several messages dictated by Pleasonton, when they wired back to know what was the reason of the sudden change in the communications. Being compelled to tell the general what they asked, Pleasonton said, "Send this to them," which was in effect that another great victory had been won in the West by Rosecrans. They immediately answered : "That is a lie." Pleasonton then ordered the wires cut, the men arrested, and the establishment placed in charge of an officer ; then he reported all the facts to Burnside.

The hum and activity before a battle began to be felt in the army, for Burnside had resolved to attack Lee in his most strongly-fortified position, which he had given him due notice of from the 17th of November to the 11th of December. Did he want more time ?

It is an approved maxim in war never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone—that he desires it. A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitered should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to fortify or intrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.—*Napoleon*.

The following report of General Burnside states quite clearly his idea of the crossing of the Rappahannock, and in justice to him it is given in full :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
November 22, 1862.

GENERAL :—By reference to my plan of operations, submitted by order of the Commander-in-Chief, it will be found that one of the necessary parts of that plan was to have started from Washington at once pontoon trains sufficient to span the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg twice ; and I was assured that at least one train would leave as soon as the General-in-Chief and General Meigs returned ; and I proposed that if an escort was required, and I was informed of the departure of the train by telegraph, I would furnish

it from my cavalry. Receiving no information of its departure, I ordered Lieutenant Comstock to telegraph in reference to it. It is very clear that my object was to make the move to Fredericksburg very rapidly, and to throw a heavy force across the river before the enemy could concentrate a force to oppose the crossing, and supposed the pontoon train would arrive at this place nearly simultaneously with the head of the column. Had that been the case, the whole of General Sumner's column—33,000 strong—would have crossed into Fredericksburg at once over a pontoon bridge, in front of a city filled with families of rebel officers and sympathizers with the rebel cause, and garrisoned by a small squadron of cavalry and a battery of artillery which General Sumner silenced within an hour after his arrival.

Had the pontoon bridge arrived on the 19th or 20th, the army could have crossed with trifling opposition, but now the opposite side of the river is occupied by a large rebel force under General Longstreet, with batteries ready to be placed in position to operate against the working parties building the bridge and the troops crossing.

The pontoon train has not yet arrived and the river is too high for the troops to cross at any of the fords.

You can readily see that much delay may occur in the general movement, and I deem it my duty to lay these facts before you, and to say that I cannot make the promise of probable success with the faith that I did when I supposed that all the parts of the plan would *be carried out*. Another very material part of the proposition, which I understood to be approved as a whole, was that all the surplus wagons that were in Washington were to be loaded with bread and small commissary stores and sent to this place at once, which would probably have supplied our army with from five to ten days' provisions.

These trains could have moved with perfect safety, as they would have been protected by the movements of this army. I do not recall these facts in any captious spirit, but simply to impress upon the General-in-Chief that he can not expect me to do as much as if all the parts of the plan had been carried out. In fact a force can be arrayed against us at this place that would materially retard us.

The work of the Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments at Aquia Creek, or Bell Plain, has been most completely accomplished, and I am not prepared to say that every effort has not been made to carry out the other parts of the plans, but I must, in honesty and candor, say that I cannot feel that the move indicated in my plan of operations will be successful after two very important

parts of the plan have not been carried out, no matter for what reason.

The President said that the movement, in order to be successful, must be made quickly, and I thought the same.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE.

General G. W. CULLUM, Chief of Staff,
Washington, D. C.

The pickets of both armies were along the banks of the river, watching each other's movements closely; sometimes they would chat where the river was narrow enough to be within hailing distance of each other.

As the enemy held the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, it was evident that the river would not be spanned by the pontoons without a desperate struggle. There were many stone houses near the river where Barksdale could secrete his men; thus shielded they could carry on their work of death to those engaged in putting down the pontoons, and be comparatively safe themselves. Fredericksburg was full of their soldiers, and it seemed impossible to get the pontoons down. That situation of affairs called General Hunt into action with the reserve artillery; he soon lined Stafford Heights with all of the available guns at his command. On the right he placed Battery E, 2d United States; A, 4th United States; G, 1st Rhode Island; L, 2d New York; a Pennsylvania battery under Captain Durell; B, 1st New York; and D, 5th United States. These batteries composed the right, and were under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Hays.

The 4th New York; K, 1st United States; G, 4th United States; K, 5th United States; D, 1st New York; C, 1st Rhode Island; and H, 1st Ohio, were the right center under Colonel Tompkins.

B, 1st Connecticut; M, 1st Connecticut; A, 1st New York; B, 1st New York; 3d New York Battery; G and D, 1st Pennsylvania, constituted the left center, commanded by Col. R. O. Tyler.

The 5th New York; C, 1st New York; B, 1st Maryland; 2d Maine; 1st New York; L, 1st New York; 4th Pennsylvania; F and G, 1st Pennsylvania, was the left, under the command of Capt. G. A. DeRussy.

On the morning of the 11th of December, the construction of the bridges commenced before day. There was no attempt to disturb the men at that work until they had reached near the middle of the river; then they were in safe range, and the deadly work of their concealed sharpshooters began, and continued until the remaining few who had not found a grave in the bottom of the river were hastily brought back. Those who were wounded or killed and fell in the boats were rescued after night by their comrades.

Then General Hunt ordered his batteries to play on the enemy, especially on the houses along the bank of the river. That to a great extent silenced their fire; but another attempt to continue putting down the pontoons was the signal for them to renew their attack on the men in the river.

When all of those batteries were pouring in their shot and shell, it seemed as if no human being could live in the town, yet the sharpshooters along the shore were concealed so well that it was impossible to complete the work until they were dislodged. To accomplish that General Hunt suggested that the batteaux be filled with volunteers; that as soon as they started he would have every gun belching its fiery flame and smoke so the sharpshooters could not see to execute their work so well; when they neared the other shore the artillery was to cease, and before the smoke cleared away enough for them to be seen, they would be so near the shore that they could not be beaten back again.

The honor of that forlorn hope was awarded to the 7th Michigan and the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, of Howard's division of the Second Corps, and the 89th New York, of Hawkins' brigade of the Ninth Corps. They soon cleared not only the river front, but drove the enemy

well back into the town, though not without a fearful loss of their own numbers. Those regiments made a fame that day that will last as long as the nation has an existence.

The opposition at the crossing below the city was not so stubborn, as the valley along the right bank of the river did not afford so much protection to the sharpshooters; though the passage of the river was disputed to the last extremity, yet the grand division of Franklin, composed of the First and Sixth Corps, readily effected a landing on the other shore, and were ready to meet the foe even in his stronghold on the heights back from the river. The First and Sixth Corps crossed over on the 12th inst.; the divisions of Sickles and Birney of the Third Corps were held as a reserve on the left bank of the Rappahannock.

It must be remembered that there were only two corps in Lee's army—Longstreet's and Jackson's—but at the same time it must not be forgotten that a division of their army almost corresponded to a corps in ours. In that respect their army was better organized for effective work. In our army there were so many corps that it gave a chance for some one to misunderstand the orders and not move in conjunction with the others, thereby paralyzing the movements, perhaps at a vital time. We have just seen how the vexatious delay in the arrival of the pontoons utterly ruined all of Burnside's plans, for he aimed to cross ten days before Jackson joined Lee. If our army had crossed even by November 25, Longstreet would have been unable to seriously oppose the passage of the river, nor could he have held his position on Marye's Heights, for Franklin crossed some three miles below him and would soon have been able to cut off his communication with Richmond, forcing him back in the direction of Chancellorsville. But on the morning of the 13th of December, when our army lay along the river in the dense fog, Jackson was well intrenched on the heights with four divisions, D. H. Hill's division having been added to his command that morning.

In order to facilitate their movements a military road

had been cut just back of the crest so that troops could be speedily sent from one part of the line to the other unobserved from our position, which not only gave Jackson a better chance to handle his own troops to advantage, but also to get reinforcements from Longstreet if he was heavily pressed, for Longstreet's position was so strongly fortified behind the stone wall and the parapet on the crest of the heights above and to the rear of the stone wall, that he needed but a scanty number of infantry, with his artillery frowning along his whole front, to beat back and destroy any column that might be hurled against him.

Longstreet said in a speech, delivered from his former headquarters on Marye's Heights, in May, 1884, when the First Corps was making a historical examination of the field, that just prior to the battle Lee came along and saw a section of a battery not in position, and called his attention to it. Longstreet said to him "that he had no place for it; that with his artillery already in position he could rake the ground in front as if with a fine-tooth comb." Longstreet needed but a small infantry force behind the stone wall to assist his artillery. *

* During the war there was a very intense secession element in Fredericksburg.

When the historical visit was made there in May, 1884, under the auspices of the First Corps, the city did everything in its power to welcome the veterans of the Army of the Potomac, members of Congress, and others to the place where a great battle had been fought. The mayor had convened the council, which not only officially welcomed us, but in addition provided for a grand banquet.

The special train passed through the city without stopping, until it reached Hamilton's Crossing, where Franklin fought on the left. After that part of the field was fully examined where Jackson occupied the ridge, and the valley below where Reynolds advanced, the train moved back to the town, where Mayor Sener in a very eloquent speech welcomed us to their historic city. General Rosecrans, as Chairman of the Congressional Committee, replied in a very appropriate and brief address. Then we were escorted to the new opera building, there to partake of the banquet in waiting for us.

When Burnside ordered Franklin to attack the enemy on the left with a division, it was his judgment that the position of the corps would indicate that it should be made by the First, and its commander was so notified.

It was but natural that General Reynolds should select the Pennsylvania Reserves to make the attack on our extreme left. He came out in command of a brigade of the Reserves and commanded the division at the second battle of Bull Run, and then when he was in command of the First Corps it was his duty to give them the position of honor.

On entering the hall we were welcomed by the committee and greeted by 100 ladies, who had volunteered their service for the occasion.

The Chairman of the Committee, who owned the Opera building, was a Sixth Corps man of the name of Hunter, who settled there after the war, and had amassed quite a little fortune in the foundry business.

The newspaper men were especially gracious to us, and the friendliness of S. J. Quinn, R. B. Merchant, and J. W. Woltz was of the most cordial character.

The address of welcome was made by Judge Goolrich, who had served in the Confederate army. Hon. George B. Loring, of Massachusetts, was called on to reply to him. Congress was represented by addresses from Belford of Colorado, Herbert of Alabama, and Cutcheon of Michigan. Generals Longstreet, Newton, and Rosecrans were called on and loudly applauded. Among the guests were Generals H. J. Hunt, Abner Doubleday, George J. Stannard, Roy Stone, James S. Robinson, H. W. Slocum, W. W. Dudley, and John C. Robinson; also Colonels Bliss and Jackson of Newton's staff, Kniffin, Tichenor and Thompson; Major Craig of General Hunt's staff, Maj. Isaac Hall, Major Cranford, Capt. A. H. Van Deusen, Drs. Little and Donohue, D. W. Cleaver and many other officers and veterans and members of Congress—nearly a hundred members of the House were present.

Senator Dolph, of the Senate, accompanied by his family, was quite an interested spectator. Ex-Governor Dingley, of Maine; Major Haynes, of New Hampshire; Bagley, of New York; Murray, of Ohio, and Hon. W. W. Brown, of Pennsylvania, formerly of the Bucktails, were deeply interested in the review of the field. The press of the country was represented from Washington and other cities.

They had fought so valiantly on the right at South Mountain that General Hooker was filled with admiration, and said, as they struggled up the mountain, "That it was as splendid a line of battle as the world ever saw."

They opened the battle of Antietam under Meade, and won distinction on that field that will always be a bright gem in the history of the State. Now they were to open another great battle under two of their old brigade commanders, one commanding the corps, the other the division. No wonder they had every confidence of success, considering that their tried and capable generals were to lead them. It was like Charlemagne's troops, when he galloped to the front, none doubted the result.

The First Brigade was commanded by Colonel William Sinclair, of the 6th Regiment. It was composed of the Bucktails, Capt. C. F. Taylor; the 1st, Col. Wm. C. Talley; 2d Col. Wm. McCandless, and 6th Regiments, Maj. W. H. Ent, of the Reserves, and the 121st Pennsylvania, which was a new regiment, and had recently joined the army.

It may be well here to briefly explain the Pennsylvania Reserves' organization:

Recognizing the danger to which Pennsylvania, by its long line of border on States seriously disaffected, was exposed, and finding that adequate provisions did not exist by law to make the military power of the State available for its protection, Governor Curtin issued his proclamation on the 20th of April, 1861, calling the Legislature to convene in extra session on the 30th instant. In his message, which was delivered at the opening of the session, the Governor said:

"The time has passed for temporizing or forbearing with the rebellion. the most causeless in history. * * * The insurrection must be met by force of arms; and to reestablish the Government upon an enduring basis by asserting its entire supremacy; to repossess the forts and other Government property so unlawfully

seized and held to insure personal freedom and safety to the people and commerce of the Union in every section, the people of the loyal States demand, as with one voice, and will contend for, as with one heart, and a quarter of million of Pennsylvania's sons will answer the call to arms, if need be, to wrest us from the reign of anarchy and plunder, and secure for themselves and children, for ages to come, the perpetuity of this Government and its beneficent institutions. * * *

It is impossible to predict the lengths to which the madness that rules the hour in the rebellious States shall lead us, or when the calamities which threaten our hitherto happy country shall terminate * * * To furnish ready support to those who have gone out, and to protect our borders, we should have a well regulated military force. I, therefore recommend the immediate organization, disciplining and arming of at least fifteen regiments of cavalry and infantry, exclusive of those called into the service of the United States. As we have already ample warning of the necessity of preparing for any sudden exigency that may arise, I cannot too much impress this upon you.

This message from the patriotic Governor of the grand old State was immediately referred to a select committee of the House. In compliance with the recommendations, a bill was reported on the 2d of May to create a loan and to provide for arming the State, which, in the usual course of legislation, became a law on the 15th.

The Reserves were very desirous of retaining their organization as a division, and were permitted to do so after they entered the army.

In compliance with the provisions of this act, Governor Curtin issued his call for men to compose the corps, and apportioned the number that would be received from each county, according to its population, in order that every section of the State and every class of its people should be duly represented in it. Great enthusiasm was everywhere manifested to enlist, and a strong desire was felt to be admitted to its ranks. Four camps of instruction were established: Easton, West Chester, Harrisburg and Pittsburg.

George A. McCall, a graduate of the West Point Military Academy, was appointed a major general to command

the corps, and Brig. Gens. John F. Reynolds, George G. Meade, and E. O. C. Ord were placed in command of the three brigades. Thus was officered and equipped 15,000 of as fine men as ever marched out of the State to defend their country.

The 1st Regiment of the Reserves was the 30th from the State, consequently the Bucktails, which was the 13th in the division, was the 42d from the State. It will be observed that there were two 11th Pennsylvania Regiments in the First Corps at Fredericksburg; the other 11th was in the Third Brigade of the Second Division, under General Gibbon; the last-mentioned one was the regular 11th. This account of the Pennsylvania Reserves is made to avoid confusion by the reader years hence, when all the participants have passed away, leaving no one to explain.

The Second Brigade, under the command of Col. A. L. Magilton, of the 4th Regiment, was composed of the 3d, 4th, 7th, and 8th of the Reserves, with the 142d Pennsylvania under Col. Robert P. Cummings. The Third Brigade was the 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Reserves, commanded by Gen. C. F. Jackson.

When Meade crossed the Rappahannock on the afternoon of the 12th, the Bucktails were thrown forward as skirmishers, and the 2d Regiment was detailed to occupy the buildings and outhouses of Smithfield. Batteries A, B, and G, of the 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, were posted in front of Meade's First Brigade. The other battery of the division, Battery C of the 5th United States, had been sent to Captain De Russy. The Second Brigade was placed three hundred paces in the rear of the First Brigade, while the Third Brigade occupied a position in rear of the Second in column by regiments.

Early on the morning of the 13th, Meade accompanied Reynolds to Franklin's headquarters, when Franklin indicated where Burnside desired the attack to be made, and informed Meade that his division had been selected to make it.

The heavy fog along the river was clearing away, when Meade returned to his division to prepare for the impending assault on the enemy's position on the hills back some distance from the river. He made some minor changes in the disposition of his troops—the 6th was thrown forward as skirmishers, while the rest of the First Brigade was moved in front of his artillery. The Second Brigade held its position three hundred paces in the rear. The Third Brigade came by the flank well up to the First Brigade. The 9th Regiment, of this brigade, was deployed as skirmishers on the flank—this made three regiments on the skirmish line, Bucktails, 6th and 9th, of the Reserves.

The enemy was keenly observing all of these movements from the heights above, and seeing the impending attack, opened a heavy artillery fire from a battery posted on the Bowling Green road, down toward the Massaponax and Prospect Hill, giving it an enfilading fire on the left and rear of Meade's division. The general at once faced the Third Brigade to the left, thus forming with the first two sides of a square. Simpson's battery was at once placed on the left of the Third Brigade, while Cooper's and Ransom's were ordered to occupy a position on the left of the First Brigade. These batteries, with some of Doubleday's, soon silenced the enemy's batteries, but in the mean time, under cover of the smoke and the quite dense copse on the slope of the hill in their front, sharpshooters had advanced to the Bowling Green road, but were soon dislodged by General Jackson, commanding the Third Brigade.

Meade now decided to prepare for the attack, and ordered the batteries to shell the woods in front. He changed Ransom's battery to the right of the First Brigade, but Amsden, who had just returned from detailed duty, took a position near Cooper.

In about thirty minutes the guns of the enemy were silenced, as the well-directed shots from our batteries had caused a serious explosion. Meade's Third Brigade was still facing down the river. Reynolds directed him to put

it on the left of the First Brigade facing the enemy, in order to give Doubleday a chance to bring his division on the extreme left, extending as far as possible in the direction of the banks of the Massaponax.

General Burnside had sent General Hardie of his staff to General Franklin, so that he could report the movements of the troops on the left—presumably with a view to giving Burnside an idea how to press the troops in the center and right.

General Hardie's telegrams to Burnside are given as they were written during the battle—describing the scene just as he saw it :

11 A. M.—Meade advances half a mile, and holds on. Infantry of enemy in wood in front of extreme left ; also in front of Howe. No loss, so far, of great importance. General Vinton badly, but not dangerously, wounded.

LATER.—Reynolds has been forced to develop his whole line. An attack of some force of enemy's troops on our left seems probable, as far as can now be judged. Stoneman has been directed to cross one division to support our left. Report of cavalry pickets from the other side of the river that enemy's troops were moving down the river on this side, during the latter part of the night. Howe's pickets reported movement in their front, same direction ; still they have a strong force, well posted with batteries here.

12 NOON.—Birney's division is now getting into position. That done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance. Batteries over the river are to shell the enemy's position in the wood in front of Reynolds' left. He thinks the effect will be to promote Meade's advance. A column of the enemy's infantry is passing along the crest of the hills from right to left, as we look at it.

12:05 P. M.—General Meade's line is advancing in the direction you prescribed this morning.

1 P. M.—Enemy opened a battery on Reynolds, enfilading Meade. Reynolds has opened all his batteries on it. No report yet. Reynolds hotly engaged at this moment. Will report in a few moments again.

1:15 P. M.—Heavy engagement of infantry (enemy in force) where battery is. Meade is assaulting the hill. Will report again in a few moments.

1:25 P. M.—Meade is in the wood, in his front. Seems to be able to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in, if necessary. The bat-

tery and wood referred to must be near Hamilton's house. The infantry firing is prolonged and quite heavy. Things look well enough. Men in fine spirits.

1:40 P. M.—Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's position in the wood, we have 300 prisoners. Enemy's batteries on our extreme left retire. Tough work. Men fight well. Gibbon has advanced to Meade's right. Men fight well. Driving the enemy. Meade has suffered severely; Doubleday, to Meade's left, not engaged.


Col. William Cooper Talley, in command of the 1st Regiment of the Reserves, was on the right of the First Brigade, with the 2d on the left of the brigade, and the 121st Pennsylvania, under Col. Chapman Biddle, in the center.

In this charge, which was longer and equally as brilliant and daring as that of the famous Pickett charge at Gettysburg, or McDonald's celebrated charge at Wagram, the command was exposed to a heavy artillery fire not only in front, but from the flanks. Col. William Sinclair was wounded, and Colonel McCandless of the 2d took command of the brigade, when Colonel Talley on the right struck the railroad; he at once came under a severe infantry fire.

Colonel Talley was a young officer, of unpretending manners, and was not ambitious for promotion. C. H. Ingram of Talley's regiment said to me that he kept his eye on the pale face of the young colonel as they advanced. Ingram again looked at Colonel Talley as the regiment reached the slope to make their charge on the enemy's works; he said Colonel Talley was one of the coolest men he ever saw in action. He guarded his right against a surprise, and at the same time with intrepidity led the charge in front.

Bates, in his valuable history of "Pennsylvania Volunteers," in speaking of Colonel Talley in the celebrated Fredericksburg charge, says:

In the battle of Fredericksburg, the 1st Regiment of Pennsylvania Reserves, commanded by Colonel Talley, the regiment occupied



GEN. W. COOPER TALLEY.

the right of the brigade, and moved in steady, unwavering line across an open plain, under a heavy enfilading artillery fire; and when the order was given, charged the enemy with resistless energy, crossing the railroad and ditches, driving him two hundred yards beyond the intrenchments. Colonel Talley, finding his regiment outflanked on the right, with the enemy strongly reënforced in front, and no support coming up in rear, was compelled to retire, after having opened the way to victory. In this engagement Colonel Talley led the regiment with great gallantry. * * * The signal advantage gained in the whole battle, was gained by this part of the line; and had the successful assault here made been vigorously followed up it would doubtless have resulted in a brilliant victory, instead of that bloody repulse which filled the land with gloom.

We give the following graphic description of Meade's charge, from "Burnside and the Ninth Corps: "

By twelve o'clock, most of the dispositions on our side were made, and General Meade began to advance with earnestness and vigor. His division consisted of three brigades (of Pennsylvania Reserves), of which the Third was on the left, the First on the right, closely followed by the Second. General Gibbon's division was ordered to hold itself ready as a support. The troops went forward with great spirit and resolution. In handsome style they charged up the road, regardless of a hot fire from the enemy, crossed the railroad, ascended the heights beyond, broke through the enemy's first line, under General Taliaferro, and gained a position near Captain Hamilton's house, capturing and sending back three hundred prisoners and more. Nothing could be better than this gallant charge. It was made in the midst of a destructive fire of artillery, and for a time carried everything before it. Finding an interval in the enemy's line, between the brigades of Archer and Lane, General Meade took advantage of it, and wedged his advance in turning the flanks of both brigades and throwing them into confusion. He next struck Gregg's brigade and broke it to pieces, with the loss of its commanding officer. Gen. A. P. Hill's line was then pierced, and General Meade's next duty was to break the line of General Taliaferro. But that was not so easy. For an hour and a half had the gallant little division pushed forward in its successful career. But it was now bearing the brunt of a contest with the entire corps of General Jackson, which had been ordered to meet the audacious attack, and it could not maintain itself without continued support. * *

General Meade had come within a hair's breath of achieving a great success. His attack had been so vigorous as to be almost a

surprise. His troops had come upon the enemy, in some cases, before he had time to take the muskets from the stacks.

Biddle's new regiment caught the enthusiasm of war, and in that charge exhibited the coolness of veterans of long experience; in fact, they were quite loath to retire, when they were being surrounded by the enemy on all sides. But the 2d Regiment of the Reserves, under command of Captain Meally, was forging well to the front; A. P. Hill's first line of battle was routed; Archer's left was forced back, and Lane's right brushed aside; the First Brigade of the Reserves advanced rapidly on A. P. Hill's second line commanded by Gregg and Thomas, and the 19th Georgia surrendered a few minutes afterwards to Adjutant Woodward of the 2d Regiment of the Reserves. Gregg was mortally wounded, and his command thrown into great confusion. Gregg was a young man of great valor, and was the Governor elect of South Carolina.

The Third Brigade was fighting desperately on the left, and suffered so terribly from the artillery fire on the heights on Jackson's extreme right that it was unable to make the headway that the First Brigade did.

Meade was watching the progress of the battle on the left and sent Lieutenant Dehon of his staff, with orders to General Jackson "to move to the right flank till he could clear the open ground in front of the battery, and then, ascending the heights through the woods, sweep round to the left and take the battery. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Dehon fell just as he reached General Jackson, and a short time after the latter officer was killed." Of these two officers General Meade thus feelingly speaks in his report:

The loss of Lieutenant Arthur Dehon, 12th Massachusetts Regiment, my aid, is greatly to be deplored, as he was a young man of high promise, endeared to all that knew him for his manly virtues and amiable character. The public service has also to mourn the loss of Brig. Gen. C. Feger Jackson, an officer of merit and reputation, who owed his position to his gallantry and good conduct in previous actions.

Col. Joseph W. Fisher, of the 5th Regiment, assumed command of the Third Brigade when Jackson fell mortally wounded. The brigade was unable to execute the movement Meade desired it to. The Second Brigade of the Reserves followed the First Brigade promptly. Col. A. L. Magilton commanding, gave orders to press the First as closely as possible, and led the advance in person. The 4th Regiment, on the right of the brigade, suffered so severely from an enfilading fire from the right that Lieutenant Colonel Woolworth, commanding the regiment, faced to the right to meet it. He succeeded after a stubborn fight in driving the enemy back. The 8th Reserves and the 142d Pennsylvania were blocked off at the railroad—they were suffering from a heavy oblique fire and could not advance. The 3d Regiment, under Colonel Sickel, which was on the left of the brigade, obliqued over to the left, to meet the heavy musketry from that direction. The 7th Regiment, under Colonel Bolinger pulled, up by the side of the 3d, and during the time the Reserves Division was on the crest of the hill, it entertained the enemy in a manner decidedly interesting.

A. P. Hill's division of six brigades was not sufficient to prevent the advance of the Reserves, but when Early's and Taliaferro's divisions both joined in the assault on them, with assistance from D. H. Hill's division still farther in reserve, that Spartan band of soldier patriots, known as the Pennsylvania Reserves, sullenly retired down the hill "from whence they came."

The Third Brigade again changed commanders, and Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson, of the 9th, withdraws the brigade, because they are heavily pressed and the last round of ammunition is exhausted. Meade repeatedly sent back for assistance, but none arriving in time, he fell back this side of the railroad, and then rallied the remnant of his division with the assistance of Sickel, Talley, McCandless and others.

It was in vain to attempt to charge that hill again with

the Reserves, they were too much exhausted by the valorous deeds they had performed that morning. Meade in person called on Birney for reënforcements, and was given Ward's brigade, but it was too late. Why Meade was not supported in his grand charge which resulted in such terrible loss of life is a disputed question.

General Birney, in his report, says :

The enemy's batteries commanded the open field, and my loss being heavy, General Reynolds ordered me to retire my command from the field, holding it in hand behind the embankment. When the movement consequent on this order was half completed, General Meade's division was being sorely pressed, and he sent to me for assistance. I immediately reversed the movement of Ward's brigade, placing the 99th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Leidy ; 57th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Campbell, and 55th New York Volunteers, Colonel De Trobriand, in support of Meade's batteries, ordering forward the 30th Regiment of New York Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Birney ; 40th New York Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Gesner, and 4th Regiment, Maine Volunteers, Colonel Walker, under General Ward, to the support of the troops in front.

That enabled Meade to extricate his command from the maelstrom which threatened its destruction.

Gen. John C. Robinson, of Birney's division, had just crossed the river as Meade was retiring. Seeing that Livingston and Randolph's batteries were in danger of being captured, General Robinson hurried two of his regiments, the only two he had in line, to the support of these batteries. These two regiments delivered a volley, and then made a charge, hurling the enemy back into his intrenchments. His other regiments getting into line, Robinson advanced his line of battle to the crest of the hill, and throwing forward a strong skirmish line succeeded in capturing a colonel, a captain, Lawton, assistant adjutant general to General Early, and some sixty men. Gibbon's division was on the right of the First Corps, with the Third Brigade in front, commanded by Gen. Nelson Taylor, and

that supported by the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. Peter Lyle.

The First Brigade, commanded by Col. Adrian R. Root, was formed in close column by regiments, and supported Hall's battery, which was on the left of Taylor's brigade. Taylor ordered the 13th Massachusetts forward as skirmishers, and formed the brigade in line of battle in the following order from right to left: The 88th Pennsylvania on the right, then the 97th New York, with the 83d New York next, and 11th Pennsylvania on the left.

The valley on the right bank of the Rappahannock at that point being quite wide and rather level, all of Reynolds' troops were greatly exposed to the artillery of the enemy. When Taylor advanced, the fury of their batteries was turned on his brigade.

The 88th Pennsylvania was advanced to the front under cover of a slight elevation, from which point it was hoped their muskets would reach the battery that was doing such great damage; they were successful, and the battery was at once silenced. General Taylor was then ordered to advance his line of battle, which he did to near the railroad, when the enemy concentrated such a heavy fire on the two regiments on his left—the 11th Pennsylvania and 83d New York—that the general in his report says: "They were soon melted away." Col. Richard Coulter, of the 11th Pennsylvania, was wounded, and Capt. Christian Kuhn took command of the regiment. The fire on the 83d New York was so severe that the regiment changed commanders three times in a very few minutes, in the following order: Capts. John Hendrickson and Joseph A. Moesch, and Lieut. Isaac E. Hoagland. The heavy losses of these two regiments caused General Taylor to halt. Lyle's brigade was ordered up to relieve these two regiments, and the 97th New York and 88th Pennsylvania were marched a short distance to the right to give Lyle a chance to unmask. The brigade formed with the 136th Pennsylvania on the left, then the 90th Pennsylvania, with the 26th

New York on the right. The 12th Massachusetts was unable to take a position between the 26th and 97th New York Regiments, on account of the retiring troops of Taylor's brigade, whom they were relieving; but the regiment was commanded independently by Colonel Bates. It was no difference how they fought, so the leaden hail was fired at the enemy.

In the mean time the 13th Massachusetts, having exhausted all of its ammunition, had been withdrawn to the right and left of the brigade; Colonel Leonard remained with four companies on the left in support of Hall's battery, which had advanced beyond the Bowling Green road. When Lyle's brigade advanced, the 136th Pennsylvania was given a very responsible position, the left flank of the brigade; and although it was a new regiment it fought with a valor unsurpassed. It forged its way across the railroad into the wood, and held that position for two hours and forty minutes, and having exhausted all of its ammunition, 60 rounds, and having no support on the left, it had to defend itself against a force which presented a front twice its length, occupying a chosen position, protected by a dense wood and supported by a battery. Colonel Bayne though seeing the enemy was overlapping him and would soon endanger his flank and rear, still held his position, hoping that the advance of the enemy would be checked by troops coming to his assistance, but finally, seeing the great peril his regiment was in, he retired until he could join other troops of the division, who were fighting somewhat at will, as the brigades were mixed up by that time more or less, for Colonel Root's brigade had been ordered up by General Taylor to make a charge—Gibbon had been wounded, Taylor was in command of the division, and Colonel Leonard took command of Taylor's brigade. As Colonel Root was sweeping down like a mountain eagle to make his charge, he passed the 12th Massachusetts going to the rear for ammunition. Colonel Root said to Colonel Bates, "Don't retire." Colonel Bates told him their con-

dition. "Never mind," said he, "I am going to make a charge." Colonel Bates at once gave the order to fix bayonets and file to the right of Root's brigade, and the gallant 12th Massachusetts again went into the fight on the right flank with not a single cartridge—but the regiment that had followed Fletcher Webster until he fell mortally wounded at second Bull Run, would follow any officer who had the courage to lead them, and Colonel Bates was brave to a fault.

Colonel Root, in his report, says: "I wish to acknowledge my obligations to Colonel Bates, 12th Massachusetts Volunteers, for his prompt and generous response to my request for his coöperation. He promptly united his regiment with my brigade and charged upon the enemy's position with fixed bayonets and empty cartridge boxes." Colonel Root arranged his brigade as follows for the charge: the 107th Pennsylvania on the left, with the 105th New York in the center, and the 16th Maine on the right. These regiments were deployed to the right of Hall's battery, and were supported by the 94th and 104th New York Regiments. That was as grand a charge as was ever made, and the troops engaged in it deserved the highest credit for their work there. Colonel McCoy, commanding the 107th Pennsylvania, knew he had a regiment that was steeled against danger, so he concluded he would lead the brigade.

The 16th Maine, under Colonel Tilden, rushed to the front like the foaming waters of a cataract; the 105th New York, under Major Sharp, was abreast of the 107th Pennsylvania, while the 12th Massachusetts was crowding the 16th Maine; the 97th New York, under Colonel Wheelock, was forging its way well to the front, and the 88th Pennsylvania held a good alignment, while the 90th Pennsylvania contributed to the charge.

But here are two regiments disobeying orders—the 94th and 104th New York had been directed to support the charge, and they now are mingling with the front line, and there

is no support to Root's line of battle. As that determined line was almost on a dead run when it struck the enemy, it forced the Confederate line back up the hill.

The 16th Maine crossed bayonets with the enemy, and the awful carnage of death began. Taliaferro's line yielded with sullenness—the two lines were yet near each other. Otis Libby, of the 16th Maine, was so badly clubbed over the head with a musket that he was crazed with pain, and rushing at their line pierced two soldiers through with his bayonet. Monroe Layford, seeing his brother killed, rushed at the one who killed him, saying, "Curse you, you killed my brother," ran his bayonet through him in an instant. The shock was too heavy for the enemy to withstand, and he recoiled like the retiring movement of a powerful gun. For the time being Reynolds' right division had cleared its front, but there were no troops within supporting distance, and the enemy soon, heavily reënforced, again cautiously coming down the hill covered with timber which afforded shelter and protection, and gave him great advantage, it seemed rash to remain there. General Taylor, who accompanied the charge and greatly cheered the boys by his presence, told Colonel Root to withdraw his command whenever he deemed it advisable. Colonel Root says :

It was with real pain that I gave the order for the brigade to fall back. The officers and men received it with surprise and grief, and retired so reluctantly that the enemy was enabled to close up on the rear of the brigade and inflict a loss exceeding that incurred during the charge itself.

He further adds :

I am happy in being able to bear testimony to the gallant manner in which the regimental commanders took their men into action, and I deem it a duty no less than a pleasure to make especial mention of the 16th Maine Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Tilden commanding. This regiment is a new one, and here fought its first battle, and I felt some apprehension lest the terrible fire from the enemy's concealed rifle pits would be too severe a trial for its men. But

the gallant manner in which this regiment charged the enemy's position excited my surprise and admiration, and reflected the highest honor upon its officers. Previous to the battle 38 men of this regiment had volunteered to do duty with Hall's battery, and their conduct is represented by Captain Hall to have been creditable in the highest degree. The 94th New York Volunteers, Major Kress commanding; the 104th New York Volunteers, Colonel Prey; the 105th New York Volunteers, Major Sharp commanding, and the 107th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel McCoy, are comparatively veteran regiments, and have been tried upon a number of hard-fought battlefields. In doing their entire duty during the recent engagement they did what I expected of them.

He also especially mentioned Lieut. Charles E. Scoville, 94th New York Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant general, and Lieut. Abner R. Small, 16th Maine, acting aid-de-camp.

There were two regiments of Taylor's brigade on the front line all the time—the 97th New York and the 88th Pennsylvania—they retired only with Root's brigade. In the charge Major Sharp, commanding the 105th New York, was wounded. Capt. Isaac S. Tichenor then assumed command and led the regiment gallantly, until a shell burst near him; he fell to the ground unconscious, and was left for dead. Then it fell to Captain Moore to command the regiment and take it off the field.

General Hardie sent the following dispatches to Burnside:

2:15 P. M.—Gibbon and Meade driven back from the wood; Newton gone forward. Jackson's corps, of the enemy, attack on the left. General Gibbon slightly wounded, Bayard mortally, by a shell. Things do not look so well on Reynolds' front; still, we will have new troops in soon.

2:25 P. M.—Dispatch received. Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in. Will report soon again.

3 P. M.—Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things look better somewhat.

3:40 P. M.—Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon

as it can be collected, and if it be done in time, of course another attack will be made.

The enemy are in force in the wood on our left, toward Hamilton's, and threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They seem to have detached a portion of their force to our front, where Howe and Brooks are now engaged.

Brooks has some prisoners, and is down the railroad. Just as soon as the left is safe our forces here will be prepared for a front attack; but it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are engaged in front now, anyhow.

Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the *morale* of the troops is generally good.

P. S.—Engaged now heavily in front.

4:30 P. M.—The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has been opened on our left, but the left is safe, though it is too late to advance, either to the left or front.

Meade had been relieved by Birney, Sickles took the place of Gibbon, and these two divisions of the First Corps, that had stood the brunt of the battle all day, were relieved.

We now turn to Doubleday's division on the left of the First Corps. While the troops of the corps were crossing the lower bridge, Reynolds directed Doubleday to station Colonel Gavin's brigade at the bridge to guard it. In accordance with this order Gavin ordered the 7th Indiana and 76th New York to the right bank of the river, while the 95th New York and 56th Pennsylvania remained on the left side.

Doubleday, with the other three brigades of his division, faced down the river and marched until he gained a position a little to the left of Bernard's house, nearly three-fourths of a mile from the crossing, where he halted for the remainder of the day and the night. As he was in reserve, he placed his command in column by regiments, 100 paces apart; thus parking in rear of Meade and Gibbon.

Doubleday says: "While thus posted we were shelled by enemy's long-range guns." Jackson had 47 guns on his front—14 on his right and 33 on his left—at Bernard's

Cabin. In addition to this, J. E. B. Stuart's command was on Jackson's right, with all of his artillery posted as near his right as possible. The combined artillery of Stuart and Jackson could rake the whole valley to the right of Smith's corps.

On the morning of the 13th Colonel Gavin reported with his brigade to Doubleday, having been relieved from duty at the pontoon bridge. The enemy held a wood along the river bank which was intersected with ravines, and was quite a strong position, as it not only concealed him, but at the same time shielded well his troops from our artillery and sharpshooters. Captain Gerrish's New Hampshire Battery was placed on the right of Doubleday's line, while Lieutenant Stewart's battery, B, 4th United States Artillery, was posted on the left for the purpose of shelling this wood. After these two batteries had shelled it sufficiently, Doubleday ordered General Meredith to take the wood with his brigade.

The 2d United States Sharpshooters was directed to deploy as skirmishers. As usual, that regiment advanced to its work with as much alacrity as if preparing for a dress parade or to be reviewed by the President. Grand soldiers! they were the pride of the division. The 24th Michigan and 7th Wisconsin advanced in line of batt'le, with the 2d Wisconsin and 19th Indiana supporting, followed by the 6th Wisconsin in the second line in good supporting distance. In the wood were masked batteries of eight guns with which to sweep the river. Quite a number of soldiers and horses were captured here by the Iron Brigade. General Doubleday was greatly pleased with the conduct of the 24th Michigan, and took occasion to highly commend it to General Reynolds. This was its maiden fight, and its action was watched by the veterans with considerable solicitude. It was commanded by Col. Henry A. Morrow, who won distinction later in the war, and served after the war as colonel of the 21st United States Infantry.

The 7th Wisconsin was commanded by Col. W. W.

Robinson. That regiment came out early in 1861, and its colonel was an old officer who was capable of a much higher command—he afterwards commanded the Iron Brigade, and as an officer stands high in the estimation of the Army of the Potomac. Col. W. F. Rogers, commanding the Third Brigade of the First Division, advanced and took a position on Meredith's right, advancing to the Bowling Green road. The sharpshooters of the enemy were holding that road, and clung to it with great tenacity when Rogers moved forward. A battery some 500 or 600 yards in rear of them was doing considerable damage, but was compelled to retire by this brigade. Gerrish's battery was then moved to a position at the intersection of a road with the Bowling Green road, when Colonel Rogers threw out skirmishers to protect the battery, and then retired his brigade some distance to the rear to support it.

Col. Walter Phelps, Jr., commanding the First Brigade, moved forward and took position on the right of Colonel Rogers, placing three companies on the Bowling Green road as skirmishers. Colonel Gavin, commanding the Second Brigade, moved forward on Phelps' right; Doubleday's division was now all in line of battle. Reynolds' battery was taken from the left of the command and placed between Phelps and Gavin.

It is certain that Doubleday's division was handicapped by Stuart clinging to the Rappahannock this side of the Massaponax, and preventing his advance by that means so as to assist Meade's charge.

After the battle Jackson inquired of one of our officers who accompanied a flag of truce what division that was on the left. He highly complimented its marching under the heavy artillery fire it was subjected to.

Doubleday all the time had to refuse his left to guard against an attack in the direction of the Massaponax.

Burnside or Franklin ought to have given Reynolds enough troops to have swept the left bank of the Massaponax from its confluence with the Rappahannock: then a

simultaneous attack of all of Reynolds' divisions, Doubleday's, Meade's, and Gibbon's, might have broken through Jackson's troops. Doubleday would have been able to evade to a certain extent the fourteen guns of Jackson on Prospect Hill, though he would have suffered some from them, and, in addition, would have felt the whole power of Stuart's artillery and cavalry. The Comte de Paris thus speaks of Jackson's position :

The one on the right was almost as formidable as the first, for its defenders being concealed among the woods and able to move about unperceived by their adversaries, were admirably posted for observing the latter at a distance in the plain, and crushing them with the fire of their artillery so soon as they should cross the railway track to climb the acclivities which rose to the margin of the wood. In the wood itself the chances would have been more equal, but the knowledge of the roads which traversed it was a great advantage to its defenders.

Hon. W. C. Oates, a member of Congress from Alabama, who was in Hoke's brigade and with his command came forward to assist in repelling Meade's attack, said to me that "If Franklin had made the attack with 40,000, it is my opinion that he could not have driven Jackson from his strong position. I think it was the wisest thing to do—to retire across the river."

Oates is a very candid man and avoids all appearance of prejudice, but certainly is mistaken in the "40,000" matter, as the troops on each side displayed equal determination at that part of the line. Yet Jackson and Stuart evidently commanded from 40,000 to 50,000—the evidence in my possession fully confirms that. Then, taking into consideration their strongly intrenched position on those heights, honeycombed with roads made by them, perhaps it was well that the Army of the Potomac was quietly withdrawn under the somber shades of night.

Late in the afternoon Doubleday drew in his left wing, under Meredith and Rogers, as there were strong indications

of an attack by the enemy, and his center was then being very hard pressed.


Jackson determined late in the afternoon to attack Franklin, but after a careful reconnoissance of the Union line he desisted. Had he advanced over that valley to drive Franklin into the river, he might have deeply regretted it, and given Franklin a chance to follow his defeated troops to the crest of the hill with a good chance of victory. It was a safe plan to quietly remain in their positions and await the attacks of the Union Army.

Doubleday had another reason for contracting his lines on the left. If a night attack was made, he had a better opportunity to handle his command and could more easily reinforce any point that was furiously assailed. If the enemy had made an attack at night it would have been of a most determined character.

The shattered divisions of Meade and Gibbon were in reserve, where they could come to Doubleday's assistance. But the night wore away and the light of another Sunday morning came with its "olive branch of peace," its morning greeting to all mankind, to pay due homage on that blessed day to the Lord God of Hosts. Although Jackson had the reputation of being a devout Christian, yet there is no evidence of his being religiously inclined that day, except through the thunderings of his cannon as they belched forth their missiles of death at the boys in blue in the valley below.

It is seldom, in this country at least, that the artillery played such an important part in a battle as it did at Fredericksburg. In my humble judgment there never was a better artillery officer than Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac. He had picked his subordinate officers with great care, so that that arm of the service was well prepared for the great struggle between the two armies.

Col. C. S. Wainwright, chief of artillery of the First Corps, displayed the qualities of an excellent officer. He



GEN. DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.

was present wherever danger threatened, to post the artillery where it could do the greatest execution. If Meade and Gibbon were engaged in a charge, he was there. If Doubleday was pressed on the flank and in front with a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, Wainwright was at the side of the artilleryman who fired the first shot in the war.

Believing that the artillery deserve great credit for their services in that battle, and thinking that the highest praise that can be bestowed on them is to quote from General Reynolds' report what he said of the artillery, it is here given with great cheerfulness :

To Captains Ransom, Cooper and Simpson, commanding batteries of Meade's division ; Captains Reynolds, Hall, Gerrish, and Lieutenant Stewart commanding those of the other divisions as well as Captain Wolcott, commanding a battery of Smith's corps, great credit is due for the intrepidity with which they maintained their positions, and the coolness and judgment with which they managed their command under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries, so advantageously posted during the whole day of the 13th.

Captain Cooper and Lieutenant Stewart maintained the most advanced position with the steadiness for which their commands had been noted on former fields. To Colonel Wainwright, 1st New York Artillery, chief of artillery, I am indebted for the excellent judgment he displayed in the management and disposition of the whole artillery of the corps, and for the admirable manner in which the damages it received were repaired on the field and the guns again brought into action under his supervision.

What General Reynolds then said of the artillery is simply a cold fact, which is the highest tribute that can be paid to Wainwright and his command. The general overlooked the fact that the 5th Maine, under Capt. George F. Lippien ; Battery C, Pennsylvania Light, under Capt. James Thompson, and Battery G, of same regiment, under Capt. Frank P. Amsden, had also been engaged, but Wainwright acknowledges their services. Captain Lippien was in command of the artillery of Meade's division. Although the troops were yet on the south side of the Rappahannock,

the battle would not be renewed, for Jackson had industriously employed all of the time, since the charges of Meade and Gibbon, to deepen his rifle-pits and otherwise strengthen his position, so that he was much better prepared to withstand an attack now than he was yesterday.

Jackson had had twenty-four hours to come down in the valley and drive Franklin into the river, but so far not even a sign of a move indicated that he would pay the fraternal visit he was so enthusiastic over yesterday; time and a good observation of Franklin's lines had cooled his fiery ardor.

Franklin was well prepared to take care of his host, if he would only "Come into my (valley) parlor." Burns' division on the right, under the gritty little general, was hoping for a chance to display its mettle; Smith's corps on his left was ready any moment, with Sickles and Birney of the Third Corps, two splendid divisions, commanded by able generals, who resting on their arms, while Doubleday on the extreme left had his division well in hand for any emergency, even a night attack.

With this magnificent line of battle in full view of Jackson, there was no danger that he would attack.

Reynolds highly commends Lieutenant Rogers of Doubleday's staff for his skillful manner of withdrawing the pickets in front of Doubleday.

Reynolds returns his thanks to Doubleday, Meade and Taylor, who succeeded Gibbon, after the latter was wounded.

Doubleday says: "I was much indebted to Surg. Edward Shippen, medical director, for his care and attention to the wounded. He also exposed himself a great deal on the field." He speaks highly of the behavior of his staff, Major Livingston, Captains Bloodgood and C. F. Noyes, Lieuts. J. B. Martin, L. A. Bartlett, H. T. Lace, and W. H. Wilcox. Meade thanks his brigade commanders, and "To Colonel Sinclair particularly, who had command of the advance during the whole day, and who was severely wounded,

I desire to express my obligations for assistance rendered me."

Reynolds' staff was constantly in the saddle until the battle was over, and so was his escort, Company L, 1st Maine Cavalry, under Capt. Constantine Taylor, but this company was noted for its good discipline and readiness to go at once, regardless of danger, or else it would not have been selected by Reynolds, who never was rash, but fear to him was a stranger, and he quietly impressed those around him with a courage that made them court danger, if necessary.

Taylor performed quite important service in connection with the pontoon trains, as will be seen by the following report :

HALFWAY BETWEEN DUMFRIES AND OCCOQUAN,

On the road to Alexandria, Va.,

November 21, 1862—5 p. m.

GENERAL :—The pontoon train commenced crossing the Occoquan this morning. I am within five miles of the Occoquan, but no pontoon train has been met with. I send this as the first news from our train. I shall continue moving until I meet the train.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

C. TAYLOR,

Capt. 1st Maine Cavalry, Commanding Battalion.

To General FRANKLIN,

Stafford Court-house.

Gibbon speaks in complimentary terms of his staff, and personally mentions Captains Wood and Lee, and Lieutenants Haskell and Moale.

General Taylor acknowledges his indebtedness to his two aids, Captain Hartz and Lieutenant Post. Colonel Magilton, commanding the Second Brigade under Meade, says: "Lieutenants Wilson and Campbell deserve great praise for the manner in which they conveyed orders under such a terrific fire, showing great coolness and courage, although both were slightly wounded."

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson, who took the Third Brigade of Meade's off of the field, does not forget

his staff—Captain Swearingen, and Lieutenants Bemus and Chamberlain. Colonel Lyle commanding Gibbon's Second Brigade says:

I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the coolness and bravery of Colonel Bates, commanding 12th Massachusetts; Colonel Bayne, commanding 136th Pennsylvania Volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel Jannings, commanding 26th New York Volunteers (who was wounded in the early part of the action); Lieutenant Colonels Allen and Wright; Majors Sellers and Wetmore, and to the line officers of the several regiments of the brigade. The steadiness and good behavior of the men, in my opinion, have never been excelled.

Colonel Adrian R. Root, who commanded the First Brigade in Gibbon's division, that so heroically charged the enemy, says:

I desire to render a general tribute of honest praise and gratitude to the officers and soldiers of my brigade.

Meredith in his report, speaks in commendable terms of his staff—W. W. Dudley, J. D. Wood, J. W. Shaefer, Samuel H. Meredith, and J. M. Howard, Jr.

Colonel Rogers, of Doubleday's Third Brigade, closes his report by saying:

I take pleasure in referring to the promptness with which I was supported by Colonels Hofmann and Lord, Lieutenant Colonel Hardenbergh and Captain Layton.

I take pleasure also in testifying to the very efficient service rendered by the 2d United States Sharpshooters, under Major Stoughton, of Colonel Phelps' Brigade.

Of his staff, Lieutenants Taylor, Cook and Bridges, he says:

They performed their duties with great coolness and bravery under the severe artillery fire to which all were subjected.

Colonel Gavin, commanding Doubleday's Second Brigade, says:

Officers and men behaved admirably on the retreat, as they did during the entire fight. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of both officers and men during the severe cannonading. I can only say that the brigade sustained fully its well-earned reputation. Men all behaved so well I shall not attempt to speak of individual good conduct.

On our left it might well be termed a drawn battle—while Franklin was unable to carry Jackson's strongly fortified position, yet he was master of the valley, and it was equally as hazardous for Jackson to attack him, although Franklin had no breastworks, but the unalloyed valor of the troops would have vigorously met the enemy in an open field contest.

Let us now see how the tide of battle has raged on the right—has our artillery been successful in making a breach in the stone wall, or has our infantry been able to take it by storm?

General Sumner, in command of the right grand division, gave the order to Couch, commanding the Second Corps, to attack with his command and carry Marye's Heights. Couch directed French to take the lead with his division. He advanced with Kimball's brigade, supported by Andrews', and that in turn by Palmer's.

The following telegrams announced the fact that French was marching :

12 M.—The advance has started.
To General SUMNER.

D. N. COUCH.

From the signal station in the top of the courthouse steeple came the second dispatch :

12:45 P. M.—Our infantry have advanced, and are hotly engaged. The enemy hold their own ; they have about two batteries in action on a hill and are playing into our infantry.

To General BURNSIDE.

B. F.

Kimball with great courage and bravery led his brigade on the enemy's works amid a storm of canister from the

batteries concentrating their fire on him as he steadily advanced, besides a deadly fire from Cobb's and Cook's brigades. When within fifty paces of their works the sheet of flame was so terrible that his brigade was compelled to halt. Their commander being severely wounded, had a depressing effect on the men, but Colonel Mason of the 4th Ohio assumed command in Kimball's place and valiantly fought the brigade. Andrews and Palmer were unable to push any farther to the front, and there the division stood and received the deadly fire of the enemy, which is thus described by the Comte de Paris: "When within two hundred meters of the enemy, they were received by discharges of musketry, every shot of which, aimed at leisure, made sure of a victim." Their ranks melting away like snow on a southern hillside from the sun at noonday, they fired a volley at the enemy and retired.

The third dispatch from the court house steeple says :

1 P. M.—Our troops are under a severe cross fire, but stand firm.
To General BURNSIDE. B. F.

Hancock was then ordered to French's assistance, advancing with Zook in front, then Meagher and Caldwell two hundred paces apart. Long before Hancock reached the outskirts of the city his division was suffering severely from Longstreet's artillery. As Hancock swept past the remnant of French's division at the head of Zook's brigade, Kimball's men joined him; but he was able to go only some twenty-five paces farther when Zook's brigade was threatened with annihilation if it advanced.

Then Meagher, the impulsive Irish patriot, attempted to pass to the front, but his brigade fell like grass before the reaper.

After Zook's and Meagher's brigades lay stranded, Hancock turned to Caldwell to have him try his luck. He advanced with a determination to scale the enemy's works,

but the third and last brigade of Hancock was sacrificed without even disturbing the enemy.

1:30 P. M.—Two of our divisions are now engaging the enemy.
To General BURNSIDE.

1:35 P. M.—Send the ammunition to the Lacy House; Hancock and French are so hotly engaged, I need reinforcements.
To General BURNSIDE. D. N. COUCH.

If you can send a good division, I think the left flank of the enemy can be turned; it will only be necessary now, I have not a division for the purpose.

To General BURNSIDE.

D. N. COUCH.

Couch undertook to use Howard's division for that purpose, but when French and Hancock were so badly cut up he was compelled to order Howard to their support.

Howard directed Owen's brigade to advance, followed by Hall's, with Sully remaining near the edge of the city. Although these troops fought with great valor, their efforts were all in vain. While the enemy had lost General Cobb, and General Cook was wounded, their casualties so far had been little more than those of a heavy skirmish, while the gallant corps of the Army of the Potomac had suffered a loss that was sickening to behold—the ground was covered with the wounded and dying. When Meagher made his charge, two brothers of the 88th New York lay clasped in each other's embrace, dead in each other's arms; no one knows whether they spoke after they put their arms lovingly around each other—nor does it matter now.

So far Cobb's and Cook's brigades, with the artillery, were the troops engaged under Longstreet. The desperate fighting of the Second Corps made it advisable for these two brigades to be strengthened; consequently Ransom's and Kershaw's brigades were advanced to their assistance, Kershaw assuming command. Willcox attempted to relieve the right by pushing Sturgis in on the left of Hancock. Accordingly Ferrero's brigade, under cover of Dickenson's bat-

tery, marched rapidly over the open space and up the hill, which checked the advance of the enemy, as his infantry had sallied over their works and were attempting to assail Hancock's left. Ferrero compelled the enemy to retire behind his works, but that drew a concentrated fire on Dickenson's battery. Of Ferrero's troops Willcox says: "But the gallant Dickenson gloriously fell at his post, and his battery suffered considerably in men and horses, under a concentrated fire of artillery and some musketry." While Ferrero was advancing under a galling fire, it was evident that his troops would be overpowered soon, and General Nagle's brigade was ordered to his support. General Whipple seeing that Sturgis' small division was struggling up the slope in face of a concealed foe, sent him Carroll's brigade.

But the hour demanded more victims, and Getty's division, which had been held near Hazel Run as a reserve, where observations could be made of the battle on the left and right, advanced. Willcox, as a last resort, to save his own troops under Sturgis and to relieve the Second Corps on the right, ordered Getty forward. He advanced with Hawkins' brigade until it nearly reached the enemy's works, when his infantry opened such a well-aimed fire that Hawkins' brigade soon lost heavily and was badly crippled. Harland's brigade coming to their relief fought with great valor, but Getty was finally compelled to fall back in front of such a destructive fire—where it was nothing but sacrifice to remain.

General Griffin is relieving General Sturgis, who is holding on in spite of everything until he is relieved.

To General SUMNER.

WILLCOX.

The left and right grand divisions had been engaged, and it now devolved on Hooker to bring up the center, composed of the Third and Fifth Corps. But Birney's and Sickles' divisions of the Third Corps had taken the place of Meade and Gibbon on the left; while Car-

roll's brigade of Whipple's division of that corps had been sent to the aid of Willcox, leaving only Platt's brigade of Whipple's division of the Third Corps.

Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps had gone to relieve Sturgis, so it left Hooker with Platt's brigade of the Third Corps, and Humphrey's and Sykes' division of the Fifth Corps to make his charge, but Platt's brigade was too far to the left to be of any service in that trying ordeal. As he calmly looked over the work of the day—for it was then late in the afternoon—Hooker regarded it as a forlorn hope to lead two divisions against the enemy's works, which several corps had attempted to storm and signally failed. It is true that Smith's corps, and Burns' division, on Smith's right, had not been fighting very hard, but Reynolds, on the left, with Birney's and Sickles' divisions, had been heavily engaged, while the Second and Ninth Corps, on the right, had suffered great losses. Hooker saw nothing but disaster in another assault under the circumstances.

From the engagement at Williamsburg, where Hooker fought Longstreet, to the battle of Antietam, which he opened on the right, and electrified his troops by riding where danger seemed the greatest, no one doubted Hooker's anxiety to fight a battle. He had won, and justly so, too, the soubriquet of "Fighting Joe." For the first time in the war he was averse to fighting, and dispatched an aid to Burnside, at the Phillips House, begging him to desist from a further attempt to carry a position which it was utterly impossible to take. The aid reported to Burnside Hooker's message, but the commander-in-chief was inflexible, and declined to consider Hooker's suggestion. When the officer returned with Burnside's answer, Hooker resolved to go and tell Burnside in person what he thought of again attempting to charge the enemy's works.

Pleasanton, who had been with Burnside nearly all day, looked out and saw Hooker ride up on his white charger. When he dismounted Pleasanton said to me he thought

Hooker was the maddest man that he ever saw. Burnside was not aware that he was coming, so Pleasonton slipped out and went into another part of the house, as he did not want to be present when they met, for he knew there would be a high time. Pleasonton said Hooker made the air blue with adjectives over the management of the battle. But Hooker was unable to make Burnside yield, and he returned to his command to carry out the imperative orders of his superior.

Hooker's report is such a clear and condensed description of the battle that it is here given :

At 1:30 o'clock, or thereabouts, I received orders to cross this corps and attack. Before the corps had fully crossed, I was directed to send a division to support General Sturgis. General Griffin's division, the largest of the three, being nearest the position, for the purpose, was assigned to this duty. General Butterfield was then left with the two smaller divisions of his corps to make an attack upon the right, where General Sumner's (Second) and a portion of the Ninth Corps, greatly outnumbering this force, had been at work all day without making any impression.

A prisoner, in the morning, had given to General Burnside, General Sumner and myself full information of the position and defenses of the enemy, stating that it was their desire that we should attack at that point, in rear of Fredericksburg on the Telegraph road ; that it was perfectly impossible for any troops to carry the position ; that if the first line was carried a second line of batteries commanded it.

The result of the operations of General Sumner's corps, which had made a determined, spirited attack, without success, fully confirmed the statements of this prisoner. I carefully surveyed the point of attack, and, after conversation with several of the general officers of Sumner's and my own command, I was convinced that it would be a useless waste of life to attack with the force at my disposal. I dispatched an aid to General Burnside, to say that I advised him not to attack. The reply came that the attack must be made. Under ordinary circumstances I should have complied at once, but so impressed was I with the conviction heretofore stated, that I determined it to be my duty to the troops under my command to give General Burnside a fuller explanation and dissuade him, if possible, from what I considered a hopeless attack, especially as the few moments it would take for this purpose could not possibly affect

the result of the attack in the slightest degree. Accordingly I did so. The general insisted upon the attack being made. I returned and brought up every available battery, with the intention of breaking their barriers, to enable Butterfield's attacking column to carry the crest. This artillery fire was continued with great vigor until near sunset, when the attack with bayonets was made by Humphrey's division, General Sykes' division moving on its right, to assault echelon and support. This attack was made with a spirit and determination seldom if ever equaled in war. The impregnable position of the enemy had given them so strong an advantage that the attack was almost immediately repulsed, and Sykes' division recalled, without having fully assaulted, to cover the withdrawal of Humphrey's. This movement was a necessity, for the loss and repulse of the attacking columns had been so severe that, should the enemy have followed up their advantage, without this precaution, the result could not have failed to be of the most disastrous character.

This is a fair and graphic description of the battle on the right and center.

When Sumner's and Hooker's men assailed Longstreet—the annals of history do not furnish an instance where greater heroism was displayed on a battlefield than that shown by the gallant soldiers of these two generals—less than 1,000 of Longstreet's men suffered any injury, because even cannon could not make a breach in the works behind which they were ensconced.

Burnside, as he paced up and down the veranda of the Phillips House while the battle was raging, said: "That height must be carried this evening."

He became desperate as the day wore away. Hooker, with only two small divisions, was ordered in the center, while an order was sent to Franklin to attack on the left with his whole command. That was an impossibility—it could be done only by massing his columns, when his flanks would have been exposed; then, again, there was no time to execute this hasty order. Franklin's front was fully two miles long, and the columns could not be massed in time to make an attack that evening. Had General Burnside adhered to Lincoln's urgent request for him to cross the

Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan, where his troops could ford the river, with no troops strong enough to dispute its passage, he would have occupied Fredericksburg without having to fight the great battle which had just terminated. Then if he had met the enemy, it would have been on a field where he would have had nearly equal chances—not attacking a Gibraltar. Furthermore, he solemnly promised that he would obey the wishes of the President in that matter, but utterly failed in its execution. It was the mistake of his life. He did not want to fight a battle that late in the fall, but if he had occupied Fredericksburg, and repaired his railroad to Aquia Creek, there is scarcely a doubt that he would have had a chance to meet the enemy. Lee would, in all probability, have taken a position some distance from him, and before the two armies could have met, the winter would have forced an armistice until spring, when Burnside would have been in excellent condition to pursue his adversary. Since the war, referring to the repulse of Humphreys and Sykes, who were forced back with fearful loss, General Burns observed to General Rosecrans and myself, that Hooker said "that he had lost about as many men as he was ordered to sacrifice," then gave the signal to retreat. And the Comte de Paris attributes the very same language to the irate general.

The great struggle had ended. It was an awful night for the Army of the Potomac—the wounded and the dying lay on the frozen ground, while those who had been fortunate enough to escape unharmed stood in groups, cold and hungry, without any fire, wondering whether the battle was to be renewed again in the morning. It was known that Burnside was anxious to renew the battle, and that he was going to lead his old corps, the Ninth, and storm the enemy's works.

The battle had been so badly managed that both officers and men were opposed to its renewal. There were not half a dozen officers who shared Burnside's opinion on that question.

Longstreet said: "They fully expected Burnside would renew the battle the next day. They knew that another day would nearly ruin the Army of the Potomac. If Burnside would attack such a strongly fortified position, it was reasonable to suppose that he would repeat his folly the next day;" but, thanks to Sumner, Hooker and other officers who had the nerve to tell him of the fatal consequences of another defeat, he was forced to yield. He was unyielding in his purpose until he was told that the officers and men were all opposed to it; and even then he would not be satisfied until he had visited some of the troops.

Some have censured Lee for not attacking the Union Army, and that astute general has given to the world the reason he did not. It was because he fully expected Burnside to renew the attack; he never had a serious thought of risking the great victory that he had gained by advancing on the Army of the Potomac in the open plain. It was enough to state after the battle that he thus lost a golden opportunity that deeply pained him the remainder of his life. His artillery might have done some damage, that was all. If his infantry had advanced, the joy of Sumner, Hooker, Franklin, Reynolds, Meade, Doubleday, Smith, Burns, Willcox, Couch, Humphreys, Hancock and French would have known no bounds, while the Union troops would have made a charge that would have paled the desperate assaults of the French at Waterloo.

Besides, Hunt's artillery was admirably posted on Stafford Heights to warmly greet any advance. The only thing that Lee could do was to patiently remain behind his fortifications and destroy Burnside's columns as they advanced.

When Burnside determined to give up the contest the order was issued for the troops to quietly retire, on the evening of the 15th, across the same bridges that they had marched over to offer battle to the enemy. The retreat was made in good order, which fully showed that there was

no demoralization in the army. It suffered great losses, but it retained its unwavering faith in the final triumph of the Union cause, though every one seemed to realize the fact that a great mistake had been made.

On the 21st of December Generals Franklin and Smith sent a plan to the President to take the old Peninsular route, but advised that the army march up both banks of the James River with the aid of the gunboats in the river. Franklin had been quite a confidant at the White House on former occasions, and that may have stimulated them to prepare and send their views. It is evident from Lincoln's laconic reply that he did not greatly relish it; and it may have been against Franklin's interest that he assisted in it, as it was not long before he was relieved of his command. There is no doubt of their honest intentions, and that the plan was very good, but it seems that the Peninsular route had greatly annoyed the President. The following is the President's reply:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, December 22, 1862.

Yours of the 21st, suggesting a plan of operation for the Army of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan and shall yet try to give it more deliberate consideration with the aid of military men. Meanwhile let me say it seems to me to present the old questions of preference between the line of the Peninsula and the line you are now upon. The difficulties you point out pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But now, as heretofore, if you go to the James River a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line to protect Washington. It is the old difficulty. When I saw General Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River, last July, I cannot be mistaken in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the army away from there.

Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.

Major General FRANKLIN and Major General SMITH.

To which Franklin made the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION,

December 26, 1862.

I respectfully acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d

inst. In arguing the propriety of a campaign on the James River, we supposed Washington to be garrisoned sufficiently, and the Potomac impassable, except by bridges. The fortification of Harper's Ferry is another important requisite. These matters were considered as of course, and did not enter into discussion of the two plans of campaign. I presume you are right in supposing that I advised the withdrawal of the army from James River in July last. I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same advice.

The army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, was in an unhealthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there was a prospect that we would have to remain in that position during the two worst months—August and September. The effect of this would have been to ruin the army in health. Circumstances are very different now. The army is in good health, and the best months of the year are before us.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. B. FRANKLIN, Major General.

To the PRESIDENT.

It will be seen by this correspondence that there was an active antagonism to Burnside; it was widespread and general, though he apparently knew nothing about it. In the mean time the commander-in-chief set to work to try to retrieve his fast-waning popularity as a general.

His next idea was to prepare to cross his army lower down the Rappahannock, and by that means gain Lee's rear and cut off his communications with Richmond. That was a good plan, except that it involved the crossing of the river in face of the enemy; for it is presuming too much to suppose Lee would not have watched his movements close enough to have been fully aware of the design the moment it was commenced in earnest.

The cavalry, under Averell, was to pass the Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford, then cross the Rapidan, strike the railroad in Lee's rear and tear it up; then proceed in the direction of Suffolk. Averell arrived at the ford on the 30th of December, and the infantry was preparing to march, when Burnside received a telegram from the President not to make the move until further orders.

Then he became aware that his subordinate officers were undermining him at Washington. He then asked the President to permit him to make a move or relieve him. Mr. Lincoln consented, and Burnside prepared to cross the river above Fredericksburg, and he lent all of his energies to achieve success. He placed Couch on the lower Rappahannock to again draw the attention of the enemy in that direction, as if that was his real point of attack. Sigel was posted at Falmouth. The weather was fine, and the troops cut new roads back from the river so the enemy could not observe their movements, and hope seemed to crown the movements of the general-in-chief, and had he been successful the mutterings against him would have died away like the receding noise of a passing storm.

Franklin's and Hooker's grand divisions bivouacked on the 20th near Banks' Ford, where Burnside intended to cross. That ford was easily passed in summer, but in winter it was quite deep and very rapid; hence the pontoons had to be put down for the army to cross on. As the river was narrow at that point it would have taken only a short time to throw a bridge across it. So far the enemy was deceived as to his real movements and designs. Couch had been vigilantly watched, for Burnside had a weakness for crossing several miles below Fredericksburg. He strongly contemplated that before the battle; then he thought he could cross some three miles below the city and get possession of the Telegraph road before Lee's forces could arrive from Port Royal. His design to cross his whole army about Port Royal or Skinker's Neck on December 30, when the President stopped him, was well known to Lee, so his move up the river a few days later took the enemy by surprise.

Up to the evening of the 20th the weather had been perfectly splendid, and if Burnside had had three more days of good weather, or if he had moved three days earlier, he would have been able to cross the river and fight a battle in the open plain between Salem Church and Chancellorsville,

where Hooker intended to fight when he crossed, and fought the ill-fated battle of Chancellorsville. Even at this late date, a quarter of a century after the war, it seems strangely cruel that Burnside, with such well-laid plans, which would have given him a victory beyond a doubt—for the army would have fought with a desperation never excelled—should so suddenly be enveloped in a storm that raged with a fury as if two storm centers had met.

During the night of the 20th the rain began, and by the morning of the 21st the earth was soaked and the river banks had the appearance of a quagmire. Already fifteen pontoons were on the river, nearly spanning it, and five more were amply sufficient. Burnside began at once to bring up his artillery, which had the effect of making a perfect mortar bed for a considerable area around the ford. All day the men worked in the rain, but to little purpose. Quite a number of cannon were advanced near the ford, but the 22d only added to the storm, and the artillery, caissons, and even wagons were swamped in the mud.

The storm had delayed Burnside's movements, giving Lee ample time to line the other shore with his army, though there was no attempt to interfere with his crossing except from the sharpshooters, who peppered away on all occasions. No doubt Lee was hoping Burnside would effect a crossing, with a swollen river in his rear. It would have been a sorry predicament for the Union Army indeed. But Burnside finally became resigned to his fate and gave the order for the army to retire to its quarters, and thus ended the famous mud march.

His last ill luck was too much for his heretofore apparent good nature. Up to that time he had paid no attention to the criticisms made on him, but then he let loose the flood-gates of his resentment and issued an order peremptorily dismissing Generals Hooker, Brooks, Newton, and Cochrane from the service of the United States, and depriving Generals Franklin, Smith, Sturgis, and Ferrero, and Colonel Taylor of their respective commands. This most

extraordinary order had to have the approval of the President. Mr. Lincoln as usual looked the matter over with a view to best serve the interests of the country. I said to Rosecrans on this subject that I did not think Lincoln had a particle of jealousy against a living being, and that he was so in earnest to preserve the Union, that if it had depended on his place as Chief Executive of the nation he would have left the White House promptly and without a regret.

After due deliberation over the remarkable paper presented by Burnside to dismiss several prominent generals, and deprive several others of their commands, or accept his resignation, the President decided to relieve him as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac, but not to accept his resignation; and on the 26th of January he severed his connection with the army as its commander, although he continued to the close of the war as a corps commander. The fact that Burnside never sought the position of commander-in-chief, and had twice before declined it on the ground that he did not consider himself competent to command it, was greatly in his favor with the army, the authorities at Washington, and the country; though he lost the battle of Fredericksburg by mistakes, yet he never lost a due respect with the authorities or the country.

But few generals have the peculiar ability to command great armies like the Army of the Potomac; though Meade did it, and that other Pennsylvania soldier, who fell at Gettysburg on the first day, was able to command any army.

Burnside stands well in history as a corps commander, but as commander-in-chief, a position thrust on him against his judgment and wishes, if guilty of errors or lacking in judgment, the mantle of charity should cover all.

An unpleasant duty presents itself in recording the fact that General Meade is about to leave the First Corps—his ability attracted the attention of his superiors, and he is assigned to the command of the Fifth Corps. But the news

of his promotion was by no means a surprise after the battles of South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg, where he distinguished himself so notably, and displayed great capacity. He was selected as a corps commander, where his sphere of usefulness was extended.

In the following farewell order to the Pennsylvania Reserves he justly gives them great credit for his rapid advancement :

General Orders, }
No. 101.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION,
December 25, 1862.

In announcing the above order, which separates the commanding general from the division, he takes occasion to express to the officers and men, notwithstanding his just pride at being promoted to a higher command, he experiences a deep feeling of regret at parting from them with whom he has been so long associated, and to whose services he here acknowledges his indebtedness for whatever reputation he may have acquired.

The commanding general will never cease to remember that he belonged to the Reserve Corps ; he will watch with eagerness for the deeds of fame which he feels sure they will meet under the command of his successors ; and though sadly reduced in numbers from casualties of battle, yet he knows the Reserves will always be ready and prompt to uphold the honor and glory of their State.

By command of Major General Meade :

(Signed) EDWARD C. BAIRD, A. A. G.

The ranking officer of the division was Colonel Sickel, of the 3d Regiment, and to him was intrusted, through General Meade, the command of the Reserves. Sickel had highly deserved the star for his gallant conduct on more than one field, and his being placed in command of the division was evidence enough of that fact.

But the loss of General Meade to the First Corps, which was a heavy blow, did not fill the measure of its sore trial, for it was rumored that Governor Curtin, Generals Reynolds and Meade, were again requesting that the Reserves be returned to the State, or at least to Washington, to have their depleted ranks recruited to their full complement. And on the 5th of February a telegram from Gen-

eral Doubleday, directed Colonel Sickel to repair with the division to the defenses of Washington, and consequently the three brigades encamped at Fairfax Court House, Upton's Hill, and Alexandria for the remainder of the winter.

It was one of the original divisions of the First Corps. It had not only been the stepping-stone of Reynolds and Meade to fame, but it placed a crown of glory on the First Corps that will be as enduring as the existence of the nation. While its services in the future are not to be identified directly with the First Corps, yet we will keep its place vacant, hoping some time to welcome it back.

The First Corps at this time underwent a reorganization in a certain sense. A new division was added to it, composed of two brigades. This new division took the number made vacant by the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, and consequently was No. 3.

Gen. Abner Doubleday, who commanded the First Division, was assigned to the command of the new Third Division. But before entering into detail of this new division, Doubleday's farewell order to his old division is given, because the general was warmly attached to the officers and men of that command. His old brigade was in the division, and his devotion to it knew no bounds :

In taking leave of this command I desire to say one word of farewell. Wherever the service may call me, and whatever may be my future lot, I shall never forget the ties which bind me to this brigade, and this division. I shall never cease to remember the brave men who stood by my side in some of the most stupendous battles the world ever saw. Men who fought against such heavy odds at Gainesville, and the first day at Bull Run; who stormed the heights at South Mountain, took eight standards from the enemy at Antietam, and held their ground so bravely at Fredericksburg, have won my admiration and regard. I am happy to have fought by their side, and proud of the honor of having commanded them. I wish them now at parting, individually and collectively, all honor and success.

Thus spoke the brave general to his old command,

which was a good guaranty that he would be faithful to the new one of which he was about to assume command. Time proved that he extended the same care, ability, and devotion to them; and in return they loved, respected, and followed him in battle wherever he went. To this day his name fills them with delight.

This new division, infantry and artillery, was solidly from Pennsylvania. The First Brigade, commanded by Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, was composed of the 121st, 135th, 142d, and 151st Pennsylvania. The Second Brigade, made up of the 143d, 149th, and 150th, was under the command of Col. Roy Stone. Maj. Ezra W. Mathews was chief of artillery of the division, with Batteries B, F, and G, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery. Such was the organization of the new division that ere long made its mark on the field of battle.

Gen. James S. Wadsworth—that grand old man whose hair was then as white as the driven snow, and with his millions came out to share the lot of a common soldier, was assigned to the command of the First Division. There was no duty assigned to him that he did not cheerfully perform, and no danger that he did not defy for the sake of his country.*

* General Wadsworth turned his salary over for the benefit of our soldiers in Southern prisons.

He not only took his boys—except James W., who was then a mere lad,—but his son-in-law into the service with him. The general was killed in the Wilderness, on the Lacy farm, by Longstreet's corps.

It was thought at the time by the enemy that Grant was killed, and cheer after cheer rolled down their lines several times with great joy, but Longstreet at once recognized Wadsworth and sent his body to our lines under a flag of truce.

Craig Wadsworth, his son, a fine officer, died of disease contracted in the service. So did his son-in-law. When James W. was sixteen, the general was going to put him in the ranks as a private soldier, but Major Kress and Captain Halstead of his staff, remonstrated with the general, that he was too young for such heavy service. So the general desisted from his purpose. However, in the winter of 1864 he voluntarily entered the army, and was appointed captain and aid-de-camp on Gen. G. K. Warren's staff, remaining in the service until after the battle of Five Forks. He has since the war served in Congress, and is now one of the leading men of the Empire State.

The First Brigade, Phelps', remained the same, with the exception that it had been deprived of the 2d United States Sharpshooters; while to the Second, then commanded by Gen. Lysander Cutler, the 147th New York was added.

General Patrick took his brigade with him to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac when he was made Provost Marshal General, and in its place came a new brigade composed of the 22d, 29th, 30th, and 31st New Jersey Regiments, with the 137th Pennsylvania, under the command of that gallant hero who lost his eyes in the battle of Gettysburg, Gabriel R. Paul. The Fourth, the Iron Brigade, stood the same, with General Meredith in command. The artillery of the division was the 1st New Hampshire Light, Battery L, 1st New York, and Battery B, 4th United States, with Capt. John A. Reynolds chief.

The Second Division had been commanded by General Gibbon, who was succeeded by Gen. John C. Robinson of New York. His division stood the same, with the exception that Gen. Henry Baxter succeeded Colonel Lyle in command of the Second Brigade. The only change made in Robinson's artillery was, that in place of Battery F, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, he was given Battery C, 5th United States, with Captain Ransom acting chief of artillery of the division. This completed the reorganization of the First Corps before it entered upon the campaign of 1863.

There are many incidents of real worth which would be interesting to note concerning nearly every regiment, but the length of this chapter admonishes us to bring it to a close.

Captain Smith, in his history of the 76th New York, graphically relates an account of such cheerfulness, by a member of that regiment, as he lay mortally wounded on the field, that it is here given in order that generations yet unborn may know what sacrifices were made for the sake of the perpetuity of the Union, by vouchsafing to them the

unity of a happy country with all the rich blessings of peace. He says :

During this engagement, Henry McFall, of Company F, fell mortally wounded in the thigh, by the bursting of a shell. Colonel Wainwright says of him : "He was attended to very bravely, under fire, by a little assistant surgeon of the 95th New York. Probably he sank under the shock, for he died very shortly. On leaving, the brave fellow called out cheerfully, 'Good-bye, Colonel,' evidently, as I thought, with the intention of keeping up the spirits of his comrades. I have always admired him, and should like to know how his family are doing."

Truth is stranger than fiction, and the pathetic account of this soldier's tragic death could be duplicated in every company in the Army. Years hence the people will little know how dearly their freedom was saved with the precious lives of men just budding into manhood, they voluntarily gave up "That the nation under God should have a new birth of freedom."

But all the sacrifice, devotion and heroism cannot be justly claimed by the men. The devotion of the women on both sides was very intense. However, but few of the gentler sex went squarely into battle; but an instance is given by Major Small, in his history of the 16th Maine, where a girl disguised her sex and attired in a soldier's uniform, joined Company I of that regiment, and fought until she was captured in the charge on Taliaferro's division. She is thus spoken of by the *Richmond Whig*:

Yesterday a rather prepossessing lass was discovered on Belle Isle, among the prisoners of war held there. She gave her real name as Mary Jane Johnson, belonging to the 16th Maine Regiment. She gave as an excuse for adopting soldier's toggery, that she was following her lover to shield and protect him when in danger. He had been killed, and now she had no objection to return to the more peaceful sphere for which nature, by her sex, had better fitted her. Upon the discovery of her sex, Miss Johnson was removed from Belle Isle to Castle Thunder. She will probably go North by the next flag of truce. She is about sixteen years of age.

Return of casualties in the Union forces, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. A. at the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15, 1862.

FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj. Gen. J. F. Reynolds.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday.

First Brigade—Col. Walter Phelps, jr.	30
Second Brigade—Col. James Gavin	26
Third Brigade—Col. William F. Rogers	67
Fourth Brigade { Brig Gen. Sol. Meredith Col. Lysander Cutler }	65
Artillery—Capt. Geo. A. Gerrish and Capt. J. A. Reynolds	26
General Headquarters Escort	3
Total First Division, including Escort	217

SECOND DIVISION { Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.
Brig. Gen. Nelson Taylor.

First Brigade—Col. Adrian R. Root	475
Second Brigade—Col. Peter Lyle	460
Third Brigade—Col. S H. Leonard	314
Artillery—Capt. George F. Leppien	17
Division Staff	1
Total Second Division	1,267

THIRD DIVISION—Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.

First Brigade { Col. William Sinclair Col. William McCandless }	510
Second Brigade—Col. A. L. Magilton	632
Third Brigade { Brig. Gen. C. F. Jackson, (killed) Col. Joseph W. Fisher Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson }	681
Artillery	30
Total Third Division	1,853

Total First Army Corps 3,337

SECOND ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. W. S. Hancock.

Corps and Division Staff	4
First Brigade { Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell Col. Geo. W. Von Schack }	952
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher	545
Third Brigade—Col. Samuel K. Zook	527
Artillery—(4th U. S., Battery "C.")	5
Total First Division	2,033

FREDERICKSBURG.

305

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard.

Staff	1
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully	122
Second Brigade—Col. Joshua T. Owen	258
Third Brigade—Col. N. J. Hall and Col. Wm. R. Lee	515
Artillery	18
Total Second Division	914

THIRD DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Wm. H. French.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. N. Kimball, Col. J. S. Mason	520
Second Brigade—Col. O. H. Palmer	291
Third Brigade—Col. J. W. Andrews, Lt. Col. Marshall	342
Artillery 7, and Artillery Reserve 7; total	14
Total Third Division	1,167

Total Second Army Corps 4,114

THIRD ARMY CORPS—Brig. Gen. George Stoneman.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. D. B. Birney.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson	146
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward	629
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Hiram G. Berry	165
Artillery—Capt. George E. Randolph	10
Total First Division	950

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. D. E. Sickles.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr	81
Second Brigade—Col. George B. Hall	16
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Revere	2
Artillery—(4th U. S., Battery "K")	1
Total Second Division	100

THIRD DIVISION—Brig. Gen. A. W. Whipple.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. A. S. Piatt, Col. E. Franklin	9
Second Brigade—Col. Samuel S. Carroll	118
Artillery 1, and Division Staff 1, total	2
Total Third Division	129

Total Third Army Corps 1,179

FIFTH ARMY CORPS—Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin.

First Brigade—Col. James Barnes	500
Second Brigade—Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer	222

XX

Third Brigade Col. T. B. W. Stockton	201
Artillery 3, General Staff 2; total	5

Total First Division 928

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Geo. Sykes.

First Brigade—Col. Robert C. Buchanan	51
Second Brigade—Maj. G. L. Andrews, Maj. C. S. Lovell	140
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren	36
Artillery—(5th U. S. Battery "I")	1

Total Second Division 228

THIRD DIVISION—Brig. Gen. A. A. Humphreys.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. E. B. Tyler	454
Second Brigade—Col. Peter H. Allabach	562
Division Staff 3, Cavalry (4th Pa.) 1	4

Total Third Division 1,020

Total Fifth Army Corps 2,176

SIXTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Wm. T. H. Brooks.

First Brigade—Col. Alfred T. A. Torbert	162
Second Brigade—Col. Henry L. Cake	17
Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell	10
Artillery	8

Total First Division 197

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. A. P. Howe.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Calvin E. Pratt	26
Second Brigade—Col. Henry Whiting	144
Third Brigade { Brig. Gen. F. L. Vinton	15
{ Col. Robert F. Taylor	
{ Brig. Gen. F. H. Neill	
Artillery—(5th U. S., "F")	1

Total Second Division 186

THIRD DIVISION—Brig. Gen. John Newton.

First Brigade Brig. Gen. John Cochrane	24
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Charles Deven, Jr.	17
Third Brigade—Col. T. A. Rowley, Brig. Gen. F. Wheaton	12
Cavalry Brigade { Brig. Gen. G. D. Bayard	4
{ Col. D. McM. Gregg	
Artillery—(2d U. S., "G")	10

Total Third Division 67

Total Sixth Corps 450

NINTH ARMY CORPS—Brig. Gen. O. B. Willcox.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Burns.

First Brigade—Col. O. M. Poe	13
Second Brigade—Col. Benjamin C. Christ	8
Third Brigade—Col. Daniel Leasure	3
Artillery—(1st New York, Battery "D")	3
Total First Division	27

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. S. D. Sturgis.

Staff	1
First Brigade—Brig. Gen. James Nagle	500
Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero	491
Artillery—(1st Rhode Isl'd, "D," 2; 4th U. S., "E," 13)	15
Total Second Division	1007

THIRD DIVISION—Brig. Gen. G. W. Getty.

First Brigade—Col. Rush C. Hawkins	255
Second Brigade—Col. Edward Harland	41
Total Third Division	296

Total Ninth Army Corps 1330

Engineer Brigade—Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury	59
Artillery Reserves—Lieut. Col. William Hays	8

RECAPITULATION.

Right Grand Division—(Second and Ninth Corps)	5444
Center Grand Division—(Third and Fifth Corps)	3355
Left Grand Division—(First and Sixth Corps)	3787
Engineers and Artillery Reserve	67

Total Casualties Army of the Potomac 12,653

Return of casualties of the Confederate forces at the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 11-15, 1862, commanded by Maj. Gen. R. E. Lee, as shown by the "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies."

FIRST ARMY CORPS.

McLAWS' DIVISION.

Cobb's Brigade	234
Barksdale's Brigade	242
Kershaw's Brigade	373
Washington Artillery	26

Total McLaws' Division 875

STUART'S (Cavalry) DIVISION.

W. H. F. Lee's Brigade	13
----------------------------------	----

ANDERSON'S DIVISION.

Perry's Brigade	89
Featherston's Brigade	43
Wright's Brigade	3
Wilcox's Brigade	9
Mahone's Brigade	159

Total Anderson's Division	303
-------------------------------------	-----

PICKETT'S DIVISION.

Kemper's Brigade	46
Jenkins' Brigade	8

Total Pickett's Division	54
------------------------------------	----

RANSOM'S DIVISION.

Cook's Brigade	380
Ransom's Brigade	154

Total Ransom's Division	534
-----------------------------------	-----

HOOD'S DIVISION.

Law's Brigade	315
Toomb's Brigade	12
Robertson's Brigade	6
Anderson's Brigade	10

Total Hood's Division	343
---------------------------------	-----

Total First Army Corps	2,122
----------------------------------	-------


SECOND ARMY CORPS.

(As corrected returns, by brigades, are not given, for the Second Corps, this list can only be shown by Divisions).

A. P. Hill's Division	2,120
D. H. Hill's Division	173
Ewell's Division	932
Taliaferro's (Jackson's) Division	190

Total Second Army Corps	3,415
-----------------------------------	-------

Total First and Second Army Corps	5,537
---	-------



GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER.

CHAPTER X.

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

IT seems eminently fit and proper to begin the chapter on the battle of Chancellorsville with the order assigning Hooker to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and Lincoln's letter to him. They are both a part of the history of the country :

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, D. C., Jan. 25, 1863.

MY DEAR SIR :—Please meet General Burnside here at ten o'clock this morning.

Yours, truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Major General HALLECK.

General Orders, }
No. 20. }

WAR DEPT., ADJ'T GEN.'S OFFICE,

Washington, D. C., Jan. 25, 1863.

I. The President of the United States has directed :

1st. That Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

2d. That Maj. Gen. E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

3d. That Maj. Gen. W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

4th. That Maj. Gen. J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac.

II. The officers relieved as above will report in person to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

By order of the Secretary of War :

E. D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, D. C., Jan. 26, 1863.

GENERAL :—I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to

be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of the Army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Major General HOOKER.

Lincoln's letter fully confirms what was said in the preceding chapter of the jealousies, bickerings and distrust that prevailed among the officers of the Army of the Potomac, while the rank and file had obeyed every order with promptness. Failure after failure, with the famous "Mud March" as a closing melodrama, was too much for the *morale* of the troops. They were disheartened, for from the time the army crossed the Long Bridge over the Potomac to the time Hooker took command, misfortune had pursued it like an evil spirit, and many soldiers began to believe that the generals of the Confederate army over-matched ours; the prophetic statement that the war would last only ninety days had been already lengthened into

years, with only one decisive victory in its favor—South Mountain. It is a great wonder that more were not discouraged at the gloomy prospects. Suits of clothing were sent by friends at home to soldiers, who, on receiving them, walked out of camp as citizens. They were loyal to the Government, but one victory in so many battles was not winding up the war very fast. At that rate the Confederacy would win its independence.

Another thing that added to the misfortunes on the field, was the fact that Lincoln was not supported by all the leaders, even in his own party. There were prominent men who did not consider him aggressive enough, while it was a well-known fact that Chase, one of his Cabinet officers, was seeking a nomination against him. The high games of political chance in Washington could not be played without the world knowing them; and the army was keenly watching every move that affected the final settlement and the end of that terrible internecine war, where neighbor met neighbor, and brother was arrayed against brother. It was heartrending to soldiers, but perhaps the wire-pullers were not annoyed by any such unpleasant occurrences, as brave men were between them and the enemy. In the midst of the war every hand should have upheld the President, and statesmen above all men should have warmly and unitedly supported him. Fortunately a large number did support him. The writer was a Chase man, but not as against Lincoln; Chase was an eminent statesman, but his ambition led him into a grave error. Lincoln exhibited one of his many noble traits of character when he appointed him Chief Justice, after the treatment he had received from him while he was Secretary of the Treasury. But Chase is gone, "peace to his ashes."

Hooker visited the regiments, and made a thorough inspection. The officers were required to have all absentees return to their commands. A regular system of furloughs was established by which the officers and men of each company and regiment were entitled to a given

number, and when they returned others were to be allowed the privilege of going home. Lincoln sustained Hooker by issuing a proclamation on the 10th of March, granting amnesty to all deserters who returned by the 1st of April. The people at the North took new heart, and instead of encouraging desertions, recruits began to arrive, and the busy scenes in camp once more betokened a healthful state.

Hooker reorganized his army, and abolished the grand divisions. Gen. John F. Reynolds remained in command of the First Corps, Couch of the Second, while Sickles was assigned to the Third. Meade had taken the place of Butterfield in the Fifth, Sedgwick retained the Sixth, while the Ninth, Burnside's old corps, was detached and sent to Suffolk, and in its stead came the Eleventh and Twelfth. The Eleventh had been Sigel's, but Howard now assumed the command.

That corps was mainly composed of Germans, and it is not quite certain that a change in the commanders by taking away a German and substituting a man of the religious principle of Howard, was the best for the service. Howard was a devout Christian, while the Germans had their own views of religion, which may be said to have been altogether different from his, so they had no interest in common with him. Braver men never marched to battle than the Germans, but they are a peculiar people, and if opposed too much in their ideas they become refractory. They were greatly disappointed when Sigel was relieved, and came near taking it as a direct affront to them.

No American could command that corps with the same success as one of their own nationality, and Howard, as the Havelock of the army, certainly was not the man.

Hooker put the cavalry under Stoneman, an officer of ability, but certainly no great cavalry leader, as he lacked the dash of Sheridan or Buford.

A new spirit was infused into the army. Activity was exhibited everywhere. Men were returning under Lincoln's proclamation, and Hooker found himself at the head of a

large army, which he styled "the finest army on the planet." But there were some drawbacks. The time of some of the regiments would soon expire, and if there was no favorable opportunity to offer battle to the enemy in the near future, he would lose the trained men of eight regiments from Pennsylvania, enlisted only for nine months; two regiments from Maine, and thirty-three from New York; the latter being two years' troops. That would take away from him over 20,000 effective soldiers. Their time expired on the 1st of May. A majority of these had signified their intention of reënlisting, but desired to go home to see their friends, and get the bounty offered by the different States. So Hooker had to offer battle to the enemy early in the spring, or lose the assistance of forty-one regiments, equal to a large corps. It was advisable for these troops to return to their States, for they would not only reënlist, but would induce other young men to join their ranks.

Lincoln visited the army and reviewed the troops, which gave them new cheer, and every visit he made to the army was equal to the addition of a new brigade. The troops knew he was an earnest, honest man, and their friend in time of trouble. When the officers were too severe he would interpose clemency in a mild way, and save them; and for that they loved him. If he had been stern and harsh the history of this country might have been different. He listened to all complaints patiently, and then usually made his decision. Respectful and kind to all, he won the esteem and affection of his countrymen, and his name is linked with Washington's in history, the highest honor that could be conferred. While he was hurling great armies at the South to compel its people to obey the laws, he nightly prayed that they would see the error of their ways, and return in peace. He "would save the Union with or without slavery." And when the assassin's bullet ended that great man's life there was mourning in the South.

There was another great reason why Hooker should

make an early move; General Longstreet with two divisions, Hood's and Pickett's, of his corps, had been temporarily detached, and was appearing before Suffolk, to lay siege to it. Then was the time to strike Lee, when he was weakened by the absence of that great general, as it was far better to fight Lee without him. Lee was recruiting his army with the utmost vigor, as he had now a general to face who had won distinction on every field in which he engaged. He knew he was a bold officer in battle, and led his forces with the enthusiasm of a Marshal of France. And now that Hooker was at the head of the army, if he continued to infuse his troops with the same spirit, he would be as dangerous to meet as Prince Eugene, who crossed the Theiss, killed 20,000 of the enemy, and drove 10,000 into the river at the battle of Zentha.

Lee's cavalry was badly worn down and jaded by the hard service of making raids in the rear of the Union Army during the winter. It greatly needed rest and recruiting, for it had been used to its last physical endurance. The Confederate commander was endeavoring to fit it for the ensuing campaign, as he knew it would be a desperate one.

The work of our artillery at Fredericksburg, under General Hunt, must have made an impression upon Lee, for his batteries had been, independent of each other, assigned to the different divisions. After that battle he organized his artillery into one command, and placed it under General Pendleton.

The authorities at Richmond, in the mean time, were not idle by any means. New conscription laws had been enacted, which were enforced with a rigor that would have made Russia bow to their mandates. The patrols systematically scoured the country, leaving no chance for deserters to keep in concealment, as the women of the South, true to their cause, aided by informing them where deserters were located. Indeed, so earnest were the

women in this work, that their information was given with great care and exactness, and men hid in caves were readily found. As an illustration in point, one man was living on a hill by the side of the road. He went into his cellar, and dug a tunnel leading under the road; and, coming out in a grove on the other side, he could get air, and watch the movements of the patrol at the house. He was successful in evading them for a long time; but one day he was spied by a neighboring lady, who made haste to give the news. When the patrol visited there again, a file of men were stationed close to the opening, while others proceeded to the house to scare him out. When he appeared at his supposed secure place of observation, he found himself in the clutches of the men left there to capture him. From these two elements, added to the sick and wounded, who had recovered enough to rejoin their regiments, Lee found his army rapidly swelling. If that had not been the case, he could not have spared Longstreet to attack Suffolk; for he had a river front of about twenty-five miles to guard, from Skinker's Neck, below Fredericksburg, to United States Ford, just below the confluence of the Rapidan and Rapahannock—which was a very extended line in the face of an army like Hooker's, with an able commander; and he was liable to have his lines pierced at any given point, and driven from his base. Such an attack really was made; for Lee's position was suddenly turned by four of Hooker's corps pressing down on his left and rear before he was aware of it.

The exigencies of the service required great activity on the part of the Confederates before the spring campaign opened, in the way of garnering supplies, Guiney Station, where Stonewall Jackson died, after Chancellorsville, being the principal depot.

But few changes were made in the general officers of Lee's army. D. H. Hill was sent to North Carolina to superintend matters there, and his division was given to General Rodes. Early, who commanded Ewell's division

in the battle of Fredericksburg, still retained command, while Trimble was assigned to Jackson's old division.

A new excitement spread over the country at that time. Mosby at midnight wound his way through our lines, evaded the pickets, entered General Stoughton's room, and in person waked him up and informed him that he was a prisoner of war to be abducted through our lines and taken to Richmond. General Stoughton was in command at Fairfax Court House, and had no right to occupy quarters where he was in danger. He was a very promising officer, and those who knew him well expected much from him. He was colonel of the 4th Vermont Infantry, and had been nominated to be a brigadier general by Lincoln on the 5th of November, 1862, but the Senate did not act on his case; consequently, on the 4th of March, 1863, his appointment as brigadier general expired by limitation, four days before he was captured. The late General Stannard said to me: "Stoughton was one of the most capable officers in the service, but sacrificed his future by allowing women to control him."

The following version of Stoughton's capture was given to me by General Stannard, a short time before his death, in Washington, D. C. He gave Stoughton's idea of it, as related by him to Stannard only a short time before he died:

Stoughton's headquarters were at a residence where lived a lady whom he permitted to visit a lady cousin outside of our lines. He also permitted this lady cousin to visit the family where he had his headquarters; that young damsel from beyond the lines made a diagram of the house, and the position of the troops, so that Mosby could evade the camps, and reach Stoughton's room unobserved; this he did with such great confidence that he boldly walked into Stoughton's room without hesitation or molestation.

The family declared their utter ignorance of the matter; but it is unreasonable to suppose that Mosby, with his great caution, would have attempted so bold and hazardous a movement without being well advised, as he had

only 29 men with him, and near Stoughton's headquarters was his brigade well on the alert, and ready at the least alarm to move at once.

Mosby also attempted to capture other officers, but in that he failed, which is conclusive evidence that he was well advised.

Colonel Mosby has personally informed me that he was not assisted by those young ladies but by a sergeant,* who had deserted from the Army of the Potomac because he had been severely punished.

* This innocent plea of the family recalls the case of the dashing young lieutenant of the 24th Wisconsin, serving in Sheridan's division of Rosecrans' army.

He was young and not a little fond of having his picture taken. His servant had one in his possession one day when he was out in search of something for his table. He called at the house of a spruce young widow, to see if there were any chickens for sale there. She plied her questions to Sambo to know whose servant he was. He was very proud of his dashing master, who afterwards commanded a brigade with great credit. The colored man was not long in exhibiting his picture. She at once declared that he was the handsomest officer she ever saw, and she would be ever so much delighted to have him dine with her. This was eagerly conveyed to him by his loyal valet. He told Sheridan of it. Quick as a flash the General saw through it, and said, "She simply wants to beguile you, so that you can be captured." Said Sheridan, "Don't you think of going to dine with her unless you take about three companies with you to surround the premises, concealing them from view." That just suited him, so he sent the fair widow word that he would accept her pressing invitation to dine with her. The day was fixed and the order received from Sheridan to make a reconnoissance; that enabled him to take a part of the regiment with him.

When he reached the house he halted in the woods and gave instructions that placed his men in full possession of the secret. Then they deployed to the right and left, encircling the premises at a distance far enough from the house to be unobserved, but where they could see every movement there. He told them if he fired his revolver it was a signal of distress to them, and they were to rapidly advance to his assistance. He then mounted his horse and proceeded alone to the house, where he was greeted in the most winsome manner by the young and fascinating widow. They soon sat down to an elegant dinner prepared for the occasion. When they were about half through a rap came at the door, which she affected not to hear. Then the door was opened by a major of the Confederate army, accompanied by about fifteen men.

He turned to the Confederate officer and asked him if it was not a little intrusion on his part, and added that he was greatly enjoying his dinner. The major admitted that it did seem as if it was a slight intrusion, but that he could not help it. He was compelled to request him to quit the table.

Jones, who commanded a brigade of Confederate cavalry, was remarkably active during the latter part of the winter and spring. He made a raid through West Virginia in the latter part of January; failing to force his way through Greenland Gap of the Alleghanies, he passed through Beverly and Philippi, continuing as far as Morgantown, levying heavy contributions on the country through which he passed. Doubling back through the mountains at Fairmont, he encountered a detachment of Union soldiers guarding the bridge over the Monongahela, whom he captured, and then destroyed the valuable railroad bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio. Again he is in the Shenandoah Valley, where he surprised two regiments of Milroy's cavalry sent to dispute his advance. The encounter took place near Strasburg, where he dispersed those regiments and took about 200 prisoners. A part of his brigade pushed

In the yard, before they started with their prisoner, he declared he was the best shot in the Army of the Cumberland, and that he could shoot a chicken's head off when it was running. The major said if he could do that he would escort him to the Union lines, and set him free; if not he was to remain a prisoner. The chicken was started up, when he drew his revolver and fired at it—he not only missed the chicken's head, but was not sure he came within three feet of the chicken. He said he believed they were greatly in hopes he would shoot its head off, for a look of disappointment settled on their countenances when he missed it. The major said that decided it, he would be compelled to retain him as a prisoner. When he fired his men began to close in on the house with their arms at a trail. Soon the Confederate major looked up and saw their line advancing—he took in the situation, and acknowledged the matter as being very clever. When the Union soldiers surrounded the house with the Confederates in the yard, the widow was standing in the door, strongly protesting her entire innocence in the matter; he said to her that it might be so, but it smacked of suspicion in his opinion, and he added he had half a mind to take her with the soldiers to Sheridan's headquarters. But he finally decided to permit her to return to the meal he had been so rudely taken away from. It is scarcely to be presumed that she enjoyed it after her confederates were marched away in triumph, "who never would return." This is an authentic example, what treachery sometimes lurked beneath the charms of the gentler sex, to ensnare the susceptible, like Stoughton, who fell through weakness, and some years ago died in New York City a broken-hearted man. General Starnard saw him a short time before his death, when he unbosomed himself, and gave vent to his deep chagrin and mortification over the unfortunate affair which clouded his military career so early in the war and really compelled him to leave the service.

on to the Potomac, and crossing the river in a boat, they surprised a detachment of Union troops, nearly a company strong, and took them prisoners, near Poolesville, Maryland.

Gen. W. H. F. Lee's brigade attempted to surprise and take Gloucester Point, on the York River, failing in which they turned north and shelled the Union gunboats in the Rappahannock, while Fitzhugh Lee crossed the river and surprised and captured a post of 100 men at Leedstown.

The activity of the Confederate cavalry only spurred up the Union cavalry to increased effort; and the former soon had to pay pretty dearly for their bold and daring raids. They attempted to appear at several places at the same time in order to create the impression that they were numerically strong, whereas that arm of the service was much depleted. The Union cavalry were compelled to go in large bodies, being in the enemy's country, where their movements and strength were closely observed by the citizens, who were ready to convey any intelligence to the Confederates that would give them the advantage. Besides, they were in almost continual danger of ambushes. As the ides of March approached, the Union cavalry prepared to measure skill and strength with their enemy in the saddle; so Averell's division, composed of Duffié's and McIntosh's brigades, with two regiments, the 1st and 5th Regulars, under Captain Reno, quietly took up the line of march for the upper Rappahannock. When he reached the Rappahannock, at Kelley's Ford, Averell found that the passage of the river was to be stubbornly contested, the Confederate cavalry being dismounted and lined the south bank as sharpshooters. Lieut. S. A. Brown, of the 1st Rhode Island, was ordered to charge across the river and endeavor to clear the right bank of the enemy so that the division could cross. Brown and his men made a gallant charge; not only did they clear the bank, but they captured about 25 prisoners. The enemy then made great efforts to secure their horses before Averell could get his command over. The river was so high that it took a

long time for the whole division to cross; so long, in fact, that it gave the enemy time to gain their horses and send word back to Lee that the Union cavalry was on the south bank of the Rappahannock in force. Averell being now on the right bank, threw out skirmishers to avoid an ambush and advanced the division, moving very cautiously and slowly. Fitzhugh Lee knew of the proposed advance the day before, no doubt through some kind friend in citizen's suit, who started off post haste to Culpeper to tell the Confederate commander of his impending danger. The river was thought to be too high for the Union forces to cross; hence there was no especial preparation made to dispute its passage, except to line its banks with sharpshooters. The Union cavalry had scored one bold and aggressive move, however, much to the discomfiture of their opponents.

As soon as Lee learned of the passage of the Rappahannock he hastily advanced his brigade to meet Averell. The two forces met more than a mile from the river. Lee imagined that he was meeting only the advance guard, which he intended to vanquish before a support could arrive, and in that way defeat his adversary in detail, so he at once ordered a charge. But Averell's men were well posted at the edge of a wood behind a stone wall. As Lee's troops advanced over the fields the telling fire of the Union forces made them retreat in disorder.

Averell had drawn up his command with Duffié's brigade on the left, the 5th Regulars in the center, and McIntosh's brigade on the right, with the 1st Regulars in reserve. The 3d Virginia was hurled against the 5th Regulars in the center. The regiment dashed up to the stone wall in the face of a severe fire and were attempting to make a break in it, when Duffié directed the 1st Rhode Island to charge in reverse and rear. Seeing that move the 2d Virginia advanced to the assistance of the 3d, but both were compelled to retire, with the loss of the commander of the 2d, who was captured.

Lee evidently was not aware of the strength of the force

in his front, because, immediately after the repulse of the 2d and 3d Virginia, he ordered Colonel Bower, of the 5th Virginia, to charge McIntosh's brigade on the right, but it received such a heavy fire from the artillery, advantageously posted to support McIntosh, that he retreated at once. Lee seeing he was badly beaten began to retreat. Averell thought that he was engaged with a much heavier force than he actually was, and it required an effort on the part of Stuart and Lee to keep their forces well enough organized to deceive Averell as to their strength. If he had charged with one brigade Lee's command would have been seriously crippled, if not captured. Major Pelham was mortally wounded. He was a fine young artillery officer, and had scarcely passed twenty-one years of age.

The enemy were driven to Brandy Station, a distance of eight miles, where Lee made another stand behind a stone wall, where he placed all the men that he could collect, some 300 or 400. It was the most favorable place for Lee to make a fight with a small number, and if Averell was allowed to pursue him much farther, not only Culpeper, but Gordonsville, with its immense stores for Lee's army, would fall into Averell's hands, and the railroad to Richmond by that route be destroyed. It was a case of desperation with the Confederate cavalry commander. After Lee had placed this line behind the stone wall, with his artillery posted just in the rear, he headed the 3d Virginia, and, leading the charge in person, came down on Averell with great fury. The 5th Regular Cavalry lay in ambush, and received them with a volley, while McIntosh ordered the 3d Pennsylvania to charge them in flank and rear, forcing the Confederates to retire, but leaving the impression on Averell that Fitzhugh Lee had been reënforced with a brigade of infantry. Laboring under that delusion Averell decided to return to the Rappahannock. This was gratifying to the enemy, who had thus adroitly deceived him. Had he pursued at this opportune moment Lee's force would have been

badly cut to pieces. It was Averell's golden chance to achieve greatness, but he let it pass. Fortune knocks once at a door, but seldom returns. Had Averell pressed Lee with courage, and either captured his force or scattered it, and taken Gordonsville, he would have ranked with Sheridan at Winchester. As it was, he really accomplished nothing of importance to present to Hooker on his return.

The rainy season prevented any more movements until the second week in April, when Hooker directed Stoneman to take his cavalry and proceed to the upper fords of the Rappahannock, where Averell had crossed a short time before. Stoneman, with his three divisions, could have crossed the country and taken Gordonsville had there been celerity in his movement. One division had crossed the river, and advanced to Brandy Station, but a heavy rain compelled it to beat a hasty retreat, as the Rappahannock was rising rapidly and would soon be impassable.

What Lincoln thought of this movement is given in the following letter to Hooker :

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., April 15, 1863.

It is now 10:15 p. m. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your dispatch of this evening. The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious.

A. LINCOLN.

To Major General HOOKER.

It had proved just what Lincoln predicted, a gigantic failure. He never even crossed the Rappahannock until the infantry did, and then broke up into such small guerilla bands that he accomplished nothing. Pleasonton did more by far with his skeleton brigade.

It was now about the 20th, and the waters were still too high for an advance. Stoneman's intention was to throw cavalry around by the way of Gordonsville, and, after tearing up the railroad there, to rapidly march in the direction of Hanover Court House, there to strike the only line of communication Lee had with Richmond, destroy that, and march north to join Hooker, who was to cross his army below, at or near Hamilton's Crossing and Skinker's Neck.

By that move Hooker intended to turn Lee's right and take possession of the Telegraph road leading to Richmond, thus compelling Lee to abandon his strong position on the heights back of Fredericksburg. The two armies would then meet on a field selected hastily, without any fortifications, which would at least give Hooker an equal chance. The only danger would have been the crossing of the Rappahannock in the face of the enemy. It is barely possible that, had he held a portion of his army in its position in front of Fredericksburg, he could have crossed at Skinker's Neck, back from the river, and effected a landing on the right bank before he would have been seriously opposed. The river there is quite wide, and might be called an arm of the sea.

As a matter of history this intended move of Hooker's is given for the benefit of those who may desire to study all the maneuvers of the war, and to show what great strategic movements were made by our generals to save the nation.

The river continued so high that Hooker abandoned this plan, and began a series of feint movements in order to deceive Lee. Doubleday, on the 19th of April, was sent with a part of his division to make a reconnoissance to Port Conway. On the 23d, the 24th Michigan and 14th Brooklyn, under Colonel Morrow, crossed the river and took possession of that town, captured a number of prisoners, horses and mules, and a large Confederate mail. The regiments recrossed the river that evening, and proceeded to their quarters at Belle Plain. These two demonstrations indi-

cated that Hooker was still feeling his way, with a view to crossing there with his whole army in the near future.

Stoneman was still on the north side of the Rappahannock, where he had arrived on the 17th.

Hooker determined to divide his army, and throw a heavy force under Sedgwick below the city, while two divisions of the Second, with the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps were to follow Stoneman on the upper Rappahannock and make a detour back from the river, so that the maneuver could not be observed by the enemy occupying the right bank. As the river was still very high there was not much probability that a citizen would give the alarm. Besides, Hooker had kept his counsel so well that but few officers were aware where and how the real movement was to be made. He knew how disastrous it had been to McClellan and to Burnside that their plans were so publicly known, and he resolved to keep his movements as secret as possible. The corps commanders only knew his plans when they received their orders to march. The President was notified by General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff, in person.*

* When General Butterfield arrived at the White House, and sent his card to Lincoln with the request that he desired to see him alone, he was at once ushered into the room where the President was, surrounded by members of his Cabinet, Senators and Members of Congress.

When General Butterfield glanced at those present he gracefully said to the President that he bore a message from Hooker, under strict orders not to impart it to anyone but the President of the United States; that under those positive instructions he would be compelled to withdraw until he could see him alone. Thereupon the President requested those present to retire. It was with great reluctance that some of them complied with the request made by Lincoln—especially was it the case with the Secretary of War, whose eyes flashed as he turned them on General Butterfield, as if to say that there was no secret or important move of the army that ought to be kept from him.

Soon the room was cleared with the exception of a distinguished Senator from New England, whose majestic eloquence had charmed the nation on many occasions. He sat still, holding a large bundle of papers in his hand, with his eyes intently fixed on General Butterfield. Lincoln glanced at the Senator, and asked if there was anything he could do for him. "Yes," said the statesman, drawing out one of the papers, "I would like to have this appointment." "It is granted,"

Hooker gained great credit in the army for his soldierly manner. The army only asked to be led against the enemy with reasonable skill on the part of the commander-in-chief, and had learned to look up to Hooker as a general whom it could follow and have confidence in. Aside from his service in the war of the rebellion, he had been in the Mexican war, where he served on the staff of General Pillow with considerable distinction.

It was the intention of the enemy to take Suffolk, and have the forces under Longstreet rejoin Lee before Hooker could move. As Longstreet conceived the idea of going to the assistance of Bragg, when he fought Rosecrans at Chickamauga, it is to be presumed that it was one of his deep-laid plans to lay siege to Suffolk, while the army were in winter quarters, with a river between them.*

That both armies appreciated that fact, is well supported by the following correspondence :

SUFFOLK, VA., April 21, 1863.

General Halleck has just left my headquarters. General Longstreet is here, waiting Hill or other troops. I hold everything yet. How do you get along?

JOHN J. PECK, Major General.

Major General HOOKER, Army of the Potomac.

APRIL 21, 1863—10 p. m.

Am glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient with me. I must play these devils before I can spring. Remember that my army is at the bottom of a well and the enemy holds the top.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major General Commanding.

Major General PECK, Suffolk, Virginia.

said the President. "Is there anything else?" He proceeded with a long list of business, and succeeded in getting more favors granted in a few minutes than he could have secured in a year. He finally wanted to make an argument before the President on a war measure, but Lincoln shrewdly parried that move, and bowed his distinguished guest out, so that he could hear General Butterfield's report.

*I had it from Longstreet that he urged Lee for a month, before he would consent to his letting his corps go, as he fully expected then, "to crush Rosecrans" at Chickamauga.

Thus matters were on a strain at every point. Hooker was making great haste to throw his army across the Rappahannock to relieve Peck at Suffolk. On the 26th of April Hooker directed General Williams to issue the order to the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to "Begin their march at sunrise to-morrow morning, the former to encamp as near Kelley's Ford as practicable, without discovering itself to the enemy, and the latter as nearly in the rear as circumstances will permit."

General Butterfield sent a similar order to the Fifth Corps to follow. On the same date Hooker wrote General Peck, at Suffolk, saying :

Your dispatch received. I have been delayed in my operations by the severe storm. I have communicated to no one what my intentions are. If you were here I could properly and willingly impart them to you. So much is found out by the enemy on my front with regard to movements that I have concealed my designs from my own staff, and I dare not intrust them to the wires, knowing as I do that they are so often tapped.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major General.

Couch, of the Second Corps, was directed to leave one division opposite Fredericksburg, as Gibbon held the position most exposed to view that remained; the other two divisions, French's and Hancock's, were to march opposite Banks' Ford. One brigade was to be detached and sent to United States Ford, which is situated below the confluence of the Rappahannock and Rapidan opposite Chancellorsville. General Hunt was to remain with the Second Corps to direct the artillery, as it was supposed there might be a stubborn resistance to the attempt to cross at Banks' Ford, as it was less than three miles above Fredericksburg, and Lee could easily throw a force there on short notice.

The Rappahannock being a very swift river, there was no other place at which it could be crossed until United States Ford was reached, some six miles above Banks'

Ford. The former ford takes its name from a mine in that vicinity, once worked by the Government.

When Slocum, Howard and Meade had crossed the Rappahannock they were in a narrow peninsula between the Rappahannock and Rapidan, varying from two to five miles in width. There were two fords across the Rapidan, Ely's and Germanna; the first is about four miles above the confluence of the two rivers, while the latter is about ten miles. The brigade of the Second Corps sent to United States Ford was only intended to keep a vigilant watch on the movements of the enemy, as that ford would be cleared the moment Slocum, Howard and Meade marched down the right bank of the Rapidan in the direction of Chancellorsville. It also prevented sympathizers from crossing there, or signaling information of Hooker's movements.

When Slocum arrived at Germanna Ford with two corps he found the engineer of Lee's army constructing a trestle bridge at that place. Pleasonton at once dashed across with his cavalry and captured some prisoners, while the rest escaped by scattering in different directions. Stuart was waiting to be attacked, but Slocum passed to his left and was not aware of his presence. When Stuart learned that a very heavy force had passed southward, he at once understood the movement, and attempted by all possible haste to get possession of Germanna Ford, and delay if not prevent the passage of the river at that point. He seems to have been taken wholly by surprise; had he been successful in preventing the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from crossing at Germanna Ford, while Meade was crossing unopposed at Ely's Ford only a few miles below, Slocum could have marched down the left bank of the Rapidan until he reached that point, leaving a force large enough to deceive Stuart. Nor was even that necessary, for Stuart only had the brigades of the two Lees. Stoneman, with his three divisions, was still in the rear. If he had exhibited one-tenth of the energy of Stuart, he would have pur-

sued him, and either captured or dispersed his command, which would have greatly crippled Lee at that critical time. Fearing Stoneman's heavy force of cavalry, Stuart directed W. H. F. Lee to watch his movements, and keep between him and Gordonsville, where heavy supplies were stored for Lee's army, while he (Stuart) took Fitz-Hugh Lee's brigade and attempted to go round the right flank of Slocum's advancing columns, and inform Mahone and Posey, of Anderson's division, posted opposite United States Ford, for fear they might slumber in blissful ignorance of the strategic movement that was being successfully executed and suffer the loss of a part of their commands. Then, again, it was all-important that Gen. Robert E. Lee should be notified of the great efforts being made to gain the rear of his army.

If Stoneman had pursued Stuart and broken up his command, Lee could not have been able to learn the situation of affairs on the upper Rappahannock. Even with the tardiness and great delay at Chancellorsville, the Union army, in all probability, would have passed out of the wilderness into the plateau, reaching as far as Salem Church on the plank road and Banks' Ford on the river, where two divisions of the Second Corps were ready to cross and join Hooker's advancing columns. No power could have saved Lee then. The soldiers would have marched victoriously on the works they stormed in vain a few months before with such heavy loss. But Stoneman failed even to annoy Stuart or retard his movements. Driven almost to desperation with chagrin and mortification at permitting a heavy column of the enemy to pass him without his knowledge, which imperiled Lee's position, Stuart pressed forward at the head of a single brigade and on sight attacked the Union army with ferocity and impetuosity. It is true that he made the charge near Madden's farm, where he had had his headquarters a short time before and, from that fact, knew the ground well ; but that advantage was not of much value in such an undertaking. One of Stuart's regiments

made the circuit of the Union army and attempted to pass in front of Slocum, Howard, and Meade over the river to warn Mahone and Posey of impending danger. Stuart attempted to force his way along the plank road, but he soon found the Union forces too strongly posted there, and he turned and took the Brock road to Todd's Tavern. There he left Fitz-Hugh Lee, as the Catharpin road starts from Todd's Tavern, on the Brock road, and intersects the Plank road west of the Tabernacle Church, and it was important for Stuart to retain possession of it to watch the movements of Hooker's advance. Then taking a regiment with him he started, by the way of Spottsylvania Court House, to inform Lee that Hooker was coming from the west.

In the mean time Pleasonton had sent a regiment, the 6th New York Cavalry, to Spottsylvania to make a reconnaissance in that direction. While Stuart was proceeding on his way to Lee in the night, he met the 6th New York Cavalry, under the command of the bold and high-mettled Lieut. Col. Duncan McVicar.

Although Stuart had with him a regiment, and the 6th New York only numbered about 200, he sent back to Lee for another regiment, but finally changed the request and ordered forward the brigade. The two commands met and fought by moonlight. It was one of the most tragical affairs of the war. The Union cavalry was surrounded, but they cut their way out with the loss of their commander, who was mortally wounded.

We now turn to the movements of Sedgwick on the left, for he has the First, Third, and Sixth Corps—nearly half of the Army of the Potomac. The Sixth Corps was marched to Hamilton's Crossing, where two bridges were put down for Brooks' division to cross on, while Howe's and Newton's divisions were held in close readiness on the left bank to cross at a moment's notice. Reynolds' corps was directed to move below some distance, near Pollock's mill, where bridges were to be put down for Wads-

worth's division to pass over; Doubleday's and J. C. Robinson's divisions were held in readiness on the Stafford side to support Wadsworth. The Third Corps, under Sickles, occupied a position where it could easily reënforce either or both corps without delay, in case of an engagement or a bold feint might lead to a heavy battle.

The engineers were directed to put down bridges across the Rappahannock during the night of the 28th, but some orders had not been received which evidently had been issued, so that it was near morning when the work of putting down the bridges for Reynolds really began. The enemy were on the alert and quickly perceived the movement, and at once opened a severe fire on the troops of the First Corps as they approached the bank of the river.

In the mean time Col. Charles S. Wainwright, chief of artillery of the corps, posted his batteries in the best possible manner to cover the crossing. Reynolds', Hall's, Amsden's, and Cooper's above, and Edgell's, Thompson's, and Ricketts' batteries below Pollock's mill. Ransom's was posted on a rise between the road and the river. Col. Walter Phelps, Jr., commanding First Brigade of the First Division, was directed to have the boats taken to the river, and, in accordance with that order, he detailed the 22d, 24th, and 30th New York Volunteers to carry them by hand to the crossing. His other regiment, the 14th Brooklyn, was thrown forward as skirmishers. Afterwards the 30th was relieved from the duty of assisting in carrying the boats to the river, and the regiment was directed to remain in reserve. Colonel Fairchild, of the 2d Wisconsin, detailed Companies B, E, and D of that regiment to run the pontoon wagons to the river. The other companies of the regiment were directed to advance and engage the enemy on the opposite bank of the river while the boats were being launched. It soon became evident that the bridges could not be put down while the enemy held the other bank. It was simply a repetition of the cross-

ing under Burnside in the noted battle a few months before. So the order was given for the 6th Wisconsin, under Colonel Bragg, and the 24th Michigan, under Colonel Morrow, to cross the river in boats and take possession of the other bank.

The infantry opened fire to distract the attention of the enemy from the two regiments crossing the river in boats. The artillery also trained its guns on the rifle-pits and prevented reënforcements. A regiment was broken up in confusion as it advanced, and was compelled to retreat. Though the 6th Wisconsin landed first, it was but a moment until the 24th Michigan was bounding up the bank and pursuing the enemy. The boats then returned to convey over the 2d and 7th Wisconsin and 19th Indiana. In this movement General Wadsworth, who commanded the division, occupied a seat in one of the first boats that went over and swam his horse by the side of the boat. I have been told since the war by Confederates that they so admired that gallant act in General Wadsworth that they refrained from firing at him.

The general was so delighted over the conduct of the brigade that he caused the following order to be issued :

General Orders }	HDQRS. 1ST DIVISION, 1ST ARMY CORPS,
No. 40. }	May 9, 1863.

The general commanding, availing himself of the temporary repose now enjoyed by his command to review the operations of the past few days, deems it proper to express his thanks to Colonel Bragg, 6th Wisconsin Volunteers ; Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan Volunteers, and the gallant men under their command, for the heroic manner in which they crossed the Rappahannock and seized the heights on the opposite shore on the 29th of April ; and likewise to Brigadier General Meredith and the whole of the Fourth Brigade, for the promptness with which they followed in this daring enterprise. The skill and courage with which Captain Reynolds' Battery L, 1st New York Artillery, returned the enemy's fire, the boldness exhibited by the 14th New York State Militia as skirmishers, and the steadiness of the whole command during the advance and retreat, have afforded the general commanding the highest gratifi-

cation, and inspired him with entire confidence in the troops of this division. By command of Brigadier General Wadsworth :

JOHN A. KRESS.

Lieutenant Colonel and Acting Assistant Inspector General.

The Second Brigade of Wadsworth's division, under Cutler, was engaged in putting the bridges down. When the bridges were completed the three remaining brigades of the division marched over and formed as follows : Meredith on the left, Phelps in the center and Cutler on the right, with Paul's New Jersey Brigade supporting.

Stewart's battery was advanced to a position in front of Phelps. The enemy threatened to mass in front of Meredith, and Phelps was moved over close to him to assist in repelling the expected attack, as Stewart was supported by Paul. The enemy evidently by that time understood the mission of Sedgwick, and the threatened movement on the left was simply checkmating Sedgwick, for Lee, having learned of Hooker's move at Chancellorsville, lightly regarded Sedgwick in the valley below the city. Ransom's battery, which had crossed the river with Stewart's, was withdrawn, and Reynolds took his place. A section of Taft's was posted on the road above Traveler's Rest, where it did good service. On May 1 Amsden's battery was moved down to Traveler's Rest to replace a battery of the reserve artillery, which had been ordered to Banks' Ford.

Wadsworth's division had made a brilliant passage of the river in the face of the enemy, and seriously threatened his left and greatly annoyed him, while the troops on the left bank of the Rappahannock, and Robinson's division of the First Corps, with Newton's and Howe's of the Sixth Corps, as well as the Third Corps, under Sickles, were displayed to advantage by Sedgwick. This was intended to create the impression in Lee's mind that Hooker really intended to cross there and fight his battle where Franklin's grand division had made its attack in the previous battle. Added to these commands was Gibbon's division, of the



GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES.

Second Corps, still in camp in full view from Stafford Heights. It was an important but unsatisfactory service that was performed by the First and Sixth Corps on the left. On May 1 Sickles, who had been ordered to join Hooker, taking a route unobserved by the enemy, rapidly marched to Chancellorsville. Reynolds says :

On April 30 the troops remained in position, the division across the river throwing up some light defense, rifle-pits, etc., and during the day two batteries (Ransom's and Stewart's) were crossed and placed so as to cover the bridges.

About five p. m. the enemy opened fire from their battery on the hill, near Captain Hamilton's, on our working parties and the bridges, which was replied to by our batteries on the north side of the river. The fire was kept up until nearly dark, during which time it became necessary to move the Second Division (massed in the ravines, where it sustained some loss) to the shelter of the river road. One boat of the bridge was struck and disabled. It was, however, promptly replaced. The engineers received orders to take up one of the bridges at dark and move it to Banks' Ford. The 136th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers was placed at the disposal of the engineer officer for that purpose, and accompanied the train to the ford, returning about noon the next day. At dark Ransom's battery was replaced by Reynolds', of rifled guns.

May 1 was passed with the troops occupying the same position. The enemy's force opposite to us was very much diminished, though still strong on their extreme right, where their battery was posted. The pickets along the Bowling Green road showed the same. The order for the demonstration at one o'clock did not reach me until six p. m. The troops were at once put under arms, and a division of the Sixth Corps moved in the direction of the lower bridge, the skirmishers on the left being advanced to the Massaponax, in which position they remained until dark.

At seven a. m., on May 2, I received orders to withdraw the forces from the right bank of the river, take up the bridge, and proceed with my command to report to the commanding general, near Chancellorsville.

Doubleday's and Robinson's divisions were at once put in motion for Chancellorsville.

When Wadsworth's division began to cross the river the batteries of the enemy opened a vigorous fire, which was replied to by our batteries. Reynolds' battery, which was

on the right bank, did effective service. As soon as their batteries were silenced, Reynolds rode forward to overtake the other two divisions of the corps; Reynolds was under the impression he could cross at Banks' Ford, but there was no bridge there, and he was compelled to proceed to United States Ford. Leaving the column, he made great haste to report to Hooker in person.

Chancellorsville is in the country called the Wilderness, which is bounded on the north by the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers, on the west by Wilderness Run, which rises near Major Lacy's farm, on which the battle of the Wilderness was fought later in the war. On the south the high table-land, which is nothing more than a watershed, forms the headwaters of the Ny River, near which Sickles followed Jackson when the latter was making his detour to strike Howard. Lewis Creek rises near the Catharine Furnace, and uniting with another stream coming from the south, west of the Catharpin road, forms the Ny River, which in turn is one of the four streams which unite and form the Mattapony. East of the Wilderness this ridge widens out into a beautiful plateau, dotted over with farms, and it is this open plain that Hooker must occupy in order to handle his large army against the forces of Lee.

In the direction of Fredericksburg Hooker had three roads on which to move his army in order to reach the open plain referred to. The left one, called the River road, hugs the right bank of the Rappahannock River; the middle one is called the old turnpike road, and it is not over three-fourths of a mile to Absalom McGee's on this, which is the eastern, edge of that dreary forest; the right-hand one is the Plank road, quite a distance before the open plain is reached.

While Hooker's army mainly moved on these roads, the one leading to the west was the route by which he was to protect his right flank. Chancellorsville is located at the intersection of the road from Ely's Ford, United States

Ford, and the roads leading to Fredericksburg, with the turnpike and Plank roads blending into one at this point in their westerly course, until they pass Dowdall's Tavern on the left and the Wilderness Church on the right; then, when they ascend the next ridge, the Plank road bears a little to the left, and the old turnpike inclines to the right. In less than half a mile they both cross the Brook road, which starts at the old turnpike, crosses the Orange plank road, and intersects the Brock road about two miles distant, which is the direct route to Spottsylvania Court House. That road was of great importance to Hooker, for it enabled him to turn Lee's left flank; and at Todd's Tavern, his troops could take the Catharpin road and strike the Plank road east of the Wilderness, which contains perhaps some 20,000 to 30,000 acres, cleared off before the war to supply the furnaces in that vicinity. Spottswood, a Colonial governor, is said to have lived in this county not far distant from the noted battlefield.

The following order was issued preparatory to advancing on the enemy from Chancellorsville :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
April 30, 1863—2:15 p. m.

The general directs that no advance be made from Chancellorsville until the columns are concentrated. He expects to be at Chancellorsville to-night.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

To Captain COMSTOCK.

In order to show Hooker's original design, where he fully expected to fight the battle, the following order issued by him is given :

CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA.,
May 1, 1863—11 a. m.

The Fifth Corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the River road by most direct route, the head of it advanced to near midway between Mott's and Colin Runs, the movement to be masked by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at two o'clock.

The Twelfth Corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the Plank road, the head of it resting near Tabernacle Church, and

masked from the view of the enemy by small advanced parties, and the movement to be completed at 12 o'clock, to enable the Eleventh Corps to take its position. The Eleventh Corps, with its batteries, will be masked on the Plank road, about one mile in rear of the Twelfth. This movement to be completed at two o'clock.

One division of the Second Corps, with one battery, will take a position at Todd's Tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the approaches in the direction of the enemy.

The other divisions and batteries of the corps will be massed out of the road near Chancellorsville, these dispositions to be made at once.

The Third Corps will be massed as fast as it arrives about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States Ford road, excepting one brigade, with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's Tavern.

General Pleasanton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise engaged, at Chancellorsville.

After the movement commences, headquarters will be at Tabernacle Church.

By command of Major General Hooker :

WILLIAM L. CANDLER,
Captain and Aid-de-Camp.

It seems that this order, although not revoked in orders, was changed materially.

The division of the Second Corps designated to proceed to Todd's Tavern was French's, but it remained near Chancellorsville until it was moved forward to support the retiring troops. The Eleventh Corps, instead of supporting the Twelfth, moved to the right and took a position at Dowdall's Tavern, where a brigade of the Third Corps had been ordered. Meade advanced Griffin on the river road with his left resting on the river, and Sykes on the old turnpike on Griffin's right, extending over to Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps, with Geary's division on Williams' right. "Humphreys was ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to reënforce Griffin or Sykes as the exigencies might require."

It seems that the alignment was not well preserved. Sykes' left failed to connect with Griffin's right or Slocum's left under Williams, so that when he emerged from the

Wilderness he found the enemy strongly posted and determined to resist his advance. The enemy's line of battle overlapped his front, and was turning his flanks when Warren reported the condition of affairs to Hooker, and the army was ordered back to Chancellorsville.

It was a great mistake, for Griffin, followed by Humphreys, had reached Decker's, within full view of Banks' Ford, without serious opposition, and Colonel Abbott, of the 1st Michigan, who led Griffin's division, says, "We were almost to Banks' Ford." They were surprised to receive the order to retire and surrender the ground they had acquired. Thus it will be seen that Meade had forged the whole front of his corps from the river to Zoan Church on the old turnpike, out of the Wilderness, and held a good tenable position, with the exception of Sykes, who could have been reënforced by either Humphreys and Griffin or Hancock, as he was in no serious peril, though heavily pressed by McLaws.* The left flank of Williams' corps was well through—having passed the swamp. Neither Sykes, Williams nor Geary suffered that afternoon a tithe of what they did afterwards in that battle. When the order was received Williams' left was abreast with Absalom McGee's, and advancing in an open field, while the right was still struggling in the dense and almost impenetrable thicket. When the order came from Hooker to retire the line back in the direction of Chancellorsville the whole army deplored it, and several urgent requests were sent back to him to let them move ahead. Especially was this the case with Griffin and Humphreys, who were already in sight of Banks' Ford, and could have relieved Sykes' left by throwing a division on the enemy's right, and compelling him to fall back in the direction of Tabernacle Church. Such a move would have let Sykes swing out full into the cleared land with Griffin stretching to the

* The swamp is but little more than a low, wide place in which rises Matt River formed just north of the Plank road, and winds its way through the forest, across the old turnpike just west of Absalom McGee's, and thence to the river.

left in command of Banks' Ford, leaving only Slocum on the extreme right to struggle through the dense forest, with three corps to assist him, the Second, Third and Eleventh. It was in vain that Humphreys and other officers begged Hooker to countermand his order. It is alleged that he was misinformed as to the real situation at the front, or else he would not have issued the order.

Some of Hooker's friends claim that his plans were greatly disarranged by the irregular advance of his army. He seemed to place stress on following the Orange plank road, for in his circular order he stated that his headquarters would be at Tabernacle Church, which is on the Old Mine road, only a short distance from the Plank road. But his troops had achieved marked success on the left by the river, enough to give him great encouragement. If he had permitted Griffin and Humphreys to advance they would have secured Banks' Ford. Gibbon's division of the Second Corps, the First, and the Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick, could have hastily crossed there, formed on Griffin's left, and swept forward in the direction of the Plank road, which would have compelled the enemy to form in line of battle facing north to meet Hooker's forces moving up from Banks' Ford. Then Slocum would have been operating on Lee's left flank as Jackson did on Howard's subsequently. Hooker only used Sedgwick below Fredericksburg to deceive Lee as to his real intentions, which is fully corroborated by the following order, and there was no necessity of retaining him there after Banks' Ford was in his possession, as it was ascertained that only Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, with a part of the reserve artillery under Pendleton, were left at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick with a large corps :

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 30, 1863.

GENERAL :—I am directed by the major general commanding to inform you that his headquarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night. It is proposed that the army now at that point will assume the ini-

tiative to-morrow morning, and will advance along the line of the Plank road, uncovering what is called Banks' Ford, where bridges will be at once thrown across the river, which route will then become the shortest line of communication between the two wings of the army. Major General Butterfield will remain at the present headquarters, and will at once transmit to the major general commanding any communications you may desire to send him. It is not known, of course, what effect the advance will have upon the enemy, and the general commanding directs that you observe his movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak point, attack him in full force and destroy him. If he should show any symptoms of falling back, the general directs that you throw your whole force on the Bowling Green road, and pursue him with the utmost vigor, turning his fortified position by the numerous by-roads which you can make use of for that purpose. If any portion of his organized forces should pass off to the rear of the railroad, you will, by detachments, pursue until you destroy or capture him. Simultaneous with the advance of your column on the Bowling Green road, if at all, a column will also advance on the Telegraph road, and between you will sweep the country between the two highways and the railroad. You will be within easy communication, and both columns will spring to one another's assistance in case of encountering any considerable resistance, which can best be judged by the magnitude of the fire. Keep your provisions and ammunition and forage replenished, leaving as much of your train to be brought afterwards as practicable.

Trains will only embarrass and check your forward movement, and must not accompany you, unless it be the pack train.

It may be expedient for you to join the right wing on the south bank of the river, and under cover of it to Fredericksburg. Be observant of your opportunities, and when you strike let it be done to destroy. When you move forward, if you want all your artillery, the batteries of the reserve here can be called for. The enemy have at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that you will not permit them to cross the river. You will find an able commander in Major General Reynolds.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Major General,

To Major General SEDGWICK,

Chief of Staff.

Commanding Left Wing, Army of the Potomac.

This order, which was issued on the eve of the contemplated battle, showed the great importance of Banks' Ford, and if Hooker had permitted the troops to advance they

would have swung around, as above indicated, and hurled Lee back in the direction of Spottsylvania, as his fortifications in the rear of Fredericksburg were then untenable. The ground Hooker would have occupied was equally good with any position Lee could have chosen, unless he had retired to some line farther south than the Plank road. That position would have been quite as good for Hooker, for while he was pressing Lee from this direction of Banks' Ford, he could have thrown a force around on the Brock road at Todd's Tavern, and operated on Lee's left and rear; as the force in Lee's front was equal in strength to the Confederate commander's whole army, and, led by such generals as Meade, Reynolds, Sedgwick, Couch, Humphreys, Griffin, Sykes, Williams, Geary, and Slocum, there was no danger of disaster if the two armies should meet in an open field to measure strength and military science on an equal basis.

As to the possibility of Hooker's left wing being able to gain possession of Banks' Ford, and receive reënforcements from Sedgwick, strong enough to meet any force of the enemy, the following, taken from General Meade's report, seems to be conclusive:

The next day (May 1), under the orders of the major general commanding, the corps was put en route to take a position to uncover Banks' Ford, the left resting on the river, the right extending on the Plank road. For this purpose, Sykes' division was ordered to advance on the old Richmond turnpike until after crossing Mott's Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy, and open communication with Griffin on his left and Slocum on his right, and, when all were in position, to advance simultaneously against the enemy, supposed to be in position from the Plank road to the river. Griffin was ordered to move down the river, or the Mott road, until in the presence of the enemy, when he was to deploy, his left resting on the river and his right extending toward Sykes. Humphreys was ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to reënforce Griffin or Sykes, as the exigencies might require.

These movements were commenced about eleven p. m. Sykes moved out on the old pike, and, after proceeding over a mile, met the enemy's skirmishers. He immediately deployed, and, after a

spirited engagement, drove the enemy for a considerable distance. Finding the enemy in force and making dispositions to outflank him on both flanks, without any communication either on the right or left with a supporting force, General Sykes reported the condition of affairs to the major general commanding the army, and by him was ordered to withdraw. This he did in good order, returning to Chancellorsville.

In the mean time the column of Griffin and Humphreys proceeded on the river road, and had reached Decker's house, within view of Banks' Ford, without any opposition from the enemy, when the order of recall was received, and the column returned to Chancellorsville.

The advance of Griffin and Humphreys imperiled the enemy's right flank, and Sykes was not in great danger, as Meade could have thrown Humphreys on the enemy's right and rear and relieved him at once.

In support of the theory that if Griffin and Humphreys had been ordered, through Meade, to attack McLaws' right and rear, which would have forced him (McLaws) to retreat from his position and compelled Anderson also to have given way in front of Slocum without being attacked by the latter, General Warren, in his report, says :

In General Sykes' front the enemy deployed to the right and left, in line far outreaching the whole of ours, and I have never seen the steadiness of our troops more tried and proved. Captain Weed brought his battery into the front line on the ridge where it could operate against the enemy, and was able to reply to him within musket range, and used his guns with great effect. When the division had all been deployed to extend the line of battle, the lack of numbers compelled a regiment to be deployed as skirmishers. No connection, however, could even thus be made with our troops on the right, and my aid, Lieutenant James, in attempting to communicate with the presumed position of General Slocum, ran against the enemy's skirmishers, from which he fortunately escaped, though many shots were fired after him. A similar effort by one of General Sykes' aids was foiled in the same way.

General Sykes bravely resolved to hold the position assigned him, which his command had so gallantly won from the enemy, and I set out with all possible speed to report the condition to the commanding general.

From information received since the advance began, the general decided to countermand it and receive the enemy in the line occupied the night before. Unfortunately, this line had been taken up the day before by tired troops toward the close of the day and without much prospect of fighting a pitched battle upon it. It was a bad line, and had several commanding positions in its front for the enemy to occupy. It was, perhaps, the best that could be designated for such a sudden change of programme in the face of an enemy. I carried to General Sykes the order to fall back, and he then withdrew his command in perfect order, bringing off his wounded, with the exception of a few who were cut off on the extreme right of his extended skirmish line. All the other columns withdrew to the vicinity of Chancellorsville without having engaged the enemy. The enemy advanced cautiously till he came upon our new lines, and made some feeble demonstrations, easily repulsed, and the day closed without any real trial of strength. During the evening the Third Corps joined us at Chancellorsville.

Two general plans of operations were now considered. One was to choose a position and intrench ; the other, to choose our point of attack, and advance with our whole force of five corps upon it. The saving of our men and the advantages of resuming the offensive after a successful repulse favored the one ; the increased *elan* of our men and the choice of our point of attack the other. I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument. I thought, with our position and numbers, to beat the enemy's right wing. This could be done by advancing in force on the two main roads toward Fredericksburg, each being in good supporting distance, at the same time throwing a heavy force on the enemy's right flank by the river road. If this attack found the enemy in extended line across our front, or in motion toward our right flank, it would have secured the defeat of his right wing, and consequently the retreat of the whole.

Such was Warren's opinion how best to renew the battle after Hooker had ordered the army to fall back around Chancellorsville when McLaws attacked Sykes on the first advance. If that was the better plan on the second day, it would have been wisdom to have permitted Meade to proceed on the first day, as Griffin had turned the right flank of Lee's army without firing a shot, and could within half an hour have uncovered Banks' Ford, when Sedgwick's force of three corps could have crossed that night, and

formed on Meade's left in the open country, where the soldiers of the Union army would have gained a glorious victory without a doubt. Sykes had only lost 28 killed, 167 wounded, and 91 missing, 286—not much more than the loss of a single regiment in some battles—when he was peremptorily ordered to retire. The above figures are from Sykes' official report.

Mahone's and Posey's brigades, of R. H. Anderson's division, were stationed near the United States Ford when Hooker's forces crossed at Germanna and Ely's Fords. As Meade marched down the south bank of the Rapidan, these two Confederate brigades retired in the direction of Fredericksburg, until they met reënforcements near Tabernacle Church. At midnight, on the night of the 30th, McLaws marched with the rest of his command, Wofford, Semmes and Kershaw's brigades toward Chancellorsville. Jackson followed early the next morning, reaching the position of General Anderson near Tabernacle Church at eight a. m. At eleven a. m. the Confederate lines advanced in the direction of Chancellorsville, evidently with the intention of intercepting Hooker's advance before it reached the eastern edge of the Wilderness, to prevent his maneuvering his large army in the open country. It will be seen that both armies began their advance at the same hour. If Hooker had moved promptly in the morning, his right wing would have succeeded in arriving at Aldrich's, on the Plank road, where the Catharpin branches off to Todd's Tavern on the Brock road, while the center would have rested near Zoan Church on the old turnpike, with the left on the River road under Meade, farther advanced in the direction of Banks' Ford before he met the enemy.

Wright and Posey advanced on the Plank road, while McLaws advanced on the old turnpike with Mahone's brigade, of Anderson's division, in the advance. The brigades of Wilcox and Perry also assisted McLaws, which made six brigades on Sykes' front, with only three brigades in his command. In the action with Sykes, the brigade of

Semmes suffered most. In his report of the battle, Lee does not speak of losses in the other brigades, therefore they must have been comparatively few. Anderson took the line of the unfinished railroad to the left, with the hope of turning Hooker's right.

When Hooker withdrew his army to a position near Chancellorsville, Lee did not follow him that night through the Wilderness; he simply felt his position as best he could. By Hooker's retiring, Lee did not believe he would advance again, hence he began to study his position at Chancellorsville. The following, taken from his report, most clearly gives his views:

It was evident that a direct attack upon the enemy would be attended with great loss, in view of the strength of his position and his superiority of numbers. It was, therefore, resolved to endeavor to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this plan was intrusted to Lieutenant General Jackson, with his three divisions.

The commands of Generals McLaws and Anderson, with the exception of Wilcox's brigade, which during the night had been ordered back to Banks' Ford, remained in front of the enemy.

Just before dark, Jackson sent word to Lee that his advance was checked, which brought the Confederate commander to the front at once. They held a consultation at the point where the Catharine Furnace road diverges to the left from the Plank road. Two pines stand near each other where these two notable generals studied the situation, and finally decided on a plan that crowned their efforts with success. Colonel Long, who was on Lee's staff, and Captain Boswell "were sent out to make a moonlight reconnoissance, the result of which was reported about ten p. m. and was not favorable to an attack in the front." Thus Long speaks in his *Life of Lee*.

As Hooker's front was well protected, it seemed useless for Lee to attack an army superior in numbers.

Lee questioned Jackson about Hooker's right. The

information indicated that Howard was badly posted. Rev. Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, was sent for, and he told Lee that he had preached in a church near Chancellorsville, and knew all the roads through the country. "That troops could be conducted to a designated point beyond Chancellorsville by a road sufficiently remote from the Federal position to prevent discovery." Long says that with that information Lee decided to turn the Federal position from a point where an attack was unexpected. Captain Carter was selected as a guide. But Jackson had several men who were raised in that vicinity and knew all the numerous byroads in that section. A son of Melzi Chancellor also assisted Jackson that day.

J. E. B. Stuart's adjutant general, Fitzhugh, was an old regular army officer, educated at West Point, who had resigned before the war, and was living near United States Ford, consequently his services were of great importance in that battle. It was no vain boast of theirs to attempt to capture United States Ford, as Fitzhugh could have led them there beyond a doubt, but the chances were they could not have held it.

When Jackson reached a position opposite Hazel Grove, he turned toward the Brock road, and crossing it, followed a blind track where his march was shielded from the direction of Chancellorsville. Already his movements had been discovered, and Sickles had pursued him, attacking his rear guard vigorously; Birney's division captured the 23d Georgia.

Williamson's brigade of Slocum's corps, and Barlow's brigade of Howard's corps had been sent to Sickles. Strengthened by these forces, and fully believing that he was between the forces of Jackson and those of Anderson and McLaws, he prepared to pursue a contrary course to that of Jackson, which would throw him on the left flank of Anderson and roll him up on McLaws. If that move had been made and the rest of the line reaching to the river had moved forward simultaneously, Hooker's forces would have

hurled the troops of Anderson and McLaws back in the direction of Fredericksburg, and would have compelled Jackson to beat a hasty retreat in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House. Hooker had directed Col. Alexander Moore, of his staff, to go to Sickles and tell him to reconnoiter, but not bring on an engagement. When Sickles convinced Colonel Moore of the situation there, he returned to Hooker for orders. Hooker returned his aid with instructions for Sickles to make a vigorous attack, but before he could reach him it was too late.

Hooker had overtaxed himself since he was placed in command of the army, and the vigorous intellect that he had exhibited up to that moment then seemed paralyzed. He knew the condition of affairs well, and really anticipated what came, as the following order evinces :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Chancellorsville, Va., May 2—9:30 a.m.

I am directed by the major general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the position you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet the contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be.

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purpose of observation as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,

Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp.

Major General SLOCUM and

Major General HOWARD.

Howard held the extreme right of Hooker's army, and to him this order was particularly addressed. His corps rested on the Plank road, with the right beyond Talley's and a brigade facing west to protect his flank, which

was not strong enough to oppose a heavy force. His headquarters were at Dowdall's Tavern or Melzi Chancellor's. Dowdall and Chancellor had both owned this hotel at different times. From Chancellorsville to Dowdall's Tavern it is perhaps two miles. This was Howard's headquarters, while his right rested beyond Talley's house about a mile farther to the west. Von Gilsa's brigade held the extreme right in a dense woods where it was impossible to see over a hundred yards. There Jackson found Fitz Lee with his brigade of cavalry. Jackson asked him if he knew where Howard's position was, to which General Lee said, "Yes, come with me and I will show you his whole command."

The above was fully confirmed by Gen. Fitz Lee, when he was Governor of Virginia, in a letter to the writer.

Reaching the Orange plank road, General Jackson himself rode with General Fitz Lee to reconnoiter the position of Howard, and then sent the Stonewall Brigade of Virginia troops, under Brigadier General Paxton, to hold the point where the Germanna plank road obliquely enters the Orange road. Leading the main column of his force farther on the Brook road to hold the turnpike, the head of the column turned sharply eastward toward Chancellorsville. About a mile had been passed, when he halted and began the disposition of his force to attack Howard.

Rodes' division, at the head of the column, was thrown into line of battle, with Colston's forming the second line and A. P. Hill the third, while the artillery, under Col. Stapleton Crutchfield, moved in column on the road, or was parked in a field on the right.

Well-trained skirmishers of Rodes' division, under Maj. Eugene Blackford, were thrown to the front. It must have been between five and six o'clock in the evening, Saturday, May 2, when these dispositions were completed.

Upon his stout-built, long-paced little sorrel, General Jackson sat, with visor low over his eyes, and lips compressed, and with his watch in his hand. Upon his right sat Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the very picture of a soldier, and every inch all that he appeared. Upon his right sat Major Blackford. "Are you ready, General Rodes?" said Jackson. "Yes, sir," said Rodes, impatient for the advance. "You can go forward, then," said Jackson.

A nod from Rodes was order enough for Blackford, and then

suddenly the woods rang with the bugle call, and back came the responses from bugles on the right and left, and the long line of skirmishers through the wild thicket of undergrowth sprang eagerly to their work, followed promptly by the quick steps of the line of battle. For a moment all the troops seemed buried in the depths of the gloomy forest, and then suddenly the echoes waked and swept the country for miles, never failing until heard at the headquarters of Hooker, at Chancellorsville, the wild "rebel yell" of the long Confederate lines.

Never was assault delivered with grander enthusiasm. Fresh from the long winter's waiting, and confident from the preparation of the spring, the troops were in fine condition and in high spirits. The boys were all back from home or sick leave. "Old Jack" was there upon the road in their midst; there could be no mistake and no failure. And there were Rodes and A. P. Hill. Had they not seen and cheered, as long and as loud as they were permitted, the gay-hearted Stuart and the splendid Fitz Lee with long beard and fiery charger? Was not Crutchfield's array of brass and iron "dogs of war" at hand, with Poague and Palmer, and all the rest, ready to bark loud and deep with half a chance? Alas! for Howard and his unformed lines, and his brigades with guns stacked, and officers at dinner or asleep under the trees, and butchers deep in the blood of beeves! Scattered through field and forest, his men were preparing their evening meal. A little show of earth-work facing the south was quickly taken by us in reverse from the west. Flying battalions are not flying buttresses for an army's stability. Across Talley's fields the rout begins. Over at Hawkins' Hill, on the north of the road, Carl Schurz makes a stand, soon to be driven into the same hopeless panic.

By the quiet Wilderness Church in the vale, leaving wounded and dead everywhere, by Melzi Chancellor's, on into the deep thicket again, the Confederate lines press forward, now broken and all disaligned by the density of bush that tears the clothes away; now halting to load and deliver a volley upon some regiment or fragment of the enemy that will not move as fast as others. Thus the attack upon Hooker's flank was a grand success, beyond the most sanguine expectation.

The writer of this narrative, an aid-de-camp of Jackson's, was ordered to remain at the point where the advance began, to be a center of communication between the general and the cavalry on the flanks, and to deliver orders to detachments of artillery still moving up from the rear.

The above is an extract from the Rev. James Power

Smith's account, in an able review in the *Century*, of Jackson's move around Hooker's army until he struck Howard. Smith served on Jackson's staff as an aid, and after the war he became prominent as a divine at Fredericksburg.

It will be observed that Jackson and Lee approached within three-fourths of a mile of Howard without being seen. There is not a military man in the world but will say that Von Gilsa's front should have been protected with heavy picket guards to have prevented a surprise. On the approach of Lee's cavalry they would have been able to have given him a warm reception, as Von Gilsa was posted in the thick undergrowth, where his cavalry could not have charged. This would have warned the other picket posts, and sent alarm to Howard's headquarters. Then he could have received reinforcements and extended his line of battle farther to the west, and been prepared to face the enemy.

In fact, a regular line of pickets should have been thrown around his corps at a distance far enough away to have prevented any surprise. The cattle were in the forest on the right of the road; when Jackson made his advance they joined in the wild excitement of the hour and greatly added to the confusion.

Howard had three divisions in his corps, each composed of two brigades. Gen. Chas. Devens, Jr., commanded the First Division, and occupied the right of the line, with his First Brigade; under Colonel Von Gilsa, on the extreme right. That brigade was composed of the 41st, 45th, and 54th New York Regiments, and the 153d Pennsylvania. Only half of the brigade was refused back, facing west when the attack was made. The 54th New York was on the extreme right, while the 153d Pennsylvania was on its left, with the 41st New York holding the extreme front on the Plank road, and the 45th New York on its left. Devens' Second Brigade, under Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean, was the 25th, 55th, 75th and 107th Ohio troops, with the 17th Connecticut.

On Devens' left was Schurz's division, with Steinwehr on the left in the direction of Chancellorsville as the corps held the road. But it must be remembered that only Bushbeck's brigade of his division was engaged, as Gen. Francis C. Barlow's brigade, which had been on reserve, was sent to Sickles a short time before; so Howard really had but seven brigades to resist Jackson's corps. General Doubleday and the Comte de Paris in their histories say that the first known of Jackson's premeditated attack was the wild game coming from that direction.

While these two distinguished authors correctly represent Howard's headquarters, yet there were many in the corps who fully expected the attack and knew of the advance.

Capt. David B. Castle, of the Signal Service, sighted the column at quite a distance off, and sent the news to Howard, but he informed me that his information was not credited, and no attention was paid to it.

Col. James S. Robinson, of the 82d Ohio, said he was aware of the advance of Jackson, and wondered why no precaution was taken to meet it. When Rodes' division (D. H. Hill's) arrived at the turnpike he formed his command with Colquitt on the right, Doles next, with his left resting on the turnpike. Rodes' old brigade (commanded by O'Neal) on the left of the turnpike, with its right resting on it. Iverson was on the extreme left. As the troops advanced it was understood that the turnpike was to be the guide, while Iverson was to get possession of Talley's house, because that was supposed to command Howard's headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern.

Doles first struck Howard's outposts with two guns. Flanking with two regiments, he swept right over the Union troops.

The position at Talley's was taken, where five more guns were lost; which compelled Howard's reserve to retreat, as it suffered from a reverse as well as an enfilading fire, while his main line of battle was telescoped by Jackson's advance. Devens was hurled on Schurz suddenly.

At Dowdall's Tavern Colston's division hurried forward and joined in the pursuit. Schurz attempted to stem the tide, but Rodes and Colston were both upon him, with A. P. Hill hurrying forward to assist in the attack. Bushbeck made a gallant stand, but he was soon overpowered and his brigade swept back.

Howard and Schurz had appeared on the scene and attempted to form a new line of battle. In the mean time Sickles had been apprised of the disaster, and he hastily marched back in the direction of Hazel Grove. Pleasonton, who was with Sickles, returned with his cavalry to Hazel Grove in advance of the latter. The flying battalions of Howard were forcing their way in the direction of Chancellorsville, unable to check the onward charge of Jackson's corps, retreat being their only safety. Howard sent to Pleasonton for assistance at that critical moment. Taking in Howard's trouble at a glance, Pleasonton saw that something desperate must be done to stay Jackson's victorious columns.

Hazel Grove is near a half mile south of the Plank road. From it a small road leads through the woods,* and intersects the Plank road near where Jackson fell. Pleasonton directed the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry to take that road and fall on the enemy at the first favorable opportunity. Every officer and man in the regiment well knew that meant a ride to death, but not a lip quivered or a voice trembled in the whole command. The regiment swept through the woods at a full gallop, scattering the advancing Confederates of Jackson's right. A small open field lies on the south side of the Plank road, just west of where Jackson was wounded. When the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry struck that open field it turned to the left, and charged into the advancing columns of Confederate infantry, knowing full well that they were thrown into that maelstrom to save

* Hazel Grove is the name of a farm west of Fairview. It takes its name from the hazel bushes growing along a small stream that skirts the farm, and is a branch of Lewis' Creek.

Hooker's army, every man of them resolved to sell his life as dearly as possible. This was, perhaps, their last day on earth; and the command to charge lessened the time to minutes and seconds for some of them to live. In a moment more they were on the infantry of the enemy, using sabers with a valor that would have received the highest praise from Wellington. Of the five officers who led the charge three were killed—Maj. Peter Keenan, Capt. Charles Arrowsmith, and Adj. John Hazeltine Haddock. The horse of Capt. J. Edward Carpenter was shot under him. Major Busy was the only officer who escaped unharmed.

Pleasanton at once took command of all the artillery near him, and taking a good position, prepared to receive the enemy, who had quickly rallied after the fearful assault of the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Having an abiding faith in his double-shotted guns, he bade his gunners reserve their fire until the enemy was in safe range, and then directing the guns to be depressed, gave the order to fire. The awful carnage that followed would blanch the cheek of "the Lion-hearted." Although the enemy had suffered so fearfully from Pleasanton's artillery, yet the gaps in their ranks were closed up and they were advanced again as if to get another taste of death. Hooker seeing the great disaster to his right, rushed from his headquarters, and, like Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen, brought up his old division, then commanded by General Berry, to rush on the enemy and impale them on their bayonets if they could not otherwise break their lines.

Berry and Williams advanced from Chancellorsville, hoping to assist in reforming the Eleventh Corps, and to check the advance of Jackson. Sickles, with his two divisions, Berry and Whipple, and Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps, were making great efforts to counter-march, to attack the right flank of Jackson. It was a perilous place, and Hooker feared at one time that Sickles' whole command was lost, and told one of his officers to state his fears to Col. William Birney, who was a volun-

teer aid on Hooker's staff during that battle. Colonel Birney, whose brother, David B. Birney, commanded one of Sickles' divisions, kept a faithful watch until the head of Sickles' column made its appearance in the direction of Hazel Grove.

If Jackson had been able to force his way in the direction of Chancellorsville until his right occupied Fairview, Geary's right would have been untenable, which would have forced those on his left to give way; and if Sickles' command had not arrived in time to have struck Jackson's right and rear, there is no telling where disaster to Hooker's army would have ended that night. He might have been swept from Chancellorsville. His attack, however, was rather too late for that, and Pleasonton with great impetuosity threw his small command on Jackson to make the impression that he was encountering a heavy force. That gave Sickles time to arrive and reënforce the "gallant little cavalry commander," and hold the enemy permanently in check.

In his great haste to return, Whipple lost a part of his ammunition (mule) train, and caissons of his batteries, and two or three of his cannon, which were in the woods occupied by the enemy between Sickles' line of battle and the Plank road. Both Jackson and Sickles were preparing for a night attack at the same time. Sickles wanted to recover Whipple's lost cannon and ammunition, and he also anticipated an advance of the enemy. In fact there was a general expectancy all along the line that the battle would be renewed during the night. Berry, Williams and Birney formed two sides of a quadrangle as they prepared that night to advance on Jackson. Berry and Williams moved west, taking the Plank road as their guide, while Birney formed from Hazel Grove and advanced north toward the Plank road, striking the enemy on the right flank. Hooker had given permission to Sickles to renew the attack, so that when Colonel Hart, of Sickles' staff, returned from headquarters with the request granted, Sickles directed

Birney to prepare his division for an advance. Ward's brigade formed the first line, with Hayman's following a hundred yards in the rear. The guns were uncapped, and orders were given not to fire until the Plank road and the breastworks of Steinwehr, from which Bushbeck's brigade had been driven, were retaken. It was a beautiful night; the moon, nearly full, made it light enough to enable the troops to advance. The forest was thick enough to prevent an alignment, but the veterans of the Third Corps were well disciplined for the perilous duty they were required to perform, and while the artillery of the enemy, and as they grew closer, the musketry in addition, stubbornly resisted the advancing columns of Birney, yet that division forced its way to the front until the enemy was compelled to attack Berry's division and Knipe's brigade of Williams' division, in the direction of Chancellorsville along the Plank road. Williams' division, of the Twelfth Corps, which was ordered back by Hooker when he gave up the advance on Fredericksburg, returned to the position it had previously occupied, its right resting on the Plank road with the left near Fairview. There it connected with Geary's right, which faced southeast, holding the same general direction it did in the advance. The two divisions formed a right angle near Fairview. In the evening the enemy approached that point, and made so strong a disposition to attack it, that Ruger, of Williams' division, was compelled to throw forward the 27th Indiana and 3d Wisconsin to protect the position.

On the following morning, May 2, Williams followed Sickles in his advance beyond Hazel Grove. Williams was strongly feeling Anderson's lines, and really pressing him back, when the news came that Jackson was crushing Howard. With all possible haste Williams marched back to take up his old position from Fairview to the Plank road in order to assist Howard. It was with difficulty that his command could form in line of battle because of the flying fugitives of Howard's corps. Ber-

ry's division of the Third Corps had taken a position on the right of Williams, his left extending to the Plank road. Berry overlapped a little, but Williams relieved those troops. These two divisions hurried to the rescue of Howard.

Ruger with his brigade held the left of the line near Fairview. He had formed two lines of battle to save that point; the 27th Indiana on the left, the 2d Massachusetts in the center, and the 3d Wisconsin on the right. The 13th New Jersey and 107th New York were in the second line.

Hooker's position at that moment was very critical, and Jackson came very near forcing him from Chancellorsville in the evening. A statement from John Bresnahan, a brave and gallant soldier of the 27th Indiana, who lost his arm there next morning, says:

While approaching the scene just described, there was danger of our regiment being swept off the field by the fleeing multitude; but Colonel Colgrove was equal to the emergency. The boys touched elbows and moved to the top of a cleared ridge, about six hundred yards to the left of our original works, where the regiment halted, facing a ravine and heavy woods beyond, about three hundred yards from our line, out of which the men of Howard's corps were pouring, with the enemy yelling after them. The enemy at this point was checked by a well-directed fire of shell and canister from Lewis' battery, which came very timely to our assistance.

Thus ended the desperate combat between the two armies until Sickles began that famous night attack.

The battle at night was described so graphically, just after it, by General Williams, that it is here inserted:

A tremendous roll of infantry fire, mingled with yellings and shoutings almost diabolical and infernal, opened the conflict on the side of Sickles' division. For some time my infantry and artillery kept silent, and in the intervals of the musketry I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently having hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the mean time Sickles' artillery opened, firing over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and cursings redoubled.

All at once Berry's division, across the road on our right, opened in heavy volleys, and Knipe (commanding my right brigade next to the Plank road on the south) followed suit. Best (chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps) began to thunder with his thirty-odd pieces. In front and on the flanks, shell, and shot, and bullets were poured into these woods, which were evidently crowded with rebel masses preparing for the morning attack. Along our front and Sickles' flank probably 15,000 or more musketry were belching an almost incessant stream of flame, while from the elevation just in the rear of each line from forty to fifty pieces of artillery kept up an uninterrupted roar, reëchoed from the woods with a redoubled echo, from the bursting shells which seemed to fill every part of them with fire and fury. Human language can give no idea of such a scene—such an infernal and yet sublime combination of sound, and flame, and smoke, and dreadful yells of rage, of pain, of triumph, or of defiance. Suddenly, almost on the instant, the tumult is hushed; hardly a voice can be heard. One would almost suppose that the combatants were holding breath to listen for one another's movements. But the contest was not renewed.

Thus spoke one of the bravest generals in praise of others on the field.

Then came a scene that has been well pictured in history. Jackson was never himself when he was not performing some daring deed. Sickles was not only holding on to Hazel Grove, but Birney was pressing in Jackson's right flank. Then Jackson determined to attack Berry before Birney could reach the Plank road, and ordered A. P. Hill's division, which had been in reserve, to advance and relieve the front line of battle, which was then in confusion, as the commands were badly mixed with each other and decimated by casualties in the action. Jackson knew he must continue his work that night, or the chances were that he would pay dearly in the morning for his delay, for Sickles was pressing his right flank from Hazel Grove with Williams' and Berry's divisions, and Hay's brigade of French's division confronting him, while Reynolds, with the First Corps, closing well on his left flank, placed him in an uncomfortable position, though a mistake the next morning added fame to his name.

As Jackson was advancing along the Plank road to

reconnoiter the Union position, in order to direct A. P. Hill, who was moving forward his division to make an attack on Berry, he was mortally wounded. Doubleday says:

Pending this movement he rode out on the Plank road with part of his staff and a few orderlies to reconnoiter, cautioning his pickets not to fire on his return. When he came back new men had been posted, and his approach was mistaken for the advance of Pleasonton's cavalry. His own men fired into him with fatal effect. Nearly all his escort were killed or wounded and he received three balls, which shattered both arms. His horse ran towards the Union lines, and although he succeeded in turning him back, he was dashed against the trees and nearly unhorsed. He reached the Confederate lines about the time our artillery again opened up the Plank road with a fire which swept everything from its front. Several of his attendants were killed and others wounded.

The Rev. James Power Smith, an aid on Jackson's staff, says:

Regretting the necessity of relieving the troops in front, General Jackson had ordered A. P. Hill's division, his third and reserve line to be placed in front. While this change was being effected, impatient and anxious, the general rode forward on the turnpike, followed by two or three of his staff and a number of couriers and signal sergeants. He passed the swampy depression and began the ascent of the hill toward Chancellorsville, when he came upon a line of the Federal infantry lying on their arms. Fired at by one or two muskets (two musket balls from the enemy whistled over my head as I came to the front), he turned and came back toward his line, upon the side of the road to his left. As he rode near to the Confederate troops just placed in position, and ignorant that he was in the front, the left company began firing to the front, and two of his party fell from their saddles dead.

Captain Boswell of the Engineers, and Sergeant Cunliffe of the Signal Corps, spurring his horse across the road to his right, he was met by a second volley from the right company of Pender's North Carolina Brigade. Under this volley, when not two rods from the troops, the general received three balls at the same instant. One penetrated the palm of his right hand and was cut out that night from the back of his hand. A second passed around the wrist of the left arm and out through the left hand. But a third ball passed through the left arm, half way from shoulder to elbow. The large bone of the upper arm was splintered to the elbow-joint, and the wound bled freely.

His horse turned quickly from the fire, through the thick bushes, which swept the cap from the general's head, and scratched his forehead, leaving drops of blood to stain his face. As he lost his hold upon the bridle-rein, he reeled from the saddle, and was caught by the arms of Captain Milbourne of the Signal Corps. Laid upon the ground, there came at once to his succor, Gen. A. P. Hill and members of his staff. The writer reached his side a minute after to find General Hill holding the head and shoulders of the wounded chief. Cutting open the coat sleeve from wrist to shoulder, I found the wound in the upper arm, and with my handkerchief I bound the arm above the wound to stem the flow of blood. Couriers were sent for Dr. Hunter McGuire, the surgeon of the corps and the general's trusted friend, and for an ambulance. Being outside of our lines, it was urgent that he should be moved at once. With difficulty litter bearers were brought from the line near by, the general placed upon the litter, and carefully raised to the shoulder, I myself bearing one corner. A moment after, artillery from the Federal side was opened upon us; great broadsides thundered over the woods; hissing shells searched the dark thickets through, and shrapnels swept the road along which we moved. Two or three steps farther, and the litter-bearer at my side was struck and fell, but, as the litter turned, Maj. Watkins Leigh, of Hill's staff, happily caught it. But the fright of the men was so great that we were obliged to lay the litter and its burden down upon the road. As the litter-bearers ran to the cover of the trees, I threw myself by the general's side, and held him firmly to the ground as he attempted to rise. Over us swept the rapid fire of shot and shell—grape-shot striking fire upon the flinty rock of the road all around us, and sweeping from their feet horses and men of the artillery just moved to the front. Soon the firing veered to the other side of the road, and I sprang to my feet, assisted the general to rise, passed my arm around him, and with the wounded man's weight thrown heavily upon me, we forsook the road. Entering the woods, he sank to the ground from exhaustion, but the litter was soon brought, and again rallying a few men, we essayed to carry him farther, when a second bearer fell at my side. This time, with none to assist, the litter careened, and the general fell to the ground with a groan of deep pain. Greatly alarmed, I sprang to his head, and, lifting his head as a stray beam of moonlight came through clouds and leaves, he opened his eyes and wearily said, "Never mind me, Captain, never mind me!" Raising him again to his feet, he was accosted by Brigadier General Pender: "Oh, general, I hope you are not seriously wounded. I will have to retire my troops to reform them, they are so much broken by this fire." But Jackson, rallying his strength, with firm

voice said, "You must hold your ground, General Pender; you must hold your ground, sir;" and so uttered his last command on the field.

Charles W. Hathway, Company K, 1st Massachusetts, says:

Their version agrees with the 1st Massachusetts', with one exception—that is, which fired at the general first, they (the Confederates) or the Union troops. The Confederates claim that he and his guide were lost, and rode almost into our lines, but finding his mistake retreated, and was first fired upon by his own men, and some Union soldiers immediately in front returned the fire, and the firing then became general.

We of the 1st Massachusetts claim that he rode near our lines, and was ordered to halt by Sergeant Dan Kelly, of Company K, when he wheeled his horse and rode into the woods upon the right of the Plank road, and a portion of the three left companies (H, K and F) fired upon him.

The firing was immediately returned by the Confederate picket line, and then the firing became general upon both sides, and our artillery opened with double-shotted canister, which came too near us for comfort, as it went crashing through the woods just above our heads. It seems as if the woods were one sheet of flame for a few minutes, the musketry rolling forth from both Union and Confederate lines.

General Berry that night desiring to consult with General Hooker, placed General Carr temporarily in command of the division. Colonel Michael Burns perceiving the fact that the enemy was massing on the front, sent for General Carr. On arriving there, General Carr became convinced that a night attack was contemplated soon; he went to the rear, and gave Colonel Osborn an order to open with all of the artillery, which was promptly obeyed. General Carr said:

Gen. Stonewall Jackson was killed in that night attack by our men, and not by his own troops. From what I could see when called to the advanced line by Colonel Burns, previous to the opening of our artillery fire, I am satisfied General Jackson could not get in front of his picket line without running into our lines.

Now the evidence on both sides is impartially laid

before the reader, and each one can arrive at his own conclusions.

After hearing and studying carefully both sides, it is difficult to decide which army wounded him. It seems the historians of the North have accepted the theory that he was killed by his own men. Both sides agree that he rode very near to our picket line, and the members of the 1st Massachusetts claim that they fired the volley that ended his life. This statement seems quite probable, and ordinarily would be accepted, but the Confederates so stubbornly claim it that many are disposed to concede it to them. They fully believe it, and the Comte de Paris, after weighing the accounts on both sides, decided that Jackson was wounded by his own men. I have avoided prejudice in the matter, and there is new and positive evidence introduced here never before laid before the public. If I have an opinion at all in the matter, it is that Sickles' soldiers shot him. General Carr stated to me in a letter, that the two lines at that point were within twenty feet of each other. It will always remain a mystery, and perhaps be the subject of much discussion.

A. P. Hill, while leaning over Jackson, was wounded by a shot from a section of Dimick's battery planted on the Plank road, and supported by Berry's division. Jackson and A. P. Hill both being wounded in the night battle, it so discouraged the enemy that he withdrew to Dowdall's Tavern, when our troops reoccupied the position that Bushbeck had been forced from, and Whipple recovered all of his lost cannon and ammunition, besides capturing some guns from the enemy.

Thus ended the battle on the first day at Chancellorsville. The first great advantage of the enemy had been nearly overcome, and Jackson's corps, then without a commander, was in a very precarious condition. Reynolds, who had left his (First) corps at United States Ford, went in person to report to Hooker; who, on learning the condition of affairs, sent an order to Doubleday, whom he

had placed in temporary command, to march rapidly to the front, where he was assigned a position on the right of the troops of French's division, which was the extension of the line from Fairview, with Williams on the left.

With the exception of occasional firing, the battle ceased, and the weary soldiers lay on their arms for much-needed rest. Hooker's dispositions for the battle next morning were most admirable. Meade had taken a position on the right of Berry, while Reynolds, with the First Corps, had arrived and occupied a position near the Bullock or White House on Meade's right, so that in the morning Jackson's troops had Birney and Whipple on their right flank, with Williams, Berry, Griffin, Sykes and Humphreys in support of and confronting them, and Reynolds in position to move on the left flank. This was a critical position for Jackson's corps to occupy, but, as General Stannard said of some of the mistakes in the war, "If they had not been made the war would have been brought to a close before the object had been accomplished for which it was fought."

Instead of holding his lines firmly and pressing Jackson's troops on the morning of the 3d, at early dawn, before they had been reorganized by Stuart, who had taken command at the request of General Rodes and Jackson's adjutant general, and forcing them beyond the Brock road, so that Anderson's left would have been unprotected and Stuart compelled to go to Todd's Tavern to take the Catharpin road to reunite with Lee, Hooker made no attempt to destroy his adversary. If the course indicated had been taken Anderson and McLaws would have been pressed back toward Salem Church, while Sedgwick was rapidly advancing from Fredericksburg. McLaws and Anderson would have had to retreat either over the Catharpin or taken the road at the Tabernacle Church for Spottsylvania. But instead of using his army as it was established in line of battle, Reynolds was never required to advance or fire a gun. Sickles was ordered to bring

Birney and Whipple from Hazel Grove and surrender the ground they had so gallantly fought for at night. But that was not all; the moment Sickles surrendered Hazel Grove, the key to the position was gone, and it was clear Hooker had made a fatal mistake.

A. P. Hill, who had been wounded, was superseded by Heth. When the new commander of Hill's troops observed Sickles retire in the direction of Fairview, he followed him with the brigades of Lane, McGowan, Archer and Brockenborough. Some have censured Stuart for not pressing more to the left the next morning, in the same direction Jackson was the evening before. It was well he did not, for Reynolds, with 17,000 men, lay there ready to receive him "with hospitable hands to bloody graves." But instead he pursued the much wiser course of pressing forward his right under Heth, which connected him with Anderson, and at the same time gave him Hazel Grove, from where he could sweep Fairview with his artillery. When Sickles received orders, at daylight Sunday morning, to withdraw from Hazel Grove and proceed to Fairview, Graham's brigade was directed to cover the movement and bring up the rear. The enemy perceiving the movement pressed Graham very hard, when Graham directed Huntington's battery to open fire, which proved so effective that the Confederates were handsomely repulsed. A battery from Fairview was also directed to open on the enemy, as Huntington's battery would again be attacked when it attempted to move. A brigade having also been instructed to assist Graham, the enemy having opened the fight with renewed zeal, Heth's troops leaving their breakfast and flying to their guns with the cry, "Let us remember Jackson."

Hooker had more troops than could be used to advantage at Chancellorsville. If he had reënforced Sedgwick on the night of the 2d with two corps, Marye's Heights could have been carried and held with ease. Hooker might then have retired across United States Ford, and

taken command in person, left Lee in the Wilderness, where he could have been held or compelled to retreat in the direction of Gordonsville, when he could have fallen on his rear with his splendid army and harassed and damaged him as effectually as the Russians did Napoleon on his retreat from Moscow. But he neither reënforced Sedgwick nor transferred his army. He did not even press Jackson's troops next morning.

Archer, rendered desperate, attacked the position of Fairview with maddened fury; but Ruger's brigade, of Williams' division, met his attack with a firmness that hurled him back in the direction of Hazel Grove. McGowan then advanced, but he suffered a similar fate to that of Archer, and was compelled to retire. The artillery of Hooker at Fairview was doing effective work. Graham's brigade, of Birney's division, came to the assistance of Ruger, it being evident that the enemy was making great efforts to carry Fairview. Stuart was advancing in three lines of battle which, he says, became "more or less merged into one." Berry was pressing Stuart's left so hard that Colquitt was sent from the right to the left to support Pender, while Iverson was ordered up to his assistance.

When the mist cleared away sufficiently for Stuart to see the field, he observed that Hooker, in abandoning Hazel Grove, gave away the key to the situation, and he at once ordered 30 pieces of artillery to that point to concentrate their fire on Fairview. Again Stuart ordered another assault all along the line. Why Hooker did not hurl Reynolds on Stuart's left flank, supported by Sykes and Griffin on his left, is strange.

On the north of the road Berry had fallen and General Hays was wounded and a prisoner. The contest was again renewed at Fairview, and Whipple's division bore the brunt of the struggle. The enemy made a desperate assault on the salient point, which was nearly carried, when Colonel Bowman ordered his brigade forward, and was again compelled to retire, though Bowman lost heavily. In the 12th

New Hampshire, Colonel Potter, Lieutenant Colonel Marsh, Major Savage, Capt. A. J. Huntoon and others were severely wounded; of 537 men who went into the action, only 212 could be mustered for duty after it was over, which shows the severity of the conflict.

McLaws was on the extreme right of the Confederate line of battle, Wofford on the turnpike, with Kershaw on his left and Semmes on the Plank road leading to Fredericksburg. These brigades were hovering on Hancock's front, though unable to give him battle. Anderson pressed hard on Geary's front, which was all the assistance he was able to give the assaulting columns from Hazel Grove and Dowdall's Tavern, where Stuart was making such determined charges to force his way to Chancellorsville. Again had Hooker sent a division by the river road and turned McLaws' right, and rolled him up on Anderson, who in turn would have been compelled to retire in the direction of Hazel Grove, the victory would have been his, for the reason that he would then have been in possession of the roads to Fredericksburg, on which Sedgwick was approaching.

At Fairview Doles came around a hill and then following the bed of a small branch, was enabled to strike Williams on the flank. A gap between Geary's right and Williams' left made a favorable point for attack. Doles was being driven back, when Paxton, in command of the old Stonewall Brigade, came to his support.

Williams' division had been in the fight from early morn; a good part of it was out of ammunition, and the men were faint from exhaustion. As his line wavered, it left Graham's brigade uncovered; but Birney seeing Graham's danger, took a portion of Hayman's brigade and led the charge in person to save him. Whipple's division had been ordered to support Berry, but that gallant officer had given his last command. When it was known that Whipple was mortally wounded, General Revere marched his brigade and a part of another out of the line of battle

point was slowly retired behind the batteries, but Sewell, thinking that another attack might break the enemy's lines, again ordered a charge at double quick. He retook the works thrown up for the protection of our guns, and planted the colors of the brigade on the parapet. When the last round of ammunition was fired with no prospect of assistance, Sewell retired the brigade to the rear of the Chancellor House, where he reported to General Carr in command of the division.

The artillery of the enemy posted on the Plank road was planting its shells all around the Chancellor House, while the enemy at Hazel Grove, prompted with a hope that victory would soon be his, was thundering away at Fairview. Sickles seeing him make another advance, sent Major Tremaine again for assistance, but when he arrived he found the commander-in-chief had been stunned with a shell, and no one was at headquarters to hear his request. General Butterfield, his chief of staff, was at Falmouth; Warren had gone to Sedgwick; General Van Alen thought he had no authority to act, and Couch, the senior corps commander, was not at headquarters. Perry's brigade, on the left of Anderson, had ascended Lewis' Creek and joined with Archer in the attack on Fairview. General Lee had evidently been watching that vital point, as he accompanied Perry and Archer, and gave the order to renew the attack. Geary's right was forced back, and the whole Union line facing west gave way and retired in the direction of the Chancellor House, notwithstanding the last stubborn fight made by Carr, as well as by Graham and Whipple, who had gone to Carr's relief. The Union line was defeated and compelled to retire. Major Tremaine was again sent to headquarters for aid, but had no better success than before. Meade was present, and the request of Sickles, through Major Tremaine, was referred to him, but he felt a delicacy of assuming the responsibility at that critical moment; perhaps for the reason that three corps, the First, Fifth and Eleventh, had remained idle all the

morning to the full knowledge of the commander-in-chief, whereas, if the First and Fifth had been thrown on Stuart's left flank, he would have been crushed at once; or, as General Sickles said to me, "In fifteen minutes."

Meade was one of the junior corps commanders. It is true he had commanded the First Corps for twelve days, but that was a temporary assignment on the field, when Hooker was wounded at Antietam. Couch, Slocum and Reynolds all ranked Meade, and were on the battlefield, and his declination to virtually assume command was certainly made in good taste, although the service greatly suffered by it at that critical moment. Couch afterwards declined to assume command pending Hooker's prospect of an early recovery.

Hooker rallied enough to understand that his army was suffering a great defeat—that it was his Austerlitz—and he begged Geary to retake the position he had retired from, and promised him if he would that he would give him support at once. The soldiers of Geary's division once more advanced, and really retook their old position and held it for some time, but their ranks were melting away from a concentrated fire from the enemy, which finally compelled them to yield in their weakness, and they once more retired never to advance again. Even at that late and critical moment, if the First Corps, under Reynolds, and the Fifth, under Meade, had advanced on Stuart's left flank and rear, defeat would have been turned into victory. So anxious was Doubleday, who commanded a division of the corps, to assist, that he begged Reynolds to get orders to attack. Reynolds, who was a great soldier, was chafing for an opportunity to crush Stuart's left and thereby relieve Sickles and Slocum. Finally he ordered Doubleday to make a reconnoissance. Accordingly Doubleday directed Roy Stone to take his brigade and advance in the direction of the Plank road, which resulted in finding no enemy in force in their front, but the corps never received orders to advance.

Sickles, although he had been just placed in command of a corps for the first time, had fought with great valor and handled his corps with a skill that gave his men confidence. So the Third Corps, although it was forced back to the Chancellor House, would have rallied with spirit and dash and again retaken their works just abandoned and in the hands of the enemy, but for the fact that the spirit of Hooker was gone, and he mounted his horse and rode silently to the rear, where the new line was being formed by Couch, and thus abandoned the roads to Fredericksburg over which he had ordered Sedgwick to advance that morning and form a junction with him. No one desired to inform him of his real mental condition, though afterwards he said to Doubleday: "That for once he lost confidence in Hooker;" and there was no doubt that his injury was far worse than was supposed at the time.

Anderson, Perry, and Archer rushed on to Fairview for the purpose of occupying that point, lest Hooker might attempt to retake it with fresh troops.

The Confederate artillery was hastily brought from Hazel Grove and planted at Fairview, where it had a short and sweeping range on the Union troops around the Chancellor House, as a temporary line of battle was formed there to aid in directing the commands to the new position on a line with the Bullock or White House. The Chancellor House was on fire from the shells of the enemy, and even the woods, where our wounded lay unable to escape.

Sickles, Knipe, and other officers were attempting to prevent a panic, for the commands were all in confusion and consequently uncontrollable. The Chancellor House was rapidly burning to the ground, while the woods in the front where our wounded lay were on fire, and the flames rapidly approaching them as they lay helpless on the ground.

Great confusion prevailed in the ranks of both armies, and it took a considerable time for the soldiers to find their commands. The Confederate forces came on like

a mob, the three lines being merged into one. Couch had ample time to form on the new line selected, for the enemy was slow to pursue, even with the prestige of victory on his side, which was full evidence that the Confederate troops were exhausted.

Reynolds held the right and Meade next, while Sickles occupied the apex between Meade and Couch, and Slocum's position was between Couch and Howard, the latter's left resting on the Rappahannock.

Lee felt Hooker's new position cautiously. He possessed a wily shrewdness that indicated danger, and while he had recklessly hurled his troops on Hooker at Chancellorsville, where he knew the Union commander was cooped up in a small area, with his lines of battle in almost every conceivable shape, he could neither successfully resist an attack nor with confidence advance; he therefore moved on the Union position with timidity. While he was thus feeling Hooker's new line his attention was called to the battle at Fredericksburg between Sedgwick and Early. A new danger was threatening him in an unexpected quarter, for he knew that Sedgwick had, in addition to the Sixth Corps, the division of Gibbon of the Second Corps, while Early only had his division of four brigades—Hay's, Hoke's, William Smith's, and Gordon's, with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division. Wilcox was near Banks' Ford, from which point he could reënforce Early; but with his assistance it would give Early only six brigades against four divisions, composed of eleven brigades, under Sedgwick, and, as a celebrated general once said, "God was always on the side of the largest army." Lee was a little afraid that Early might receive unkind treatment at the hands of Sedgwick; so he desisted from pressing Hooker until he could hear from Fredericksburg. Warren had been dispatched by Hooker to go to Sedgwick in person and direct him to attack Early on the morning of the 3d and then make all possible haste in the direction of Chancellorsville. At this time Sedgwick was at Hamilton's Crossing with his corps, ready

to pursue Early on the Bowling Green road. The commander of the Sixth Corps was entirely ignorant of what had transpired on Hooker's right, and even then did not know that a most terrible battle was going on at night while he was reading the following order from Hooker:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 2, 1863, 9 p.m.

The major general commanding directs that General Sedgwick cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order and at once take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on the road. He will leave all his trains, except the pack-train of small ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and between us we will use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest messenger. Send word that it is delivered to General Sedgwick.

J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp.

To General BUTTERFIELD.

General Sedgwick, in his report, says:

The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with my entire command on the south bank of the river, ready to pursue by the Bowling Green road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg, where no bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight. I commenced, therefore, to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg, on the Bowling Green road; General Newton taking the advance, followed by the Light Brigade and Howe's division.

The enemy was on the alert, and resisted his advance with stubbornness, skirmishing, and falling back when compelled to, in the direction of Fredericksburg. At the Bernard House an attempt was made to surprise the Confederate forces and capture the heights; but it did not succeed. Then Sedgwick, when he reached Fredericksburg, in the gray of the morning, attempted to carry Marye's Heights by surprise before the fog had lifted

enough to disclose the advance of his troops; but Early was fully alarmed by his night march, and was prepared for an assault at any moment; consequently when Wheaton and Shaler advanced in the early morn they were allowed to approach within twenty yards of the enemy's works, at which point they received a sudden and destructive fire. The repulse of Wheaton and Shaler was a great disappointment to Sedgwick, who remembered the 13th of December, when charge after charge was made to carry the heights that were then frowning on him, as if to say; "hurl not your soldiers against me again." But Sedgwick had Hooker's order to come to him, and his faithful friend, General Warren, was there watching and superintending every move with a view of aiding Sedgwick in his endeavors to comply with that order.

Two attempts had failed, but it was still hoped that the left flank of the enemy's position could be turned. Gibbon, who had succeeded in getting a bridge thrown across the river at the Lacy House, had marched over, when he was directed to move to the right, which would have thrown him on the Confederate left, but that the bridge across the canal had been removed, and he was therefore compelled to repair it under heavy artillery fire. As the canal greatly impeded the advance of both the right and center grand divisions in the battle in December, it is a great wonder that the precaution had not been taken by Sedgwick or Gibbon to collect planks enough in Fredericksburg before the division started, carry them at the head of the column, lay them almost in an instant, and then proceed. But instead of that, the column was halted, and men sent to the nearest house, some little distance away, to tear off its boards to make the bridge. Had a brigade, or even a regiment, of Gibbon's men crossed over the canal, it might have saved, or aided in saving, a direct assault in front, which cost Sedgwick a thousand men before noon.

When the flank movement of Gibbon's failed, Newton was ordered to prepare to charge the heights in front, where

our columns had suffered so much a few months before. Howe was ordered to move to the left of Hazel Run with his division, while Brooks remained near Hamilton's Crossing.

But it fell to Newton's lot to bear the brunt of the battle, as Gibbon could neither advance on the right, nor could Howe on the left carry the heights in his front, as the enemy enfiladed him from the second line of works, while he advanced on the first. Newton's division was formed, Burnham's brigade being on the left, the right wing of the 5th Wisconsin, under Colonel Allen, advanced as skirmishers, closely followed the 31st New York on the left, and the 6th Maine on the right; while the left wing of the 5th Wisconsin formed the third line. On the left of Burnham was the Vermont brigade of Howe's division under General Grant. Grant, an honor to the famous name, was appointed Assistant Secretary of War under Proctor, a deserved recognition of one of the most gallant Union soldiers. On the right of the Light Brigade, under Colonel Burnham, was the 7th Massachusetts, Colonel Johns, and the 36th New York, Colonel Walsh. The right column of Newton's division near the Plank road was headed by the 61st Pennsylvania, Colonel Spear; the 43d New York, Colonel Baker, supported by the 82d Pennsylvania, and the 67th New York (the 1st Long Island). Doubleday says:

Spear's column, advancing through a narrow gorge, was broken and enfiladed by the artillery—indeed almost literally swept away, and Spear himself was compelled to advance up a broken, stony gulch, swept by two rebel howitzers. The head of his column was twice broken, but he rallied each time. He was then badly wounded, and there was a brief pause, but Colonel Walsh, of the 36th New York, rallied the men again, and they kept straight on over the works.

Just as these two columns on the right received such a heavy volley from the enemy Colonel Burnham was wounded, and fell from his horse, when Colonel Allen, of the 5th Wisconsin, assumed command of the brigade, and

said to the men, "When the signal 'forward' is given, you will start at double quick, you will not fire a gun, and you will not stop until you get the order to halt. You will never get that order." The charge was then sounded, when every man in the first line, with a cheer which reëchoed from the heights, sprang like a tiger from his lair, followed at thirty steps by the second and third lines. That was signal enough to set all the enginery of war in motion. The flanking batteries on Lee's Hill enfiladed the lines of the Light Brigade with shell and shrapnel; the batteries on the right poured in their volleys of canister, while the rifle-pits, in front and on the flanks, threw torrents of leaden hail with deadly precision.

As the right wing of the 5th Wisconsin passed over the fatal ground in December, the 6th Maine pressed them closely, and both regiments were rushing forward to plant their colors first on the enemy's works. In the mean time the left wing of the 5th Wisconsin made a dash and joined the first line and mingled with the troops of the 3rd New York and 6th Maine. When the stone wall was reached a short rest was taken before the parapet above was attacked, then the 6th Maine had the honor of planting its colors first on the enemy's redoubts.

Grant's Vermont Brigade of Howe's division, at the time of Newton's advance, was a little to the left, with his right resting on Hazel Run, and in the attack one regiment—the 6th Vermont—obliques to the right and became engaged with Newton's division, and was the second regiment that gained Marye's Heights. The rest of the Vermont brigade charged up the principal heights and captured several pieces of artillery, and drove the enemy from his commanding position. In this attack the 2d Vermont alone lost 106 killed and wounded.

Howe carried the works in his front, and the heights that Burnside had attempted to take only a few months before were in the possession of Sedgwick.

Early was evidently surprised at the result, as he hastily

retreated on the Telegraph road in the direction of Richmond with part of his command, while Hays and Wilcox took the Plank road in the direction of Chancellorsville.

Sedgwick decided to order up Brooks from near Franklin's Crossing before he took the line of march to attempt to join Hooker. That gave Hays an opportunity to make a detour around Sedgwick, in order that he might join Early, and Wilcox retired toward Salem Church on the Plank road, to await the advance of Sedgwick. When Brooks came up he was directed to take the advance, as his troops had not been engaged. The many delays which occurred to annoy Sedgwick had greatly worn away the day, and the advance was made with great caution.

In the third volume of the *Comte de Paris*, he thus speaks of the second battle of Fredericksburg :

At half-past eleven Sedgwick was in possession of the famous heights which for three months the two armies had been accustomed to look upon as impregnable. The assault had cost him about 1,000 men. The center of the enemy's line, too much extended for the number of its defenders, had been broken, and the latter, having dispersed north and south, were hastily retreating, leaving prisoners, cannon, and what was still more precious, the possession of the Chancellorsville road, in the hands of the assailants. It was of great importance to take immediate advantage of this. The sound of Hooker's cannon was no longer heard, but this could afford no excuse for delay. Unfortunately, Sedgwick insisted upon pushing Brooks' division to the front line, and as the latter was still near the bridges, this inexcusable maneuver made him lose nearly four hours.

Gibbon's division, on the extreme right, was in very good condition, and as it was near the Plank road, over which Hays and Wilcox had retired with their brigades, he might have given a very harassing and damaging pursuit. Newton's division had suffered severely, and not only needed but deserved to be left at Fredericksburg performing guard duty, a position assigned to Gibbon ; he left one brigade in the city with outposts on the heights ; the other two brigades returned to the left side of the river to protect

stores at Falmouth. With the exception of the Vermont Brigade, Howe's division had suffered but slightly.

If Newton's division had been left at Fredericksburg and Gibbon had rapidly followed Hays and Wilcox, with Howe closely supporting him, and Brooks making a forced march to sustain Gibbon and Howe, it seems hardly probable that Wilcox could have made a stand at Landram's blacksmith shop, which is about half a mile east of Salem Church. In fact, it seems barely possible for Wilcox to have made a successful stand before McLaws had united with him; and that would have been near the eastern edge of the Wilderness, with Sedgwick occupying a position in an open plateau, where he could have welcomed the enemy with no larger a force than McLaws' division and Wilcox's brigade, and he could not have been outnumbered if he used his artillery to advantage.

The battle would have been so near to Hooker's left, under Howard, that it would have certainly been an incentive to press forward in the direction of the battle to assist Sedgwick, which would have revealed the fact that there was nothing in front of Howard and Slocum but a thin line that afternoon while Sedgwick was fighting at Salem Church. When McLaws advanced to Salem Church Anderson's division was massed at the Mine Run and River road; Heth took Anderson's position there and held it until the battle was over. Sedgwick resolved to put Brooks in the advance, with Bartlett's brigade on the left of the Plank road, in two lines of battle, and the New Jersey Brigade, under Col. Henry W. Brown, was formed on the right of the road in similar order. Brooks' advance was stubbornly contested, and the first stand made was at Landram's blacksmith shop, which was seemingly to give Wilcox an opportunity to select a line of battle in the rear or west of Salem Church. This was the only position the enemy could select to give him the advantage east of the Wilderness. From Landram's shop the ground is quite level until the edge of a thick undergrowth and wood

is reached, which is not more than a quarter of a mile wide, then there is a rise in front of the church, which faces east. The church itself was an assistance to the enemy, being built of brick and standing so far to the left that our batteries were unable to reach it. In addition a log schoolhouse stood southeast of the church, which afforded shelter for the Confederate sharpshooters.

A temporary breastwork had been hastily thrown up between the church and schoolhouse running north across the road. It was in front of this position that Bartlett formed his brigade, with the 5th Maine on the left, and the 99th Pennsylvania on the right of the 5th Maine, with the 121st New York extending north in the direction of the Plank road, the 16th New York supporting. With this formation Bartlett advanced, when a most sanguinary struggle took place.

Finding that the 23d New Jersey was failing under the deadly fire, Bartlett ordered in the 16th New York, and carried the log schoolhouse and was forcing back the enemy from the church when McLaws' troops arrived just in time to save the day on the left.

The First Brigade of Brooks' division, under Colonel Brown, formed on the right of Bartlett, with the 23d New Jersey, under Colonel Grubb, on the left of the Plank road and the 1st and 3d New Jersey on the right of it. The 2d New York had occupied the advance as a skirmish line until it reached the Tabernacle Church, where it was passed by the regular line of battle. This resistance brought Colonel Penrose with the 15th New Jersey and four companies of the 2d to the front. Sedgwick, seeing that Penrose had arrived, directed him to the right of the 3d, hoping to turn the enemy's left if possible, but Colonel Brown, commanding the brigade, met Colonel Penrose and ordered him to support the 3d Regiment, as it was evident that it could not hold its position without assistance. Penrose moved up in support, and soon ordered his regiment—the 15th New Jersey—to take the place of the 3d on the

front line of battle, the former line having been withdrawn.

The New Jersey Brigade lost heavily in officers and men. Colonel Brown, commanding the brigade, was wounded, and Col. M. W. Collett, of the 1st New Jersey, was killed. General Newton was closely supporting Brooks, though his division was marching by the flank, and when the engagement began at Salem Church it required time to get into position on the right of Brooks.

The Second and Third Brigades of Newton, under Col. William H. Brown and Gen. Frank Wheaton, were engaged, and suffered heavy losses. It was not long before Brooks was wounded, when Eustis assumed command of the brigade. Shaler's brigade had suffered so severely in the charge on Marye's Heights that it was held in reserve.

When McLaws arrived at Salem Church he found Wilcox in line of battle across the Plank road. He immediately placed Wofford on the right, with Kershaw between them. Mahone, who came up on Wilcox's left, was directed to move more toward the river, so that Semmes could form on the left of Wilcox. This made a heavy line of battle for Sedgwick to face. Bartlett's brigade faced Wofford's, Kershaw's, and a part of Wilcox's commands, while the New Jersey Brigade faced Wilcox's left and Semmes'. Mahone faced Newton, and the determined attack made by the latter endangered Mahone so much that McLaws ordered Wofford to send reinforcements to him. It was a short but sanguinary action, in which neither side gained the mastery. Night coming on put an end to the engagement. The two armies lay on their arms facing each other, expecting to renew it early next morning. Everything being quiet along Hooker's front, the battle at Salem Church could be distinctly heard by the army lying idle under Hooker. If any effort had been made to feel the enemy on Howard's front, the fact would have been developed that McLaws had gone to fight Sedgwick, leaving Stuart and Anderson alone on Hooker's whole front. Had

Howard taken the River road he would have found no troops to oppose his advance but Anderson's division at the crossing of the Mine and River roads, which could have been easily brushed away with his whole corps. Then he could have continued on the River road until he arrived opposite Mahone; then facing south, he could have struck him on the left flank, and rolled him upon Semmes and Wilcox, which would have enabled Newton and Brooks to renew the attack with new spirit and bright hopes, and forced McLaws and Wilcox from their strong position at Salem Church. Failing to attempt to assist Sedgwick, whose guns were loudly calling for help in close proximity to Hooker's left, it would seem as if the night would bring forth a strong resolution to act in some decided way, either to move forward and burst the fetters that environed his army, which Hooker could do by ordering the troops to make an attack all along the line, for Anderson had deserted Hooker's front to go and assist in vanquishing Sedgwick, leaving only Stuart to cover the whole of Hooker's front from Reynolds' right to Howard's left, a distance of miles, compelling him to make his line so thin that Kilpatrick or Custer with a squadron of cavalry could have pierced it at almost any point. Or Hooker could have transferred a part or the whole of his army to the aid of Sedgwick by the United States Ford, which was in his possession and in his rear, out of view of the enemy, and marching down the left bank of the Rappahannock, recrossing at Banks' Ford, and forming on Newton's right, have compelled Mahone to give way. The enemy was so weak on Hooker's front that even his whole army could have retired without opposition. The position of the United States Ford was such that troops could have quietly marched under cover of the darkness of the night and not been observed or discovered until the next morning, for at that very moment Lee was preparing to withdraw Anderson for the purpose of environing Sedgwick at Salem Church.

McLaws sent Maj. E. L. Costin to find Early, and inform him of the situation. When Sedgwick carried the works on Marye's Heights Early's force was cut in two. Hays retreated to the right over the Plank road, while Early, with the rest of his command, retreated down the Telegraph road, supposing he would be pursued by Sedgwick, which was Hooker's original order. Being disappointed in this he halted and anxiously awaited developments. When Major Costin came to him with news from McLaws, he at once prepared to return to reoccupy Marye's Heights, which should have been held by Gibbon instead of leaving a brigade in Fredericksburg with simply outposts to occupy the works captured from the enemy, with the other two brigades placed on the north side of the Rappahannock. The order of the division should have been reversed, that is, Gibbon's division should have occupied the position deserted by the enemy, and guards sent to Falmouth to protect the stores. There was no danger of the enemy surprising and capturing them, for he had no transports with which to cross the river below; Lee could not cross the Potomac below Washington after the second battle of Bull Run for the same reason, and was compelled to seek a crossing near Harper's Ferry, where the river was fordable. Hooker not only wasted the night of the 3d without attempting to reënforce Sedgwick, but the next day witnessed the same inactivity. He was not himself. Though he could have withdrawn his troops better at night, there was really no time during the forenoon of the 4th that he could not have retired at his own pleasure, with scarcely a feeble resistance. Only Stuart remained in his front with a corps that had fought two days, which, while it had been victorious, had suffered great losses, its commander lying dangerously wounded in the rear, and many of its soldiers wounded and killed. Stuart sought no battle with Hooker. He simply remained in his front to deceive him until Lee, who had gone with McLaws and Anderson, could drive Sedgwick across the Rappahannock, or, what was

better, capture him. Lee intended to hold McLaws at Salem Church with his division, with Wilcox's brigade facing east. Anderson's division was to connect with Early's left and face north, there being a large gap between Anderson's left and McLaws' right, which it was thought would close up when the attack was made; while Early faced west, forming three sides of a quadrangle, and the Rappahannock made the fourth.

Sedgwick was fully aware of the critical condition he was in. Leaving Newton to face McLaws, he ordered Brooks to refuse back his left and face Anderson, while Howe was directed to face east and confront Early.

Thus Lee labored assiduously to environ the position of Sedgwick, either for his destruction or expulsion from the south side of the river.

Sedgwick, on his part, made every preparation possible to meet the attack from so vastly superior a force. The sun was low in the west, and no assistance had come to Sedgwick from Hooker, nor had there been any effort to relieve him by advancing on Stuart, who could have been swept out of existence the moment a forward movement had been ordered. Howard, on the left, could have taken the river road and forced Heth back and fallen on McLaws' left, while Slocum could have marched on the old turnpike, with Couch on the Plank road, leaving Sickles, Meade, and Reynolds to pursue Stuart, for Reynolds alone with the First Corps could have defeated him.

Those three corps—the First, Third and Fifth—would have sent Stuart back over the ground lost by Howard, while Howard, Slocum, and Couch would have relieved Newton and forced McLaws to retreat south toward the Brock road, and Hooker's great hopes would have been realized; but he silently held his position near Chancellorsville while Sedgwick was attacked and fought another desperate engagement on the evening of the 4th without assistance, although six corps lay within five or six miles, and half of them had never participated in the battle.

Hooker not being attacked on the 4th, presumed or feared that Lee was planning to attack Sedgwick, and Griffin, with his division of the Fifth Corps, was ordered to make a demonstration to the right of Bullock's house. In this action Griffin lost about 500 men without accomplishing anything of value to the commander. Reynolds, on the extreme right, remained idle, although his soldiers were chafing for orders to attack the enemy. He could have easily turned Stuart's left flank and compelled him to retreat; but one division of the Fifth Corps was ordered to advance with no support on the right or left. *

Early advanced with Hoke on the left, Hays in the center, and Gordon on the right, followed by Barksdale and Smith. Early, thinking he could turn the left flank of Howe and cut him off from Banks' Ford, advanced Smith on the right for that purpose, but he met with a repulse, besides a heavy loss of prisoners.

Grant's Vermont brigade was on the left of Howe's line. In his report, Grant says:

While this was transpiring on the right, and the enemy were gaining the crest in front of the main line and endeavoring to get possession of the skirt of woods in our front, by direction of the general commanding the division I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Martindale to throw the 26th New Jersey to the front and right, to hold possession of the ravine, and to prevent, if possible, the enemy from gaining the woods; and at the same time Colonel Walbridge, of the 2d Vermont, was ordered to move to the left, to the former position of the 26th New Jersey, and Colonel Seaver, 3d Vermont, to take the position just occupied by the 2d Vermont, thus leaving the 6th Vermont and the battery on the right. The efforts of Lieutenant

* FREDERICKSBURG, Va., February 26, 1889.

SIR:—Yours to hand and contents noted. In regard to the Bullock House, I would state that the Bullock House and the White House are one and the same, and was formerly owned by Col. Lorman Chancellor. He gave it the name of "Woodlawn," and sold it to a man by the name of E. F. Bullock, and it was called the Bullock House until the war, and to my knowledge was not known as the White House until after the battle of Chancellorsville.

YES CHANCELLOR.

To J. H. STINE, Esq.

Colonel Martindale at this juncture were not entirely successful ; the left of the regiment broke and came back in confusion. The enemy gained the skirt of woods, and in great force bore directly toward the 2d Vermont. when that regiment rose, and poured a well-directed fire into the enemy's front, and continued it with remarkable rapidity. This regiment was supplied with new waterproof cartridges, and the firing was so rapid as to resemble a continuation of volleys. The 26th New Jersey passed away from the front, so that the 3d Vermont opened, and with the 2d Vermont poured its terrible fire full upon the already confused masses of the enemy. The enemy were here checked, broken, and held at bay. Still farther to the left, as the enemy advanced, the 4th Vermont became engaged. As the enemy appeared obliquely, the 4th Vermont would have been exposed to a cross fire, but Colonel Stoughton, with great coolness, threw back his right wing, presenting a bold front, and opened a murderous fire. The enemy still pressed forward, gaining the ravine in front of the 4th Vermont, and at the same time a force farther to the left threatened to turn our left and cut us off from the river. Colonel Stoughton now changed front forward to his original position and poured in fresh volleys, holding the enemy in check. In the mean time the 5th Vermont had arrived from the right, and been posted behind the crest to support the 2d and 3d Vermont ; but, perceiving that Colonels Walbridge and Seaver were able to hold their own, I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Lewis to take the 5th Vermont farther to the left, and to a position completely commanding the ravine and crest to the left, should the enemy succeed in flanking the 4th Vermont.

At this time the enemy had a large force in front of our entire line, attempting with desperate vigor to turn it ; but the Vermont regiments remained firm and unbroken, closely hugging the crest and literally presenting a wall of fire. Baffled in his efforts to break our line, and perceiving that the battery on our right had changed its position, the enemy rallied, and made an attempt to turn our right, but the 6th Vermont was there. The enemy rushed desperately forward, and nearly gained the crest immediately in front of the 6th Vermont, when that regiment suddenly rose and gave him a terrible volley, and immediately charged upon him down the slope and through the ravine and on to the crest which had been previously held by the Third Brigade. In the mean time Lieutenant Colonel Martindale, with great gallantry and perseverance, rallied the 26th New Jersey, and then charged down on the right of the 6th Vermont. The enemy was utterly routed.

Thus is officially and graphically told the struggle on

the left of Howe's line, where the Confederates made desperate attempts to get possession of Banks' Ford, and prevent Sedgwick from crossing to the north side of the Rappahannock. This was in accordance with the well-laid plan of Lee, who hoped to take Banks' Ford and capture the Sixth Corps. To the valor of the Vermont Brigade is greatly due the frustration of the Confederate commander's bold plan. He had taken nearly that number at Harper's Ferry after the battle of South Mountain, and he believed that Hooker was unable to come to the rescue of Sedgwick if he (Lee) could cut him off from Banks' Ford.

There can be no discredit attached to the 26th New Jersey when its left broke in confusion under the deadly fire of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Martindale displayed great coolness in handling his regiment, as was evidenced in the charge by the regiment made that afternoon. He highly commended Maj. William W. Morris and Acting Adjutant Terhune, and particularly the conduct of Sergt. Maj. Amos J. Cummings, whom he placed in command of Companies C and F, whose officers had been separated from the regiment. Since the war Cummings has been a noted journalist and is now a distinguished member of Congress from the Ninth District of New York.

The folly of not holding Marye's Heights with Gibbon's division was then fully exemplified, for Early could not have retaken the works he had been forced out of the day before, and in addition he would have confronted two divisions instead of one. Howe held a line of some two miles with his small division of two brigades, which when attacked was compelled to yield before the combined assault of Early and Anderson. Had Gibbon with his three brigades been in line with Howe it would have prevented Sedgwick being forced across the river that night. But, as before stated, one of Gibbon's brigades was stationed in Fredericksburg, while the other two had been ordered to the Stafford side, so that Gibbon was unable to render any assistance to Howe, except to prevent the enemy

from advancing through the city in the direction of Banks' Ford. Lee directed Anderson's right and Early's left to attack the apex or right angle formed by Howe's right and Brooks' left, which was near the Dowman House. Wright and Hoke advanced, with Posey supporting on the left and Hays on the right. The Union forces yielded, and retired under cover of darkness in the direction of Banks' Ford.

From the following dispatches, it will be seen that Hooker relied greatly on the judgment of Sedgwick to control his movements :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 4, 1863.

I have reported your situation to General Hooker. I find that we contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good position. General Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at five p. m. Look to the safety of your corps, you can retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks' Ford. The latter would enable you to join us more readily.

G. K. WARREN, Brigadier General.

To General SEDGWICK.

MAY 4, 1863—2:15 P. M.

I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the bank of the Rappahannock until to-morrow. JOHN SEDGWICK, Major General.

To General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863—7:15 p. m.

The general directs a full report of your position, the number of the enemy's forces opposed to you, and your dispositions. He wishes this report as soon as possible that he may act advisedly.

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.

To Major General SEDGWICK.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

May 4, 1863—7:40 p. m.

The atmosphere being thick with smoke, it is impossible for the signal officers to see the movements of General Sedgwick or those of the enemy. The artillery firing is very heavy. The musketry fire seems to have sensibly diminished.

S. WILLIAMS, Asst. Adj. General.

To General HOOKER.

BANKS' FORD, VA., May 4, 1863—9:50 p. m.

General Sedgwick is in direct communication with me, and is about half a mile south of my bridges, in the upper rifle-pits. I informed him in due time of when I expected my bridges to be shelled, but I presume he could not prevent it.

Rebel skirmishers are reported to me now as on the left bank, below this, but I do not believe it.

H. W. BENHAM, Brigadier General.

To General BUTTERFIELD.

F SIGNAL STATION, May 4, 1863—10 p. m.

I reported to headquarters what forces were engaged. The enemy attacked Sedgwick. It was his right and center that they were driving,

JAMES S. HALL,
Capt. and Signal Officer.

To General BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863—10:20 p. m.

I am now going to General Sedgwick; expect to see him in twenty minutes. Shot and shell flew all around my bridges several times; most fortunately did not hit them. I had only one sergeant killed. Have two bridges ready at this moment.

A strong infantry fire has just burst out to the right and front, apparently within one-half to three-quarters of a mile.

H. W. BENHAM.

To D. BUTTERFIELD, United States Ford, Va.

BANKS' FORD, VA., May 4, 1863—11:30 p. m.

(Received May 5—1 a. m.)

My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north side of Banks' Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopardize it by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw.

JOHN SEDGWICK, Major General.

To General HOOKER, United States Ford.

MAY 5, 1863—12:30 a. m.

Communication with General Sedgwick is at present full and open by two bridges and by messenger or telegraph. His main body is, however, below the crest of the hill, opposite the ford, under full fire of artillery.

I consider his command in great danger.

R. O. TYLER, Brigadier General.

To Major General BUTTERFIELD, Chief of Staff.

BANKS' FORD, VA., May 5, 1863.

(Received 1 a. m.)

I shall hold my position, as ordered, on south of Rappahannock.

SEDGWICK.

To General HOOKER.

HEADQUARTERS, May 5, 1863—1 a. m.

(Received 2 a. m.)

Dispatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this.

By command of Major General Hooker :

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.

To General SEDGWICK.

BANKS' FORD, May 5, 1863—2 a. m.

General Hooker's order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately.

JOHN SEDGWICK, Major General.

To Major General BUTTERFIELD.

HEADQUARTERS, May 5, 1863—1:20 a. m.

Yours received, saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.

HOOKER, General.

To General SEDGWICK.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,

May 5, 1863—3:20 a. m.

Yours just received, countermanding order to withdraw. Almost my entire command has crossed over.

JOHN SEDGWICK, Major General.

To Major General HOOKER.

MAY 5, 1863—5 a. m.

The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung and in process of being taken up. The troops are much exhausted. The dispatch countermanding my movements over the river was received after the troops had crossed.

JOHN SEDGWICK, Major General.

To General BUTTERFIELD.

FALMOUTH, VA., May 5, 1863—5:20 a. m.

Have arrived with my command in rear of Falmouth. There is a dense fog. Everything is quiet, as far as I can ascertain. An officer of the Fifth Artillery reports that Sedgwick's corps has re-

crossed at Banks' Ford, with the exception of one brigade, taken prisoners.

A. PLEASANTON, Brigadier General.
To Major General BUTTERFIELD,
Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA.

May 5, 1863—6:15 a. m.

The commanding general directs that as soon as your bridges are taken up at Banks' Ford they be removed immediately, and packed in the rear of the former camps of Sickles' corps.

By command of Major General Hooker :

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Major General,
To Brigadier General BENHAM. Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS,

May 5, 1863—7 a. m.

I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up.

JOHN SEDGWICK, Major General.
To General BUTTERFIELD.

This practically ended the noted battle of Chancellorsville, which will live in history for its brilliant conception and its unfortunate ending.

Hooker failed to reënforce Sedgwick until it was too late. If he had withdrawn two of his corps and sent them to Sedgwick by four o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th, he could have defeated Lee with great ease. Gibbon's division held Fredericksburg. If a corps had crossed over the bridge at the Lacy House, and the other one crossed at Banks' Ford, and been ready to participate in the attack made on Sedgwick late in the evening, the Union forces could have held Marye's Heights, and the ridge extending west to Salem Church—a stretch of several miles, where a large army could have been operated. Then that night he could have transferred the other corps by the way of United States Ford, and then down the left bank of the Rappahannock to Banks' Ford, when Lee would have been perfectly outgeneraled. Of the seven infantry corps under

Hooker's command, but three were engaged, as the following telegrams fully state :

NEW YORK, May 6, 1863—3 p. m.

Nothing will so cheer the hearts of all good men as the immediate reinforcement of General Hooker by troops from around Washington, Fort Monroe and Suffolk.

E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York.

To His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

May 6, 1863.

General Hooker has had, has now, and will have, everything he asks for by telegraph, which is always in full connection with the War Department. He knows best what he wants, and when and where, and directs everything according to his own plans. He reports confidentially that only three corps of his army, all told, have been engaged. You need not be told that this is less than half the army in his command and actually with him.

Further accumulation of troops, not called for by him, would exhaust his supplies and endanger his plans. Be patient.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

Governor MORGAN, New York.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 6, 1863—4:30 p. m.

Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12:30. The army had previously recrossed the river and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above I see no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. Not to exceed three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand.

Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

This dispatch of Hooker's states it in full, "There is a

better place nearer at hand." That position was held by Sedgwick until five o'clock on the evening of the 4th, then he was forced down to Banks' Ford, which he crossed under cover of darkness. Gen. Martin McMahon, Sedgwick's chief of staff, superintended the crossing of the troops under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. Hooker closes his dispatch by an expression of gladness that the cavalry had finally turned up. Hooker made a mistake when he placed Stoneman in command of the cavalry. He lacked dash and foresight in such a degree, qualities so necessary for a cavalry leader, that his circuit around Lee's army really was a failure. If Hooker had held him closer, he might have made better use of him and, when Lee began to retreat, have ordered him to throw his cavalry in the advance to destroy the railroads, and intercept supplies and reinforcements for the Confederate army.

Hooker knew that Longstreet might suddenly return from Suffolk with Pickett's and Hood's divisions, and his idea for Stoneman to approach as near Richmond as possible and destroy the railroad for several miles, would have not only prevented supplies being sent to Lee, but would have prevented reinforcements either by Longstreet or by any other command that might be convenient to move forward to Fredericksburg. The dispatches of Hooker and Sedgwick crossed each other, which produced great confusion. When Hooker found that Sedgwick was on the left bank of the Rappahannock, and the Confederate forces were in full possession of Marye's Heights and the plain west of Chancellorsville, the only place where a great battle could be fought, and knowing that he was hemmed in on the right bank, where he could not maneuver his army without risk, he decided to withdraw immediately. Then he resolved to call a council of war, composed of his corps commanders, to decide the question whether battle should be offered to the enemy, or retire across the Rappahannock. But it seems that the matter was not fully settled at that consultation. Reynolds, Meade and Howard

were for attacking the enemy, while Couch had not studied the situation full enough to desire to give a positive opinion, but inclined to support the position taken by Reynolds, Meade and Howard. Hancock testified before the committee on the conduct of the war: "I understood from him (Couch) always that he was in favor of fighting them." Slocum came in late and apparently did not receive his notice in due time.

Sickles was the only corps commander who seriously opposed an attack on the enemy. He was the only volunteer in command of a corp. All the others were West Point graduates, though none had fought more skillfully or valiantly than he (Sickles). His night fight against Jackson was one of the most gallant efforts of the war, and was certainly one of the most brilliant moves recorded in history. As a volunteer officer he modestly refused to pit his opinion against officers whose scientific training had especially fitted them to judge, but he based his reason on a political standpoint. He was fearful, if they persisted in still further keeping up the battle on a field where there had been four days of solid disaster to the Union army, that it would have a very depressing effect throughout the country. It seems that this fear was shared by Governor Morgan, from his telegram to the President:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

May 22, 1863.

GENERAL:—An issue having been raised between the commanding general and myself in regard to the construction to be placed on the language I used at the consultation of corps commanders held on the night of May 4, I would esteem it a personal favor if you would, at your earliest convenience, state your recollection of what I said, and the impression it made on you at the time.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. G. MEADE,

Major General.

HDQRS. FIRST ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF POTOMAC,

May 24, 1863.

GENERAL:—Your note of the 22d instant has been received. My recollection of the substance of the remarks made by you at the

consultation of the corps commanders, held on the night of the 4th of May, is that you were decidedly in favor of an advance in the direction of Fredericksburg at daylight the next morning ; that you considered this army had already too long been made subservient to the safety of Washington, and you threw that out of the question altogether. This drew the remarks from General Sickles. I simply said, as my corps was the only one which had not been engaged, I could not urge my opinion, but that I agreed with you.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN F. REYNOLDS,
Major General Volunteers.

To Major General GEORGE G. MEADE,
Commanding Fifth Army Corps, Army of Potomac.

If Hooker needed encouragement from his generals to attack the enemy, he most assuredly had it. Sickles alone opposed an advance. But if it had been decided to make an assault on the enemy, Sickles would have led the Third Corps as gallantly as Marshal McDonald did his at Wagram, when he pierced the Austrian center and won the victory. Hooker was discouraged, and decided to retire across the Rappahannock. But it was not advisable to begin the movement in daylight, lest the enemy might observe it and attack him when his columns were breaking to the rear and illy prepared to repel an attack ; so every preparation was made to recross the river that night. In the mean time the heavy rain in the mountains had so swollen the Rappahannock that the bridges were greatly endangered and, but for the good judgment of Gen. H. J. Hunt, chief of artillery, it is probable that all three would have broken from their moorings and left Hooker's army on the south bank. But there was no immediate danger, even if his bridges had been swept away, for Lee made no great haste to press Hooker. It is true he made every preparation to strike him if an opportunity presented itself. After Sedgwick crossed to the Stafford side of the Rappahannock at Banks' Ford, and Gibbon had retraced his steps over the bridge at the Lacy House, opposite Fredericksburg, Barksdale was placed in command of Marye's Heights, and Early was directed to take a position opposite

Banks' Ford; while Lee returned to Hooker's front at Chancellorsville, with McLaws and Anderson forming his right wing as before, and Stuart's corps was moved to the left, and the whole line strengthened.

On the morning of the 5th the fog was so dense that it was impossible for Lee to make a good reconnoissance of Hooker's position, as his line mainly occupied a dense wooded front, and the heavy clouds retained the fog until late in the day.

No attack was made that day, and at seven o'clock in the evening the artillery began to cross. When darkness came on the army was crowded around United States Ford, in a drenching rain, with the river rising at the rate of a foot an hour. Soon the bridges were entirely submerged and a delay occurred before the bridges could be repaired enough for the artillery to resume crossing. Meade, who had favored attacking the enemy in the council of war, and who had been charged with covering the rear, attempted to get the order countermanded when the bridges were submerged, and have the corps return to their position and be ready to meet Lee in the morning. But no communication could be had with Hooker, as his headquarters were on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and the attempted signals of Meade failed to be understood at Hooker's headquarters—at least they were not responded to.

When the morning dawn of the 6th came the Army of the Potomac had nearly passed over the river, with the Fifth Corps bringing up the rear, and marched over with Sykes' Regulars, the last division to cross.

The Confederate skirmishers soon appeared on the opposite bank and made but little resistance to the taking up of the bridges by the Engineer Brigade, and at four o'clock in the afternoon they were removed.

The storm still raged with unabated fury, and Lee seeing no chance farther to harass Hooker, marched his army back to Fredericksburg with the prestige of another battle in his favor.

Hooker retired more through the injury his brain had received by the blow at Chancellorsville than otherwise. On all previous battlefields he was like a raging lion, all the time leading and cheering his men; at Chancellorsville his courage failed him and he did not fight half of his army. Both armies reached their old quarters on the 7th and took some greatly needed rest.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 7, 1863.

The President and General-in-chief have just returned from the Army of the Potomac. The principal operation of General Hooker failed, but there has been no serious disaster to the organization and efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its position on the Rappahannock, having recrossed the river without loss in the movement. Not more than one-third of General Hooker's force was engaged. General Stoneman's operations have been a brilliant success. A part of his force advanced to within two miles of Richmond, and the enemy's communications have been cut in every direction. The Army of the Potomac will speedily resume offensive operations.

EDWIN STANTON, Secretary of War.*

Major General BURNSIDE, Cincinnati, Ohio.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 7, 1863.

MY DEAR SIR:—The recent movement of your army is ended without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? If possible, I would be glad of another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the enemy's communications being broken; but neither for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done in desperation or rashness. An early movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you in your mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army.

Yours, as ever, A. LINCOLN.

To Major General HOOKER.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863.

I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, and in answer have to state that I do not deem it expedient to

* This letter was sent to Generals Grant, Rosecrans, Dix, Pope, and Curtis, and the Governors of the loyal States.

suspend operations on this line from the reverse we have experienced in endeavoring to extricate the army from its present position. If in the first effort we failed, it was not for want of strength or conduct of the small number of the troops actually engaged, but from a cause which could not be foreseen, and could not be provided against. After its occurrence, the chances of success were so much lessened that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that we were engaged in, which would be more certain in its results. At all events a failure would not involve a disaster, while in the other case it was certain to follow the chance of success. I may add that this consideration almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, I can only decide after an opportunity has been afforded to learn the feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for it is no fault of theirs (if I except one corps) that our last efforts were not crowned with glorious victory, I suppose details are not wanting of me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one made. It has this to recommend it, it will be one in which the operations of all the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within my personal supervision. Very respectfully, &c., JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major General Commanding.

His Excellency the President of the United States.

Thus ended one of the great struggles in the late war. The reports are quoted from quite freely to aid the reader in the future to form his own conclusion, for there are many reasons alleged why Hooker lost the battle. The prevailing opinion seems to be that with a quick move he would have had Lee in his grasp. There are many criminations and recriminations as to a lack of support. So it seems but fair, in a history where candor should reign supreme, that official papers made then should, to a great extent, decide the question at issue.

There is no doubt but that Lee was a thorough military student, for he fought Grant in a similar manner only a few miles away in the Wilderness, the next year. Chancellorsville no doubt aided him in making the fight of the Wilderness.

Gen. H. J. Hunt was not satisfied with the manage-

ment of the battle, and more than once said so to me. He said: "Hooker would not listen to my suggestions. I did not want Hazel Grove evacuated, which gave J. E. B. Stuart an opportunity to place some thirty pieces there, which made the angle near Fairview untenable." General Hunt said much more which I took down at the time, which is not given to the public. Hooker's telegram to the President that he had only fought three corps, states the whole matter. If at any time he had given the command to the whole army to "forward," Lee's army would have been not only defeated, but routed from the field. Especially was that so on Sunday morning, when Reynolds with the First Corps, and Meade with the Fifth Corps, lay on Stuart's left flank with some thirty thousand men, and were never ordered to fire a gun. Reynolds was within a half mile of Stuart's left flank, and could have rolled him up on Hazel Grove any minute, where Sickles should have been held; then an Austerlitz would have been in store for Lee's army.

The history of this noted battle is concluded by General Heth, who commanded a division in Stonewall Jackson's corps at Chancellorsville, who made the following statement to me in relation to that battle, and what should have been the result of it. He said:

My reasons for thinking so are these: General Lee, Longstreet's corps being absent, when in front of Hooker, had between 40,000 and 45,000 men in his command. He found that the position occupied by General Hooker was too strong to attack in front. This induced him to detach Jackson with from 20,000 to 25,000 men to make an attack on what may be termed Hooker's right. Hooker had sent his cavalry, under Stoneman, to break up the railroads leading into Richmond and destroy the James River and Kanawha Canal. General Howard's (Eleventh) corps occupied a very strong position on Hooker's right. Now it is hardly possible that General Lee could have expected that Jackson's attack on Hooker's right—Howard's corps—would be an utter and entire surprise. Nevertheless this was so. None of the roads leading to the points where Jackson formed three lines of battle, the first line being within 500 or 600 yards of Howard's position, were found to be picketed. Jackson's

force ran over long lines of muskets, stacked, Howard's people being engaged in butchering beeves and in thus procuring their evening meal. Had these roads been picketed Howard would have been apprised of Jackson's approach, and would have been prepared to receive his attack in a position naturally very strong. He could with his corps certainly have held Jackson in check until he could have been reënforced by as many men as Jackson had under his command, for I have understood that there were 40,000 men in Hooker's army present at Chancellorsville who never fired a shot, or who, from the configuration of the ground, could do but little fighting. It has always been my opinion that with the superior numbers of Hooker that Jackson could have been crushed; and the forces under General Lee should have met the same fate after Jackson was destroyed, as Hooker's army lay between these two forces, and which could or should have virtually ended the war.

List of casualties of Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker commanding, at the battle of Chancellorsville, Va., May 1-3, 1863 (including skirmishes along the lines May 4-6, 1863):

FIRST ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

First Brigade—COL. Walter Phelps, Jr.

General Headquarters Staff	1
24th New York, Col. Samuel R. Beardsley	1
30th New York, Col. Wm. M. Searing	1
Total First Brigade	3

Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler.

76th New York, Col. William P. Wainwright	2
95th New York, Col. George H. Biddle	2
Total Second Brigade	4

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul.

29th New Jersey, Col. William R. Taylor	5
30th New Jersey, Col. John J. Cladek	5
Total Third Brigade	10

Artillery—Capt. John A. Reynolds.

4th U. S., Battery B, Lieut. James Stewart	2
Total First Division	19

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

397

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson.

First Brigade—Col. Adrian R. Root.

94th New York, Capt. Samuel A. Moffett	1
104th New York, Col. Gilbert G. Prey	3
Total First Brigade	4

Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter.

5th Massachusetts, Col. James L. Bates	7
Total Second Brigade	7

Third Brigade—Col. Samuel H. Leonard.

13th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. N. W. Batchelder	6
83d New York (9th Militia) Lieut. Col. J. A. Moesh	4
88th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Louis Wagner	2
Total Third Brigade	12

Artillery—Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom.

Maine Light, 5th Battery E, Capt. Geo. F. Leppein	28
Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Capt. James Thompson	4
Total Artillery	32
Total Second Division	55

THIRD DIVISION—Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Rowley.

121st Pennsylvania, Col. Chapman Biddle	3
135th Pennsylvania, Col. James R. Porter	29
151st Pennsylvania, Col. Harrison Allen	16
Total First Brigade	48

Second Brigade—Col. Roy Stone.

143d Pennsylvania, Col. E. L. Dana	1
149th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Walton Dwight	1
150th Pennsylvania, Col. Langhorn Wistar	1
Total Second Brigade	3

Artillery—Maj. Ezra W. Matthews.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery G, Capt. F. P. Amsden	11
Total Third Division	62
Total First Army Corps	135

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

SECOND ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.

Staff	1
Escort, Companies D and K, 6th New York Cavalry	2
Total Staff and Escort	3

FIRST DIVISION—Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell.

Staff	1
5th New Hampshire, Col. Edward E. Cross	25
61st New York, Col. Nelson A. Miles	27
81st Pennsylvania, Col. H. Boyd McKeen	61
148th Pennsylvania, Col. James A. Beaver	164
Total First Brigade	278

Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thos. F. Meagher.

28th Massachusetts, Col. Richard Byrnes	16
63d New York, Lieut. Col. R. C. Bentley	6
69th New York, Capt. James E. McGee	10
88th New York, Col. Patrick Kelly	46
116th Pennsylvania (battalion) Maj. St. C. A. Mulholland . .	24
Total Second Brigade	102

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Samuel K. Zook.

52d New York, Col. Paul Frank	43
57th New York, Lieut. Col. Alfred B. Chapman	31
66th New York, Col. Orlando H. Morris	70
140th Pennsylvania, Col. Richard P. Roberts	44
Total Third Brigade	188

Fourth Brigade—Col. John R. Brooke.

27th Connecticut, Col. R. S. Bostwick	291
2d Delaware, Lieut. Col. David. L. Stricker	61
64th New York, Col. Daniel G. Bingham	44
53d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. R. McMichael	11
145th Pennsylvania, Col. Hiram L. Brown	122
Total Fourth Brigade	529

Artillery—Capt. Rufus D. Pettit.

1st New York Light, Battery B, Capt. R. D. Pettit	12
4th United States, Battery C, Lieut. Evan Thomas	15
Total Artillery	27

Total First Division 1124

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

399

THIRD DIVISION—Maj. Gen. William H. French.

First Brigade—Col. Samuel C. Carroll.

14th Indiana, Col. John Coons	64
24th New Jersey, Col. Wm. B. Robertson	36
28th New Jersey, Lieut. Col. John A. Wildrick	59
4th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Leonard W. Carpenter	73
8th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer	12
7th West Virginia, Col. Joseph Snider	24
Total First Brigade	268

Second Brigade { Brig. Gen. William Hays.
Col. Charles J. Powers.

Staff	4
14th Connecticut, Maj. Theodore G. Ellis	56
12th New Jersey, Col. J. Howard Willets	178
Maj. John T. Hill	
108th New York, Col. Charles J. Powers	52
Lieut. Col. Francis E. Pierce	
130th Pennsylvania, Col. Levi Maish	29
Maj. Joseph S. Jenkins	
Total Second Brigade	319

Third Brigade { Col. John D. MacGregor.
Col. Charles Albright.

1st Delaware, Col. Thomas A. Smith	55
132d Pennsylvania, Col. Charles Albright	44
Lieut. Col. Jos. E. Shreve	
Total Third Brigade	99
Total Third Division	686

Reserve Artillery.

1st United States, Battery I, Lieut. Edmund Kirby	2
Total Second Army Corps	1,815

THIRD ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles.

Staff	1
-----------------	---

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. David B. Birney.

Staff	2
-----------------	---

First Brigade { Brig. Gen. Chas. K. Graham.
Col. Thomas W. Egan.

57th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter Sides	71
---	----

63d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Wm. S. Kirkwood	}	118
Capt. James F. Ryan		
68th Pennsylvania, Col. Andrew H. Tippin		75
105th Pennsylvania, Col. Amor A. McKnight	}	76
Lieut. Col. Calvin A. Craig		
114th Pennsylvania, Col. Chas. H. T. Collis	}	181
Lieut. Col. Frederick F. Cavada		
141st Pennsylvania, Col. Henry J. Madill		235
Total First Brigade		756

Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward.

20th Indiana, Col. John Wheeler	24
3d Maine, Col. Moses B. Lakeman	28
4th Maine, Col. Elijah Walker	28
38th New York, Col. P. Regis de Trobriand	37
40th New York, Col. Thomas W. Egan	70
99th Pennsylvania, Col. Asher S. Leidy	26
<hr/>	
Total Second Brigade	248

Third Brigade—Col. Samuel B. Hayman.

17th Maine, Lieut. Col. Charles B. Merrill	}	113
Col. Thomas A. Roberts		
3d Michigan, Col. Byron R. Pierce	}	73
Lieut. Col. Edwin S. Pierce		
5th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Edward T. Sherlock	}	78
Maj. John Pulford		
1st New York, Lieut. Col. Francis L. Leland		80
37th New York, Lieut. Col. Gilbert Riordan		222
Total Third Brigade		566

Artillery—Capt. A. Judson Clark.

New Jersey Light, Battery B, Lieut. Robert Sims	10
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E, Lieut. P. S. Jastram	17
3d U. S., Batteries F and K, Lieut. J. G. Turnbull	8
<hr/>	
Total Artillery	35

Total First Division 1,607

SECOND DIVISION { Maj. Gen. Hiram G. Berry (killed).
 { Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr.

Staff 1

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

401

First Brigade { Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr. Col. William Blaisdell.

1st Massachusetts, Col. N. B. McLaughlen	95
11th Massachusetts, Col. William Blaisdell	} 76
Lieut. Col. Porter D. Tripp	
16th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Waldo Merriam	73
11th New Jersey, Col. Robert McAllister	169
26th Pennsylvania, Col. Benjamin C. Tilghman	} 91
Maj. Robert L. Bodine	
Total First Brigade	504

Second Brigade { Brig. Gen. Jos. W. Revere. Col. J. Egbert Farnum.

Staff	1
70th New York, Lieut. Col. Thomas Holt	32
71st New York, Col. Henry L. Potter	39
72d New York, Col. William O. Stevens	} 101
Maj. John Leonard	
73d New York, Maj. Michael W. Burns	38
74th New York, Lieut. Col. William H. Lounsbury	} 40
Capt. Henry M. Alles	
Capt. Francis E. Tyler	
120th New York, Lieut. Col. Cornelius D. Westbrook	66
Total Second Brigade	317

Third Brigade { Brig. Gen. G. Mott (wounded). Col. William J. Sewell.

Staff	2
5th New Jersey, Maj. Ashbel W. Angel	} 121
Capt. Virgil M. Healy	
6th New Jersey, Col. Geo. C. Burling	} 67
Lieut. Col. S. R. Gilkyson	
7th New Jersey, Col. Louis R. Francine	} 47
Lieut. Col. Francis Price	
8th New Jersey, Col. John Ramsey	} 125
Capt. J. G. Langston	
2d New York, Col. Sidney W. Park	} 54
Lieut. Col. William A. Olmstead	
115th Pennsylvania, Col. Francis A. Lancaster	} 111
Maj. John P. Dunne	
Total Third Brigade	527

Artillery—Capt. Thos. W. Osborn.

1st New York Light, Battery D, Lieut. Geo. W. Winslow . .	14
1st U. S., Battery H, Lieut. Justin E. Dimick	} 21
Lieut. James A. Sanderson	
4th U. S., Battery K, Lieut. Francis W. Seeley	45
Total Artillery	80
Total Second Division	1,429

THIRD DIVISION { Maj. Gen. A. W. Whipple (mortally wounded).
 Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham.

Staff 1

First Brigade—Col. Emlen Franklin.

86th New York, Lieut. Col. Barna J. Chapin	} 77
Capt. Jacob H. Lansing	
124th New York, Col. A. Van Horne Ellis	204
122d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Edward McGovern	102
Total First Brigade	383

Second Brigade—Col. Samuel M. Bowman.

12th New Hampshire, Col. Joseph H. Potter	317
84th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Milton Opp	215
110th Pennsylvania, Col. James Crowther	} 45
Maj. David M. Jones	
Total Second Brigade	577

Third Brigade—Col. Hiram Berdan.

1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Lieut. Col. Casper Trepp	68
2d U. S. Sharpshooters, Maj. Homer R. Stoughton	16
Total Third Brigade	84

Artillery { Capt. Albert A. Von Puttkammer.
 Capt. James F. Huntington.

New York Light, 10th Battery, Lieut. Samuel Lewis	18
New York Light, 11th Battery, Lieut. John E. Burton . . .	11
1st Ohio Light, Battery H, Capt. J. F. Huntington	8
Total Artillery	37
Total Third Division	1,082
Total Third Army Corps	4,119

FIFTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. James Barnes.

2d Maine, Col. George Varney	3
18th Massachusetts, Col. Joseph Hayes	13
2d Company Mass. Sharpshooters, Lieut. R. Smith	1
1st Michigan, Col. Ira C. Abbott	15
13th New York, (battalion) Capt. Wm. Downey	5
25th New York, Col. Charles A. Johnson	3
118th Pennsylvania, Col. Charles M. Prevost	8
Total First Brigade	48

Second Brigade { Col. James McQuade.
Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.

9th Massachusetts, Col. Patrick R. Guiney	13
32d Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Luther Stevenson	11
4th Michigan, Col. Harrison H. Jeffords	20
14th New York, Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Davies	3
62d Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer	15
Lieut. Col. James C. Hull	
Total Second Brigade	62

Third Brigade—Col. Thos. B. W. Stockton.

Michigan Sharpshooters, Brady's company	1
16th Michigan, Lieut. Col. Norval E. Welch	6
17th New York, Lieut. Col. Nelson B. Bartram	5
44th New York, Col. James C. Rice	4
83d Pennsylvania, Col. Strong Vincent	4
Total Third Brigade	20

Artillery—Capt. Augustus P. Martin.

1st Rhode Island Light Battery C, Capt. R. Waterman	8
---	---

Total First Division 138

SECOND DIVISION—Maj. Gen. George Sykes.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

3d U. S., Companies B, C, F, G, I and K	9
4th U. S., Companies C, F, H and K	4
12th U. S., Companies A, B, C, D and G, 1st Battalion, and Companies A, C and D, 2d Battalion	23
14th U. S., Companies A, B, D, E, F, and G, 1st Battalion, and Companies F and G, 2d Battalion	15
Total First Brigade	51

Second Brigade—Col. Sidney Burbank.

2d U. S., Companies B, C, F, I and K	28
6th U. S., Companies D, F, G, H and I	28
7th U. S., Companies A, B, E and I	16
10th U. S., Companies D, G and H	12
11th U. S., Companies B, C, D, E, F and G, 1st Battalion, and Companies C and D, 2d Battalion	28
17th U. S., Companies A, C, D, G, and H, 1st Battalion, and Companies A and B, 2d Battalion	35
Total Second Brigade	147

Third Brigade—Col. Patrick H. O'Rorke.

140th New York, Lieut. Col. Louis Ernst	21
146th New York, Col. Kenner Garrard	50
Total Third Brigade	71

Artillery—Capt. Stephen H. Weed.

1st Ohio Light Battery L, Capt. Frank C. Gibbs	11
5th U. S., Battery I, Lieut. M. F. Watson	5
Total Artillery	16
Total Second Division	285

THIRD DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Erastus P. Tyler.

91st Pennsylvania, Col. Edgar M. Gregory	} 76
Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Sinex	
126th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. D. W. Rowe	77
129th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob G. Frick	42
134th Pennsylvania, Col. Edward O'Brien	45
Total First Brigade	240

Second Brigade—Col. Peter H. Allabach.

123d Pennsylvania, Col. John B. Clark	8
131st Pennsylvania, Maj. Robert W. Patton	4
133d Pennsylvania, Col. Frank B. Speakman	11
155th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Jno. H. Cain	14
Total Second Brigade	37
Total Third Division	277

Total Fifth Army Corps 700

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

405

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard.

FIRST DIVISION { Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, Jr. (wounded).
 { Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean.

Staff 1

First Brigade—Col. Leopold Von Gilsa.

41st New York, Maj. Detleo von Einsiedel	61
45th New York, Col. Geo. von Amsberg	76
54th New York, Lieut. Col. Charles Ashby	42
Maj. Stephen Kovacs	
153d Pennsylvania, Col. Charles Glanz	85
Lieut. Col. J. Dachrodt	
Total First Brigade	264

Second Brigade { Brig. Gen. N. C. McLean. { Col. John C. Lee.

Staff	3
17th Connecticut, Col. Wm. H. Noble	111
Maj. Allen G. Brady	
25th Ohio, Col. William P. Richardson	152
Maj. Jeremiah Williams	
55th Ohio, Col. John C. Lee	153
Lieut. Col. Charles B. Gambee	
75th Ohio, Col. Robert Reily	140
Capt. Benj. Morgan	
107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim Meyer	133
Lieut. Col. Charles Mueller	
Total Second Brigade	692

Artillery—Capt. Michael Wiedrich.

1st New York Light, Battery I	13
Total Second Division	519

THIRD DIVISION—Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.

Staff 1

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Alex. Schimmelfennig.

82d Illinois, Col. Frederick Hecker	155
Maj. F. H. Rolshausen	
Capt. Jacob Lasalle	
68th New York, Col. Gotthilf Bourry	54
157th New York, Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr.	98
61st Ohio, Col. Stephen J. McGroarty	60
74th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Adolph von Hartung	52
Total First Brigade	419

Second Brigade—Col. W. Krzyzanowski.

58th New York, Capt. Frederick Braun	}	31
Capt. Emil Koenig		
119th New York, Col. Elias Peissner	}	120
Lieut. Col. John T. Lockman		
75th Pennsylvania, Col. Francis Mahler		59
26th Wisconsin, Col. Wm. H. Jacobs		198
Total Second Brigade		408

Unattached.

82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson	81
--	----

Artillery.

1st Ohio Light, Battery I, Capt. Hubert Dilger	11
Total Third Division	920

Reserve Artillery—Lieut. Col. Louis Schirmer.

1st Ohio Light, Battery K, Capt. Wm. L. DeBeck	3
Total Eleventh Army Corps	2,412

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum.

Provost Guard.

10th Maine (battalion) Capt. John D. Beardsley	3
--	---

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.

Staff	1
-----------------	---

First Brigade—Brig. Gen. Jos. F. Knipe.

5th Connecticut, Col. Warren W. Packer	}	63
Lieut. Col. James A. Betts		
Maj. David F. Lane		
28th New York, Lieut. Col. Elliott W. Cook	}	78
Maj. Theophilus Fitzgerald		
46th Pennsylvania, Maj. Cyrus Strous	}	99
Capt. Edward L. Witman		
128th Pennsylvania, Col. James A. Mathews	}	212
Maj. Cephas W. Dyer		
Total First Brigade		452

Second Brigade—Col. Samuel Ross.

Staff	2
20th Connecticut, Lieut. Col. Wm. B. Wooster	} 169
Maj. Philo B. Buckingham	
3d Maryland, Lieut. Col. Gilbert P. Robinson	85

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

407

123d New York, Col. Arch. L. McDougall	148
145th New York, Col. E. Livingston Price	} 95
Capt. George W. Reid	
Total Second Brigade	499

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger.

Staff	1
27th Indiana, Col. Silas Colgrove	150
2d Massachusetts, Col. Samuel M. Quincy	138
13th New Jersey, Col. Ezra A. Carman	} 141
Maj. John Grimes	
Capt. George A. Beardsley	
107th New York, Col. Alex. S. Diven	83
3d Wisconsin, Col. William Hawley	101
Total Third Brigade	614

Artillery—Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh.

Staff	1
1st New York Light, Battery K, Lieut. E. L. Bailey	7
1st New York Light, Battery M, Lieut. Charles E. Winegar	} 22
Lieut. J. D. Woodbury	
4th U. S., Battery F, Lieut. Franklin B. Crosby	} 16
Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg	
Total Artillery	46

Total First Division 1612

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. John W. Geary.

First Brigade—Col. Charles Candy.

5th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Robert L. Kilpatrick	} 82
Maj. Henry E. Symmes	
7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton	99
29th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Thomas Clark	72
66th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell	73
28th Pennsylvania, Maj. Lansford F. Chapman	} 101
Capt. Conrad U. Meyer	
147th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Ario Pardee, Jr.	94
Total First Brigade	521

Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Kane.

Staff	1
29th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Wm. Rickards, Jr.	21
109th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry J. Stainrook	} 22
Capt. John Young, Jr.	

111th Pennsylvania, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.	26
124th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Simon Litzenberg	20
125th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob Higgins	49

Total Second Brigade 139

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Geo. S. Greene.

Staff	1
60th New York, Lieut. Col. Jno. C. O. Redington	66
78th New York, Maj. Henry R. Stagg	131
Capt. William H. Randall	
102d New York, Col. James C. Lane	90
137th New York, Col. David Ireland	54
149th New York, Maj. Abel G. Cook	186
Capt. Oliver T. May	
Lieut. Col. Koert S. VanVoorhis	

Total Third Brigade 528

Artillery—Capt. Joseph M. Knap.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Lieut. C. A. Atwell	9
Lieut. James D. McGill	
Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. R. B. Hampton	9
Lieut. James P. Fleming	

Total Artillery 18

Total Second Division 1,206

Total Twelfth Army Corps 2,822

CAVALRY, FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton.

Second Brigade—Col. Thomas C. Devin.

6th New York, Lieut. Col. Duncan McVicar	19
Capt. William E. Beardsley	
17th Pennsylvania, Col. Josiah H. Kellogg	14
8th Pennsylvania, Maj. Pennock Huey	102
New York Light Artillery, 6th Battery, Lieut. Joseph W. Martin	6

Total Second Brigade 141

RECAPITULATION.

General Headquarters	1
First Army Corps	135
Second Army Corps	1,815
Third Army Corps	4,119
Fifth Army Corps	700

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

409

Eleventh Army Corps	2,412
Twelfth Army Corps	2,822
Cavalry	141
Grand Total	12,145

Return of casualties at Fredericksburg (or Marye's Heights), and Salem Heights (or Salem Church), and near Banks' Ford, Va., May 3-4, 1863.

SECOND ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch.

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.

First Brigade { Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully,
Col. Henry W. Hudson,
Col. Byron Laffin.

15th Massachusetts, Maj. George C. Joslin	2
1st Minnesota, Lieut. Col. William Colville, Jr	9
34th New York, Col. Byron Laffin	3
Lieut. Col. John Beverly	
82d New York, (2d Militia) Col. H. W. Hudson	6
Lieut. Col. James Huston	
Total First Brigade	20

Third Brigade—Col. Norman J. Hall.

19th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Arthur F. Devereux	9
20th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Geo. N. Macy	17
7th Michigan, Capt. Amos E. Steele, Jr	7
42d New York, Col. James E. Mallon	9
59th New York, Lieut. Col. Max A. Thoman	15
127th Pennsylvania, Col. William W. Jennings	10
Total Third Brigade	67

Artillery.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Capt. Geo. W. Adams	23
Total Second Division	110

SIXTH ARMY CORPS—Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick.

Staff	2
-----------------	---

FIRST DIVISION—Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks.

Staff	1
-----------------	---

Provost Guard.

4th New Jersey, Co.'s A, C, and H, Capt. Chas. Ewing . . . 1

First Brigade { Col. Henry W. Brown, (wounded)
Col. William H. Penrose,
Col. Samuel L. Buck, (wounded)
Col. William H. Penrose.

1st New Jersey, Col. Mark W. Collett	}	105
Lieut. Col. William Henry, Jr		
2d New Jersey, Col. Saml. L. Buck	}	49
Lieut. Col. Charles Wiebecke		
3d New Jersey, Maj. J. W. H. Stickney		95
15th New Jersey, Col. William H. Penrose	}	154
Lieut. Col. Ed. L. Campbell		
23d New Jersey, Col. E. Burd Grubb		108
Total First Brigade		511

Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Jos. J. Bartlett.

5th Maine, Col. Clark S. Edwards	96
16th New York, Col. Joel J. Seaver	142
27th New York, Col. Alex. D. Adams	19
121st New York, Col. Emery Upton	276
96th Pennsylvania, Maj. Wm. H. Lessig	79
Total Second Brigade	612

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. David A. Russell.

18th New York, Col. George R. Myers	34	
32d New York, Col. Francis E. Pinto	43	
49th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Thos H. Hulings	6	
95th Pennsylvania, Col. Gustavus W. Town	}	153
Lieut. Col. Elisha Hall		
Capt. Theodore H. McCalla		
119th Pennsylvania, Col. Peter C. Ellmaker	122	
Total Third Brigade	358	

Artillery—Maj. John A. Tompkins.

Massachusetts Light, Battery A, Capt. W. H. McCartney . . .	2
New Jersey Light, Battery A, Lieut. A. N. Parsons	1
Maryland Light, Battery A, Capt. Jas. H. Rigby	3
2d U. S., Battery D, Lieut. E. B. Williston	1
Total Artillery	7
Total First Division	1,490

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

411

SECOND DIVISION—Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe.

Second Brigade—Col. Lewis A. Grant.

26th New Jersey, Col. A. J. Morrison	}	124
Lieut. Col. Ed. Martindale		
2d Vermont, Col. James H. Walbridge		132
3d Vermont, Col. Thomas O. Seaver	}	25
Lieut. Col. Samuel E. Pingree		
4th Vermont, Col. Charles B. Stoughton		53
5th Vermont, Lieut. Col. John R. Lewis		23
6th Vermont, Col. Elisha L. Barney		74
<hr/>		
Total Second Brigade		431

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Thos. H. Neill.

7th Maine, Lieut. Col. Selden Connor		92
21st New Jersey, Col. Gilliam Van Houten	}	211
Lieut. Col. Isaac S. Mettler		
20th New York, Col. Ernst von Vegesack		208
33d New York, Col. Robert F. Taylor		221
49th New York, Col. Daniel B. Bidwell		35
77th New York, Lieut. Col. Winsor B. French		83
<hr/>		
Total Third Brigade		850

Artillery—Maj. J. Watts De Peyster.

5th U. S., Battery F, Lieut. Leonard Martin		9
<hr/>		
Total Second Division		1,290

THIRD DIVISION—Maj. Gen. John Newton.

First Brigade—Col. Alex. Shaler.

65th New York, Lieut. Col. Joseph F. Hamblin		17
67th New York, Col. Nelson Cross		29
122d New York, Col. Silas Titus		7
23d Pennsylvania, Col. John Ely		61
82d Pennsylvania, Maj. Isaac C. Bassett		46
<hr/>		
Total First Brigade		160

Second Brigade { Col. Wm. H. Browne, (wounded). Col. Henry L. Eustis.

7th Massachusetts, Col. Thomas D. Johns	}	150
Lieut. Col. Franklin P. Harlow		
10th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Jos. B. Parsons		69
37th Massachusetts, Col. Oliver Edwards		16
36th New York, Lieut. Col. James J. Walsh		26
2d Rhode Island, Col. Horatio Rogers, jr.		81
<hr/>		
Total Second Brigade		342

Third Brigade—Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton.

62d New York, Lieut. Col. Theo. B. Hamilton	120
93d Pennsylvania, Capt. John S. Long	79
98th Pennsylvania, Col. John F. Ballier	} 41
Lieut. Col. Geo. Wyncoop	
102d Pennsylvania, Col. Joseph M. Kinkead	169
139th Pennsylvania, Col. Frederick H. Collier	76
Total Third Brigade	485

Artillery—Capt. Jer. McCarthy.

1st Pennsylvania, Light Batteries C, and D, Capt. J. McCarthy	9
2d United States, Battery G, Lieut. John H. Butler	14
Total Artillery	23
Total Third Division	1,010

LIGHT DIVISION—Col. Hiram Burnham.

6th Maine, Lieut. Col. Benjamin F. Harris	169
31st New York, Col. Frank Jones	143
43d New York, Col. Benjamin F. Baker	204
61st Pennsylvania, Col. Geo. C. Spear	} 88
Maj. George W. Dawson	
5th Wisconsin, Col. Thomas S. Allen	193
New York Light, 3d Battery, Lieut. W. A. Harn	1
Total Light Division	798
Total Sixth Army Corps	4,590

RECAPITULATION.

Second Division, Second Army Corps	110
Sixth Army Corps	4,590
Total Fredericksburg	4,700
Total Chancellorsville	12,145
Grand total Hooker's and Sedgwick's losses	16,845

Report of Surgeon L. L. Guild, Confederate States Army, medical director, of Confederate casualties at the battle of Chancellorsville and Marye's Heights, and Salem Heights, (Fredericksburg) May 4-6, 1863, as modified and corrected by reports of officers commanding Confederate forces in Chancellorsville campaign :

FIRST CORPS.

McLAWS' DIVISION—Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

Wofford's Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. T. Wofford	562
Kershaw's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Jos. B. Kershaw	104
Barksdale's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wm. Barksdale	592
Semmes' Brigade, Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes	603
Cabell's Artillery Battalion	28
Total McLaws' Division	1,889

ANDERSON'S DIVISION—Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson.

Mahone's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wm. Mahone	217
Perry's Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. A. Perry	109
Wilcox's Brigade, Brig. Gen. C. M. Wilcox	535
Posey's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey	290
Wright's Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright	296
Total Anderson's Division	1,447
Alexander's Artillery, Col. E. P. Alexander	40
Lee's Cavalry Brigade, Stuart's Division	11

Total First Corps 3,387

SECOND CORPS.

Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. Brig. Gen. R. E. Rhodes.
Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.

A. P. HILL'S DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill. Brig. Gen. Henry Heth.	
Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender. Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer.	
General Headquarters Staff	4
General's Escort	4
Signal Corps	1
Heth's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry Heth	279
McGowan's Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. McGowan	455
Thomas' Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. L. Thomas	177
Lane's Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. H. Lane	739
Archer's Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer	365
Pender's Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. D. Pender	706
Total A. P. Hill's Division	2,730

D. H. HILL'S DIVISION.

Rodes' Brigade, Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes	816
Doles' Brigade, Brig. Gen. George Doles	437
Colquitt's Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. H. Colquitt	449

Iverson's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson	486
Ramseur's Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. D. Ramseur	788
Total D. H. Hill's Division	<u>2,976</u>

EARLY'S DIVISION—Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early.

Gordon's Brigade, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon	161
Smith's Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Smith	86
Hoke's Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert F. Hoke	230
Hays' Brigade, Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays	369
Total Early's Division	<u>846</u>

TRIMBLE'S DIVISION—Brig. Gen. R. E. Colston.

Staff and Pioneer Corps	6
Paxton's Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. F. Paxton	493
Jones' Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones	472
Colston's Brigade, Col. E. T. H. Warren	802
Nicholls' Brigade, Brig. Gen. F. T. Nicholls	463
Total Trimble's Division	<u>2,236</u>
Total Second Corps	<u>8,788</u>
Total First and Second Corps	<u>12,175</u>

CHAPTER XI.

FREDERICKSBURG TO FREDERICK.

AFTER the battle of Chancellorsville was fought, it was well known to both Hooker and Lee that hostilities would soon be resumed between the two armies; so both commanders began to prepare their campaigns.

Lee knew that if Hooker crossed the Rappahannock again, he would probably strike Gordonsville, with its supplies, and attempt to beat him (Lee) to Richmond, and again environ the capital of the Confederacy, or take some other route that might prove disastrous to the Confederate cause.

Lee also knew that Hooker had lost about a corps from his army by the expiration of their term of service, as Hooker had hastened the battle of Chancellorsville on that account. It seemed a most opportune time for Lee to again march North, and draw the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond. It might ruin Hooker's plan until autumn. It seemed to be Lee's idea to procrastinate the war as much as possible, in order to induce foreign intervention, and to strengthen the peace party in the North, which was the natural ally of the South.

Lee plainly states to Jefferson Davis the above-named reasons for again marching North. So, on the 3d of June, 1863, he directed Longstreet to move to Culpeper Court House. McLaws' division, then at Fredericksburg, was secretly marched away; while Hood, who was on the Rapidan, was also directed to move to Culpeper. Pickett's division joined with Longstreet there.

The next morning Rodes' division of Ewell's corps

received orders to follow. It was the intention of Lee to withdraw his army quietly before Hooker was aware of it. On the following day Early and Johnson's divisions of Ewell's corps followed, leaving A. P. Hill's corps to hold the heights of Fredericksburg. Hooker was aware that Lee was making some important movement, and so notified the authorities at Washington. On the 6th he threw Sedgwick across the Rappahannock at Hamilton's Crossing to feel the enemy. Lee, seeing the movement, sent orders to Ewell to halt until the real intentions of Hooker were developed. As Sedgwick did not attack in force, Lee saw that it was only for observation, gave orders to Ewell to continue his march, and left the next evening for Culpeper himself.

As soon as Hooker learned that Longstreet and Ewell had disappeared, leaving only Hill in his front, he suspected that Lee was marching North again; therefore he resolved to frustrate his designs by crossing over and crushing Hill with his army, and compel Lee to fall back. But Halleck again interfered, and directed Hooker to not attack Hill. Thus was lost another golden opportunity to seriously cripple Lee, whose army of three corps stretched from Fredericksburg to the headwaters of the Shenandoah—100 miles—with Longstreet in the center at Culpeper.

Had Frederick the Great commanded the Army of the Potomac, Lee's army would have been defeated in detail, and the fragments scattered in the mountains in less than two weeks. Hooker was sensibly aware of the situation, and realized that it was his duty to cross his army over and surround Hill, as Ewell did Milroy a few days later. Halleck, seeing the determination of Hooker to attack Hill, reported the matter to the President, urging him to direct Hooker to move between Lee's forces and Washington. So Lincoln wrote one of his laconic letters to Hooker. He said :

If Lee should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, he would fight you in intrenchments, and have

you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would, in some way, be getting an advantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, *like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other.*

There is scarcely a doubt but that Lincoln, if he had been in the field, would have been a great general. That he was sensitive of the safety of Washington is a fact beyond dispute; for if it had fallen into the hands of the enemy even for a short time, there was great danger of foreign recognition of the Confederacy; yet there were enough troops in and around Washington to have saved it from any such terrible fate.

If Hooker had crossed his whole army over the Rappahannock, and surrounded Hill's corps, it could not have held out forty-eight hours. The rear of the heights was not intrenched, so an assault from that direction could easily have been made. Hooker could have crossed half of his army at Skinker's Neck, and then marched up the Telegraph road from Richmond, cut Hill off from retreating in that direction, until he arrived near Hamilton's Crossing, then by making a detour to the left his force would have been directly in the rear of Hill's position while the other half of his army could have ascended the left bank of the Rappahannock until it reached United States Ford, and there crossing and taking possession of the road to Culpeper Court House, moving eastwardly, and uniting with the other wing of his army, hold Hill in his position until he could crush him with his combined force before Longstreet could have returned to his relief. If any number of Hill's troops had cut their way out through Hooker's lines, Pleasonton's three divisions of cavalry could have overtaken them with ease. Besides, our cavalry, by crossing first at United States Ford, could have prevented any information being sent to Culpeper, by taking possession of Spottsylvania Court House and Todd's Tavern, at the

junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. But Halleck, whose military genius was only successful in opposing his own generals in the field, thought he knew the true situation, and was able to compel Hooker to take up his march in the direction of Washington, leaving Hill to follow Longstreet at his pleasure.

It is insinuated that Hooker's conversation with some of his officers was secretly sent to Washington. It is claimed that Hooker said: "If he (Lee) wants to exchange queen for queen, then all right." That is, Richmond for Washington. If Hooker had crushed Hill and then marched on Richmond, it would have been evacuated before he appeared before it, for Keyes was on the Peninsula with about 15,000 troops and would have coöperated with him.

But Davis could have chosen another city for his capital, and perhaps it would have made little difference to his government. Lee, on the other hand, if he had appeared before Washington, with the corps of Ewell and Longstreet, would not have outnumbered the troops inside of the fortifications, including Schenck's force drawn from Baltimore and Harper's Ferry. Then Hooker could have arrived in Washington with a part of his forces, by steamer up the bay, almost as soon as Lee could have reached there and so have been ready to deal him a heavy blow. Thus it is alleged that Hooker soliloquized over the situation, which was written to Washington and greatly alarmed Halleck, and the fiat went forth for Hooker to march between Lee and Washington.

The Comte de Paris in his work says on that point: "All that we propose to demonstrate at present is that Hooker's idea was correct and suggestive. He did not succeed in convincing either the President or General Halleck.

"He was told in reply not to mind Richmond, but to attend to Lee's army, and to pursue or attack the latter on the march or in its encampment; as if the movement against Hill was not the best way to strike at the weak

point of this army and to thwart all the projects of its chief?"

Lee had not, as yet, developed his plans sufficiently for either Hooker or the authorities at Washington to understand them. Was he aiming to take the route of 1862, and make the field of Bull Run famous for a third battle there? Twice had the Confederates scored a victory on that ground, and it would seem more likely for Lee to do that than for him to take the Shenandoah Valley route for the North, where he had suffered one defeat (South Mountain), fought a drawn battle at Antietam, and came so near having his army ruined and routed. It was Hooker's duty to learn what were the intentions of the Confederate commander, so he directed Pleasonton to proceed to the upper Rappahannock with his whole cavalry force and three brigades of infantry, there cross it, and move in the direction of Culpeper until he struck the enemy.

On the 8th of June Stuart's cavalry, nearly 10,000 strong, was reviewed by Lee near Culpeper, and witnessed by Longstreet's whole corps. Stuart was a fine cavalry commander, and, like Marshal Murat, was excessively fond of show. On the review he was not contented to pass before his commanding general, as is the usual custom on such occasions, but he went through all the different movements of a real battle—making dashes on the enemy with his cavalry, while artillery was brought into action, and the roar of cannon sounded in the distance like the fury of the hostile armies at Waterloo or Austerlitz. As Pleasonton marched up the left bank of the Rappahannock, he could hear the mutterings of Stuart's cannon, which convinced him that a heavy force was near Brandy Station, distant four or five miles from Rappahannock Station.

Pleasonton decided to send Buford's division of cavalry and Ames' brigade of infantry up to Beverly Ford, two miles above Rappahannock Station, while the divisions of Gregg and Duffié, with Russell's brigade of infantry, the 7th Wisconsin, two companies of the 2d Wisconsin, and

the 56th Pennsylvania, the whole detail under command of Col. W. W. Robinson, of the 7th Wisconsin, were left at Kelley's Ford, lower down, with instructions for Duffié to bear to the left, and see if there was any Confederate force on the road from Fredericksburg to Culpeper.

Gregg was to move between Duffié and Buford, with his infantry on his right flank, extending in the direction of Buford's left. Russell's brigade of infantry moved on the immediate right of Gregg's cavalry, while Colonel Robinson's command marched up the river about a mile, and then, turning to the left, touched Russell's right, while Colonel Hofmann, commanding the 56th Pennsylvania, on the right of Robinson's command, received orders from Buford at different times during the day; recrossed the Rappahannock under his orders that evening, Gregg taking the direct road to Brandy Station, while Duffié, in bearing to the left, would strike the road from Ely's Ford to Stevensburg at Willis Madden's.

The column at Kelley's Ford was delayed in crossing by the failure of Colonel Duffié to arrive at the proper time, it being near nine a. m. when the head of his column was ready to cross. He had been ordered to rendezvous at Morrisville the night before. When Duffié began to move in the morning he took the wrong road. Col. John I. Gregg, commanding one of his brigades, knowing Duffié was making a mistake, informed him of the fact; he, however, took no notice of the information for some time, but continued his march. It was then impossible for him to arrive at Kelley's Ford to cross at the appointed time. When Duffié's division arrived, Gen. D. McM. Gregg, who commanded the division, asked Col. John I. Gregg, what caused the delay, when he was told that Colonel Duffié took the wrong road. It was supposed that Russell, by taking a short cut, would arrive in time with his infantry brigade to be of valuable service in the battle. The river was crossed at daybreak by Buford's force under cover of a heavy fog. Gregg and Duffié crossed Kelley's Ford without any opposi-

tion, but the movement was closely watched, and Captain White reported to Gen. B. H. Robertson, whose headquarters were on John Minor Botts' farm, that the enemy was crossing in heavy force. Robertson at once communicated the intelligence to General Stuart, who ordered him to advance in that direction and check the enemy, so as to protect the right flank of the forces engaged with Buford. Robertson advanced about two miles, when he met the enemy. He dismounted part of his command, and formed a skirmish line to feel the force in his front, when the fact was developed that he was facing Russell's brigade of infantry, while Duffié had taken the road by Willis Madden's to Stevensburg, and Gregg had passed his right flank with his division of cavalry, and was marching in the direction of Brandy Station; these facts were hastily forwarded to Stuart, who ordered him to fall rapidly back, as Gregg was gaining his rear.

Colonel Davis' brigade of Buford's division encountered the outposts of Jones at Beverly Ford, but they were easily driven back. Stuart was so elated over his grand review the day before, in the presence of General Lee, that he made no disposition of his troops for defense against a sudden attack from the Union forces, and he came very near losing four batteries of his mounted artillery in the charge of Davis; but for the fact that they were not observed by the Union cavalry, they would have all been captured, for the horses were picketed and the men on fatigue duty. A piece of woods shielded them from view as the Union cavalry pursued the Confederate pickets, thus pressing near the artillery.

As it was Stuart's intention to cross the Rappahannock on the 9th, Jones was ordered to Beverly Ford, while W. H. F. Lee was bivouacked near Wellsford, and Fitz-Hugh Lee's brigade, under Munford, was encamped for the night at Oak Shade, the old-fashioned church built of brick brought from England, on the left of Hazel River. Thus Stuart's cavalry lay closely along the right bank of the Rappahan-

nock on the morning of the 9th of June, when our cavalry on the left bank began crossing at daylight. It was a bold and unexpected move on the part of Pleasanton. For the first time our cavalry took the offensive, and charged well up to Lee's infantry; Gregg was only a short distance from Ewell's troops when he was at Brandy Station.

As Buford advanced against Jones, his right flank was endangered from W. H. F. Lee and Munford, who were higher up the river. Lee soon formed on the left of Jones, and attacked Buford's right flank with considerable success. Stuart's headquarters were at Fleetwood Hill, the old homestead of John S. Barbour, the father of Hon. J. S. Barbour, who was elected United States Senator from Virginia in 1889. Near him was the brigade of Hampton. The firing in the direction of the river brought Jones' troopers to the scene of action, where they formed the pickets on foot, contesting the advance of Davies' brigade. The 8th New York was severely attacked, and the combatants met in a hand-to-hand encounter with sabers and pistols. In that struggle the Union troops displayed great valor.

Stuart's force, in front of Buford, was greatly superior to that of Buford's, however. The latter was hotly engaging Stuart until Gregg could arrive at Brandy Station and attack the Confederates in the rear.

Pleasanton sent Hooker the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,

June 9, 1863—11 a. m. (Received 12:45 p. m.)

GENERAL:—All the enemy's forces are engaged with me. I am holding them until Gregg can come up. Gregg's guns are being heard in the enemy's rear.

A. PLEASANTON,

Brigadier General, Commanding.

To Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army of the Potomac.

General Gregg had gained the rear of Stuart's position, and was directly between him and Lee's army near Culpeper. He at once prepared to strike a hard blow at

Stuart. Accordingly he sent a courier to Duffié at Stevensburg to hasten up with his division from that point, as Gregg had already succeeded in swinging around and striking the road from Brandy Station to Stevensburg, that the force was light in that direction, and as Duffié was only sent to Stevensburg to learn that fact it was unnecessary for him to remain there. There were only two regiments of the enemy in that vicinity—the 4th Virginia, under Colonel Wickham, and the 2d South Carolina, under M. C. Butler, now a distinguished member of the United States Senate.

Butler's regiment was advantageously posted, with his right resting at Norman's mill-pond, on Mountain Run, which courses its way from beyond Culpeper, and flows into the Rappahannock below Kelley's Ford, after passing Jack Stone's mill. Quite a curious and interesting history is connected with the battle at that point. In early days a Miss Norman married Mr. Stanton, the father of Edwin M. Stanton, whose army, as Secretary of War, was then fighting where his mother in childhood days had played on the banks of that meandering and romantic stream.

A shell burst and killed Lieut. Col. Frank Hampton, brother of Wade Hampton, Captain Farley, volunteer aide-de-camp to General Stuart, and carried away the foot of Col. M. C. Butler. That was a severe blow to the regiment, but it held its ground as well as possible until overpowered, then retired in the direction of Culpeper.

Wickham's regiment faced John I. Gregg's brigade, but avoided an engagement. So in reality one regiment of the enemy detained Duffié's division there, while Gen. D. McM. Gregg was sending courier after courier to induce him to come to his (Gregg's) assistance at Brandy Station, where the two forces were engaged in a pitched battle of a most desperate character.

Gregg longed for Duffié to come in time to turn the tide of battle at Fleetwood Hill, which would drive Stuart on the forces of Buford, which were ready "to welcome them

to hospitable graves." Arriving at Brandy Station, Gen. D. McM. Gregg saw heavy columns of the enemy at the Barbour House. Stuart had ordered Jones and Hampton to retire from the front of Buford to meet the forces under Gregg that had turned his right flank and gained his rear. In addition to the commands of Jones and Hampton, Robertson's brigade had returned from the direction of Kelley's Ford, and Stuart was again able to present a strong front where danger most threatened him.

Gregg hesitated to attack without the assistance of Duffié's division, but there was no time to be lost; he must either charge with the troops at his command or retire, and as he had made such a successful circuit of Stuart's position, he felt compelled by his orders to attack at once and trust to Duffié's arrival in time to support and assist his forces engaged. He therefore ordered Percy Wyndham to charge. The enemy had a battery posted at the Barbour House. A section of artillery was hastily put in position and opened on it. At the same time Major Russell was directed to charge on the enemy's cavalry that was breaking away to the left.

As the battery at the Barbour House slackened its fire, the artillery of Wyndham was advanced; at the same time he ordered the 1st New Jersey to charge on the battery stationed in the rear of the Barbour House. The 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry and the balance of the 1st Maryland were thrown forward to support the charge of the 1st New Jersey.

The 1st Maryland, led by Lieutenant Colonel Deems, charged the enemy posted behind the buildings in the garden and orchard. The 1st Pennsylvania divided; one wing, under Colonel Taylor, struck the enemy in front, while the other wing, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gardner, dashed on the enemy's flank. This combined movement forced the enemy back on the plain below. Percy Wyndham led the 1st New Jersey, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Broderick. The enemy was driven from his

guns. Then a desperate struggle was made to retake them, but Wyndham's forces were again successful in repelling the attack.

Gregg seeing that Wyndham would soon be overpowered, ordered Kilpatrick forward on his right, who formed line of battle *en échelon* of regiments, directing a section of artillery on the right of the second regiment. Wyndham had just been forced from the hill. Kilpatrick directed Colonel Irvine, of the 10th New York, who was on the left of his brigade, to advance and retake the hill if possible. Kilpatrick's artillery then opened, and Colonel Davies with one battalion of the Harris Light was also ordered in, but Irvine and Davies were at once met by two heavy columns of the enemy, and seeing this Kilpatrick ordered Colonel Douty, of the 1st Maine, to sweep to the right and charge the enemy on the flank. It was a new regiment, seeking maiden honors, and the record it made there that day was equal to that of any lancers in history. In the mean time Kilpatrick ordered Irvine and Davies to withdraw and rally their commands to the support of the 1st Maine. Passing over the batteries and driving the gunners into a safe hiding place, the troops of that new but gallant regiment were forcing everything before them for more than a mile.

Of that charge Adjutant E. W. Whitaker, of the Harris Light, said, "It was one of the grandest I ever witnessed on any battlefield." The bits of the adjutant's bridle broke and his horse ran away and kept with the 1st Maine to the end of its charge, which gave him an opportunity of ascertaining the facts. The gunners of the Confederate batteries sprang to their places and began firing again with great rapidity, as if in revenge for being driven away. Their cavalry had collected and were ready to attack the brave Maine men. Receiving their orders to wheel and cut their way back, they gallantly began their ride, many of them to death, for they were suffering from a fire not only in front but from both flanks.

Just as the guns, heavily shotted, were ready to fire on the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Smith suddenly changed direction to the right, and the murderous fire passed harmlessly in their wake, and before they could be reloaded the regiment had cut its way out. General Gregg seeing that there was no hope of Duffié coming on the field in time to assist him, while trains from Culpeper had already arrived with infantry to assist Stuart, decided to retire.

Buford hearing the guns of Gregg, again attacked, hoping the combined assault would rout the Confederate cavalry, but a most stubborn resistance was made to his advance. Gen. W. H. F. Lee was severely wounded, which compelled him to leave the field. Pleasonton having accomplished all that Hooker desired, and feeling that he was unable to win a decisive victory because Duffié failed to support Gregg at Brandy Station at the proper time, gave the order to recross the Rappahannock.

Thus ended a fierce and desperate struggle between the two cavalry commanders, which was only a prelude to other engagements where heroism and dash were displayed with great skill on both sides. Stuart was now opposed by a cavalry commander whose prowess on the field met the Confederate general with equal ability, supported by such gallant officers as Buford, the Greggs, Kilpatrick, Percy, Wyndham, Davies and others. The Union cavalry was officered and ready to meet the Confederate horsemen on the field. Stuart was well supported by officers who were trained and daring. Robertson, Fitz Hugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Jones and Hampton were ever ready to follow his lead.

It was Stuart's purpose to shield the movements of Lee's infantry on its march North, so that Hooker would not be able to concentrate his army at any given point and pierce his columns while on the march. As it was Pleasonton's duty to learn the movements of the whole of Lee's army if possible, he was compelled to attack the cavalry, and get that out of the way to uncover what was going on behind the

mountains. For that reason we will soon be compelled to record the battles in the valley between the Bull Run and Blue Ridge Mountains, beginning at Aldie. Lee's comprehensive plan was to blind Hooker as to his real intentions, so he ordered General Imboden, with his brigade of cavalry, to go in the direction of Romney to cut the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, in order that the Army of the Potomac could not be reënforced from the Northwest.

Jenkins' brigade of cavalry preceded Ewell's corps, which began its march on the 10th of June, making forced marches so as to arrive at Winchester before the authorities at Washington would learn of the movement, and either reënforce Milroy or order him to evacuate, before he was attacked by an overwhelming force. Lee well knew that Hooker's cavalry was not sufficiently strong in numbers to make a circuit of the Confederate forces then lying at Culpeper, and from which point the advance into the valley was to be made immediately.

Ewell passed through Chester Gap in the Blue Ridge, and bivouacked on the night of the 12th at Front Royal. There he turned Rodes' division down the Shenandoah in the direction of Berryville, to capture the Union force stationed there as a sort of outpost to Winchester—it being near midway between the Shenandoah River and Winchester, and cut off Milroy's retreat to Harper's Ferry. The divisions of Early and Johnson marched direct upon Winchester until they arrived within a few miles of it. There Early bore to the left and attacked Milroy's force at Kernstown, which was another outpost in that direction.

It seems that the scouts and cavalry coming in failed to appreciate the actual strength of the approaching enemy, and led Milroy to believe there was no danger. It never once dawned on their minds that it was one-third of the Confederate army rapidly bearing down on a comparatively small command.

On the evening of the 13th Ewell arrived within three or four miles of Winchester, and began to prepare to cap-

ture the whole force there. Ewell directed Early to send Gordon's brigade square in front of the town to make a strong demonstration, as if that constituted the attacking party, while the brigades of Hays, Smith, and Hoke were to make a detour far enough away from the town not to be observed, and pass west of it until the woods leading to Romney and Pughtown were reached and held. Then Colonel Jones was ordered to run his artillery into position by hand. The movement was shielded by a piece of woods, and twelve guns were placed in an orchard, while eight were in a cornfield north of the woods. After the artillery had played about three-quarters of an hour on the outer works, Hays' brigade was directed to advance and carry them, which was quite easily accomplished. As the artillery did not begin firing until about an hour by sun, it was nearly dark when Hays carried the works to the northwest. That ended the battle for the day.

It was presumed by the Confederate generals that Milroy would evacuate the town during the night. Early held the roads to Romney and Pughtown, while Johnson was sent east of Winchester with his division. The latter was ordered to leave Jones to hold that position, while the brigades of Stewart, Nicholls, and Walker were directed to make a circuit and gain the Martinsburg road and form line of battle facing Winchester, so as to cut off any attempted retreat at night. Milroy, who was a brave soldier, had not been warned in time of the danger that then surrounded him, and resolved to cut his way out during the night (for it was impossible to do so by daylight) or sell his life as dearly as possible.

Then came one of the most desperate night struggles of the war. Milroy struck the Confederate forces with masterly skill and cut his way out with a part of his command. The remainder of his troops were taken prisoners.

Rodes appeared before Berryville, threw Jenkins' brigade of cavalry between that point and Winchester, and while he left one brigade in front he attempted to send the other

three brigades around to the north and capture the whole force, but Col. A. T. McReynolds, who was in command there, had left a few soldiers at that point to make a bold demonstration, while he had quietly retreated before the snare was laid for him. That swept the valley of the Union forces, and Ewell pressed on for Martinsburg with unprecedented zeal.

The ease with which Lee concealed the movements of one-third of his army until it appeared before Winchester, and was ready within a few hours to surround and capture it, is proof positive that it was highly essential that a division of cavalry be stationed at Front Royal to impede the progress of a heavy force of the enemy suddenly issuing through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and descending on the forces stationed in the valley at Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harper's Ferry.

In fact, the plan of General Rosecrans, which he made to the Secretary of War when he was directed to conduct Blenker's division to General Frémont, and on his return to report anything he might see that would benefit the service, was the better plan by far. In looking the matter over, it was his opinion that all commands in that section ought to be consolidated into one and thrown forward to Gordonsville, or some point in that vicinity, to protect the Shenandoah Valley and also constitute the right wing of the Army of the Potomac in its advance. This was a proposition of great military sagacity, and would have prevented several disastrous campaigns to our arms in the valley.

No infantry force stationed in the Shenandoah could protect itself from surprise except with the aid of a strong division of cavalry under the command of a general like Buford or Sheridan; as General Heth said, "The cavalry of any army is its eyes and ears."

When Milroy was attacked he fought with an iron will, but his pickets were too feeble in strength to pierce the movements of the advance to test its force. The reports to

him were that it was the advance of the force which had been in his front.

After the cavalry fight at Beverly Ford, Brandy Station, and Stevensburg, on the 9th of June, 1863, Pleasonton fell back to the vicinity of Warrenton Junction, where he could watch the movements of the enemy and at the same time shield the movements of Hooker's infantry, which was ready to abandon its position along the Rappahannock and again retrace its steps in the direction of Washington. In making that movement the right wing of the army became the left in its reverse movement.

On the 11th the Third Corps marched from its quarters near Falmouth to Hartwood Church, which is nearly opposite the United States Ford.

General Reynolds was directed the following day to break camp at Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church and proceed to Deep Run, a tributary of the Rappahannock that empties into it several miles above the junction of the Rappahannock, while the Third Corps moved to Bealeton, with Humphreys' (Third) division advanced to the Rappahannock, the Eleventh Corps having moved from Brookes' Station to Hartwood Church.

On the 13th the First Corps moved to Bealeton, while the Fifth marched from the vicinity of Banks' Ford to Morrisville, and the Eleventh to Catlett's Station. Hooker's left wing was composed of four corps—the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh, with Pleasonton's cavalry.

The right wing began its movement on the 13th by the Sixth Corps leaving Franklin Crossing, below Fredericksburg, and moving to Potomac Creek, while the Twelfth moved from Stafford Court House and Aquia Creek to Dumfries, where Hooker made his headquarters on the following day.

The Sixth moved up and took the position the Twelfth had just vacated, while the artillery reserve, under General Hunt, moved from Stafford Court House to Wolf Run Shoal.

The Eleventh Corps, leading the left wing, came up to Catlett's Station. On the 15th Hooker moved his head-

quarters to Fairfax Station, directing Slocum to Fairfax Court House and Sedgwick to Dumfries. As yet the Second Corps was facing A. P. Hill on the Rappahannock, but General Couch on the 11th had been ordered to Harrisburg to take command of the forces in defense of that city, in anticipation of Lee's movement into Pennsylvania. At the same time General Brooke was assigned to the Department of the Monongahela, with headquarters at Pittsburg. Hancock, who had succeeded Couch in command of the corps, was ordered to follow the right wing, moving to Aquia Creek.

On the 16th the Sixth Corps arrived at headquarters, Fairfax Station, while the Second marched to Wolf Run Shoals. The cavalry moved from Union Mills and Bristoe Station to Manassas Junction and Bull Run.

On the 17th Pleasonton was directed by Hooker to make a reconnoissance of the valley between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains. D. McM. Gregg's division of cavalry moved to Aldie, a gap in the Bull Run Mountain. Kilpatrick's brigade had the advance, and on entering that quaint little hamlet encountered the pickets of the enemy, for the head of Stuart's forces had been advanced to that place that morning. Fitz-Hugh Lee's brigade, commanded by Col. T. T. Munford, lay not far distant near Dover.

Robertson's brigade was at Rector's Crossroads, and W. H. F. Lee's brigade, commanded by Colonel Chambliss, was kept near Salem to picket Thoroughfare Gap, and to keep open communication with Hampton, who was still in the rear near the Rappahannock. Thus Stuart's cavalry occupied the valley between the mountains. Both sides were apparently surprised when they met, but instantly prepared for action.

At Aldie the road divides, one branch running northwest in the direction of Snicker's Gap, while the other pursues a westwardly course through Middleburg, toward Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Munford at once placed

his brigade on the hill, between the two roads, which gave him quite an advantageous position for his artillery; and dismounting a part of his cavalry behind a fence where quite a ditch had been cut, made his position almost impregnable, for he could then double his forces on the two roads where his flanks rested. Kilpatrick dismounted the 2d New York, and with drawn sabers attacked the Confederates in that position; while a number of prisoners were taken by this regiment it was almost impossible to dislodge Munford's men behind the barricade.

On the right the 4th New York, under Colonel Di Cessola, who had been placed under arrest, charged unarmed at the head of his troops up the Snicker's Gap road. Seeing his great gallantry Kilpatrick handed him his own saber in the midst of the fight. He was seriously wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.

Although the two opposing forces were about equal in numbers, Munford was so well posted that Kilpatrick was unable to dislodge him, and D. McM. Gregg sent the 1st Maine to his assistance. As it came on the field Kilpatrick inquired what regiment it was, and when told it was the 1st Maine, he said, "Forward, 1st Maine; you saved the field at Brandy, and you can do it here! Are there twelve men who will follow me?" But instead of twelve men responding to his request the regiment gave a deafening yell and charged up the Snicker's Gap road with such momentum that Munford's left was swept back, and his position behind the fence endangered.

It greatly pleased the Maine boys as they passed Kilpatrick in the charge; the gallant general's horse had been shot in the neck and disabled. In that charge Colonel Douty and Captain Summat, two gallant officers of the 1st Maine, were killed. The death of Colonel Douty was a great blow to the regiment, for he was a gallant and capable officer.

The regiment had two other good field officers, Lieutenant Colonel Smith and Major Boothby, who distin-

guished themselves on that field, so that it was ready for action at a moment's warning. However, the regiment was composed of such material that had it lost all of the field officers it would have moved right along, as it had many men in the ranks capable and brave enough to have led it.

Munford retired from the field, and it was the impression then of the Union officers that he had been compelled to retreat. His right, on the Snicker's Gap road, had been turned, but the road to Middleburg, around which the other brigades of Stuart's cavalry were concentrated, was open to him. But it was not our forces in his front that compelled him to leave the field, but an order from Stuart for him to hastily retire to Middleburg. When Pleasanton advanced with D. McM. Gregg's division to Aldie, Col. A. N. Duffié, commanding the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, had been directed to make a detour to the left, according to the following order: "You will proceed with your regiment from Manassas Junction by way of Thoroughfare Gap to Middleburg; there you will camp for the night and communicate with the headquarters of the Second Cavalry Brigade. From Middleburg you will proceed to Union, thence to Snickersville, from Snickersville to Percyville; thence to Wheatland, and passing through Waterford, to Nolan's Ferry, where you will join your brigade."

The regiment moved out on the morning of the 17th of June, the anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill, which, to a New England regiment, was enough to inspire it with sufficient patriotism to face death to save the country. And it had a full test before the sun rose the next morning.

As it approached Thoroughfare Gap, the advance encountered the pickets of Colonel Chambliss, but they retired in the direction of Salem, leaving the road open to Middleburg, whither Duffié's orders carried him. It was a beautiful day, and as the regiment marched in the direction of Middleburg, the valley appeared most lovely, and the bluish tinge on the mountains made it an interesting and

picturesque scene to behold. The birds sang their sweetest notes, and the boys were more than happy.

It must be remembered that Gen. W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under the command of Colonel Chambliss, had been left in their rear—a force at least four times that of the 1st Rhode Island, which only encountered Chambliss' pickets, and was not aware that a brigade was left to block its retreat next day. At about four p.m., the 1st Rhode Island struck Stuart's pickets, and at once charged them, drove Stuart and his staff out of Middleburg on the gallop, who escaped capture only by reason of the superior speed of their fresh horses. At this time Fitz Lee's brigade, under the command of Colonel Munford, was fighting at Aldie, five miles away. Stuart had only a squadron of cavalry at Middleburg when Duffié charged on the town. It was strange to him that a mere regiment could penetrate the center of his command. His surprise induced him to send Capt. Frank Robertson of his staff with an order to Munford to fall back to Middleburg. Duffié and the whole regiment knew that they had captured Stuart's headquarters, but that it would be almost a miracle to escape with the brigades of Chambliss, Robertson and Munford closing in on them. Duffié's orders were to remain at Middleburg that night, and report to Kilpatrick at Aldie. He was a French officer, and insisted on strictly obeying orders without regard to the change of circumstances. He was going to stay in Middleburg that night if it cost his life. Capt. George N. Bliss wanted the regiment to move at once to Aldie before the Confederates could surround them. He claimed it would save the regiment, and when the order was issued to remain in Middleburg that night no one supposed it was the point of concentration of Stuart's forces.

If Duffié had moved on the road to Aldie it would have aided Kilpatrick in his struggle with Munford, for a regiment coming up in the rear would have decided the day against the Confederates, and placed our troops in better

condition to have followed up Stuart the next day. But Duffié decided to meet his fate, and sent Capt. Frank Allen with two men to Aldie to report to Pleasanton, while he barricaded the roads coming into the town. His reserve he placed on the road leading to Aldie. Before dark Stuart returned with the 4th and 5th North Carolina Cavalry, and attacked Duffié. The men at the barricades fought bravely, but were outflanked by superior numbers, and fell back on the reserve. Companies G and F were ordered to dismount and conceal their horses in a grove, and take a position behind a stone wall that bounded one side of the road.

It was quite dark when the enemy charged down this road until he arrived at the stone wall, when a volley was poured into his ranks at short range. It produced great consternation and confusion by the wounding of the men and horses. The enemy retreated a safe distance and again charged, only to be discomfited by another volley from the carbines of Duffié's troops. The third charge was made, and resulted in the enemy being hurled back again with considerable loss. It was evident that the Confederates were endeavoring to flank the position, therefore Duffié decided to withdraw from the town before all his forces were captured. In doing so Major Farrington, who was in command of the men behind the stone wall, was ordered to retire. The next morning the Confederates again hotly pursued Duffié and, as a matter of course, the regiment was compelled to divide into small squads, and escape as best they could on foot over the Bull Run Mountains. The following is taken from the "Campaign of Stuart's Cavalry," by Maj. H. B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant general:

Early in the morning Col. A. N. Duffié had crossed the Bull Run Mountain at Thoroughfare Gap. His orders directed him to encamp at Middleburg on the night of the 17th and to proceed the next day toward Nolan's Ferry, extending his march to the west as far as Snickersville. These orders seem to have contemplated a somewhat extended scout by this regiment, on the left flank of General Gregg's

division—a hazardous movement in the presence of an enterprising enemy. Colonel Duffié reached Thoroughfare Gap at 9:30 a. m., and was somewhat delayed in crossing the mountain by the picket from Chambliss' command. By eleven o'clock, however, he was fairly on his way toward Middleburg. At four o'clock, p. m., he struck the pickets which Stuart had established for his own safety outside the town, and drove them in so quickly that Stuart and his staff were compelled to make a retreat more rapid than was consistent with dignity and comfort. Having with him no force adequate to contest the ground with Duffié's regiment, Stuart retired towards Rector's Crossroads. Munford was notified of his danger, and directed to withdraw from Aldie, and Robertson and Chambliss were ordered to move immediately upon Middleburg. The only hope for Duffié's regiment now lay in an immediate advance upon Aldie, where he might have created considerable commotion by attacking the rear of the 10th Virginia Cavalry on the Middleburg road. But he did not know this, and his orders were positive, requiring him to encamp for the night at Middleburg. He therefore made the best of his situation by dismounting one-half of his regiment behind stone walls and barricades, hoping that he might be able to hold his position until reënforced from Aldie, whither he sent Capt. Frank Allen to make known his situation at brigade headquarters. Captain Allen reached Aldie, after encountering many difficulties, at nine o'clock, p. m. He says in his report, "General Kilpatrick informed me that his brigade was so worn out that he could not send any reënforcements to Middleburg, but that he would report the situation of our regiment to General Gregg. Returning he said that General Gregg had gone to state the facts to General Pleasonton, and directed me to remain at Aldie until he heard from General Pleasonton. I remained, but received no further orders." Thus Colonel Duffié was left to meet his fate.

At seven o'clock in the evening he was attacked by Robertson's brigade. His men fought bravely, and repelled more than one charge before they were driven from the town, retiring by the same road by which they had advanced. Unfortunately for Duffié, this road was now closed by Chambliss' brigade, which surrounded him during the night, and captured, early the next morning, the greater part of those who had escaped from Robertson on the previous evening. Colonel Duffié himself escaped capture, and reached Centerville early in the afternoon of the next day, with four of his officers and twenty-seven men. He reports the loss in his regiment at 20 officers and 248 men. This, however, was an exaggeration of the calamity; for other officers beside himself had taken to the woods, and succeeded in making their way back to the Federal lines. On the 18th

and 19th, Major Farrington, who was separated from his regiment on the night of the 17th, in Middleburg, thus brought in 2 officers and 23 men; Lieutenant Colonel Thompson brought in 18 men; Sergeant Palmer 12 men, and Capt. George N. Bliss 6 men. Color Sergeant Robbins, who was wounded and captured, was left in Middleburg, and fell into the hands of his friends when Stuart retired from that place. This reduces the loss to 200.

This regiment was composed of good material, and it rapidly recuperated.

On the 17th of August following it assembled 300 men at Warrenton, and was attached to McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's division.

This statement, made by the adjutant general of Stuart, is as high an encomium as could be passed on the valor of the 1st Rhode Island, and I deem it unnecessary to add more.

Pleasanton followed Stuart as the latter suddenly retired through Upperville, where he made a stubborn stand, but was finally compelled to fall back through Ashby's Gap. Pleasanton then learned from some prisoners that Longstreet was moving along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge.

General Lee, in a report to Jefferson Davis, dated June 18, 1863, says:

Longstreet's corps has moved east of the Blue Ridge, with the view of creating embarrassment as to our plans, while Ewell, having driven the enemy from Winchester and Martinsburg, has seized upon the Potomac, so as to enable General Hill's corps to move up from Fredericksburg.

Again, General Lee, on the 20th, says:

General Longstreet's corps, with Stuart's cavalry, still occupy the Blue Ridge, between the roads leading through Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, holding in check a large force of the enemy, consisting of cavalry, infantry and artillery.

General Ewell was then north of the Potomac at Sharpsburg, the battlefield of Antietam, Boonsborough and Hagerstown, with Jenkins' cavalry in his advance. Imboden was actively operating on the left flank of Lee's army. A. P. Hill's corps, following in the wake of Ewell, was

coming up, and Longstreet was ordered to cross to the west side of the Blue Ridge and intrust the gaps to Stuart.

Here begins one of the most interesting pieces of history in connection with the battle of Gettysburg. Lee says:

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northwest.

Stuart at once started on his raid to get between Hooker and Washington, hoping thereby to capture supplies on the way to the Union army. He had not much difficulty in making the circuit of our army; but he utterly failed in intercepting any provisions or artillery, and was unable to rejoin Lee's army. He finally succeeded in crossing the Potomac near Rockville, where he captured an immense train with supplies for Hooker's army, which he took with him. That compelled him to move so slowly that he was never able to unite with Lee's army. He was at Carlisle on the afternoon of the 1st of July, and was not aware that a great battle had been fought at Gettysburg that day.

We now turn to Ewell, who had the advance of Lee's army. He (Ewell) took the divisions of Rodes and Johnson, with Jenkins' cavalry brigade, and proceeded through Chambersburg to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. Early's division was directed to march from Boonsborough to Greenwood, and thence to York. On the 24th Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and they arrived at Chambersburg when Ewell reached Carlisle. Thus the whole of Lee's army was in the State of Pennsylvania, and the advance guard threatening Harrisburg. As yet Lee supposed Hooker was in Virginia.

Early was to strike the Northern Central Railroad at York, tear it up, and proceed to Wrightsville. As he approached the latter place the militia of the State of Pennsylvania retreated across the bridge and fired it, thus preventing the enemy from crossing to the left bank of the Susquehanna. Early then rejoined his corps.

The movement on Harrisburg was arrested by information given Lee by one of his scouts, who learned that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching South Mountain.

When Pleasonton returned from his reconnoissance of the valley from Aldie to Ashby's Gap, and reported that Longstreet was on the east side of the Blue Ridge, it caused the perplexity that Lee desired and induced Hooker to move with great caution. He was all the time concentrating his army near the south bank of the Potomac, to cross it rapidly if necessary, as will be seen by the following :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 22, 1863.

General Wadsworth is bridging Goose Creek near the pike. Can you bridge Goose Creek near the mouth, on a road that will conduct to Edwards' Ferry?

DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Major General.
To Captain TURNBULL, Edwards' Ferry.

In order to fully express the great anxiety of Hooker over the situation, the following official paper is given in full :

CAMP NEAR FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE,
June 24, 1863.

GENERAL :—In accordance with your request, I present the following reasons for moving our army at once to the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry :

1. The whole of Lee's army is reported to be on the Potomac, above that place, part of it across the river, and threatening an advance upon Harrisburg.
2. There we can protect Washington as well, and Baltimore better than here, and preserve our communications and wants of supply.

3. It is the shortest line to reach Lee's army ; will enable us to operate on his communications, if he advances ; to throw overwhelming forces on either portion of his army that he allows the river to divide ; and is too strong a position for him to attack us in, even if we make heavy detachments.

4. It will enable us to pass South Mountain without fighting for the passes, if we wish to move upon him, and will thus destroy any advantages these mountains would give as a protection to his right flank.

5. It will prevent Lee from detaching a corps to invade Pennsylvania with, as it would expose the rest of his army to our attack in superior force.

6. These opinions are based upon the idea that we are not to try and go round his army, and drive it out of Maryland, as we did last year, but to paralyze all its movements by threatening its flank and rear if it advances, and gain time to collect reinforcements sufficient to render us the stronger army of the two, if we are not so already.

Respectfully submitted.

G. K. WARREN, Brig. Gen. Vols.,
Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.

Major General HOOKER,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

In accordance with the report General Warren made to Hooker, he immediately began his preparations to concentrate the army on the north bank of the Potomac, and dispatched General Butterfield to Washington and Baltimore to secure as many troops from these two points as possible to swell the Army of the Potomac ; when Butterfield arrived in Washington, he called on Halleck for assistance ; but receiving no encouragement from him, he then called on the President, who listened earnestly to his statement, and at once sent for Halleck. Halleck said there were no troops which were not needed to take care of the property and other necessary duty in Washington. Lincoln seemed worried, but said to Butterfield : " You hear Halleck's answer." Butterfield then proceeded to Schenck's headquarters in Baltimore, where he received a warm reception, but was only able to get one brigade (Lockwood's) from the forces stationed there. As a matter of course, the force at Harper's Ferry Schenck was perfectly willing should be

under the authority of Hooker; but Halleck again interfered as he did before, when McClellan fought South Mountain and Antietam. Halleck then arbitrarily compelled Miles to remain, even when he knew his forces were in danger of being captured.

It was natural to suppose that he would have yielded when the two armies faced each other again, in almost the same way they did before the battle of South Mountain; yet he boldly interfered, though aware that Lee's army had been increased to its maximum strength. Longstreet's corps had received the addition of Pickett's division. Lee had urged Davis to strip the other commands, in order to give him an army strong enough to defeat Hooker, with the hope that Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg and Philadelphia would be at his mercy. If he (Lee) could have taken Philadelphia, and established his headquarters in Independence Hall, the Confederacy would have been well nigh assured. Hooker, like McClellan, wanted the troops in Harper's Ferry subject to his orders, and to become a part of his army, and to temporarily abandon it after the stores were removed. He visited Harper's Ferry, and ordered General French, who was in command there, to have three days' rations prepared for his men, and be prepared on a moment's warning to move with the army.

Hooker telegraphed Halleck that it was utterly useless to leave over 8000 men at that point, after Lee's whole army had passed to the north, when he so greatly needed the assistance of French in the struggle with Lee, well knowing that the two armies must meet and fight a great battle in a few days. General Gates, who commanded the Ulster Guard, says in his history :

I have very conclusive evidence of the fact that some reënforcements arrived to General Lee after "the three corps" had marched from Chambersburg, and, in fact, during the battle. This I have in the record kept of the marches of the 14th Virginia Regiment, by its colonel, James M. Hodges, on the back of a pocket map of the State of Virginia, and whose regiment was in the final charge made

by Pickett's division (Armistead's brigade), on the third day of July, and Colonel Hodges was killed within a hundred feet of me.

This record shows that Colonel Hodges was at Richmond in May. June 3 he was at Hanover Junction (Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad). June 8 he left Hanover Junction and crossed the Potomac on the 25th. On the 2d of July he marched twenty-three miles, and "camped within three miles of Gettysburg." He was just in time to participate in the closing scenes, and he led his regiment up almost to the muzzles of the muskets of my men, through a fire that thinned his ranks at every step.

There need be no further proof added that from nearly every point troops had been sent to Lee. This is fully demonstrated in the answer of Davis to Lee, when the latter suggested that Beauregard be directed to make a demonstration in the direction of Culpeper to divert Hooker's attention from Lee, when Davis informed him that not enough troops were left to accomplish such a purpose.

On the 25th the left wing of Hooker's army, composed of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, under General Reynolds, crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry and bivouacked at Barnesville, Edwards' Ferry, and Jefferson, Maryland.

On the 26th the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac moved from Fairfax Court House, Virginia, to Poolesville, Maryland. The other corps rapidly followed the left wing across the Potomac, as Hooker then had definite information as to the movements of Lee, and the great danger of Harrisburg being captured and the Pennsylvania Central destroyed by the enemy.

On the 27th Hooker's headquarters were moved from Poolesville to Frederick. The First Corps was directed to move from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland; the Second Corps from near Edwards' Ferry to Barnesville, Maryland; the Third Corps from Point of Rocks to Middletown, Maryland; the Fifth Corps to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick City, Maryland; the Sixth Corps from Dranesville, Virginia, to Poolesville, Maryland; the Twelfth Corps from near the mouth of the Monocacy to Knoxville, Maryland; Buford's

cavalry division from Leesburg, Virginia, to near Jefferson, Maryland; Gregg's cavalry division from Leesburg toward Frederick City, Maryland; the artillery reserve from Poolesville to Frederick, Maryland; Stahel's cavalry division reached Frederick City, Maryland, and Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Goose Creek, Virginia, to the mouth of the Monocacy, Maryland.

Thus, it will be observed that Hooker was rapidly pressing on in the direction of Gettysburg, where the battle was fought inside of four days.

Hooker was displeased that French, commanding a division of fresh troops, should remain idle at Harper's Ferry, and he accordingly telegraphed Halleck as follows :

SANDY HOOK, June 27, 1863.

I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10,000 men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river; and so far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of it for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and His Excellency, the President.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major General.

To Major General HALLECK, General in Chief.

To this dispatch Hooker received a negative answer. He then sent the following :

SANDY HOOK, June 27, 1863—1 p. m.

(Received 3 p. m.)

My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major General.

To Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 27, 1863—8 p. m.

Your application to be relieved from your present command is received. As you were appointed to this command by the President, I have no power to relieve you. Your dispatch has been duly referred for Executive action.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

To Major General HOOKER, Army of the Potomac.

General Orders, } WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJT. GEN.'S OFFICE,
No. 197. } Washington, June 27, 1863.

By direction of the President, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker is relieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army, and of the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adjt. General.

That evening a special train was sent to Frederick, bearing Asst. Adjt. Gen. James A. Hardie with the double orders—one relieving Hooker, and the other appointing General Meade to the command of the Army of the Potomac.

There were many officers in Washington extremely anxious to go to the army, and this was a most acceptable opportunity. Besides, it concealed the real motive of sending the special train to the army. Notably among the number was General Butterfield, who chatted with Hardie on the train, little dreaming that he had the order for his chief's removal. Nor did Generals Sickles, Marston, or any of the other officers have a suspicion that Colonel Hardie was on any such important mission.

When the train arrived at Frederick, Hardie at once ordered a conveyance to take him to headquarters. Arriving there he handed to Meade the order, and officially informed him that he was no longer a corps commander, but in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac. How steadily he was pressing Hooker's star of fame, and how events repeated themselves! He then went to Hooker's headquarters and notified him that he was relieved.

On the field of Antietam, Hooker commanded the First Corps, and Meade the Pennsylvania Reserves under him. When the battle was raging with fury on the right, Mansfield was mortally wounded, and Hooker was taken from his horse so badly wounded that he was compelled to leave the field, Meade assumed command of the First Corps. Hooker's confidence in Meade is indicated in the following farewell order to the Army:

General Orders, } HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
No. 66. } June 28, 1863.

In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27, 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of this army in many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotion.

The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail, that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumphs of its arms may bring success worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major General.

Hardie remained the next day with the army, and sent the following telegram:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Frederick, Md., June 28, 1863—2:30 p. m.
(Received 3:20 p. m.)

I shall return to-night. I have been waiting for the formal issue of the order of the late commander, before telegraphing. This is now written. I have had a chance to ascertain the state of feeling and internal condition of the army. There is cause for satisfaction with it. The late commander leaves for Baltimore this afternoon.


JAS. A. HARDIE, Asst. Adj. General.

To Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

Hooker was ordered to Baltimore to await orders, whither he went immediately after issuing his farewell order to the Army of the Potomac. General Gates says, that while there on waiting orders he visited Washington, and was arrested by Halleck, but was soon released.

This unexpected change in the command of the Army of the Potomac was made in a very quiet and soldierly manner. Great precaution was taken to prevent Hooker, as in the case of McClellan, from disobeying the order. Neither attempted or thought of anything but entire submission to the orders from the War Department. Hooker was severely criticised for his rashness in tendering his resignation, and some critics have said that Hooker seized upon that pretense to avoid the responsibility of another battle with Lee, but that savors of enmity and jealousy. Hooker never turned his back on a foe in battle. He was goaded to desperation by an enemy in Halleck, who was bitterly opposed to his being placed in command of that army, and sought every opportunity to disparage and cripple his movements. When Hooker was advancing north, he was handicapped by orders from Halleck, and would have crossed the Potomac days before he did but for the orders of Halleck, and he evidently took advantage of Hooker's impetuous request to be relieved with eagerness and gratification, which was evidenced by the fact that on the evening of the same day that he received Hooker's dispatch, asking to be relieved, Colonel Hardie was sent on a special train with the double orders relieving Hooker, and placing Meade in command, lest Hooker might recall his request by dispatch.

It is hard to rate Hooker's place in history as a general. He never fought a battle in which he did not only display great gallantry on the field, but was successful, except Chancellorsville, and in that his plans were equal to those of any generals recorded in the military history of the world. That they failed in execution is fully known to the world. His record in the West afterwards was of the most brilliant character. He fought among the clouds on Lookout Mountain, and won a fame that shines with a golden luster. If he had been victorious at the battle of Chancellorsville, he would have rivaled Prince Eugene and Turenne in history.



GEN. MEADE.

CHAPTER XII.

GETTYSBURG.

ON assuming command of the army Meade issued an order so charged with modesty that the excellence of his character shines like a diamond through it :

General Orders, }
No. 67. }

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28, 1863.

By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an All-controlling Providence the decision of the contest.

It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me.

GEORGE G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.

Feeling the great necessity for active operations against the enemy, for Stuart, in command of Lee's cavalry, was on Meade's right flank and making desperate efforts to gain the head of the columns of the Army of the Potomac in order to reach Lee and impart the information he had gathered from being on its right flank from Fairfax Court House, Meade issued an order, dated the same day, directing the army to move the next morning at four o'clock.

As General Heth, who opened the battle on the Confederate side, has since said: "It was a great misfortune to us in that campaign not to have had the benefit of the cavalry service, for it is the eyes and ears of every army." Lee was still in the dark as to the whereabouts of his cavalry, or the movements of the Army of the Potomac.

General Heth also said: "If Lee had had his cavalry with him he would have known the movements of his adversary; and if he had been compelled to meet him at Gettysburg he could have concentrated his army there two days before and held the choice of positions. As it was, we stumbled in there, on the morning of the 1st of July, when my division was hotly engaged almost immediately."


It was remarkable foresight and great generalship on the part of Meade to throw his army forward with the left resting at Emmitsburg, the center at Taneytown, and the right at Frizellburg, Union, and New Windsor; for Stuart was again foiled in his attempt to pass Meade's front and was brushed to the right where he encountered Kilpatrick at Hanover.

In the mean time Buford had been ordered by Pleasanton to advance to Gettysburg, a central and strategic place where the armies would be very likely to concentrate.

Meade hastening to the front, arrived there the evening of the 1st day of July, taking up his headquarters near the cemetery. Meade's strategy in keeping Lee's infantry and cavalry apart surpassed that of Hannibal and Scipio, for his achievements were of greater value; and as the cycle of time revolves it will greatly add to his military fame.

After assuming command of the army on the eve of one of the greatest battles recorded in history, the military genius he displayed was most remarkable; and his memory richly deserves a monument on that field.

Hooker had taken the line on the east side of South Mountain, because that was the shortest one leading in the direction of Gettysburg, which is a little southeast of Chambersburg, where two of Lee's corps were, and some twenty



GEN. J. B. CARR.



miles distant. He could protect Washington and Baltimore, and perhaps prevent Lee from attempting to march on Philadelphia, and at the same time more quickly relieve Harrisburg, for as yet Hooker had no positive information that Lee was concentrating his army at Cashtown, with a view of feeling for the advance of the Army of the Potomac. When Meade assumed command he followed out the plans of Hooker for the same reasons. If the army had been debouched through passes in the South Mountain range into the Cumberland Valley, and cut off Lee's communication with Richmond, he (Lee) might have taken the route through Gettysburg to Baltimore, and not only endangered that city but Washington. Meade directed the left wing under Reynolds, on the 1st of July, to march to Gettysburg; the First Corps arriving about nine o'clock on the field where the great battle was fought.

We now turn to the Confederate army, and give its movements. General Heth, who opened the battle by an attack on Buford, made the following statement for this history :

In June, 1863, when Lee's army was moving north down the Shenandoah Valley, to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania, Longstreet was ordered to hold the gaps in the Blue Ridge, and in turn to be relieved of that duty by Stuart, so as to permit him (Longstreet) to cross the Potomac. Stuart went to Lee and urged him to modify his order, so as to permit him (Stuart) to go down the river, where he could strike the Federal army a heavy blow and cripple him. After hearing the appeal of Stuart, he consented to his request, providing he would hasten back with what information he gained, and take his position on the right flank as it moved northward into Pennsylvania. All of which Stuart promptly assented to. When the cavalry commander evaded Hooker, and got between him and Washington, no opportunity seemed to present itself for him to impede, or even harass, the Army of the Potomac. When Stuart began his movement to return to Lee's right flank, he encountered Hancock at Edwards' Ferry, where Stuart himself expected to cross the river. That compelled him to go lower down and cross at a ford nearer Washington. After he had gained the north bank of the Potomac, when he made another attempt to join Lee, he again struck the troops of the Army of the Potomac, and was again compelled to

bear to the right in the direction of Hanover, where he came in contact with another portion of the Union forces causing him considerable delay; for he had with him an immense wagon train, captured near Rockville, which necessarily compelled him to march very slowly. He then resumed his march in the direction of York, where he hoped to find some of Ewell's command; but he had suffered many delays and was again doomed to disappointment. Then he marched in the direction of Carlisle; arriving there he found it occupied by State militia. The commanding officer refused to surrender the city, although Stuart threatened to shell it. He was then far beyond Lee's army, it being at that time concentrated at Gettysburg and fighting the battle.

When General Heth visited Lee's headquarters, Lee asked him, "Harry, where is my cavalry? . Where is Stuart? I hope nothing has happened to him." Heth said:

It was a great misfortune to us in that campaign not to have the benefit of the cavalry service, for it is the eyes and ears of every army. I attach no blame to Stuart, for he went with the full consent of Lee—it is one of the fates of war. If Lee had had his cavalry with him, he would have known the movements of his adversary, and if he had been compelled to meet him at Gettysburg he could have concentrated his army there two days before, and held the choice of positions. As it was, we stumbled in there on the morning of the 1st of July, when my division was hotly engaged almost immediately. Lee was in the dark as to the movements of Hooker, and said to me, "If Hooker does not find me, I must find him." Lee wanted to fight the battle at Cashtown, with the mountain at his back, so his flanks would be well protected; there he could have whipped any army in the world. But not knowing where Hooker was he became restive, and began to prepare to concentrate his army, for as yet he knew nothing of the movements of the enemy, but he well knew that great efforts were being made to bring on a battle, and that it must take place soon, so he desired to unite his forces at Cashtown.

So far as the battle of Gettysburg is concerned, that battle was fought by my (Heth's) going there after shoes for my division. On the 30th of June I directed Pettigrew to take his brigade and go to Gettysburg and get some shoes. On arriving near Gettysburg he found it occupied by a Union force, so he returned without securing any shoes. When he made his report to me on his return I said to him there was no considerable force there. Just then Hill came up and I said to Pettigrew to repeat to the general what you said to me.

After it was stated again by Pettigrew, Hill and myself both said there were no troops there of any moment. I turned to Hill and said, "I will take my division and go down there and get the shoes myself," which was assented to by him. Arriving near the town I saw a few individuals, but yet presumed the enemy was not there in force. I ordered my batteries to wheel away on the woods for half an hour and then stop. Then I ordered Davis to advance on the left of the road, while Archer was directed to move through the woods on the right. This advance was stubbornly resisted. In fact those two brigades suffered most severely. Archer on the right got cramped under the brow of a hill with Willoughby Run immediately in his rear. The Iron Brigade of Wadsworth's division charging down the hill, he was compelled to surrender with a part of his men. On the left, while Davis' brigade fought most gallantly, yet a part of his command was overpowered in a railroad cut, and were compelled to surrender. When these two brigades were repulsed I went back to my artillery and there found Generals Lee and A. P. Hill. I asked his permission to put in my whole division. But he said no, that Longstreet was not up, and that he did not want to bring on a general engagement that day. General Rodes, who was on his way to Cashtown heard my cannon, faced by the left flank, and came to my assistance.

General Hill had followed Heth, with Pender's division, and was on the field while Heth was engaged.

On the 30th of June Longstreet, who was at Chambersburg, was ordered to take McLaws' and Hood's divisions and proceed to Cashtown, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden, while Ewell was ordered to countermarch from Carlisle and join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg. So Lee was able, on the evening of the 1st of July, to concentrate his army in the vicinity of Gettysburg, with the exception of Pickett.

While the Confederate commander had thus thrown forward his army to Gettysburg, yet he hoped to lure the Army of the Potomac on while he withdrew to Cashtown to have the advantage of the mountain at his back, but the forces of Buford and Heth meeting on the morning of the 1st of July, and becoming hotly engaged, dispelled all of Lee's hopes of drawing the Union army to Cashtown.

Meade, on the other hand, while he advanced Reynolds to Gettysburg to support Buford, was hoping to fight at Pipe Creek. Both were disappointed at the unexpected turn in events, and both generals ordered their commands to march rapidly on Gettysburg.

In the forenoon of June 30 Buford entered Gettysburg with Gamble's and Devin's brigades; his reserve brigade, under General Merritt, was at Mechanicstown guarding trains. Soon Buford sighted the enemy, which was Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division, ordered to Gettysburg to get a supply of shoes for A. P. Hill's corps. But Pettigrew retired when he saw the forces of Buford, as given in the statement of General Heth.

Early on the morning of July 1 Gamble's brigade, composed of the 8th Illinois, under Maj. John L. Beveridge, four companies of the 12th Illinois, and six companies of the 3d Indiana, under Col. George H. Chapman, and the 8th New York, commanded by Lieut. Col. William L. Markell, was directed by Buford to move out on the Cash-town road to impede the progress of the enemy, which was advancing from that direction. About eight o'clock Gamble's skirmishers notified him that the Confederates were advancing in heavy force. Gamble at once reported the fact to General Buford, who gave orders for Gamble to advance his brigade in line of battle about a mile from the seminary in support of the pickets. Tidball's battery, 2d United States Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Calef, was placed in position with a section on each side of the Cashtown road, while the other section was placed on the right of the left regiment. This battery was composed of three-inch rifled guns. Buford says :

It fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery of twelve guns, all at short range. Calef held his own gloriously, worked his guns deliberately, with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful effect upon the enemy.

Gamble dismounted the troopers of the 12th Illinois,



John F. Reynolds

JOHN FULTON REYNOLDS, MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.V.

3d Indiana, and half of the 8th New York, and posted them behind a stone wall and under cover of trees; from this position they poured a deadly fire into the advancing columns of Davis and Archer under Heth. When the enemy pressed them so closely that their horses were in danger of capture, they mounted and retired to the next ridge in their rear, where the artillery was posted. The 3d Indiana remained and fought, with the Wisconsin boys, on the right of the Iron Brigade. Devin's brigade, composed of the 6th New York, under Maj. William E. Beardsley, the 9th New York, commanded by Col. William Sackett, the 17th Pennsylvania, under Josiah H. Kellogg, and two companies of the 3d West Virginia, commanded by Capt. Seymour B. Conger, was directed to take a position on the right of Gamble's brigade. Devin formed with his right resting on the Mummasburg road. He sent forward a squadron of the 6th New York to the front and left as skirmishers, and picketed the roads to Carlisle, thus establishing a continuous line from the York road on the extreme right.

Devin held this position until forced back by the Confederates coming up from Heidelberg. He dismounted all of his command except the 9th New York, which was placed in reserve, and held his position until the Eleventh Corps arrived; then he was directed to mass his brigade on the right of the York road, and hold that approach to Gettysburg.

Reynolds gave orders to Wadsworth to march his division as rapidly as possible, as the battle could be distinctly heard. Entering Gettysburg, he rode to the Eagle Hotel, where he met Peter Culp, a citizen of that place, who was acting as a scout for our army. After questioning him about the situation, he directed him (Culp) to take him to the Lutheran Seminary, where Buford was in the belfry watching the battle. Here these two noted generals examined the field with their field-glasses for a short time, when they descended, and walked to the rear of the seminary,

in the direction where Gamble was engaged. After a short consultation, Reynolds rode to the front as Wadsworth's division was arriving, preceding this division as it hurriedly passed the seminary to the front where Gamble was engaged. Several officers gathered around Reynolds and Buford, as they stood viewing the battle between Heth's division and Gamble's cavalry; among the number was Maj. E. P. Halstead, of Doubleday's staff, and Captain Hall, of the 2d Maine Battery. The latter had rode forward with Reynolds to get instructions. Hall says:

I was at Reynolds' side for some little time at the Seminary Ridge, having gone ahead of my battery at his request, and I rode from Seminary Ridge out to the position taken by my guns, some half mile beyond the ridge, by his side, and all his remarks and appearance he gave me the impression that he had gone there to stay.

Captain Weld, an aid-de-camp on Reynolds' staff, says:

At eight o'clock Reynolds and his staff started to the front. On the crest of the hills beyond we could see the enemy's guns going into position; a few hurried words from General Buford showed the condition of affairs. General Reynolds, turning to me (Weld), said, "Ride at once at your utmost speed to General Meade, tell him the enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear he will get to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, and if driven into the town I will barricade the streets, and hold him back as long as possible."

Cutler's brigade had the lead, and he was directed to form his brigade on the right of the Chambersburg pike. Then he rode to the left, directed Meredith, who commanded the Iron Brigade, to face by the left flank and advance through an oak grove, to which Buford reported the enemy advancing to take possession. The 2d Wisconsin was in advance, and at once formed line of battle, and moved on the right of the woods overlapping into the McPherson farm, the 7th Wisconsin coming up on its left; then the 19th Indiana, with the 24th Michigan on the extreme left of the brigade. While the brigade was getting into position Reynolds rode into the edge of the grove, where a



GEN. ABNER DOUBLEDAY.

sharpshooter of Archer's brigade mortally wounded him. Maj. J. G. Rosengarten, of his staff, says:

General Reynolds was personally attending to the hasty formation for the charge of the Iron Brigade when he was fatally wounded by one of Archer's skirmishers, at a moment when his aids were riding to the various regiments carrying the instructions of the general to charge as fast as they arrived. He was immediately borne from the field by four of the 76th New York, who carried Reynolds back to a little stone house on the Emmitsburg road. His bearers were Milo Morgan, Melvin Reed, France Brace, and B. F. Taylor. He was taken to the seminary first, then to the small brick house at the edge of the town, on the Emmitsburg road.

The country had lost one of its ablest defenders. He had won high commendation as an artillery officer in the Mexican war. On the Peninsula he displayed great gallantry. In the Second Bull Run, in command of the Pennsylvania Reserves Division, his generalship prevented Longstreet from crushing our forces near the Henry House.

At Fredericksburg he commanded the First Corps under Franklin on the left, where he again displayed such marked military skill that the entire army united in praise of him.

At the battle of Chancellorsville Reynolds' corps was on Stuart's left flank. Reynolds was anxious to attack Stuart and hurl him from the field, but he received no orders to that effect. He never sought advancement, and twice when he was tendered the command of the Army of the Potomac he modestly refused it. His star of military fame rose evenly, but with remarkable rapidity. True to the interests of his superiors, he was no less mindful of those below him in rank; he received the humblest soldier with the utmost kindness and consideration. His name is deeply ingrafted in the hearts of his countrymen, while his martial deeds will be emulated and admired in foreign lands. He took in the strong and weak points of a battlefield with the keen perception of Charlemagne, although the latter had an experience of a thirty-two-year war with the Saxons, while Reynolds had only the advantage of the Mexican and some two years of the late war, yet his generalship impressed all with the fact that he was a great soldier.

Buford and Reynolds are as much entitled to the honor of selecting Gettysburg as the field on which to fight the battle as anyone else. Taking in the situation, they threw their forces in front of Lee's columns and stubbornly resisted the advance of the Confederate army. They had both passed over Pipe Creek and had noted its advantages. When they arrived at Gettysburg they saw the value of that position, and both resolved to compel Lee to fight there. If they had chosen the Pipe Creek position rather than Gettysburg, they would have slowly fallen back and allowed Lee to have followed to Pipe Creek, for Reynolds sent a message to Meade that he (Reynolds) was not ordered to bring on a battle, but that he had decided to hold the enemy in check until he (Meade) could come up and decide the matter himself. When Howard arrived on the field the First Corps had been fighting about three hours, and nearly two brigades of Heth's division had been captured with Generals Archer and Davis. When Reynolds fell Doubleday, who was in command of the First Corps, carried out Reynolds' ideas and held the line where the dying general directed the First Corps to go into action. It would seem only fair to presume, therefore, that Doubleday was entitled to at least as much credit for selecting Gettysburg as Howard, who came on the field after Lee, Hill, Heth, and Pender were there, and two of Ewell's divisions close at hand. Meade was unaware of the situation at the front. He had the fullest confidence in Reynolds, whom he had placed in command of the left wing and given the advance. When Meade learned that Reynolds was killed he sent Hancock forward to select a place to fight the battle; that at once was evidence enough that, while he considered Pipe Creek a good position to meet the enemy, he desired to obtain the best place. A position cannot be selected to fight a battle after it has been raging for three to four hours; the time to select it is before the armies meet. General Bankhead says, "No one selected Gettysburg; the two armies met there and immediately prepared for action." When

Reynolds fell he was in front of the Iron Brigade, nearly on a line with the left of the 2d Wisconsin and the right of the 7th Wisconsin as they advanced. When he was borne to the rear in a dying condition a deep shudder passed over the troops, for they not only dearly loved him, but had great confidence in his ability. Gen. John C. Robinson, who commanded a division in the First Corps, said to me that, "If Reynolds had lived there would have been a different history of that battle."

Col. Lucius Fairchild, who was in command of the 2d Wisconsin, observing the effect of Reynolds' death on the soldiers, sprang forward and led his regiment in the charge in obedience to General Reynolds' order, which had just been given. The regiment had advanced but a short distance when Lieutenant Colonel Stevens was killed. A low place in the woods that bore off to the left in the direction of Willoughby Run was passed, and as the regiment was ascending the rise on the other side of that low place Fairchild was wounded in the right arm and was compelled, on account of great loss of blood, to leave the field and turn the command of the regiment over to Major Mansfield. Fairchild was taken back to Gettysburg, where his arm was amputated that afternoon. When our forces were driven back through the town Fairchild had the soldiers in the house with him carry him out in a chair on the porch, and as the 2d Wisconsin passed he waved his left hand and said to his regiment, "Give it to them, boys; we must win this battle." The 7th Wisconsin swept into the woods and soon came abreast with the 2d, while the 19th Indiana was coming up at a rapid pace. The last-named regiment had been on picket duty the night before and their guns were loaded, while the Wisconsin regiments and the 24th Michigan were compelled to load as they advanced.

While the 7th Wisconsin was forming in the field east of the grove where Reynolds was killed, the first infantry soldier wounded on the Union side was Capt. L. E. Pond, Company E, of this command. He was a gallant soldier,

and has since served his State in its Senate, where he procured an appropriation to erect monuments to the memory of those from Wisconsin, who fell at Gettysburg in that memorable battle. President Harrison selected him as the agent to pay the soldiers at the Milwaukee Agency.

The 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan had an open field to advance through, consequently they rapidly gained on the Wisconsin regiments on the right, because Archer's brigade was heavier in the front of the 2d and 7th Wisconsin, and was making a desperate struggle to hold the ridge in the woods on the right bank of Willoughby Run, but as the Iron Brigade rushed on, Archer's men were forced under the bluff, with the Wisconsin regiments closely pursuing them. The force in front of the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan gave way and crowded under the bluff with the center and left of Archer's brigade. Then the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan were thrown forward on Archer's right flank. The brigade then formed in its new position two sides of a square, with Archer hemmed in the bend of Willoughby Run, which was at his back; the Wisconsin regiments facing him and coming down the bluff, while the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan were on his right flank ready to enflade him at short range. Under these circumstances Archer decided to surrender, as the movement had been made so quickly that he had been unable to notify Heth of his perilous position, and his surrender took place at once. Col. D. B. Dailey, then a lieutenant, and aid on General Meredith's staff was the person to whom Archer delivered his sword, and surrendered at Gettysburg; but to Private Patrick Maloney, of Co. G, 2d Wisconsin Infantry, belongs the credit of overtaking and capturing him. Dailey was an officer of Co. B, 2d Wisconsin Infantry, at the time. His company was on the right of the regiment, and the regiment on right of brigade, in that engagement. Just as Archer's men broke in front of his company, the lines were within fifteen paces of one another. General Archer was

with the left of his command. After the contest was over, his company had fairly reached the edge of the woods when General Archer's line gave way. They pursued them vigorously, and captured Archer with a number of his men, about thirty paces west of Willoughby's Run. Patrick Maloney, the brave, patriotic and fervent young Irishman, doubly risked his life for the capture of Archer, by going in advance of his comrades and among the fleeing Confederates, for the sake of his prize. Archer at first resisted arrest, but soon Maloney had help, and the sullen general was subdued. When Dailey arrived on the spot, General Archer appealed to him for protection from Maloney. He then requested him to give him his sword and belt, which he did with great reluctance, saying that courtesy permitted him to retain his side arms. Dailey directed that he be taken back to General Meredith's headquarters; which was the last he saw of him. General Archer's sword being much lighter than his own, he put it on and sent his to the rear. About four o'clock in the afternoon of that day he was severely wounded, and was carried into the house of a Mr. Scott in Gettysburg, where he found the late Col. Henry A. Morrow, of the 24th Michigan, who was also wounded. He could not have been in the house more than ten minutes before he heard the cry: "The enemy is coming." He immediately unbuckled his lately acquired trophy, and handed it to a young lady of the house, whom he afterwards learned was Miss Mary McAllister, and who did as much to alleviate the suffering of our soldiers during and after the battle as any lady in Gettysburg, where she still resides, with the request that she conceal it if possible; telling her that it was General Archer's sword. With characteristic promptness and fidelity, she took the sword and belt, threw them into a wood-box in the parlor; carelessly throwing a newspaper over them, where they lay until after the battle. Dailey and other wounded were taken from the house by a Confederate guard, and carried to their rear; during Gen-

eral Pickett's charge they were under the fire of our own artillery, and many of our men being wounded, they requested Colonel Jenks, who had charge of the prisoners, to remove them farther back. His reply was that he could not do so without orders. On the night of the 4th, while in camp midway between Gettysburg and Millerstown, he made an arrangement with two of the 7th Virginia Infantry, who were guarding them, to escape, but as the opportune moment approached, the guard was doubled and their plans thwarted. On the night of the 5th, while the enemy was rapidly retreating over the ridge leading to the Hagerstown Valley, he eluded the guard by leaving the road and taking shelter in the dense timber and underbrush. There he remained until the afternoon of the 6th. When the rear of the enemy had entirely passed over into the valley, he made his way slowly, and with great difficulty, back to Gettysburg, and to the house of Miss Mary McAllister, who informed him that Colonel Morrow had taken his sword and belt, with the promise to her, that he should have them on his return. After remaining a few days at Gettysburg, he set out for his command and overtook it at South Mountain, where he received the sword from Colonel Morrow. In the fall of that year, while in the vicinity of Rappahannock Station, he presented the sword and belt to General Meredith, who commanded the Iron Brigade in its memorable and deadly combat with Archer, but it was returned to him after Meredith's death and he still has it.

General Doubleday rode up, and as he knew Archer well, he in his gentle and affectionate way, offered to shake hands, and said, "General Archer, I am glad to meet you." Archer refused Doubleday's hand, and said, "I am not glad to meet you, sir."

The great success of the Iron Brigade had thrown it far ahead of Cutler's brigade on the right of the Chambersburg pike. Captain Richardson, of the brigade staff, then brought the order from General Meredith to retire the two left regi-



GEN. R. R. DAWES.

ments to the east side of Willoughby Run and to prolong the new line he was forming. In that movement the 7th Wisconsin took the right of the brigade, while the 19th Indiana changed position with the 24th Michigan, and took the left of the brigade. It was then back near midway in the grove, where it halted for orders. While the Iron Brigade had been successful in capturing Archer in the woods, Cutler's brigade had suffered severely. Cutler put the brigade in line of battle with the 76th New York on the right, the 56th Pennsylvania on its left, and the 147th New York between the 56th Pennsylvania and the railroad cut and the Chambersburg pike, which runs through Cashtown, where Reynolds had posted James A. Hall's Maine Battery. The brigade was divided, and Colonel E. B. Fowler was sent to the left of the railroad cut with his own regiment, the 14th Brooklyn, and the 95th New York, under Colonel George H. Biddle. Thus five of Cutler's regiments were in line of battle, while the remaining regiment, the 7th Indiana, under Colonel Ira G. Grover, was guarding the train from Marsh Creek to Gettysburg; it was not therefore on the field the first day of the battle. Hall, in his report, says :

At nine a. m. marched, following the advance brigade of the First Division, First Corps, to the battlefield, about a half mile south and west of town, where we were ordered into position by General Reynolds on the right of the Cashtown road, some 400 yards beyond Seminary Hill. The enemy had previously opened a battery of six guns directly in our front at 1,300 yards distance, which they concentrated upon me as I went into position, but with very little effect. We opened upon this battery with shot and shell at 10:45 a. m., our first six shots causing the enemy to change the position of two of his guns and place them under cover behind a barn. In twenty-five minutes from the time he opened fire, a column of the enemy's infantry charged up a ravine on our right flank, within sixty yards of my right piece, when they commenced shooting down my horses and wounding my men. I ordered the right and center sections to open upon the column with canister, and kept the left firing upon the enemy's artillery. This canister fire was very

effective, and broke the charge of the enemy, when just at this moment, to my surprise, I saw my support falling back without any order having been given me to retire. Feeling that if the position was too advanced for infantry it was equally so for artillery, I ordered the battery to retire by sections, although having no order to do so. The support falling back rapidly, the right section of the battery which I ordered to take position some seventy-five yards to the rear, to cover the retiring of the other four pieces, was charged upon by the enemy's skirmishers and four of the horses from one of the guns shot. The men of the section dragged this gun off by hand. As the last piece of the battery was coming away, all its horses were shot, and I was about to return for it myself when General Wadsworth gave me a peremptory order to lose no time, but get my battery in position near the town on the heights to cover the retiring of the troops.

The force of the enemy which attacked Hall's battery also struck the three regiments under Cutler on the right of the railroad cut. The 76th New York, on the right, suffered so heavily from an enfilading fire from the right that Major Grover, in command of the regiment, ordered the right wing to change front to the rear to oppose the new force. Simultaneously with that he fell mortally wounded, and the brigade commander ordered the regiment to fall back. This was done in good order, and the line reformed on the railroad track near the seminary. Colonel Hofmann retired the 56th Pennsylvania under the same order and at the same time. The 147th New York, on the left of the 56th Pennsylvania, received the order to retire, but just at that moment Lieut. Col. Francis C. Miller, who was in command, was wounded and unable to repeat the order to Major Harney, who immediately assumed command. General Doubleday says the regiment lost 207 killed and wounded out of 380. At that time the regiment was unaware that an order had been given to retire with the other regiments on the right. All the reports of the officers, including General Doubleday's, assert that the regiment held its ground most bravely, and that it was hemmed in while thus fighting until relieved subsequently by the movement of the 14th Brooklyn, 95th New York, and 6th Wisconsin.

To these reports the surviving members of the regiment strenuously object. They claim they were never relieved as reported. Gen. J. V. Pierce, then captain in the regiment, made the following statement on the field in the presence of General Dawes, who commanded the 6th Wisconsin, and to the latter regiment is given the honor and credit of securing the remnant of the 147th New York. At the time there was no official report made of the operations of that regiment at Gettysburg. I quote from General Pierce's statement, made at the railroad cut in 1888 in presence of hundreds. He says:

The firing of the enemy in my immediate front slackened and the enemy retired toward the right. I moved my men forward with the men of Company C, and discovered a line of Confederate skirmishers on our front advancing from the valley up a slope toward a rail fence, firing as they advanced into Hall's battery, while the battery was fighting for dear life. A detachment of Confederates gathered in a fence corner a short distance beyond the cut. I immediately ordered, "Left oblique, fire." The order was responded to by the two left companies, G and C. Several rounds were fired into the skirmish lines. It became too hot, and I saw them return down the hill with several of their number stretched on the hillside. Hall's battery had been fighting that skirmish line in a death grapple. Artillery against skirmishers is like shooting mosquitoes with a rifle. The Confederate skirmishers had the best of it up to the time the left of the 147th Regiment opened on them. The moment the battery was relieved from the force of the attack it began to limber to the rear, and as the Confederate skirmishers fell back the battery disappeared in a cloud of dust up Chambersburg pike. While this was taking place on the left, the battle reopened on the right with redoubled fury, and the cry came down the line, "They are flanking us on the right." The right companies, by Major Harney's orders, swung back on the south side of the rail fence; the left front of the regiment was relieved of pressure from the enemy, who either lay concealed close under the ridge near the west end of the railroad cut, or had passed toward our right to crush that. The fight was again fierce and hot; the boys on the right were falling like autumn leaves; the air was full of lead. Men fell all along the line.

I saw an officer ride down from Oak Hill in our rear and wave his cap in retreat. To venture into this maelstrom between the rail-


road cut and that fence on the right was death. Fierce flamed the fire around the altar of the Union from the guns of the 147th New York. The smoke of carnage rose as an incense and wrapped the folds of the flag defended within its shortened lines. Not a man flinched; none left the field except the wounded; the untouched living and the dead remained.

You may point to Thermopylæ and its Spartans, but a greater Thermopylæ was here, and a more than Spartan heroism stood within the dead angle on this ground. Never was a grander fight made against triple odds; never greater readiness to do and die on duty's line; never greater results hung trembling in the balance than swayed in the battle front of the 147th New York. Shall the battle of Gettysburg be fought? Shall the high tide of the Rebellion ebb from these fields into the peaceful waters at Appomattox? Shall foreign nations recognize the Confederacy? Shall the great struggle be fought now and here to a finish? The answer came back from the smoking guns of the 147th New York: "Our whole duty shall be done. We are here to stay."

Closer pressed the enemy. A regiment, the 55th North Carolina, was pressing far to our right and rear and came over to the south side of the rail fence, their colors drooped to the front. An officer in front of the center corrected the alignment as if passing in review. It was the finest exhibition of discipline and drill I ever saw before or since on the battlefield. The battery was gone from our left; the signal was repeated by an aid-de-camp from Wadsworth's staff. Gallant Harney recognized the signal and gave the command, "In retreat, march!" As I started with my men to the rear I found Edwin Aylsworth mortally wounded, who begged me not to leave him. I stopped, and with the sergeant, Peter Shuttz, assisted him to his feet and tried to carry him, but could not, and had to lay him down. His piteous appeal, "Don't leave me, boys," has rung in my ears and lived in my memory these five and twenty years.

Sergeant Shuttz was killed soon after near Oak Ridge. The time spent in assisting Aylsworth delayed me so I was among the last to leave the field.

Finding the enemy so close upon us and the way open the route we came in by, I followed several of my men into the railroad cut. A squad of Confederates were at the west end of the cut behind some rails, and as we struck the bottom of that railroad cut saluted us with all their guns, and every one loaded with bullets. I did not stay to dispute possession, for they evidently intended "to welcome us Yanks with bloody hands to hospitable graves," and I climbed up the rocky face of the cut on the south side, and made my way with many of our men across the meadow between the railroad cut



CAPT. L. E. POND.

17

and the Chambersburg pike; crossed the pike into a small peach orchard and overtook the colors in the hands of Sergt. Wm. A. Wybern. Just as I joined him he received a shot and fell on the colors as if dead. I tried to remove them, but he held to them with true Irish grit; I commanded him to let go, and to my surprise he answered, "Hold on, I'll be up in a minute!" rolled over and staggered to his feet and carried them all through the fight, and was breveted for his courage.

Both statements are given to the public, so that the history will be entirely impartial.

Col. E. B. Fowler, who was in command of the 14th Brooklyn and 95th New York, observed the retreat of Cutler to Seminary Ridge, retired his two regiments until on a line with the railroad cut, then, changing front, he marched in the direction of it. The Confederates changed front to meet him and gained the cut before Fowler did, and immediately occupied it. In the mean time the 6th Wisconsin had been ordered to that point to assist Cutler in retaking the ground he had lost on the right of the cut. General Dawes says:

We could see that the thin regiments of Cutler's brigade, beyond the turnpike, were being almost destroyed. The rebel line swayed and bent, and the men suddenly stopped firing and ran into the railroad cut, which is parallel to the Cashtown turnpike. I now ordered the men to climb over the turnpike fences and advance upon them. I was not aware of the existence of a railroad cut, and mistook the maneuver of the enemy for a retreat, but was soon undeceived by the heavy fire which they began at once to pour upon us from their cover in the cut. Capt. John Ticknor, a dashing soldier, one of our finest officers, fell dead while climbing the second fence, and others were struck, but the line pushed on. When over the fences and in the field, and subjected to an infernal fire, I saw the 95th New York Regiment coming gallantly into line upon our left. I did not then know or care where they came from, but was rejoiced to see them. Farther to the left was the 14th Brooklyn Regiment, but we were ignorant of the fact. The 95th New York had about 100 men in action. Maj. Edward Pye appeared to be in command. Running hastily to the major, I said, "We must charge," and asked him if they were with us. The gallant major replied, "Charge it is," and they were with us to the end. "Forward, charge!" was the order

given by both the major and myself. We were now receiving a fearfully destructive fire from the hidden enemy. Men who had been shot were leaving the ranks in crowds. Any correct picture of this charge would represent a V-shaped crowd of men with the colors at the advance point, moving firmly and hurriedly forward, while the whole field behind is streaming with men who had been shot, and who are struggling to the rear or sinking in death upon the ground. The only commands I gave, as we advanced, were "Align on the colors! Close up on that color! Close up on that color!" The regiment was being broken up so that this order alone could hold the body together. Meanwhile the colors were down upon the ground several times, but were raised at once by the heroes of the color guard. Not one of the guard escaped, every man being killed or wounded. Four hundred and twenty men started as a regiment from the turnpike fence, of whom 240 reached the railroad cut. Years afterwards I found the distance passed over to be 175 paces. Every officer proved himself brave, true, and heroic in encouraging the men to breast this deadly storm, but the real impetus was the eager, determined valor of the men who carried muskets in the ranks. The rebel colors could be seen waving defiantly just above the edge of the railroad cut. A heroic ambition to capture it took possession of several of our men. Corporal Eggleston, of Company H, a mere boy, sprang forward to seize it, and was shot dead the moment his hand touched the colors. Private Anderson, of his company, furious at the killing of his brave young comrade, recked little for the rebel colors, but he swung aloft his musket and with a terrific blow split the skull of the rebel who had shot young Eggleston. This soldier was well known in the regiment as "Rocky Mountain Anderson." Lieutenant Remington was severely wounded in the shoulder while reaching for the colors. Into this deadly *melée* rushed Corp. Francis A. Waller, who seized and held the rebel battle-flag. His name will remain upon the historic record, as he received from Congress a medal for this deed.

It would require many pages to justly recount the heroic deeds of all, but one incident is so touching in its character that it should be preserved. Corp. James Kelly, of Company B, turned from the ranks, and stepped beside me, as we both moved hurriedly forward on the charge. He pulled open his woolen shirt, and a mark where the deadly minnie ball had entered his breast was visible. He said: "Colonel, won't you please write to my folks that I died a soldier?"

My first notice that we were immediately upon the enemy was a general cry from our men of: "Throw down your muskets. Down with your muskets." Running quickly forward through the line of men, I found myself face to face with at least a thousand rebels,

whom I looked down upon in the railroad cut, which was here about four feet deep. Adjutant Brooks, equal to the emergency, had quickly placed men across the cut in position to fire through it. I have always congratulated myself upon getting in the first word. I shouted: "Where is the colonel of this regiment?" An officer in gray, with stars on his collar, who stood among the men in the cut, said: "Who are you?" I said: "I am commander of this regiment. Surrender, or I will fire on you." The officer replied not a word, but promptly handed me his sword, and all his men, who still held them, threw down their muskets. The coolness, self-possession, and discipline which held back our men from pouring in a volley saved a hundred lives, and as my mind goes back to the fearful excitement of that moment, I marvel at it. The fighting around the rebel colors had not entirely ceased when this surrender was demanded. I took the sword. It would have been the handsome thing to say, "Keep your sword, sir," but I was new to such occasions, and, when six other officers came up and handed me their swords, I took them also, and held the awkward bundle in my arms until relieved by Adjutant Brooks. I directed the officer in command, who proved to be Maj. John A. Blair, of the 2d Mississippi Regiment, to have his men fall in without arms. He gave the command, and his men, to the number of 7 officers and 225 enlisted men, obeyed. To our major, John F. Hauser, I assigned the duty of marching this body to the provost guard. Major Hauser, a thorough soldier, had been educated at a military school at Thun, Switzerland, and he had served with Garibaldi. His shout of "Forwards, forwards," as we charged, is well remembered by all of us who yet survive.

Corporal Waller now brought me the captured battle-flag. It was the flag of the 2d Mississippi Volunteers, one of the oldest and most distinguished regiments in the Confederate army. It belonged to the brigade commanded by the nephew of Jefferson Davis. It is a rule in battle never to allow sound men to leave the ranks. Serg. William Evans, a brave and true man, had been severely wounded in the thighs. He had to use two muskets as crutches. To him I intrusted the keeping of the battle-flag. Wrapping the flag around his body, he started for Gettysburg. Weak and faint from loss of blood, he became exhausted in the street. Brave and faithful friends came to his relief. Two young women assisted the wounded soldier to their home, and placed him upon a bed. The Union troops had then begun to retreat in confusion through the town, and the cheers of the victorious enemy could be plainly heard. Evans begged of his friends to hide the rebel flag. They cut a hole in the bed-tick beneath him, and, thrusting in the flag, sewed up the rent. The flag was soaked with Evans' blood, where he had lain upon it, but

it was safely concealed until the enemy had retreated from Gettysburg, and on the morning of July 4 he brought his precious trophy to Culp's Hill.

Adjutant Brooks buckled on one of the captured swords, but the other six were given to a wounded man to be delivered to our chief surgeon. The enemy, when they took the town, captured the hospital and the swords. No discredit to the doctor is implied, as his hands were full of work with wounded men.

There was now a lull in the battle. Our comrades of the Iron Brigade, who had charged so brilliantly into the McPherson Woods, had been, according to their usual custom, completely victorious. They had routed Archer's brigade, capturing its commander and many of its men, and then changed front to move to the relief of Cutler; but the charge upon the railroad cut, and its success, prevented that necessity. By this charge upon the cut Joseph R. Davis' brigade was captured or scattered. Wadsworth's division* had bravely opened the battle. They had fairly defeated, upon an open field, a superior force of the veterans of the army of General Lee. It was a short, sharp, and desperate fight, but the honors were with the boys in blue. In his official report General Doubleday says that when Cutler's regiments were overpowered and driven back "the moment was a critical one, involving the defeat, perhaps the utter rout, of our forces." Defeat was never more swiftly turned into victory.

The general falls into the time-honored line of battle fiction, when he says that the cut was "carried at the point of the bayonet." Not a single bayonet was fixed for use in the regiment. He says also that "two rebel regiments, with their battle-flags," were captured. There was really only one regiment captured as an organization, and only a part of that. One of our punsters, however, has said it was a "major" part. The 95th New York took prisoners, as did also the 14th Brooklyn. All the troops in the railroad cut threw down their muskets, and the men either surrendered themselves, or ran away out of the other end of the cut. Later in the day we marched through this railroad cut, and at least one thousand muskets lay in the bottom of it.

During the brief period of quiet on the battlefield, we moved into a piece of timber on the Seminary Ridge, just north of the deep railroad cut through that ridge, and here half an hour was spent in organizing the shattered companies. Seven of the twelve company commanders had been shot in the battle:

* The activity, efficiency, and, if I may so express it, ubiquity, of Gen. James S. Wadsworth in the battle was remarkable. He was of venerable and commanding appearance, and was absolutely fearless in exposing himself to danger.



COL. GEORGE N. REICHARD.

Capt. John Ticknor,* Company K, killed ; Lieut. O. D. Chapman, Company C, killed ; Lieut. Howard F. Pruyn, Company A, wounded ; Lieut. W. M. Remington, Company K, wounded ; Lieut. John Beeley, Company H, wounded ; Lieut. Lloyd G. Harris, (now a banker in St. Louis, Mo.) Brigade Guard No. 1, wounded ; Lieut. Levi Showalter, Brigade Guard No. 2, wounded.

When the nephew of Jefferson Davis was captured, that gave Cutler a chance to reform his lines. But it was evident to Doubleday that he could not hold that ridge with only two brigades which had already suffered greatly, and as heavy lines of the enemy could be seen advancing, Doubleday directed Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, who then commanded the Third Division after Doubleday assumed command of the corps, to put Col. Roy Stone's brigade in between Meredith and Cutler. That was a small brigade, composed of three regiments : the 143d Pennsylvania, under Col. Edmund L. Dana, 149th Pennsylvania, commanded by Lieut. Col. Walton Dwight, and the 150th Pennsylvania, under Col. Langhorne Wister. Col. Roy Stone had been a captain in the Bucktail Regiment in the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, and was given permission by the Governor to recruit a brigade of a similar organization, the 149th and 150th Regiments, the members of which wore bucktails on their caps the same as the original regiment of the Pennsylvania Reserves did. Until after the battle of Gettysburg there was considerable feeling over the regiments in Roy Stone's brigade wearing the distinguished insignia worn by the regiment which was enlisted early in the war, and the 149th and 150th Regiments were dubbed by the First Buck-

* The line officers, in addition to this list, were : Capt. J. H. Marston, commanded Company E ; Lieut. Michael Mangan, Company E, lost a leg ; Lieut. Oscar Graetz, commanded Company F ; Capt. Thomas Kerr, commanded Company D ; Lieut. James L. Converse, commanded Company G ; Lieut. John Timmons, Company G ; Lieut. H. B. Merchant, Company H, wounded ; Lieut. Earl M. Rogers, commanded Company I ; Lieut. Howard J. Huntington, Company A ; Lieut. Wm. Golterman, Company F ; Capt. R. P. Converse, commanded Company B ; Lieut. C. P. Hyatt, Company B.

tails as the bogus Bucktails. The gallant and heroic part taken by Roy Stone's brigade in that famous battle was so fully recognized by their comrades who originally wore that conspicuous mark on their caps, that all asperities soon disappeared and nothing was thought of but the common good of the country.

B The First Brigade of the Third Division, under the command of Col. Chapman Biddle, was directed to take a position on the left of the Iron Brigade *en echelon*, with the following formation: The 142d Pennsylvania, commanded by Col. Robert P. Cummins, on the right; the 20th New York, under Col. Theodore P. Gates, in the center; and the 121st Pennsylvania, commanded by Maj. Alexander Biddle, on the left. The 151st Pennsylvania, under the command of Lieut. Col. George F. McFarland, had been detached, like the 6th Wisconsin, and held in reserve near the seminary, lest another contingency might arise like the one at the railroad cut, where the 6th Wisconsin changed defeat into victory in a very few minutes. Capt. James H. Cooper's Pennsylvania Battery was directed to take a position on the left of the 142d Pennsylvania and on the right of the 20th New York. Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery of the First Corps, directed Cooper to open on a battery in the direction of the Cashtown road that was engaged with Hall's artillery. While Doubleday had thus put in these two divisions of the First Corps, the second one, under Gen. John C. Robinson, was in reserve near the seminary.

A lull had come in the action for the reason that Heth's two brigades, which had been advanced, were badly cut up, and Archer captured. Lee, who was with Heth and Hill, hesitated to permit Heth to again attack, even with Pender in supporting distance. A new danger now began to threaten the First Corps; Ewell, whose headquarters on the night of the 30th was at Heidelberg, received orders from General Lee to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate. Rodes' division was at Heidelberg, Early's three miles off, on the road to Berlin, and




CAPT. J. H. COOPER.



Johnson's, with Colonel Brown's reserve artillery, between Green Village and Scotland. The next morning Ewell started with Rodes' division for Cashtown, and at the same time he ordered Early to move by the way of Hunterstown. When Ewell was near Middletown he received information from Hill that he was moving on Gettysburg. Ewell immediately changed direction and took the Middletown road for Gettysburg with Rodes, while he directed Early to take the Heidelberg road. Ewell, at the same time, notified Lee of his new movements; he was answered by the latter that if he (Ewell) found the enemy in strong force he did not desire him to bring on a general engagement. While Ewell was receiving the message he could distinctly hear the engagement of Hill in the direction of Gettysburg. Lee's admonition to Ewell made him approach Gettysburg with due caution. After reconnoitering the position, Rodes formed line of battle with Iverson on the right, Colonel O'Neal, in command of Rodes' old brigade, in the center, and Doles on the left. Iverson and O'Neal were posted on Oak Ridge, while Doles was down in the plain. But there was a considerable gap between O'Neal's left and Doles' right. Into that Rodes had put the 5th Alabama, of O'Neal's brigade. The brigades of Daniel and Ramseur were placed in reserve. To meet this force General Baxter, of Robinson's division, directed Colonel Coulter, of the 11th Pennsylvania, to take his regiment and the 97th New York, under Colonel Wheelock, and move in the direction of Rodes' right. Coulter advanced about a quarter of a mile beyond the railroad track with his skirmishers. That left a wide interval between Cutler's right and Coulter's left. Robinson then ordered Baxter to advance with the other regiments of his brigade, which he did, and assumed command of the brigade, and formed it in line of battle from left to right, with the 11th Pennsylvania on the left, the 97th New York and 83d New York next, then the 88th Pennsylvania and the 12th Massachusetts on its right, with the 90th Pennsylvania on the extreme right.

Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, had arrived from Emmittsburg, and halting at the cemetery, which is the abrupt northern termination of the ridge, threw forward Schimmelfennig and Barlow. Col. Thomas H. Carter, who commanded Rodes' artillery, had hastily placed his batteries in position, and was enfilading the ridge occupied by the First Corps, and at the same time replied to Dilger and Wheelock's batteries, of the Eleventh Corps, posted on Schimmelfennig's left. O'Neal had been directed to strike Baxter's right flank. One of his regiments, the 5th Alabama, had just been ordered to the left, and the 3d Alabama, by mistake, remained with Daniel's brigade in reserve, leaving O'Neal to advance with the 6th, 12th, and 26th Alabama Regiments to attack Baxter; the latter, observing the movement, removed back his right behind a stone wall, and awaited O'Neal's advance until within a short range; then his (Baxter's) men delivered such a fatal fire that O'Neal was badly repulsed, although the 5th Alabama was sent to his support. Iverson was ordered to attack Baxter's left.

In the mean time Cutler, who was facing west, saw Iverson threatening his right flank, and not knowing that Robinson had moved Baxter to the left to connect with his right, faced north, which threw him on Iverson's right flank, and as the latter advanced on Baxter, who was again occupying a position behind a stone wall, and well concealed from view, Iverson approached within a short distance without being aware of Baxter's presence, as he was but a few moments before farther to the right facing O'Neal, and driving him northward. Then his brigade faced west. When Iverson was close up to the wall, Baxter's brigade rose and delivered a volley into the North Carolina brigade, composed of the 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23d from the "Tar-heel State." At the same time Cutler and Roy Stone's brigades poured an enfilading fire on Iverson's right flank. It was but the work of a few minutes. Baxter's men, at the opportune moment, sprang over the wall, and made a



GEN. JUDSON KILPATRICK.

charge which resulted in capturing Iverson's brigade, with the exception of the 12th, which stole to the rear under a flag of truce carried by it. The other regiments hoisted white flags and surrendered. This was one of the most brilliant and successful feats in military history.

Iverson says:

I again sent Capt. D. P. Halsey, assistant adjutant general, to ask General Daniel, who informs me that he met his staff officer, and was told that one regiment had been sent, and no more could be spared. I then found that this regiment had been formed on the right of the 3d Alabama, which was on my right, and could not be used in time to save my brigade, for Colonel O'Neal's Alabama brigade had in the mean time advanced on my left, and been almost instantaneously driven back, upon which the enemy, being relieved from pressure, charged in overwhelming force upon and captured nearly all that was left unhurt in three regiments of my brigade. When I saw white handkerchiefs raised, and my line of battle still lying down in position, I characterized the surrender as disgraceful; but when I found afterward that 500 of my men were left lying dead and wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade, I exonerated, with one or two disgraceful individual exceptions, the survivors, and claim for the brigade that they nobly fought and died without a man running to the rear. No greater gallantry and heroism has been displayed during the war.

In the mean time Robinson had ordered Paul, who was on the reserve at the seminary, to advance and take a position on Baxter's right. That gallant brigade, composed of the 16th Maine, under Colonel Tilden, the 13th Massachusetts, commanded by Colonel Leonard, the 94th New York, under Col. Adrian R. Root, the 104th New York, commanded by Col. Gilbert G. Prey, and the 107th Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McThomson, advanced with great spirit, and promptly took the position first occupied by Baxter's brigade, and took part in the repulse of Iverson.*

* 107TH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY AT GETTYSBURG.—On the march from Rappahannock to Gettysburg Col. T. F. McCoy took sick at Centerville and did not march with the regiment. Lieut. Col. James McThompson was in command. It was understood between the lieutenant colonel and Maj. H. J. Sheaffer that in case they got into action he, the lieutenant colonel, would take


Daniel, who had been unable to succor Iverson, whom he was supporting, moved to the right to endeavor to force his way down the Chambersburg pike, and in so doing encountered Roy Stone's brigade, when a most desperate encounter ensued.

Roy Stone, when he moved to take his position between Meredith and Cutler, formed his brigade facing west with the 150th Pennsylvania on Meredith's right, the 143d Pennsylvania on its right, between McPherson's house and barn, while the 149th Pennsylvania was on the right of the brigade. Stone then detailed Capt. G. W. Jones with his company, of the 150th; Capt. C. M. Conyngham, of the 143d; and Capt. J. C. Johnson, of the 149th, as skirmishers in the direction of Willoughby Run, from where A. P. Hill was advancing. These companies fought most gallantly, and greatly impeded the advance of Hill's troops.

The brigade was so much exposed to the artillery of the enemy that Stone made the following change, which shel-

care of the right and the major the left of the regiment. When the brigade and division halted on the night of the 30th of June at Marsh Creek, General Paul ordered the muskets emptied and cleaned. When the brigade was back of the seminary building waiting orders, Major Sheaffer called the attention of the lieutenant colonel to the fact that the guns were empty. The lieutenant colonel said he would not take the responsibility of loading, as General Paul had given no orders. When the quick movement of the brigade to the right along Oak Ridge was ordered, the major rode to the head of the regiment and as each company passed over the railroad cut he ordered them to load, which they did on the run. When near the Mummasburg road, the regiment by the left flank went into line and charged with the brigade up the ridge at a low stone wall. The enemy was met, driven back, and our brigade captured many of Iverson's Confederate brigade.

Here both Baxter's and Paul's brigades did splendid work. While the battle was raging the major saw Lieutenant Colonel Thompson spring from his horse on the right. His horse ran down the line and when close to the major's a bullet struck him in the neck and he fell forward. To prevent the horse falling on him, Major Sheaffer pulled back his horse, and then the major was shot in the groin. He ran his horse down the hill and was taken in an ambulance to the Lutheran Church in the village. This was now used for hospital purposes. He would not go in, but remained in the ambulance. Shortly the enemy had the town and when they got to the square, a short distance from the church, the major asked to be helped on his horse and rode down the street through a shower of bullets. At the intersection of the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads he met General Wadsworth,



GEN. ADRIAN R. ROOT.

tered his men from that fire: In this second position the 150th faced west with its right resting on the Chambersburg pike; the 149th on the pike facing north, its left forming on the 150th; the 143d on the right of the latter. The brigade then formed two sides of a right angle. When Daniel advanced the 149th and the 143d faced him. Being then in good range the brigade fired two volleys, and then Colonel Dwight charged at the head of the 149th Pennsylvania, driving back Daniel's forces.

Roy Stone being wounded turned over the command of the brigade to Col. Langhorne Wister, of the 150th, who directed Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper to take command of the regiment. Seeing that Daniel would soon return to the assault, the 150th Pennsylvania was divided into two wings. The left wing was placed under the command of Maj. Thomas Chamberlin, which held its position facing west. Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper posted the right wing on the left of the 149th on the Chambersburg

of the First Division, who had with him two guns of battery and a remainder of his men. The major told him of the situation of the town, and they skirted the south part of the town and reached the foot of Cemetery Hill on the Taneytown road. There General Wadsworth said to the major, "For God's sake help me, if you can, to get these men into line"—soldiers then running in all directions. The major, in the excitement, forgetting his wound, did all he could and soon a line was formed along a stone wall on the right of Steinwehr's division of the Eleventh.

Robinson's division held Oak Ridge until the enemy were getting in its rear, the Eleventh Corps having given way, and then fell back along the ridge and into the town, many being captured in the town, the 107th among them. In the evening the major met the remnant of the regiment, and lying on the grass on Cemetery Ridge, had a talk with the lieutenant colonel, adjutant, and others. The colonel said he was completely used up and could do no more and wished to go back. The major begged him not to do so and said, "Colonel, I cannot walk, and possibly on the morrow we may have another heavy battle, and that I cannot follow with my horse."

The next morning (second day) the lieutenant colonel was yet unable to command, and the major turned over the command to Captain Roath, in case certain movements were made, and Captain Roath was in immediate command of the regiment in the remainder of the second and third days' fighting, although the major did not leave the field until after Pickett's charge, most of the time being at division headquarters, in Zeigler's woods adjoining the cemetery.

pike so as to strengthen the threatened point of attack by Daniel and Davis' remnant of Hill's corps which had not been captured, whom Daniel endeavored to persuade to unite with him in his first charge. By this time Daniel had prepared for his second advance, and had reached the railroad cut again, when Colonel Wister ordered the right wing of the 150th, under Huidekoper, and the 149th, under Dwight, to charge, and again Daniel was compelled to yield. Colonel Huidekoper says:—

One of the bravest men I ever saw was Sergt. Samuel Phifer, color-bearer of the 150th Pennsylvania. Three different times when we had been swept back, and it seemed impossible to live under the fire, he advanced, knowing it was certain death sooner or later, by my simply saying, "Sergeant, you must try it once more, for I cannot get the regiment up unless you do."

During the last charge Lieutenant Colonels Dwight and Huidekoper, Major Chamberlin, and Adj. R. L. Ashurst were wounded. In five minutes Colonel Wister was wounded in the mouth, and compelled to retire from the field, so Colonel Dana, of the 143d Pennsylvania, assumed command of the brigade. Huidekoper would not leave the field until he received a second wound, when he was taken into the McPherson barn, but was soon removed to the Catholic Church in Gettysburg, where, while on the table to have an amputation performed, he, with the others in the church, was taken prisoner.

Early, of Ewell's division, having arrived on the field, a combined attack all along the line was made. As the battle raged, color-bearers fell, only to have others take their places, meet the same fate, and give other patriots a chance to seize them. As the brigade was being forced back off the ridge, Color Sergeant Crippen, of the 143d, fell mortally wounded, and the regiment would have lost its colors, but Sergt. Patrick DeLacy saw them, and called out to Major Conyngham to rally the regiment on the colors, which was instantly done, and they were saved.

Colonel Dana said in his report :

At about this point in the action, Colonels Stone, of the 149th, and Wister, of the 150th, having been wounded, I took command of the brigade. The contest soon became severe and close. Three successive assaults upon our line were repulsed, in which we sustained heavy losses in killed and wounded, but the enemy evidently, from the numbers left upon the ground at each repulse, suffered still more severely.

General Doubleday says :

I relied greatly on Stone's brigade to hold the post assigned them. My confidence in this noble body of men was not misplaced. They repulsed the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers at close quarters, and maintained their position until the final retreat of the whole line. I have said the losses were exceedingly heavy ; more than half of those who went into the battle were killed or wounded. In the 2d Wisconsin, 69 came back out of 302 ; in the 19th Indiana, 78 returned of 288. The 150th Pennsylvania lost 316 men out of 400, and 16 officers out of 17 ; the 149th Pennsylvania in the same proportion.

The First Corps only consisted of about 8,200 when it entered the field. It was reduced, at the close of the engagement, to about 2,400. My thanks are specially due to a citizen of Gettysburg named John Burns, who although seventy years of age, shouldered his musket and offered his services to Colonel Wister, of the 150th Pennsylvania. He was wounded in three places.

Colonel Wister advised Burns to go to the left and fight in the woods, which he did, with the Iron Brigade. This incident of Burns has been rendered in verse by Bret Harte in a poem entitled "John Burns at Gettysburg."

Meredith having been wounded and taken to Gettysburg by an aid on his staff (Gilbert M. Woodward), Colonel Robinson, of the 7th Michigan, succeeded to the command of the Iron Brigade.

When Daniel and Davis made the attack on Roy Stone, Brockenborough and Pettigrew advanced on the brigade, but failed to force it from its position in the woods. Morrow was then severely wounded.

Tidball's battery, under Calef, had again been ordered to the front line, and Reynolds' famous New York battery

was directed to take a position on the same ridge near him. Reynolds had considerable difficulty in getting into position on account of the severe infantry fire. These batteries were soon compelled to retire.

Captain Reynolds, receiving a severe wound, was no longer able to remain on the field, and Lieutenant Breck, an excellent artillery officer, assumed command of the battery, and selected a position about 500 yards to the rear, where the battery opened. Lieut. B. W. Wilber was directed to take the right section farther to the left.

General Wadsworth rode to the extreme left of the line of the First Corps, where Chapman Biddle's brigade was posted, and riding up to the Ulster Guard, directed Colonel Gates to throw a company of his regiment into the house and outbuildings of E. Harman, in a field on the farther side of, and some thirty rods beyond, Willoughby Run. Colonel Gates detailed Capt. Ambrose N. Baldwin, Company K, who was killed on the last day of the battle, to perform that perilous duty. At this time the enemy occupied Harman's buildings; but after a spirited contest, they were compelled to retire, when Baldwin took possession. Hill cautiously advanced, and, as his lines pressed forward, Baldwin reported that fact. Colonel Gates at once reënforced him with Captain Conyngham, who had to fight his way to get to the Harman buildings, where Baldwin was stationed. These two companies succeeded in holding the right of Hill's corps in check for two hours. In the mean time Doubleday, finding he was reduced to desperate straits, ordered his last regiment on reserve, the 151st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McFarland, to advance on the right of Biddle's brigade (the regiment belonged to that brigade), and assist in preventing the enemy from sweeping the First Corps from the ridge until he could send to Howard for assistance. Lieutenant Slagle was sent in great haste to Howard for a part of Steinwehr's division, then on reserve on Cemetery Hill, to assist Doubleday; but Howard declined to send them.


While the left was thus sorely pressed, Early's division was forming in line of battle on the hills along Rock Creek, north of the town. Gordon, on the right, relieved the pressure on Doles' from Schurz's division, while Hays, in the center, and Hoke, on the left, prolonged Ewell's line of battle far beyond Barlow's right, under Von Gilisa, who was again unfortunate enough to have the extreme right, the same as at Chancellorsville, when Howard was hurled from his position. Barlow, seeing the movement of Hoke to outflank him, made a desperate effort to force Gordon back on the right, which would compel Hays and Hoke to retire from his right. But Barlow falling severely wounded, his division yielded ground, but rallied on the reserve. This was a better position than the first, with the Almshouse buildings as a protection to his troops, and where he had a battery stationed. But Hoke and Hays had made too much progress for Barlow's division to reform and make a successful stand. While attempting to ward off the attack of Hoke and Hays on the right flank, Gordon was pressing in front with great desperation, followed closely by Smith in reserve; and the gallant Barlow was left on the field wounded several times and a prisoner, while the division retreated from the last position in which it could make a stand. That movement uncovered Schmelfennig's right, and placed it in danger from Gordon on the left. Doles immediately advanced on Von Amberg's brigade, and forced it back on the Second Brigade, which was supporting Von Amberg *en echelon*. This last move decided the fate of the day north of the town, and the Eleventh Corps at once began a retreat for Cemetery Hill, passing through the streets of Gettysburg, closely pursued by Ewell. Doubleday says:

I now sent my adjutant general (Halstead) to reiterate the request for assistance, or to obtain for me an order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to remain where I was, in the face of the constantly increasing forces which were approaching from the west. Howard insisted that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the

distance. The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his error; he still, however, refused to order me to retire, but sent Halstead off to find Buford's cavalry and order it to report to me.

Pender's division was then moving forward, with Lane on the right, Colonels Perrin and Scales on the left. Scales struck Robinson, in command of the Iron Brigade, but was compelled to retire and wait for reënforcements. Pender and Scales were both wounded in that advance. Immediately after, the attack was renewed on the Iron Brigade and a most desperate struggle took place between the two contending forces. Men seemed to seek death by rushing to raise a flag that had fallen from the hand of the color-bearer, who lay mortally wounded. Colonel Morrow, of the 24th Michigan, after he had lost the third color-bearer, directed the fourth one to stick it in the ground where he (Morrow) could rally the regiment on it, but he, too, was wounded. Then Morrow picked up the colors himself, but they were taken from him by Private William Kelley, of Company E, remarking as he did: "The colonel of the 24th shall never carry the flag while I am alive." He was killed instantly. The colors then were taken by Private Lilburn A. Spaulding, of Company K, who carried them until Morrow took them to rally the regiment, when he was severely wounded. By this time eight color-bearers had gone down in the 19th Indiana. They were then seized by Lieut. Col. W. W. Dudley, who waved them with a cheer, when he fell wounded in the right leg. Since the war Colonel Dudley has been Commissioner of Pensions, and is one of the best known men in the country. He was one of the most gallant soldiers of the Army of the Potomac.

Sergt. Maj. Asa W. Blanchard, a noble-hearted youth, took the colors and was mortally wounded, and died on the field. As the regiment retired Lieut. W. W. Macy saw that the colors were left and soon would be in possession of the enemy. He ran back under a heavy fire and secured them. Just then Captain Hollon Richardson rode up,



GEN. W. W. DUDLEY.



when Macy gave them to him to rally the brigade. As the enemy pressed the Iron Brigade, Perrin's brigade had forced back Biddle on the left of this command, which exposed its left flank, when Doubleday ordered the Iron Brigade, and Dana, in command of Roy Stone's brigade, to retire in the direction of the seminary.

Buford had arrived on the left of Biddle, and by threatening to charge with Gamble's brigade of cavalry, which had done such heroic service in the morning, compelled Lane to form squares, which greatly impeded the advance of the enemy's right, which he had intended to swing around and thus cut off the retreat of the Iron Brigade, then fighting under Robinson, of the 7th Wisconsin, after Meredith was wounded. Buford deserves to have a monument erected on the spot where he defied Lane to advance, thereby greatly frustrating the well-conceived designs of the enemy.

As Perrin rushed on he struck the 151st Pennsylvania, under Lieut. Col. George F. McFarland. It was that regiment's maiden fight, and it acquitted itself so gallantly that no praise bestowed on it can be fulsome. Fearing he could not control the regiment to fire by volleys, McFarland gave the order to fire at will, which was so splendidly executed that every patriot can rejoice over the work done by that gallant body of men. Colonel McFarland says :

Not a man left the ranks, even to carry a wounded comrade to the rear. But the regiment had lost terribly, and now did not number one-fourth of what it did two hours earlier in the day. The enemy, on the contrary, had increased, and was now rapidly forming on my left. All support had left both flanks and were already well to the rear. Hence I ordered the shattered remnants of as brave a regiment as entered the field to fall back, and accompanied it a few paces.

In a few minutes Colonel McFarland was hit in both legs at the same instant, which caused the amputation of his right leg and seriously injured his left one for life.

Cutler, who had been the first on the field, was unable to hold out longer; his decimated ranks too well told the

great struggle he had made to maintain the position assigned to him. One of his colonels rejoiced in the fact that his regiment was the first to fire in that noted battle. Colonel Hofmann, of the 56th Pennsylvania, was fully determined to do all in his power to repel the invasion of the Confederate army from the State of Pennsylvania, and as he ordered his regiment "forward into line, fire!" he was eagerly going at his work. Several years after the battle he said to me: "My regiment fired the first volley at Gettysburg." The 2d Wisconsin also claims that honor, and that gallant soldier, diplomat, and statesman, Col. Lucius Fairchild, earnestly believes it. The 76th New York, which was on the right of Cutler's brigade, and first into line, also claims the honor of firing the first volley, and thus opening the battle. Cutler's brigade was in the advance, and formed line of battle before Meredith's did, which, it is claimed, rather gives the preponderance of evidence in favor of Cutler's brigade, but Fairchild crowded Cutler so closely in the matter that it is clear these three regiments should each have a medal of honor from Congress.

The 76th New York, on the right of the 56th Pennsylvania, had suffered an extraordinarily heavy loss. Judge Smith, in his history of the regiment, says:

All the regiments in this advance brigade were fearfully cut up. The 76th went into the fight with 348 men and 27 officers, and in half an hour it lost 2 officers killed, and 16 wounded; 27 men killed, and 124 wounded; making a total killed and wounded in the half hour of 18 officers and 151 men, or over half the officers, and nearly half the men expended in that brief period.

Among the number killed was Major Grover, who was in command of the regiment. General Cutler, in his report of the battle, says:

Major Grover, commanding the 76th New York Volunteers, a brave and efficient officer, was killed early in the action of the 1st instant, and the command devolved upon Capt. John E. Cook; and most ably and faithfully did he perform the duty. With him lay on that part of the field Captain Story, Lieutenants Cahill, P. S. Clark,

Carter, and Button. Serg. Maj. Thomas Martin was killed. Sergeant M. M. Whitney of the 76th New York, who held the right of the first line of battle, was severely injured but did not forsake his post of duty. He was a gallant soldier.

Orderly Sergeant Henry Cliff, of Company F., fell severely wounded in the left leg. Of him Judge Smith says:

And there, for five days, the sergeant lay with a broken limb, unable to stir, almost dying from thirst and hunger, and nearly roasting, while day after day he watched the cool shade in its slow journey around the tree, never quite reaching him, but advancing toward him and then retreating, as though tantalizing him for his loyalty! He was finally found by our men, his limb amputated, and he still lives to tell his story.


Baxter's brigade was nearly out of ammunition when Paul's arrived, but it remained on the field, getting what it could from the boxes of those who had been shot. While the brigade had hurled O'Neal's brigade back with heavy loss, and had captured Iverson's, yet it had suffered heavily. It held a position on the crest with fixed bayonets, with not a single cartridge. Colonel Bates commanded the 12th Massachusetts a part of the time, and so did Lieut. Col. David Allen, Jr. Col. Charles W. Wheelock, of the 97th New York, a brave and determined officer, got separated from his regiment on retiring from Seminary Ridge, and was taken prisoner in the house of Elias Sheads under the following circumstances: The enemy was so close that he entered Mr. Sheads' house, just under the brow of the hill, between the seminary and the town. A Confederate colonel and some men followed him in the house to capture him. While their attention was distracted Miss Carrie Sheads hid Colonel Wheelock's sword in the folds of her dress and thus concealed it. He was taken prisoner, but escaped after the battle. When the Confederates were retreating, he returned, secured his sword and joined his command. The regiment was commanded by Maj. Charles Northup until the colonel returned.

The 11th Pennsylvania had three regimental com-

manders : Colonel Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines and Capt. John B. Overmyer. In the 88th Pennsylvania Major Foust was wounded, whereupon Capt. Henry Whiteside assumed command and gallantly fought it to the close of the battle. This regiment captured the colors of the 16th Alabama and the 23d North Carolina Regiments in the surrender of Iverson's brigade. Bates says :

The regiment lost 7 killed, 30 wounded, and about 40 prisoners, among whom were Captains Mass and Schell, and Lieutenants Grant and Boone. * * * The 90th Pennsylvania Regiment had two regimental commanders ; after four commanders of the First Brigade, of Robinson's division, had been wounded, Colonel Lyle was put in command of it, and Major Sellers commanded the 90th Pennsylvania. He was a brilliant young officer of fine military genius.

Paul's brigade occupied the extreme right of the First Corps when the final attack came that compelled the corps to retire to Seminary Ridge. A sad calamity had just occurred to the brigade. General Paul received a wound that carried away both of his eyes. He lived many years after the war in Washington, but always had to be led. Colonel Leonard, then of the 13th Massachusetts, took command of the brigade, but soon being wounded, was succeeded in the command by Colonel Root, of the 94th New York. It was not long until Colonel Root was wounded, when Colonel Coulter assumed command, only to be wounded, and his place was filled by Colonel Lyle, of the 90th Pennsylvania. Four commanders of the brigade wounded shows the suffering of the troops on that part of the field. The brigade was well up to the Mummasburg road, with the 13th Massachusetts facing north, and occupied the apex in the right angle formed by Hill's corps on the west, and Ewell's on the north. Baxter was out of ammunition, and on that account had to lead the retreat of Robinson's division. Then came Paul's brigade, with the 16th Maine, bringing up the rear, slowly pursued by the advancing foe. But the history of the world furnishes no retreat that was conducted more masterly by the generals



LIEUT. COL. W. W. GROUT, M. C.

nor more orderly by the troops than that of the First Corps as it retired back to Seminary Ridge to make another stand in the face of overwhelming numbers. A sight most grand to see was Doubleday, Wadsworth and Robinson guiding their men with a coolness as if on dress parade. Robinson had two horses shot from under him, yet he came up from the right, leading his valiant soldiers with a steady nerve. The 7th Wisconsin retired, with Capt. Hollon Richardson carrying the flag of the 19th Indiana on horseback at the head of the Iron Brigade. The captain was on the brigade staff, and heroically performed his duty.


The regiments of the corps would retire a hundred and fifty or two hundred yards, and then turn and deliver a volley into the front line of the Confederates as they advanced, until Seminary Ridge was reached; there the infantry took a position behind the temporary breastworks, hastily made in the morning by Robinson's division, and in support of the batteries posted on the ridge. The color-bearer of the 2d Wisconsin was shot while the regiment was retreating to Seminary Ridge, when Corp. J. J. Little ran back and got the colors, otherwise they would have been captured. General Meredith, who was badly injured in Gettysburg, on hearing of the gallant act of Corporal Little, said he would issue an order commendatory of his bravery. Little has served many years since the war in the Architect's Office of the Treasury Department. Before the infantry retired from the line of McPherson's woods, Capt. James A. Hall sent back for the gun he was compelled to leave early in the day by order of General Wadsworth.

Pender's and Heth's divisions were both in front of the First Corps when it retired from the position it had held from the time Reynolds put it there in the morning before he fell. The enemy did not hotly pursue Doubleday as he retired to Seminary Ridge, but halted to rearrange his lines, which gave Col. C. S. Wainwright, chief of artillery of the First Corps, time to arrange his batteries near the seminary

before the Confederate infantry columns peered over the McPherson Ridge, stretching from the south nearly to the Fairfield road; Hill's left rested beyond the Chambersburg pike, while Rodes' division, which had forced in Robinson on the right, came forward abreast with Hill's troops under Pender and Heth, their line reaching to the Mummasburg road, where, making a right angle, Doles, Gordon, Hays, and Hoke were converging on Gettysburg from the north, in an endeavor to cut off the retreat of the First Corps to Cemetery Hill. Colonel Wainwright says:

Having heard incidentally some directions given to General Doubleday about holding Cemetery Hill, and not knowing that there was such a place, while the seminary was called indiscriminately "Cemetery" and "Seminary," I supposed the latter was meant. I therefore directed Captain Cooper to take a good position in front of the professor's house on this ridge, and sent an order to Captain Stevens, of the 5th Maine Battery, to occupy the position first assigned to Lieutenant Stewart. Soon after this the enemy filed in two strong columns out of the woods, about five hundred yards to our front, and marched steadily down to our left until they outflanked us nearly a third of a mile. They then formed in double line of battle and came directly up the crest. During this movement Battery L opened on the columns, but the firing of Lieutenant Breck's four guns was much interfered with by our own infantry moving in front of his pieces. As we had no regular line of battle on this crest, and the enemy outnumbered us five to one I withdrew Lieutenant Breck's two sections when their first line was within about 200 yards, and ordered him behind a strong stone wall on the seminary crest.

Meantime General Doubleday had removed Captain Stevens' battery to the right of Captain Cooper's, and Lieutenant Wilber's section falling back with its support, came into position at the same point, thus concentrating twelve guns in so small a space that they were hardly five yards apart. Lieutenant Stewart's battery was also in position on the same line, half the battery between the Cashtown pike and the railroad, the other half across the railroad in the corner of a wood. The enemy's lines continued to advance steadily across the space between the two crests, but when the first line was within about 100 yards of the seminary, Lieutenant Davison, commanding the left half of Stewart's battery, swung his guns around on the Cashtown pike, so as to enfilade the whole line. This, with the fire of the other batteries, checked them for a moment at this point, but



GEN. SOL. MEREDITH.



it was only for a moment, as their second line did not halt, but pushed on, strongly reinforced by a third column deploying from the Cashtown road. An order was now received by Captain Stevens from General Wadsworth to withdraw his battery. Not knowing that he had received such an order, and still under the false impression as to the importance attached to holding Seminary Hill, I directed all the batteries to remain in position. A few minutes, however, showed me that our infantry was rapidly retreating to the town.

The above is an extract from Colonel Wainwright's official report of this engagement. He was a great artillery officer, and especially on this occasion greatly added to the fame of the First Corps by the skillful handling of his guns. The infantry aided the batteries by firing on the advancing columns of the enemy, and inflicted great damage to him as he neared the seminary, although, as N. B. Prentice, of the 7th Wisconsin, who was wounded there, and for his good record as a soldier made quartermaster of the 37th Wisconsin, said to me: "We cut great gaps in their lines which were instantly closed up, yet their columns never faltered." Brave to a fault, it is to be hoped that these Southern soldiers will, if the occasion requires, defend the flag as heroically as they desperately endeavored to destroy it and ruin its supremacy on land and sea.

Stewart had a brass battery of Napoleon 12-pounder guns, smoothbore, and effective at short range. Perhaps no battery ever did better execution on a battlefield than Battery B, 4th U. S. Artillery, that day. These brass guns, loaded with canister, hurled death and destruction through the columns of infantry as they advanced within a few yards.

But the Eleventh Corps was no longer a hindrance to Ewell. He was rapidly swinging his left round in Doubleday's rear to hem him in. Wainwright said, in his report, that their right had so overlapped our left that retreat from Seminary Ridge was inevitable. Although Howard had sent Custer's brigade to help save the Eleventh Corps, yet, even at that perilous moment, Doubleday

had received no order to retire to Cemetery Hill. But seeing that to remain there longer was to sacrifice the whole corps, he gave the order to abandon the position on Seminary Ridge and fall back to Cemetery Hill, south of the town. The corps suffered greatly in passing through the town from the fire of Ewell. Early entered the town and occupied the Diamond, which is considered the center. The soldiers of both sides occupied the town at the same time. The First Corps obliques to the right and evaded the center, Cemetery Hill lying south at the end of Baltimore Street. Many of the First Corps were captured in the town. Major Gerker, a staff officer in the First Corps, was so hotly pursued, that he dodged into the Lutheran Church, which had been turned into a hospital for our soldiers. The surgeons were all busy attending to the wounded, and therefore paid but little attention to Major Gerker as he entered. He spied a surgeon's sash, put it on, took a canteen and gave the boys water. Thus playing surgeon, he expected to soon quietly leave and join the corps. But just then in came Harry Gilmore, a Confederate officer of considerable fame. He and Gerker had been chums from boyhood. The Gerkers lived in Philadelphia, and the Gilmores were Baltimoreans. Gilmore seeing Gerker with a surgeon's sash on, knew in a moment he was playing a game to get away, so he walked up to him and said, "Gerker, where in the devil did you study medicine?" Gerker said "his heart went down in his boots," for Harry Gilmore knew him well. In a minute Gilmore said to him in a low tone, "Gerker, play your game, that is all right," and immediately left the church. In a short time Major Gerker put in an appearance on Cemetery Hill, and inquired for the First Corps.

While utter confusion reigned in Gettysburg, Early, who had rode forward to the town, where Hays' brigade was capturing many Union soldiers, looked up Baltimore Street at Cemetery Hill, where the First and Eleventh Corps were being posted, with a view of pressing on and attacking that

position before the Union army had time to intrench itself on the heights overlooking the city. But Hays' brigade was not strong enough to accomplish the purpose. Smith, who had been in reserve, had moved over to the York road, and sent word to Early that there were troops moving in their rear. Kilpatrick was facing for Carlisle to prevent Stuart from joining Lee. On receiving word from Smith, Gordon was sent to his (Smith's) support, so that Early only had the brigades of Hoke and Hays at hand to follow up the Union forces as they retired to Cemetery Hill. The Twelfth Corps was also sighted by the enemy, as it arrived about that time. Slocum directed Williams to take possession of Wolf's Hill, until he (Slocum) could ascertain the position of the two forces engaged. It is quite probable that when Williams' division came in view on Wolf's Hill it was supposed that other commands would soon arrive over other roads. Rodes was in no condition to follow up and attack Cemetery Hill, for all of Iverson's brigade had been captured, except one regiment, and that had sustained considerable loss, and O'Neal's brigade had been so badly crippled that it was of but little service, leaving but Ramseur and Daniel, who had also been fighting heavily. So Ewell waited for Johnson's division to arrive before attempting to take Cemetery Hill. Johnson had about eighteen miles to march that day, and did not arrive until about sunset. Perhaps he could have arrived earlier, but Anderson, of Hill's corps, had received peremptory orders to hurry forward, and Johnson was compelled to follow him. While Anderson halted at Willoughby Run with Hill's corps, Johnson moved to the left of Early, and took up position on Rock Creek, with the idea of taking possession of Culp's Hill, which almost joins Cemetery Hill on the east; a mere depression separates them. Could Johnson have secretly mounted a battery on Culp's Hill, and supported it, the Union position on Cemetery Hill, not much more than a quarter of a mile distant, would have been untenable. In the evening Lee visited Ewell to

examine the position in his, Ewell's, front, and he was half inclined to draw him back on Seminary Ridge, which certainly would have been a good move. Ewell had studied the Rock Creek line well, and thought he could push Johnson up that stream and turn the Union position on Cemetery Hill by getting possession of Culp's Hill.

We turn now to the movements of the Union generals, and see what disposition they made of their forces. Doubleday was directed to occupy the cemetery with a part of the First Corps, while Wadsworth's division was sent to occupy Culp's Hill. Hancock, who had been very active in stationing the troops after he arrived, surrendered the command to Slocum, when the latter came to the cemetery. In the mean time Howard objected to Hancock assuming command of the forces, for the reason that he, Howard, outranked him. It seems that Meade had, in reality, sent Hancock to the front invested temporarily with full powers as commander-in-chief of the army in his absence.

General Hancock, in his official report, says :

A few minutes before one p. m. I received orders to proceed in person to the front, and assume command of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, in consequence of the death of Major General Reynolds. Having been fully informed by the Major General Commanding as to his intentions, I was instructed by him to give the necessary directions, upon my arrival at the front, for the movement of the troops and trains to the rear, toward the line of battle he had selected, should I deem it expedient to do so. If the ground was suitable, and circumstances made it wise, I was directed to establish the line of battle at Gettysburg.

Geary arrived with the two brigades of the Second Division of the Twelfth Corps, when Doubleday was falling back, and took a position on Cemetery Hill to prevent the enemy from turning his left flank, and planting himself farther south on that ridge. The Second Brigade, of Geary's division, was halted some two miles back from Gettysburg with a section of Battery K, 5th United States Artillery, pursuant to orders by General Slocum. At two

o'clock Sickles received an urgent request from Howard for help, as the First and Eleventh Corps were being hard pressed by a superior force of the enemy. At that time Humphreys was making an examination of the country around Emmittsburg with a probable view of fighting the battle there. Sickles had received no orders to proceed to Gettysburg. As yet Meade was uncertain where the battle would be fought, and had strongly talked of the Pipe Creek line to his corps commanders; thus Sickles was left in great doubt. When Howard implored him for assistance, he did not wait for Humphreys to return, but at once gave orders for the First and Second Brigades, of Humphreys' division, with two brigades and three batteries of Birney's division, to march immediately to Gettysburg, leaving de Trobriand's brigade of Birney's division, and Burling's brigade of Humphreys' division, to hold the position there and guard the supply trains. The roads were badly cut up by the passage of the First and Eleventh Corps, including artillery, and the supply trains which were ahead of the troops; but Birney pressed forward and arrived on the field about half-past five that afternoon, while Humphreys, who received orders to come on direct to Gettysburg, encountered the enemy after dark, but not being observed, countermarched his division and took another road, which delayed him so much that he did not arrive until one o'clock the next morning. These were all the troops that arrived that night.

Geary's division and Sickles' corps lay stretched on Cemetery Ridge in the direction of the Round Tops. The Second Corps arrived at Taneytown at eleven o'clock on July 1. Hancock now reported to Meade in person, when he was directed to proceed to the front and take command, as General Reynolds, who was in command of the left wing, then in the advance, had been killed. When Hancock was directed by Meade to proceed to the front and assume command of the forces at Gettysburg, he (Hancock) assigned Gibbon to the command of the Second

Corps. In the afternoon the corps marched to within three miles of Gettysburg, and halted for the night. At seven a. m., on July 2, it appeared on the field and was placed in position by General Hancock, who had joined his corps before it arrived. Before Hancock turned over the command at Gettysburg to Slocum, he sent Major Mitchell to Meade with the message that he would hold the position until night, and informed him of the state of affairs at the front. Shortly after that Hancock sent a second message to the general commanding, giving in detail the movements which had taken place, and his opinion that Gettysburg was a very strong position. Just after dark Hancock started to Taneytown to consult with Meade. Upon his arrival at headquarters he found that Meade had issued orders for the other corps in the rear to advance at once to Gettysburg, and was himself ready to go there in person. Meade arrived at the cemetery about one o'clock that night, and at once consulted with the generals present on the situation.

No movement took place during the night, except by the left wing of Ewell under Johnson. Ewell had impressed upon Lee that he could carry Cemetery Hill when Longstreet attacked the left of the Union line. If Ewell could gain a foothold on Culp's Hill during the night he imagined he would be in possession of the key to Meade's position on Cemetery Hill. In the night some of Johnson's officers and men attempted to reconnoiter Culp's Hill. When Wadsworth was directed to occupy it the evening before on his way there, he found on the Baltimore pike the 7th Indiana, which had guarded the First Corps train from Marsh Creek that day, and consequently had not been engaged in the battle. It was in good condition, and nearly as large as the two brigades which had been in action that day; therefore he directed it to the right of the division on Culp's Hill. This hill faces north, and, like Cemetery Hill, overlooks the town, both being in close proximity. After it

approaches near Rock Creek it abruptly breaks off to the west, facing easterly on the creek, with Wolf's Hill beyond that historic stream. What few were left of Wadsworth's two brigades were worn out, and the 7th Indiana was assigned to picket duty, with Company B on the extreme right of the line. It was stationed near where the hill turns to the west. On the picket post on the extreme right of the line was Sergeant Hussey, with Privates Harshberger and W. S. Odell. A noise was heard as of men moving cautiously in the timber some distance to their right. As they advanced to investigate, before the enemy discovered them, they got behind some bowlders, permitting the officer leading to pass them, when Sergeant Hussey dashed out and seized the officer, while Harshberger and Odell fired on the advancing body of troops. Other members of the company running up, poured in such a rapid fire that the enemy turned and fled in the direction of Rock Creek, where Johnson's division lay. Some prisoners were captured in that night's encounter. Ewell was greatly astonished to find a force on Culp's Hill and abandoned the project of trying to take it that night. The Comte de Paris says: "These incidents exercised a powerful influence over the battle the following day."

A noted general said that a linchpin might even decide a battle. There is no doubt but the rebuff of that small party from Johnson's division at that point was of great value, and it greatly aided in the success of our army in the ensuing battle. The 7th Indiana will ever have the proud distinction of the valorous work done that night.

There was great activity at Meade's headquarters in establishing and connecting regular lines of battle. While Wadsworth held a firm position on Culp's Hill, with Stevens' 5th Maine Battery on his left, yet there was quite an interval from his right to where Williams' division, of the Twelfth Corps, bivouacked for the night.

The Eleventh Corps held a position just outside and west of the cemetery, its left extending about to the southwest corner. Then came John C. Robinson's division of the First Corps on the left of Howard, which closely hugged a stone wall in front of it, crossing over the Taneytown road. Geary's division, which during the night was stationed on Cemetery Ridge, was in the morning sent to the right of Wadsworth on Culp's Hill. Then Geary formed two lines of battle. Greene's brigade took a position on the right of Wadsworth's division, of the First Corps, with his Second Brigade, under Kane, on the right of Greene, which was Geary's front line.

In support of Greene and Kane, Candy's brigade was massed in double columns of battalions. Geary was facing east, and Wadsworth on his left faced north, thus forming a salient point at Wadsworth's right and Geary's left; yet the line was well protected from artillery by large boulders and heavy timber.

About nine o'clock General Ruger, who was assigned to the command of General Williams' division, the latter having been placed in the command of the Twelfth Corps, moved the division to the right of Geary, and posted the First Brigade, under Colonel McDougall, on the right of Kane, and in prolongation of the line occupied by Geary. Only a part of the brigade occupied the front line, while the other part was placed behind a stone wall, some 75 yards to the rear, in support of the first line. The Third Brigade, under Colonel Colgrove, was directed to McDougall's right, with the right of the brigade well refused back, facing southeast. With this completion of the line of battle on Culp's Hill, we now turn to Cemetery Ridge, and witness the movements there.

The Second Corps, under Hancock, arrived on the field at seven o'clock, and immediately moved to Cemetery Ridge. The division of Alexander Hayes relieved John C. Robinson, which placed Hayes' division on the left of the Eleventh Corps. Gibbon's division was assigned the

center, and Caldwell's division formed the left of the Second Corps. At seven a. m. Sickles directed Birney to relieve Geary and take a position with his left resting on Little Round Top and his right thrown on a direct line toward the cemetery.

In the mean time Meade had ordered de Trobriand and Burling up from Emmittsburg, where they had been left by Sickles the day before. Arriving about nine a. m., de Trobriand was placed in the center of Birney's division, with Ward on his left, and Graham on his right. Humphreys was not ordered to put his division in line of battle until midday. Moving up to fill the space between Birney and Caldwell, Carr's brigade, with the 71st New York, under Colonel Potter, filled the space between Caldwell and Birney. The Second Brigade, commanded by Col. W. R. Brewster, was massed in line by battalions 200 yards in rear of the front line, while the Third Brigade, under Col. George C. Burling, was massed 200 yards in rear of the second line.

Birney's picket line had been on the Emmittsburg road, with his sharpshooters some 300 yards in advance. The constant firing at the front led Birney to believe that the enemy was massing in his front; so he requested Sickles to permit him to strengthen the sharpshooters in order to ascertain the movements of Lee's troops in the timber beyond the Emmittsburg road. Birney sent Capt. J. C. Briscoe of his staff with Colonel Berdan, who was directed to take 100 of Berdan's Sharpshooters, with the 3d Maine, and feel the enemy's right. Berdan advanced along the Millerstown road, and entered the woods to strike the right flank of the Confederates, which would unmask their movement. This heavy force of sharpshooters, drove the enemy's pickets in, and revealed the fact that three columns of their forces were marching to our left. Berdan was immediately attacked by a heavy force under Longstreet, and driven back in the peach orchard, with a loss of about 60 killed and wounded. Berdan did very

valuable service that day with his sharpshooters. It was equal to a much larger force with those repeating rifles in the hands of skilled marksmen; his men could hit a Confederate distant almost a half mile with exactness. Scattered as they were, and sheltered in every instance possible, the enemy was discomfited by their fire.

When Berdan discovered heavy columns of the enemy moving on our left flank, he immediately reported it to Birney, who communicated it to Sickles. It was then that Sickles gave the order to Birney to throw forward his line of battle to the Emmitsburg road, which had been held by his skirmishers all forenoon. Birney's left at this time rested on the northern slope of Little Round Top. Ward, on the left, was advanced five hundred yards, while de Trobriand in the center, and Graham on the right, were swung around so that Graham's right rested on the Emmitsburg road at the peach orchard. Along the northern bases of Little and Big Round Tops flows Plum Run, and immediately on its right is the Devil's Den, composed of large bowlders, behind which the enemy, comparatively safe, would be able to deliver such a deadly fire, if advanced upon, that would make it impossible to be taken. Smith's battery of rifled guns was placed at the Devil's Den so as to sweep the low depression made by Plum Run. Thus Smith held the extreme left position of the Third Corps. Winslow's battery, from Hunt's artillery reserve, was placed on the right of Ward. The batteries of Clark and Ames were posted in the rear of the peach orchard. Graham, at the peach orchard, had been strengthened by the 3d Michigan from de Trobriand's brigade, and the 3d Maine from Ward's. Near the Emmitsburg road Randolph's, Seeley's, and Turnbull's batteries were placed.

In front of Humphreys' center was a log house surrounded by an orchard between him and the Emmitsburg road, which he occupied with the 73d New York, commanded by Maj. M. W. Burns. From that position the enemy were watched and held at bay. That regiment was

subsequently relieved by the 16th Massachusetts. Humphreys then received an order to send Burling's (Third) brigade to the support of Graham. About four p. m. Humphreys again received an order to move forward and occupy the Emmitsburg road with his first line under General Carr, while Brewster moved up in supporting distance. Birney faced south and Humphreys faced west. This position formed a salient angle at the peach orchard where Graham and Carr united.

The Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position on the right of the Twelfth. In that position Sykes could easily turn Ewell's left flank, while Slocum, with Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and the Twelfth, could attack him in front from Culp's Hill. Meade was seriously considering an attack on Ewell as he lay stretched along Rock Creek like a snake, with the head of Johnson's division well up in front of Culp's Hill. But Slocum and Warren both urged that the ground was too rough, and the idea was abandoned. If that plan had been fully developed before Sykes arrived, and he had been directed to form a line of battle, and advance over Wolf's Hill and Benner's Hill, he would have struck Ewell in the rear, and although the steep declivity down Culp's Hill to Rock Creek would have prevented any alignment of the troops under Slocum, yet Johnson would have had to hastily retreat back in the direction of the almshouse, where the Eleventh Corps fought on the previous day, which was a very poor position. It is but just to say that the Eleventh Corps, although it was compelled to make a hasty retreat from its position on the afternoon of the first day, fought bravely, considering the fact that it was enfiladed by the artillery on Oak Hill, and the infantry force in front occupied a far more advantageous position. Had Meade attacked Ewell, he would have been compelled to push him back from Oak Hill, or else have gained no permanent advantage by the movement. In that case the whole of Meade's army necessarily would have been advanced to Seminary Ridge, which would

have made the Union army the one to assault. It was a strange coincidence that while Meade was contemplating an attack on Ewell, Lee was studying the advisability of Ewell attacking Slocum on Culp's Hill. Both commanders abandoned their movements on that part of the field on the morning of the 2d. Then Lee, turning back, rode past his headquarters over to his right where Longstreet was posted, and carefully examined the Union line in his front. That seemed to him the best point to begin the main attack, though Ewell, when he heard the guns of Longstreet, was to assault Culp's Hill, and in that way threaten Meade's center from the rear and endanger his reserve artillery and ammunition on Powers' Hill, beyond the Baltimore pike. A. P. Hill was to watch the progress of the battle, and if he could strike a favorable blow, he was to attack in the center. Lee could see the depression in the ground between Little Round Top and the eminence where Gibbon lay, and there he resolved to strike, and if possible to carry Little Round Top, which had been pointed out to him by moonlight the night before by Ewell. Longstreet looked on the work before him with deep forebodings of disaster, and was opposed to it. He wanted to march around Big Round Top, and, moving to the left flank of the Union army, take a position behind Pipe Creek, which had just been abandoned by Meade, or some other strong position, and then, being between Meade and Washington, compel him to attack the Confederate army in a position where it would have the advantage. On that point Longstreet says :

As General Lee rode to the summit of Seminary Ridge and looked down upon the town he saw the Federals in full retreat, and concentrating on the rock-ribbed hill that served as a burying-ground for the city. He sent orders to Ewell to follow up the success, if he found it practicable, and to occupy the hill on which the enemy was concentrating. As the order was not positive, and left discretionary with General Ewell, the latter thought it better to give his troops a little rest, and wait for more definite instructions. I was following the Third Corps as fast as possible, and as soon as I got possession

of the road went rapidly forward to join General Lee. I found him on the summit of Seminary Ridge watching the enemy concentrate on the opposite hill. He pointed out their position to me. I took my glasses and made as careful a survey as I could from that point. After five or ten minutes I turned to General Lee and said, "If we could have chosen a point to meet our plans of operation, I do not think we could have found a better one than that upon which they are now concentrating. All we have to do is to throw our army around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington. We can get a strong position and wait, and if they fail to attack us, we shall have everything in condition to move back to-morrow night in the direction of Washington, selecting beforehand a good position into which we can place our troops to receive battle next day. Finding our object is Washington or that army, the Federals will be sure to attack us. When they attack we shall beat them, as we proposed to do before we left Fredericksburg, and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be great."

"No," said General Lee, "the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there."

I suggested that such a move as I proposed would give us control of the roads leading to Washington and Baltimore, and reminded General Lee of our original plans.

If we had fallen behind Meade, and had insisted on staying between him and Washington, he would have been compelled to attack, and would have been badly beaten.

Lee was not disposed to accept the reasoning of Longstreet, although military men of far less fame would have recognized its force at once. That move would have placed the Confederate army between Meade and his supplies at Westminister and greatly jeopardized Baltimore and Washington. It is no wonder Meade kept a jealous eye on his rear and was fully prepared for a retrograde movement if circumstances dictated. I consider the criticisms on him, in view of Longstreet's persistent attempts to have Lee move around Meade's left and gain his rear, far from just or laden with too much patriotism. Meade was anxious to meet Lee at Gettysburg or any other place where he could safely win a victory, but he did not desire to blindly have another defeat stamped on the escutcheon of the Army of the Potomac.

Lee well remembered the Peninsular campaign, First and Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, where he had been successful. Those victories inspired him with a confidence that he could win a victory wherever he met the Union army. His soldiers greatly shared his confidence and fully relied upon his judgment, and were ready and anxious for battle at his command. The firm opposition of Longstreet to attacking the Union position nettled Lee, and he resolved to discard the advice of his hitherto trusted lieutenant. Perhaps he feared it would be a token of doubt and would lessen the *morale* of his army. There was another move he could make, viz, withdraw to the passes in the South Mountain range and there await Meade's attack; but as he had just left Cashtown, where he desired to meet Meade, for him then to waver was to admit that disaster might follow a conflict between the two armies; therefore he resolved to attack the position occupied by the Third Corps, and Longstreet was accordingly ordered to prepare for action. The attempt was then made to move his two divisions, Hood's and McLaws', around to the left through the woods and behind a ridge, so as to conceal the movement from the Union signal station on Little Round Top. If that could be accomplished the attack would be made a surprise, for there was then no cavalry on the immediate left of the Union army to observe the movements of the enemy or to give warning of his approach. Buford, who had suffered so severely on the morning of the first day, had been ordered from near Big Round Top to Westminster on the morning of the second, while Merritt lay at Emmittsburg, miles away. Kilpatrick and Gregg were on the right flank. But another reason other than his concealed movement influenced the delay of the attack by Longstreet, namely, Law's brigade of Hood's division, for which he was waiting, had not yet arrived. Law arrived a little before twelve o'clock, and was at once directed to move to the extreme right of the Confederate line, which was to sweep up Plum Run. When Law moved to the



BREVET COL. A. J. SELLERS.

place assigned him his right rested at the base of Big Round Top. Taking a hasty survey of the country around him, he saw no cavalry occupying the country south of that bold mountain and wondered at its absence, and then queried if the Union soldiers occupied that great natural fortification; but as none were visible he decided to send a scouting party up its steep side to discover, if possible, the location and strength of the Union force there, if any. In a short time one of them returned to him with the information that they had ascended to the summit and found that it was not held by the Federals. Law made haste to communicate this important information to Hood, who speedily sent it to Longstreet. As no attention was paid to it, Law again called Hood's attention to the fact, and added that he (Law) had captured some Union soldiers, who claimed to be going to the rear in the direction of Emmitsburg on surgeons' certificates. Law questioned them as to the position of the reserve hospital and reserve artillery, which they located, and said a road east of Round Top led there. Again Longstreet was urged to move farther to the right and at least occupy Big Round Top, but he sent word to Hood that Lee's orders were positive to make an attack where he (Longstreet) had posted the two divisions, and that they must be obeyed.

On the receipt of that order from Longstreet, Hood directed his division to prepare for action and directed his artillery to open on the Union left at the Devil's Den and to the right of it. The cannonading did not continue long before Hood was wounded in the arm, when Law succeeded to the command of the division. Law commanded an Alabama brigade, composed of the 4th, 15th, 44th, 47th, and 49th Alabama. Colonel Sheffield, of the latter regiment, assumed command of the brigade when Law was assigned to the division. On the left of the Alabama Brigade was Robertson's Texas Brigade. This line was supported by the Georgia Brigades, commanded by Benning and G. T. Anderson. McLaws' line on the left was formed with Ker-

shaw on the left of Robertson, and Barksdale on Kershaw's left, supported by Semmes and Wofford. Thus the Confederate line was prepared to advance on Sickles, who was awaiting the assault. Each division had four batteries. Law says he had twenty guns in action. If this is true, it is fair to presume that McLaws had twenty, and thus Longstreet opened the battle on the afternoon of the 2d with at least forty guns.

Law advanced up the Valley of Death, through which Plum Run flows, with his brigade on the right, which, instead of following in the valley, veered to the right to avoid the heavy and well-aimed fire of Smith's battery, stationed on the rocks of Devil's Den. An interval was thus left between that brigade and the right of Robertson's Texas Brigade. Benning's brigade was ordered forward to fill the interval. At the same time Anderson's brigade was directed to move to the left of Robertson, and Law hurled his whole division on the left of Birney's division with great force.

Captain Smith had posted four of his guns at Devil's Den while he left the other section 150 yards in the rear. The 4th Maine supported his battery. General Hunt, chief of artillery, had just ridden along inspecting especially the position of batteries. As he passed Smith, and saw his cannon on that advanced position, he remarked that the guns were well posted, but would be difficult to remove in case the enemy forced back our infantry. Smith knew it was a desperate fight, and worked his guns with great effect.

Winslow's battery, on the right of Ward's brigade, opened at the same time, but these batteries were unable to check the advancing line of battle under Law. When it reached within 200 yards of Ward, he opened fire, which checked the enemy's advance long enough for Ward's men to reload. Ward ordered a second volley as soon as the guns were reloaded. This produced considerable disorder and confusion for a time in the ranks of Law's division, and gave Ward a chance to advance his right and

center about 160 rods to the front, and occupy a stone wall which the enemy was endeavoring to secure.

Our troops on the left being compelled to give ground, Ward sent to Birney for assistance. The 40th New York, from de Trobriand, was sent to him, and directed to the left of Smith's battery, where, under Colonel Egan, it fought most valiantly. Ward had been driven back several times, and as many times had he forced the enemy to retreat. De Trobriand was holding his own with two regiments, the 5th Michigan, and the 110th Pennsylvania. He had reënforced the skirmish line at the peach orchard with the 3d Michigan, under Colonel Pierce, while the 17th Maine and 40th New York had gone to Ward's assistance. De Trobriand had a ravine in his front in a heavy forest, across which the enemy was unable to advance under the severe fire from those two regiments.

The 5th Michigan suffered severely, losing more than half its members. Had de Trobriand been reënforced then, it is quite evident he could have turned Law's left, which would have endangered McLaws' right; but troops not arriving in time, and the enemy advancing on his left and right, he fell back to avoid being surrounded.

In the council of war, held about three o'clock, Meade directed Sykes to Little Round Top with the Fifth Corps. Longstreet began his attack while it was in session, and Sickles merely reported and immediately returned to the front. When Sykes arrived at the base of Little Round Top, he had been preceded by Warren, for the council had been speedily closed, and the generals prepared for action.

When Warren arrived on the summit of Little Round Top the soldiers of the signal station were rolling up their flags to retire, as the enemy under Law were pressing so closely that their lives were already in great danger, and it was always understood that the signal stations were not to be exposed to the enemy's fire. Warren directed them to unfurl their flags and continue their work of signaling with Meade's headquarters. Seeing Vincent's brigade, of Barnes'

division, of the Fifth Corps, approaching, Warren rode up to Sykes and Barnes, and requested that Vincent be moved on Little Round Top, and hold it, as the Alabama Brigade was hurrying up its side from the direction of Plum Run to take possession of the summit. Vincent's men seized two guns of Hazlett's battery and dragged them to the crest, where they were placed in position to bear on Law near the Devil's Den. Sykes hurried forward, and seeing Smith's battery at the Devil's Den was in peril he (Sykes) galloped to Birney and explained to him the necessity of protecting Smith's guns, as they swept "the Valley of Death," from which the enemy was approaching and endeavoring to take the Round Tops. Sykes said to Birney: "Your troops are nearest at hand; close to the left in the rear of Devil's Den, and I will fill the gap made on your right with the brigades of Sweitzer and Tilton of Barnes' division." Sweitzer moved to the position assigned to him with the 62d Pennsylvania on the left, 4th Michigan in the center, and the 32d Massachusetts on the right. His other regiment, the 9th Massachusetts, was on picket duty. Tilton arriving, deployed his brigade to the right of Sweitzer, with the 22d Massachusetts on Sweitzer's right, the 1st Michigan in the center, supported on its right by the 118th Pennsylvania, with its right refused back at a right angle. The 18th Massachusetts was posted in rear of the center as a reserve.

The enemy attacked Tilton's whole front and the 32d Massachusetts. Sweitzer's left and center not being pressed, he directed the 62d Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan to form lines in the rear of the 32d Massachusetts to aid it and Tilton. In the mean time the enemy was moving around Tilton's right flank, beyond the 118th Pennsylvania; consequently Tilton retired about 300 yards to the right and rear. Sweitzer, on his left, at the same time fell back.

Caldwell's division of the Second Corps having been ordered to that part of the line, the First Brigade, under

Colonel Cross, was directed by Caldwell to advance through the wheat field, the Second Brigade, under command of Col. Patrick Kelly, formed on the right of the First Brigade, while General Zook, commanding the Third Brigade, still extended Caldwell's line to the right in the direction of the Emmittsburg road at the peach orchard. Colonel Brooke, commanding the Fourth Brigade, was held in reserve. Colonel Cross, commanding Caldwell's First Brigade, fell mortally wounded, and Colonel McKeen, of the 81st Pennsylvania, assumed command. The brigade having exhausted its ammunition, Colonel Brooke was ordered to its relief.

Cross had fought his way through the wheat field under a very heavy fire. Zook, on the right, had driven the enemy back, who now occupied a woods at the farther side of the wheat field, and was partially protected, while the Union troops, as they crossed the field, were fully exposed to a deadly fire. Caldwell, seeing the frightful carnage of his division, called on Barnes for assistance. Sweitzer's brigade being then near the head of the "Valley of Death" on the crossroad running from the Taneytown to the Emmittsburg road, he was directed to assist Caldwell. Brooke was attempting to seize the crest of a hill in front, which Caldwell greatly coveted, hoping to stay the tide of battle there. Caldwell rode to the left to see Ayres, whose division of the Fifth Corps was coming on the field. Weed's Third Brigade was directed to Little Round Top, where Vincent, of Barnes' division, had been. Ayres directed Col. Sidney Burbank, commanding the Second Brigade, to advance across Plum Run and connect with Sweitzer, who had been ordered on Caldwell's left. The First Brigade of Ayres, under Colonel Day, was directed to support the Second.

Ayres' division was known as Sykes' regulars, notwithstanding the fact that the Third Brigade was composed entirely of volunteers. Caldwell, turning to his own division, found that Brooke had made a most gallant charge,

and had advanced far into the woods, but was wounded. Sergeant F. C. Jones of the 64th New York, afterwards promoted to a captaincy for bravery on the field, says: "Brooke went farther to the front than any other troops."

Proceeding to his right, he found Zook outflanked, and the enemy moving rapidly around to get in his rear. That compelled him to fall back, and of necessity carried with him Ayres' right flank. The Confederates fought with great desperation, while Caldwell and Ayres made a most gallant stand. Both sides suffered fearful losses. Among the number General Zook, a brave and capable officer, was killed. The valley fairly ran red with blood from the wounded and killed of both armies.

The Union forces under Ayres and Caldwell, after the most desperate fighting and heavy losses, were compelled to yield ground. In fact our entire line immediately in front of Little Round Top was broken, the troops in rapid retreat, while the enemy had reached the foot of the rocky ridge and their columns were advancing in hot pursuit. This was a critical juncture in the battle, and led to one of the most brilliant and successful charges, for the number engaged, which occurred during the battle.

Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, commanding two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves, (the First and Third) attached to the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, had arrived on the field and were ready for the emergency. These troops had been rested and refreshed, after a long, forced march, and were prepared to use their greatest effort in assisting to drive the invaders from their native State.

Company K, of Colonel Talley's regiment, was from Gettysburg, and, from the summit of Round Top, in sight of their homes. This celebrated company had been recruited and taken to the front by its distinguished captain, Hon. Edward McPherson.

CHARGE OF THE FIRST BRIGADE, WRITTEN BY A PARTICIPANT.

The charge of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves at Little Round Top is celebrated in history and in song. Its achievement is one of the leading topics in the discussion of the battle of Gettysburg.

* * * * *

The fact that the commands of Ayres and Caldwell gave way does not detract from the skill of the officers nor the valor of their men. No more determined effort was ever made in the defense of a cause or of a country than that by the Union soldiers on the second day to hold Little Round Top. Nor does the fact that a brigade of fresh, determined Pennsylvanians dashed down the mountain side like an avalanche, and swept the advancing rebels before them in confusion, prove that the latter were not terribly brave. Both of the contending forces were nearly exhausted, their ranks thinned, and their ammunition, in some cases, expended. It had been a charge and countercharge—an alternate advance and retreat. Along the entire line the fighting was, at times, terrific; there was no less bravery displayed on the right and center of the line of battle. But I am speaking of our left and the enemy's right.


From the dawn of the second day the only well-grounded hope of success entertained by Lee was to break the left center and get possession of Little Round Top. The Pickett charge was but a forlorn hope. It was made by a large number of troops, and was an exhibition of wonderful desperation and a wanton recklessness. It was the last spasmodic struggle in death, nothing more.

When the advancing enemy came in range with Hancock's guns, that gallant officer opened a discharge of shell and canister, making havoc through their masses. Yet they advanced to within a short distance of the guns, driving away the gunners at the point of the bayonet. Just as the hordes were sure of success, two reserve batteries that had been placed in position by General Warren, of Meade's staff, opened a murderous, enfilading fire, and swept them from the hill; at the same time a portion of the infantry of the Second Corps sent volleys of musketry into the fleeing foe, recaptured our guns and immediately opened them on the enemy's lines. Great was the carnage, and yet Lee would not abandon his effort. More men must be slain in the effort. When Sickles' corps had cleared the front of the Fifth Corps, Sykes ordered a countercharge upon the again advancing enemy. His division of Regulars led the charge and drove him back upon the center. But on the left the enemy outflanked the Regulars, and in

turn drove them back up the hill in hot pursuit. It now looked as though our little Gibraltar would be taken by storm. This was the opportune moment for the regiments of the First Brigade to do their work. The brigade was commanded by Col. William McCandless, and consisted of the following five regiments : 1st, commanded by Col. William Cooper Talley ; 2d, by Lieut. Col. George W. Woodward ; 6th, Col. Wellington H. Ent ; 11th, Col. Samuel M. Jackson, and the 13th, or Bucktails, by Col. Charles Frederick Taylor. These troops had arrived on the field from a long forced march a sufficient length of time to recuperate, and were ready and anxious to defend their native State. General Meade commanded, in a voice clearly heard and fully understood : " Bring up the Pennsylvania Reserves, double-quick." Whereupon General Crawford ordered Colonel McCandless to move the First Brigade, which was near at hand, in line, ready for an emergency. Colonel McCandless accordingly executed the order as quickly as it was given. The regiments went into position under almost a full run, halted suddenly, fronted, aligned at one glance, aimed accurately and delivered two death-dealing volleys into the advancing foe, who were struggling to reach the crest, and then, with a shout and a yell that rang along the hillsides and through the "Valley of Death," with fixed bayonets, charged down the rugged declivity, crossed the open marshy space in front, cleared the rocky face of the slope beyond and halted not until they reached the stone wall bordering the skirt of the woods, where the enemy made a last desperate rally. In that charge there was a young officer by the name of John Taylor, in command of the color company of the 2d Regiment, who distinguished himself by charging over the stone wall and planting the colors of his regiment some 30 feet beyond it, but the fire from the enemy was too deadly, and he was compelled to fall back behind it. After the battle he served on the staff of Colonel McCandless. Since the war he has been Quartermaster General of the Grand Army of the Republic.

The Confederates were driven in confusion and dismay. They were never again allowed to recross the historic "stone wall." The key to the situation was securely held by the First Brigade. This wall, though poorly constructed, became a breastwork for "the five regiments of Reserves." No concentration of the enemy's forces did or could dislodge them. Any who approached sufficiently near received death from behind the wall. Thus ended the first charge of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves in the second day's battle of Gettysburg.

General Meade, in his official report, speaking of the great conflict on the left of our line, says : "Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Birney



GEN. J. H. KIDD.

(Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), the superiority of numbers of the enemy enabling him to outflank the corps in its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally designed to be held."

In the mean time, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth Corps and part of the First Corps, with detachments from the Second Corps, succeeded, with the gallant resistance of the Fifth Corps, in checking, and finally repulsing, the assault of the enemy, who, about sunset, retired in confusion and disorder, and ceased any further efforts on our extreme left.

General Crawford, in his report of the battle of Little Round Top, says: "Our troops in front, after a determined resistance, unable to withstand the force of the enemy, fell back, and some finally gave way. The plain to my front was covered with fugitives from all divisions, who rushed through my lines and along the road to the rear. Fragments of regiments came back in disorder, and without their arms, and for a moment all seemed lost. The enemy's skirmishers had reached the front of the rocky ridge; his columns were following rapidly. My command (Pennsylvania Reserves) was formed in two lines, the second massed on the first. The 6th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ent, on the right; the 1st Regiment, Colonel Talley, on the left, and the 11th Regiment, Colonel Jackson, in the center. The second line consisted of the 1st Rifles (Bucktails), Colonel Taylor, and the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Woodward. Colonel McCandless commanded the whole.

"Not a moment was to be lost. Uncovering our front, I ordered an immediate advance. The brigade advanced gallantly with loud cheers. Two well-directed volleys were delivered upon the advancing masses of the enemy, when the whole column charged at a run down the slope, driving the enemy back across the space beyond, and across the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a short but determined struggle. The enemy retired to the wheat field and the woods. * * * * As night was approaching and my flanks were unprotected, I directed Colonel McCandless to hold the line of the stone wall and the woods on the right. Heavy lines of skirmishers were thrown out, and the ground firmly and permanently held."

Colonel McCandless, in his official report of the Little Round Top charge, says:

"Our first position was naturally strong, being a rocky, woody hillside, with good cover, sloping steeply down to a plain, which extended from the base about seven hundred yards to a stone wall. This plain was marshy and difficult to cross; over it, however, the enemy passed his infantry in a disordered mass, driving our

forces back on my position. I immediately formed my brigade in two lines, the first line being composed of the 6th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ent, on the right; the 1st, Colonel Talley, on the left, and the 11th, Colonel Jackson, in the center. The second line was massed on the first, and was composed of the 1st Rifles (Buck-tails), Colonel Taylor, and 2d Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Woodward. As soon as our front was uncovered the brigade advanced in gallant style, the first line delivering a volley; then the whole brigade charged at a full run down the hillside and across the plain, driving the advancing masses of the enemy back upon the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a desperate struggle, we finally carrying it. Prior to reaching the wall, however, my left flank being exposed to a galling fire, I deployed the second line to the left, forming a prolongation of my first line, along with which they steadily advanced. It was at this time, and when within a short distance of the wall, that the brave and lamented Col. Charles F. Taylor fell while gallantly leading his regiment. Being ordered not to advance beyond the stone wall, I formed a line along it, threw a strong line of skirmishers on my front and flankers on my right and left. I remained in this position up to six p. m. of the 3d instant, the enemy shelling the position without effect."

The testimony of all the living officers and men who took part could be given, corroborative of the importance, brilliancy and success of "The charge of the First Brigade at Little Round Top."

While the Union forces had been compelled to yield ground under Ayres and Caldwell, yet Law saw that he could not get possession of Little Round Top by following these two generals, as he would have to advance over an open space where he would be exposed to a fire that would greatly deplete his ranks before he could arrive where Ayres and Caldwell were posted, who would then in turn charge him back over the wheat field, and perhaps break his weakened lines. Before the action began, he wanted to take possession of Big Round Top, but was compelled to follow up the "Valley of Death" according to Lee's orders. He then thought he saw a chance to drive our troops from Little Round Top by sending a force up the secluded depression between the Round Tops, which was only a few rods wide and covered with woods, which would shield his movements; but again his efforts were foiled, for

Vincent had formed his brigade in a semicircle, with the right of the 16th Michigan resting not far from Hazlett's battery, the 44th New York, on its left, tracing along the side of the mountain, the 83d Pennsylvania, on its left, stretching down to the depression between the two mountains, and the 20th Maine, under Colonel Chamberlain, was on the left of the brigade, and occupying a position between the two mountains. Law attacked vigorously the whole front of Vincent. The 44th New York and 83d Pennsylvania repulsed several assaults; when the 16th Michigan on the right was attacked, a part of that regiment gave way; but Patrick H. O'Rourke, commanding the 140th New York, at once threw his regiment in and saved that point.

General Weed had been mortally wounded and Lieutenant Hazlett, while stooping over him to receive what he supposed was his last command, was shot and died with his arms around him. As O'Rourke charged Vincent was mortally wounded, and soon Patrick O'Rourke heroically surrendered up his life. Thus Weed, Vincent, O'Rourke, and Hazlett lay near each other, silent in death, on Little Round Top. The battle still waged with great ferocity for, as yet, the enemy had not given up the hope of carrying Little Round Top, the key to the situation. Failing in the effort to break through the right and capture Hazlett's guns, and possess the summit, Law moved his troops back and again attacked the center and the left. While the assault on Vincent's center was made with great determination, the left, under Chamberlain, was assailed with desperation.

Vincent having fallen mortally wounded, Col. James C. Rice, of the 44th New York, assumed command of the brigade. Of the last attack he says:

Now occurred the most critical time of the action. For above half an hour the struggle was desperate. At length the enemy pressed so strongly upon the left flank of Colonel Chamberlain's regiment that he wisely determined to change the order of battle,

and commanded his left wing to fall back at right angles to his right. He then ordered a charge, and repulsed the enemy at every point.

General Crawford having arrived with two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves, Fisher's brigade was directed to support Vincent's brigade on Round Top and was posted in the rear. At dusk Colonels Rice, Chamberlain, and Fisher held a consultation and decided that it would be unwise to permit the enemy to hold the crest of Big Round Top, as it would be fortified during the night and would compel Little Round Top to be evacuated in the morning if artillery were posted on it. It was therefore decided that Fisher with two of his regiments and Chamberlain with his regiment should charge up the mountain at once and dislodge Law's force there. Accordingly these two officers, with the 20th Maine and 5th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, ascended the mountain and drove the enemy before them, capturing some thirty prisoners, including one of General Law's staff. Chamberlain in the darkness was unable to tell whether he was near a heavy body of the enemy or not, and sent back for the 83d Pennsylvania and 44th New York. Fisher had moved to the right of Chamberlain and occupied a position on the side of Big Round Top, but in the night sent two regiments to Chamberlain's left. Thus ended the conflict on the Round Tops, leaving both in possession of the Union troops, but which had cost so many precious lives.

Graham, who held the right of Birney's line at the peach orchard, was exposed to a fire from two directions. Although he had been heavily reinforced, his position was one of great peril.

The 141st Pennsylvania was advanced to the road leading from Little Round Top to the Emmittsburg road, with the 2d New Hampshire on its right, occupying the salient with its right wing on the Emmittsburg road, the 68th Pennsylvania prolonging the line of the right wing of the 2d New Hampshire on the Emmittsburg road. When Ker-

shaw advanced, the 3d Michigan, 3d Maine, 2d New Hampshire, and 63d Pennsylvania moved forward to the south side of the peach orchard, and checked his advance, but when Barksdale's movement, from the west, threatened their rear, they fell back to the road leading to Little Round Top from the Emmittsburg road. Thus Hood, with Kershaw, and Semmes' divisions from the south, and Barksdale and Wofford's from the west, were attacking Sickles' salient at the peach orchard, and melting it away; Longstreet had directed his batteries to follow closely the infantry and take a position to enfilade Humphreys' front, along the Emmittsburg road, which was receiving a galling fire from Barksdale. When the salient gave way the enemy was rapidly gaining Carr's rear, who held the right of Humphreys' line. In order to meet this new move he threw back his left with his right, still holding on to the Emmittsburg road. The struggle had been one to the death. Semmes and Wofford had pressed forward and had greatly aided Kershaw and Barksdale. Graham had been wounded, and was a prisoner, the impetuous Barksdale had fallen mortally wounded, but on pressed the Confederate forces. The losses on both sides were appalling; it was a death grapple; men fell like the leaves before an autumn wind.

General Patterson, then a captain in the 2d New Hampshire, said, that his regiment had 21 out of 23 officers wounded or killed. Scarcely had this taken place when Carr's right flank was endangered from Anderson, who sought to occupy the interval between the right of the Third Corps and the left of the Second. Hancock had ordered two regiments forward to protect Humphreys' right, but they were not strong enough to prevent or impede Anderson's advance, and Carr retired his right before Willard's brigade of Hay's division could arrive.

R. H. Anderson, of Hill's corps, who was on the left of McLaws' was ordered to aid McLaws' attack as the battle rolled from Hood's right, around toward the seminary.

Anderson had formed his line connecting with McLaws' left in the following order, Wilcox, Perry, Wright, and Posey. When Barksdale, holding McLaws' left, advanced, Wilcox, on Anderson's right, received orders to move. Perry, and Wright received the same order, and all three brigades advanced on Humphreys; Carr receiving the weight of these three brigades retired his right to a point on a line with his left, which he had thrown back when the salient at the peach orchard gave way.

Wilcox kept steadily to the front while Perry halted his brigade at the Emmittsburg road. Wright on his left, like Wilcox, pushed ahead and attacked the new line of battle. Doubleday says, "Wright pierced our line of battle more effectually than Lee did with Pickett the following day." But Anderson did not support Wilcox and Wright with Posey and Mahone, nor did he order Perry forward when he halted at the Emmittsburg road.

Wilcox and Wright made a most gallant charge, and if they had been supported, Lee's chance to break the Union line at that point would have been far better than on the following day, when he ordered the Pickett charge without any probability of success, although it has passed into history with great celebrity and fame. Three of Anderson's brigades, Perry, Posey, and Mahone, were not pressed in at the opportune moment; the divisions of Heth and Pender rendered very feeble assistance. But the last-mentioned two divisions had fought the First Corps the day before, and were in no condition to make an assault. Sickles receiving a severe wound near the Trostle House, could no longer command.

When Sickles fell it was considered advisable to remove him from the field at once for fear it might have a demoralizing effect on the men, therefore Capt. M. J. Foote, of the 70th New York, Sickles' old regiment, made a detail of a sergeant and six men to take him back to a place of safety. Meade, learning of Sickles' fate, left his headquarters hastily, and galloped to where the battle was raging



GEN. JOHN NEWTON.

with great fury, and at once placed Hancock in command.

The condition of affairs is well portrayed in the following extract from Hancock's report ; he says :

I directed General Humphreys to form his command on the ground from which General Caldwell had moved to the support of the Third Corps, which was promptly done. The number of his troops collected was, however, very small, scarcely equal to an ordinary battalion, but with many colors ; this small command being composed of the fragments of many shattered regiments. Three guns of one of its batteries had been left on the field, owing to the losses of horses and men. I established Colonel Willard's brigade at the point through which General Birney's division had retired, and fronting the approach of the enemy, who were pressing vigorously on. There were no other troops on the right or left, and the brigade soon became engaged, losing its commander, Colonel Willard, and many officers and men.

Hancock had sent a staff officer to Meade for reinforcements, as it seemed Longstreet was determined to break the line of battle on our left, and take possession of the Round Tops. Newton, who had been placed in command of the First Corps the evening before, directed Doubleday and Robinson to report to Hancock. Their divisions had suffered severely the day before, yet they quickly responded to the command. Doubleday formed his division in lines by regiments ready to charge. The left wing of the 13th Vermont was supporting a battery. At the head of the division was the right of that regiment, under the command of Colonel Randall. When Doubleday halted for orders, it was observed that the enemy had captured one of our regular batteries. Colonel Randall rode up to Hancock and requested permission to charge and retake it. Hancock said : " There it is, retake it if you desire to." In a moment the Vermont boys were charging on that point of the Confederate line retreating with the battery. They not only retook four of our guns, but captured two from the enemy.

In rear of the new line formed by Hancock, General Hunt posted several fresh batteries from the reserve artillery, which greatly aided in repulsing the advance of the enemy. The interval between the right of the Third Corps and the left of the Second was penetrated by the enemy, when Meade in person led two regiments of Lockwood's brigade and drove him back. A heavy force of the enemy had appeared under cover of some undergrowth, which Hancock discovering, directed the 1st Minnesota to charge it. The order was obeyed in most gallant style, routing the enemy and capturing a stand of colors.

So desperate was the conflict that Meade ordered Williams and Geary's divisions, of the Twelfth Corps, except Greene's brigade, to reënforce Sickles; these troops, however, did not arrive until the battle was lulling.

A. P. Hill, who held the center of Lee's army, did not vigorously advance against our troops on the left of Longstreet, or else he might have pierced our lines at Ziegler's grove, as Hancock had stripped that part of the line to save Sickles. Hill's right division, under Anderson, had aided McLaws in his attack on Humphreys. As the two exhausted lines of battle watched each other, the shades of night began to settle down, and the conflict on that part of the field ceased. The troops of the Twelfth Corps were directed to return to their former position on Culp's Hill. It was Lee's intention to have Hill and Ewell attack when they heard Longstreet's guns; but his orders were only provisional, not peremptory. Johnson, who lay along Rock Creek, facing Culp's Hill, directed Major Latimer to begin cannonading about four o'clock, but his infantry did not advance until later. Wadsworth and Greene were alone defending Culp's Hill. Greene seeing great danger of having his right flank turned, deployed farther in the direction of the Baltimore pike to prevent it. Although his line was strengthened with the 14th Brooklyn, 6th Wisconsin, and 147th New York, from the First Corps, and the 82d Illinois, 45th New York, and 61st Ohio, from

the Eleventh Corps, yet Greene was compelled to yield ground on the right, when the Confederates took possession of the temporary works which had been evacuated by Ruger and Geary to go to the rescue of Sickles.


The 6th Wisconsin arrived about eight p. m., while the enemy was making a desperate attempt to drive the 102d New York from behind the temporary breastworks it occupied. That regiment held the center of Greene's brigade, and had the line been broken there the Union reserve artillery and supply train would have been in danger of capture, and our center pierced. When Colonel Dawes arrived with the 6th Wisconsin, Colonel, then Captain Stegman, in command of the 102d New York, requested him to support his right wing, as that was heavily pressed. The timely aid given by the "Badgers" has been often acknowledged by that grand soldier, Lewis R. Stegman, who, to me, has frequently praised the 6th Wisconsin for coming up at a time when he most needed help to hold his position. Shortly afterwards the 45th New York arrived and supported the left wing of the 102d New York. It was said by an officer that the Confederate dead were so thick in front of these three regiments that the enemy could have made breastworks of them. The work done that night on Culp's Hill saved the position of Meade's army.

Ruger rapidly marched to the position where Sickles was fighting. Geary being ordered to follow him (Ruger), withdrew from his position and moved to the Baltimore pike, but, being unable to tell what direction Ruger had taken, did not move any farther. Almost as soon as the battle had ceased in front of Sickles, Ruger and Geary were ordered to move back to their former positions. When Colgrove's brigade of Ruger's division arrived at Spangler's Spring the head of his column was right among the Confederates, developing the fact that the enemy held the position so recently evacuated by Ruger and Geary. Unable to make a successful attack in the night Ruger retired to McCallister's Hill, with McDougall's left

resting near the Baltimore pike, while Colgrove's right rested on Rock Creek. Geary, advancing from the Baltimore pike, was met by a volley from the enemy occupying his intrenchments; he therefore placed his two brigades on a crest, thus preventing Johnston's force from advancing to the Baltimore pike, and reported to Generals Slocum and Williams the situation of affairs on the right of the Union army on the night of the 2d of July.

At the same time Early made an attack on Cemetery Hill with the brigades of Hays and Avery, supported by Gordon; but the latter did not advance far enough to participate. Early saw the movement was going to fail, as he was not being supported on his right by Rodes as he expected. Hays and Avery had received their orders to attack Cemetery Hill, and they boldly advanced to their work about seven o'clock. Hays, on the right, struck Von Gilsa at a stone wall at the base of the hill, while Avery attacked Ames' brigade. After a stubborn fight these two brigades of the Eleventh Corps were forced up the hill through Wiedrich's and Ricketts' batteries.

Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries, which had been cut up on the first day, were then brought into action. Stevens' battery had an enfilading fire on Avery and greatly retarded his progress, but Hays, on the right, gained the crest of the hill and captured Wiedrich's battery and two guns of Ricketts'. The cannoneers fought with great bravery, using their rammers on the enemy; a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place over the guns. One Confederate was killed with a stone by a gunner. The 33d Massachusetts poured in an oblique fire which was very destructive. Hancock sent Carroll's brigade to the point when the fighting was going on over the guns, for the soldiers of these two batteries had decided to die there rather than surrender their pieces. Carroll's brigade made a charge and drove the Confederates down the hill, which virtually ended the conflict for the second day, for Early retreated back to his former position, while Rodes, who had



COL. R. BRUCE RICKETTS.

advanced through Gettysburg and was then close up in line of battle, did not make an attack.

The night of the 2d was spent on the Round Tops by the Union soldiers in building breastworks of loose stones that thickly covered both. Longstreet's troops were close in front of Big Round Top engaged in the same work. A soldier said when they were placing rocks in position he could distinctly hear the enemy building his line of works in anticipation of the renewal of the battle next day.

Ewell, seeing that Johnson had occupied the position of Geary and Ruger, knew he would be attacked early in the morning; he therefore sent Daniel's, O'Neal's, and Smith's brigades to him. Walker, who had halted the evening before to oppose a force on his right, moved his brigade up and joined Johnson's division; so on the morning of the 3d Johnson had six brigades with which to withstand the attack of Ruger and Geary, who had only four brigades of old troops; Lockwood's small brigade had arrived from Baltimore, but it had never been seasoned in battle.

The enemy held a stone wall that rendered an attack by Geary from the pike decidedly hazardous. At one a.m., after the consultation of Slocum, Williams, and Geary, the latter took position, with Kane on the left and Candy on the right, in double line of battle along a narrow lane which ran from the Baltimore pike to the stone wall. Geary formed his line of battle with great secrecy within a few rods of the enemy.

Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps, was directed to place fourteen pieces in position about five hundred yards west of the pike, while Knapp's battery was posted at the headquarters of Slocum. Lockwood's brigade was directed to support Muhlenberg's artillery. Just as day was breaking the artillery opened on the Confederates and continued about a quarter of an hour; then Geary charged with Kane's and Candy's brigades. At first the enemy wavered, but soon advanced in three lines of battle, which was received with deadly fire from Greene

and Kane. Again Muhlenberg's artillery was ordered to open, Geary personally superintending it. Muhlenberg's guns prevented the enemy from turning Ruger's left and separating the divisions of Geary and Ruger. When the artillery ceased the 147th Pennsylvania charged and drove the Confederates from the stone wall. Then the 5th Ohio, on Candy's left, received an enfilading fire, but held its ground. The 66th Ohio was ordered in perpendicular to Greene's position in order to enfilade the enemy. Greene's men being out of ammunition, the 28th Pennsylvania, 29th and 7th Ohio were ordered into the intrenchments to their relief. Lockwood's brigade then came to Geary's assistance and was posted in the rear of Greene's position and relieved the regiments that were out of ammunition.

About eight o'clock Johnson renewed the attack with great determination, when Slocum called for assistance. The 14th Brooklyn and the 147th New York of the First Corps, and Shaler's brigade of the Sixth were ordered to assist Geary.

Ruger, in order to maintain a connection with Geary's right, ordered the 20th Connecticut, of McDougall's brigade, to occupy the edge of the woods across the swale from the Baltimore pike, while the 107th New York, of Colgrove's brigade, was placed in reserve to the 20th Connecticut between the pike and the swale to the left of McDougall. Colgrove occupied a position on McAllister's Hill, between McDougall's right and Rock Creek, with the 3d Wisconsin on the left, then the 2d Massachusetts on its right, the 27th Indiana, with the 13th New Jersey, under Colonel Carman, on the extreme right facing Rock Creek. The 20th Connecticut had been hotly engaged from early in the morning. About eight o'clock Colgrove charged across the swale, made by the water from Spangler's Spring, which made its way to Rock Creek on Colgrove's right, with the 2d Massachusetts and 27th Indiana. The point of attack by Colgrove was the Confederate position at Spangler's Spring which was surrounded by a forest, in which

Johnson's men were well posted, and protected by the forest and temporary breastworks. When Colgrove crossed the marsh, which was an open space, he was met with a deadly fire from the enemy, whom he was unable to harm or dislodge. Being compelled to fall back upon McAllister's Hill, from which position he had moved, the Confederates charged his retiring regiments, but at the proper time, when they had gained the open space, Colgrove about-faced his command, and suddenly delivered such a deadly volley into their ranks that they hastily retired back to their position. McDougall's right did not advance with Colgrove, but the 123d New York, on his left, moved up on the right of the 20th Connecticut, which, with Geary's right, drove the enemy from the stone wall along the lane leading to the pike. That position being carried, fully dissipated Johnson's hopes of seizing the Baltimore pike in the rear of Meade's headquarters, and endangering the supply trains at Powers' Hill.


About half past ten, Johnson, with two brigades, made another attempt to turn Geary's right, but were met and repulsed by Kane. Then Geary charged and retook his works, taking many prisoners. Johnson, who had been anxiously waiting to hear the guns of Longstreet and Hill open along their part of the line, had waited in vain, and after several hours of desperate fighting, fell back too much exhausted to renew the conflict, but still clung to the base of Culp's Hill. That ended the battle on that part of the field. Though Johnson had been disappointed at the inaction of Hill and Longstreet, yet they had not been idle. Lee had visited that part of the line, and made a careful inspection of it in company with Longstreet, who again urged the propriety of moving around Big Round Top, instead of again attacking in front. Lee asked Wofford if he could not break the Union line again. But he said no, that the enemy had had time to strengthen his position, and that it could not be done. Wofford held the same opinion that Law and Longstreet did, but notwithstanding all the

evidence and arguments of the generals on the right, Lee decided to repeat the operations of the day before, and gave orders for the artillery to be put in position, preparatory to the final assault.

On the third day it would have been more difficult to execute a flank movement around Big Round Top than on the 2d, for Kilpatrick had arrived there with Merritt's and Farnsworth's brigades, and taken a position south of Big Round Top to prevent that move, and, if possible, turn Longstreet's right and capture the supply trains of the Confederate army. It was a little late in the battle to make that move. Besides, the Sixth Corps had been well posted to support Kilpatrick's cavalry. Grant's Vermont brigade, which was the extreme left of the Union army, was so far out in the direction of Emmitsburg that Longstreet would have encountered him. If it had been attempted, Lee's army would have been in danger of being attacked and broken up, for Ewell was in a bad position to have been left without a support on his right. Gregg's division of cavalry was in his rear, and if he had attempted to retire, Slocum's infantry on Culp's Hill, with Gregg on his flank, could have dealt him a severe blow before he reached Seminary Ridge, while in all probability Robinson's division of the First and Eleventh Corps could have intervened between him and Lee's retiring columns, and compelled him (Ewell) to retreat in the direction of Cashtown. With a divided army Lee would have been in no condition to have dictated to Meade where the battle should be fought to a finish and leave one or the other victorious.

Every moment Lee remained in front of Meade surrounded him with new difficulties, which he was unable to surmount, and, being blinded to the situation, was fully resolved to hurl his army on Meade and strike the fatal blow.

While Johnson was attempting to hold his position on Culp's Hill Colonel Alexander placed the six reserve bat-



GEN. H. J. HUNT.

teries of Longstreet's corps along the Emmitsburg road. Soon Colonel Walton, Longstreet's chief of artillery, posted the rest of the batteries, reaching from the peach orchard to the Codori House, thus occupying the position which Humphreys had occupied the day before. Major Henry's four batteries were posted on the right of the orchard in order to have a cross fire. Dearing's artillery was posted where Pickett was to make his charge, with the Washington Artillery on his right and Cabell's battalion on his left.

The Comte de Paris estimates that Longstreet had 75 and Hill 63 cannon in that action. General Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, made a careful inspection just before the fury of these war dogs began, and estimated them at 100 to 120; and then says: "To oppose these we could not, from our restricted position, bring more than 80 to reply effectively."

General Hunt knew very well that the oppressive silence from eleven to one "was only the calm before the storm," and accordingly he arranged his artillery to meet the impending conflict. He directed Colonel Wainwright, in command of the artillery of the First Corps, to post it outside of the cemetery gate, and north of the Baltimore pike, in the following order from right to left: Stevens, Reynolds, Ricketts, Wiedrich and Stewart. Major Osborn, chief of artillery of the Eleventh Corps, was ordered to place Dilger on Stewart's left, then Bancroft, Eskin, Wheeler, Hill and Taft. Then of the Second Corps came Woodruff, Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty, under command of Captain Hazard. Next Thomas, with Major McGilvery's command, consisting of Thompson, Phillips, Hart, Sterling, Rank, Dow, and Ames, and Cooper, of the First Corps, with Rittenhouse and Gibbs on Little Round Top. Rittenhouse was then in command of the battery that Warren hurried on Little Round Top the day before when Lieutenant Hazlett, its commander, was killed while stooping over the dying form of General Weed to receive his last order. General Hunt, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Craig, his assistant

adjutant general, had just finished his tour of inspection from the right of the line to the left on Little Round Top, and was talking to Rittenhouse when two guns, a minute apart, were fired by the Washington Artillery. This was the signal for Lee's batteries to open up along the front of Longstreet and Hill. The signal had been delayed a considerable time, Longstreet having no faith in the success of the movement. He directed Colonel Alexander to take a position in the edge of the woods near Warfield's, there to observe the effect of the cannonade, and apprise Pickett when the moment had arrived to make the charge. But in a note to him after he (Alexander) had arrived at the place designated, advised him not to give the order to Pickett, unless the Union line was sufficiently disorganized by the cannonade to have some show of success. Alexander, seeing that he was being made responsible for the whole movement, declined to assume the risk. Then Longstreet, knowing that Lee was determined to have the charge made, directed Colonel Walton to have the signal guns fired, which was an order for every gun on the line to open.

General Hunt remained on Little Round Top to observe the effect on both armies. He had directed his center to remain quiet, while the batteries of both wings immediately opened and continued firing. The guns in the center soon began firing slowly.

As soon as General Hunt had decided in his mind the nature of the attack, he went to the park artillery reserve, and ordered all the batteries to be ready at a moment's notice to move to the front, after which he went to report to the commander-in-chief; but the casualties had been so great there that Meade, upon urgent advice, had moved his headquarters temporarily over to Slocum's on Powers' Hill. Hunt then proceeded along the line to see the effects of the cannonade and to replace the disabled batteries. It was now half-past two, and, according to his opinion, the enemy's artillery would soon cease. His own



COL. JOHN N. CRAIG.

ammunition was running low; several caissons had been exploded, and he therefore considered it unsafe to bring more up at that time. So he directed the batteries to fire slowly, and cool their guns preparatory to rapid firing when the charging column moved. About three o'clock the enemy's guns ceased firing; then Hunt, seeing where the charge was going to be made, ordered the batteries of Fitz Hugh, Parsons, Weir and Lowan forward to take position in front of the advancing enemy. He then went to the left to McGilvery's batteries, and directed him to take the enemy in the flank as he approached. When Pickett arrived at the Emmitsburg road, he brushed back the Union skirmish line, and boldly dashed forward. This brought him within full sweep of the Union batteries from Rittenhouse, on Little Round Top, to the right of the Second Corps. Rittenhouse could only use his right section on the advancing column; but with those two guns he cut great gaps in Kemper's brigade, which was on the right. When the column had advanced a little farther, Garnett, in the center, suffered from McGilvery's batteries, as well as Kemper. Armistead, on the left, had not kept pace with the other two brigades. Hazard's guns were heavily loaded with canister, which made great havoc in the advancing column; but their ranks were kept closed up, as if nothing had happened, and forward they pressed to the stone wall, behind which was Gibbon's division of the Second Corps. Pickett had suffered so much from this concentrated fire on his division that he began to look for his support. Lang and Wilcox, on the right, had been unable to get into position in time to render any service to him, and his troops could not be seen. On the left Pettigrew had put his men in motion; but, being posted in the rear of Pickett, he was unable to keep abreast with him. Besides, he had a division that fought the First Corps on the first day, and his troops were in no condition to make a charge with Pickett's division of fresh troops, that came leisurely up in the rear of Lee's army, having remained

idle during the battle. But Pettigrew formed his line with Archer's brigade on the left of Armistead, then his old brigade under Colonel Marshall, next Davis, with Brockenborough on the left. Trimble supported this line with Scales' brigade in rear of Archer's, while Lane on his left supported Pettigrew. Of this line of battle, General Hays, who commanded the division on the right of Gibbon, said in his report :

Their march was as steady as if impelled by machinery, unbroken by our artillery, which played upon them a storm of missiles. When within one hundred yards of our line of infantry the fire of our men could no longer be restrained. Four lines rose from behind our stone wall, and before the smoke of our first volley had cleared away the enemy, in dismay and consternation, were seeking safety in flight. Every attempt by their officers to rally them was vain. In less time than I can recount it they were throwing away their arms and appealing most piteously for mercy. The "Angel of Death" alone can produce such a field as was presented. The division captured and turned into corps headquarters fifteen battle flags or banners.

Thus, as Pickett's support on the left had been vanquished, and on his right had not been able to appear on the field, it was a forlorn hope for him to hurl his division on Gibbon, with Doubleday's division on his left to support and assist him, but on he pressed with a frenzy. Garnett in the center, who, though sick, would not turn his command over to another, was mortally wounded when only a short distance from the stone wall in front of Gibbon. When Garnett fell, his brigade hesitated for a moment, which gave Kemper time enough to come up with the center brigade. Kemper ordered his men to open fire, which was also obeyed by Garnett's brigade. Armistead, who had not marched quite so fast, was then up, when Pickett ordered a charge, as the double-shotted guns of Hazard and McGilvery with canister were causing great havoc on Pickett's men as they advanced in close range, while the infantry of Gibbon and Doubleday had both united with the artillery and were pouring in heavy volleys. The 151st Pennsylv-

vania and the Ulster Guard of New York, under Colonel Gates, on Gibbon's immediate left, united with Gibbon's men in the conflict. Men were firing at will, while officers were unable to be heard. Gibbon had ordered a charge, but in the din of battle his voice was not heard and the men continued to fire at will.

Three days before General Stannard's death I took his last or dying statement with reference to the part his brigade took in that battle. It is given in his own language as he dictated it that night, for the reason that he emphatically said that if he did not complete it then he never would. The next day he was brought home sick and in a few hours he became delirious. He was very unwell the evening before when he made it. A member of Stannard's staff was present when he gave it:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 26, 1891.

DEAR SIR:—In compliance with your request I have the honor to state that I was present at the bedside of General Stannard, a few days before his death, when he related to you the details of the movements of the three regiments of the Second Vermont Brigade in repelling Pickett's assault upon the Union line on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg, and the counter-charge upon Wilcox's supporting column.

He stated with vehement earnestness that their movements were made upon his own discretion, and that he received no orders from any one relative thereto. I was on General Stannard's staff while he was in command of the Second Vermont Brigade, and was with him at Gettysburg. I have visited the battlefield with him many times, and have heard him indignantly complain many times that he had been robbed of his due credit by the official report of his superior officer. Respectfully, JOHN R. THOMPSON.

To J. H. STINE.

STANNARD'S DYING STATEMENT.


I was standing almost alone when Pickett's division crossed the Emmittsburg road, coming in the direction of my front. The 16th was immediately recalled from the skirmish line in front of me, and placed in close column by division in my immediate rear. The enemy apparently veering off to my right, I directed the 13th and 14th Regiments to pour an oblique fire into their advancing columns. The 13th changed front forward on first company; the 16th, after

deploying, performed the same, and formed on the left of the 13th, at right angles to the main line of our army, bringing them in line of battle upon the flank of the charging division of the enemy, and immediately opened a destructive fire at short range. Unable to return the fire, many surrendered. While I was in the act of throwing the 13th and 16th at right angles to the regular line of battle, Hancock rode up to me and wanted to know what I was going to do? When I told him, he said I would leave a gap in our line of battle for a column on the right of Pickett to force its way into and break our line of battle. I assured him I could resume my position in the regular line of battle before a support to Pickett on his right could advance, as there was none in sight. Hancock still insisted that I was making a great mistake, but I knew I could handle my regiments with agility enough to put them back on the line of battle before a body of troops could march a mile, so I declined to rescind my order. He was soon wounded near me, but he was not borne from the field until he saw that my movement was a complete success, and he afterward promised me to correct his report, in which he took the credit of giving me the order to throw my regiments on Pickett's right flank, but he died before he made the correction. Not only did he not give me the order, but at the time was bitterly opposed to it, for the reason that he feared that a column of the enemy would be able to wedge itself in there before I could make a counter-movement, and bring my regiment back into line. When the charge of Pickett had failed, and his men were retreating, I was about to order the regiments back into their former position, when I saw another rebel column charging immediately upon our left. I directed the 16th to attack its flank, while I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Rose, of the 14th, to advance four companies on the left of the 16th, and pour in an enfilading fire, while the six companies of the 14th checked its advance with a deadly fire from the front. This column, which proved to be the brigades of Lang and Wilcox, soon gave way. The 16th captured the colors of the 2d Florida and the colors of two other regiments. That virtually ended the battle of Gettysburg.

I received no advice or suggestion from any one with reference to these two flank movements, and, as it was vigorously opposed, I knew if I failed to hold my position in the line of battle, and prevent its being pierced there, I would be court-martialed.

I had no fears of the result, as I could easily maneuver my troops in face of the enemy, for I had been able to do that for two days under a severe fire.

As General Hancock was speaking to Stannard, having turned his horse to the front, he was struck by a bullet,



GEN. GEORGE J. STANNARD.

which passed through the pommel of his saddle and deep into the upper part of his thigh, carrying with it a piece of wood and a nail from the saddle. Seeing Hancock reel in his saddle, Lieutenants Benedict and Hooker, who were at Stannard's side, sprang to the wounded general, caught him in their arms as he sank from his horse, and laid him upon the ground. He was bleeding profusely, and fearing that he might bleed to death before a surgeon could arrive, General Stannard took his own handkerchief and, with the assistance of Lieutenant Benedict, bound it around the wound, twisting it tightly with a pistol barrel and stopping the flow of blood. General Hancock lay where he fell till the fate of Pickett's charge had been decided, and he had sent a message to General Meade announcing the complete repulse of the enemy. He was then lifted by General Stannard's aids into an ambulance and taken to the rear.

NEW YORK, January 17, 1877.

DEAR SIR:— * * * At the time your book, "Vermont at Gettysburg," was published, I read it with great interest, and I have since had occasion to consult it with reference to matters connected with that battle. I have especial reasons to remember yourself and Colonel Hooker on that field, for to you both I am indebted for your kindly aid in assisting me from my horse when I was struck and about to fall to the ground, and that incident is, of course, indelibly impressed upon my memory. I am, truly yours,

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK

To Col. G. G. BENEDICT, Burlington, Vt.

Stannard said to me further, "That there was some danger of Hancock's bleeding to death there, right under fire, when the Confederate army was making its great effort to give the Confederacy a permanency among the nations of the earth."

When Stannard made his attack on the right, the 8th Ohio, which had been on the skirmish line, closed in on Pickett and fired with such deadly aim that for a moment that part of the line wavered.

Webb, in front of Armistead with the 72d Pennsylvania and a portion of the 71st Pennsylvania behind the fence, bravely met the enemy; while the 69th Pennsylvania and the remainder of the 71st Pennsylvania were posted in a copse of trees firing as rapidly as possible. Cushing's Battery A, 4th United States Artillery, and Brown's Rhode Island Battery, on his left, had been so crippled that they were of little use. Cushing was mortally wounded, being shot through both thighs, but he ordered his three remaining guns which were fit for service to be run down to the fence and fired into the advancing enemy, even though he had reported to General Webb an hour and a half before that he was severely wounded. When his last gun was fired he fell dead near it.

When Pickett's line struck the Union forces, Gibbon's left brigade, under Harrow, was not heavily pressed, so Harrow advanced and partially turned Kemper's right flank. Hall, in the center, held his own, but saw Webb on his right attacked by Armistead. Turning to the left he (Hall) saw two regiments in reserve. He directed them to move by the right flank, intending to take them to Webb, but in the confusion these troops joined Hall's brigade. When Webb was forced back Hall was again attacked and compelled to yield, slowly retiring and firing every step or two. Hall was an artillery officer in Fort Sumter when the war broke out, and a clear-headed soldier of splendid nerve. His report of the final result is given in such a way as to impress one with its simplicity and correctness. Part of it is here given:

During this time the 15th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1st Minnesota, and 19th Maine Volunteers, from the First Brigade of this division, had joined the line, and are entitled to a full share in the credit of the final repulse. The line remained in this way about ten minutes, rather giving way than advancing, when, by a simultaneous effort upon the part of all the officers I could instruct, aided by the general advance of many of the colors, the line closed with the enemy, and, after a few minutes of desperate, often hand-to-hand



GEN. ALEXANDER S. WEBB.

fighting, the crowd—for such had become that part of the enemy's column that had passed the fence—threw down their arms and were then taken prisoners of war, while the remainder broke and fled in great disorder. The Second Brigade had again joined the right of my line, which now occupied the position originally held by the command. Generals Garnett and Armistead were picked up near this point, together with many colonels and officers of their grade.

General Webb says :

General Armistead passed over the fence with probably over 100 of his command and several battle-flags. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers were ordered up to hold the crest, and advanced to within forty paces of the enemy's fire. Colonel Smith, commanding the 71st Pennsylvania, threw two companies of his command behind a stone wall on the right of Cushing's battery, fifty paces retired from the point of attack. This disposition of his troops was most important. Colonel Smith showed true military intelligence on the field. The 69th Pennsylvania, and most of the 71st Pennsylvania, even after the enemy were in the rear, held their position. The 72d Pennsylvania fought steadily and persistently, but the enemy would probably have succeeded in piercing our lines had not Colonel Hall advanced with several regiments to my support. Defeated, routed, the enemy fled in disorder. General Armistead was left mortally wounded within my lines, and 42 of the enemy who crossed the fence lay dead.

Armistead was a regular officer before the war, but resigned to enter the service of the Confederacy. Like many others, he was in great doubt in his mind to know what to do, whether to remain in the United States service or cast his lot with the Confederacy. I heard Longstreet tell a son of Gen. John P. Hatch that his mother begged him to remain in the United States service. As Armistead lay dying, he said: "Tell Hancock I wronged him and wronged my country." It appears that he was aware that Hancock commanded that part of the field. They had been very intimate, and when he was breathing his last, inside of Hancock's lines, his remorse was most intense. Pickett, seeing that he would suffer the loss of his whole command, ordered a retreat. The Union troops realized that a great

victory had been won, and were anxious to follow Pickett back to the Confederate line. There was great consternation in their ranks. Lee rode among them to restore order and confidence. Longstreet rearranged his lines as best he could, and posted his artillery to the best advantage to resist the attack, if one was made. Perhaps some batteries had a reasonable supply on hand, but there is no evidence that the Confederate army had enough ammunition on hand to have made a stubborn resistance against a heavy attack. But Meade was not strongly urged to make a countercharge; before arrangements could be made it was too late, and both armies rested on the field during the night of the 3d of July, in the position they had occupied for two days. That battle was fought much like Chalons, which is considered one of the fifteen important battles of the world, and its results are similar.

Aetius, the Roman general, posted his left on a sloping hill, which Attila furiously charged, but, like Pickett, was repulsed with great loss. He had robbed his center to reinforce his right, which was then in no condition to withstand the victorious cavalry, who forced back his right wing, and then turned on his center.

But the Hunnish general, like Lee, remained on the field, and apparently retired at his own pleasure. Meade, like Aetius, permitted Lee to remain in his front, after he had mastered him all along the line.

A standard author says: "It is probable that the crafty Aetius was unwilling to be too victorious." The same can be said of Meade; it was a safe victory. Lee expected Longstreet would sustain Pickett in his charge, with Laws' and McLaws' divisions. As Longstreet was preparing to advance these two divisions, a new danger threatened his right and rear, where the reserve trains were parked. Kilpatrick had appeared there about one o'clock, when the cannonading began, but was not observed for some time. Deploying the brigades of Merritt and Farnsworth he attempted to capture Longstreet's reserve train.

Maj. H. C. Parsons thus graphically describes that memorable charge :

On the morning of the 3d of July, General Kilpatrick was ordered to move with his two brigades, from the right to the left of Meade's position. By some mistake in the order or direction Custer took his brigade to the position held by General Gregg, and when the mistake was discovered Merritt was ordered to report to Kilpatrick in his place. We rode with a single brigade into the position at the left and rear of Round Top, near the Emmittsburg pike. Kilpatrick and Farnsworth rode to the ridge on which the pike is located, and after inspecting the field sent for me. I was that day in command of 1st Battalion of the 1st Vermont and at the right of the brigade. A regiment of infantry was, at the moment, marching through the wheat field from the ridge beyond the turnpike to the support of Pickett's charge ; it was then about 12 o'clock. I was ordered to take one squadron to charge down the turnpike with sabers and then ride to the left along their skirmish line, charging as foragers, and to cover of a stone house very near their batteries. We drove in their line with a loss of two men and three horses, and the regiment evidently expected a general advance and fell back to its original position. This is the charge referred to in the Confederate reports as creating the fatal diversion, and sometimes credited to Merritt, but it was made more than an hour before Merritt came to the field, and his command was at no time upon the pike.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon we were in position in the woods on the low ridge directly in the rear of Big Round Top. When the order came for Kilpatrick to attack the Confederate position and break their lines or create a diversion, the 5th New York was upon the skirmish line ; the 18th Pennsylvania was resting with its left near the Emmittsburg road ; the 1st West Virginia in the center, and the 1st Vermont on the right ; except one squadron of the 5th New York and one squadron of the 18th Pennsylvania, which were directly in the rear of our batteries.

The first charge was made by the 18th Pennsylvania upon the 9th Georgia. The regiment fell back in confusion and without loss ; the 1st West Virginia was then hurled against the 1st Texas, which was protected by a rail fence across the open field ; the charge was gallantly made but was repulsed with great loss, except at one point, where a squadron led by Farnsworth broke through the line and charged a battery—which was abandoned for a moment by the gunners—so closely that an officer, Lieutenant Robinett, fell wounded between their guns ; here Farnsworth's horse was shot. The 2d Battalion of the 1st Vermont was thrown out on the right as skirm-

ishers ; the 3d Battalion, under Major Wells, was led to the charge by Farnsworth ; a few moments afterwards I was ordered by Colonel Preston to lead my battalion in their support, but in the detour through the woods we crossed their course and came first into action. We rode across the open field, past the Slider House, and were met at the foot of the mountain by the 4th Alabama, which had been faced about from its position and at short range, less than 100 yards, we received the volley that was referred to in the Confederate report as having emptied half our saddles, but it passed over, only one horse being shot.

The first squadron cleared the wall at the right and reformed under the protection of the hill ; the second squadron fell back and joined Wells, following him in the main charge. Farnsworth's horse had been shot in the charge leading the 1st West Virginia, but Private Ellis, of Company E, leapt from his saddle, giving the general his horse, coolly unstrapped the general's saddle, and escaped with his trophy on foot. General Farnsworth was first hit as he rode out of the woods in the second charge, but continued to lead his men.

I was ordered forward shortly after his charge and we entered the walled field on the hill, from opposite directions ; his command swept through the 15th Alabama, and the principal part, under Major Wells, rode past the Confederate batteries and cut its way out through the 1st Texas, taking prisoners with them.

Farnsworth and Lieutenant Cushman and about twenty men, turned back near the batteries to cut their way out through the 15th Alabama. In their lines he fell with four wounds in his body, two of them, at least, mortal ; and Lieutenant Cushman, whose horse was shot and who was terribly wounded in the face, fell by his side.

As I charged into the field, Sergeant Duncan, who was at my left, flew past me with an exultant shout, with his raised saber,—threw up his left arm and fell under my horse. My horse recoiled over his dead body and I was surrounded and commanded to surrender. As I raised my saber, however, a ball pierced my right side and another grazed my right elbow, paralyzing my sword arm,—at this moment my horse was struck and frantically broke through their lines, carrying me out before he fell. Corporal Waller, and an aid of Farnsworth's, rode up and supported me on my horse, and told me how Farnsworth and Cushman fell together.

There has been some dispute as to the moment of this charge. Lieutenant Cheney, of Company E, was shot through the body, a ball striking his watch and falling into his boot ; the watch stopped at twenty-six minutes past five, and thus fixed definitely the moment of the final charge. In this charge, which rode twice through

their lines, drew one regiment out of position, and drew the fire of two batteries, there were about 300 men; the losses were 65, the prisoners were reported at 103. They rode more than a mile within the enemy's; lines convinced General Lee that a forward movement was undertaken, and changed his entire plans. I carried my command over four walls—three under fire—but Wells' charge led by Farnsworth, was the thunderbolt. The horses flew over rocks, walls and fallen timber, under a close enfilading fire, where the boldest hunter would not ride to-day. It demonstrated the power of cavalry, if properly hurled. If its results had been followed up by a general advance, the line from which we had already drawn three regiments could have offered very little resistance and the victory of Gettysburg would have been complete.

Farnsworth's "star" was taken by Colonel Oates and afterward lost; his pistol by Lieutenant Adrian, and his gauntlets are now held by a member of the 15th Alabama, who will return them upon my order, to his family. He was the only general officer that fell at Gettysburg within the enemy's lines, and yet he has received neither mention in Meade's report, in history, nor is any monument erected to him.

This charge, had it occurred on any other part of the field, or at an earlier time in the engagement, would have received the attention of the army and, perhaps, of the world. The scene as witnessed from Elder's farm has been graphically told: The column as it marched around the point of the hill and through the broken lines of the 15th Alabama, rode over the roughest country, perhaps, ever ridden in such an engagement. The enfilading fire gave the appearance of an infantry battle, while in its front and through its smoke flew the maddened horses with their riders and gleaming sabers. Everything gave way before it. They demonstrated, as perhaps in no other engagement, the perfect power of a small column of horse when carried under cover close upon infantry lines and hurled with its full momentum.

Meade first prepared an order written in all recognition and gratitude, but when it was reported to him that three-fourths of the men were killed, he recalled it rather than to take the responsibility for the order, which was, however, freely accepted by Pleasonton.

Measured by results alone, the first charge ordered by Farnsworth stopped a brigade on its way to Pickett's support, and drew the 1st Texas out of its position on Round Top; the second charge drew the two regiments out of position, broke the entire front of Hood's division and so fatally exposed it that a squad of my own men rode through the gap left by the 1st Texas, into our own lines, and did not rejoin the regiment for several days. The loss of horses

was greater than of men, but Company L, which went into the action with 65 men, and reported only 17 for duty in the morning, really lost only one-fourth of their number.

As usual, the infantry fired high, and the surprise and the swift movement of the troops protected them.

Such is an account of one of the most desperate cavalry charges in the world's history. While the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, led by Lord Cardigan, challenged the admiration of the world, and has been crystallized in poetry, the prowess of Farnsworth and Adjutant General Estes, of Kilpatrick's staff, will ever be remembered as one of the most gallant military feats in the annals of history. While Cardigan rode silently at the head of his brigade, Farnsworth led his troopers with a determination that steeled them against death. While Cardigan rode through a battery blazing its missiles of destruction at him, and rushed on the Russian cavalry and engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with a body of Cossacks, Farnsworth scaled stone walls and broke three lines of battle before he was mortally wounded. Cardigan returned with only a bleeding wound; but the troopers of the lamented Farnsworth left him dead on the field. But few of Cardigan's men returned from that charge, although it lasted only about twenty minutes. Farnsworth's loss was equally as great, but it caused the divisions of Law and McLaws to stand still while Pickett's men, unsupported, were enveloped in the maelstrom of destruction before the Union line, and the last hope of the Confederacy died in battle and smoke there on that blood-stained field, while the second charge paralyzed Lee's right, and came near stampeding the Confederate army. The high-water mark of the Confederacy had been reached, and it was that day rolled back, sounding down the long corridors of time, that there would be one country, one flag, one people, and one sentiment, "For the Union, one and indivisible, now and forever."

Merritt, on the left of Farnsworth, advanced on the Emmittsburg road to get in Longstreet's rear, but Ander-



CAPT. MICHAEL WEIDRICH.

son's Georgia Brigade, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and 59th, faced to the rear and stubbornly resisted Merritt's advance, for if the supply trains were captured they were ruined. Merritt seeing it was impossible to charge so heavy a body of infantry, dismounted his command and fought as infantry. After fighting some time Merritt withdrew, because it was impossible for him to seize the trains; besides, if he had overcome Anderson, Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, and Wofford were in easy supporting distance, so it was wisdom on his part to withdraw.

On page 215 of his volume on Gettysburg, the Comte de Paris says of Pickett's charge :

Armistead, urging his men forward, has reached the front rank between Kemper and Garnett—if it be yet possible to distinguish the regiments and brigades in this compact mass of human beings, which, all covered with blood, seems to be driven by an irresistible force superior to the individual will of those composing it—and throws himself like a solid body upon the Union line.

I can find no evidence to sustain the assertion that when the Confederate column under Pickett struck the Union line Armistead held the central position between Kemper and Garnett. On the contrary, all the evidence I have been able to collect from those now alive, who were in the charge, is decidedly against that statement. It is here given that the reader may judge for himself.

General Kemper says, "he was not aware of Armistead coming up in the center."

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

June 4, 1891.

DEAR SIR :—Your favor of this date is just to hand. You wish to know of me if Pickett's division, in the charge on Cemetery Heights at Gettysburg, maintained the same relative organization when it struck the Union forces as when it commenced the charge.

I was in the charge, the colonel of the 8th Virginia Infantry, of Garnett's brigade. The relative order of the several brigades when the charge began, was Kemper on the right, Garnett in the center, and Armistead on the left. This relative order was not changed during the entire charge.

Respectfully, etc.,

To J. H. STINE.

EPPA HUNTON.

AYLETT'S P. O., KING WILLIAM COUNTY, VA.,

June 10, 1891.

DEAR SIR:—Yours of the 6th instant has just been received, and I reply at once. The assertion of the Comte de Paris in his history, that Armistead and Garnett's brigades "exchanged positions just before the Pickett charge struck the Union line," is incorrect. I never heard of it before. In the final charge there was much blending of the attacking columns, from the terrible losses and gaps created by the fire of the Union artillery and infantry, but no swapping of positions. In the original formation of the line of battle, before Pickett's advance, Kemper's brigade held the right, Garnett's was on his left, and Armistead's, for which there was not room in the extended line of battle, was formed immediately in rear of the others. Fences, obstructions, the fire of the enemy in front and from Round Top, and the loss of officers, caused the brigades to mix before they struck the Union line. Not only is this my personal recollection, but Col. Walter Harrison, Pickett's assistant adjutant general and inspector general, in his book called "Pickett's Men," at pages 90 and 91, sustains me. My regiment, the 53d Virginia, was the central and directing regiment of Armistead's brigade, and he marched right in front of my colors. I did not see either Garnett or Armistead fall.

Yours, very truly,

To J. H. STINE.

WM. R. AYLETT

WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA

June 8, 1891.

DEAR SIR:—Your letter of the 3d instant to hand, and in answer allow me to say, the position of the brigades was at start like diagram below. After our left supports retired, Armistead moved into line with Garnett. He was placed as you see in diagram for the purpose of taking said position, as before the charge General Pickett knew they would be needed to do this.

Garnett.

Kemper.

Armistead.

I have nothing to guide me as to the farthest point General Pickett reached in person. We started in where Armistead's right was in diagram, and at the Emmittsburg road General Pickett sent me to General Longstreet to tell him that he would take the enemy's position, but could not hold it without help; when I returned to General Pickett with General Longstreet's answer, I found General Pickett between the Emmittsburg road and Cemetery Heights. Then three of us, one directly after the other, were sent to urge

General Wilcox to bring his brigade to our assistance. On my return I found him near the descent of the last hill, facing the Federal works. Then I called his attention to a column of the enemy which was moving by head of column around our left flank, which was much too short. He sent me at once to Deering's artillery battalion to order them to open on the column, and in this way protect his flank. Lieutenant Marshall was on left of battalion, and I came to him first. He said his battery had only three rounds of shot. He opened at once with them, after which I rode to General Pickett, who ordered our men back, so as to get out before being inclosed. At this time he was near the last valley in front of Cemetery Ridge. When I gave Kemper the order to charge, his objective point, by order of General Pickett, was a red barn. The only members of the general's staff that went in with him on that day were Maj. Charles Pickett, Capt. E. R. Baird, Capt. W. S. Symington, and myself.

Respectfully, R. A. BRIGHT.

To J. H. STINE. Late Captain on General Pickett's Staff.

NORFOLK, VA., July 3, 1891.

MY DEAR SIR:—It singularly happens that your communication of June 22, 1891, asking certain questions about the charge of Pickett's division at Gettysburg, has reached me on the anniversary of that memorable day. The facts you ask for in relation to the formation, etc., of that division are given you below, according to the best of my recollection after such a long lapse of time. Considering the magnitude of that battle, its wonderful surroundings and effects, I can but think that the impressions that were made on even a *nonparticipant*, to say nothing of one who was engaged in it, could scarcely wear out, even after these many years. Garnett and Kemper's brigades were formed in front; Armistead, with his brigade, slightly in rear and left of same. This formation was, I think, fully preserved (although great gaps, during the advance, were made by the concentrated fire of batteries from front and flank, and well-delivered volleys of musketry all along the line, yet constantly filled up by closing in, as on dress parade) until the division got into the works on Cemetery Ridge, after which everything became a regular *melee*; after that, the Deluge.

Very respectfully, C. PICKETT.

Late Major and Assistant Adjutant General,

To J. H. STINE. General Pickett's Division.

BALTIMORE, July 27, 1891.

DEAR SIR:—I have your favor of the 25th instant, asking me my recollections of General Armistead's position in the charge at Gettysburg on the third day.

When we started Garnett and Kemper's brigades were a first line, and Armistead's brigade was in the rear, forming a second line. After moving forward some distance the troops on our left wavered, and finally broke badly. Pickett then ordered Armistead to move up and take position on the left of our first line. This movement was made promptly, and while we were still moving to the front. Almost as soon as Armistead came on line with the other two brigades, the direction of the charge was changed somewhat to the left, and all three brigades were massed somewhere about the point where the Federal infantry struck our right flank.

To the best of my recollection the troops directly in front (if I may so call it) did not stand, but those coming in from toward our right flank struck us both in front and flank.

The three brigades being, as I said before, somewhat massed, I can not say exactly where in the line Armistead was killed. It was, though, across the stone fence, and after we had taken some of the Federal guns. I have not read the account written by the Comte de Paris, and of course, therefore, do not know where he says that Armistead was killed. Yours, very truly,

W. STUART SYMINGTON,

Captain and Aid-de-Camp on Pickett's Staff.

To J. H. STINE, Esq.,

No. 323 C St., S. E., Washington, D. C.

WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, W. VA.;

August 17, 1891.

MY DEAR SIR :—Yours of the 27th ultimo has been forwarded to me at this place. In reply to your inquiry I beg to say, that in the memorable charge of Pickett's division at Gettysburg, there were engaged only three of the brigades of the division, which were arranged as follows : Kemper's and Garnett's brigades constituted the first line, Kemper's being on the right of Garnett's ; Armistead's brigade followed in the rear of Garnett's. This was the order in which the charge was made.

The line of Kemper and Garnett was supported on the left by a line of North Carolina troops, which had advanced in line of Kemper's and Garnett's ; but these North Carolina troops broke and left the line of Kemper and Garnett unsupported on the left.

I was adjutant of the 9th Virginia Regiment, which was the left regiment of Armistead's brigade. I have the impression, made on me at the time, that Garnett's brigade had become so reduced, that as it advanced, it appeared to me as a skirmish line. Armistead's brigade struck the " Bloody Angle," as it was called. I wish it were permitted me to speak of the gallant conduct of General

Armistead; how, holding his hat on the point of his sword, he strode along before his brigade, until within a hundred yards of the stone fence, a person on horseback (I have been told that it was General Garnett) engaged him in conversation for a few moments, when his regiments passed him; and then when he came up to the stone fence, he strode over it, calling on his men to follow, and advanced to the abandoned artillery guns of the enemy and placed his hands upon them as if to turn them upon his foes, and in that act was shot down.

Very respectfully,

J. F. CROCKER.

To J. H. STINE, Esq., Washington, D. C.

General Huidekoper was taken to the Catholic Church, the belfry of which was used by Ewell and his staff for observation. When these officers came down, they talked over the situation. It was repeatedly said that Ewell's Corps was out of ammunition, and the cartridge boxes of the dead were resorted to to replenish their supply.

Robert I. Patterson, of the 19th Indiana, was taken prisoner on the first day, and was held in the rear of the Confederate line. When Pickett's charge was repulsed, Lee and his staff rode near him, when he could hear their conversation and Lee's orders. Patterson says:

The utmost consternation prevailed in the Confederate army, and arrangements for the immediate removal of their supply trains was made, with the army to follow. But as a countercharge was not made, their lines were rearranged to hold their position.

Meade rode to the front to consider the advisability of attacking with his left wing, but he feared that in crossing the plain where Pickett had just suffered a disaster the Union army would in turn meet the same fate, as he was not aware of the scanty amount of ammunition of the Confederate batteries as given by Pickett's staff, so he decided to feel Lee's position, and ordered McCandless' brigade to advance.

The enemy's sharpshooters, with a battery in their immediate front, were defiant and troublesome, therefore, in accordance with orders, McCandless, with his First Bri-

gade, at once proceeded to silence or capture them. The Bucktails, Major Hartshorne; 1st, Colonel Talley; 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Woodward; 11th, Colonel Jackson, crossed the "wall" and advanced through the woods to an open field, waving with golden grain; while Colonel Erit, with the 6th Regiment, crept cautiously up to the battery which he stormed and captured. While the 6th was fairly engaged taking the battery, McCandless, with the aforementioned regiments of the brigade, which, after attracting the attention of the enemy, and drawing his fire, had dropped upon the ground, now moved by the right flank, and filing left forward in line of battle in a woods at right angles with the "stone wall," and deployed skirmishers to the front, right, and left, charged on double-quick over the field for half a mile, receiving the enemy's fire from the woods on three sides. Half wheeling to the right and pouring a few volleys into the enemy in the woods, the brigade charged up the crest.

Halting a few moments, it faced about, wheeled a little to the right, and, with a shout, charged through the woods in their rear, through the meadow, and up over the steep acclivity on the opposite side, taking the enemy in the flank, driving him in confusion, and penetrating far into his lines. The trophies of this brilliant movement, besides the capture of the battery, were 6,000 stand of arms; the flag of the 15th Georgia, and three hundred prisoners, including a colonel and several line officers. The Confederate colonel surrendered to Colonel Talley, who conducted him to the Union lines as one of his prizes. The ground of the previous day's fight was retrieved, and with it the wounded who had lain where they fell.

This was the last fighting done along the line of the field. The battle of Gettysburg was ended. It was late twilight when the First Brigade returned to the main lines heavily laden with their trophies of war, physically exhausted, but mentally happy. Pennsylvania was redeemed, the Union cause sustained. It is worthy of note that Gen.

John F. Reynolds' first command in the army was the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, that he opened the fight, and that his old brigade closed it.

Company K of Colonel Talley's regiment should have special mention in history. It was from Gettysburg, and during the three days' terrible fighting at their homes not a man asked leave to visit his family. The entire company, who were not killed or wounded, followed the retreating enemy and remained with the command to the end of their term of service. The company was commanded in the battle by Capt. Henry M. Minnigh and Lieut. George E. Kitzmiller. It was recruited by Capt. Edward McPherson, from among young men of the best families of that now historic town. McPherson resigned to take a seat in Congress, but his patriotic zeal induced him to volunteer as a staff officer, in which capacity he did valuable service for his country.

RIGHT FLANK AT GETTYSBURG.


The momentous events that occurred at Gettysburg on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July, 1863, were so transcendently important, and so attracted the attention of the whole country and riveted it upon the main battle that ebbed and flowed from Seminary Ridge to and around Cemetery Hill and the Round Tops that many minor events occurring on both flanks of the contending armies, which exerted an important influence on the successful issue of the greatest battle of modern times, were forgotten or lost sight of for a long time.

It is not the intention of this history to enter into a detailed account of the fighting that occurred on this flank, therefore much that would be interesting must be omitted, and the reader referred to the accounts of Miller, Carpenter, Brooke, and Kidd. Only such events as are necessary to connect this brilliant cavalry fight with the main battle are narrated.

The 30th of June found the Army of the Potomac on

the move on all the roads leading north and northeast from Frederick toward Pennsylvania. Buford was at Gettysburg, Kilpatrick at Hanover, where he encountered Stuart, and forced him off the direct road to Gettysburg, obliging him to make a long detour which carried him to Carlisle. Gregg was at Manchester; from thence on the morning of the 1st of July, he marched to Hanover Junction, and from thence, on the night of the 1st, to Hanover, with McIntosh's and Irvin Gregg's brigades. Huey's brigade was sent to Westminster. Early on the morning of the 2d the march was resumed via the Baughnatown road to Gettysburg, and the command marched to the extreme right of our line on Cross Creek about twelve m., having passed Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves on the road. At the Revere House the command turned to the left and proceeded as far as the Baltimore pike at White's Run; at this point it was turned back, again encountering Crawford hurrying to the front, and retraced its steps to the Hanover road, and took up a position, about two p. m., on the eastern slope of Brinkerhoff's Hill, relieving some infantry posted on the left or south of the road. This regiment on being relieved immediately withdrew by its left, and Irvin Gregg's brigade at once became engaged in skirmishing with the enemy occupying the western slope of the same hill. During the afternoon the artillery was brought into play, and toward nightfall McIntosh's brigade became engaged on the right, and a spirited contest occurred along the summit of the ridge between the dismounted cavalymen and Walker's infantry brigade of Johnson's division for the possession of a stone fence; but the cavalry got and held it. After nightfall the division withdrew and bivouacked on the Baltimore pike east of White's Run.

During the forenoon of the 3d Irvin Gregg's brigade was ordered to report to the division commander, on the Taneytown road in the vicinity of General Meade's headquarters, and on the arrival of the head of the column Colonel Gregg



GEN. GREGG.

was informed that General Meade was in doubt as to where General Lee was and what he was doing, and desired him to move up the road into Gettysburg and try to find out; however, before the order could be executed, General Meade was advised as to General Lee's position and intentions, the order was countermanded, and the brigade was directed to resume its position of the day before.

Before reaching the Hanover road the column was deflected to the left opposite Rhiel's house, and took up a position south of Deodorf's house, connecting with Neill's brigade of the Sixth Corps. While the Third Brigade was moving toward Gettysburg the First Brigade moved to the Low Dutch or Salem road, about three-fourths of a mile from its junction with the Hanover road.

Early on the morning of the 3d Custer had been directed to report to Kilpatrick on the left of the army, and was, as he states, in the act of complying with instructions, when an order from Gen. D. McM. Gregg directed him to take position across the Hanover road on the extreme right of the army. This order he complied with, placing his brigade in position facing Gettysburg near the Spangler House. At twelve m. Custer received another order, directing him, on being relieved by a brigade of the Second Division, to proceed to join General Kilpatrick.

On the same morning General Gregg was again directed to take up his position on the right of our line, and he posted the First and Third Brigades on the right of the infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Baltimore pike, because, as he states in his report, he understood General Custer was occupying with his brigade his position of the previous day, which was the extreme right of the cavalry forces:

At 12 m., General Gregg received an order from General Pleasanton, commanding the Cavalry Corps, to send General Custer to report to General Kilpatrick, and he sent the First Brigade of his division to relieve him. This change having been made, and the enemy displaying a

strong line of skirmishers evidently with a view to attack. he determined, notwithstanding his orders, to retain General Custer's brigade until after the impending attack was repulsed, realizing the disastrous consequences that must result if the enemy succeeded in driving him from his position.

During the forenoon Custer had noticed some movements of the enemy, and was convinced that an attack would be made, and had made his arrangements to meet it; but just as McIntosh arrived, he received an order to report to General Kilpatrick on the left of the army, and he informed McIntosh that some trouble was brewing on his right and front. Custer at once took the necessary steps to develop the designs of the enemy, by advancing his skirmishers and pushing forward a mounted force toward the York pike, on the road leading by Stolsmith's house.

From Stuart's position along Cress Ridge, the slope and summit of which were covered with timber, and which extended from Rummel's farm to Stolsmith's, the whole country to the south and east lay like an open map exposed to the gaze of the Confederate commander. The position and every movement of the Union troops could be distinctly seen, whilst his men were perfectly screened.

Custer soon found out that he was in the presence of a formidable force, and sent word to General Gregg to that effect, asking that Col. Irvin Gregg's brigade be brought up at once. General Gregg, however, had received a dispatch from General Howard, who, from Cemetery Ridge, had observed the movement of Stuart toward our right, informing him of that fact; and coming on the field, he averted Custer's movement toward the left, and Col. Irvin Gregg was ordered to move as rapidly as possible and mass his brigade at the junction of the Plum Creek and Hanover roads at the Revere House, about a mile directly south from Rummel's farm buildings, behind which the right center of Stuart's line rested, while his skirmishers were

thrown forward to the buildings, which they occupied, as well as the fences in advance.

McIntosh observing this, and entirely discerning Stuart's position, dismounted the 1st New Jersey and deployed it in the direction of Rummel's, the enemy extending his skirmish line south along the fence, and opened with his batteries from the summit of the ridge. Two squadrons of the 3d Pennsylvania and Duvall's troops were moved across the fields between the Lott House and Rummel's in support of the left of the 1st New Jersey, and two squadrons were moved out on the Low Dutch road to protect our right, and one squadron was drawn up facing northwest, its right extending toward the junction of the Low Dutch road and that leading by Stolsmith's to the York pike, the left of Stuart's line. Custer ordered Pennington's battery in position in front of the Spangler House, north of the Hanover road, while Randol was put in position near the Lott House west of the Low Dutch road. The 1st Maryland was in reserve near the Lott House, and Custer was in the act of withdrawing, in compliance with his orders to report to General Kilpatrick on the extreme left of the army. At this junction General Gregg, who had been apprised of the formidable force in his front by General Howard's dispatch, appeared upon the field, arrested Custer's movement, took command, and assumed direction of the battle about to ensue.

The 1st Maryland Cavalry, which was stationed near Lott's house, was moved to the Low Dutch road to strengthen the right, the 5th Michigan was put in to support the left, and under its gallant colonel, Russell A. Alger, made one of the most brilliant charges of the war, but was finally obliged to fall back for want of ammunition, when the enemy charged our right and center. The 7th Michigan advanced to meet the charge, but the enemy, pushing in fresh troops, that gallant regiment was forced back. The charge of the 1st Virginia was determined and vigorous, but they became scattered by the flank fire of our

carbines and the artillery fire, and were in turn compelled to retire on their supports.

While this fighting, charging, and countercharging was going on in the fields between the Lott House and Rummel's, Stuart was forming Hampton's and Fitz Lee's brigades behind the belt of timber near Stolsmith's for a final charge to crush the Union forces and drive them from the field. Irvin Gregg's brigade began to arrive and was massing near the Revere House on the Hanover road on our left flank and in plain view of Stuart. Of this part of the action, and the end of the fight, Captain Miller, in his article on "Battles and Leaders of the War, No. 21," says:

The afternoon was passing away, the sun was declining in the heavens, and the shadows were beginning to lengthen, when there was seen to emerge from behind the screen of woods in front of Stolsmith's the head of a column which grew as it advanced into a mighty mass until the brigades of Hampton and Lee stood revealed to the gaze of the Union commander; steadily forward they moved as if on parade, directing their march on the Spangler House, the center of the Union line. For an instant the Union forces were mute with admiration at the magnificent spectacle, then the guns of Pennington opened with a roar of shot and shell whirled across the plain, tearing great gaps through and through the gray mass; but filling the vacant places, on they came. Canister was substituted for shell, and the head of the column melted away, but nothing could stay that mighty mass. Suddenly, at the opportune moment, Gregg, who had quietly and intently watched the movement from its commencement, directed the 1st Michigan to charge, and with Custer and Town at their head, the gallant Wolverines dashed forward with a ringing shout full upon the head of the advancing force. The meeting was as the crash of ocean waves breaking on a rock-bound coast, and men and horses rolled and tossed like foam upon the crest. Alger with the 8th and part of the 7th Michigan, charged the column upon its right flank. McIntosh's squadrons, each acting for itself, charged on the right and left piercing it through, whilst Town's charge entered its front like a wedge and the mighty engine was broken to pieces, its individual members driven from the field, and the right flank was won.

General Stuart, in his report of this fight, says that he withdrew after this repulse for the reason that all his avail-

able forces had been put in, and that Gregg had a large brigade (Col. Irvin Gregg's) massed upon his left that had not been engaged, and that he did not deem it advisable to renew the contest.

Of the commander of the Union forces it is hardly necessary to speak, but we cannot forbear to quote from the address of Gen. James H. Kidd, at the dedication of the Michigan monuments :

If Custer's presence on the field was opportune, and, as has often been said, providential, it is to Gen. D. McM. Gregg to whom, under Providence, the credit for keeping him there was due. Gregg was a great and a modest soldier, and to him let us pause a moment before we enter on a description of the coming battle, to pay the tribute of our admiration. In the light of all the official reports put together link by link, so as to make one connected chain of evidence, we can see that the engagement that took place here almost twenty-six years ago was, from first to last, a well-planned battle, in which the different commands were maneuvered and placed with the sagacity displayed by a skillful chess player in moving the pawns upon a chess board ; in which every detail was the fruit of the brain of one man who, from the time he turned Custer to the northward until he sent the 1st Michigan thundering against the brigades of Hampton and Fitz-Hugh Lee, made not a single false move ; who was distinguished not less for his intuitive foresight than for his quick perceptions at critical moments. That man was Gen. D. McM. Gregg.

As Lee retreated, and our army advanced, T. J. Shannon, of the 14th Regulars, saw a Confederate leaning forward on a rock at the Devil's Den, while a Union soldier was in the same position behind a rock near the base of Little Round Top. Both had evidently fired at the same time, and both had expired and remained in the position they occupied when the fatal bullet ended their lives and sent both souls into eternity.

While Meade advanced in the direction of Gettysburg, he was compelled to make his base of supplies at Westminster, on the Western Maryland Railroad. From there the army was supplied by wagons. When the battle began,

Westminster was a great source of anxiety to Meade lest J. E. B. Stuart should return there and seize all of the stores. So he detailed several picked regiments to protect and guard it in case Stuart did attempt it. Looking over the regiments, the 15th Vermont, under Col. Redfield Proctor, and Lieut. Col. W. W. Grout, was selected. It belonged to the brigade of General Stannard, which won such great fame in that flank charge on Pickett's division. Time has proven that the selection was a wise one, for Redfield Proctor's executive ability has since elevated him to be Governor of Vermont, and Secretary of War under Harrison. In the latter position his capacity has ranked him as one of the ablest Secretaries since the days of General Knox, and the momentum of its force placed him in the United States Senate as the successor of Senator Edmunds. Lieutenant Colonel Grout, has been brigadier general of militia of Vermont, and many years a member of Congress, serving on some of the most important committees. If the apprehended attack on Westminster had been made by Stuart it would have been stubbornly resisted.

The losses of the Union army at Gettysburg, were as follows, in the aggregate for the three days, stated by brigades:

FIRST CORPS.

Headquarters—Staff.....	7
First Division, First Brigade.....	1,153
First Division, Second Brigade.....	1,002
Second Division, First Brigade.....	1,041
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	648
Third Division, First Brigade.....	898
Third Division, Second Brigade.....	853
Third Division, Third Brigade.....	351
Light Artillery Brigade.....	106
<hr/> Total.....	<hr/> 6,059



COL. REDFIELD PROCTOR.

SECOND CORPS.

Staff and Unassigned.....	18
First Division, First Brigade	330
First Division, Second Brigade.....	198
First Division, Third Brigade.....	358
First Division, Fourth Brigade	389
Second Division, First Brigade	768
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	491
Second Division, Third Brigade	377
Third Division, First Brigade	211
Third Division, Second Brigade.....	366
Third Division, Third Brigade.....	714
Light Artillery Brigade.....	149
Total	4,369

THIRD CORPS.

Staff.....	13
First Division, First Brigade	740
First Division, Second Brigade	781
First Division, Third Brigade.....	490
Second Division, First Brigade	790
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	778
Second Division, Third Brigade	513
Light Artillery Brigade	106
Total	4,211

FIFTH CORPS.

Ambulance Corps.....	1
First Division, First Brigade	125
First Division, Second Brigade	427
First Division, Third Brigade	352
Second Division, First Brigade	382
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	447
Second Division, Third Brigade	200
Third Division, First Brigade	155
Third Division, Second Brigade	55
Light Artillery Brigade	43
Total	2,187

SIXTH CORPS.*

First Division, First Brigade	11
-------------------------------------	----

* Not engaged at Gettysburg. At Funkstown, in pursuit of Lee's army, was engaged with slight loss.

First Division, Second Brigade.....	5
First Division, Third Brigade.....	2
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	1
Second Division, Third Brigade	15
Third Division, First Brigade.....	74
Third Division, Second Brigade	69
Third Division, Third Brigade	53
Light Artillery Brigade	12
Total	242

ELEVENTH CORPS.

Staff.....	6
First Division, First Brigade	527
First Division, Second Brigade	778
Second Division, First Brigade.....	587
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	348
Third Division, First Brigade.....	807
Third Division, Second Brigade	669
Light Artillery Brigade	69
Total	3,801

TWELFTH CORPS.

First Division, First Brigade	80
First Division, Second Brigade	174
First Division, Third Brigade.....	279
Second Division, First Brigade	139
Second Division, Second Brigade.....	98
Second Division, Third Brigade	303
Light Artillery Brigade.....	9
Total	1,082

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

First Regular Brigade	68
First Volunteer Brigade	93
Second Volunteer Brigade	8
Third Volunteer Brigade.....	37
Fourth Volunteer Brigade.....	36
Total	242

CAVALRY CORPS.

First Division, First Brigade	99
First Division, Second Brigade	28

First Division, Reserve Brigade	291
Total	418
Second Division, First Brigade	35
Second Division, Third Brigade	21
Total.....	56
Third Division, First Brigade.....	98
Third Division, Second Brigade.....	257
Total	355

HORSE ARTILLERY.

First Brigade.....	8
Second Brigade.....	15
Total	23
Total Casualties Cavalry Corps.....	852

RECAPITULATION.

General Headquarters.....	4
First Army Corps	6,059
Second Army Corps	4,369
Third Army Corps.....	4,211
Fifth Army Corps	2,187
Sixth Army Corps.....	242
Eleventh Army Corps.....	3,801
Twelfth Army Corps.....	1,082
Cavalry Corps	852
Artillery Reserves.....	242
Total Union Loss	23,049

The First Corps alone lost 6,059, which was more than one-fourth of the loss of Meade's army, where seven infantry corps, cavalry and artillery were engaged. This record of losses for the First Corps is not surpassed in the history of the world.

The heaviest loss suffered by any brigade was that of the First Brigade, First Division, First Corps—the Iron Brigade—1,153, and the heaviest loss of any regiment was that of the 24th Michigan of that brigade, 363. The largest loss of any brigade by percentage of numbers engaged was also that of this same Iron Brigade, but of regi-

ments it was that of the 1st Minnesota, 86 per cent., as against 81 for the 24th Michigan.

Other extraordinary regimental losses were, the 151st Pennsylvania, 337; the 149th Pennsylvania, 336, and the 157th New York, 307; in each case over 70 per cent. of those engaged.

Excessive losses of light batteries were the following:

Cushing's (A), 4th Regulars.....	39	43
Stewart's (B), 4th Regulars.....	36	40
Arnold's (A), 1st Rhode Island.....	32	36
Sheldon's (B), 1st New York.....	26	
Brown's (B), 1st Rhode Island.....	28	
Freeborn's (E), 1st Rhode Island.....	30	33
Thompson's (C), Pennsylvania Light.....	28	
Biglow's 9th Massachusetts.....	28	31

The figures given in the second column represent statements of losses other than those of the "revised returns," which include only losses of men borne on the battery rolls.

The Confederate losses were as follows:

First Corps (Longstreet's).....	7,539
Second Corps (Ewell's).....	5,937
Third Corps (A. P. Hill's).....	6,735
Stuart's Cavalry Division.....	240
Total Confederate Loss.....	20,451
Total Union Loss.....	23,049
Grand Total (both sides).....	43,500

CHAPTER XIII.

FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

JULY 4 TO OCTOBER 30.

AFTER the grapple of the giants, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, at Gettysburg, on the 1st, 2d, and 3d days of July, 1863, which ended with the repulse of Pickett's magnificent charge on the Union center on Cemetery Ridge and the foiling of Stuart's splendid cavalry dash on the right flank, General Lee, disappointed in the confident hope and anticipation of crushing the Union army, was obliged to solve the problem of successfully withdrawing his shattered army from its position in front of Meade's victorious legions. For this purpose the weather was most propitious. The heavy cannonading of the previous three days brought on violent thunder storms. During the night of the 3d the rain fell in torrents, and a darkness like that of Egypt settled down upon the field of battle, concealing from view all movement of troops, while volleys of reverberating thunder drowned the rumbling of trains and artillery. During the 4th the rain continued without cessation. Nevertheless, reconnoissances, made in all directions, disclosed the fact that General Lee had withdrawn his left and taken up a new position parallel with the Blue Ridge, covering the roads over that range, on which his immense trains, artillery and wounded, were moving on the night of the 3d and all day of the 4th.

During the night of the 4th the Confederate army withdrew, and on the morning of the 5th were discovered to be

in full retreat on the Fairfield and Cashtown roads. The Sixth Corps being the strongest, was at once pushed forward in pursuit on the Fairfield road, and Col. Irvin Gregg's brigade of Gregg's cavalry division on the Cashtown road. General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, found the retreating army strongly posted in the Fairfield Pass, and after closely reconnoitering the position deemed it too strong to be successfully attacked. Leaving Neil's brigade of infantry and McIntosh's cavalry brigade to harass and annoy the enemy, the army was put in motion for Middletown, Maryland, and every effort was put forth to head off the retreating army, whose line of march must necessarily lead, via Hagerstown, to Williamsport on the Potomac. Buford's division marched from Westminster on the 4th, via Frederick, Maryland, across the Catocin and South Mountain Passes, en route for Williamsport, on the Potomac, and at five o'clock p.m. on the 6th came up with the enemy's pickets near St. James' College, between Boonsboro and the Antietam.

Kilpatrick, marching on the 4th, reached Emmittsburg at three o'clock p.m., where he found Huey's (Second) brigade of Gregg's cavalry division. Pushing forward at once on the Monterey pike, he encountered some of Stuart's cavalry, which he brushed aside, and, moving on to Monterey, struck, captured, and destroyed Ewell's trains, taking a number of prisoners. He then moved by Smithsburg to Boonsboro, foiling Stuart's attempt to cut him off.

The infantry corps moved promptly on all roads leading from Gettysburg through the mountain passes, and were concentrated in the vicinity of Boonsboro, west of the Blue Ridge, on the evening of the 9th. On the 10th Meade's headquarters moved from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, a tributary of the Antietam, between Boonsboro and Williamsport. The Second, Third, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps were across the Antietam in front of the enemy's right, and the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Corps in position in front of Hagerstown and Funkstown. On the 9th and 10th the

cavalry of the two armies (which covered Lee's retiring infantry columns and preceded the advance of Meade's corps) had numerous and spirited engagements.

General Lee, moving steadily in retreat through Hagerstown (the head of his columns arrived at Williamsport on the evening of the 6th and the rear on the morning of the 7th), found the river, swollen by the recent rains, impassable, and his pontoons, which had been left there to facilitate his crossing, destroyed. Being thus brought to a halt, he took up a strong position between the fords at Williamsport and Falling Waters, his right resting on the Potomac and his left on the Conococheague, near Hagerstown, Maryland. This line ran along a range of heights west of Marsh Creek, and was strongly intrenched, while the fording places on the river were put in condition to cover the crossing of his army.

To the commander of the Union forces this position appeared too formidable for successful attack without a full examination; and with this view General Meade determined to make a reconnoissance in force, supported by the entire army, early on the morning of the 13th; but his corps commanders were so decidedly averse to an advance that he postponed it until the following day. During the night the enemy withdrew from this position and crossed the Potomac.

An examination of the position occupied by the Confederates showed it to be very strong, quite as much so as Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg. To have blindly hurled his masses upon this position in the hope that some weak point would be found might have been splendid blundering, but certainly could not be characterized as judicious and scientific warfare. From all the facts known at the time, and from subsequent light thrown upon the subject by the publication of Confederate records, the calm view of all military men capable of forming a correct estimate of military operations must be that General Meade was governed by sound military principles in refraining from an immediate and direct attack.

• What might have been accomplished by a movement

across the Potomac by way of Shepherdstown and Harper's Ferry with two corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry, commenced from Boonsboro on the morning of the 11th, it is, perhaps, now useless to speculate upon. However that may be, one cannot help thinking that great results must have followed.

General Meade, backed by the strong positions afforded by the passes through and over the Blue Ridge, with reënforcements (French had already joined with 6,500 fresh troops) constantly coming up from his base, and the accumulating bodies of Northern militia under Couch gathering on his right flank, would certainly have been as secure against any forward movement, had the enemy been in condition to make it, as General Lee was behind the Antietam. This formidable flanking force, marching from Boonsboro on the 11th, would have been across General Lee's line of retreat, between Williamsport and Martinsburg, some time during the night of the 12th or morning of the 13th; and as General Lee's crossing did not commence until the night of that day, he would have been in the position of General Mack at Ulm, or the Roman Consuls in the Caudine Forks. But as no movement of this kind seems to have been contemplated by anyone having the authority to make or propose it, no good purpose can be subserved by discussing it further.

The movement of Gregg's cavalry division across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry on the 14th accomplished nothing, although a severe engagement took place between Col. Irvin Gregg's (Third) brigade and the bulk of Stuart's cavalry near Shepherdstown, which lasted from one o'clock until nine p.m. on the 16th, and in which a large number of people on both sides were killed and wounded.

On the morning of the 14th, General Meade was apprised that the enemy had slipped away during the night, and his army was put in motion with all practicable dispatch, directed upon Williamsport, but was unable to overtake him.

Buford and Kilpatrick, however, overtook the rear guard at Falling Waters, attacked and captured two cannon, three flags and many prisoners. On the 15th, headquarters of the army were moved to Berlin, and the columns were all put in motion by various roads for that place and Harper's Ferry. On the 16th and 17th the army crossed the Potomac, and moved along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, keeping pace with the Confederate army in its retreat up the valley of Virginia, and preventing it from debouching through the various passes of that mountain barrier into the rich valleys of Loudoun and Fauquier Counties, which General Lee designed to occupy, and threatened his communications with Richmond.

Longstreet and Hill, moving rapidly on the 20th and 22d, passed safely through Chester Gap; but Ewell essaying to pass through on the 23d, met the heads of the Third, Fifth and Second Corps advancing through the gap, and a spirited contest ensued, which resulted in forcing him back and compelling him to continue his march up the valley as far as Luray, and to cross over by way of Thornton's Gap. General Lee, having safely passed the Blue Ridge, massed his army around Culpeper Court House.

General Meade, under instructions from Washington, took up a strong and threatening position behind the Rappahannock, with Gregg's cavalry division thrown forward to Amissville, but being directed not to advance against Lee's position at Culpeper, all active operations between the two armies ceased.

On the 1st of August, Buford's cavalry division crossed the river on a reconnoissance; and at or near Brandy Station encountered Hampton's and Jones' brigades, commanded by Stuart in person, which they drove back to within a mile and a half of Culpeper, and found that place occupied by A. P. Hill's corps. They then fell back and recrossed the river at Rappahannock Station. After this the two armies remained quietly watching each other.

During the month of August the Army of the Potomac

was considerably reduced in strength by the detachment of troops for duty elsewhere, and it was ascertained that General Longstreet's corps had been sent to Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, and arrived at its destination in time to be present at the great battle of Chickamauga, which was fought on the 19th and 20th of September. On the 13th of September, Meade directed a reconnoissance in force, with the entire Cavalry Corps, supported by the Second Corps. Kilpatrick, with his division, crossed at Kelley's Ford, and Buford, with his division, at Beverly Ford, followed by the Second Corps, while Gregg moved from his camp between Sulphur Springs and Jefferson.

The enemy were encountered on all the roads converging toward Culpeper, and driven through that town—the heads of the three cavalry columns meeting at noon in the town. The pursuit was continued until nightfall and the enemy forced across the Rapidan, but were found to be too strongly posted on the opposite bank to be dislodged by a direct attack.

The army crossed the Rappahannock and took up a position around Culpeper. Buford made a reconnoissance toward the upper Rapidan and a movement by the right was contemplated; but before it could be put into execution two corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, were withdrawn from the army and sent to Tennessee to reinforce Rosecrans, whose army was shut up in Chattanooga.

General Lee's army was at Orange Court House and Gordonsville, with strong advanced posts intrenched behind the fords along the Rapidan, holding tenaciously the line of that river, with uninterrupted communication with Richmond and Lynchburg from which to draw supplies. In these positions the two armies lay until the 9th of October.

The Army of the Potomac was disposed in the following order from right to left: The Second Corps on the Sperryville pike, in the vicinity of Stone House Mountain; the Third across the roads leading from Culpeper via James City, to Madison Court House; the Fifth and Sixth facing

Cedar Mountain, and the First in the neighborhood of Stevensburg. Buford's cavalry division was on the left, Kilpatrick's on the right, and Gregg's division north of the Rappahannock at Bealton; and, as was the custom, their vedettes encircled the entire army and kept out observation parties toward the enemy.

During the 8th and 9th of October information from various sources reached General Meade that a movement of some kind was imminent. The unusual activity observed by our signal officers in the Confederate camps on those days, and the movement of long trains and columns of infantry and artillery on the 9th toward Madison Court House, was attributed by some as preliminary to the evacuation of Virginia, by others to a direct advance against the Union army in its position at Culpeper, and by still others to a movement around General Meade's right flank, by the roads leading north, along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge.

Increased vigilance was enjoined upon Kilpatrick, and on the evening of the 9th orders were sent to General Buford, which he received on the morning of the 10th, directing him to force a crossing of the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, and, sweeping up the river, endeavor to uncover Morton's Ford in front of General Newton's corps, the First, which was then to cross, and, if the movement was successful, to be followed by the Fifth and Sixth Corps at the fords higher up. This movement was successfully executed by General Buford with his usual soldierly promptness. The crossing was forced at Germanna, and the enemy rapidly pushed back until Morton's Ford was uncovered. But before this was accomplished night had fallen, and Buford bivouacked within the outer works of the enemy, leaving them in possession of the works immediately at the ford. Meantime the enemy crossed the Robertson River at Madison Court House, and forced Kilpatrick's cavalry back to James City, where he was supported by Prince's division of the Third Corps, and the Second Brigade of Gregg's division of cavalry, under Col. Irvin Gregg.

This movement seemed to be so formidable that General Meade changed his orders for the passage of the Rapidan, and issued orders for a retrograde movement which carried his army to the north bank of the Rappahannock on the 11th. This movement was covered by Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, until it reached Brandy Station, where he was joined by Buford, who, finding that our infantry had moved during the night, drove the enemy from Morton's Ford, recrossed the Rapidan, and moving via Stevensburg, reached Brandy Station in time to sustain Kilpatrick, who was contending against the entire force of the enemy's cavalry.

In falling back from the positions occupied around Culpeper, the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps marched along the south side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, the Second along the north side, and the Third Corps via Wellford's Ford, on the Hazel River, to Freeman's Ford on the Hedgeman River.

Gregg was instructed to take up a position across the Sperryville pike until after the withdrawal of the Third Corps, and then to move with his division to Sulphur Springs, via Rixeyville and Jefferson, with his Second Brigade, and with his First Brigade by the most direct route from its position on the Rappahannock. This brigade reached Sulphur Springs before dark on the evening of the 11th, while the Second Brigade did not arrive at Jeffersonton until eight p. m., and bivouacked between that place and the springs. Nightfall of the 11th found the Army of the Potomac (with the exception of the Second Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, Col. Irvin Gregg) north of the Rappahannock, and its commander master of the situation and in a position to foil any attempt against his communications by General Lee, and reduced Lee to the necessity of delivering battle on ground chosen by his enemy, or the abandonment of his enterprise.

General Gregg was instructed that the movement of his command, via Jefferson and Sulphur Springs, was to watch the roads leading to the Shenandoah Valley by

Thornton's and Chester Gaps, and to Warrenton by way of Amissville; that it was information of the movements of General Lee's army that was wanted, and that it was important that any which might be received should be promptly communicated to army headquarters. No indication of any movement of troops was observed by General Gregg on the march from Culpeper, via Rixeyville, to Jefferson. About midnight on the night of the 11th, General Gregg received a communication from General Humphreys, chief of staff, asking him to obtain certain and early information of the enemy's movements in the direction of Sperryville and Little Washington. As this was the route followed by General Jackson in his celebrated and successful march around General Pope's right flank in August, 1862, General Meade may be supposed to have been naturally somewhat apprehensive of a similar attempt on the part of General Lee. To prevent the recurrence of such a march, the movement of the previous day, which placed his army on the Washington side of the Rappahannock, was admirably adapted; and if the movement on Warrenton, originally contemplated by General Meade, had been carried out, it would have been rendered absolutely impossible. The position of General Meade's army around Warrenton would have been impregnable to any but a vastly superior force.

General Lee, in his advance report, says he broke up his camps at Orange Court House and Gordonsville on the 9th, with a view to bring on a general engagement with General Meade's army at Culpeper Court House; that he reached the vicinity of the court house on the 11th, and found that the enemy had evacuated the position; that he was obliged to halt for the remainder of the day to provision his army; that he determined to make another attempt to strike General Meade's communications north of the Rappahannock, and force his army still farther toward Washington; and with that view he moved on the morning of the 12th in two columns. It was the move-

ment of these columns that was the source of so much anxiety to the Union commander, and the direction of which General Gregg had been requested, at midnight on the 11th, to obtain early and accurate information.

The duty assigned to General Gregg's division was both delicate and arduous. The character of the country through which the movement was made not being favorable for distant observation, and the march of the columns being veiled behind a cloud of cavalry, commanded by Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, upon whom the eyes of the world were fixed as the most accomplished and successful cavalry leader that up to that time the war had produced, rendered the obtaining such definite knowledge as General Meade required absolutely impossible except by actual contact, involving a severe and protracted contest.

The measures taken by General Gregg to procure this information were well adapted to the purpose. The 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, on the night of the 11th, was posted between the village of Jefferson and Rixey's Ford, with vedettes thrown forward as far as the crossing; and early on the morning of the 12th, the 1st Maine Cavalry was sent, via Amissville, Gaines' Crossroads and Little Washington, to Sperryville. The other regiments of the brigade crossed the river and took up a position covering the roads to Fayetteville and Warrenton. About nine o'clock a. m., on the 12th, Major Kerwin, commanding the 13th Pennsylvania, sent a dispatch to General Gregg that the enemy's cavalry were pressing his vedettes. This dispatch reached him at Sulphur Springs, on the north bank of the Hedgeman River, at ten a. m. Col. Irvin Gregg, to whose brigade the 13th Pennsylvania and 1st Maine Cavalry belonged, was ordered to immediately recross the river, taking with him an additional regiment. Selecting for that purpose the 4th Pennsylvania, he proceeded to the front to ascertain what was going on. Colonel Gregg reached the village of Jefferson about 12:30 p. m., where he met the 13th retiring in good order, to get a good

defensive position nearer to its support. The movement to the rear was arrested, the village reoccupied, and preparations made to offer such resistance to the enemy's advance as would compel him to develop the nature and number of his forces. These dispositions were scarcely completed when a strong attack on the village was made by Stuart's dismounted cavalry, which was repulsed with severe loss.

General Lee being present when General Stuart arrived upon the ground with Funsten's brigade, he was directed by him to send a regiment, the 12th Virginia, to the right, and another, the 7th Virginia, to the left, while the 11th Virginia, which had been repulsed, was remounted and sent to the left to attack the right of the Union troops in the village. During this time the skirmish firing was continuous and rapid. Up to three o'clock p.m. no infantry force had made its appearance; at about that hour Maj. S. B. M. Young, commanding the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, on the left, sent word to Colonel Gregg, who had just returned from the extreme right, from where he had observed a movement of the Confederate cavalry to his right rear, that it was infantry that were opposing him (men with knapsacks on), and that he could not long maintain his position. This was conclusive as to the forces opposing us, and the information was at once sent to General Gregg by Lieut. Archer N. Martin, of the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one of Colonel Gregg's aids; but it did not reach him, as Lieutenant Martin ran into Funsten's command, the 12th Virginia Cavalry, had his horse killed, and was himself severely wounded. Meanwhile Colonel Gregg, having acquired the information he was seeking, and ascertained that he had the whole, or a large part, of Lee's army on his hands, attempted to withdraw. But the enemy pressing on with cavalry on both flanks, and infantry on his front, his troops became somewhat demoralized. No time being given for effecting any organization as the men came in from the skirmish line, the broken regiments got across the river under cover of the 10th New York Cavalry, and almost

simultaneous with the crossing the enemy opened upon our position on the northern bank of the river, from the opposite bluffs, with two batteries of General Ewell's artillery; at the same time the heads of his infantry columns appeared in sight.

It was now between four and five o'clock p.m., and at 4:50 p.m. the following dispatch was sent to General Pleasanton, whose headquarters were supposed to be with General Meade:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION,

October 12, 1863—4 50 p. m.

COLONEL:—We have been fighting all afternoon. This morning at daylight I sent a regiment to make a reconnoissance toward Little Washington. I placed a regiment at Jefferson to support the reconnoissance. The enemy forced the crossing at Rixeyville, and columns of infantry and cavalry crossed and advanced upon Jefferson. I got the regiments across to resist the advance of the enemy, but the force was so overwhelming that after a stubborn resistance the regiments were driven back and effected a crossing under my guns. A column of infantry is now moving up the right bank. The officer commanding my brigade near Warrenton reports columns of infantry moving up the west bank toward the mountains. The columns of infantry moving in plain sight are large. I am much concerned for the regiment sent to Little Washington. The loss in the regiment engaged to-day is very heavy; I cannot give it yet. The enemy have opened with twenty pieces of artillery, and are driving me from my position at the springs.

Very respectfully,

D. MCM. GREGG,

Brigadier General of Volunteers.

Col. ROSS SMITH, Chief of Staff.

Up to the date of this dispatch General Gregg had no information of General Lee's army, except that he was engaged with his cavalry. Col. C. H. Smith, with the 1st Maine Cavalry, pushed on through Amissville, passed Gaines' Crossroads, to Little Washington, which point he reached before twelve m. without having met with anything to indicate any movement of General Lee's army in that direction. From Little Washington Lieutenant Harris was sent back with twelve men to communicate this information.

He passed Amissville on his return (no enemy in sight), and on his arrival near Jefferson found the enemy's cavalry between that place and his party and a fight going on. He at once retraced his steps in the attempt to rejoin his regiment; but on his arrival at Amissville he found all the roads in possession of the enemy.

Colonel Smith sent Majors Boothby and Brown on to Sperryville, from which point they returned to Little Washington at sundown, not having seen any enemy. Colonel Smith at once commenced his return march toward Jefferson, and after nightfall ran into Gen. A. P. Hill's corps, at Amissville. He was thus cut off from his direct road, and in an extremely critical position, from which he extricated himself and command with signal ability; and after a march of ninety miles reached Bristoe Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, early on the morning of the 13th.

Lieutenant Harris being unable to reach General Gregg, and cut off from his regiment by the advance of General Hill's corps, concealed his party in a dense thicket of old field pines, which everywhere abound in Virginia, until nightfall, when he made his way through the Confederate outposts, crossed the river, and when near the Bull Run Mountains ran into Mosby's command, was captured, and while being conducted, via Warrenton, to the south side of the Hedgeman River, again made his escape alone, recrossed the river, and several days afterwards reported to his regimental commander near Bealton.

Moving from his camps on the Sperryville pike, early on the morning of the 12th, to head off General Meade's army, which had twenty-four hours' start of him and was well concentrated on the north bank of the Rappahannock, General Lee, the right wing of whose army had about sixteen or eighteen miles to march to reach Sulphur Springs, must have moved with the utmost dispatch. He arrived with the advance of General Ewell's corps within two miles of Jefferson, where Funsten, who moved from Brandy Station early the

same morning, said he found the head of Ewell's corps. None of these officers give the time of day, but the hour could not have been later than eleven or 11:30 a. m. The pace at which they were marching would have brought them to the Sulphur Springs Crossing of the Hedgeman River at an hour certainly not later than one o'clock p. m.

General Lee, in his report, says :

After a skirmish with some of the Federal cavalry at Jefferson, we reached the Rappahannock in the afternoon, where the passage of the river was disputed by cavalry and artillery. Early next morning the march was resumed and the two columns reunited at Warrenton in the afternoon.

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart says, in his very detailed report of this skirmish :

After a hard struggle they retreated rapidly down the road ; the horse artillery not having come up (General Long commanding), the artillery of General Ewell's corps opened fire with eight guns on the batteries and supporting squadrons of the enemy on the opposite side of the river. As it was nearly dark, my first care, after crossing, was to have the bridge relaid, so that the infantry might cross directly over.

General Lee's advance was, therefore, delayed by the disposition and the resistance made by these two regiments of cavalry, the 13th and 4th Pennsylvania, from eleven or half-past eleven a. m., until dark, at six or seven o'clock p. m., a period of seven or eight hours, in marching a distance of six or seven miles.

General Meade not receiving such information as he wanted up to ten or eleven o'clock a. m., and being inspired with the belief, occasioned by the representations made by Generals Pleasonton and Sykes, that Lee was in his rear at Culpeper, determined, for some reasons not explained at the time, nor understood since, to send, at one o'clock p. m., the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps, with Buford's cavalry division, back across the river on a reconnoissance toward Culpeper. The enemy's cavalry were encountered

near Brandy Station, and not being in force were rapidly pushed back on Culpeper. But the place was unoccupied, except by a small body of cavalry. The object of the reconnoissance, however, was accomplished and a day lost.

General Buford's report that General Lee's army was not at or in the vicinity of Culpeper, demonstrated the incorrectness of the surmises of the corps commanders before mentioned, but did not disclose the position of Lee's army; nor does General Meade appear to have received any information, until, as he says in his report:

During the night dispatches were received from General Gregg, commanding a cavalry division guarding the upper fords of the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, that he had been forced back early in the morning from the Hazel River, and in the afternoon from the Rappahannock, and that the enemy were crossing at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo in heavy force.

The dispatches here alluded to, we have seen, were dated at 4:50 p. m.; the distance from Sulphur Springs to Rappahannock Station did not exceed ten or eleven miles; the roads were good and unobstructed, and there is no reason why the distance should not have been covered in an hour or an hour and a quarter. It is therefore inexplicable how this delay, which came so near being fatal, could have occurred. Late as the hour was, it gave General Meade the definite information for which he was looking, and revealed to him the critical position in which his army had been placed by his backward movement of the morning. He was, however, prompt in remedying the mistake, and the troops were at once recalled.

Warren's corps, being nearest the river, was directed to proceed, via Bealeton, to support General Gregg, and cover the Third Army Corps, which was at Freeman's Ford. The order for this march was received by General Warren, at his position about two and one-half miles from Rappahannock Station, at eleven o'clock p. m. on the 12th, and

he says in his report : "The movement was immediately begun. We marched all night, and by one o'clock a. m. joined General Gregg at Fayetteville."

After sending the 4:50 p. m. dispatch, General Gregg continued to hold the crossing at Sulphur Springs, resisting every attempt of the enemy to force him from it until his accumulating force rendered any further resistance hopeless. He then withdrew slowly, followed by the enemy's cavalry, and several charges and countercharges were made on the Warrenton pike between the First Brigade, under Colonel Taylor, and the Confederate cavalry. Night put an end to the fighting, which had been raging with more or less fury since one p. m., and Gregg withdrew to Fayetteville.

On the morning of the 13th, Lee's right wing crossed the river and moved to Warrenton. Hill moved at the same time ; and on the afternoon of that day the two wings of his army were united at that place. General Meade, having lost the day of the 12th in the execution of his rearward movement and failed to secure the position at Warrenton, put his army in motion, marching all night to regain the time lost, and on the morning of the 13th moved on all the roads leading through Auburn, Greenwich, and Catlett's Station, to Bristoe and Manassas.

The First, Fifth and Sixth Corps, the trains, and Buford's cavalry moved along the railroad, and by the afternoon of the 13th had reached Catlett's Station ; the troops were camped, and the trains parked between there and Warrenton Junction.

During the night of the 12th Kilpatrick covered the road leading from Fayetteville to Warrenton. The Third Corps withdrew from Freeman's Ford, passed through Fayetteville, and marched via Auburn to Greenwich, preceded by Kilpatrick, who was relieved by Gregg. After the passage of the Third Corps Warren moved to Auburn, on the road leading by Three-Mile Station, and bivouacked west of Cedar Run after dark. Gregg brought up the rear, and

went into position between the Second Corps and Warrenton long after dark.

Lee, having arrived at Warrenton during the morning, sent Stuart on a reconnoissance toward Catlett's; that officer, taking with him the brigades of Lomax, Gordon, and Funsten, proceeded at once on the road leading from Warrenton to Catlett's, via Auburn; arriving at the latter place, he left Lomax to watch and guard his rear. Pushing on with Gordon and Funsten in the direction of Catlett's, as he cautiously approached St. Stephen's Church, the whole plain around Catlett's, covered by our trains, came under his observation, and they were for a time probably at his mercy. Carefully concealing his force in a dense thicket of old field pine, he sent a report of the situation to General Lee at Warrenton. Not hearing from Lomax, who had been driven from Auburn by the advance of General Kilpatrick and the Third Corps, he determined to remain in his position during the night; meantime the advance of the Second Corps and Gregg's cavalry isolated him completely from the main army at Warrenton. At early dawn on the 14th the perilous position in which he was placed was revealed; but presuming that General Lee had received the information sent him the previous day, and would be advancing to the attack from the direction of Warrenton with his entire army, he immediately opened fire with his guns on Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, which was drawn up in line of battle on a hill east of Cedar Run, facing toward Warrenton. This unexpected fire, coming from the rear, somewhat startled these veteran troops; but they changed front without confusion, and Caldwell's batteries soon got into position, making the shelter of old field pine hot for the daring cavalrymen.

Ewell, however, advancing from the direction of Warrenton, attacked General Gregg, and affairs now began to look serious for the Union army. But Warren was on the move, and Gen. Alexander Hays' division, marching rapidly in the direction of Catlett's, forced Stuart out of

his concealed position, from which he withdrew by his left, crossing Cedar Run between Auburn and Catlett's, and passing around Gregg's rear, between Auburn and the Warrenton Railroad.

The road being now clear, the Second Corps moved rapidly in the direction of Bristoe Station, covered by the Second Cavalry Division. The advance, General Webb's Second Division, reached the station about two p. m., while the rear of the Fifth Corps was moving off beyond Cedar Run, and the enemy was advancing in line of battle from the direction of Greenwich. General Warren, in his report, says :

A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy's line of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily awaiting it, and another moving against it at the double quick, while the artillery was taking up position at a gallop and going into action.

Webb's division was faced to the left, occupying the railroad cut and embankment. Hays' division prolonged the line to the left and Caldwell's to his left as it arrived on the field. Brown's battery went into action on the north side of Broad Run, without support, and Ricketts' on the heights south of the bridge. Gregg's cavalry division followed Caldwell. The First Brigade crossed Kettle Creek under fire from the troops of Ewell's corps, which was beginning to arrive, and took position on Caldwell's left.

When the advance of Gregg's (Second) brigade approached Kettle Creek the road and railroad bridge were found to be in possession of the enemy. The way being thus blocked, this brigade moved to the right and took up a position, covering our hospitals, near the Brentville road. The attack was gallantly made and as gallantly repulsed, the advantage remaining with the Union forces. Night put an end to the fighting, and the Bristoe campaign was ended. General Meade issued the following congratulatory order :

General Orders, } HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
No. 96. } October 15, 1863.

The major general commanding announces to the army that the rear guard, consisting of the Second Corps, was attacked yesterday while marching by the flank.

The enemy, after a spirited contest, was repulsed, losing two colors, a battery of five guns, and 450 prisoners.

The skill and promptitude of Major General Warren, and the gallantry and bearing of the officers and soldiers of the Second Corps are entitled to high admiration.

By command of Major General Meade :

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant General.

This is a very graceful acknowledgment of the services of the Second Corps, which was well deserved; but it brought no rejoicing to the camps of the weary cavalymen whose services were entirely ignored. This disparaging order was partially modified by the commanding general, in General Orders, No. 97, October 17, 1863; but it emphasized the fact, evinced on more than one occasion before and subsequently, that General Meade's sympathies were with his infantry and artillery rather than his cavalry.

Of this campaign it may be said that it was conducted on the part of the Union commander under a misapprehension as to the designs of his opponent not warranted by what ought to have been known of his character nor by past experiences. First: That the movements of General Lee's army were preliminary to evacuating the line of the Rapidan. Second: That the apparent movement to turn his right had been given up for the less important one of occupying the abandoned position of the Federals at Culpeper. Third: That having placed his army in an admirable position on the 11th, it was not prudent to abandon it on the 12th without waiting for information as to General Lee's movements on the mere supposition that Lee might, after all, have only designed to get possession of the town of Culpeper. Lee's object being to attack Meade's army at Culpeper, that general might have waited in his position, which had been prepared for such a contin-

gency, for twelve hours, and, if then desired, could have withdrawn his army to the north bank of the Rappahannock during the night of the 11th, and had time to reach Warrenton in advance of the enemy. Had General Lee attacked at Culpeper, he undoubtedly would have been repulsed; and the Union army could have seized the position at Orange Court House and Gordonsville, and interposed between Lee and Richmond, thus forcing that general back upon Lynchburg. The strategy as well as the tactics of the Union commander were faulty in the extreme throughout this campaign.

General Lee, after following the Union army to Bull Run, fell back, destroying the Orange and Alexandria Railroad as he went, and took up a position behind the Rappahannock with a strong force of infantry and cavalry intrenched on the north or east bank at the railroad crossing, which he held until the 7th of November, when General Sedgwick, with the Fifth and Sixth Corps, advanced and carried the position by assault, capturing four pieces of artillery, 1,600 prisoners and 1,200 small arms. The assault was made by the Second and Third Brigades of the First Division of the Sixth Corps, commanded by Gen. David A. Russell.

On the 8th and 9th the army crossed the river and took up a position from Kelley's Ford, through Brandy Station, to Welford's Ford on the Hazel River, and at once commenced to repair the railroad.

The foregoing brief account is taken entirely from the official records (Series I, Vol. XXIX, Part I, Bristoe Station and Mine Run, Serial 48), except so much as relates to the 1st Maine Cavalry.

I now turn to the account of this day's operations given in his "History of the American War," by the Comte de Paris, in his chapter on Bristoe Station. The distinguished author of this history—usually so fair in his statements, so correct in his criticisms, and so just in his conclusions—is not only incorrect in his facts, but unwarranted in his de-

ductions in reference to the operations of the Second Cavalry Division on the 12th of October, 1863. His account is too long to quote in full; but the substance of it is this:

That General Meade, on the night of the 11th, was north of the Rappahannock, and master of the situation; that on the morning of the 12th, not receiving the information from General Gregg that he expected in reference to the movements of General Lee's army, he became impatient, and, by an unhappy inspiration, sent General Buford's cavalry and three corps of infantry back across the river to Culpeper, and lost his power to control affairs; that he waited still, in his position at Rappahannock Station, until dark, when he learned from Buford's report that General Lee's army was not at Culpeper; that at 10:30 o'clock that night he received a dispatch from General Gregg, dated at Fayetteville, saying that Lee had been crossing his army at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo for several hours; that General Gregg, when he discovered the advance of Lee's army, was too intent upon fighting to think of sending reports to his superior; that the commanding officer of the 13th Pennsylvania forgot to send reports to General Gregg, and that the colonel of the 1st Maine Cavalry, driven back from Amissville and unable to reach Sulphur Springs, disappeared for several days; and that it would have been better if General Gregg had not fought so much and written more.

Now the Comte de Paris, in all this, ignores the very important fact that General Lee was moving rapidly and secretly; that he was veiling the march of his infantry columns behind his cavalry, and that that cavalry was led by one of the most successful and distinguished cavalry leaders of this or any country or age; and that if any information was to be obtained it would have to be fought for, and the fight once joined, must be a desperate one.

It must be obvious to any impartial critic that any information sent to General Meade at any time prior to the 4:50 p.m. dispatch, before mentioned, could not have con-

veyed to him any correct intimation of the condition of affairs; nor is it probable that frequent communication of such information as General Gregg had, up to four p. m., would have exercised any influence upon the commanding general's actions.

The Comte de Paris says that in the interval between the two engagements—the respite allowed him by General Stuart—General Gregg should have sent a report to General Meade. There was no interval, no respite, from the time the fight was joined, about one o'clock p. m., until Gregg was forced across the river at four p. m. There was no cessation or let-up; and the first intimation that General Gregg had of the presence of the enemy's infantry was the almost simultaneous appearance of the heads of Ewell's columns and the opening of his guns from the opposite bluffs. The crossing of the river was not forced until about dark, at least an hour and a half after the 4:50 p. m. dispatch was sent. He also says (page 762):

All necessary precautions—the leaving of the 13th Pennsylvania at Jefferson; the dispatch of the 1st Maine to Amissville and the First Brigade, under Taylor, to scout the country toward Warrenton—seemed to be taken to learn if Lee is endeavoring to turn the Federal right wing; but neither Gregg nor Meade is promptly informed of the fact. These precautions will be of no use, however, owing to a singular occurrence of fortuitous circumstances and culpable negligence.

In the first place, the 1st Maine, coming back from Amissville in the night, falls unexpectedly, near Jefferson, on the outposts of the 11th Virginia. Dreading some ambush, the former falls back on Little Washington, and thus it cannot give any information to Gregg, from whom it will be separated for several days.

This account, which is entirely incorrect, is sufficiently confuted in the relation of the operations of the 1st Maine, as is also the statement in reference to the 13th Pennsylvania. Again the comte says (page 764):

How could Gregg have left his chief so long without sending information as to what was taking place on the right of the army? We have said that Gregg himself, no doubt, did not receive any in-

formation from his detachments which he had sent to scout the country; the enemy making his appearance on Hedgeman River, the surprise made him neglect that important duty; but he committed an inexcusable error in not taking advantage of the respite which Stuart gave him after the first engagement.

In reference to this severe criticism, it is to be said that it is not only not just and fair, but that it is extremely unjust and unfair, and is not warranted by the facts in the case. Neither Gregg nor any of his detachments had any information of the whereabouts of General Lee's infantry columns up to three or half-past three o'clock. It was after Colonel Gregg had sent information to General Gregg that a large body of the enemy's cavalry were moving to their left—his right—that the position was no longer tenable, and instructions had been received to retire, that information came to Colonel Gregg, which came not from the observance of any infantry columns, but from Capt. (afterward Col.) S. B. M. Young, of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, now major of the 3d United States Cavalry, then in command of the skirmish line on his left, to the effect that it was infantry that was opposing him—men with knapsacks. This information was immediately sent to General Gregg by Lieut. Archer N. Martin, 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, one of Colonel Gregg's aids.

The time had now arrived when the pressure of the enemy could no longer be resisted; so that, like a weak embankment, pressed by the accumulated waters behind it, this thin skirmish line began to yield before the united strength of General Lee's right wing, crumbled and went to pieces.

• Colonel Gregg's dispatch to General Gregg, conveying the information of the presence of General Lee's infantry, did not reach him; for it was here, with the 7th and 11th Virginia on his right, the 12th Virginia on his left and rear, and the advancing infantry columns pressing upon his center, that Colonel Young, pale and bleeding, informed Colonel Gregg that he had been shot at close range by an

infantryman. Lieutenant Martin, on foot and covered with blood, approached and reported that the enemy were holding the road in his rear; that his horse had been killed and himself wounded. And Lieutenant Cutler, 1st Maine, another aid, rode up wounded in the arm, and reported: "We are fast being surrounded."

Maj. H. H. Gregg, 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, whose battalion had been holding the position behind the stone wall that surrounded the cemetery, came up from the front on foot exhausted, and reported everything in confusion and the enemy advancing rapidly. This officer, who was furnished a horse, was no sooner mounted than the horse was killed and he was himself captured, informed Colonel Gregg subsequently, after his return from Libby Prison, that fifteen minutes had not intervened between the time he reported to him and the arrival of Gen. R. E. Lee on the field.

Colonel Gregg, with the fragments of these broken and exhausted regiments, recrossed the river, covered the 10th New York, which was then forced back and crossed under cover of the guns and skirmishers on the north bank. General Gregg, riding up the slope to near the summit of the hill, observed the advance of the enemy's cavalry and infantry columns, and was astounded by the almost simultaneous opening of his batteries from the opposite bluffs. It was then that the 4:50 p. m. dispatch was written and forwarded to General Meade's headquarters.

As the distance from General Gregg's position on the Fayetteville road to Rappahannock Station would not exceed ten or eleven miles, and ought to have been covered in an hour, it is unaccountable how the delay in delivering this dispatch, which came so near being fatal, could have occurred.

The Comte de Paris goes on to say, same page: "He, Gregg, endeavored to retrieve it (this inexcusable error) by dispatching several couriers to Meade during the battle of Sulphur Springs, but they were killed or lost their way."

Here the comte confuses Colonel Gregg, whose couriers were stopped between Jefferson and Sulphur Springs, and General Gregg, whose couriers were not killed. There was no enemy on the road; they could not have lost their way, because all of General Gregg's staff officers or orderlies were familiar with the roads. Finally, there were no couriers sent; for after the 4:50 p. m. dispatch, there was no information to communicate; and General Gregg's plain duty was to retard the crossing of Lee's army as long as possible, which the comte admits was done. He, however, deduces from the events which he has so incorrectly but so graphically described, this extraordinary conclusion:

It would have been better for the army had he not given battle, and had he done more to communicate with his chief, [and] in fact the position of the army is very critical.

This latter is doubtless a correct inference. The heads of Lee's columns massed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, three of General Meade's corps near Culpeper, and the other corps strung along the river from Freeman's Ford to Kelley's, at dark on the evening of the 12th, might well excite apprehension in the mind of any general. But what if General Gregg had allowed himself to be forced from his position at Sulphur Springs by Stuart's cavalry brigade back upon the road to Fayetteville, without having seen Lee's infantry? What if that infantry, uninterrupted in its rapid march, had crossed the Hedgeman at three p.m., and by nightfall reached Warrenton? What then? It was not anything that General Gregg or his cavalry did or failed to do that endangered the army. It was the false reports that were responsible for the days and nights of marchings in retreat, rearguard actions, and general scramble for the fortifications around Washington, before an army numerically inferior, and certainly not superior in *morale*, to that which Meade commanded.

It seems necessary, for the truth of history, that the foregoing account should receive a place in this work, for

the reason that General Meade, in his report of operations, and General Humphreys, chief of staff, Army of the Potomac, in his "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," and the Comte de Paris, in his history, appear to have construed General Gregg's 4:50 p. m. dispatch as communicating intelligence of General Lee's movements which had been obtained early on the morning of the 12th, and retained during the whole of that eventful day, whereas it is evident from the facts he states, the inference was, at the date of the dispatch, that General Lee crossed the Hazel River in the morning, because at 4:50 p. m. his cavalry, infantry, and artillery appeared simultaneously, with his broken regiments, on the south bank of the Hedgeman.

General Meade's army had present for duty 76,153 effective troops, while General Lee's army had present for duty only 56,088. (See "War Records," Vol. XXIX, Part I, pages 226 and 823.)

CHAPTER XIV.

MINE RUN.

LEE, having failed to surprise Meade in his flank movement which ended with the Bristoe action, fell back behind the Rappahannock, with his headquarters at Culpeper.

When the Confederate army retreated from Gettysburg, Longstreet regarded the cause of the Confederacy as lost, unless the Army of the Cumberland could be overwhelmed or destroyed. He urged Lee to permit him to take his corps and reënforce Bragg, who was opposing Rosecrans. Lee hesitated to give his consent, but, after nearly a month's persuasion on the part of Longstreet, he finally yielded under the impression, as Longstreet assured him, that both Lee's and Meade's armies would go into winter quarters, and he (Longstreet) would not be needed there. Longstreet said to me: "That that was the only hope of saving the Confederacy," and that, "Rosecrans was a much abler general than Bragg, and had he been let alone, Rosecrans would have driven him into the sea." He further stated: "I thought with my corps and Bragg's army Rosecrans could be crushed, which would perhaps save the waning fortunes of the Confederacy, and counteract the defeat at Gettysburg; but, as it was, while Rosecrans was driven back, I lost 10,000 of my corps, who could not be replaced, and left us that much worse off."

The above statement by Longstreet was made in the fall of 1882. We had spent the evening before with Rosecrans, when those military operations were all gone over. After we left Rosecrans, Longstreet said: "I deeply regret that I

ever took part in the battle of Chickamauga against Rosecrans, for I did the Confederacy no good, while perhaps I marred his fame, as I regard him one of the ablest officers of the army, and without my troops against him it would have given him great prestige."

Thus it will be seen that Lee had only the corps of Ewell and Hill. It might be estimated that one-third of his army was absent with Longstreet. He had placed his army on the right bank of the Rappahannock, in much the same position he occupied when Burnside assumed command, before the battle of Fredericksburg, while the Union army held the same relative position. Lee holding the fords of the Rappahannock, from Sulphur Springs down to Kelley's Ford, hoped to detain Meade on the north bank until the late fall storms set in, when both armies would go into winter quarters. If Meade attempted to move down the river to Fredericksburg, Lee thought it would be the same old race of 1862 over again, when the Confederate army, by forced marches, gained the heights back of Fredericksburg, and held them until after the battle. Meade was strongly of the opinion that he could conceal his movements until he could strike the river at Fredericksburg or Banks' Ford, and succeed in crossing and get possession of the heights before Lee would be aware of it; but Halleck emphatically declined to have that route considered at all. He claimed it would abandon the Alexandria and Orange Railroad which crosses the Rappahannock at the station of that name. This would not necessarily have been the case, for the move, if successful, would have given Meade possession of the road to Culpeper, and had he been able to master Lee on the field of battle, he could have compelled him to retreat. Though Lee had only two-thirds of his army to oppose Meade, it must be remembered that the Army of the Potomac had been stripped of three corps, Ninth, Eleventh and Twelfth, which had been sent west. So Meade had also lost one-third of his corps, and in round numbers one-third of his army, which left the two armies

numerically about as before. The movement around Lee's right flank having been abandoned, if Meade had made a forward movement he would have been compelled to advance his army, and make a front attack. The Indian summer, the balmiest part of the season, gave hopes that there would be ample time for the Army of the Potomac to make a forward movement, and the battle of Gettysburg had increased the confidence of the Union soldiers, who then looked with bright hopes to a speedy termination of the war. Meade felt its growing confidence in that respect, and he decided to have the railway repaired in his front, toward the Rappahannock, preparatory to an advance.

The Confederate forces were posted with Hill on the left of the railroad and Ewell on the right. On the 7th of November Sedgwick left Warrenton with the Sixth Corps and marched to Fayetteville. The Second, Third and Fifth Corps moved to Auburn, Catlett's Station and Warrenton Junction. Meade then divided his army into two wings; the left one, composed of the First, Second and Third Corps, under General French, moved in the direction of Kelley's Ford, while the right wing, composed of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, with Sedgwick leading, marched on to Rappahannock Station. When the left wing arrived in rear of the crest opposite Kelley's Ford, an examination of the troops on the bank was made; as yet the pickets of the enemy were unaware of the presence of the Union army. The Third Corps was then advanced, with de Trobriand's brigade making the attack, sending forward sharpshooters under Colonel Trepp. The 2d North Carolina, under Colonel Stallings, at once opened a rapid fire on Trepp's sharpshooters, but the latter's telescopic rifles soon compelled them to seek shelter in a ditch, when the 13th North Carolina came to their rescue. The right bank of the Rappahannock was low at the ford, and Rodes, who was in command, had to keep his artillery and his reserve back about a mile on the way leading to Stevensburg. When de Trobriand advanced to the bank of the river,

Rodes ordered a battery to the rescue of the North Carolinians; but Birney's artillery had been rapidly put in position, and compelled it to retreat. Rodes had formed his division to advance to the ford, but suffered so much from the Union artillery that he was unable, without frightful loss, to come to the rescue of his troops there. De Trobriand taking advantage of the situation, threw his brigade across the river, and captured the 2d South Carolina. The pontoons were soon laid, and Meade's left wing marched over Kelley's Ford without serious opposition. Rodes seeing the heavy force opposed to him, fell back with his right in the direction of Stevensburg, at the same time notifying Ewell of the events which had taken place, who ordered Johnson to Rodes' assistance, and to form a line of battle closing the angle from the Rappahannock to Mountain Run.

Meade did not attempt to pursue Rodes, consequently did not attack the new line of battle formed by Ewell, but waited to hear from his right, under Sedgwick, at Rappahannock Station. At that point it seems that Lee had a desire to cling to the north bank of the river, and occupied the works there with Hays' brigade of Louisiana troops and Green's battery. Early, who had just relieved Johnson, had the brigades of Gordon, Hoke and Pegram back near Brandy Station. It was certainly a very peculiar idea of Lee's to leave a single brigade on the opposite bank of a river exposed to the attacks of a heavy force from the enemy. But, nevertheless, Hays was occupying these old works which had been in turn occupied by both armies. They had been reformed and strengthened with a view to withstand a heavy siege. Early ordered Hoke's brigade forward to assist Hays. Sedgwick had formed his line with the Fifth Corps on the left of the railroad, and the Sixth Corps on the right. General Wright, who was in command of the latter corps, directed the First Division, under Russell, to connect with the Fifth Corps at the railroad, and Howe's division, on Russell's right, was ordered to advance

and seize a hill some three-quarters of a mile from the enemy's works. Upon that hill Waterman and Martin's batteries, and four 20-pounder Parrot guns from the artillery reserve, were posted. In the mean time Gen. R. O. Tyler, of the Fifth, had brought up ten guns to enfilade the redoubts of the enemy from the left. It soon became evident to Sedgwick that the enemy was very strongly posted, and he continued the artillery firing until dark, when he could assault the works with infantry. Russell taking the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine, closely supported by the 49th and 119th Pennsylvania, advanced as secretly as possible to storm the works, upon which the artillery had been unable during the afternoon to make much impression or to destroy. When the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine scaled the parapets there took place a hand-to-hand encounter of a most desperate character; but the Union troops were victorious, with a loss of half their number. The 5th Maine and 121st New York subsequently carried the rifle-pits on the right, capturing a large number of prisoners. The 96th Pennsylvania gallantly rushed to the enemy's pontoon bridge and prevented the escape of Hoke and Hays' soldiers who had not already been taken prisoners. The 95th Pennsylvania, seeing the 96th cut off their retreat, was prompt in guarding the prisoners and conducting them to the rear. General Russell in his report says:

Much praise is due Captain Morrill of the 20th Regiment Maine Volunteers, who commanded a skirmish detail of 75 Maine volunteers, and on learning their works in the front were to be stormed, he called for volunteers to aid their sister regiment. Major Fuller, commanding the 6th Maine skirmishers, reports that some 50 men responded to the call, and by their valor and dash rendered most efficient aid.

The character of this night's charge is clearly stated in the following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
November 12, 1863.

SIR:—I have the honor herewith to transmit, in charge of Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell, seven battle-flags and one staff, the flag of

which was torn off by the standard-bearers to prevent it being captured. These trophies were taken in the recent gallant assault on the enemy's intrenched position at Rappahannock Station, and Brigadier General Russell has been designated by Major General Sedgwick to deliver them to you, because of his conspicuous conduct as the leader of the storming party on the occasion.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GEORGE G. MEADE,
Major General Commanding.

To Adjutant General of the Army.

The appreciation of the Government is expressed in the following communication :

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 19, 1863.

GENERAL :—The Secretary of War received with great satisfaction at the hands of Brig. Gen. D. A. Russell, the seven battle-flags and one staff taken in the recent assault on the enemy's intrenched position at Rappahannock Station, by the storming party led by the gallant General Russell.

The Secretary desires me to convey his thanks to the officers and men engaged in those operations of the army, which reflect such high credit upon the skill which planned and the bravery which successfully executed them.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.

To Major General MEADE, U. S. Volunteers,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Lee seeing that the left wing of the Army of the Potomac had, without difficulty, crossed to the south side of the Rappahannock, while its right had succeeded in capturing two of his (Lee's) brigades at Rappahannock Station, placing his army in a most embarrassing dilemma, retreated behind the Rapidan, and again bade defiance to his old adversary. With Ewell and Hill retreating on different roads, was Meade's golden opportunity to strike one or the other of these corps a blow, and then, facing the other, attack that one. He had surprised Lee at the Rappahannock, captured two of his brigades, and crossed the river in his face, when both armies were about equal in numbers. Lee mor-

tified at the manner in which he had been outgeneraled, flew to the jungles of the Wilderness behind the Rapidan, and there, crouched panther-like in his lair, waited for Meade to come up again. If the wings of Meade's army had hotly pursued the corps of Ewell and Hill, and not permitted time for them to form a line of battle without attacking it, the chances were greatly in Meade's favor. But he stopped to repair the railroad as he advanced, which gave Lee all the time he desired to select the place and intrench himself where it was not only hazardous but almost ruinous to attack him.

On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac moved on the Rappahannock, but not until the 27th did Meade cross the peninsula between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, which he should have accomplished in a single day. So desperate was Lee that he moved to Orange Court House, then returned to the right bank of the Rapidan, finally taking a position on its right bank with his right resting on Mine Run. It was even a better position than Chancellorsville, though in the same vicinity, for a part of Meade's army had to march over the same ground as before in order to reach that ill-fated field. This was the only position Lee could take to make a successful stand against Meade; for if he retreated in the direction of Fredericksburg, the moment he passed the confines of the Wilderness, his rear would be exposed in an open country to a pursuing army, when he would lose many soldiers captured on the march by the cavalry. His army would thus be depleted and his ability to resist would soon be exhausted. Besides, the military stores at Gordonsville had to be protected if possible.

When Meade discovered Lee's position he decided to cross at the lower fords, and, seizing the plank road and turnpike running from Fredericksburg to Orange Court House, turn Lee's right flank or compel him to retreat. These two roads separate at Dowdall's Tavern, some two miles west of Chancellorsville. The turnpike leads to the

right, while the plank road runs almost parallel with it on the left. Meade's plan was to concentrate his army in the vicinity of Robertson's Tavern on the turnpike, about two miles east of where it is crossed by Mine Run. In accordance therewith, General French, commanding the Third Corps, was directed to proceed to Jacobs' Mill, cross the Rapidan at that point, and continue his march on the road leading to Robertson's Tavern, while General Warren, in command of the Second Corps, crossed at Germanna Ford, and took the turnpike for the same place. General Sykes, who with the Fifth Corps crossed at Culpeper Ford, was ordered to take the plank road to Parker's Store, and if practicable proceed to the crossroad leading to Robertson's Tavern. Gregg's division of cavalry crossed the Rapidan River to protect the left flank of the army. Custer's division held the upper fords of the Rapidan, while Merritt was left at Richardsville to guard the trains. Sedgwick followed the Third Corps, and Newton, in command of the First Corps, took two divisions; the Third Division was left on the railroad to follow the Fifth. Warren arrived at Robertson's Tavern about ten o'clock and began skirmishing with the enemy, but Meade ordered him to simply hold his position until French arrived. An hour later French reported that the head of his column was near the plank road and he was waiting for Warren. He was directed to move promptly to Robertson's Tavern, but in that he utterly failed. Prince, who commanded his leading division, came to the fork in the road, and French compelled him to take the right-hand one, which threw him on the Raccoon Ford road away from Warren. Then Prince was ordered to countermarch and take the other road to Robertson's Tavern.

The enemy followed Prince and attacked his and Carr's divisions which had been deployed on his left. One of Carr's brigades was driven back, and the others being out of ammunition, Birney advanced with his division and relieved Carr. French had failed to obey or understand

Meade's orders, and toward evening Meade sent for Newton with the First Corps to move over from the plank road to Warren's support on the turnpike at Robertson's Tavern. General Gregg, who was on the plank road, advanced to New Hope Church, which is near the intersection of the plank road and the crossroad leading to Robertson's Tavern. There he (Gregg) met Stuart's cavalry, and had a severe engagement, driving them back until reënforced with infantry, when Sykes relieved Gregg. Meade having formed his line of battle, began the examination of the enemy's position, which resulted in the officers opposing an attack upon that position. Lee occupied the western bank of Mine Run, which was 100 feet high, back perhaps 1000 yards from the stream. With artillery posted on it, our troops would have been cut to pieces before they could have reached the summit, and then, exhausted, could not have forced the Confederates from their position. Warren, who had taken the lead, and had been the inspiration of that campaign, was directed to take the Second Corps, with a division of the Sixth, and move to the left and attempt to turn Lee's right. It was Meade's intention to support Warren's move with a column in the center, composed of the First and Third Corps, and another on the right, composed of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. But now came another unexpected change ; while General French, who had commanded the center, reported that he was fearful he could not succeed, Warren and other officers reported Warren's position so favorably on the left that the enemy was expected to retreat during the night. Meade now decided to still farther reënforce Warren with two divisions of the Third Corps, which gave him six divisions, nearly half of the Army of the Potomac. The batteries of the right and center were to open at eight o'clock on the 30th. In the center, the skirmishers of the First Corps and one division of the Third, advanced across Mine Run, and drove back the enemy's line of skirmishers.

About nine o'clock Meade received a dispatch from

Warren, stating that the position of the enemy in his front then was so strongly fortified that he advised against making the attack. The Confederates saw our army moving on the plank road, and knew that that point would be strongly assaulted early in the morning; consequently they worked all night making abattis and intrenchments preparatory to the great struggle that was to take place the following day. Warren feared that the enemy had divined the real movement, and early next morning a critical examination was made of the position he was to attack. The more he studied it, the more he was convinced that it was almost impossible, without an excessive sacrifice of life, to make a successful assault. The position was of no importance whatever; it was the destruction of Lee's army he wished to accomplish. So Warren, ever clear-headed and honest, decided not to attack the enemy in the strongest position Lee could have selected, and accordingly sent the following dispatch to Meade:

The position and strength of the enemy seem so formidable in my present front that I advise against making the attack here—the full light of the sun shows me I cannot succeed.

General Meade says:

As Sedgwick's attack was subsidiary to Warren's, and as, owing to Warren's confidence of the night before I had given him so large a part of the army that I had not the means of supporting Sedgwick in case of a repulse or reënforcing him in the event of success, I was obliged to suspend the attack of Sedgwick on the enemy's left, which I did just in time; and immediately proceeded to General Warren's column, some four miles distant, in the hope of arranging some plan by which the two attacks might yet take place in the afternoon. I reached General Warren between 10 and 11 a. m., and found his views were unchangeable, and that it was his decided opinion it was hopeless to make any attack. It was too late to move the troops back and make an attack on the center that day, and General Warren was so far separated from the right that his movement to turn the enemy's right could not be continued without moving up the rest of the army in support, and abandoning the Turnpike road, our main line of communications.

After further consulting with Warren, Meade said :

Under these circumstances I could see no other course to pursue than either to hazard an assault, which I knew to be hopeless, and which I believed would be attended with certain disaster, or, acknowledging the whole movement a failure, withdraw the army to the north bank of the Rapidan.

The rank and file understood quite as well as the generals that it was a forlorn hope to attack the position which Lee had so carefully selected ; and many of the men pinned their names on their coats so they might be identified. The Confederate position at Mine Run was still better than the Union position at Gettysburg ; the latter was in the shape of a fish-hook, while the enemy's position here was semicircular, and any threatened point could be reënforced with promptness, and the condition of the country was such that either of their wings could be extended and a new line fortified in a single night against an attack. Meade and Warren fully realized this fact, and resolved not to waste time in front of a position that could not be carried. The weather was exceedingly cold, and the troops found it necessary to keep in constant motion in order to prevent freezing, and several perished on the retreat. In speaking of Mine Run, Colonel Talley says :

In accordance with instructions, I marched my command, the 1st Pennsylvania Reserves, to the right of our line and to the foot of that terrible hill, the entire side of which was covered with an abattis—trees and branches of trees, sharpened and laid with their points outward—ditches thinly covered with brush, and other death-traps, constructed for the purpose of preventing the assailants from ascending.

It was night—a cold, gloomy night, the coldest that was experienced by the army during any other engagement or attempted engagement ; everything was gloomy ; the impregnable defenses, the frowning forts, the leafless trees, the earth and the heavens, all seemed to frown and threaten ; the daring men, generally, even amid dangers, so witty, cheerful and hopeful, could not be heard to speak above a whisper. A dreadful silence reigned, but slightly broken by the cautious, ghost-like steps of the troops, who trod a

few paces to and fro, in order to prevent the blood from congealing, so low was the temperature. Silence was important, that our position and intention might not be known by the enemy.

I was instructed to await the order to charge the works in my immediate front, which would be given during the night, when the other line was ready. Every man could see the fearful abattis, anticipate the trenches, see the steep ascent of the hill, and almost measure the distance to the summit. Every moment I expected to receive the order to charge. Certain death faced us, yet not one of my brave, noble men left the ranks. I moved among them frequently to quietly encourage them; they did not seem to need it; they fully understood the situation, and were firm, unflinching and ready to meet their fate, though madness they believed it to be, in a general commanding, to require such a sacrifice. I had full confidence in my old, tried soldiers, who had fought on many fields, and whom I had led in the charges at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and other battles. We remained for hours in this position. The order did not arrive.

Had it come, the charge would have been made, with all the force and courage men possess; yet but few, if any, would have reached the summit. While endeavoring to climb over the trees and branches and pass the ditches we would have been raked by the rebel grape and canister, and those who might have reached a sufficient distance would have received the concentrated fire of their musketry. And thus would have ended the remainder of the 1st Reserves.

Finally we fell back, and marched during the remainder of the night toward the place of beginning. No battle was fought. The army, perhaps the Union cause, was saved, due to the clear judgment and military skill of those grand officers, Meade and Warren.

If officers less cautious and less able had been in command, the battle, likely, would have been fought there and then. It is very tempting to a commanding officer—after marching far and maneuvering much, with the people at home so anxious and so urging, though so ignorant of the surroundings, for forward movements and dashing fights—when he has reached the enemy, to attack him, however strong his position.

Had the two armies fought at Mine Run the result would have been the greatest slaughter recorded in the history of the United States. It was the part of wisdom to retire in due season, which Meade did; and the army returned to winter quarters to be reorganized under a new commander, that indefatigable soldier, General Grant.

CHAPTER XV.

THE WILDERNESS.

WHEN Meade returned to the north side of the Rapidan after Mine Run he at once proceeded to put the army in winter quarters in the peninsula formed by the Rappahannock and Rapidan, with the exception of one corps. The First and Third Corps occupied positions two miles south of Culpeper Court House, the Second Corps near Stevensburg, while the Fifth Corps guarded the railroad from the Rappahannock back to Bristoe Station. The Sixth Corps was at Wilsford, on the Hazel River.

Neither army could move, so there was comparative quiet until April, when the Ninth Corps was ordered to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, and by the 3d of May had relieved the Fifth Corps from guard duty north of the Rappahannock. The war had raged with unabated fury for three years, yet the Southern Confederacy was still in existence, and its authorities at Richmond were hoping it could hold on until the nations of Europe would recognize it as an independent and sovereign power.

Though Lee had been defeated at Gettysburg, yet the Army of the Potomac had been unable to strike him a blow sufficiently hard on his retreat to cripple him in his future movements. Circumstances had conspired to permit him to retreat across the Rappahannock with his defeated army; and during the winter he had been able to recruit its ranks to such an extent that he had a powerful army ready to take the field and fight most desperately. This army, which had fought under him from the Peninsular Campaign to that time, regarded him as a great general, and were ready

to follow his lead in the future the same as in the past. The few reverses his army had suffered when attempting to invade the North did not weigh heavily with them. They still thought on Southern soil—at home—they were unconquerable. Lee's life was wrecked unless the Confederacy succeeded. The game became a more desperate one with him as the war neared its close. While Longstreet and other officers thought it was hopeless to prolong the struggle after Gettysburg, Lee continued firm in his belief that he could yet pull the Confederacy through.

He had resigned his position in the United States Army and declined the command of the Army of the Potomac when it was tendered to him after Lincoln was inaugurated. His valuable possessions of Arlington and other estates, which had descended to him through Colonel Custis from George Washington, would in case of defeat be confiscated, and he would be an outcast from society where once he had been received with distinguished honor. With a general so determined the Confederate army, composed of veterans seasoned to the hardships and privations of war, was almost invincible. The Union authorities were fully aware of this, as well also of the important fact that the war was lengthening out beyond a point of safety to the nation. There had been no grand system by which all the armies had worked together, while the Confederates could easily reënforce any one of their armies liable to attack, and were able, with a far less number of soldiers, to throw an overwhelming force on any Union general who attempted to advance.

When McDowell advanced on Beauregard at Bull Run, Johnson put his troops on the cars, arrived on the field in time to render the latter assistance, and thus turned defeat into victory, while the forces under Patterson were stationed in his front. Jackson victorious, marched down the Shenandoah, then turning rapidly, returned to Richmond, and was soon attacking the Army of the Potomac under McClellan. After the battle of Fredericksburg, Longstreet went to lay siege to Suffolk. When Rosecrans was march-



GEN. U. S. GRANT.

ing on Chattanooga, Longstreet went to Bragg's assistance, and most stubbornly fought Rosecrans at Chickamauga. Then returning, his corps lay near Gordonsville, prepared to move at a moment's notice to any point Lee directed. Thus having the interior lines, it was an easy matter to reënforce any army in danger. The Administration saw that bloody battles were being fought without success ; that time was being wasted as well as money with the different armies acting independent of each other. Therefore Congress passed an act, which was approved on February 29, 1864, reviving the grade of lieutenant general in the army. That move was made in order to appoint a general who would have command of all the armies, and have concert of action, which would prevent the Confederate armies reënforcing at any one point without suffering at the place from which their troops had been taken. On the 9th of March, General Grant received his commission as lieutenant general. It was made quite an occasion at the White House, when Lincoln presented his commission to him. The Cabinet and Grant's staff in Washington were present, with a few other visitors. In presenting the commission the President took occasion to make one of those elegant little addresses which are living monuments of his goodness and greatness. He said :

General Grant, the Nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing struggle, are now presented, with commission constituting you Lieutenant General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor, devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need add that, with what I here speak for the Nation, goes my own hearty concurrence.

To which Grant replied :

Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight

of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.

The next day Grant visited the Army of the Potomac. Meade had his headquarters at Brandy Station. These two generals had not met since the Mexican war, when they were both subalterns. Grant became attached to Meade and retained him in command of the Army of the Potomac, notwithstanding he offered to resign, so that Grant could put Sherman or some other Western officer in command. But Grant held Meade in high respect for his work at Gettysburg, and refused to accept his resignation.

It was some time before Grant finally took up his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court House. He had to return to the West to arrange matters there for the grand plan of moving all the armies at once as soon as the spring opened. Meeting Sherman at St. Louis, he gave him his old command, promoted McPherson to the position Sherman had held, and advanced Logan to the command of McPherson's corps.

In the mean time Meade determined to reorganize the Army of the Potomac. There were more corps in it than he desired. Lee's army had been well managed with only three corps, while the Army of the Potomac had more than double that number; on various occasions the corps commanders had not fully complied with the commander-in-chief's wishes, and this, perhaps, had much to do with the reorganization. At Gettysburg Sickles moved his corps from the line of battle, extending from Little Round Top to the seminary, forward to the Emmitsburg road, a distance of a half mile or more. During that battle and ever since there has been an acrimonious discussion carried on in regard to the matter; Meade would have drawn Sickles back to the regular line on the second day, but Longstreet was ready to begin the attack on him, and for that reason Meade desisted from issuing an order for him to retire, and threw half or more of the army in to support him.



COL. C. M. CONYNGHAM.

The reason assigned by Meade for consolidating the corps was the reduced strength of the regiments. As Meade had served in the First Corps in the battles of second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam (where he commanded the corps after Hooker was wounded) and Fredericksburg, it seemed strange to the officers and men of that corps that it should be selected to lose its place among the corps, when it had fought so valiantly on so many fields, and had particularly distinguished itself when Meade had led it into action. At Gettysburg it held in check, with the assistance of two divisions of the Eleventh Corps, two-thirds of the Confederate army, until the other corps of the Army of the Potomac arrived. It had in reality closed the battle of Gettysburg with the charge of General Stannard. No prouder record was ever made in the military history of the world than the First Corps had. While Meade was popular with the officers and men, yet there has ever been a sincere regret in the minds of the gallant soldiers of that corps that it was blotted out as a distinctive organization. That it was a mistake is manifest from the statement of General Humphreys, in his history of "The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865," in which he says:

But it caused some dissatisfaction with both officers and enlisted men, owing to the spirit of rivalry between the several corps, the divisions of a corps, and the brigades of a division. The history and associations of these organizations were different, and when they were merged in other organizations their identity was lost and their pride and *esprit de corps* wounded.

But the old First Corps submitted without a murmur, and in the battles until the final surrender at Appomattox it maintained its former record on the field. Many valuable officers were left without commands. General Newton, who was in command of the corps then, and after Hancock was wounded at Gettysburg was put in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps until the close of that battle, was one of those who had suffered by the consolida-

tion. The three divisions of the First Corps, commanded respectively by Gens. James C. Rice, John C. Robinson, and John R. Kenly, were consolidated and formed two divisions of the Fifth Corps. In the new organization of the Fifth Corps, three of the four divisions came from the First Corps; for Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves was one of the original divisions of the First Corps, when the corps was so designated under McDowell in the spring of 1862. It was detached at Fredericksburg to join McClellan on the Peninsula, and there fought in the Fifth Corps. When McClellan's army came to the assistance of Pope, it rejoined the First Corps, and fought the battles of second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg in it; then it was again put in the Fifth Corps. Under the reorganization it was the Third Division of the Fifth Corps. John C. Robinson was given the Second Division, of three brigades. The Third Corps was made the Third and Fourth Divisions of the Second Corps.

When Grant visited Meade on the 10th, he informed him that Butler was directed to move up the right bank of the James at the same time that the Army of the Potomac would, so as to sever the communications between Richmond and the South. This would cut off supplies and reinforcements. He also informed Meade that General Sigel would be directed to move his forces with a view to a concentration near Lynchburg. Sigel, who was in the Shenandoah Valley, would ascend it, while General Crook, commanding the other column under Sigel, was to march from the Great Kanawha through Lewisburg, when the latter would join the Army of the Potomac by the way of Gordonsville and become its right wing.

Grant had already seen the necessity of remaining with the Army of the Potomac. To remain in the West in command of all the armies would be to neglect the Army of the Potomac, which had the most important work to do; if the latter failed what the other armies did would be of no avail. Besides, Grant knew that Halleck would still exercise a

great influence over the Army of the Potomac if he (Grant) remained in the West. Grant and Halleck had had differences in the West, and Halleck had made serious blunders in directing the Army of the Potomac. But for his stubbornness Miles' force would never have been surrendered, and his blind folly again came very near stranding the Army of the Potomac in its pursuit of Lee, when he was marching on Harrisburg and Philadelphia. His refusal to permit Hooker to direct French temporarily to abandon Harper's Ferry and unite with the Army of the Potomac, caused Hooker to ask to be relieved. Grant first settled where his headquarters would be with the Army of the Potomac; next the route he would take. There were four from which to choose. He could turn Lee's left flank and take the Gordonsville line; that had the advantage of having Sigel's command unite with him and swell the size of the Army of the Potomac. It would necessarily have to be a short campaign to enable the men to carry their rations; and Grant believed that to supply the Army of the Potomac by wagons would make such an immense train that it would be cumbersome. He could take the line up the south bank of the James, but Butler was already there with two corps. Then there was the old route up the Peninsula between the James and York Rivers, which McClellan had stranded on. The two latter routes would not have protected Washington. The last and fourth route was to turn Lee's right flank, which would prevent a countermovement on Washington, and force him back on Richmond and destroy his army as soon as possible.

At midnight on the 3d of May the army was put in motion to cross the Rapidan. Warren with the Fifth Corps was directed to cross at Germanna Ford. Wilson's cavalry division had preceded him and taken possession of the ford so that a bridge could be thrown across. Warren's corps arrived at six a.m. and began crossing at seven. By one o'clock the whole corps was across. Wilson's cavalry, leading the way for some distance, turned off to the right

in the direction of Robertson's Tavern in order to see if the enemy was advancing. Griffin's division followed Wilson's cavalry. Warren kept on to old Wilderness Tavern road, with Crawford's, Wadsworth's and Robinson's divisions in the order named. Not seeing the enemy Wilson withdrew and moved on to Parker's Store, in front of Warren. Hancock, preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford and took the road to Chancellorsville, where he encamped for the night. Sedgwick was ordered to follow Warren, while Torbert's division of cavalry was left to protect the rear. When the troops had crossed the Rapidan, Grant sent orders to Burnside to unite with the army south of the Rapidan. Making a forced march, he arrived there the next day, some of his troops having marched forty miles. When Warren crossed Grant left his headquarters at Culpeper and proceeded to the front.

On the 2d of May Lee summoned his corps and division commanders to him at the signal station on Clark's Mountain. He then said to them that he thought the enemy would cross at the lower fords on the Rapidan and turn his right flank. When Warren crossed the Rapidan and moved to old Wilderness Tavern, Ewell, who was aware of the movement, by reports from the 1st North Carolina Cavalry, which he had sent down in the direction of Germanna Ford, sent Major Campbell, of his staff, to inform General Lee. Ewell received an order to regulate his advance so as to keep abreast with A. P. Hill on the plank road, but not to bring on an engagement, if possible, until Longstreet could come up. Johnson's division was leading, with Jones' brigade thrown forward to skirmish. Griffin encountered the advance of Johnson's division and pushed Jones back, when the brigades of Battle and Doles were ordered to his assistance. As Ewell was ordered to simply hold the Union army in check and observe its movements, these three brigades slowly fell back, pressed by Griffin, supported by Wadsworth on his left with the Third Brigade of Robinson's division. Crawford's division was formed on the extreme




COL. JOS. H. MOESCH.



left of the corps, as it was in the advance. The Fifth Corps had pressed back the brigades of Jones, Battle, and Doles on Ewell's corps, which then formed in line of battle from right to left in the following order: Daniel's, Doles', Battle's, Stewart's, Walker's, Stafford's, Pegram's, Hay's, and Gordon's brigades. The conflict which ensued was most sanguinary. Wright's division of the Sixth Corps was ordered up on Griffin's right, as Johnson was overlapping his right flank, but was unable to get into position on account of the heavy undergrowth which he encountered. Getty's division of the Sixth Corps was directed to move in the rear of the Fifth Corps and take a position at the Brock and Plank roads to arrest the advance of A. P. Hill until Hancock, who had marched to Todd's Tavern on the Brock road, in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House, could get into position. In the mean time the battle raged between Ewell's and Warren's corps. Ayres' Regulars on the right were compelled to yield ground, which carried the other brigades of Griffin back. Griffin lost two guns in that movement, which were captured by the enemy. Wadsworth's division formed line of battle with Cutler's brigade on the right, Roy Stone in the center, and Rice on the left. Advancing against the enemy the right wing of Ewell's corps was struck. The woods were so thick that alignment could not be maintained, and much confusion prevailed. In the advance a gap was made between Cutler and Stone, of which the enemy quickly took advantage, and forcing his troops into it compelled Stone to fall back. Then Rice, Cutler, and the Maryland Brigade suffered from a flank fire, which compelled that part of the line under Wadsworth to fall back. McCandless' brigade, of Crawford's division, did not move as soon as Wadsworth's troops did, and really acted in consequence as an independent command. It became enveloped with the right of Ewell's corps, under Gordon, and lost many killed and wounded, besides some prisoners. Crawford's Third on the left meeting with a severe fire. Col. Ira Ayr,

Jr., commanding the Tenth Regiment fell severely wounded.

Meade and Grant had watched the progress of the battle from a rise not far from the Lacy House. Fearing that Hill would seize the position of the intersection at the Brock and Plank roads, Hancock was hurried back to Getty's assistance, who only had three brigades with which to impede Hill's advance, as Neill's brigade had been detached and was with Wright. Although Heth had arrived in front of Getty, he made no attempt to attack him, which was evidence to Grant and Meade that Hill, too, had instructions not to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet could arrive. Ewell had fought most desperately on the right, but Warren had checked him by driving back his advance brigades on the main body of his corps. Ewell and Warren had begun throwing up temporary breastworks, to await the result of the action on the left, and to let Wright get into position. Ricketts was still back at Germanna Ford waiting to be relieved by the advance of Burnside, who was marching rapidly under the orders of Grant. When Hancock received the order to countermarch his corps, he at once gave the order and rode back to Getty to get an idea where to put in the Second Corps. Getty had formed his three brigades with Eustis on the right, Wheaton in the center and Grant on the left. Birney's division coming up was placed in two lines on Getty's left. When Mott and Gibbon arrived they extended the line to the left in the same formation. Barlow's division coming up last, formed Hancock's extreme left, with the exception of Frank's brigade, which was posted at the intersection of the road leading to the Catharpin Furnace and the Brock road. Barlow was thrown forward across the Brock road on a farm which had some elevated positions in the fields, with his left pushed back across the Brock road. This was the only point on Hancock's front where artillery could be used, the dense forest almost entirely precluding the use of artillery along the whole line. Hancock posted all hisartil-



COL. S. J. WILLIAMS.

lery there on his extreme left, with the exception of one section of Ricketts' Pennsylvania Battery, and Dow's 6th Maine, which was posted on Barlow's right, on a line with Mott's reserve force. One section of Ricketts' battery was placed by Getty where the line of battle crossed the Orange plank road. About four o'clock Getty attacked the enemy in pursuance to orders received before Hancock's arrival. He had gone but a short distance up the Orange plank road when he struck the enemy well posted. Hancock, seeing that Getty had met the enemy in heavy force, ordered Birney in to assist him, which, advancing, he did; Birney's own division on Getty's right with Mott's division on Getty's left. The battle raged with such severity that Carroll's and Owen's brigades, of Gibbon's division, were detached to go to the right of Getty to assist at that point. In the action two of Barlow's brigades, the Irish and Colonel Brooke's, became involved with the enemy and drove the right of his line some distance. The section of Ricketts' battery which had accompanied Getty and Birney lost so many horses and men that the guns were captured, but were retaken, under the direction of Captain Butterfield, of Carroll's staff, by detachments from the 14th Indiana and 8th Ohio, of Carroll's brigade. The action closed about eight o'clock without any material advantage to either side. That afternoon the Army of the Potomac lost one of its most gallant officers, who had been a classmate at West Point with General Grant. When Grant learned that General Hays had been killed he was deeply affected. Although it was so far a drawn battle, the Union forces were in condition to drive Hill from the field and win a victory had they had a little more daylight or a Joshua commanding the sun to stand still.

In order to crush Hill before Anderson and Longstreet arrived, Grant and Meade decided to throw Wadsworth, with Baxter's brigade, on Hill's left and rear; but it was late in the afternoon, and these very troops had already had a severe

engagement. When Wadsworth received orders to report to Hancock, who was then hotly engaged with the enemy at the intersection of the Brock road and Orange plank road, he at once obeyed. He was then near the Lacy House, facing west. Changing the direction of his division to face south he deployed in line of battle, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, and moved to the support of the Second Corps, guided by the musket-firing of the engagement there being hotly contested. The troops were soon in the wilderness of second growth pine, marching in the direction of the left rear of the Confederate troops engaged with the Second Corps, and opposed by a strong line of pickets, with strong reserves, protecting the Confederate flank. The skirmish firing gave the Confederates warning of the approach of troops on the rear and flank, probably not unexpected from General Warren's position. It being after dark, firing in Hancock's front ceased, and the Confederate line withdrew to relieve the flank from Wadsworth's threatened attack. General Wadsworth halted when the darkness was so great that no alignment could be kept up. Firing having ceased, save an occasional shot, that general was unable to judge of the distance intervening between his troops and the Second Corps, while the Confederate pickets were close in his front. The thick branches of the pines kept out the starlight, and the night was one of darkness in its fullest sense.

Wadsworth had not, owing to obstructions and the density of the forest, connected with Hancock or struck the Confederate left when he halted. The regiments rested on their arms in line of battle. The regimental commanders were called upon to report the number of cartridges in possession of the men. At eleven p. m. the reports showed that nearly all the cartridges had been expended in the engagement during the day. General Wadsworth's orders were to proceed quietly. The conflict with the Confederate pickets, and Col. Roy Stone's enthusiasm, made it a howling wilderness. Captain Monteith, aid-de-camp, was sent back to report to General Warren the situation, and bring


some ammunition. The captain received orders from General Warren to move forward and attack at a specified time, five a. m., being the earliest dawn. Monteith then proceeded to the supply train, where Sergt. J. A. Watrous packed ten mules, that had never before been "cinched," each carrying 2,000 cartridges. He started to return by two a. m., and reached the line of troops, after much trouble and twisting around trees, a few minutes before the time to open the morning service in behalf of the United States Government. The troops had had no supper, save dry hard tack, and no time to prepare breakfast, but were regaled with cartridges. At five a. m. Wadsworth ordered the advance, and soon was in front of the Second Corps, which was advancing to attack. Hancock withdrew to the left of the Orange plank road; General Wadsworth made a half wheel to the right, his left resting on the plank road, making a prolongation of the Second Corps line, with his right exposed in the Wilderness.

Owing to the density of the woods, small pine trees, and low long limbs, mounted officers had much trouble at times in the saddle. General Wadsworth reined to the road, and rode with the line of battle. The Confederate line of battle was soon reached, when it stubbornly resisted the advance, but yielded ground. The general's horse was shot while riding near the road; mounting the second horse, he rode into the line of troops engaged, when that horse, too, was killed. He then mounted the third one. Information came to him that the enemy was massing and extending his lines on his (Wadsworth's) right. He asked Hancock for a brigade, which was promptly sent from the Ninth Corps, which he placed in support of the troops near his left, believing the commotion on the right to be an attempt to call attention that way, and then assault on the Orange plank road. Now there was a lull in the battle which had shivered the Wilderness into splinters. Men had advanced where pine trees could not stand, and for a brief space of time a silence, ominous and portending, prevailed. The thick

smoke that lurked near the ground, raised and hung heavily overhead.

The general had eaten neither supper nor breakfast, but opportunely at this lull his cook came with some coffee and hardtack. His aids joined him, for they, too, had had thirty hours of hard work and compulsory fasting. A commotion and a yell at the front announced the fact that Longstreet had arrived, and his men were forming line of battle on Hill's right. The Union line again advanced. Soon a messenger came from Hancock with the information that his (Hancock's) left was yielding, and for Wadsworth to be watchful, and to govern himself according to circumstances along his front and on his left. Across the plank road the Second Corps was seen to be yielding, the Confederate line passing, and exposing General Wadsworth's left flank. Directly in front, and only a few yards distant, was an Alabama brigade lying on the ground. The general wheeled a regiment, near the plank road to the left to fire into the Confederate flank, which was pursuing the Second Corps back, when suddenly the Alabama brigade arose with a yell and a volley, causing disorder in the Union lines, which retired to the Brock road.

General Wadsworth sat on his horse in the line of battle, attended by E. M. Rogers and E. S. Osborne, aids on his staff, when the Alabamians fired their volley only a few yards distant. The general seemed to be unmindful of the perilous position, and, for an instant, held his horse reined to the front. His troops were routed, and he faced the Confederate line, his aids with him. Wadsworth was prancing to the rear when a ball went crashing through his head, the blood spattering on Lieutenant Rogers' coat, which still stains his uniform. The general fell from his horse to the ground upon his back. Lieutenant Rogers' horse was shot by the same volley. Seeing the general lying with his face upward and mortally wounded, Lieutenant Rogers attempted to take the general's watch and other valuables from his pockets, but as the Confederate



GEN. EDWIN S. OSBORNE.

44

line was pressing so closely, he was compelled to fly or be captured. In making to the rear he found Wadsworth's horse, his bridle rein having caught on a snag. Vaulting into the saddle, Rogers soon reached the troops of the division, while the brave division commander, hero, patriot, and one of nature's finest noblemen lay almost lifeless within the enemy's lines. The whole Confederate line was shouting with joy, under the impression that Grant had been killed, until it was discovered to be Wadsworth. Gen. then (Col.) E. S. Osborne, of Wadsworth's staff, took as many of the troops as he could rally to the left of the Brock road, and from there to the intersection of the Orange plank and Brock roads. At this time the latter road was full of troops of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps. The confusion was so great that Osborne had considerable difficulty in holding the regiments of Roy Stone's brigade at that point. Having restored order, Osborne moved the troops along the plank road a short distance, then filed into the woods and stacked arms, and then found he had the brigade headquarters colors, and the colors of the 121st, 142d, 143d, 149th, and 150th Pennsylvania Regiments, with small detachments of each regiment. On looking at the officers, Osborne found that Lieut. Col. John Irvin, of the 149th, was the ranking officer present. Therefore, Osborne and Irvin, after consulting, decided to let the men rest and make coffee, as the battle was liable to be renewed at any moment. Osborne then placed the headquarters flag near the Orange plank road, so it could be seen from the crossing, and advised Lieut. Col. Irvin to take command of the brigade. General Rice, commanding the Second Brigade, of Wadsworth's division, had been detailed on special duty by Hancock, and Colonel Hofmann, of the 56th Pennsylvania, was put in command of the brigade by Rice. Hofmann at once proceeded to form the troops of that brigade back on the Brock road, near the remnant of Roy Stone's brigade. When Hancock gave the order for these two brigades of the old First Corps to charge the works which had

been held by the Second Corps, and were then occupied by the Confederates, these two brigades advanced together and retook them. Hofmann displayed great coolness and gallantry in this charge, and well earned the rank of major general for his heroic conduct. The brigade under Cutler had been forced back in the direction of the Lacy House early in the day, and was rallied by Cutler near the old Wilderness Tavern, and did not participate in the subsequent charges of the division that day. There were two pieces of artillery near the crossing, and shortly after coffee had been taken, this section of the artillery opened on the enemy, and there was considerable commotion near one of the guns. While waiting for results Osborne saw two officers riding toward him from the crossing. They both came up at once, when Osborne saw they were Hancock and Captain Wilson of his staff. General Hancock said, in a sharp tone of voice: "What troops are these?" Osborne answered: "They are what is left of the old First Corps." He then remarked: "Those are just the troops I want. Take them up there and drive the enemy out of our works." Colonel Irvin and Capt. William M. Dalglish then came up, and the order was repeated to them by Captain Wilson; then Hancock and Wilson rode away. Osborne and Irvin got the troops in line, and, at double-quick, went to the cross-roads, leaving the gun at the road. The enemy had driven the troops of the Second Corps out of the works, and were using them as shelter against our attack. The command moved on the right into line, and with Hofmann's brigade charged the works that had been abandoned by the Second Corps, and drove the enemy from them. This was one of the most brilliant exploits that was performed during the war. Again had the soldiers of the old First Corps added another wreath of fame to their accumulated laurels. The credit of that work was assumed by others, who, an officer in high repute says, "Were not in the engagement at the supreme moment at all." The officers entitled to special mention for distinguished conduct there, were Gen. E. S.



CAPT. P. DE LACY.

Osborne, then lieutenant colonel and inspector on Wadsworth's staff; Lieut. Col. John Irvin, of the 149th Pennsylvania; Capt. Wm. L. Dalgleish; Maj. C. M. Conyngham, of the 143d Pennsylvania; Major Jones, of the 150th Pennsylvania; and Colonel Hofmann, of the 56th Pennsylvania.

There were many other acts of valor performed on the part of officers and men that placed them high on the roll of honor that day. Captain Bell, of the 150th Pennsylvania, was killed while on the works defending the flag of his regiment. Capt. P. De Lacy, of the 143d Pennsylvania, captured a Confederate battle-flag. On the morning of the 6th, Gibbon was placed in command of his own and Barlow's divisions, the latter holding the extreme left of the Union line, with Sheridan at Todd's Tavern to guard his flanks. Getty's division of the Ninth Corps advanced up the Orange plank road, with Grant's brigade on the left of the road, Wheaton in the center, and Eustis on the right. At five a. m., the right, under Birney, advanced according to orders, and the enemy was driven back, but not without a stubborn resistance. After Birney had advanced about a mile and a half, he halted to arrange his lines. The troops were compelled to lie down in loading, and then partly rise and fire, the enemy doing the same. Grant had forged ahead with his Vermont Brigade until his right flank was endangered, when Wheaton directed his brigade to advance, with its right moved back to protect Grant. At seven a. m., Hancock sent an order to Gibbon to advance and relieve the heavy pressure on Birney. For some reason Gibbon did not attack in heavy force, which disappointed Hancock; but he supposed Gibbon feared that Longstreet was approaching and preparing to turn his left and gain our rear. Hill had been driven back a mile and a half, and the divisions of both Wilcox and Heth were almost exhausted, and could no longer withstand the force in front of them. Just at this critical moment for the enemy, the head of Longstreet's force, under Kershaw, came up, and, filing to the right of the Orange plank road, took


the place of Heth; at the same time, Field's division relieved Wilcox.

Hancock's plan was a good one to hurl Hill off of the field before Longstreet could get his troops in position; and if the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon on the left, under Gibbon, had promptly responded to the order of Hancock, Longstreet would not have been able, in time, to have thrown the brigades of G. T. Anderson, Mahone, and Wofford on Barlow's left, which came very near rolling Hancock up on Warren, and would have proved a great disaster. And it likely would have been much worse for our troops, but for the wounding of Longstreet, which suspended all operations on that part of the field until Lee came up, he having been notified that Longstreet had been severely wounded.

The Union line had retired about three-quarters of a mile on account of the heavy attack on the left, which also endangered Birney. From the fact that Longstreet had been wounded by the troops attacking Hancock's left, Lee decided to rectify his line. In the mean time Eustis' brigade, of Getty's division, and Leasure's brigade, of Stevenson's division, had been ordered to the left to assist Barlow.

Near two p. m. the First Brigade of Robinson's division, and two regiments of heavy artillery, were ordered to Hancock.

Late in the evening Early made an attack on Wright's division of the Sixth Corps, and by throwing Gordon's and Johnson's brigades on Wright's rear and flank, rolled up Shaler's brigade with a heavy loss of prisoners, including Shaler himself. Seymour's brigade did not suffer so much, though the general was taken prisoner. This appears to have been more the work of Gordon than anyone else. He had been urging that movement earlier in the day, but Early had been watching Burnside's movements until nearly sunset, when he conceded to the request of Gordon to permit him to move around General Shaler's position.



GEN. L. A. GRANT.

Although it created a great commotion and confusion at the time, it was an independent movement of Early's division and was not ordered by Lee, or his whole line would have advanced. Early drew back his line, while Wright rectified his, the Sixth Corps being put in touch with the Fifth. Thus ended the great battle of the morning of the 6th. The Confederate army had fallen back, while Grant, instead of ordering a forward movement and attacking them in the jungles of the Wilderness, decided to move by the left flank on Spottsylvania, perhaps to compel Lee to fight on more open ground. His order for that movement was as follows :

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

May 7, 1864 - 6:30 a. m.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to old Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the Plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. It is more than probable that the enemy concentrated for a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

To Major General MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Early on the morning of the 7th, Craig Wadsworth, a son of the general, and Lieut. E. M. Rogers induced the officers to organize a party of skirmishers to go and try to

get the body of General Wadsworth. The request was granted, but the detachment did not proceed far until the major in command was severely wounded with several of his men. Seeing that it was impossible to recover the general's body, Rogers and young Wadsworth gave it up. However, it was sent into our lines under a flag of truce. Wadsworth stood high in the South, notwithstanding the fact that he was doing all in his power to disconcert their plans to form a Southern Confederacy. But few men in the world possessing his vast wealth ever used it to so good a purpose. He disposed of it as though it were not his own, and had carefully to account for all he possessed. He did not seek the field for renown, but to assist in the restoration of the Union. He cast aside the position of Military Governor of the District of Columbia, where he was a central figure at the Capital, having untold honors bestowed upon him by statesmen, officers of the navy and army, and foreign diplomats, and where he could have wielded an immense power at the White House and War Department, and in time could have made for himself a great name over the country.

He not only resigned as Military Governor of the District of Columbia, in the face of earnest protests of leading men up to the President, but he demanded that he be given a position at the front, though ever so humble. Having fallen mortally wounded, at the head of his division, he sacrificed his life "on the altar of his country," that future generations might enjoy the blessings of a united nation—the best Government on the globe—erected by the people, and defended for the inheritance of the people.

CHAPTER XVI.

SPOTTSYLVANIA.

GRANT and Lee had met and had fought the great battle of the Wilderness. The result of this engagement had not been wholly satisfactory to either. Grant had come from the West, where he had steadily risen from the rank of colonel to be the most prominent general of the Union armies. The siege of Vicksburg had crowned his efforts with success, and the country turned to him with a full reliance, that, as lieutenant general in command of all the armies, he would be able, in a combined movement, to crush the rebellion. He had taken up his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac in order to direct its movements against the most powerful army of the Confederacy; but he had to cope with a general, who, as a defensive officer, had no superior in the annals of military history. Lee, as a native of Virginia, knew its strong military positions, and was confident of ultimate success from that standpoint. Grant hoped to cripple Lee's army or destroy it when he moved, but the battle of the Wilderness closed with no such results. In fact, Lee thought he had so worsted the Army of the Potomac that Grant was ready to fall back; and he ordered Anderson, who had succeeded Longstreet when he was wounded, to move his corps to Spottsylvania, so as to be in position to fall on Grant's retreating columns in case the latter made an attempt at a backward movement.

The woods being on fire compelled Anderson to move sooner than was intended, in order to seek a safe place for his troops to rest. His march would have been retarded by

Sheridan if Meade had not changed the orders, for Sheridan would have taken charge of the bridges over the Po River, and prevented his advance until the Fifth Corps could have occupied Spottsylvania Court House. Butler had been ordered to move on Richmond; and Grant wanted to hold Lee in his front, so as to give Butler an opportunity to lay siege to Richmond, and cut off communication with the South by destroying the railroads. Both generals were unaware of each other's designs until the two armies met at Spottsylvania. Then came another struggle for the mastery, in which a most desperate battle was fought on the same plan as that of the Wilderness. But for the accident of Merritt being ordered to relieve Sheridan in his work of holding the bridges over the Po River, the Army of the Potomac would have marched unopposed into Spottsylvania, where Lee would have been crowded off to the right, placing the Army of the Potomac between Lee and Richmond.

Lee had fought but one offensive battle (Gettysburg), and in that had signally failed to grasp the situation, even when, time and again, he was warned by Longstreet not to repeat the blunder of the Union army at Fredericksburg, but to move around the left of the Army of the Potomac and take a position that would compel Meade to attack the Confederate army where it would have a decided advantage. Lee's remorse, after that famous battle, led him to resign the command of the Confederate army; but Jeff Davis knew his great capacity as a defensive general, and declined to accept his resignation.

Lee's movements were shielded by the Wilderness, and he took the risk of moving his army by the flank, beginning the movement with his right wing under Anderson.

Grant moved with caution, so as to keep his army intact in case Lee attempted to attack him. Hancock, on the left, remained in his position, while Warren was directed to take the advance with the Fifth Corps. This would leave the Army of the Potomac intact to repel a movement of the Confederate army, with Warren at Todd's Tavern,

where he could easily countermarch and form on Hancock's left. General Robinson's division had the advance. When it arrived at Todd's Tavern, the way was blocked with the cavalry escort of General Meade. As the troops advanced, with the 12th Massachusetts in the lead, Colonel Cook, in his history of that regiment, says:

A solitary horseman rode out from the forest and reined his horse in front of our adjutant.

"What regiment is this?"

"The 12th Massachusetts."

"Order them to deploy on the left of the road. What regiment comes next?"

"The 9th New York."

"Order them to deploy on the right of the road."

"By whose order?"

The figure raised the flapping brim of his felt hat, and answered with a single word, "Sheridan."

By that time Colonel Coulter, in command of the brigade (Baxter had been wounded in the Wilderness), rode up and received Sheridan's order, which was promptly executed. This brigade advanced rapidly some two miles in the direction of Spottsylvania, where Merritt's cavalry was overtaken. Then Robinson formed the division with Lyle's brigade on the left, Dennison's on the right, with Coulter's left in the rear to protect Lyle's left flank. The division crossed Alsop's farm and a wood, when it suddenly received a galling fire from infantry, accompanied by artillery. In this fire General Robinson was severely wounded in the leg (causing its loss by amputation, which ended his military service), when the division fell back to the woods in the rear. Griffin coming up, bore to the right and deployed Bartlett's brigade, with Sweitzer and Ayres marching on the way that led in the direction of the Po River. As Bartlett advanced across the Alsop farm his advance was checked by a heavy fire and his troops forced to retire some distance, when the division was quickly formed on Ayres' brigade, which lay in a low place in the road. The division again advanced and occupied a position which was held

by our troops. Crawford coming up, formed between Coulter, who had taken command of Robinson's division, and Griffin and drove the enemy back out of the woods.

Colonel McCandless, in command of the First Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, was wounded after the division left Todd's Tavern, when Col. W. Cooper Talley, of the 1st Regiment, took command of the brigade. When the division arrived at the Alsop farm, Crawford directed Talley to charge with his brigade, which he did, but was unable to take the Confederate line. Another charge was made by that brigade, which also proved unsuccessful. Then Talley sent his assistant adjutant general, Rupert, to the rear to report to General Crawford, whom he found sitting against a tree, suffering from a blow from a limb that had been cut off by a cannon ball. Talley sent word to him that he had charged twice and had been unable to force the enemy from his lines. Crawford told Rupert to tell Talley to go to the troops on the left and give the officer in command his compliments, and ask him to unite in the charge. But Talley reminded Crawford that there was a space on his right, about a quarter of a mile, that was not occupied by our troops, and that he was liable to be flanked. Crawford made some inquiry as to what troops were on the right, beyond that interval. Talley said that he believed it to be Penrose's brigade. Crawford then directed him to go and request the officer in command to close to the left and unite in the charge. Had this request been made by Warren, in command of the corps, it would have been obeyed with alacrity by the Maryland Brigade; but in the confusion of a repulse, with their division commander lying badly wounded, they looked to the corps commander for orders, which was correct. No brigade on that field fought with greater valor than the Maryland brigade, and Col. Charles E. Phelp's gallantry on that as on every occasion was most admirable. He was taken prisoner.

It would have made no difference if the brigades on the left and right had united in the third charge of the Pennsyl-



COL. CHARLES E. PHELPS.

vania Reserves, for General Ewell had arrived with two divisions of his corps to strengthen Anderson, so the Fifth Corps and the New Jersey Brigade of the Sixth Corps alone faced nearly two-thirds of Lee's army, then in line of battle ; and it was well that no further attempt was made to storm their position with so slender a force. Talley made the third charge, and was again compelled to fall back. He then decided to go to the troops on his right, beyond the interval, and see what arrangement could be perfected for another attack. On his way to the right he was captured by a company of Confederates who had concealed themselves in the dense woods where he had to pass. Seeing that he was completely surrounded, with no chance to escape, he surrendered. As he passed over the line of breastworks held by the enemy, he scanned them closely and observed their strength, as he had just made three charges against them. Being taken to General Ewell, he was asked his name and what troops he commanded. On his replying that he commanded the First Brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves, Ewell said : "Yes, we have met them frequently on the field." He then paid them a very high compliment, and said that he was pleased to meet one of them ; that he was stationed at Carlisle before the war, where he had formed the acquaintance of many people whom he highly esteemed ; and that he did not order the barracks burned there, and was sorry that it had been done. Talley said to him that there were two companies from Cumberland County in the brigade. Ewell wondered if any of them knew Judge Graham. Upon being told that Judge Graham's son was a captain in the brigade, he was greatly pleased and offered to parole him, but Talley thanked him with a declination. He with other prisoners was started for Richmond, but Sheridan, in his raid, recaptured them a few days afterwards, when Talley again resumed command of his brigade.

He said when he crossed their line of works, on his way to Ewell, he saw the uselessness of attempting to storm them with the troops then present. Instead of Longstreet's

corps, then under Anderson, Ewell was present with two divisions in line of battle behind formidable breastworks.

Wadsworth's division, then commanded by Cutler, came up and formed on Griffin's right. That division made a vigorous attack on the enemy, and drove him back quite a distance; but Field's division of Anderson's corps had arrived, and, meeting the troops of Cutler and Griffin, the battle became stubborn without Warren being able to advance, as Sedgwick, who had been ordered to follow him, had not yet arrived; and the day wore away, with only his advance coming up in time for Penrose's brigade to get into action.

An incident of this day's encounter is related by Capt. P. De Lacy, of the 143d Pennsylvania, now of Scranton, Pennsylvania. He says:

A little incident of the fight at Laurel Hill, after the Wilderness battle, on the 8th of May, 1864, occurred, which I will relate. I was at the time a member of the 143d Pennsylvania Volunteers, Third Brigade, Fourth Division (Wadsworth's), then, I think, commanded by General Cutler, and formed a part of the Fifth Corps. We went into action that morning, soon after passing the cavalry, in a woods where they had evidently been hotly engaged. We emerged into a large clearing, and soon formed line; we then moved forward about a quarter of a mile, when we received quite a brisk fire from a ridge running nearly parallel with our line of battle, and nearly in the middle of the clearing. The ridge was partly wooded and formed like a hog's back, with considerable of an elevation, and quite an extensive clearing beyond. The position was a good one to hold our advance or to check us; for the enemy's main line was not very far distant, and this ridge, for a few hours at least, became the scene of a very spirited contest. We took the ridge; the enemy rallied and drove us back; we rallied and retook it; the enemy again rallied and pushed us back a short distance; but we went for them again, and drove them away beyond the ridge. This time we held it; but the enemy again charged and made one more attempt to retake it, and it is at this point the incident which I have alluded to occurred, which I will relate as I remember it.

I was, at the time, sergeant in Company A, 143d Pennsylvania Volunteers, and we were the right company and connected with the left of the 19th Indiana; or, in other words, the 19th was on our right.

The force of the last charge fell heavily on the 19th, and pushed

the men of that regiment back up the slope of the ridge a short distance, probably 30 or 40 paces, although they continued their fire; but the color-bearer of the 19th did not move back, but manfully held up his colors, although the Confederates had reached to within 30 or 40 steps of him. At that critical moment, the writer and George W. Engle, of Company A, 143d Pennsylvania, by permission of Major Charles M. Conyngham, then commanding the 143d, went to the rescue of the colors of the 19th.

The position of the lines at the time was almost at right angles, and we reached the color-bearer in less than one minute; he was alone and down on one knee holding up his flag. I went to his right, and George W. Engle to his left. He was at the side of an old rail fence which was partly broken down, along which the regiment had been in line. Soon after we had reached him, he ran his arm high up, supporting the flag, when a ball struck the staff and shattered his arm. He partially fell back with his flag against the writer, who was on one knee by his side, at the same time the flag falling over both of us. I assisted in raising him up to his knees; then he dropped his wounded arm to the ground, and ran up his good arm and grasped the colors firmly, while he fairly groaned with pain, but called out to us: "STAY WITH ME, BOYS." We told him to keep up the flag, *we would stay with him; and we did*, and used our guns the very best we could.

It was one of the hottest locations I ever got into; the enemy not thirty steps in our front, lying down in a little depression in the field. We could see their ramrods glisten every time they turned them to load their guns. For fifteen or twenty minutes this was the actual condition, though the regiment continued to fire, and other troops that had been rallied and brought up took part and made it so hot that the enemy made a break for the woods. Very many of them were killed or wounded.

At about this time the men of the 19th closed in on their colors and we started for the 143d Pennsylvania, which was not over fifty yards to the left. As we moved back from their colors, the officer in command of the 19th asked us what company we belonged to (evidently thinking we belonged to the 19th). George W. Engle remained a short time, and, I think, gave our names, company, and regiment; at all events, a short time after, I noticed that officer and Maj. Chas. Conyngham, of the 143d Pennsylvania, talking together.

No braver man than that color-bearer ever lived. I would like to know if he still lives.

Investigation shows that the colors of the 19th Indiana were carried that day by Corp. Andrew J. Wood.

In the morning Wilson's cavalry had driven a brigade out of Spottsylvania; but it seems Sheridan needed his assistance, and ordered him (Wilson) to retire. Later in the day Wilson again attempted to occupy it, but Wofford's, Brian's, and a brigade of Fitz-Hugh Lee arrived, which again compelled Wilson to retire. When Sedgwick arrived he was posted on Warren's left, while Burnside, still later, extended the line in that direction. Hancock was the last to leave the Wilderness, and when he arrived at Todd's Tavern he was halted to watch the movements of the enemy. As Grant and Lee were moving on parallel roads, not over two miles apart, it was easy for Hancock to make a reconnoissance to observe the enemy's movements. Ascertaining that Lee's army were all concentrating at Spottsylvania, Hancock moved up on Warren's right. Thus the Union line, from right to left, was Hancock, Warren, Sedgwick, and Burnside.

The following day was occupied in rearranging the lines and intrenching. The sharpshooters kept up a constant fire, and early in the morning General Sedgwick was killed by one of them. His death was a great shock to the army and to the country.

The skirmish lines of the Fifth and Sixth Corps were pressed forward to develop the enemy's position, and ascertain, if possible, a weak place to attack.

Colonel Coulter, who assumed command of the Second Division after General Robinson was wounded, pays him the following compliment in his official report. He says:

During the advance General Robinson was severely wounded and taken from the field. His being disabled at this juncture was a severe blow to the division, and certainly influenced the fortunes of the day. The want of our commanding officer prevented that concert of action which alone could have overcome the enemy in front.

On the evening of the 9th the division was temporarily disbanded, mainly, it was supposed, because it became so reduced in strength, and of the loss of its commanding

officer, Gen. John C. Robinson. The First Brigade, under Colonel Lyle, was temporarily assigned to the Fourth Division, commanded by Cutler; the Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Coulter, was assigned to the Third Division, under Crawford, while the Third Brigade was made independent, to report direct to Warren.

Lee's army, from left to right, was Anderson, Ewell, and Early. The latter had been placed in command of Hill's corps during the march from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania. The Confederate army lay in a new-moon shape, with the disk open to the southeast.

Spottsylvania is situated on the ridge between the Ny and Po Rivers of the historical Mattapony, composed of the Mat, Ta, Po, and Ny. The last named rises in the Wilderness, flowing southeasterly around and north of Spottsylvania, and unites with the Po some distance from that place. The Po rises also in the Wilderness, near Todd's Tavern, courses its way eastwardly, but winds around to the south of Spottsylvania Court House. Near Anderson's left it changes its course, running almost due south, and then again resumes its eastwardly course.


When Hancock, on the evening of the 9th, arrived with Barlow's, Gibbon's, and Birney's divisions (Mott's division being left at Todd's Tavern), he crossed the Po so as to turn Anderson's left. Lee seeing that movement, drew troops from Early on the right, and posted them on Anderson's left, covering the front of the Po where it runs south. While the stream is small, yet the bluffs are steep, and Early held a position which Hancock could not take by assault. Mott had been ordered up from Todd's Tavern, and had been posted on Wright's left, as there was a big gap between the left of Wright and Burnside's right. Grant seeing that the movement to turn Anderson's left had been foiled by Lee posting a part of Early's corps along the east side of the Po, determined to advance the left under Burnside, and the center under Wright and Warren. But before bringing on the engagement Warren

and Wright were ordered to feel their fronts, to test its advisability. Warren, after he made two reconnoissances, reported in favor of the movement. The advance was ordered, when Warren directed Cutler and Crawford to attack, while Griffin was held in reserve. In order to assist this movement, Hancock was given command of that part of the field, and directed to bring the divisions of Gibbon and Birney across the Po, Gibbon being placed on the right of Warren, with Birney in reserve. The enemy observing the withdrawal of Gibbon and Birney, attacked Barlow, who was isolated from the Army of the Potomac across the Po, but they were repulsed with heavy loss.

Wright, on Warren's left, had advanced a force (a division under Upton) and carried the works in his front in most gallant style, pressing the enemy back both right and left, at the same time capturing some cannon; but Mott, on his left, failing to come up, and Warren, on his right, being repulsed, Grant ordered him to retire. The troops under Upton grumbling at the order, Grant countermanded it; but as a sufficient force could not be sent to that part of the field in time, Upton was compelled to retire.

As Early's line in front of Burnside had been weakened to reënforce Anderson's left, Burnside advanced nearly to the courthouse, but was drawn back to connect with Mott's left. If Burnside had been rushed forward, his movement would have aided Upton and Lee's right flank been turned, when he would have been placed in a very precarious condition. As it was, Grant and Meade had paid so little attention to the left that they were unaware of Burnside's success until it was too late to take advantage of it; though had Burnside made a report to Grant, the situation would have been understood and rectified. Grant says in his work, that he ought to have had a staff officer with Burnside to report to him, for Burnside, though with the Army of the Potomac, was not included in it, because he outranked Meade.

Barlow, on the right, had again been attacked, but



HON. W. H. HARRIES, M. C.

repulsed the enemy the second time, inflicting severe loss on him. Hancock fearing for his safety, then went to his support, and ordered him to cross the Po.

When the work of the day was closed, and the examination made of the situation, it was learned that Barlow, on the right, had successfully withstood two heavy assaults, and Burnside, on the left, had turned the enemy's left flank. This was the Union success. On the other hand, the enemy had repulsed our center, where, as a matter of course, our loss had been heavy, so that, with Burnside falling back to connect with Mott, and Barlow giving up his position across the Po, it would seem that it was a drawn battle.

Among the casualties, General Stevenson, of Burnside's corps, was killed; the gallant Upton, who was promoted on the field by Grant, was severely wounded, while General Rice, of the Fifth Corps, was killed.

A most gallant act was performed by Lieut. Wm. H. Harries, of the Second Wisconsin, who was afterwards elected to the Fifty-second Congress. Seeing the lifeless form of Capt. Robert Hughes, of that regiment, in danger of the approaching fire in the grass, he gallantly rescued his body from the flames.

The 11th was passed without any forward movement, except a reconnoissance by Mott, who moved close enough to the enemy's works to see a salient point, which Grant decided to assault, and issued the following order in accordance with that purpose:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES UNITED STATES.,

May 11, 1864—3 p. m.

Move three divisions of the Second Corps by the rear of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, under cover of night, so as to join the Ninth Corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. I will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents

itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have been entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier, and had been heartily entered into by Mott's division and the Ninth Corps.

Major General MEADE,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant General.

Commanding Army of the Potomac.

On the night of the 11th Hancock began the movement of the divisions of Barlow, Birney, and Gibbon, in the rear of the army, under the guidance of Major Mendell of the Engineers, in a drenching rain. The head of the column arrived about midnight near the Brown House, where it was proposed to prepare for the attack. Barlow was formed on the left, with Brooke's and Miles' brigades in front, supported by Brown's and Smith's. Birney deployed in two lines on the right of Barlow, with Mott's division formed in rear. Gibbon was held in reserve.

Hancock's orders were to begin the assault at four o'clock, but the fog was so dense, after the heavy rain, that he delayed it about half an hour, until day began to dawn, so the troops could see where to march. When Hancock gave the order, both divisions moved promptly, and kept a perfect alignment, notwithstanding the fact that Birney had to move over a marsh. As they advanced, the Confederate pickets retreated back on their reserve, which had already begun to fire on the Union line, but not a shot was fired by Hancock's men. As the reserve retired, the advancing line broke out in a hearty cheer, when both divisions rushed forward to the works of the enemy at the salient. The Confederates attempted to prevent them from crossing over, but in a moment Barlow's and Birney's divisions had scaled the breastworks, or had torn them away; men were bayoneted, muskets were used over the heads of each other, sabers performed their deadly work; in fact it was a hand-to-hand conflict. The Confederates were surrounded, and Hancock says that he took 4000 prisoners of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, 20 pieces of artillery, and 30 stands of colors. Those who were not captured fled in the

direction of Spottsylvania, hotly pursued by the boys in blue, who thought they had broken Lee's center and routed his army. About half a mile farther on they came upon another line of works which was well defended. In the mean time Hancock had ordered Mott and Gibbon to take possession of the works which Barlow and Birney had captured but had left to pursue the enemy.

Lee's army lay in a semicircle, so he could rapidly reinforce any given point, especially the center. He at once ordered heavy reinforcements to Ewell's assistance, who was trying to force Barlow and Birney to retire outside of the works which they had so recently captured. But the Union boys held the opposite side, and when the Confederates attempted to retake them they were hurled back with great slaughter. Time and again did they come with fresh troops to charge on the works which had been built by them, and which, until recently, they had occupied; but each time they were repulsed with heavy loss.

About six a. m. General Wright's corps moved up on the right of Hancock and took possession of the works to the right of the salient. Mott joined him on the left, with Birney next, and Barlow on the extreme left. At eight a. m. Wright called on Hancock for reinforcements, when Brooke's brigade was sent to him. Marching to the relief of Wright he relieved a part of Wheaton's division, and fought in the front line of battle until his ammunition was exhausted, when he returned to Hancock.

Hancock directed artillery to be posted to the right of the Landrum House, some 300 yards in rear of the works. One section of Gilliss' battery was taken up to the salient, and fired canister into the advancing columns of the enemy. A section of Brown's battery (B, 1st Rhode Island Artillery), was posted to the left of the salient, close to their fortifications, where it did most effective work. On the left, Burnside's effort was not strong enough to achieve success. He failed to crush Lee's right, and, as a consequence, added but little assistance to the assault made by Hancock.

Warren, on the right, was unable to advance as far as the Sixth Corps on his left. In his report he says :

May 12.—At daybreak General Hancock surprised Johnson's division in his lines, and captured nearly all of it, with 18 pieces of artillery. The enemy fought furiously to regain them. General Wright attacked near the Second Corps with two divisions. I also again assailed the enemy's intrenchments, suffering heavy loss, but failed to get in. The enemy's direct and flank fire was too destructive. Lost very heavily. The enemy continuing to fire [on] the Second and Sixth Corps, [I was] compelled to withdraw Griffin's and Cutler's divisions and send [them] to the left to their support, where they again became engaged. My whole front was held by Crawford's division and Colonel Kitching and the Maryland Brigade, presenting a line of battle not as strong as a single rank. The enemy made no serious effort to force it. My divisions on the left were relieved during the night from their position, and returned to the right in the morning, having been kept awake nearly all night, which was rainy.

Warren's report is quoted from in order to give his version of the battle that day, as Grant became dissatisfied with his movements, and took the divisions of Griffin and Cutler from him, and left Humphreys with him to superintend Crawford's division, which alone remained under Warren.

General Cutler, commanding the Fourth Division of General Warren's corps, says :

On the 12th we were under arms at daylight, and again assaulted the enemy's works without success. After being under fire four hours, I was ordered to report with my command to Major-General Wright. Colonel Lyle, with his brigade (which was serving temporarily with me), was ordered to hold the works on the right of the Sixth Corps. My Third Brigade (Colonel Bragg) was sent to hold the works captured that morning from the enemy, and my First and Second Brigades were sent to the assistance of the Sixth Corps, who were endeavoring to carry the enemy's works in front of the Sixth Corps, where they remained under fire until two a. m. of the 13th, having been constantly under fire for twenty-two hours, when they were relieved and moved back to the right, going into position again in the trenches, the line having been held during my absence by a skirmish line.

The enemy retired to the second line of works, about half a mile in rear of the first which Hancock had captured from Johnson. This was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the war; and the Union army there gained its first valuable victory in that campaign, fighting from early dawn until midnight.

There was no movement of the army on the 13th; but that night Warren and Wright were moved to the left of Burnside, in a heavy rain. Warren's corps led the march, in intense darkness, over muddy roads, sometimes having to corduroy them in order to pass. They crossed the Ny River, which was swollen from the rains. Many of the troops gave out from exhaustion and lost their way. Mounted men were posted as guides; but even this precaution could not keep the troops on the proper line of march through the dense forests and swamps. But Warren succeeded in getting to the designated place with a part of his command, while those who had given out came up the next day, when they were able to see their way and gain a little strength.

Wright's movement was detected, and Upton was attacked; but with the aid of Ayres' brigade the enemy was repulsed. The next night, Lee moved in front of Warren and Wright, which left Hancock with no enemy in his front. He therefore moved his position to the rear of Warren and Wright.

On the 15th both armies remained quiet, except a demonstration in front of Burnside, which was not carried into execution, perhaps on account of the rain.

The ground was so soft from the continued heavy rains that the infantry could scarcely march, while it was impossible to move the artillery. On the 18th Wright and Hancock were moved back to the right of Burnside, to strike Lee on his left flank; but he was advised of the movement in time to check it.

Warren had been ordered to open with his artillery so as to deceive Lee as to the movements of Warren and Han-

cock. Colonel Coulter, commanding a brigade under Warren, was severely wounded. Warren remained stationary while the army marched past him and took a position on his left. This movement induced Ewell to attack Warren's right flank, which would give him possession of the road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg, over which the supplies of the army were received. Kitching's and the Maryland Brigades, with Tyler's division of new troops, just arriving from Fredericksburg, met the attack of Ewell, and repulsed him with considerable loss. Crawford's, Birney's, and Gibbon's divisions came to the support of Warren's right. Grant, seeing the movement, ordered Warren to advance and prevent Ewell from returning to his intrenchments. But he (Warren) was unable to do that. A division of colored troops, under General Ferrero, guarded the road to Fredericksburg. It was evident that Lee was attempting to get possession of that road to cut off Grant's supplies. Ferrero was ordered to throw forward his cavalry, and, if he was defeated, to fall back toward Fredericksburg. When Ferrero's division was attacked, his colored troops fought most gallantly, and retook some twenty-five or thirty wagons which had been captured by the enemy by a sudden dash at the commencement of the action. This division belonged to the Ninth Corps, but had been detached for that special duty.

Thus ended the battle of Spottsylvania; for Grant, seeing that Lee held a position naturally very strong, which would cost many lives to take, resolved to move again by the left, in the direction of Richmond, with the hope of meeting him on an open field.

CHAPTER XVII.

SHERIDAN'S GREAT RAID FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE JAMES.

MAY 9 TO MAY 24, 1864.

AFTER the successful passage of the Rapidan, on May 4, 1864, and the subsequent terrific fighting on the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, in the Wilderness, in which the cavalry bore its full share, Sheridan, in obedience to orders from General Grant, concentrated his divisions in the vicinity of Aldrich's, on the plank road; and, on the morning of the 9th, moved out on his famous expedition around the right flank of General Lee's army, with the view of cutting his communications with his base, destroying the lines of railroad by which his army was supplied, and with the expectation and hope of drawing after him the enemy's cavalry, which he thought he could, if opportunity offered, defeat and destroy, and thus inflict irreparable loss upon the Confederacy.

Worn out and exhausted as the men were by four days of constant fighting, there was not much rest for them during the night of the 8th. Horses were to be shod, forage and rations drawn, and the numberless little things to be attended to on the eve of a protracted march looked after; besides all this, a constant succession of ambulances, filled with wounded men, were passing over the plank road along which, on either side, our bivouacs were stretched for miles; and this evidence of the tremendous fighting that had been going on beneath the somber shadows of the dense thickets of the Wilderness, filled the minds of all

with sadness, for many of our comrades were among these sufferers.

The night passed, and with the first faint streaks of the dawning day the camps were instinct with life and motion. "Reveille," "Boots and Saddles," and "To Horse" followed each other in rapid succession, and the first rays of the rising sun saw the heads of columns, divisions, and brigades moving from their several camps; along the plank road they moved in the direction of Fredericksburg as far as Tabernacle Church, thence crossed over to the Telegraph road by Childsburg to Anderson's Crossing of the North Anna River. The First Division, Gen. Wesley Merritt commanding, was in advance, followed by the Third Division, Gen. James H. Wilson, and the Second Division, Gen. D. McM. Gregg, bringing up the rear.

The march was without incident until the rear-guard, consisting of the 6th Ohio Cavalry, which arrived about four o'clock p. m. near a small place called Davenport, was rather fiercely attacked, and a stubborn little fight occurred, resulting in the repulse of the Confederates, after a loss of one officer, Captain Abell, of the 6th Ohio, killed, and 47 men killed and wounded from the 6th Ohio and 1st Massachusetts. The advance brigade of General Merritt's division, commanded by General Custer, forced the crossing of the North Anna at Anderson's Mills, and before reaching Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, he recaptured a train of ambulances and about 400 of our men, who had been taken during the fights in the Wilderness; among these were a large number of officers, one of them being Gen. W. C. Talley, of the 1st Pennsylvania Reserves, commanding brigade, also Colonel Phelps, of the 7th Maryland Regiment, and Capt. George Michaels, of one of the Pennsylvania regiments.

Pushing on, Custer got possession of Beaver Dam Station, together with three large trains heavily laden with supplies for Lee's army, two new locomotives, and a large amount of stores of various kinds, including hospital tents

and several hundred stand of arms ; all of these, except so much as was required to supply the immediate wants of our own troops, were burned or otherwise destroyed, while a happier set of fellows than the 400 recaptured prisoners, it would be a difficult matter to imagine.

The Second and Third Divisions bivouacked in line of battle on the north side of the river where they were feebly attacked on the morning of the 10th. The attack was soon repulsed, the divisions crossed the ford, and on reaching the station the Second Brigade, Second Division, took the advance, the 1st Maine Cavalry leading; the command had proceeded but a short distance until the enemy were encountered in some force, and quite a brisk skirmish occurred, in which Major Boothby, 1st Maine Cavalry, received a wound in the shoulder, from the effects of which he died in a few days.

Notwithstanding this opposition, the march of the column was not delayed or retarded, but moved steadily on, crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge, and went into camp near an old church of that name, about one mile south of the river. The entire corps crossed the South Anna on the evening of the 10th; during the night the First and Third Divisions, and the First Brigade of the Second Division, moved in the direction of Richmond, crossing the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad at Negro Foot Station, destroying the road for a distance on both sides of the station. General Davies proceeded to Ashland, where he encountered the enemy, captured and destroyed a train of supplies for Lee's army, and a locomotive, and, after destroying the railroad for some distance, rejoined the main force at Allen's Station, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad.

From this point the entire command moved on Yellow Tavern, where Stuart, with his main force in a strong position, which he had gained after an exhausting march round our left during the day and night of the 10th, awaited our attack. The First Division had the advance, followed by

the Third, and Davies' brigade of the Second Division brought up the rear. Immediately on coming in sight of the enemy Merritt attacked and got possession of the Brooks pike and the tavern, while Stuart reformed his line some distance to the eastward of the pike, which he enfiladed with his guns, making the position of Devin and Gibbs at the tavern somewhat hot; but supported by the artillery they held on. Meantime Custer, supported by Chapman's brigade, charged and broke the Confederate line, capturing two of his guns, and driving the separate parts of his divided force, the one in the direction of Richmond, the other toward Ashland. Davies' brigade was held in reserve.

In this brilliant action General Stuart, commanding the enemy's cavalry, was mortally wounded, and died a few days after; the prestige and the fruits of victory remained with the Union forces.

While these operations were going on in front, Col. Irvin Gregg's brigade, which had been left at Ground Squirrel Church to bring up the rear, was impetuously attacked by Gordon's Confederate brigade. The 1st Maine Cavalry was on picket in the direction of the bridge across the South Anna. The 10th New York had been directed to report to the colonel of the 1st Maine, as the enemy was making some demonstrations; and a section of artillery was left at the church for the colonel of the 1st Maine to pick up as his command fell back. The other regiments of the Second Brigade had already moved on in the direction of Richmond, except one squadron of the 16th Pennsylvania, which was returning from the left with forage.

Colonel Gregg and staff were with the section of artillery at the church, waiting for the 1st Maine and 10th New York, before proceeding to the head of the command, when suddenly, like a clap of thunder from a clear sky, several volleys were heard, a wild Confederate yell, and a crashing of branches, as the broken and routed 1st Maine and 10th New York came tearing back along the road and

through the woods, with the victorious enemy close upon their heels; clouds of dust filled the woods and the road; the artillerymen were excited and lamenting the loss of their guns, brass 12-pounders; everything seemed to be lost. The Second Brigade, struck in rear by the exulting Confederates, would be most likely rolled up and sent pell-mell on the rear of the troops contending with Stuart at Yellow Tavern; Colonel Gregg, on whom rested the responsibility for this part of the field, did not feel disposed to let the enemy have everything his own way, but quietly directed the officer in command of the guns to fill them to the muzzle with canister; the command was obeyed with a will, and the men, as soon as they found there was a chance to fight, became calm and collected. On came the maddened and exultant enemy, imagining victory within their grasp. The dust lifted. The deadly Napoleons belched forth their fearful and fatal contents into the very faces of the foe. The squadron of the 16th before mentioned, Capt. A. J. Snyder commanding, charged with a shout. Captain Gleason's two squadrons of the 1st Massachusetts, a few paces in rear of the guns, wheeled about by fours, drew saber and awaited orders to charge; but the guns had done their work—had stopped in mid-career this impetuous charge. They then quietly and leisurely limbered up and withdrew, greatly pleased with their brilliant success. The brigade was not again molested during the day; although the enemy made his appearance once or twice, he did not attempt another charge or attack.

General Sheridan, in his final report, says: "Gregg, about the same time—while the contest was in progress at Yellow Tavern—charged the force in rear with equal success, and ended the engagement."

It was, as has been seen, the other way; Stuart, in sending Gordon's brigade to harass the rear of Sheridan's column, hoped to distract his attention from his front where he meditated his main attack; but, whatever may have been Stuart's object, this impetuous charge, made at the critical

period when a position was about to be abandoned, came near being successful, and possibly would have been entirely so, but for the fact that these Napoleon guns were in position where they were, and the brigade commander with them, awaiting the arrival of his rear guard.

This episode serves to illustrate the power of these guns at short range, and the necessity for coolness and self-possession in sudden emergencies or great dangers. Doubtless all the disastrous consequences of this sudden and resolute attack, if successful, flashed through Colonel Gregg's mind when he saw his advance regiments struck in the rear, rolled up like a scroll, broken and scattered as were his rear guard, and realized the importance of so utilizing his guns as to gain the time required for putting the remainder of his troops in position to cope with this apparently victorious foe; so, dispatching his aids to the front with orders to his regimental commanders to get into line, face to the rear, and the commanding officer of his rear guard to get his men rallied in rear of the other regiments, he calmly waited for developments, and was rewarded by success beyond his most sanguine expectations—indeed, contrary to any expectations, for the case seemed utterly hopeless, and only death or capture appeared possible.

At eleven o'clock on the night of the 11th, after caring for the wounded and burying the dead, the entire command moved south toward Richmond, Wilson's Third Division in advance, followed by Merritt's First, and Gregg's Second bringing up the rear.

Daylight on the morning of the 12th found the entire command inside the outer line of fortifications, massed upon a plateau which overlooked the Meadow Bridges over the Chickahominy, which were destroyed, and the opposite, or Mechanicsville, side held in strong force by the enemy. Wilson's advance on the direct road to Mechanicsville was opposed by the enemy's batteries so formidably that he could not pass them, and Custer's brigade was directed to cross the Meadow Bridges; but they were so strongly de-

fended that Merritt's entire division was directed to force the crossing at all hazards.

While this was going on in front of the bridges, the enemy advanced from his works and attacked Wilson and Gregg. Wilson was at first obliged to fall back, so fierce was the Confederate onset, but Davies' brigade, of Gregg's division, being advantageously posted in a wooded ravine, checked the advance of the enemy, and held them. Meanwhile a strong force coming up the Brook turnpike, attacked Col. Irvin Gregg's Second Brigade, and the battle raged from right to left, until late in the afternoon, when the bridge was completed, the command safely crossed to the south side of the river, and, brushing the enemy out of the way, went into camp between Walnut Grove Church and Gaines' Mill. On the morning of the 13th the march was resumed, and the command reached Haxall's without further incident, except that when the Confederates were massed on the summit of Malvern Hill, in full view of the James River, our gunboats opened on them with their big guns, and compelled their cavalry to beat a hasty retreat. There the weary troopers found grateful rest, with rations and forage. After resting for three days, the return march was commenced, and on the 24th, after sixteen days and nights of marching and fighting, the Cavalry Corps rejoined the main army at or near Chesterfield, on the north side of the North Anna.

This raid demonstrated what could be accomplished by a well organized cavalry force, under a competent leader, ably seconded by his subordinate officers and men. Of these, General Sheridan, in closing his report, which comprises all the operations in which the cavalry were engaged, to August 1, 1864, says: "To Generals D. McM. Gregg, Torbert, Wilson, Merritt, Custer, Devin, J. Irvin Gregg, Davies, and Gibbs, to the gallant officers and men of their commands, I return my sincere thanks." Thus the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, which (from the time Hooker is alleged to have said he would give one hundred dol-

lars for a dead cavalryman), through the cavalry fights at Kelley's Ford, on St. Patrick's Day, in 1863, Brandy Station, Aldie, Middleburg, Upperville, Gettysburg, Monterey, Falling Waters, Shepherdstown, Culpeper Court House, Bristoe Station, and Mine Run, became fused in the fire of innumerable combats, was, under Sheridan, welded in a homogeneous whole, to be launched, like a thunderbolt, splintering and tearing to pieces whatever stood in its way. It was 10,000 wills subordinated by discipline to the control of one master mind, the force of 10,000 men controlling 10,000 horses hurled by one arm against our country's foes, its blows were relentless, destructive, deadly.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PREPARING TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF RICHMOND.

BEFORE Grant issued the order to move from his position in front of Lee at Spottsylvania, he directed that over 100 pieces of artillery be sent back to Washington. From the time the army had crossed the Rapidan, but few batteries had been used; and Grant did not believe that artillery would play a prominent part in that campaign. He, at the same time, took a retrospective view of the movements of the different armies. While Sherman was advancing to suit him, Sigel had been defeated in the Shenandoah, which gave the Confederates a chance to reënforce Lee.

He at once resolved to relieve Sigel, and General Hunter's name being mentioned, Grant consented to his being placed in command. Hunter was then directed by Grant to push forward his column up the Shenandoah and unite with Averell and Crook near Staunton, from which place he was to move, by way of Lexington, to Lynchburg, and in that manner draw from Lee's forces, or else unite with the Army of the Potomac, in case he was not opposed, and become its right wing.

Appearing before that Gibraltar, Hunter found it too strongly defended for him to storm; so he withdrew down the Kanawha, fearing to follow the line of the Virginia Central Railway, lest he would be overtaken. This prevented his army from assisting Grant for weeks, until it emerged from the mountain fastnesses of West Virginia.

Turning his eye on General Butler, who was south of the James River, Grant found that he was shut up in

Bermuda Hundred by Beauregard, and that reinforcements were coming from the South to again assist in the defense of Richmond. When General Butler landed at Bermuda Hundred there were but few troops in that vicinity; but when he sent an expedition, on the 7th of May, to destroy the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, he found it guarded by a strong force. Brooks, who was in command of this expedition, attacked the enemy, and drove him back; but he, rallying, charged Brooks. Finally both parties withdrew.

On the 9th another advance was made, when the troops got within three miles of Petersburg. Butler had two corps, one under Gilmore and the other under General W. F. Smith. The latter was on the right. On the morning of the 16th, under cover of a dense fog, Beauregard advanced a column on Smith's right, which was a mile and a half from the James River, and guarded only by a small squadron of colored cavalry on his right. When Heckman was struck, on Smith's right, his troops were thrown into confusion; but the 9th Maine and the 112th New York coming up, led Beauregard to believe that Smith's line lay further to the right, *en echelon*. When his troops charged in front, they were tripped by wires which Smith had had stretched there to protect his front. When the Confederates fell, they were fired on by the Union troops.

Being repulsed, Beauregard made an examination, and resolved to make another attack, but this time to move his flanking column closer to the James. Smith, seeing that Beauregard was attempting to gain his rear and seize Bermuda Hundred, where Butler's depot of supplies was located, fell back in that direction.

General Gilmore, who was on Smith's left, had not been pressed by the enemy. Whiting's division at Petersburg had been ordered by Beauregard to assault Gilmore when Smith was attacked. If Gilmore had swept forward, he could have turned the flank of the troops attacking Smith, and forced them to retire. But when Smith fell back on

his right, he ordered his corps to retire; and soon both corps were shut up in Bermuda Hundred.

Thus, when Grant was ready to move the Army of the Potomac south on Richmond, the armies of Hunter and Butler were both powerless to assist in the siege of that place.

Hancock was ordered to move at two o'clock, on the night of the 20th, in the direction of Guinea Station; but he requested to be permitted to move at dark, so as to pass the enemy's signal stations unobserved. Torbert's cavalry moved in his advance. When Guinea Station was reached, early in the morning, a small force of troops was encountered, but it did not delay the march.

At Milford Station a part of Kemper's brigade was encountered, but was repulsed by Torbert before the infantry came up, and the bridge over the Mattapony was saved from destruction. Hancock's troops began to cross as soon as the head of the column arrived.

Kemper appeared to be the advance of Pickett's division, on its way to reënforce Lee, and he was evidently surprised by the sudden appearance of Torbert at that place, for the right bank of the Mattapony was a very strong position from which to dispute its passage. As Pickett was on his way to join Lee, he had no expectation that any Union force was in that vicinity, and perhaps he doubted the propriety of attacking a force of whose strength he knew nothing.

Crossing his command to the south side of the Mattapony, Hancock took a strong position until Warren, Wright, and Burnside came up. On the 21st, at half past ten a.m., the artillery of the Fifth Corps started to follow Hancock, with Crawford's division moving closely in its rear. At noon Warren started, with Griffin's and Cutler's divisions. The Fifth Corps arrived at Guinea Station at half past five that afternoon.

Next morning Warren sent the Iron Brigade to the west of the Telegraph road, to learn if the enemy was also mov-

ing south. The information gained was to the effect that Ewell's and Longstreet's corps had marched south all night on the Telegraph road. About the time that this information was received, an order came from Warren to move to Harris' Store. In the morning Cutler's division, which was given the lead, started promptly at five o'clock.

By one o'clock Warren had reached the North Anna River, and began to cross at Jericho Ford about three o'clock in the afternoon. Griffin's division, wading, crossed over without opposition, and formed line of battle. Cutler was directed to cross and form on his right. The Iron Brigade, being in the advance, was ordered to the right of Griffin, while Colonel Bragg, in command of Roy Stone's Bucktail Brigade, was to take position on the right of the Iron Brigade. Colonel Hofmann, in command of the Second Brigade, which was Cutler's old brigade, was ordered to support them, while Lyle was held in reserve.

Crawford had taken position on the left of Griffin, so that Warren's line, from left to right, was Crawford, Griffin, and Cutler. Griffin had scarcely taken his position when he was furiously assaulted; but he repulsed the enemy.

While Hancock's passage of the North Anna was stubbornly resisted, Warren, several miles above, crossed unopposed; but as soon as he had crossed his center was attacked. Failing to drive Griffin, the Confederate force moved to the right just as Cutler, with Captain Mink, was riding on the line that he was to occupy to select a position for Mink's battery.

As the Iron Brigade was moving into position it was struck by the force that had assaulted Griffin. Not yet in position, the brigade was unable to withstand so heavy a force, the assaulting troops being Wilcox's division, composed of Brown's, Scales', Gordon's, and Thomas's brigades, followed by Heth's division. Mink hurriedly threw his battery into position, and the Iron Brigade, falling back, reformed in its rear.

This movement uncovered Griffin's right. At the same time Bartlett's brigade was sent to assist in restoring the lines. As the troops were rushing to their positions, the 83d Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel McCoy, came in contact with one of Brown's regiments, while both were marching. McCoy instantly formed line and fired the first volley, which wounded and killed many, and paralyzed the enemy. Seeing an officer of rank, the 83d boys sprang forward and caught him. It proved to be Colonel Brown, in command of the brigade. Colonel Bates reported to Cutler with his brigade; two of his regiments were sent to the right, where the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss.

Hancock was on the Chesterfield road, which crosses the North Anna, about a mile west of the railroad bridge. And here occurred another blunder on the part of the enemy—that of leaving troops in an intrenched position on the side of a river which had been evacuated by the main portion of his army, only to be overpowered by the Army of the Potomac when it came up. The same thing was done at Rappahannock Station, when Lee was retreating south, after the battle of Fredericksburg. General Mahone said to me that it was Early's work at Rappahannock Station.

It was, indeed, a strange performance on the part of the Confederates; for all night Hancock's soldiers had to keep a vigilant watch to prevent the bridge from being burned. It was late in the afternoon when Hancock began his movement to take it; so no attempt was made to cross the river that night.

The Confederate troops on the north bank of the North Anna were protected with strong intrenchments; but when the order to assault was given, the veterans of Pierce's and Egan's brigades, of Birney's division, made short work of it, and all were made prisoners who did not escape, or were pushed off the bridge and drowned.

In the morning, when the Second Corps was put in motion, it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated the south bank.

Lee had fought many of his battles with his army formed in a semicircle. This gave him an opportunity to quickly reënforce any given point he desired. He had formed his line of battle at the North Anna on the same plan. His right was thrown back and rested on a swamp, while his left, being refused back, rested on Little River; with a small front he clung to, and occupied, the North Anna, thus preventing Grant from uniting the wings of his army under Hancock and Warren. Burnside coming up in the center, and attempting to cross the river, first felt the position in which Lee had placed his army. Crittenden's division, advancing to cross, received a heavy rebuff from Mahone.

Grant, ascertaining the strong position that Lee occupied, and knowing that he had been reënforced by Pickett's and Breckinridge's divisions, and Hoke's brigade from North Carolina, saw that Lee was able to make a stubborn defense; so he decided to withdraw his army to the north side of the river.

In order to do that, he directed Wilson to move with his division of cavalry on Lee's left flank, near Little River, as if to turn it. This gave Lee the impression that an attack would be made with the right wing of the Army of the Potomac. During the night of the 26th Warren and Wright recrossed the North Anna. Then the Sixth, followed by the Fifth and Ninth Corps, marched down the left bank of the North Anna, then turning south crossed the Pamunkey, formed by the North and South Anna Rivers. Hancock remained until the following day, and then took up the line of march in the wake of the other corps. Grant was in a most critical if not dangerous position when he crossed the North Anna and attempted to attack, with his army separated by several miles; and it is strange that Lee did not take advantage of the situation and hurl his army on Hancock, or attack Warren and Wright. Perhaps he was waiting for a favorable opportunity, which Grant evidently feared, for he retired across the North Anna as soon as he could deceive Lee as to his purpose.

Grant then gave orders to change the base of supplies from Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, to the White House, on the Pamunkey, as steamers could traverse the Chesapeake and ascend the York and the Pamunkey, the latter with the Mattaponi forming the York River.

On the 25th, Grant gave orders for General Smith's corps to unite with the Army of the Potomac on the Pamunkey. This made five corps of infantry in Grant's army.

Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, preceded the Sixth Corps, and on the morning of the 27th crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover town. There Wright halted to let the Fifth and Ninth Corps come up, for it was well known that Lee would make a retrograde movement so as to place himself again between Grant and Richmond; it was, therefore, unsafe for Wright to advance without having other corps within supporting distance.

Hancock crossed the Pamunkey four miles above Hanover town. This placed the entire Army of the Potomac south of the Pamunkey, except Wilson's cavalry division, which brought up the rear.

Lee, who moved on an interior line, had again placed his army across Grant's line of march, and taken a position in front of the Chickahominy, at the crossing of the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroads. The Union cavalry was ordered to advance in the direction of Hanover to feel the position of the enemy. When it reached Hawe's Shop, the Confederate cavalry, under Hampton and Fitz-Hugh Lee, were encountered, and, on the afternoon of the 28th, the brigades of Custer, Gregg, and Davies had a stubborn fight with them which lasted for several hours. Sheridan ordered the troopers to dismount and fight as infantry.

The Union cavalry holding the position, the infantry of the Army of the Potomac advanced and took a position in advance of the cavalry, when the Confederates fell back behind the Tolopotomoy.

The next day a reconnoissance in force was made with three corps to ascertain Lee's position. Wright was directed to proceed to Hanover Court House, while Hancock moved toward Tolopotomoy Creek, with Warren on the left, who moved on the Shady Grove Church road. Burnside was held in reserve.

Wright advanced to Hanover Court House without serious opposition; but Hancock, on his left, found the enemy in strong force at Tolopotomoy Creek. Burnside was moved up on the left of Hancock so as to fill the gap between him and Warren. When Warren arrived near Huntley Corners, on the Shady Grove Church road, Early attempted to turn his left flank, attacking Crawford's division, and Colonel Hardin's brigade was driven back in confusion.

In order to relieve Warren, Hancock was ordered to attack the enemy who were in his front, which he did, taking and holding the rifle-pits occupied by the Confederates. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, had come up on the right of the Sixth Corps, after having destroyed all that he could of the Virginia Central Railroad.

Sheridan was on the left of Warren and pressing in the direction of Cold Harbor, where he arrived on the 31st and found the enemy intrenched.

CHAPTER XIX.

COLD HARBOR.

THE Army of the Potomac was now on historic military ground; in its rear was Yorktown, where the famous battle was fought which ended the war of the Revolution, while it occupied the position held by the right of McClellan's army in the Peninsular Campaign of 1862.

As the Confederates had always feared that the Peninsula would again be the route of the Union army to capture Richmond, they had been constantly preparing lines of fortifications to checkmate a movement in that direction; the Army of the Potomac had therefore bloody work before it, whether it succeeded or not. Lee was again in Grant and Meade's front to assume the defensive and prevent the crossing of the Chickahominy, which empties into the James, by the Army of the Potomac, which, then only ten miles distant from Richmond, had to meet the impenetrable barriers behind which was Lee's army; consequently Grant and Meade made another flank movement to the left, with Cold Harbor as the objective, as Sheridan had reported that position weakly defended. Wright, with the Sixth Corps, was ordered from the right of the army to pass in rear of the other corps and proceed hastily to Cold Harbor, while General Smith was directed to follow and take up a position on the right of the Sixth Corps. Hancock, who held the right after Wright had been withdrawn, was ordered to march in rear of Burnside and Warren and form on Wright's left, when it was discovered that there was a wide interval

between Warren's left and Smith's right, which Warren was directed to occupy; but, as he already had a front of over three miles, it was quite difficult for him to connect with Smith.

The Union line of battle, as then formed at Cold Harbor, from left to right, was Hancock, Wright, Smith, Warren, and Burnside. Grant and Meade knew they were in the enemy's country, where at least a majority of the people were loyal to the Confederate cause; hence they presumed that the newly-formed lines had been quickly reported to Lee. This made it necessary to support the weak line of Warren, and Burnside was directed to withdraw from his (Warren's) right and mass the Ninth Corps in the rear and right of the Fifth, to sustain Warren in case he was attacked. When Burnside began to execute the order, on the afternoon of the 2d of June, he was attacked and a part of his forces driven through a swamp, the enemy capturing many prisoners. Warren's front was at the same time assailed, when Griffin was thrown forward with his division to assist Burnside. Griffin hastily formed his division, with Ayres on the left, Bartlett in the center, and Sweitzer on the right and rapidly advanced to meet the enemy, as a dense cloud of dust indicated that a heavy force was approaching.

Bartlett's advance was on the north side of the Mechanicsville road, and when his skirmish line encountered the enemy, Griffin ordered Stewart, with Battery B, 4th United States Artillery, to take a position on the front line, which he promptly did. He soon silenced a battery of the enemy, which was abandoned, and with short fuses he checked the advance of Rodes' division. Cutler, on the left of Griffin, not being heavily attacked, sent Hofmann's brigade to Griffin's assistance; while Crawford, on Cutler's left, was expected to join Devens' right of Smith's corps.

On the morning of the 3d of June, Grant gave orders for Hancock, Wright, and Smith to make an attack at half past four.

The Second Corps was formed with Barlow on the left and Gibbon on the right, Birney supporting.

R. H. Anderson, who commanded Longstreet's corps, had been moved to the right to meet the movements of Hancock, Wright, and Smith, Hoke coming up first. On the 1st and 2d Anderson had been fighting Sheridan and Wright; but on the 3d Kershaw formed on his left, with Pickett and Field, extending the line to meet Early's right.

On the morning of the 3d, Barlow formed his division in two lines of battle, the brigades of Brooke and Miles in the front line, with McDougall and Byrnes supporting. Gibbon did the same, placing Smith and Tyler in front, with Owen and McKeon supporting in close column by regiments. Barlow's first line captured the salient on the road from Dispatch Station; but McDougall and Byrnes not getting up immediately, they were forced out by Hill and Breckinridge, though Barlow only fell back a short distance, where he took up a position behind a small elevation, which he held. Barlow's loss was very heavy. Among the killed were Colonel Morris, of the 68th New York, and Colonel Byrnes, of the 28th Massachusetts, and Colonel Brooke fell severely wounded as the troops entered the enemy's works.

When Gibbon advanced, McKeon supported Tyler; but the latter fell almost immediately. McKeon then came up on the right of Tyler's brigade, but he, too, soon fell, mortally wounded, under the severe fire. By this time McKeon's brigade, then commanded by Colonel Haskell, of the 32d Wisconsin, but which was only a mere skirmish line, it having suffered so heavily, was ordered by Haskell to again advance, when he was fatally wounded. Gibbon encountered a swamp in his front. Tyler and McKeon had gone to the right of it, with the exception of Colonel McMahan, of the 164th New York, who was on the left of McKeon's brigade. McMahan in the advance got separated from his brigade and went to the left of the swamp. He there gallantly charged over the enemy's works, but fell by the side

of his colors, pierced by several bullets. Dying in the lines of the Confederates, his colors were captured, and scarcely a man of his regiment escaped being taken prisoner.

Owen was to support Smith; but as soon as Smith became hotly engaged, Owen moved up on his left flank, and thus became unable to support Smith when he carried the works in his front, which he did at the same time McMahon stormed them. Owen is to be commended for his valor; but his judgment was at fault in not remaining in Smith's rear, to aid him when he drove the enemy from his position. Gibbon was then compelled to retire.

Wright formed his corps with Russell on the left, Ricketts in the center, and Neill (Getty's) on the right. Russell and Ricketts advanced close to the enemy's position; Neill on the right carried the rifle-pits in his front, but was unable to successfully advance any farther; yet Wright maintained himself within forty or fifty yards in some places.

Smith formed his line with Brooks on the left, Martindale in the center, and Devens on the right. Smith discovered a ravine in front of his left and center, deep enough to shelter the troops. He conceived the idea that he could suddenly make a charge from that ravine at an opportune moment, and dash on the enemy's works and succeed in forcing him back. Accordingly he ordered Martindale, when he heard the fire from Brooks' division, to advance.

When Wright advanced, Martindale supposed it was Brooks, and ordered Stannard to charge, which he did three times. Stannard in relating this occurrence to me, said:

I begged Martindale to go to Smith and have the order countermanded, for I knew my brigade would be nearly destroyed without effecting anything; Martindale went to Smith and gave Stannard's message, saying: "He will lose his brigade;" but Smith said to Martindale that Grant had ordered the enemy's works to be assaulted, and would not yield in his purpose. When Martindale returned and told me what Smith said, I pulled my hat down over my eyes, and, advancing, ordered the brigade to follow me. When I arrived near the enemy's position every staff officer and orderly had been killed

or wounded, and I was compelled to get the brigade back myself as best I could. Grant was at my headquarters, as he was riding the line of battle. After listening to the roar of the battle on Hancock's and Wright's front, he said: "Stannard, this is a heavy battle;" with that he galloped to the left, not giving me time to express my opinion, and for that reason I asked Martindale to go to General Smith to try to persuade him to countermand the order to charge.

Anderson held a position where all his artillery could be brought to bear on our advancing columns, and that, too, with an enfilading fire from either right or left, which plowed great gaps in our advancing lines. Hancock, Wright, and Smith all suffered alike from it, while our artillery was unable to aid the infantry, because there were no prominences upon which to get positions.

Warren and Burnside were ordered to watch the movements of the enemy closely, and if there was an opportunity to turn Lee's left flank, they were to embrace it; but it seemed never to come.

Grant and Meade seeing there was no hope of breaking through at any point, ordered the corps commanders to intrench their positions, until a new plan of action could be conceived; for it was evident that Lee was fully able to prevent the Army of the Potomac from entering Richmond, with his troops behind formidable breastworks. Grant was the commander-in-chief of all the armies, and if he turned back then it would have cast a heavy gloom over the country and chilled the hopes of the armies; so he at once boldly resolved to cross the James, and cut off the supplies for Richmond and Lee's army. This would give Lee an opportunity to march on Washington; but Grant decided to risk it, and at once gave orders to prepare to cross the James River.

CHAPTER XX.

CAVALRY TRANSACTIONS FROM THE NORTH ANNA TO THE JAMES.

UPON the return of the Cavalry Corps from its expedition around Lee's right flank to the army at Chesterfield, north of the Anna, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, on the 25th of May, 1864, it moved again, on the evening of the 26th, in advance of the army on the road to Hanover Ferry on the Pamunkey.

Arriving there early on the morning of the 27th, the crossing of the run was speedily effected by Custer's brigade of Torbert's division, which had the advance. The opposite, or southern bank of the run was held by a small force of the enemy, who were soon driven away by Custer's leading regiments, under cover of the fire from which two canvas pontoons were launched and two squadrons ferried over to hold the approaches to the ferry until the bridge could be laid. In an hour this was accomplished, under charge of Captain Howell, of the 50th New York Engineers, and the whole of Torbert's division crossed over.

Custer, still in the advance, met the enemy about one mile from the ferry, near Dr. Brockenborough's house, where the road to Hanover Court House branches from the road leading from the ferry to Haws' Shop. Two of his regiments were sent on each road. Devin's brigade followed on the Hanover Court House road in support, in that direction, and Merritt's brigade on the Haws' Shop road. The enemy being in strong force on the Hanover Court House road, Custer's two regiments and Devin's entire brigade soon became engaged. Custer, with the other two

regiments of his brigade, followed by Merritt, proceeded to Haws' Shop, and, as directed, took the road leading from there to Hanover Court House, and came into the road on which Devin was engaged in rear of the enemy in his front. Immediately on the appearance of Merritt on this road, the enemy abandoned his position and retired precipitately in the direction of Hanover Court House. Merritt went into position midway between Crump Creek bridge and Haws' Shop, Devin and Custer occupied the ground abandoned by the enemy. The road leading from the town of Hanover to the White House and Richmond road enters it at Haws' Shop. This road crosses the Tolopotomy about one and a half or two miles east of the shop, and runs parallel to it until it enters the road leading from Hanover Court House to Mechanicsville, about the same distance to the west of the shop, at or near Polly Huntley's Corners or Crossroads, through which the road leading from Mechanicsville to Hanover Court House passes.

The Second Division (Gregg's), encamped for the night about one mile north of the shop. Russell's division of the Sixth Corps came up during the day, somewhat nearer the shop than the cavalry, and went into camp.

Early on the morning of the 28th, the Second Division moved out on the road from White House to Richmond, at Haws' Shop, and, after marching a short distance in the direction of Mechanicsville, encountered the enemy in strong force, advantageously posted near Ænon Church, at which point a road leading from Hanover Court House via Cash Corners enters the Richmond and White House road, and soon became engaged. The Confederates were stubborn, and regiment after regiment was put in until the entire brigade were in battle array and heavy fighting going on along the entire front.

The Second Brigade, Irvin Gregg's, was moved up, and the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry was put in on the right of Davies' line and the 13th on the left; but even as thus reënforced, this officer was barely able to hold his posi-

tion. The fire of the enemy was heavy and continuous; his batteries enfiladed all the ground in rear of the line of battle and did some damage to the regiments of the Second Brigade, which was in reserve, and to our hospitals. About three p. m. Custer's brigade, of Torbert's division, came up, dismounted, and crossed the open field in rear of the center of General Davies' line, deploying to the right and left of the road: their advance was irresistible, and the wearied troops of the Second Division being inspired by this timely aid, advanced along the entire line with a cheer, while the enemy abandoned the field, leaving his dead and wounded and many prisoners in our possession. These consisted mainly of Butler's South Carolinians, which had just joined Lee's army.

Merritt's and Devin's brigades of Torbert's division were on the road leading from Haws' Shop to Hanover Court House, holding the line of Crump's Creek, a small but swift stream which has its source in the vicinity of Ænon Church, and flows northeasterly, emptying in the Pamunkey near Hanover town, and affording a good defensive line.

During the day of the 28th, while the cavalry fighting was going on, the army crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover town without molestation. On the same night, after the battle in front of Haws' Shop, the cavalry withdrew and went into camp on the Tolopotomoy, between Hanover town and New Castle Ferry, where it remained during the 29th and 30th. The First Division having some severe fighting on the road leading from Old Church to Cold Harbor, and drawing the enemy to within a mile and a half of the latter place, on the following morning Torbert advanced and drew the enemy from Cold Harbor, and held the position against very determined efforts on his part to regain it, until the arrival of our own infantry, on the 1st of June. On the morning of the 31st the Second Brigade of the Second Cavalry Division (Irvin Gregg's), was sent to White House to report to Gen. William F. Smith, whose

corps of 16,000 men had just arrived at that point from Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Gregg's command arrived at White House about three p. m., and, upon reporting to General Smith, he was directed to so post his brigade as to cover his left flank on his march to join the army, as his orders directed, at New Castle Ferry on the Pamunkey. This order was a mistake, "New Castle" being substituted, in the order directing the march, for "Cold Harbor."

General Smith's corps moved on the afternoon of the 31st, and early the following morning, June 1, Colonel Gregg's command moved on the Cold Harbor road, and arrived in the vicinity of that place in the evening of the same day.

On the 2d, the 1st and 2d Cavalry made reconnoissances to Sumner's Upper Bridge, and Bottom Bridge, and held the left of the line until the arrival of Hancock's corps, after which they withdrew and took up a position further down the Chickahominy, opposite Bottom Bridge, the enemy's cavalry occupying the northern bank, and shelling our camps at long range. Meanwhile Wilson's Third Division was operating on the right of the army, burning bridges, destroying railroads, and being engaged with the enemy around the sources of the Tolopomoy.

On the 4th, the First Division moved to Old Church, and on the 6th, Gregg's Second Division, being relieved by one of Wilson's brigades, marched to the same place: from thence both divisions moved to New Castle Ferry, where they met the trains from the White House with supplies for an extended march, known in history as the "Trevilian Raid." This expedition had for its objective, first, the destruction of the railroad between Richmond and Lynchburg; second, a junction with the forces under General Hunter, supposed to be at or in the vicinity of Charlottesville; and third, the withdrawal of the enemy's cavalry from the front of our army, whose presence would have interfered seriously with any movement for its with-

drawal from its position at Cold Harbor across the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp toward the James.

Everything being in readiness, horses shod, rations, forage, and ammunition being distributed, everything to last, with what could be picked up in the country, for an indefinite period, the command, in high spirits, crossed the Pamunkey, and after a march of 16 or 18 miles went into camp between Aylett's and Dunkirk.

The march continued along the north bank of the Anna during the 8th, 9th, and 10th, without incident, and on the evening of the latter date the entire command went into camp on the south bank of the North Anna, about four or five miles north of Trevilian Station, where, for the first time during the march, they encountered the enemy's scouts, who attacked the head of their column.

On the morning of the 11th the march was resumed in the direction of Trevilian Station. Torbert had the advance, but had not proceeded far until the enemy were encountered in full force. Devin and Merritt were at once engaged in a fierce contest, Custer having been detached and sent to the left to get to the station or in the rear of the enemy. Following a wood road which leads from the Louisa Court House road to Trevilian, Custer passed between Hampton's division, which had passed the station and was engaging Torbert, and Fitz Lee's division, which was still on the road leading from Louisa Court House to Charlottesville; and thus, meeting no opposition, reached and took possession of the station.

Sheridan, having received information that Custer had possession of the station, dismounted the brigades of Devin and Merritt, and, forming in line, drove Hampton back upon Custer. But Fitz-Hugh Lee coming up, Custer was obliged to form his command to face in two directions, and was being hard pressed; meantime, Merritt and Devin drove back Hampton, and Irvin Gregg's brigade, being brought up and put in on Fitz Lee's right flank, attacked vigorously, and drove him from the road and

back in the direction of Louisa Court House. Night put an end to the fighting.

Hampton moved toward Gordonsville, and Fitz Lee, during the night, joined him by a detour westward. Davies' brigade of Gregg's division guarded the trains.

On the morning of the 12th the work of destroying the railroad commenced, and Sheridan, having learned that Hunter was moving away from Charlottesville instead of toward that place, concluded to return; and with a view to secure a byroad leading to Mallory's Ford, which led to the Catharpin road, sent Torbert to make a reconnoissance on the Gordonsville road, which movement brought on a fight in which his entire force became engaged without being able to drive the enemy from his strong position.

On the night of the 12th, as soon as darkness set in, all the wounded being provided for in ambulances, wagons, and vehicles picked up in the country, and such of their wounded (about 100) as could not be transported being left in hospitals near the station, the command was put in motion, and reached the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford during the night, and in the morning crossed over and moved, via Troyman's Store, to the Catharpin road, and encamped at Shady Grove Church; next day passed over the Spottsylvania Court House battlefield, and so on along the north bank of the Mattapony, until, on the 18th, the command arrived at and encamped in the vicinity of King and Queen Court House; here, learning that the depot at White House was not broken up, General Sheridan sent his wounded on to West Point under an escort of two regiments, and with the remainder of his command returned to Dunkirk, at which point he crossed the Mattapony on the pontoons which had been carried with the expedition.

On the 20th the march was resumed at an early hour; the sound of artillery firing was heard from the direction of White House, and dispatches were received from General Abercrombie that that place was attacked; but

learning from an advance party, which had been sent forward on hearing the firing, that there was no danger, the command moved leisurely to the Pamunkey, and went into camp on the north side, opposite White House, the enemy holding the bluff about one mile back from the river, and surrounding the plain in the form of a semi-circle.

During the night Col. Irvin Gregg, who had become familiar with the topography of the country around the White House during the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, was sent for, and received instructions to cross his brigade early on the following morning, dismounted, and make a reconnaissance toward Black Creek and Tunstall's Station, on the York River and Richmond Railroad, as soon as it was light enough to see. The brigade crossed over, and proceeded to Dr. Macon's farm, about two miles west from the White House, the house being situated on the bluff and overlooking the plain from Black Creek to White House. From Dr. Macon's house several roads lead toward Tunstall's Station, which is concealed from view by the dense woods that cover the hill which slopes from the house to Black Creek. Halting the main force here, strong parties were sent out on these several roads; but no enemy was encountered until they reached the vicinity of Tunstall's Station, where the enemy were discovered in strong force on the opposite side of Black Creek. During the afternoon the Confederates advanced a strong skirmish line; but being unable to make any impression upon Gregg's lines, retired about sunset.

At White House, Sheridan found a train of 900 wagons, which, after breaking up the depot at that place, he was directed to bring over to the James River, directing his march on Bermuda Hundred, where General Butler had a pontoon bridge. This involved a flank march of three days, in the face of a vigilant and daring enemy; and as the trains would occupy more than ten miles of road, was an extremely hazardous undertaking. However, Sheridan

and his troopers were equal to the task imposed upon them.

On the morning of the 22d, Torbert was sent in advance of the trains to secure the crossing at Jones' Bridge, whilst Gregg moved on a parallel road on the right flank of the long line of wagons. The march was undisturbed, and on the evening of the 23d the trains were all safely parked on the south side of the Chickahominy; the night passed quietly, and on the morning of the 24th Torbert again moved in advance on the Charles City Court House road, as escort to the trains. When Torbert's advance reached the courthouse it encountered the enemy and drew him across Herring Creek, on the western or Harrison's Landing road. Torbert pushed his entire division to the front, and the trains, which had passed beyond the courthouse, were all parked, and their direction changed to Wilcox Landing, on the James, instead of Bermuda Hundred, their original destination. Gregg moved on the road leading by St. Mary's Church to Haxall's Landing, covering, as on the previous day, the right flank of the trains.

The Second Division, with the Second Brigade (Col. Irvin Gregg's) in the advance, reached the vicinity of St. Mary's Church about noon, where it encountered a small mounted force of the enemy, which it drove away. Gregg having received intelligence of the change of affairs in front, and being directed to hold on to his position near the church, took up a strong position across the St. Mary's Church and Haxall's Landing road, the right and left of his line resting on a swamp, and his artillery posted upon commanding ground in the center, Randol on the right near the road, and Dennison on the left. It was known that a large force of the enemy were in his front across the Haxall road, and the sound of axes could be distinctly heard in the intervals between the firing, showing that they were obstructing the road. The morning passed, and through the afternoon, hot and sultry, until the shadows began to lengthen, the sharp reports of the carbines rolled from right to left,

and back again; the woods became hazy from the smoke, and as the pressure of the enemy's skirmishers became heavier, one after another of the regiments of the Second Brigade were dismounted and placed in line in front of the guns.

At four o'clock p. m., the enemy being apprised by a captured dispatch from Sheridan to Gregg that we were acting on the defensive, massed his troops for an attack. Their onset struck the 1st Maine and 13th Pennsylvania on the right, and was repulsed. Swinging to the right, it struck the 2d, 4th, and 8th Pennsylvania; was again repulsed. Swinging still further around to the right, and under cover of the woods, the left of the Second Brigade was pushed back, and the enemy gained the edge of the woods midway between Randol's and Dennison's batteries. Then those guns began to thunder. Shot and shell, case and canister were poured in rapid succession into the advancing enemy. Attempt after attempt was made to debouch from the woods; but for more than an hour did those heroic cannoneers sweep the plain in front of their guns. On the right the dismounted men of the Second Brigade poured in incessant volleys; on the left the mounted troopers of the First held the open fields in their front. And so the fight raged around the center. The horses of Randol and Dennison were falling rapidly under the withering fire from the woods. Dust and smoke obscured the field; the sun was already sunken behind the trees; but the fight still went on around the center, where the enemy seemed to have massed his forces, determined to break through.

At this juncture an order came to Colonel Gregg to withdraw from the right and form his brigade at Hopewell Church, on the Charles City road. It being impracticable to comply with this order, Colonel Gregg sent the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, which had remained mounted and in support of Randol's battery, to take up this position, while the dismounted regiments withdrew, disputing every inch of

the ground. Near Hopewell Church they found their led horses, and mounting and returning, formed a formidable line behind the 16th, in which position they repulsed the last attack, long after dark, and then withdrew to Charles City without molestation.

The above order to Colonel Gregg, directing him to withdraw from the right and form his brigade at Hopewell Church, at the same time informed him that General Davies' brigade, being mounted, would cover the crossing of the swamp; and the dismounted regiments prepared to withdraw. General Davies, being under the impression that the Second Brigade had, in compliance with orders, fallen back to the new position, withdrew, and thus uncovered the left of the Second Brigade before its leading regiments had reached the swamp over which we had to pass. The enemy, finding the opposition on his right withdrawn, debouched from the woods and moved rapidly across the field of battle toward the road on which we had advanced in the morning, and along which the dismounted men of the 2d, 4th, 8th, and 13th Pennsylvania and 1st Maine Cavalry were in the act of retiring.

This road being sunk several feet below the level of the surrounding fields, these advancing and retiring troops were not aware of their proximity to each other, until Colonel Covode of the 4th Pennsylvania, who had mounted to the summit of the bank, supposing the advancing lines to be friends, called out to know who they were, when he was immediately shot and fell, mortally wounded. The retiring regiments promptly faced to the right and poured in a volley which checked momentarily the advance of the enemy; and, under cover of the increasing darkness, these regiments crossed the swamp, slowly and sullenly disputing every inch of the ground.

Of this affair, Sheridan says: "This very creditable engagement saved the train, which never should have been left for the cavalry to escort."

CHAPTER XXI.

THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

AFTER several days of desperate fighting at Cold Harbor, in which the Army of the Potomac lost heavily, Grant decided against Halleck's suggestion of attempting to take Richmond by the Peninsular route, and at once laid his plans to cross to the south side of the James and cut off the enemy's communications with the southeast by tapping the railroads. In the mean time he had sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to more effectually tear up and destroy the railroads north of Richmond; also to take orders to Hunter, who had met Jones at Piedmont and defeated him—taking some 1500 prisoners. Lee, learning of Sheridan's movements, directed Hampton and Fitz-Hugh Lee to pursue him with their divisions of cavalry, while Breckinridge's division of infantry was directed to return to the valley. Also, seeing the gravity of the situation from a junction of the forces under Hunter, he ordered Early to follow Breckinridge and take command of the forces threatening Washington, which would relieve Lynchburg. Thus the two commanders were playing a desperate game for success—Grant to save the nation established by the heroes of the Revolution, Lee to destroy it. Grant, in his proposition to transfer the Army of the Potomac to the south side of the James River, uncovered Washington, but Lee could not afford to leave Grant so near Richmond, while trying to capture Washington, for two corps could have taken Richmond with Lee's army marching on Washington, and the other corps of the Army of the Potomac could have taken steamers and been in the fortifications in front

of Washington before the Confederates could have arrived there. As Grant could not weave a net around Richmond while he remained on the north side of the James, and the Peninsula had been fortified almost to perfection, and it would have cost thousands of lives for the Army of the Potomac to have forced its way through them, while the enemy could have retired to another line of works if driven, he gave orders for the army to prepare to cross the James River. General Smith, known as "Old Baldy," was directed to return by the way of the White House, thence by steamer around to Butler at Bermuda Hundred, where upon landing he was to rapidly march on Petersburg and capture it before Lee was aware of the new movement.

The heights four miles out of Petersburg had been fortified by the Confederates, it being the highest point, and readily commanded the front with artillery. Their line of works extended around from the Appomattox in a semi-circular form until it reached Rives' house, near the Jerusalem plank road; there it abruptly turned west, crossing the road, and continued in the direction of the Weldon Railroad. It was these works on the east of the Cockade City that Smith was expected to attack and take. Smith arrived at Bermuda Hundred on the evening of the 14th, and immediately prepared to advance on Petersburg and attack the fortifications, then occupied by Wise with his brigade and what militia could be secured in the vicinity. Martindale's division moved on the right, and was expected to strike the City Point Railroad; Brooks, on his left, with the division of colored troops was to follow up and support Kautz's cavalry, which was to cover the left flank of Smith's forces. Kautz was to move so as to threaten the fortifications at the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Some two miles from Bermuda Hundred Kautz struck some intrenchments, when he veered to the left, which let up the colored troops, who spiritedly advanced and took them, capturing one gun.

When Smith came up to the line of fortifications they appeared so formidable, and the artillery was so active that "Old Baldy" feared a sufficient force of infantry was at hand to support the artillery, and desisted from attacking until he could make an examination and be sure that he would not suffer a repulse before the Army of the Potomac arrived to sustain him. His belief was sustained perhaps by the fact that Lee had been able to divine the proposed movements of Grant, and place himself in his front in time to thwart the Union commander's intentions. But in this case Lee had been deceived by Warren's movement on the night of the 12th, as if he intended to turn Lee's right by the White Oak Swamp road. Crossing the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, Warren advanced two divisions in the direction of Richmond to support Wilson's cavalry. Late in the day the enemy appeared in Warren's front, but finding him in line of battle, did not attack him, but began throwing up intrenchments which expressed a fear that Grant would attempt to force his way to Richmond by the river route. In the mean time the different corps were marched to the James River to be crossed to the south side. The trains were moved across the Peninsula at Windsor Shades and Cole's Ferry, while the Army of the Potomac crossed above. Thus the whole army was transferred to the south side of the James by noon of the 16th; Hancock had crossed the river on the morning of the 15th, and it was Grant's intention for him to press forward and assist Smith in the assault on Petersburg. It seems that no one except Grant understood that, and Hancock waited for rations until half past ten, when he received orders to march without them. This so delayed him that the Second Corps did not arrive near Smith's position until late in the evening, when Hancock reported to Smith in advance of his columns.

In the mean time Smith had ordered a heavy line of skirmishers to advance on the works, instead of a line of battle, as the enemy's artillery would do less damage to the skirmish line. The colored troops on the left under

Hicks, and Brooks' soldiers in the center, carried over a mile and a half front of the enemy's works with sixteen cannon. Then Smith's line of battle advanced and occupied the fortifications. Hoke's division had been sent to Petersburg on Beauregard's urgent request to Lee to reënforce him. Lee was ready to cross his army above Drury's Bluff, but he seemed uncertain as to Grant's movements. It is true if Grant could have induced Lee to throw his whole army into Petersburg he (Grant) could then have marched up the peninsular route, and taken Richmond, so Lee's tardiness in reënforcing Beauregard was not without its value. His troops were there in ample time to prevent the fall of the Cockade City. There was certainly a great mistake in not hurrying forward the troops after the James was crossed. Grant had delayed one day on account of his trains from the White House which crossed the Peninsula lower down. If Hancock had been aware of the urgent necessity of his presence at Petersburg he could have arrived there four hours earlier, which would have been half past two. As it was, the head of Birney's column came in sight about half past six; even then, if Birney's and Gibbon's divisions had been put in, the intrenchments and fortifications between the Appomattox River and City Point Railroad could have been easily carried, and occupied before Hagood's brigade of Hoke's division could have taken its position there. With the whole of their front in possession of the Union forces, Petersburg would have fallen an easy prey, and saved the long and desperate siege, with its heavy list of killed and wounded; for the Confederate forces could not have held on to their works on the left with our troops marching on their base from the right. No attempt was made to advance that night, but Smith requested Hancock to relieve his troops, which he did about eleven o'clock. Hancock, who ranked Smith, received a dispatch from Grant to hold his position until the other corps could come up, as Lee had forwarded reënforcements to Beauregard.

General Burnside was ordered to cross the James on the

morning of the 15th and follow Hancock, and take a position between him and Smith. Warren followed Burnside, and at midnight on the 16th halted a few miles in the rear. Wright, with the Sixth Corps, brought up the rear, and crossed over after he called in the cavalry, and had them precede him.

On the evening of the 15th Beauregard saw his lines partially in possession of the Union forces, but so far Lee had received his urgent appeals in silence, with the exception of returning Hoke's division to him. On the arrival of Hancock two corps were facing him (Beauregard) and his right center for nearly two miles had been captured and held. He could not cling to his position on the extreme right, between the Appomattox River and the City Point Railroad, and on the left, unless he could be reënforced and retake that position of the line occupied by Smith and Hancock. So during the night of the 15th he withdrew Johnson's division, posted near the James above Bermuda Hundred. At the same time he notified Lee of his action about two o'clock on the morning of the 16th. This compelled Lee to occupy the position which Johnson had vacated on the order of Beauregard. Just before day Lee moved Pickett's division to Drury's Bluff, on the James, to cross and occupy the position Johnson had, for only Gracie's brigade had been left to occupy a long line, and, if Beauregard's statement in his telegram to Lee was correct, that Grant was crossing his army to the south side of the James, which Lee answered by telegraph that he (Lee) was not aware of it, Grant could send a force against Gracie and brush him away; so Lee at once decided to put Pickett on the south side of the river, and ordered Field to follow him, while Hill remained at Riddell's Shop and Kershaw at Malvern Hill. At that very time Wright was preparing to have Wilson's cavalry march over before the Peninsula was evacuated by the last corps of the Army of the Potomac. Butler had directed Terry to move on the position occupied by Gracie, but he encountered Pickett and Field and withdrew.



GEN. JAMES A. BEAVER.

On the morning of the 16th Hancock directed Egan to assault Redan No. 12, which he carried in the most gallant manner. The two forces rested in close proximity to each other until late in the afternoon, when Meade arrived and, after examining the enemy's position, directed Hancock to make an attack, which he did about six o'clock p. m. He was supported by two brigades on his left of the Ninth Corps, and on his right by two of Smith's. On the left Redans 13 and 14 were carried, while No. 4, on the right, fell into our hands. Our losses were very heavy in that assault. Among the dead was numbered Col. Patrick Kelly, of the 88th New York, who fell gallantly leading his brigade. Colonel Beaver, of the 148th Pennsylvania, was severely wounded. He has since been Governor of the Keystone State and a prominent man in national affairs. That evening orders were given to advance at early dawn on the 17th. This important work was assigned to Griffin, who worked all night getting his command ready for the attack. It was executed in a most skillful manner. He says:

I then spent the entire night moving my troops through the felled timber, getting them in proper position, and preparing for attack. I placed my brigade on the left of the Second Corps in a ravine immediately in front of the Shade House, which the enemy held, and within one hundred yards of their lines, with Curtin on my left and a little further to the rear on account of the conformation of the ground. We were so near the enemy that all our movements had to be made with the utmost care and caution; canteens were placed in knapsacks to prevent rattling, and all commands were given in whispers. I formed my brigade in two lines * * * Colonel Curtin formed in the same way. * * * My orders were not to fire a shot, but to depend wholly on the bayonet in carrying the lines.

Just as the dawn began to light up in the east, I gave the command, "Forward." It passed along the lines in a whisper, the men sprang to their feet and both brigades moved forward at once in well-formed lines, sweeping directly over the enemy's works, taking them completely by surprise, and carrying all before us.

One gunner saw us approaching and fired his piece. That was all we heard from them, and almost the only shot fired on either

side. The Confederates were asleep with their arms in their hands, and many of them sprang up and ran away as we came over, others surrendered without resistance. We swept their lines for a mile from where my right rested, gathering in prisoners and abandoned arms and equipments all the way. Four pieces of artillery, with caissons and horses, a stand of colors, six hundred prisoners, fifteen hundred stand of arms, and some ammunition fell into our hands.

The enemy was pursued by Potter to Harrison's Creek, where he was found strongly posted on its west bank. Wilcox then made an attack on that part of the line, but was unable to carry it, although he was supported by Barlow on the right, who always fought with great intrepidity. Late in the day Colonel Gould, of the 59th Massachusetts, commanding Ledlie's division, was ordered to attack where Wilcox failed. Gould was supported on the left by Crawford and Barlow, and on the right with the assistance of all our artillery, while the advance of Gibbon and Birney to Harrison's Creek aided this movement. This effort of Gould's was partly successful. After a fearful loss he carried a part of the enemy's works, but his men being out of ammunition, were driven back by Gracie's brigade. That ended the conflict for the day, with Beauregard clinging to the west side of Harrison's Creek to the Norfolk Railroad, and on the extreme right from the Appomattox to Redan No. 3.

Beauregard had been fighting heavily all day, and had stubbornly resisted the advance of the Union army over Harrison's Creek, yet Lee was not certain that Grant had crossed the James, so he sent his son, W. H. F. Lee, with a division of cavalry, to ascertain if it was a feint on Grant's part to induce him to vacate the Peninsula, and then march up the left bank of the James and capture Richmond. Beauregard was uncertain whether Lee would reinforce him or not, as he had practically turned a deaf ear to him for two days. It was evident that he could not long hold the line on the west side of Harrison's Creek, for he had been strained to the last extremity to withstand the attacks

of that day, and night did not come too soon for his safety, for the Fifth Corps had arrived and took a position to assist the Ninth Corps, and participated in the night attack on his lines. His line was too long for the troops he had, and Lee was astride of the James, not knowing until late in the afternoon of the 17th where Grant's army was, and then he did not telegraph Beauregard, but ordered Kershaw and Field, about three o'clock on the morning of the 18th, to march from in front of Bermuda Hundred to Petersburg.

In the mean time Beauregard had removed back to a position in advance of the Jerusalem plank road, which in all probability had been selected before in case of necessity. This line was much shorter, and as a consequence could be better defended with the same number of troops. It intersected the first line at Rives' house near the Jerusalem plank road where it turned west across the road. Lee had decided to transfer his headquarters to Petersburg, and arrived there with Kershaw and Field. Kershaw relieved Johnson's division while Field took position on the right of Kershaw. Hill coming up during the day extended the Confederate line still farther to the right. While the night attack of the 17th was not successful, yet it warranted Meade in the belief that the next morning with the Second, Ninth, and Fifth Corps, in line from right to left in the order named, he could successfully break Beauregard's line; but this movement was delayed until about noon. When the advance was made, it was discovered that only a strong skirmish line held Harrison's Creek, which rapidly retreated back on Beauregard's new position.


The Second Corps, on the right, under Birney (Hancock's wound having broken out, he was compelled to yield up the command of the Second), had a shorter distance to march, and were first to arrive in front of the new position. The Ninth Corps, in the center, struck the enemy at the Norfolk Railroad cut, which he was holding concealed in a ravine. Here Burnside met stubborn resistance. Warren, on his left, attempted to relieve him, but having

to march over a mile came under the same galling fire that Burnside had been subjected to from the railroad cut, and from ravines in his front. Finally that part of the Confederate line was forced into the works when Burnside got within 100 yards of them. Warren swung around and placed his line only a few feet from them, when Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, in command of a newly organized brigade composed of Roy Stone's old brigade, the 121st Pennsylvania, and the 142d Pennsylvania of Rowley's brigade, with the 187th Pennsylvania, was severely wounded, or else it was quite probable that that brigade of seven regiments would have carried the works at that point. General Grant, learning of Chamberlain's great gallantry there, promoted him to brigadier general on the field, and requested his nomination to be sent immediately to the United States Senate for confirmation. Colonel Tilden of the 16th Maine assumed command of the brigade when Colonel Chamberlain fell.

Smith had returned to the Bermuda Hundred part of the line under Butler, with the exception of Martindale's division, which was temporarily detained to assist in the assault on the 18th. Advancing on the right of the Second Corps he succeeded in taking some rifle-pits immediately in front of the main line, but was unable to advance any farther.

A most gallant and persistent assault had been made all along the line by Martindale, Birney, Burnside, and Warren, but the enemy had been able to hold his position in the works, which had been made hastily in a few hours. General Grant studied over the situation, and deeming it wise to desist from further attack, directed the troops to be put under shelter, and given a much needed rest in a campaign which began at the Rapidan on the 4th of May and ended at Petersburg on the 18th of June.

The First Maine Heavy Artillery made a charge at five o'clock which was as distinguished as the Light Brigade at Balaklava. Although Colonel Chaplin carried the colors off the field, yet, in less than twenty minutes, he left 603



GEN. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN.

men out of 900, who were either killed or wounded. The regiment lost 423 killed during its term of service.

That night the Union army made a line of works from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road, in front of the Confederate line, again hugging the last position of Beauregard, so when day appeared the enemy saw that a regular line of fortifications was well under way, and that it could be completed under cover from sharpshooters and the fire of infantry. Both armies began perfecting their intrenchments, and nothing occurred for a few days except the constant firing of the sharpshooters, with now and then an artillery duel. Capt. A. M. Judson, of the 83d Pennsylvania, in Bartlett's brigade, thus describes the works of our line :

The breastworks were from ten to twelve feet in thickness, and under them bombproofs were constructed for shelter in case of a shelling from the mortar batteries of the enemy.

Bombproofs were also made for the officers, whose quarters were not so close to the breastworks, and who were in danger of being blown into the air at any moment the Confederates should see proper to drop a bombshell over into our midst. The proofs were constructed as follows :

A hole was dug in the ground in the shape of a cellar, say four feet deep, and eight or ten feet square. Blocks, cut from pine trees, a foot in thickness, were placed as uprights at the corners of the excavations, and upon these pine logs were laid, completely covering the cellar. Dirt was then thrown upon them and packed down until there was a covering of several feet of solid earth. In this manner thousands of bombproofs were built along the whole line of both armies. They were much cooler than tents, and sheltered us from the hot rays of the sun as well as from the shells of the enemy.

The line of works from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road was so well completed that all the troops were not needed on that front, so preparations were made to extend our line to the left beyond that road. Wright, who had been ordered to go to Butler's assistance with two divisions, had then joined the Army of the Potomac. Birney was directed to withdraw from the intrenchments, and the Ninth Corps stretched to the right, occupying the po-


sition vacated by the Second Corps. Thus the front from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road was occupied by the Ninth and Fifth Corps.

Birney was directed to cross the Jerusalem road near where Fort Hell was afterwards built. Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps rested on that road. Gibbon formed on Griffin's left, while Mott moved past Gibbon, with Barlow forming the left of the Second, and the extreme left of our army. Wright's corps marched in the rear of Birney quite a distance, and was expected to move on and strike the Weldon Railroad. Lee anticipated the movement, and directed Wilcox to move out and form across Wright's front, which would take him in flank. But Wilcox returned that evening with his division, and reported that he found no enemy. On the 22d, when the Second Corps had moved out beyond the Jerusalem road in front of Fort Mahone, called by our troops Fort Damnation, Lee, Hill, and Mahone stood observing the movements of the Second Corps. In the mean time, Wilcox had been sent again to intercept the advance of Wright.

Lee said those troops ought to be prevented from extending in the direction of the Weldon Railroad. Mahone said to him, "If you desire me to attack them, I will." "Well," said Lee, "I wish you would." Mahone then gave orders to his brigade commanders to move the troops back into the ravine, then proceed westerly nearly a mile, when the direction was changed south, gaining a piece of woods. There Mahone formed line of battle facing east, and advancing struck Barlow while his men had their arms stacked. It was impossible for Barlow to get his men in line to resist the impetuous charge of the fiery Mahone.

Mott's division at once yielded to the onward advance of the Confederate force which struck Gibbon's left. Several of Gibbon's regiments lost their colors and many prisoners. Mahone says he captured over 1,600 prisoners and four guns.

Mahone's right flank marched close to the Sixth Corps, but the movement was so rapid that Wright was unable to assist Birney, as Wilcox had again appeared in his front



GEN. D. B. BIRNEY.

with a heavy skirmish line. Wilcox did not attempt to attack Wright, but merely impeded his advance to the Weldon Railroad. It was a brilliant and successful charge on the part of Mahone, though unassisted by the artillery which had been ordered to open fire as he advanced. Birney reformed his corps in the evening, and prepared to resume the position from which he had been driven early the next morning. Mahone retired with his prisoners, cannon, and other things he had captured, while Wilcox retired in the rear of Mahone, which movement gave Wright the opportunity of forming on the left of Birney with his left refused back and his pickets thrown out in the direction of the Weldon Railroad. Our line then being established from the Appomattox to near the Weldon Railroad, the troops again began intrenching and building fortifications. Lyle's brigade, of Crawford's division, composed of the 16th Maine, 13th Massachusetts, 39th Massachusetts, 104th New York, 90th Pennsylvania, and 107th Pennsylvania, constructed Fort Davis, in memory of Colonel Davis, of the 39th Massachusetts, who was mortally wounded there. At the Jerusalem plank road Fort Sedgwick, better known as Fort Hell, was built. It received the latter name from the Confederates who suffered from the artillery in the fort. It was universally known in both armies as Fort Hell, and should be so recorded in history. The Jerusalem road runs in a southerly direction at that point, and the fort was mainly built on the east side of it. Its outlines are still well preserved to this day; being in the edge of a wood it has never been disturbed. It was finished and occupied about the 10th of July.

No one more fully understood that Grant was weaving a web around him than Lee. Hunter was approaching Lynchburg, and with the Confederate force there it was sure to fall into Hunter's hands; then his communications with the southwest would be cut off, and, as Wilson had just destroyed the routes south, Lee was compelled to act at once or be shut up in the fortifications around Richmond

without the hope of any new supplies, which would compel him to surrender in a very short time. He occupied the interior line at Petersburg, which was then so well intrenched that, with a comparatively small number of troops, he could keep the Army of the Potomac at bay; so he detached Early with his corps, to go to the relief of Lynchburg, where he arrived just in time to prevent its capture. Hunter's ammunition giving out, he retired by the Gauley and Kanawha Rivers, which left the route of the Shenandoah open to Early to march on Washington, as it was impossible for Hunter to gain the Ohio River and transport his army there in time to intercept him. Early had ample time. Grant was fully aware of Early's movements, and directed Ricketts to be sent to the aid of Lew Wallace, to assist in impeding Early's advance on Washington.

When Early crossed the Potomac Lew Wallace left Baltimore to meet him. When Ricketts arrived and found Gen. Lew Wallace gone, he at once followed and overtook him on the left bank of the Monocacy. There a stubborn battle was fought, in which Wallace and Ricketts displayed great generalship; and, although overpowered, yet they delayed Early long enough for Wright to get to Washington with Russell's and Getty's divisions, which advanced out beyond Brightwood, and formed line of battle in time to confront Early there. Wright was reënforced by General Emory with the Nineteenth Corps. With these two corps an extended line of battle was formed in a semicircle around the city; and the clerks and employées from the different departments were formed into battalions. Early, seeing that the city was guarded by a heavy force, did not press his suit, but retreated in the direction from which he had come.

It is alleged on apparently good authority—although stoutly denied by General Early—that his delay was partly caused by some of his officers getting into the wine cellar at the country residence of Montgomery Blair, and getting so "funny" that they put on the dresses left there by the ladies of the Blair family, and had a dance in the door-yard.



GEN. H. G. WRIGHT.

While the Union army lay in front of Petersburg, stretched from the Jerusalem plank road to the James River, many plans to break through the enemy's works were suggested, for it was known that Lee could be easily routed if only a breach in his fortifications could be made. Gen. (then Maj.) Hollon Richardson, of the Iron Brigade, went to Warren and offered to carry a point in Lee's line if he (Warren) would give him 1000 tried men.

Warren agreed to it, and the men were selected, but the assault was never made by Richardson. In the mean time, Colonel Pleasants induced Burnside to mine up to the enemy's works and blow up one of their forts. About the 25th of July the different approaches, or mines, were under way. It was a most ingenious scheme on a gigantic scale, well planned and admirably executed.

The only failure consisted in our forces not advancing when the mine was blown up on the morning of the 30th of July, for Lee had weakened his line by sending Wilcox, Kershaw, and Heth to checkmate Hancock's movement on Richmond, for, on the 26th, four days before the mine was to be exploded, Grant had sent Hancock and Sheridan across the James to draw as much of Lee's force away as possible, as in case he did not do that, Richmond was at their mercy. But Lee was too wily to permit Richmond to be taken; so he reduced his forces in front of Petersburg so much that when the mine was exploded, just at dawn on the morning of the 30th, his troops would have been unable to hold their fortifications if Hollon Richardson had been permitted to lead his proposed charge with his picked and drilled men. Some picked officer, like Sheridan, should have led that charge. I have carefully examined the lines and the Crater, in company with General Mahone, and I so fully believe that he clearly and correctly states the situation that I invited him to write the history of that action. The following is his statement of the work there that day :

THE CRATER, PETERSBURG, VA., JULY 30, 1864.

After the first battle of Manassas the Confederates and much of their press ridiculed the Federal army for "shooting too high," till that army learned to shoot to kill. So, likewise, they laughed at the plans of the Federal generals for the capture of the Confederate capital, insisting that the consummation of that object could only be accomplished by an approach from the south. So, after all the terrific efforts which had been made from the North and General McClellan's inglorious failure on the Peninsula, General Grant, by the sliding yet costly process from the Wilderness, landed, as the last resort, on the south bank of the James and marched upon Petersburg—the back door to the Confederate capital—making City Point on the James, only nine miles away, the base of his operations.

Petersburg, twenty-two miles south of Richmond, had been encircled with a cordon of forts and connecting curtains far too elaborate and extensive for occupation by an army of the proportions to which General Lee's had never really reached, when it had also to cover Richmond and the intervening space between the two rivers—the James and Appomattox. At Petersburg General Beauregard was in command. When General Burnside's corps advanced upon the works of the city, General Lee had not yet crossed the James. General Beauregard's force at this moment consisted of General Hooke's division and General Wise's brigade, with the usual complement of artillery.

This force, wholly inadequate to the efficient occupancy even of that very limited portion of the line of works established for the defense of the city, against which the Federals advanced, was quickly overrun and compelled to retire nearer the city; just where they halted and refaced the enemy, now nigh. The future line of defense was now taken up haphazard, and extended to a junction with the permanent line of fortifications, at a point commonly called on the Confederate side, the "Rives Salient," about three miles from and south of the Appomattox River. The Federals now occupied that portion of the permanent works which had been established for the defense of Petersburg, opposite this haphazard new line of the Confederates. Thus General Lee found the situation when he reached Petersburg on the 18th.

Presuming, as he always did, that I knew the country around Petersburg, and restive under the idea of being pent up, he came upon the field near the Rives Salient, and, after having taken in the situation, the Federal army now rapidly occupying our line, asked me what had best be done. My division was not then in line, nor was any part of Hill's corps.

My advice was that he abandon the line of permanent works and

extend the newly adopted line from the Rives Salient along the Jerusalem plank road to Second Swamp—some three miles away—using that barrier for protection to his right flank, thus reducing, immensely, the length of the line he would have to cover, and leaving him in better shape for meeting any attempt to turn his right, or for repelling a direct attack. But he said, "No, we cannot afford to sit down and become invested." He was always for battle.

General Lee subsequently asked me to examine the line carefully between the Rives Salient and the river—the haphazard portion of the line. I did, and reported it—the haphazard line—as untenable, and could be taken at almost any point whenever a vigorous assault should be made. The weaker points, after the battle of the Crater, were reinforced by supplemental works. For some time it was known in all the army—certainly that around Petersburg—that the enemy were mining, and if not at other points, certainly at the defenseless salient known as the Elliott Salient, or Pegram's battery. General Beauregard's command was known to cover this part of the line, and his reputation as an engineer officer went largely to compose the fears of all, when it was understood that under his direction a "countermine" was under way. Unfortunately the countermine was not a success. It was made above the enemy's mine. On the night of the 29th of July General Lee had reason to anticipate that the enemy designed *somewhere* an assault the next morning, and so sent around an order that all should be under arms at daylight on the morning of the 30th of July. No such order was issued to hold myself in readiness to move at a moment's notice, in such emergency; and this is verified by Colonels Taylor and Venable, of General Lee's staff. Field's division and Gen. Bushrod Johnson's, embracing the Elliott Salient (shortly to become the Crater), were in the trenches between my division and it. The left of my division rested at the terrible Rives Salient, and thence for about one mile toward the Weldon Railroad; and along this portion of my front the enemy's line, only here and there observable, was quite half a mile away.

An inspection of the map, which gives the position of the two armies at this time, leaves the imagination no play as to the peril to which General Lee's army was exposed. If the mine—itself a success, making an immense breach in General Lee's works, unsupported by any reserve force, and consternation all around the breach rampant—had been followed up by a vigorous attacking column, and the force was there, it may not be too much to say that the retreat to which he was compelled nine months later, would then have been unavoidable and most likely in the order of the d—I take the hindmost. After the explosion there was nothing on the Confederate side to prevent the orderly projection of any column through the

breach which had been effected, cutting the Confederate army in twain, rendering the rescue of the larger portion of its artillery quite impossible, the retirement of its infantry, now in the trenches, to chance, and opening wide the gates to the rear of the Confederate capital.

On the Federal side the troops for a column of 45,000 muskets, according to accounts, was there—right at the spot. The corps of Burnside, Ord and Warren were at hand, but the directing general was too far away, and the attacking corps seemed to have been lacking the requisite presence and direction of integral commanders who knew the plan and the thing to do.

I was near the middle of my division and quickly realized that elsewhere than my front the fight was to be, and the first I knew of the Crater, beyond the tremendous report of the explosion, came from a soldier, who, from thereabouts, hatless and shoeless, passed me, still going, and only time to say, "H—l has busted." About this time, Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, rode up and said: "General Lee requests that you send two of the brigades of your division to the support of Gen. Bushrod Johnson." Subsequently, and while on the way, I said to Colonel Venable: "I can't send my brigades to General Johnson. I will go with them myself." The Virginia and Georgia Brigades were on the right and were ordered to drop back in such order to the ravine in the rear as to avoid possible disclosure of this denuding of my front. They were so conducted by ravines in the general direction of the Crater as to conceal the march of the limited column from the enemy. The morning was warm and sultry. Before reaching the covered way which led up to the rear of General Johnson's line covering the Crater the brigades were halted and ordered to *strip*.

Reaching the entrance of the covered way, the head of the column was turned into it, and I rode over to General Johnson's headquarters, which were on the *lee* or north side of Blandford Heights, intervening his headquarters and the scene of the disaster which had occurred on his front, full one mile away. The primary object of my visit to General Johnson's headquarters was to see General Hill, my corps commander, whom I had been informed was there. I, of course, did not expect to find General Johnson anywhere else than on the ground where his front had been pierced. General Hill was not at General Johnson's headquarters, but General Beauregard was. Saluting him, I said: "General, I have, by direction of General Lee, two brigades of my division on the way, near at hand, for the reinforcement of General Johnson." General Beauregard, calling up General Johnson, whom I did not personally know, and who appeared to be about ready to take his breakfast, said: "General, you

had better turn over any outlying troops you may have to General Mahone, and let him make the attack," to which General Johnson cheerfully replied in the affirmative.

Then I asked General Johnson what frontage on his line the enemy occupied. "The retrenched cavalier," he answered, and I rejoined: "In feet I want to know. General Johnson, that, as you may imagine, I may determine the face of my attacking force," and then he said about one hundred yards. I then asked General Johnson to show me the way to the Crater. Whereupon, calling to some lieutenant of his staff, he said to him: "Show General Mahone the way to the Elliott Salient, or Pegram's battery."

Leaving General Johnson and his headquarters and with the lieutenant I proceeded hurriedly along the Jerusalem plank road till I reached the point at which it crossed the covered way up which my two brigades were moving, the head of the leading or Virginia brigade having just reached that point. I dismounted, entered the covered way with the lieutenant and hurried on in the direction of the disaster.

The covered way debouched into a ravine or gulch from which there made up a depression to the right quite parallel to that portion of General Johnson's line, where the blow-up had taken place, and about two hundred yards away. At this point where the covered way debouched the lieutenant said to me: "If you will go up that slope there you can see the Yankees." Moving quickly to the high ground next to the Crater I found myself suddenly in full view of General Johnson's "retrenched cavalier," now crammed with Federal soldiers and thickly studded with Federal flags. For the moment I could scarcely take in the reality, and the very danger to which I was for the moment exposed came to my relief and bade me stand still as the surest course for personal safety, and so I stood where I could keep one eye on the adversary while I directed my own command, every moment in fearful peril if the enemy should advance while my two brigades were yet in the covered way so deep and narrow as to render defense ineffectual.

A moment's survey of the situation impressed me with the belief, so crowded were the enemy and his flags—eleven flags in less than one hundred yards—that he was greatly disordered, but there in large force.

At once and the first thing I did was to send back to my line in the trenches—full two miles away—for the Alabama Brigade to be brought me quickly by the route the two brigades had come, then indicating to Captain Girardy, a volunteer staff officer, the ground on which I desired the Virginia Brigade formed—facing General Johnson's "retrenched cavalier." That brigade, under Girardy's imme-

diate superintendence had but shortly come to an order, bayonets fixed—the Georgia Brigade now debouching from the covered way, when he sang out to me “General, they are coming.” The left of the Virginia Brigade was not more than eighty feet from my position, and Girardy about midway. Turning my head to the left—for at that moment I was instructing the Georgia Brigade as it was filing up the depression—I saw the Federals jumping out of General Johnson’s “retrenched cavalier,” and coming on desultory line, as if to charge us. In a tone of voice, so raised that the whole of the Virginia Brigade might hear, I said to Girardy: “Tell Weisiger to forward.” Captain Girardy, like the brilliant officer he was, never failing to do precisely the right thing at the right time, rushed with uplifted sword to the front of the brigade himself, repeated the command “forward,” and led the brigade, which, as if on dress parade, and with the steadiness and resolution of regulars, and regulars they were in that every sense which makes the soldier effective, moved forward to meet the desultory advance of the Federal host. Reserving their fire they pushed on, when the enemy turning, the Virginia Brigade, with a plunging fire, went into the works pell-mell with them. Here and now the fight was hand to hand, and the work of death by the bayonet and the butt of the musket went on till all of General Johnson’s line was retaken, to the left of the traverse which flanked his “retrenched cavalier” on the south and to the right of which the enemy occupied some fifty feet of his line, leaving it and the pit yet occupied by him.

This heroic charge of the Virginia Brigade, which the enemy had precipitated was made about 9:15 a. m.

First getting the Georgia Brigade in position to meet any possible reverse to which the Virginia Brigade might be subjected, I hurried up to the works which the Virginia Brigade had retaken, and after making a thorough examination of the situation so disposed the same as to increase the ability of the brigade to hold the works retaken, at the same time causing sharpshooters to be so posted as to make death the penalty to those of the enemy who were attempting to escape and get back to their lines. At 9:15 a. m., General Warren, who, with his corps, besides General Ords, had been placed in position to support or follow up the success of the mine adventure, telegraphed General Meade (perhaps too far away for one directing the operations of such a scheme): “Just before receiving your dispatch to assault the battery on the left (south) of the Crater, occupied by General Burnside, the enemy drove his troops out of the place and I think now hold it.” And again at 9:45 a. m., General Warren telegraphed General Meade: “I find that the flag I saw was the enemy’s and that they have reoccupied all the line we drove

them from, except a little around the Crater, which a small force of ours still hold." The small force here referred to was that occupying still some fifty feet of our main line to the south of the traverse, butting up against it at the junction of the main line and the Crater, for the Crater was yet cram full of the enemy and from which there was subsequently taken eleven hundred and one prisoners.

It was now to clear up the job and to restore the full integrity of our line and to remove absolutely the peril to which General Lee's army had been fearfully exposed by the success of the mine, (for as General Warren says in his dispatch to General Meade, at 6 a. m., "the enemy has been running from his first line in front of General Burnside's right for some minutes," and at the same time General Meade notified General Burnside "that prisoners taken say that there is no line in their rear and that their men are falling back when ours advanced") that the Georgia Brigade, after having explained to it thoroughly the duties before it was ordered to charge and retake that small part of our main line still occupied by the enemy to the left of the traverse.

The terrific fire of the enemy to which this brigade was subjected while passing over the intervening open ground caused it to slide to the north and fail of the object the charge was designed to accomplish.

A general of the Federal artillery (C. W. S.) overlooking the scene at this moment says: "The canister, pieces of shell and other missiles striking the slope (over which this charge was made) produced an effect upon it similar to the heavy drops of rain in a thunder shower falling upon a placid sheet of water."

Still I realized that we were masters of the situation, while eager to remove any lingering danger to it, which might come from a reinforced effort by the enemy to regain the breach in our lines, which he had so successfully effected.

At this juncture Gen. Bushrod Johnson came upon the ground in the *depression* on which my brigades had formed for the charge, and agreed that he would have his men in the main line to the south of the traverse to push down upon the enemy occupying the fifty feet, between them and the traverse when I should renew the assault upon it by the Alabama Brigade, now arriving, and fixed one o'clock as the hour when he would be ready so to cooperate. Meanwhile Colonel Haskill, a brilliant officer of our artillery, always hunting the place where he could strike a blow at our adversary, presented himself for any service I could advise. There were two Cohorn mortars which had been located in the bottom on which my brigades formed for the charge, and I suggested that if he could serve them I would have them taken up to the outside of the Crater,

where he could amuse himself till one o'clock; and perhaps no such opportunity had ever occurred or would likely occur for the effective employment of these juvenile implements of death.

Quickly Colonel Haskill was emptying the contents of the two Cohorns upon the crowded mass which had been left in and confined to the horrible pit, which I estimated was, at this time, in the shape of a goose egg, cut half in two—120 feet long, 80 feet wide and 60 feet deep. While this deadly work of the Cohorns was going on, sharpshooters sent back to the pit, dead or wounded, every man who attempted to scale its sides and get away, and bayoneted muskets of the dead, were, like javelins, hurled into the pit by those who could do nothing more to hasten the completion of the work all were anxious to close out.

Meanwhile, the Alabama^a Brigade having been formed on the line from which the Georgia Brigade had proceeded to retake that portion of our main line south of the traverse, yet occupied by the enemy, and the hour of one having come, that brigade, commanded by Colonel Saunders, imitating the steady and resolute step of the Virginia Brigade, and its magnificent alignment all the way, completed the restoration of General Johnson's line to the control of General Lee's army, leaving the enemy now occupying only the Crater, or pit, and because he could not safely retreat.

At this moment I called for one hundred volunteers to go into the pit, not content that any of the enemy should remain so near, subordinated though I felt he was to our control, when a white flag or handkerchief was raised in the pit, and upon the response to come in, eleven hundred and one, like swallows out of a chimney, came pouring over the crest, and in passing to our rear, over the dreadful slope, were hurried on—many to the grave—by the mistaken fire from the guns of the Federal batteries that had previously so fearfully blistered all the ground in our rear.

The Federal loss in this well-conceived undertaking to cut in twain General Lee's army may be fairly stated at not less than 5,640 in killed, wounded and missing, with many flags, and the loss in my brigade was 250, and the larger share of the loss fell to the lot of the Georgia Brigade. Among the large number of officers that came out of the Crater was General Bartlett, of Massachusetts, who, while in the dreadful pit had his wooden leg exploded by a bomb from the Cohorns, and his perilous trip to the rear was made by the support of one of his comrades on either side. I gave him my horse to ride out and away from the field, which I left later in the day and only after I had seen that every proper disposition of my two brigades had been made and to make certain their ability to hold against any force, that portion of General Johnson's line which they had

gallantly reclaimed. During the night my ambulance corps, with a detail of the prisoners taken, was employed in removing the wounded and in burying the dead of their respective sides—all that were within reach. Although General Lee had directed that my brigades should be relieved that night, they were not till the second night thereafter.

Taking the average estimate given by several authorities on the Federal side, the troops congregated for this assault upon General Lee's lines may be safely stated at not less than 45,000, while that of my brigades did not exceed 1,800.

It was fortunate for General Lee's army that the Federal assault, after the mine had proved a signal success, did not receive that polarity and energy of action to which immediate presence and supreme direction are essential, for through the ample breach, which had been so suddenly made in his main line and the consternation which for the moment followed, there was nothing to arrest the steady projection of the Federal column fully and destructively into his rear, exposing to capture fairly that of his army from the breach to the Appomattox on the one side, and on the other to capture and rout that part of his army from it to his right flank, and by the capture of Petersburg compel the hasty withdrawal of his forces more directly covering the Confederate Capital.

MAHONE.

CHAPTER XXII.

WILSON'S RAID ON THE SOUTH SIDE AND WELDON RAILROADS AND BATTLE AT REAM'S STATION.

WHILE Hampton and Fitz Lee were fighting Sheridan, it was thought desirable that a raid be made by Wilson and Kautz to cut the Weldon and South Side Railroads.

Mahone was the president of the railroad, and he had directed his superintendent to run some cars loaded with cotton to a station on the South Side Road, about midway between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as he heard of the raid he directed the cars to be returned to Petersburg, which was barely done in time to escape capture; in fact, the car with Mahone's personal effects was captured. Being deeply interested in the movements of our cavalry, he at once began planning to intercept their return, while Gen. W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry was directed in pursuit. Wilson going to Ream's Station, on the Weldon Railroad, destroyed it; thence to a point on the South Side Road about fourteen miles from Petersburg. Kautz's division reached Ford's Station about four p. m. and at once began burning the depot buildings, water tanks, ties, wood, and other property. The advance was so sudden that two locomotives and sixteen cars were still at the station. Wilson's division moved more slowly to complete its work. Coming to a large sawmill used by the road to prepare ties it was burned.

It was near midnight when Wilson's division completed its work at that point. Chapman's brigade, constituting the rear guard, was attacked by Lee, but repulsed him. At two

a. m. on the 23d Kautz proceeded to Burkesville Junction, where he arrived that afternoon, and at once proceeded to destroy the depots, water tanks, and other property. It seems that Kautz was misled in approaching this place, which caused Wilson's division to leave the direct road and cross the Nottaway River. This gave Lee a chance to interpose between Kautz and Wilson, when a most stubborn battle began. Chapman's brigade was at once deployed and ordered to attack the enemy.

With his usual gallantry he forced Lee back and got possession of a battery, but was compelled to retire and leave it. Wilson, in his report, says the conflict lasted "from one p. m. until nearly nine p. m." Chapman stood the brunt of it. He was an able and courageous officer, possessed of a natural genius for that arm of the service, and he divided the laurels with officers of a higher rank as a cavalry leader. Wilson directed Captain Whitaker to take a squadron and find Kautz so the two divisions could unite. Finding that Kautz had already destroyed Burkesville Junction and was ready to move on the Danville road, he was directed to wait until the two divisions could be united, as Lee might interpose between them again and perhaps fall on Kautz, who had a weak division of two small brigades, which would seriously cripple the command and destroy its further progress.

When Wilson's division came up, the march on the Danville line was resumed on the 25th, destroying the road and burning the sawmills along its line, to prevent new ties being sawed by which to rebuild the track. The iron was heated by rail fires, then bent so it could not be used again. At six o'clock in the evening of the 25th the advance of Kautz's division arrived at Roanoke Station, and attempted to reach the north end of the bridge across Staunton River so as to fire it, but the enemy had a battery of six guns posted in fortifications on the south side, supported by militia from eight counties, with a small force from Danville. Kautz continued his attack on the bridge

with great spirit until after dark. While the Union forces were assaulting the bridge, W. H. F. Lee came up and attacked Wilson's rear under Chapman, who faced his brigade to the rear and met the enemy with such boldness that the Confederate cavalry retired. It was then determined to get to the bridge under cover of the darkness, and a company of the 1st Connecticut Cavalry under command of Captain Morehouse was ordered to fire it, and had nearly reached it when the burning of buildings at the station revealed the movement to the enemy intrenched on the southern side of the river, when a heavy fire was at once opened upon Captain Morehouse's company by the artillery and infantry, which compelled him to retreat. General Wilson, in his report, says :

Finding that the bridge could not be carried without severe loss, if at all, the enemy being again upon our rear, the Staunton too deep for fording, and unprovided with bridges or steam ferries, I determined to push no farther south, but endeavor to reach the army by retreating toward Petersburg.

So at midnight the line of march was taken up, with McIntosh's brigade in the advance, followed by the train, while Kautz's division and Chapman's brigade moved in the rear, ready to repel an attack from Lee's cavalry. Arriving at Wyliesburg by daylight the next morning, the command was halted two hours to rest the horses and allow the men to make coffee. Then the march was resumed through Christiansburg and Greensboro, to Buckhorn Creek, in Mecklenburg County, where Wilson halted for the night. In the forenoon of the 27th the Meherrin was crossed at Safford Bridge, thence east to Great Creek, on the Boydtown plank road, from there through Greenville County to the Nottaway, striking it at the Double Bridges about noon on the 28th. At the same time Wilson arrived at the Nottaway, Hampton reached Stony Creek Depot on the Weldon Railroad, which placed him between Wilson and the left of the Army of the Potomac.

Fitz Lee, with his division, had halted at Ream's Station,



GEN. GEORGE H. CHAPMAN.

which is about ten miles north of Stony Creek Depot, and about midway between Petersburg and that station. When this expedition was being organized and studied with reference to all the contingencies that might arise to embarrass it, Meade said to Captain Whitaker, of Wilson's staff, "Tell the general that the left of the Army of the Potomac will, on his return, be occupying the Weldon Railroad at Ream's Station."

When Wilson reached the Nottaway and crossed it, he considered himself back safe from one of the most successful raids that had been made by the cavalry of either army. He little dreamed of the maelstrom he was just entering. Wilson had learned that there was a Confederate force at Stony Creek Depot, but was led to believe that it was a small part of W. H. F. Lee's command that could not or did not follow Wilson.

The road Wilson was on passed two miles to the westward of Stony Creek Depot. He knew that the force posted there would attempt to impede his advance at the crossing of the road from Double Bridges to Prince George Court House and the one from Stony Creek Depot to Dinwiddie Court House. As the advance neared the crossroads he directed Captain Whitaker to move forward and clear the way for the main column. That order Wilson says, "was handsomely executed." But soon the advance was attacked by a strong force of dismounted cavalry, when McIntosh's brigade was deployed and forced the enemy back to Sappony Church. From the prisoners taken Wilson learned that it was Hampton in his front. The stubborn fight made by Hampton made it evident that he intended to prevent Wilson's advance at all hazards, for the fight had lasted into the night until ten-o'clock, and Wilson then decided to make a detour to the west around Hampton, and accordingly ordered Kautz at once "to take a road to the westward leading to the old stage road to Petersburg." That road intersected the stage road to Petersburg at Ream's Station. At the latter place, as I have stated,

Fitz Lee was posted, also the infantry division of Mahone. Wilson thought from the understanding when he set out on his raid, that Ream's Station would be held by Wright on his return, and if he reached there in safety his men and horses would get a much needed rest. He knew that his position at Sappony Church was a perilous one, for all the cavalry of the Confederate army was in that vicinity, which was too heavy a body for him to withstand, especially after a raid of ten days, when his men had scarcely been out of the saddle.

Wilson had a long train to protect, which moved in Kautz's rear while Wilson's division still faced Hampton. It was not until daylight that the road was clear in Wilson's front for him to begin to withdraw McIntosh and Chapman. Hampton, knowing that Wilson was in a snare, had been strengthening his line all night to do well his part of the work. Wilson withdrew his first line without serious opposition, but by the time the second commenced a retrograde movement a heavy attack was made from front and flank. The latter movement crowded Chapman back on the road to Double Bridges, and he was unable to join the main command until later in the day. About eight o'clock Kautz's advance came in sight of Ream's Station, which was heavily guarded with Fitz Lee's division of cavalry and Mahone's division of infantry. Mahone, who was in command there, had ordered a section of artillery to be concealed near the station, which was not to be fired until Kautz came near enough to give also the infantry which had been posted on either side of the road, a chance to get a concentrating fire on the Union cavalry. Mahone had placed a brigade on each side of the road, somewhat in the shape of a V with the apex just in the rear of the artillery, then each brigade was stretched along and close enough to get a deadly fire on our cavalry as it advanced. The artillery was prematurely fired, which warned Kautz of the impending danger, when he at once prepared for action.

Seeing that Kautz had given back, Mahone took his Third Brigade and made a detour through the woods to the right, and gave orders that when he had had sufficient time to get on Kautz's flank his other two brigades and the section of artillery were to advance. Wilson coming up, was not long in taking in the situation, and knowing his perilous position, directed Captain Whitaker of his staff to take 40 men, charge through the Confederate lines, and carry the news to Grant or Meade. Whitaker was successful in getting through, but he lost 23 men. Taking the highest rate of speed he could, he reached Meade's headquarters twenty minutes after ten o'clock. Whitaker was unable to make Meade realize the great peril Wilson was in, so no attempt was made to immediately move a heavy body to his relief, and Wilson was compelled to fight it out "on that line" without help, although he had been promised aid at Ream's Station on his return.

Mahone told me when we went over the field recently, that Wright was not over three miles distant, and had he moved at once could have crushed him between his (Wright's) forces and Wilson's cavalry, so he attacked Kautz without delay. Moving in the woods, he was entirely concealed from view; and bringing the Third Brigade into line, he began the attack in front and flank. Wilson could not retire on the road, for Hampton was close in his rear. His only way to save his command was to leave the road in the woods, which compelled him to abandon his artillery and train, and that had to be done without hesitation or he could not have saved his troopers, who were so worn out that they fell asleep in their saddles.

Some 16 pieces of artillery and an immense train fell into Mahone's hands, but Wilson brought his command off, and taking a circuitous route gained the Union lines in safety. It was one of the most brilliant cavalry expeditions which had been conducted by either army, and but for the unfortunate disaster which closed it, the Capital of the Confederacy would have quaked with fear. Captain

Whitaker, who had so faithfully executed Wilson's orders, and had cut his way through the enemy's lines at Ream's Station to inform Meade of Wilson's peril, was promoted to major for gallantry. Wilson highly praises him for his services during all the expedition, and Whitaker seems to have been the staff officer he constantly relied on. His charge through the enemy's lines near Ream's Station and taking the news to Meade was one of the most brilliant and successful acts that a cavalry officer ever did in the war with a small command.

It seems to me when Wilson was fighting so desperately near Ream's Station, the sound of battle could have been distinctly heard by Meade, and should have induced an immediate attempt for his relief. The cavalry had by that time raised the standard of valor to such a height that the other two arms of the service, artillery and infantry looked on with admiration, and welcomed Wilson back with joy.

Grant said of that expedition that though the losses were heavy it was fully compensated for by the destruction of the enemy's communications and demoralization.

CHAPTER XXIII.

DEEP BOTTOM AND WELDON RAILROAD.

ON the 13th of August Hancock was directed to take the Second and Tenth Corps, the latter under D. B. Birney, with Gregg's cavalry division, and proceed to the north bank of the James River and then move in the direction of Richmond. Grant wanted to make that movement for three purposes: to prevent Lee from reënföring Early in the Shenandoah Valley; to give Warren a chance to seize and tear up the Weldon Railroad; and thirdly, if Hancock could take them unawares, he might capture Richmond, or if found too weak, to oppose him.

Lee felt himself so well intrenched around Petersburg that he could spare a part of his forces to reënförce other armies, and as Early was most convenient, and could with a large army threaten Washington and Baltimore, Kershaw had been sent to him. Parties had informed Grant that three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry had been sent to Early; if such were the case Hancock with two corps could have captured Richmond and produced consternation in all the Southern armies.

Hancock advanced, with Birney on the left, close to the James, Mott was on his right; then Barlow, in command of two divisions of Hancock's corps. Barlow's right was to be protected and assisted by Gregg's cavalry division. Barlow was to bring on the engagement, and if successful was to move to the left and assist Mott, while Gregg was to watch his opportunity and, if he could, make a dash on Richmond. When Barlow moved forward he found Fields'

division at Deep Bottom, which was soon reenforced by Wilcox from Chapin's Bluff, while Mahone had been ordered from Petersburg with W. H. F. Lee's and Hampton's divisions of cavalry. As a result, the enemy was found too strongly posted to be forced out of his works; but the information thus obtained was that Early had not been heavily reenforced. Birney alone had been able to make any progress, for when Wilcox weakened his lines to assist Fields, Birney took four of his guns, though unable to carry his works. During the night Birney was directed to move in the rear of Mott and Barlow and endeavor to turn the enemy's left, but he took such a wide circuit that he did not reach the enemy's front until late the next afternoon.

The next morning, the 16th, he was directed to attack, while Miles was to move up the Charles City road to make a diversion in his favor. Terry and William Birney, the latter commanding colored troops, advanced against the enemy's works above Fassett's Mill and carried them, but was unable to hold them, only retaining possession of the advanced line of rifle-pits. Hancock remained on the north side of the James until dark of the 20th, when he recrossed and took his old position in front of Petersburg. In the mean time, Warren, on the 18th, had been directed to move to the left and take possession of the Weldon Railroad. He was to move at four o'clock in the morning and strike the railroad near the Gurley House, which was not over two miles from the enemy's lines. Griffin struck the railroad at the Globe Tavern and began tearing it up. Ayres' division moved up the railroad a mile or more from Griffin in the direction of Petersburg, with Dushane's Maryland Brigade on the left and Hays on the right. Crawford came up on the right of Ayres, with his right resting in dense pine woods, while in front of his left and Ayres' right a field of corn shut out only a short view; thus Warren's position was very precarious. I have recently visited the field in company with General Mahone, who followed this track when he crept up on Bragg the second day. But to

go on with the narrative. Cutler's division was held as a support on the 18th, when Warren moved out. In the mean time, Deering, in command of a brigade of cavalry, was holding the railroad when Warren approached. Retiring in the direction of Petersburg, he notified Beauregard, who directed Heth, with the brigades of Walker and Davis, to go to Deering's assistance. Heth struck the Maryland Brigade with such force that it was compelled to yield ground. Ayres drew back his line of battle some distance, then he attacked Heth and drove him from the field. Only Lyle's brigade, on Crawford's left, assisted Ayres. Warren's move in capturing the Weldon Railroad greatly discomfited the Confederates, and that night arrangements were made to dislodge him on the following day. In order to protect Crawford's right, for Warren was some distance from the left of the Ninth Corps, Bragg's brigade, of Cutler's division, was ordered to form a skirmish line to connect with the Ninth Corps, but it seems the connection was not well made, for Mahone, who had been returned to Petersburg, marched up a ravine until he reached a dense growth of young pine, thence south until he pierced Bragg's right, then faced west, rushed on the gritty little Badger, and knocked him from the field, struck Crawford's right, rolled it up on its left, and captured some 1,600 prisoners.

When Mahone went over this field he pointed out to me where he marched to strike Bragg. You cannot see one hundred feet in the thick pine undergrowth. This was in Mahone's favor, for he knew well the ground.

Our lines were rectified and prepared to meet him, so he knew he could not surprise us again at that point. That closed the battle for the second day. Mahone then suggested to Lee that he could withdraw his division, pass near enough to Petersburg to be unobserved by the Union forces, from there march west until after he had passed Warren's left, then turning south could reach a point where by facing east he could fall on Warren's left, surprise it, and roll it up as he had the right two days before. While doing

that Heth was to attack in front, while W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division was to take a road running east, advance on it until he arrived in Warren's rear, then he was to charge him from that direction, making an attack from front, left flank, and rear all at the same time. It was Mahone's idea that Warren could thus be driven from the Weldon Railroad. Whether to conceal the movements of Mahone or not, A. P. Hill, with his own corps, part of Hoke's division, and five batteries had attacked Warren in the forenoon, but was repulsed. When Mahone advanced later in the day, our artillery opened such a deadly fire on his infantry that the charge was broken so near our works that the Confederate troops were greatly confused, and Hagood's South Carolina Brigade was in the act of surrendering to Col. D. B. Dailey, when Hagood rushed up to Dailey, who sat on his horse, and demanded that he (Dailey) should give up the Confederate colors and return to his own lines.

But a moment more and Hagood's whole brigade would have surrendered. Dailey told Hagood it was no use to hold out as the brigade was nearly surrounded. As Dailey declined to give him a positive answer, Hagood shot him through the body. Dailey falling from his horse on one side, Hagood vaulted into the saddle from the other, and by that daring act saved a part of his brigade. Since the war these two officers have been devoted friends; Dailey urged me to have Hagood's portrait in my work. I forwarded his letter to General Hagood, and would have complied with it cheerfully had Hagood responded.

It was a hard fought battle, and skillfully managed on both sides; but Warren "held the fort." There were many gallant acts performed which I would be glad to mention, but I must content myself by noticing an aid on Bragg's staff, who did faithful work there when Mahone was driving back our people, J. Newport Potts; he had served on Wadsworth's and Warren's staffs, and later on for a brief period on Grant's.



COL. D. B. DAILEY.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CAVALRY OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

FROM THE CROSSING OF THE JAMES RIVER, JUNE 25-27, 1864, TO
HATCHER'S RUN, FEBRUARY, 1865.

ON the night of the 24th and morning of the 25th, the trains were moved back through Charles City Court House to Douthat's Landing, and ferried across the James, followed by the cavalry on the 26th and 27th.

Before this crossing was completed, General Sheridan received orders from General Meade to hasten to the support of General Wilson, who, during the absence of the First and Second Divisions, had, with Kautz' small cavalry brigade, been sent on an expedition to destroy the South Side and Richmond and Danville Railroads, in which he was successful, having done great damage to those thoroughfares over which the supplies for General Lee's army in and around Petersburg had to be transported.

Having reached, however, the left of our army, near Ream's Station, his march was intercepted by a large infantry force moving down the Weldon Railroad from Petersburg, and, at the same time was attacked on his flank by their cavalry. His command was defeated and forced south across the Nottoway River, in the vicinity of Poplar Hill; here he was comparatively safe, but obliged to march by a roundabout way to reach the army.

Sheridan, immediately on receipt of the order, moved rapidly, with Torbert's and Gregg's divisions, by way of Prince George Court House and Lee's Mills to Ream's Station, where he found the Sixth Corps; but both forces

were too late to render Wilson any assistance. Wilson's failure to return in triumph to the army was probably due to General Meade's inability to carry out his plans in reference to the occupation of the Weldon and South Side Railroad. After this move the cavalry returned to the vicinity of Light-House Point to rest and refit, after marching and fighting for fifty-six consecutive days; here it remained comparatively at rest, except the picket duty required of it, until the 26th of July.

On the afternoon of that day, Sheridan, with Torbert's and Gregg's divisions, crossed the Appomattox, and, marching all night, crossed the James River at Deep Bottom, in rear of the Second Corps; here, Kautz' cavalry division, of the Army of the James, joined us, and thus reinforced, Sheridan proceeded to the right of the Second Corps, where he found the enemy strongly intrenched across the New Market and Central roads leading to Richmond.

Torbert's division was immediately deployed on the high ground in front of Ruffin's house, whilst Gregg continued the line to the right across the road leading from Malvern Hill to Richmond. The enemy advanced across the open fields in magnificent line of battle, on a front of two divisions; but was unable to dislodge the First Division and Davies' brigade of the Second. The ground in front of the Second Brigade being open, and favorable to a mounted charge, its commander was directed to make it.

The pioneers advanced and leveled the fences; the brigade formed in three lines, on a front of two regiments, and were in the act of moving to the charge, when, for some reason, the order was countermanded, and the division moved off in the direction of Malvern Hill.

During the 28th and 29th, the cavalry remained in position on the right of the Second Corps, their line extending across Strawberry Plain to Malvern Hill, Kautz skirmishing lightly on the extreme right. On the night of the 29th, as soon as it was dark, the Second Corps recrossed

the river, and was followed by the cavalry ; moving continuously during the night, the entire command was across the river early on the morning of the 30th.

The object of this movement was to induce General Lee to detach largely from his force around Petersburg, so that they might be out of the way when the mine in front of the Ninth Corps was sprung, from which so much was expected, and so little accomplished.

This movement to the north of the James was a success ; but the mine was badly managed, not yielding the result anticipated. As the long line of cavalry moved from the James to the Appomattox a dull, heavy sound reached their ears, and they knew the supreme moment had come. The most intense anxiety filled their minds. Would it be a success, and the rebellion be ended? Or would it be a failure, and long months of campaigning remain? The suspense was not protracted ; it was not long before they realized that it was a failure.

The cavalry passed in rear of the army and proceeded to Lee's Mills, on the Black Water, where, a month before, they had found a beautiful sheet of water. Everything was changed. The water all gone, and in its place a broad expanse of mud, through which flowed a shallow, sluggish stream ; the opposite bank, which was lined with woods, was in possession of the enemy in some force, preventing their access to the water, and they were compelled to dislodge him before their thirsty horses could be watered ; this was speedily accomplished by sending one regiment, mounted, to cross the stream a mile below the mill, dismounting and deploying one regiment as skirmishers, and another to move in column across the breast of the dam.

Here, on the 1st of August, 1864, General Sheridan was relieved from the command of the Cavalry Corps, and ordered to the Valley of the Shenandoah. Torbert's and Wilson's divisions were detached from the Army of the Potomac and directed to join General Sheridan in the valley ; and thus this formidable organization was broken up

for the time. From this time on until the closing campaign began, all of the cavalry operations of the Army of the Potomac were directed by that consummate cavalry soldier, Gen. D. McM. Gregg; how faithfully, conscientiously and skillfully they were performed, history abundantly testifies.

After the assignment of General Sheridan to the command of the Army of the Shenandoah, and the detachment of Torbert's and Wilson's divisions from the Army of the Potomac, its cavalry, consisting of the Second Cavalry Division, was composed as follows:

Brig. Gen. HENRY E. DAVIES, First Brigade.

1st Massachusetts.....	Maj. Lucius M. Sargent.
21st New Jersey.....	Lieut. Col. John W. Kester.
6th Ohio.....	Col. William Stedman.
1st Pennsylvania.....	Col. John P. Taylor.
10th New York.....	Maj. Henry M. Avery.

Colonel J. IRVIN GREGG, Second Brigade.

1st Maine Cavalry.....	Col. Charles H. Smith.
2d Pennsylvania Cavalry.....	Lieut. Col. Joseph P. Brinton.
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry.....	Lieut. Col. George H. Covode.
8th Pennsylvania Cavalry.....	Col. Pennock Huey.
13th Pennsylvania Cavalry.....	Col. Michael Kenion.
16th Pennsylvania Cavalry.....	Lieut. Col. John K. Robinson.

Henceforth, until the closing scene in the tragedy begins, this Second Division of the Cavalry Corps is to be the eyes, ears and fingers of the Army of the Potomac. There are to be no more formidable expeditions around the flank, or in the rear of the enemy, but constant watchfulness, bold tactics and desperate fighting. Always on the alert, marching and fighting by day, picketing by night, it took the hard knocks and wearisome duties with a philosophic composure and a steadfast devotion to duty that entitle its members to rank amongst the best soldiers the world has produced.

From the 1st of August until the 13th, the Second Cavalry Division lay in camp, resting and recuperating

from its severe labors, and getting ready for future service, having a regular cordon of pickets surrounding the army from the Jerusalem plank road to the north of the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad.

On the 13th, it broke up its camp, crossed the Appomattox, and marched to and crossed the James at the pontoon bridge at Curl's Neck, opposite Deep Bottom, during the night of the 13th and 14th. The infantry, which had been conveyed by boat from City Point, had not completed its debarkation when the cavalry and artillery crossed to the north bank.

The cavalry at once took up a position near the junction of the River and Long Bridge roads, to cover the right of the infantry.

On the 15th, reconnoissances were made on various roads, with some skirmishing in the evening. On the night of the 15th the entire division bivouacked near Williams' house, on the Charles City road; early on the morning of the 16th it advanced up the road in the direction of Richmond, in connection with General Miles' brigade of Barlow's division—the cavalry on the road and the infantry moving through the woods on the left. The advance was without opposition until it arrived at Deep Creek, a small but difficult stream, with marshy banks, flowing north into White Oak Creek; the enemy's skirmishers were encountered on the opposite side of this stream; on the north side of the road the country was cleared and open fields extended for a distance of, perhaps, three hundred yards in front and farther to the north; the country to the south of the road was covered with timber.

The advance regiment of the Second Brigade was dismounted and pushed across the creek, deployed and rapidly advanced across the open ground, gaining the woods beyond. Just at this point the timber had been cut off from the south side of the road, and an open field extended in front of the infantry. Beyond this field the enemy were in force, prepared to dispute our advance; but Miles push-

ing forward on the left, and the dismounted cavalry on the right, compelled them to fall back ; at the same time their cavalry appearing in the road, they were charged by the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and General Chambliss was killed. Meantime Col. Irvin Gregg was severely wounded in the right wrist and obliged to leave the field.

The enemy were rapidly driven back until our advance reached White's Tavern ; but the infantry, not being able to hold the enemy's works near Fussel's Mill, from which they had driven them in the morning, they were enabled to turn their forces against Gregg and Miles at the tavern, which they did promptly, and drove them back in some confusion and with considerable loss beyond Deep Creek.

While these operations were going on north of the James, Kautz's cavalry division operated on the left of the army. Hancock and Gregg remained north of the James River during the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th, and during the night of the 20th they withdrew and took up their former position.

General Grant, having determined to break up the Weldon Railroad and render it useless as a means of supply to Lee's army, sent Hancock, with Miles' and Gibbons' divisions of his corps, and Gregg's cavalry division, to Ream's Station, on Warren's left, to complete the destruction of the road as far as Rowanty Creek ; but before this could be accomplished Hill, with a large force, attacked Hancock at the station and forced him to retire ; and Hampton coming on his left, with the rebel yell, threatened to sweep him from the field, when he was checked by the fire from Gregg's dismounted men, holding the return of the works.

General Beaver, commanding one of the brigades of Gibbon's division, who had just rejoined his command, had his leg shot off near the hip and was carried from the field by Chief Bugler Rohme, of the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, just as he was about to fall into the hands of the enemy.

CHAPTER XXV.

FIVE FORKS, APRIL 1, 1865.

ON the morning of April 1 the Confederate lines extended from Appomattox to Hatcher's Run, a distance so great that to cover them they only averaged one man to every five yards of front. Opposed to and facing them was the Union line, formed by the Second, Sixth and Ninth Corps, Army of the Potomac, and the Army of the James under Major General Ord.

To Lee, however, the point of vital importance seemed to be an isolated position about four miles to the west of his main works, at what was known as the "Five Forks," and at this place he had massed all the troops he could spare from his main body, and placed them under the command of Major General Pickett, who here intrenched his infantry east and west of the forks for about a mile in each direction, refusing his line about 100 yards on his left. W. H. F. Lee's cavalry was on his right, then followed in order Corse's, Terry's, Stewart's, Ransom's and Wallace's brigades, with Pegram's battery (three guns on Corse's right and three guns at Five Forks), and McGregor's battery (on the left of the line), while Munford's dismounted cavalry division covered the left, from Wallace's position to Hatcher's Run. Such was the Confederate position when at noon, April 1, Sheridan determined to attack at this point, with the view of isolating Pickett from the main body of Lee's army, and either capture his forces or drive him westward.

At one o'clock p. m. Sheridan ordered Warren to bring up his (Fifth) corps and form line to the right of Devin's

division, about six hundred yards south of the White Oak road, on the Gravelly Run Church road. Crawford's division was in the advance, and took position on the right of this road in such manner that the center of his line would strike the angle of the Confederate line (as was supposed), and be first to encounter their works. Griffin's division took position in the rear of Crawford, while Ayres' division was placed on the left of the road to engage the enemy in their front and prevent reinforcements being sent to the angle, which Warren believed (from the information received from, and the instructions given by Sheridan), that Crawford's center would assail and, with Griffin's assistance, carry, and take advantage of any success they might have.

Mackenzie's cavalry (Twenty-fifth Corps), which had marched from Dinwiddie Court House to get possession of the White Oak road, about three miles distant from Five Forks, having accomplished this object after a sharp skirmish with the enemy, moved to the right of, and formed a junction with the Fifth Corps, and were directed to move and cooperate with them so as to come on the flank and rear of the enemy, and hold the Ford road crossing of Gravelly Run to intercept their retreat in that direction.

About four p. m., the Union line being formed as above described, the order to advance and attack was given. Advancing, and meeting with only a slight resistance from a thin skirmish line in his front on crossing White Oak road, Warren came to the conclusion that the enemy's line of battle was in the edge of a dense wood some three hundred yards north of the road, and so continued his advance in the direction the line had started; but soon after crossing the road, Ayres (who had the smallest and weakest division in the corps) received a heavy musketry and artillery fire on his left, which at once showed that the enemy's intrenchments did not, as had been supposed, extend to anywhere near the Gravelly Run Church road, but were, in fact, about eight hundred yards west of it. Ayres immediately changed front, facing the return, bringing up Winthrop's brigade



GEN. JOHN A. KELLOGG.

(which had been in reserve) double-quick on the left of the new line, and advanced against the return under a heavy fire, his right overlapping it, and finally, after a desperate effort, carried the works—the enemy stubbornly contesting every inch of ground with the energy of men who felt that this was their last hope—this being the key to the position—and capturing many prisoners and battle-flags.

Warren, seeing that Ayres was heavily engaged with the enemy, that his information as to their position was incorrect, and that the heavy fighting would fall on Ayres', instead of on Crawford's center, at once directed Winthrop to form on Ayres' left and fill the gap between him and Devin, sent orders to Griffin to bring in his troops to support Ayres on the right, and to Crawford to change direction to the left and move at right angles to his then line. By this time, however, a large portion of both these divisions had entered the woods north of the open space along the White Oak road.

When Warren had sent these orders to Crawford and Griffin he ordered Kellogg's brigade to form at right angles to its former direction and hold it there for Crawford's division to form on, and then ordered Coulter's brigade to form on Kellogg's.

General Kellogg, who was in command of the old Iron Brigade, now consisting of the 6th and 7th Wisconsin and 91st New York, says :


The right of my line connected with Baxter's brigade, the left with the Second Division, Fifth Corps. Receiving orders, I advanced to a road half a mile in my front, at which point we executed a left wheel, and here became engaged with the enemy, the command moving forward and firing as it advanced, driving the enemy. In moving through a dense thicket the connection was broken between my line and the Second Division, causing a large gap, which was taken advantage of by the enemy, who threw a force on my left flank and opened fire, evidently with the desire of arresting the forward movement of the line of battle. I ordered my front line (6th and 7th Wisconsin) to keep advancing, and one battalion of the 91st New York to deploy on the left flank of the bri-

gade, covering that flank, then advance and engage the enemy at short range. This order was promptly executed, and held the enemy at bay until Coulter's brigade came up and filled the gap. My brigade now held the center of the line, with Baxter and Coulter on either side, and continued in that position until we reached the enemy's works. We drove them from their intrenchments across an open field, pursuing them closely for three-quarters of a mile, killing and wounding many, until, in compliance with orders, the brigade was moved into camp for the night.

During this fight Captain Palmer, of the 91st New York (now commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic), was severely injured, from the effects of which he is still suffering, though nearly thirty years have elapsed.

On returning to where he had left Kellogg, Warren found the position vacated, one of Sheridan's staff having taken the brigade to the rear of the enemy's intrenchments. By this time every member of Warren's staff and many of Sheridan's aids had been sent to hunt Crawford and Griffin, and bring them to the rear of the Confederate position; and soon both of them entered the open ground about eight hundred yards from the enemy's works, near the return. Here Warren found Griffin moving southwest against the rear of the enemy's intrenchments, and at once directed him to attack the new line of breastworks (Ransom's and Wallace's brigades) which had been hastily thrown up, and were connected with and at right angles to their main line of works, in order to oppose the farther advance of the Fifth Corps, for at this time Ayres had taken the return. Griffin at once started to carry out his orders, and was finally successful, being reënforced by Coulter's brigade of Crawford's, and Gwyn's brigade of Ayres' divisions, though for half an hour he met with great resistance, the enemy keeping up a steady and murderous fire.

At the same time Crawford's division, which was moving farther to the right, advanced steadily in rear of the Confederate line, driving Munford's dismounted cavalry division westward before them and continually turning the left of the forces which were opposing Ayres and Griffin until they



McPalmer

*Past
Commander in Chief
G. A. R.*

Albany, N. Y.

finally gained possession of the Ford road, which ran directly north from the center of the Confederate rear and thence across Hatcher's Run, where Warren found him, with his command facing westward in good order, and completely closing the outlet for the escape of the enemy toward the north; changing the division to face south, Warren, in person, led it on the Ford road toward the rear of the rebel works, meeting, at the edge of the woods, a sharp fire from the enemy, who had here formed a line across the road. Devin's cavalry division was formed in front of the Confederate works, with its left on the road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks; and when the Fifth Corps advanced to the attack they dismounted and moved against the works, keeping up a constant fire upon them and receiving the fire of the infantry and the three guns at the Five Forks battery. Pennington's brigade (dismounted) of Custer's division, on the Union left of the Five Forks battery, kept up a constant fire on the works held by Corse's and Terry's (Confederate) brigades, while with the remainder of his division Custer made a charge on W. H. F. Lee's right. Lee advanced to meet him, and after a brilliant encounter, repelled the Union cavalry and maintained his position.

William Swinton, the war correspondent of the New York *Tribune*, and the most brilliant writer in the Army of the Potomac, says, in describing the closing scenes of this engagement:

The Confederates were now completely entrapped. Held as in a vise by the cavalry which enveloped their whole front and right, stung them with a biting fire, and charged at the signal of the musketry of the infantry, they now found a line of battle sweeping down on their rear. Thus placed, they did all that men may. Forming front both north and south, they met, with a desperate valor, this double onset. But all in vain. From the rear Warren swept down toward the White Oak road, Crawford taking four guns; and simultaneously, the cavalry from the front charged upon this road with resistless impetuosity. The whole center was now carried, as the left had been before, and the Confederates, pressed front,

flank and rear, mostly threw down their arms. Having gained the White Oak road, Warren changed front again and advanced westward to continuously take in flank and rear whatever hostile force still continued to hold the right of the Confederate line. This had originally been about three miles in extent, but above two-thirds of it were now carried. Yet, vital in all its parts, what of the two divisions remained still continued the combat with unyielding mettle. Parrying the thrusts of the cavalry from the front, this poor scratch of a force threw back its left in a new and short crotchet, so as to meet the advance of Warren, who continued to press in at right angles with the White Oak road. When the infantry, greatly elated at their success, but somewhat disorganized by marching and fighting so long in the woods, arrived before his new line, they halted and opened an untimely fusillade, though there had been orders not to halt; the officers, indeed, urged their men forward, but they continued to fire without advancing. Seeing this hesitation Warren dashed forward, calling to those near him to follow. Inspired by his example, the color-bearers and officers all along the front sprang out, and, without more firing, the men charged at the *pas de course*, capturing all that remained of the enemy. The history of the war presents no equally splendid illustration of personal magnetism. Warren led the van of the rushing lines; his horse was fatally shot within a few feet of the breastworks, and he himself was in imminent peril, when a gallant officer, Colonel Richardson, of the 7th Wisconsin (old Iron Brigade), sprang between him and the enemy, receiving a severe wound, but shielding from hurt the person of his loved commander.

A charge of the cavalry completed the rout, and the remnants of the divisions of Pickett and Johnson filed westward from Five Forks, pursued for many miles by the mounted divisions of Merritt and McKenzie. The trophies of the day included many colors and guns, and above 5000 prisoners, of which number 3244 were taken by the Fifth Corps. Brilliant as the victory was, it was won without great sacrifice of life, the losses of the cavalry being but a few hundred, and those of the infantry, 634 killed and wounded.

There has always seemed to be one grave blot upon this otherwise great victory, and that is the removal of Warren, by Sheridan, from the command of the Fifth Corps at the close of this battle. The order is very short, and is couched in an order to Sheridan from Grant, "to relieve General Warren if, in his judgment, it was for the best interests of the service to do so."

During the campaign beginning in May, 1864, there had been misunderstandings between Meade and Warren, the latter sometimes modifying the plans of operations prescribed by the orders of the day for the Fifth Corps, so as to make them accord with his own judgment as the day went on; modifications which Meade sometimes did not approve, and, therefore, something like controversy grew up occasionally in the dispatches that passed between them. It appears probable that Grant apprehended that something of this kind might occur between Sheridan and Warren, and, considering the time to be a critical one, sent the message to Sheridan.

On the 16th of May, 1865, Sheridan makes a report of this battle, and in it states that, in bringing up and forming his corps at Gravelly Run Church—

General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done; and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed.

Further on, he says:

During this attack (that of the Fifth Corps and the cavalry upon Pickett's intrenched position) I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply for want of confidence on the part of his troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the command of the Fifth Corps, authority for the action having been sent to me, before the battle, unsolicited.

How different was the action of Logan when ordered to relieve General Thomas! But comparisons are odious.

Warren grew very restive under these imputations, and repeatedly demanded a court of inquiry, which was at length ordered by the President, and the court, composed of officers of high rank, after having a host of witnesses before them, Sheridan among the number, who gave at great length his reasons for believing and acting as he did, made a report to

the President completely exonerating General Warren, stating there was no unnecessary delay, and that Warren took the usual methods of a corps commander to prevent delay ; as to the imputation that he wished "the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed," they say : "His actions, as shown by the evidence, do not appear to have corresponded with such a wish, if ever he entertained it."

And so the Court went on and decided against Sheridan's charges in every instance, and in the end brought in a report completely justifying Warren in his every action, and to-day, nearly thirty years after the events we have related transpired, there is no man who fought under Warren but will say he possessed the love and esteem and confidence of the rank and file of the Fifth Corps.

CHAPTER XXVI.

LEE'S FINAL STRUGGLE AT PETERSBURG AND FLIGHT. SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX.

ON the 2d of April Lee saw that he could not hold his lines any longer, so he notified Jeff Davis, who was at church, of that fact. Davis immediately left the church to prepare for his flight, with the Confederate archives and what specie there was in Richmond.

In order to deceive Grant as to his real movements he ordered a vigorous assault on Fort Stedman as if he wanted to break through Grant's right; in fact it was a most desperate attack on the part of the Confederates which was repulsed by Parke. It was one of the most brilliant efforts of General Parke's during the whole war.

When Wright broke through the Confederate lines at Hatcher's Run, his troops moved to the right in the direction of Petersburg. Parke had forced the enemy back to the Jerusalem plank road. Gordon made several strong efforts to force Parke back but failed. Humphrey directed Miles, Hays and Mott to attack Heth, who had the brigades of Cook, Scales, McRae, and McGowan, and had been cut off from Petersburg by Wright.

Miles, being in command, attacked Cook, who was then in command, as Heth had gone to Petersburg, and was repulsed. Another attack shared the same fate. A third time Miles threw his skirmishers around Cook's right and attacked his left with Ramsey's brigade, by which he gained Cook's rear and took several hundred prisoners, a section of artillery, and a battle flag. The fortifications around Petersburg having been carried, Anderson retreated up the

Appomattox to be reënforced by Cook's command, and Pickett. At eight o'clock all of the Confederate army began its retreat up the Appomattox River. Ewell who was in front of Richmond on the left of the James in command of the divisions of Kershaw and Custis Lee, R. E. Lee's eldest son, crossed the James at and below Richmond. General Fitz Lee with his cavalry brought up the rear. It was Lee's intention to fly to Johnson, crush Sherman before Grant could reach there, and then he hoped with the two armies to again be able to fight Grant. While Lee was moving westwardly to strike the Danville Railroad, where he expected rations to feed his half famished army, which he had ordered to meet him at Amelia Court House, Sheridan with the cavalry and Fifth Corps was keeping pace with him and moving with great celerity. While Meade with the Second and Sixth Corps were following Sheridan, Parke with the Ninth Corps was moving along the South Side Railroad, followed by Ord with the Army of the James. In the mean time Weitzel marched into Richmond, which had been fired by some parties before our troops arrived. Pandemonium reigned supreme in the city which had just been evacuated by the Confederate officials. Our troops at once began to control the fire and save as much of the city as possible. On the 4th Lee arrived at Amelia Court House, where he had ordered rations for his army, only to find that the conductor had taken the whole train to Richmond where it had been consumed in the conflagration. His troops were exhausted, and he was compelled to rest there and endeavor to secure something by foraging parties over the country. Sheridan having learned that Lee was there pressed on to tap the Danville Railroad to intercept his flight. Crook was ordered to strike the Danville road between Burke's Junction and Jetersville, with orders for the troops to concentrate at the latter place. Sheridan sent Meade word of the situation at the front, when the Second and Sixth Corps were ordered to Jetersville.

On the morning of the 5th Sheridan sent Davies north

to see if Lee was attempting to escape, when he (Davies) struck a heavy train moving in the direction of Lynchburg, which he captured and burned. It is said that Lee's papers were in that train and burned up. Beyond doubt other valuable papers were consumed there.

Lee having fed his army as best he could, continued the retreat on the night of the 5th. On the morning of the 6th Sheridan ordered Crook to move to Deatonville, with Merritt to follow him, but the enemy was passing through there when Crook arrived.

Crook, Merritt, and Custer moved on the flank of the enemy to impede its progress and to strike it a blow when opportunity presented. Finally Custer struck a train in the column, which he destroyed, capturing twelve guns from Huger's batteries. In the afternoon of the 6th Humphreys and Gordon had a running fight for several miles, which night put an end to. General Wright attacked the enemy at Sailor's Creek, and with the aid of the cavalry cut Ewell off and captured his whole force; Anderson, who had attempted to assist him, retreated. Longstreet had waited all day at Rice's Station for Ewell, Gordon, and Anderson, only to learn that disaster had befallen Ewell, while Anderson and Gordon had greatly suffered in loss of prisoners. That evening Longstreet, with Wilcox, Heth, and Field proceeded to Farmville, where they crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox, and the next morning attempted to escape to Lynchburg. At Farmville rations were given to the Confederate army. Crook and Ord moved on Farmville, while Merritt marched to Prince Edward's Court House, with Griffin to follow him. Wright followed Ord to Farmville. Humphreys moved to the Lynchburg stage road to prevent Lee from escaping in that direction, when he suddenly came up on the whole of Lee's army. It was then resolved to attack him with all of our forces, but it was soon learned that those in Farmville under Wright and Gibbon could not get across the Appomattox, as the enemy had destroyed the bridges.

On the evening of the 7th Grant began negotiations for the surrender of Lee's army by sending him the following :

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL :—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant General.

To General R. E. LEE.

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL :—I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE,
General.

To Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT.

As yet Lee hoped to escape. Grant sent the following reply :

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL :—Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant General.

To General R. E. LEE.

To which Lee replied :

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL :—I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the

Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposal would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten a. m. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

R. E. LEE,
General.

To Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT.

The next morning Lee directed Gordon to attack the cavalry which Sheridan had placed across his front, and drove it back quite a distance, but as Sheridan ordered infantry up to support the cavalry, Gordon desisted from further efforts to force a way by which Lee's troops could escape. Then began the preparation in earnest for the surrender. Before, Lee was only endeavoring to gain time for a chance to get away. On the afternoon of the 9th the final arrangements were made. The Union boys fed the Confederates. The officers of both armies mingled together and had a splendid time. Grant asked Heth and others whom he had known in the service before the war to smoke with him. It was a strange thing to see these two hostile armies lying together without pickets. The Army of the Potomac marched to Richmond. From there it was sent to Washington, where it remained until Sherman's army arrived, when both were reviewed by the President, Cabinet, Generals Grant, Sherman and other officers, after which the Army of the Potomac was disbanded, its troops mustered out of the service, to again become civilians, leaving a name to live in American history for all time.

CHAPTER XXVII.

MISCELLANEOUS.

IN the written accounts of the various transactions that comprise the history of the late war, more than their proportionate share of credit for acts of valor that distinguished all ranks and grades of our volunteer soldiers, in both the Union and Confederate armies, has been accorded to those who bore high rank.

In describing skirmishes, battles and campaigns, the part that has been borne by those in command has always been particularly described, while the acts of devotion to the principles by which the rank and file of our armies were impelled to perform those deeds of valor and heroism so necessary to success, were rarely, if ever, referred to in the official reports. This, perhaps, was the result of the conditions that surrounded transactions at the front. Particular movements of divisions, brigades, regiments, or detachments of troops, and the apparent, or actual necessity for them and their results, can only be described in a general way on account of the many hundreds or thousands of men engaged in them; and thus, individual examples of heroism and conspicuous bravery and patriotism are passed over.

No army, or detachment of an army in the world's history, ever furnished a greater proportionate number of individual examples of heroic bravery than were to be found in the ranks of every regiment and brigade, not only of the First Army Corps, but of each corps comprising the entire army. Not that blind, stoical, mechanical kind of bravery which comes from military discipline, which com-

pels obedience to the commands of officers, and impels men to march up to the cannon's mouth in the face of certain death ; but the bravery that is born of intelligent, disinterested patriotism and heroic devotion to principle, so many conspicuous examples of which were to be found in every command.

GREER N. WILLIAMS.

Among the many enlisted men who earned the right to honorable and particular mention for their gallantry and faithfulness, is Greer N. Williams, who enlisted under the first call for three years' men, under Capt. W. W. Dudley, in Company B, 19th Indiana Volunteers. He was present with this company when it was first organized in 1861, and in every march, raid, skirmish or battle, in which the regiment was engaged until its final muster out in July, 1865, he was present and participated with the exception of about three months, during which time he was in hospital at Philadelphia on account of severe wounds received at the battle of Gettysburg, where he was hit seven times ; and excepting, also, his absence on veteran furlough at the time the regiment veteranized. No officer or comrade ever heard him complain at any necessary duty, however arduous or dangerous. He resides near Fountain City, Indiana, on a farm, and still has the musket and accouterments which he carried through the war, together with quite an extensive museum of trophies and souvenirs of the war of which he is pardonably proud.

NORM G. COOPER

Was a native of Waterloo, N. Y., and born in 1838. He enlisted under the first call for troops in April, 1861, in Company E, Twenty-fourth New York Infantry, as a private.

Descended from Revolutionary stock, he thought that he ought to sustain a Government which was made impact by the assistance of Colonel Cooper of the Revolutionary

war. On August 29, 1862, at Groveton, Virginia (Second Bull Run), he was wounded in his right arm and captured by the Confederates, but was soon exchanged, however, and promoted to sergeant and second lieutenant in the marches and battles following. He was at the "front," was a great favorite in his company and regiment, and was mustered out with them at the expiration of their term of service. He now publishes "Cooper's Coffee Cooler," of Sturgis, Mich., a rollicking soldier monthly paper.

He has been commander of his post, department inspector, and is now assistant inspector general G. A. R. Has been twice sent to the Sons of Veterans National Encampment as delegate at large from Michigan; is aid to Commander in Chief Yoder, U. V. U.; President of the New York Society of Soldiers and Sailors residing in Michigan, and Secretary of the State Prisoners of War Association.

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By A. D. SHAW, Company D, Nineteenth Indiana.

The name of Abraham Lincoln is with us a very precious one. It recalls to us scenes in our past lives that are graven deeply in our hearts. The first time I had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Lincoln was, when on his way to Washington to take his seat as President of the United States. Indianapolis, by previous arrangements, was designated as one of the cities where he would stop for a brief period, while *en route*. I can see him now as the people, in their love and admiration for him, carry him up the Bates House steps on their shoulders. I saw him on the balcony as he spoke his words of comfort and words of promise to the assembled thousands. How cheering and full of inspiration was every sentence! I remember how he introduced his son Robert, to the people, calling him "my son Bob." I remember his farewell words as he again turned his face to the east, and how every ear was strained to lose not a word which he might say.



COL. NORM. G. COOPER.



It was not very long—only a few months—until I had the pleasure of again seeing this remarkable man, but, oh, what a change those few months had made! The war was on, and I, with the old Nineteenth Indiana, eleven hundred strong, marched up Pennsylvania Avenue, past the White House, one hot morning in August. There in the door, with head uncovered, stood “that man of the people,” and watched our noble regiment pass by. I could even at that distance recognize the sympathetic expression on his homely face. No doubt he felt in his great heart pity for the loved ones at home and pride in the men passing by.

About the 1st of September, 1861, fifty thousand troops passed in review before him, in which our regiment participated. The review took place about four miles from the city, near the Chain Bridge, on the Virginia side of the river, and General McClellan was in command. General Mansfield and other distinguished officers were there, proud in their bearing and able in their work; but there was one who towered above them all. On him all eyes were fixed, and in him all hopes seemed centered, and as he looked with pride over that vast army before him, his face beaming with joy, there seemed to come a strength and courage and determination to every heart. It was Mr. Lincoln.

Just previous to the review, as our regiment was drawn up in line and at rest, I heard the clatter of hoofs in the rear, and naturally, as soldiers will do, especially raw men like us, I looked around to see what and who it was. It was Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan. They halted their horses directly in my rear. Their object was this: General McClellan was very much dissatisfied with our arms—the old Springfield muskets—and he had discovered that the 19th, like quite a number of others, had them, and he wished to have Mr. Lincoln give them a personal inspection. I happened to be the person who was singled out to have my gun inspected. Great heavens, how I did shake! Of course I was not aware just then what their object was. My gun was so conspicuously dirty that

I presumed that was the reason it was asked for. General McClellan handed it to Mr. Lincoln who examined it and remarked that it would not answer—"must have better ones." After they were through examining it, General McClellan returned it to me, saying, "Thank you." How relieved I was; and I do believe it was the first, and perhaps, only instance on record where an officer thanked a private for carrying a dirty gun. The next time I saw Mr. Lincoln was at the funeral of General Baker, who was killed at Ball's Bluff. I can see him now as he stood there that day. Well might he feel sad, for he had lost a true and tried friend, who with his life had sealed his devotion to his country.

Again I remember him as I saw him at the funeral of General Gibson, Commissary General United States Army, who died in Washington the following winter. I was on detached duty at headquarters, and having some little leisure, as "all was quiet on the Potomac" just at that season, I went around to the residence of the deceased general. There I saw, standing on the large flat flag-step of the residence, with his back against the wall of the house, his eye wandering up and down the line of soldiers that were drawn up in front, that form which was familiar to all though they had never seen him, the sturdy old patriot, Gen. Winfield Scott. Though old and infirm, this illustrious soldier was true as steel. Presently, there came out of the house two other persons whose names will be handed down from generation to generation as great and good men. One was Mr. Lincoln and the other Mr. Seward. Just as the service closed they came out arm in arm. It was raining at the time and Mr. Lincoln carried an umbrella, and I recollect how amused I was, even though sad the occasion, to see how Mr. Lincoln had to stoop to hold the umbrella over Mr. Seward, as Mr. Seward, you will remember, was a very small man.

Later on I had a severe attack of camp fever. My life had been despaired of, and my wife had been advised to

come and see me. She came, bringing with her our only child, a little boy two years of age. Under her watchful care I improved, and in course of time was permitted to go out for a little exercise. One morning we walked in the direction of the White House, and when directly opposite it we crossed the street. About the middle of the crossing we met Mr. Lincoln, and it being very muddy, he stepped aside and stood in the mud until we passed. Of course I saluted him and he returned it; but his eyes seemed to see only our little boy walking by my side, with his little military cap and the letters and figures "19th Regt. Ind. Vol." on the front. I have often thought of what he might have been thinking, and I doubt not that one thought was "God grant that the father may be spared to his little one."

Again, I saw him come out of the White House, to cross the street on his way to McClellan's headquarters, when an old gentleman—a farmer I should say, by his dress—hailed him. Lincoln stopped, and, seeing who it was, turned and almost ran to meet him. It was an old neighbor from home, I am sure, from the familiar way in which they talked. He asked Mr. Lincoln how he was getting along, about the health of the family, etc., and to all Mr. Lincoln replied in a very happy mood, and as he grasped the hand of the old farmer to say good-by, it was the shake of an old friend. They seemed loath to part.

This was the last time I saw Mr. Lincoln alive. At last the lowering clouds of war began to rise and the blessed rays of peace came struggling through the rifts. In the midst of rejoicing such as, I believe, was never known on earth before, the light of this great man's life went out, and a pall of sorrow covered every loyal heart. Oh what a sad time this was to us, my comrades! Not all the sorrowful events of the war seemed worthy of remembrance in this, our greater grief. Stout hearts that had never quailed in the presence of what seemed certain death gave way beneath this stroke of an assassin. I was at home,

at Indianapolis, when all that was left in the visible form of our martyred President lay in state in our old capitol building, and with a heart bowed with grief I looked for the last time on his face. To me it seemed still troubled, yet resigned. I need not say that I wept as for a father or brother, for he was both to every man who stood up to defend his country.

At the dead hour of midnight, with the rain falling and the bells tolling, his remains were taken to the depot, and, as the multitude stood with uncovered heads until the hearse passed by, I heard the expressions of many blessing his memory.

CORP. CYRUS MACY

Was a member of Company A, 6th Wisconsin Veteran Volunteer Infantry. He was wounded in the left knee at the battle of the Wilderness; he was also wounded in the head at Hatcher's Run, Virginia, February 7, 1865, causing loss of the sight of the left eye and total deafness of the left ear.

This soldier was conspicuous for his bravery, which amounted almost to recklessness, as the following incident will show:

About sunrise July 30, 1864, at the "Mine explosion" in front of Petersburg, Virginia, while all eyes were turned to the mine, the order came for a special detail of 60 select men from the "Iron Brigade" to double a picket force between the Union and Confederate breastworks. Corporal Macy became one of this detail. When the detail was made, each man was shown the picket pit in which he was to find shelter from the enemy's bullets; the picket holes were about two rods apart, and about 30 rods from the foe's breastworks, in front of the Confederate army.

At a given signal each man jumped the Union breastworks and made for his pit. It being a very warm day, the men could hardly stay in their pits, and it soon became apparent that without water their suffering from thirst and the heat would be unendurable; it could only be obtained

back of the Union breastworks. To attempt to get it would expose anyone making the attempt to almost certain destruction, as the ground that must be crossed was exposed to the bullets from the Confederate rifle-pits. But water was a necessity, and in this extremity, Corporal Macy proposed to his comrades that if they would throw him some of their canteens he would try to procure the water. This they did; and taking off all his clothing except pantaloons and shirt, and strapping eight or ten canteens to his back, he started for the Union lines, which fortunately, he reached in safety.

When he reached his regiment, his officers upbraided him soundly for the needless exposure, as they thought, and tried to dissuade him from returning; but he replied that without water the men in the pits would perish from thirst. So, filling the canteens with fresh water and strapping them, as before, upon his back, he again jumped the breastworks and made a dash for the pit from which he had come, which he reached amidst a dizzy shower of Confederate bullets, but without injury. Thus the men were, in a measure, relieved from their thirst; and they remained in the pits until they could be removed under cover of the night.

BENJAMIN B. DUKE

Enlisted as a private in Company B, 19th Regiment Indiana Volunteers, and was mustered into the service of the United States on the 29th of July, 1861. December 31, 1863, he reënlisted as a veteran and served until the close of the war, and was finally mustered out with the regiment on the 27th day of July, 1865.

He was present with and participated in all the movements of his regiment from first to last, except during a time while he was a prisoner of war, and excepting, also, a short time he was with Sherman's army, which he and his prison comrades joined at or near Columbia, S. C., having escaped from a prison pen situated a few miles north of

that place, the approach of that army affording them an excellent opportunity for escape.

He was twice a prisoner of war. He was first captured July 1, 1863, at Gettysburg, while on the skirmish line, together with Lieut. G. W. Bunch, Comrades William Lock, John Markle, William Castater of Company B, and John Gump, I. S. Pruitt, R. I. Patterson, and Wesley Galyean of Company E, and Sergeant Henderson, Jack Oliver, and Jet. Darah of Company D. Henderson and Galyean were wounded at the time. Companies B, D and E had been deployed on the skirmish line in the wheat field, on the left front of the regiment, with orders to hold this point as long as possible; but the Confederate charge upon the line at this point was so sudden and vigorous that these comrades were soon overpowered and captured. They were taken to the provost headquarters of Lee's army, situated just west of the seminary, where they were kept until late on the evening of the 3d, when they were paroled. They were sent to West Chester, Pennsylvania, where they remained until September, when they were returned to the regiment for duty without exchange, it having been discovered that their parol was not regular and was therefore void.

At the battle of the Wilderness, May 5, 1864, Comrade Duke was again captured, together with Robert G. Conley and William Sykes of the same company, Sergeant Hiatt, Sergeant McGee, John Pitman and George Bauner of Company A, Benjamin Turner of Company G, and Lieut. G. E. Finney, adjutant.

They were taken to Andersonville prison, where, for several months, they experienced the horrors of that pen, which they characterize as "a veritable hell on earth." Here the robust constitution, the vigorous temperament and active habits of Comrade Duke, together with his kindness of heart and comradeship of feeling were utilized to the benefit, not only of those of his own regiment, but of other regiments who, reduced by wounds or disease and confinement in that horrible place, would never have re-

turned to home and friends but for his kindly offices. It is asserted by those who were with him during this trying time, that his kind and cheering words, his gentle nursing, his trading and trafficking and many times dividing his last ration, although scant, with a sick and weak comrade, and his general activity in their behalf, saved the life of many a disheartened and discouraged comrade. W. A. W. Daly and Calvin Engle, of the 5th Indiana Cavalry, who live in Randolph County, Indiana, will verify this statement. After their confinement at Andersonville for several months they were moved about from one prison pen to another, and finally to a prison near Columbia, S. C., where they were at the time Sherman's army passed that way on its "March to the sea." The appearance of such an enemy in their vicinity compelled the withdrawal of most of the guards from the prison to assist in repelling his advance. Many of the prisoners, among whom were Comrade Duke and his comrades, as before stated, took advantage of the opportunity and escaped to Sherman's lines.

CAPTAIN LEE YARYAN,

of Richmond, Indiana, enlisted as first lieutenant in Company G, 19th Indiana, July, 1861. He served with this regiment until January, 1862, when he was transferred to and became adjutant of the 58th Indiana Volunteers, which at that time was at Bardstown, Kentucky, with the Army of the Cumberland.

In April, 1862, at Shiloh, he was promoted to captain and assistant division commander on the staff of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, then commanding First Division of the Twenty-first Corps. He served with distinction, and was in all the battles the Army of the Cumberland engaged in under Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas and Grant; at Shiloh, Stone River, Chickamauga, Mission Ridge, Perryville, relief of Burnside at Knoxville, etc.

, ABRAM J. BUCKLES,

Company E, 19th Indiana, was born at Muncie, Indiana, enlisted July, 1861, as a private, and served until May 15, 1865. He was color-bearer of the regiment at the battle of the Wilderness May 5, 1864. He had been wounded through the right thigh at second Bull Run and through the shoulder at Gettysburg, and although he was suffering severely at the time of the battle of the Wilderness from his Gettysburg wound, which had not yet healed, he had no thought of remaining back; and when the order came to move forward into the woods and make the attack, he took his place, with the flag over his left shoulder, the right being disabled, as above stated.

The enemy's line was soon struck and pushed back, the woods in many places being so thick with undergrowth that the men had to crawl through it on their hands and knees.

The line soon came to a cleared place, through and beyond which the retreating enemy had gone and reformed their line on the opposite side. As soon as the Union line could be straightened out it started across the open field, with the colors in the lead, when almost immediately Comrade Buckles received a Confederate bullet through the body. Staggering, but not falling, he supported himself by the flag-staff until relieved by young Divelbuss, one of the color-guard, who was killed a short time afterwards. Comrade Buckles, having been carried a mile to the rear, found himself completely exhausted. The men who had been carrying him on a stretcher, believing him to be dead, let him down, but finding him still alive, carried him to the hospital, where the doctor told him that his wound was fatal and that he must soon die. The chaplain was sent in to impart the same information and to prepare the wounded man for his approaching dissolution. Being of a very strong constitution, and temperate in his habits, however, he was able to pull through.



LIEUT. A. J. BUCKLES.

Although his wound was not healed, and did not, until 1870, he sufficiently recovered to return to his regiment in November, 1864. He was commissioned a second lieutenant, and on March 25, 1865, in an engagement on Hatcher's Run, on the left of the line at Petersburg, he lost his right leg above the knee.

Returning to Indiana, he studied law, and in 1875 emigrated to California, of which State he is now a resident and honored citizen. He was elected district attorney of Solano County in 1879, reelected in 1882, and in 1884 was elected superior judge, and reelected Nov. 1890, a position he now holds. He has also been department commander, G. A. R., of the Department of California and Nevada.

CAPT. LON. MAKEPEACE.

On the evening of July 1, 1863, Capt. Lon. Makepeace of Company A, Capt. G. W. Green of Company E, Capt. P. Hart of Company H, and Lieut. Harley Richardson of Company D, all of the 19th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, were captured at Gettysburg, near the close of the first day of that memorable contest. They were taken to the rear of the Confederate army, where they were kept until early on the morning of the 4th, when they moved, in front of the retreating Confederate forces, toward the Potomac River, which they crossed at Williamsport, from whence they were marched to Staunton, Virginia, where they were put on board of the cars and taken to Richmond, and thence to Libby prison, where they arrived on or about July 18, where they remained until the following May.

They were then taken to Danville, Virginia, thence to Salisbury, South Carolina, and afterwards to Macon, Georgia, and finally to Charleston, South Carolina, where they remained for some time. They were afterward removed to Columbia, where Captain Makepeace, together with Captain Kendall of the 73d Indiana, and a lieutenant of an Indiana battery, managed to make their escape. They wandered about through the swamps and thickets of the Confederate

country for forty-eight days, traveling more than 400 miles, several times chased by bloodhounds through swamps and canebrakes. But they were finally recaptured and taken back to Columbia, South Carolina. Here they remained until finally exchanged, which occurred on the 1st day of March, 1865, at which time they were sent through the lines at Wilmington, North Carolina, twenty months after their first capture.

LIEUT. GEORGE W. BUNCH.

This comrade enlisted into the service of the United States in September, 1861, as a recruit in Company B, 19th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. He was mustered out as senior officer of that company, as first lieutenant in Company C, 20th Indiana (consolidated), July 12, 1865. He was in all the marches and battles of his regiment from the date of his enlistment until his final muster-out.

AN INCIDENT OF GAINESVILLE.

On the evening of the 29th of August, 1862, an incident occurred, which we mention to illustrate the necessity, at times, of a quick grasp of a situation, and how the reputation of a body of men may be made or marred in a moment.

King's division late in the afternoon were slowly making their way along the Gainesville turnpike, marching in column, when suddenly a Confederate battery posted in a bit of timber only a few hundred yards to the left of the road, opened fire, and the report of the guns was followed so quickly by the explosion of the shells, that it seemed as if the troops had stumbled upon the very guns themselves. The cavalry column immediately sought shelter in a piece of timber to the right of the pike; the infantry were ordered to lie down on the roadside, protected somewhat by the ditches, while Battery B, of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, hauled out into the field through openings made in the fences, and in the shortest possible time brought all of their Napoleon guns into action.

Before, however, they got a single piece unlimbered, a projectile from one of the Confederate guns had struck one of their caissons, exploding all the ammunition in it, with a report that could be heard for miles. The 30th New York Infantry Regiment being on the left of the famous Iron Brigade (then consisting of the 19th Indiana, and the 2d, 6th, and 7th Regiments of Wisconsin Volunteers), was marching in the column immediately in front of the artillery and directly abreast of the Confederate battery when it opened fire.

The first shot carried away the head of a private in the ranks and hurled his body in the ditch. Other casualties followed, and the suddenness of the onslaught was creating a panic in the regiment; but as the first soldier started to the rear, Lieutenant Andrews, jumping to his feet, placed his revolver at the man's breast and ordered him back to his place in the ranks.

The man did not dare hesitate, but obeyed the order at once, returning to his post, and a score of others who were about to follow his example, which must have stampeded the regiment, regained their senses, and never afterwards flinched, no matter how trying the circumstances.

Thus began the battle of Gainesville. The following day Col. Edward Frisby complimented this officer in orders for his gallantry, but even more for the alertness with which he carried out his command of the situation.

Lieutenant, afterwards Captain, Andrews was attending a military school at the breaking out of the rebellion; but on the 1st of May, 1861, left his books and entered the service, as an enlisted man, at 17 years of age; but he was immediately afterward made a lieutenant, and it is claimed by many that he was the youngest commissioned officer in the service. In the autumn of 1861, while foraging near Fairfax Court House, Virginia, some Federal troops were captured after a skirmish, Lieutenant Andrews among them; and for many months he was confined in Libby Prison, in Richmond, his 18th birthday being passed there before his exchange.

Captain Andrews came of a soldierly stock. His two great-grandfathers having served in the Revolution, one of them in Colonel Walcott's Connecticut Militia Regiment in the campaign in the defense of Boston in 1775 and 1776, the other serving in three different campaigns in 1776, 1777, and 1780-'81. His grandfather, although only a boy, served as a volunteer aid on the staff of General Sullivan in the campaign at Saratoga. An uncle attained the rank of major in the war of 1812; and now he has a son, Lieut. J. M. Andrews, Jr., who graduated at West Point in the class of 1890, and in the same year went through the late campaign against the Sioux Indians with his regiment, the 1st Cavalry, United States Army.


GEN. E. DUMONT

Was born at Vevay, Indiana, April 21, 1821. He was lieutenant colonel of the 4th Indiana Regiment during the Mexican war.

When the first war meeting was called, at Indianapolis, after Fort Sumter was fired upon, several speeches were made to encourage the enlistment of soldiers. Three prominent farmers were present and made speeches, and closed with the offer of a horse each to any soldier who would go and ride it. Dumont, being called out for a speech, in response, said, he, too, would give a horse and ride it himself. Thus began enlistments in that city.

The 7th Regiment Indiana Volunteers was organized, and mustered into the service for three months, with Dumont as its colonel. Proceeding immediately to the front, they soon became engaged in the conflict that ensued and won distinction in their short term of service. In August, 1861, the 7th Indiana reënlisted for three years, with Dumont as colonel.

On September 3, 1861, he was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers, and in the following month was transferred to Kentucky, where he commanded a brigade in the Army of the Cumberland until March, 1862, when



GEN. EBENEZER DUMONT.

he was assigned to the command of the post at Nashville, Tennessee. While General Dumont was in command at this post, Gen. John Morgan, of Confederate fame, was constantly destroying our lines of communication. General Dumont asked, and obtained an order to organize a force sufficient to drive Morgan from his lines of operation. On the 3d of May, 1862, a Federal force of 1000 men was organized at Murfreesboro, and pursuit of Morgan immediately began; Morgan, in the mean time, with 1500 cavalry was heading for Gallatin, Tennessee, with the intention of destroying the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at various points. On the 5th of May the Federal cavalry overtook Morgan's command at Lebanon, Tennessee, where a severe battle took place, lasting several hours, in which Morgan was defeated with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. This was Morgan's first defeat, and it was so overwhelming that General Buell, the department commander, congratulated Dumont and his little army over their brilliant victory.

After this spirited campaign of a few days the Federal troops returned to Nashville. When Kirby Smith, with the advance of Bragg's army, invaded Kentucky, General Dumont was assigned to the command of the Twelfth Division of the Army of the Cumberland, and moved from Louisville, by way of Shelbyville and Frankfort, Kentucky, and succeeded in driving out of Kentucky various bands of Confederate cavalry which were very troublesome as bushwhackers.

During the month of December, 1862, Dumont's division reached Gallatin, Tenn, where, on account of ill health, he resigned.

The day after the capture of Nashville, General Dumont ordered an officer of his staff, Capt. David Braden, A. A. G., to proceed out on the Murfreesboro pike and post some pickets; while engaged in executing this order, he was captured by some of Morgan's command. The captain was at the time riding a very fine horse belonging to General


Dumont, which he also was politely, but firmly, requested to give up to Morgan. Having no discretion in the matter, the captain very gracefully yielded to the inevitable, and was given in exchange a unique specimen of a worn-out Confederate cavalry horse, without flesh or hair. The captain's graceful manner in accepting the situation had the effect to throw his captors temporarily off their guard; and, while studying the mettle of his new horse, he concluded to make an attempt to regain his liberty. So, making a sudden dash from his captors, he was soon out of their reach, and was borne safely back to camp, a distance of 20 miles. When General Dumont saw him, after his return to camp, he remarked: "Captain Braden, I am d——d glad to see you back, but you played h——l, in swapping horses with Morgan."

In October, 1862, General Dumont was elected to Congress by the Republicans of the (then) Sixth Congressional District of Indiana, by 1500 majority; he was reelected in 1864, by 7000 majority.

On the day previous to his death he was appointed governor of Idaho.

JOHN V. HADLEY (Danville, Indiana.)

Was born October 31, 1839, in Hendricks County, Indiana, and was raised on a farm in that county. He left Butler University, Indianapolis, to enlist into the service of his country, and was mustered into the United States service as a member of the 7th Indiana Volunteers, September 13, 1861; was severely wounded at the second battle of Bull Run, August 30, 1862, and again at the battle of the Wilderness, May 5, 1864. He was promoted from the ranks to be first lieutenant, October 1, 1862, and shortly afterwards detailed as a member of the staff of Gen. J. C. Rice, where he did service until the 5th day of May, 1864, when, being severely wounded and left upon the battlefield, he was captured and sent South as a prisoner of war. He was confined at Macon, Savannah, Charleston, and Colum-



CAPT. J. V. HADLEY.



HON. C. E. COON.

bia, from which latter place he escaped on the 4th day of November, 1864, and on the 18th day of December of that year he entered the Union lines at Knoxville, Tennessee, and was mustered out of the service on the 28th day of January, 1865. He subsequently published a book of 180 pages, giving an account of his imprisonment and final escape, one edition of which was exhausted in the first year of its publication.

On his return to civil life he studied law, was admitted to the bar in June, 1866, locating and entering upon the practice of his profession at Danville, Indiana, and was successful. He was married to Mary J. Hill, March 15, 1865; was elected to the State Senate in 1868, and served in that body three sessions; was a delegate to the National Convention that nominated General Harrison for President in 1888, and was, in the same year, elected as Judge of the 19th Judicial Circuit, which circuit then embraced the city of Indianapolis.

CHARLES EDWARD COON

Was born in Friendship, Allegany County, New York, March 15, 1842, being descended from New England Revolutionary stock. He enlisted immediately after the firing upon Sumter, in April, 1861, and was mustered into the service of the United States as a corporal of Company B, 23d New York Volunteer Infantry, May 16, 1861. In February, 1863, he was discharged on account of sickness, but he continued to perform service as chief clerk and deputy provost marshal, 27th District, New York, until March, 1864. July 24, 1864, he entered the Treasury Department as a clerk, and served through all the grades. He was engaged in Europe in funding the national debt, almost continuously from 1871 to 1881, both as assistant and as chief funding agent of the Treasury Department. He became assistant Secretary of the Treasury in April, 1884, and was Acting Secretary of the Treasury the greater part of the time until the close of the Administration of President Arthur.

November 10, 1885, he resigned. He now resides in New York City. He is a member of the Society of the Army of the Potomac, of the Society of the First Corps, of the Grand Army of the Republic, and of the Sons of the Revolution.

E. R. REED (Co. H, 2d Wisconsin).

Among those who responded to their country's call for troops to defend its unity, were the "Randall Guards," recruited at Madison, Wisconsin, by Capt. J. F. Randolph, early in 1861.

This organization was mustered into the service of the United States as Company H, 2d Wisconsin Regiment, and among its members was Private E. R. Reed, who has given a very graphic description of the services of that regiment at Gettysburg, together with some very interesting incidents, from which the following extracts are taken: "On the morning of the 1st of July, 1863, the Iron Brigade, which was the First Brigade, First Division, First Corps, came in on the Emmittsburg road with the 2d Wisconsin in the lead. We soon came to elevated ground, which afforded a long look ahead; here information given by citizens by the roadside indicated that we should soon have some hot work, as on the day previous Lee and his whole army had been encamped some six miles to the west of north. We moved on in the direction indicated, where we soon came up with the enemy and became sharply engaged. (This encounter and its results, casualties, etc., are elsewhere related.)

'An incident is here worthy of mention: One R. E. Davidson, who had been with the regiment through the first Bull Run, Pope's retreat, Gainesville, the second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and several skirmishes, had become surfeited with fighting, and had sworn that he would never go into another fight if he could find any honorable way of dodging it. He would not desert in the face of the enemy, nor do any dishonorable thing; but any honorable thing he could do to dodge a fight,

he would do. But the color-sergeant was killed at the first volley from the enemy, that day, and Davidson grasped the colors from the ground and rushed to the front and kept ten or fifteen yards in front of the line all the way through the woods, shouting to us to come on. This struck me as being a very singular way to "dodge a fight ;" but it shows how little a man knows of how he is going to act when he goes into a fight. He was a private soldier, but was made a sergeant there on the field. He continued to carry those colors through to the end, and brought them home and deposited them in our Capitol. Many had been killed and wounded while carrying the flag, but he seems to have borne a charmed life.

"In the afternoon the enemy came on again, in strong force, three lines of battle in our front and three on our left flank, and, after another desperate encounter, we were forced to fall back.

"In this engagement I was severely wounded in both legs, and, with many others who were disabled, took refuge in the Lutheran Theological Seminary. The First Army Corps swept past, closely followed by the Confederates, on through the town and up to Cemetery Hill ; then the enemy had possession of the town and we were prisoners.

"We had lost heavily. General Reynolds, our corps commander, was killed ; Gen. Sol. Meredith, our brigade commander, was wounded ; our colonel, Lucius Fairchild, lost his arm and was a prisoner ; Lieutenant Colonel Stevens was mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy ; Major Mansfield was wounded and a prisoner ; Captain Rollins, of Company H was a prisoner ; the first lieutenant was a prisoner and the second lieutenant killed, and many others were killed, wounded and prisoners ; and out of the thirty-three men of Company H who went into the charge in the morning, only one man escaped injury, and that man was Sergt. R. E. Davidson, with his flag.

"The 2d went in with 302 men, rank and file ; we had 27 killed, 153 wounded and 53 missing—total, 233 ; this

left 69 men in line, less than seven, of all ranks, to the company. The brigade, out of 1883 men, lost 189 killed, 774 wounded, 249 missing (prisoners), a total of 1212 men. Thus ended the first day at Gettysburg. The second day was full of horrors to those of us who were at the seminary as prisoners; the surrounding grounds being elevated, were occupied by about 140 pieces of Confederate artillery, the music of which, together with the effects of shots from the Union artillery upon the building and surrounding grounds, occasioned the most extreme anguish to us all. The noise, resounding through the building, was worse than ordinary artillery.

"The third day was worse than the second. By the fourth day the Confederate batteries were silenced, and only the 'distant and random gun' of the pickets could be heard. The morning of the fifth day dawned, beautiful and bright, and the last Confederate had disappeared. The wounded prisoners were now all free; but those not wounded were marched off to Richmond. My lieutenant, however, escaped and returned to his company, but Capt. Nat. Rollins was held for many months before he was released."

LOSSES IN THE HARTSUFF-COULTER-TAYLOR-BAXTER BRIGADE.*

The following statement is furnished by Capt. George A. Hussey, of No. 61 Pine Street, New York, late a member of the 9th Regiment New York State Militia (83d New York Volunteers):

* This statement is taken from "Regimental Losses in the Civil War," by Lieutenant Colonel Wm. F. Fox:

The losses—killed or died of wounds—of "famous" brigades was as follows:

Iron Brigade (5 regiments), 1131; *Vermont* (6 regiments), 1172; *Irish* (5 regiments), 961; *Philadelphia* (4 regiments), 636; *Hartsuff's* (7 regiments), 1099; *New Jersey* (6 regiments), 900; *Excelsior* (6 regiments), 876; *Iowa* (4 regiments), 443; *Heckman's* (5 regiments), 686; *Sledman's* (10 regiments), 1192; *Willich's* (9 regiments), 1115; *Harker's* (9 regiments), 1107; *Michigan Cavalry* (4 regiments), 525.

REGIMENTS.	Killed or Died of Wounds.	Died of Disease.	Total.
11th Penna. Vols.*.....	236	181	417
12th Mass. Vols.....	193	83	276
97th N. Y. Vols.*.....	181	157	338
83d N. Y. Vols.†.....	156	88	244
13th Mass. Vols.....	121	40	161
88th Penna. Vols.*.....	109	72	181
90th Penna. Vols.....	103	127	230
Total.....	1099	748	1847
1st N. Hamp. Vols., (3 mos. men).....	—	5	5
12th Indiana Vols., (1 year men).....	—	24	24
16th Indiana Vols., (1 year men).....	1	15	16
29th Penna. Vols.*.....	102	85	187
16th Maine Vols.....	181	259	440
Total.....	1383	1136	2519

All these regiments were in this brigade;† but only the first seven served in it at a battle, and should be noted as the "fifth" of those "famous seven," because of excessive losses.

The following address by the author is here inserted by request :

A quarter of a century after the desperate conflict on this part of the field, where the brave troops under the gallant Reynolds, who surrendered his life here to protect his State and save his country from perishing from among the nations of the earth, were waiting for night or the Army of the Potomac, the veterans of the two armies assemble to-day under the same flag that was unfurled at Bunker Hill, and vouchsafed to us by loyal hands. With solemn vows we declare our full belief in a united country. The death of General Reynolds inspired his soldiers with a valor, which was never excelled on the fields of battle, and this ridge was not surrendered until the commands of A. P. Hill and Ewell turned the flanks of the First and Eleventh Corps. So great was the danger on the left that General Buford threw his cavalry into column, threatening

* These regiments reënlisted.

† This regiment was also known as the "Ninth New York State Militia," by which number it was mustered into the United States service.

‡ The Brigade was in the First Corps during 1862 and 1863, and until March 1864, when it was transferred to the Fifth Corps.

a charge, thereby compelling the enemy to form squares, which delay enabled General Robinson to extricate his division on the extreme right from the maelstrom that heavily threatened his destruction. These movements made it possible for General Doubleday, the grand hero who fired the first gun from Sumter to retire the First Corps to a new position on Cemetery Hill.

The First Corps went into action here at ten o'clock on the 1st of July, with 8200 men, and held its position until four, in an open field, with a loss of 6,059. It is not too much to say that but for the desperate fighting of the First Corps on this field, the position of Cemetery Hill could not have been secured, and the great battle of Gettysburg would not have been fought. If any one asks by what magic General Reynolds was possessed that he imbued his soldiers with such heroism on the field, we answer that he received it at Monterey, Buena Vista, Peninsular Campaign, second Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. This battle was fought greatly like Chalons, which is considered one of the fifteen important battles of the world, and its results are similar. Aetius, the Roman general, posted his left on a sloping hill which Attila furiously charged, but like Pickett was repulsed with great loss. He had robbed his center to reinforce his right, which was then in no condition to withstand the victorious cavalry of the Visigoths, who forced back his right wing, and then turned on the center. But the Hunnish general, like Lee, remained on the field, and apparently retired at his own pleasure. Meade, like Aetius, permitted Lee to remain in his front, after he had mastered him along the line. A standard author says: "It is probable that the crafty Aetius was unwilling to be too victorious." The same can be said of Meade—it was a safe victory. The results of that battle were felt for centuries; the result of this we fervently hope will continue to the end of time. The value of the victory of this great battle will never be fully estimated.

If we had failed here, then the efforts of the Pilgrim Fathers, who came to this country to establish a government on an equal basis to all, would have been futile. The battles of the Revolution would have been fought in vain; the solid fabric of liberty reared by the armies of the colonists, and the corner stone of this great Republic, planted by them would have been crumbled to dust. The dial hand of time would have been turned back toward the dark ages; individual prosperity would have been crushed out; civilization would have received a shock, and Christian progress been paralyzed. From the beginning of time, the history of the world is filled with vain attempts to establish a government on an equal basis to all, and we are egotistical enough to believe ours is the model

one to stand the test. Edmund Burke said that "The slain in battle have been many times greater than the present population of the whole earth." In my humble judgment, the result of this field has more significance than any battle of the eighty-eight prominent military campaigns recorded in history. Does Sparta now enjoy any of the fruits of Marathon? Did Hannibal at Cannæ preserve Carthage, or Scipio at Zama save the Roman Empire, only for the time being? Charlemagne established a vast empire on the ruins of Rome, after a thirty-two years war of great ferocity. He had scarcely died when it dissolved like the morning mist. The Eastern empire rose to power and magnificence, only to be destroyed. The Persian Empire, which received such great impulse under Cyrus the Great, who conquered and reigned from the Ægean Sea to the Euphrates, is now a sickly dynasty of no importance, and Herat, where a million and six hundred thousand lives were sacrificed, is only the key of the road from Russia to the East Indies. I admire Marlborough, at Romilies; Ferdinand at Minden; Frederick the Great at Leuthen; Joan of Arc at Orleans; Henry V at Agincourt; Gustavus Adolphus at Lutzen, and Prince Eugene at Cassano and Turin—they won great fame. The generals who fought on this and other fields of the late war, were struggling to save a nation established by the people and for the people, where its humblest citizen may be its chief executive.

On yonder hill, a rail-splitter delivered the most memorable speech in the history of the nation. It will live in the hearts of the people, and be respected times innumerable, long after other great speeches are forgotten. How fully it reveals the fact that his heart was constantly with the armies that must save the nation, and when this great battle was fought here, he sought relief in a spontaneous speech that crowned him prince of orators. Let every hamlet in the land have Lincoln's statue if desired, but here is the place above all others to erect one to his memory, where he stood that day. Make it towering, and let there be clustered around it the statues of the war governors who so faithfully aided him in his great work. Then will the picture of this field be complete, with its marble statues, and not till then.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF THE FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

HARTFORD, 1881.

President.....	Gen. J. C. ROBINSON.
Vice President.....	Gen. J. WM. HOFMANN.
Secretary and Treasurer.....	Capt. I. N. BURRITT.

DETROIT, 1882.

President.....Gen. EDWARD S. BRAGG.
 Vice President.....Col. A. M. EDWARDS.
 Secretary and Treasurer.....Capt. I. N. BURRITT.

WASHINGTON, 1883.

President.....Col. G. G. BENEDICT, Burlington, Vt.
 First Vice President....Co' ISAAC S. TICHENOR, Washington, D. C.
 Second Vice President.....Maj. E. P. HALSTEAD, Washington, D. C.
 Recording Secretary.....Capt. I. N. BURRITT, Washington, D. C.
 Cor. Secretary.....J. W. KIRKLEY, Georgetown, D. C.
 Treasurer.....THOMAS M. EXLEY, Washington, D. C.
 Historian.....J. H. STINE, Washington, D. C.

BROOKLYN, 1884.

President.....Gen. ABNER DOUBLEDAY, New York City.
 First Vice President.....Gen. EDWARD B. FOWLER.
 Second Vice President.....Capt. IRA N. BURRITT.
 Corresponding Secretary.....Jos. W. KIRKLEY, Georgetown, D. C.
 Recording Secretary.....WM. H. RILEY, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Treasurer.....THOS. M. EXLEY, Washington, D. C.
 Historian.....JAMES H. STINE, Washington, D. C.
 Vice President, Society of Army of the Potomac,
 representing First Corps.....Col. ISAAC S. TICHENOR.

BALTIMORE, 1885.

President.....ABNER DOUBLEDAY, New York City.
 Vice President, First Division...CHAS. E. COON, Washington, D. C.
 Vice President, Second Division...CHAS. E. PHELPS, Baltimore, Md.
 Vice President, Third Division.....PAT'K DE LACY, Scranton, Pa.
 Vice President, Artillery Corps...J. A. REYNOLDS, Rochester, N. Y.
 Corresponding Secretary...JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY, Georgetown, D. C.
 Recording SecretaryWM. H. RILEY, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Treasurer.....THOS. M. EXLEY, Washington, D. C.
 Historian.....J. H. STINE, Washington, D. C.
 Vice Pres., Society Army of Potomac, E. B. FOWLER, Brooklyn, N. Y.

SAN FRANCISCO, 1886.

President.....ABNER DOUBLEDAY, New York City.
 Vice President, First Division...CHAS. B. COON, Washington, D. C.
 Vice President, Second Division...CHAS. E. PHELPS, Baltimore, Md.
 Vice President, Third Division.....PAT'K DE LACY, Scranton, Pa.
 Vice President, Artillery Corps...J. A. REYNOLDS, Rochester, N. Y.
 Corresponding Secretary.....Jos. W. KIRKLEY, Georgetown, D. C.
 Recording Secretary.....WM. H. RILEY, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Treasurer.....THOMAS M. EXLEY, Washington, D. C.



GEN. HORATIO C. KING.



SARATOGA SPRINGS, 1887.

President	Maj. E. P. HALSTEAD.
Vice President, First Division.....	CHARLES E. COON.
Vice President, Second Division.....	CHARLES E. PHELPS.
Vice President, Third Division.....	Lieut. PAT'K DE LACY.
Vice President, Artillery Corps.....	Col. JNO. A. REYNOLDS.
Corresponding Secretary.....	Lieut. ABRAM MERRITT.
Recording Secretary.....	Capt. J. M. ANDREWS, JR.
Treasurer.....	WALTER J. GIBSON.
Historian.....	J. H. STINE.

GETTYSBURG, 1888.

President.....	Maj. E. P. HALSTEAD.
Vice President, First Division.....	Capt. L. E. POND.
Vice President, Second Division.....	Sergt. J. W. KIRKLY.
Vice President, Third Division.....	Capt. P. DELACY.
Vice President, Artillery Corps.....	Gen. JAMES A. HALL.
Corresponding Secretary.....	F. DONOHUE.
Recording Secretary.....	Capt. J. M. ANDREWS, JR.
Treasurer.....	WALTER J. GIBSON.
Historian.....	J. H. STINE.

ORANGE, 1889.

President.....	Gen. R. R. DAWES.
Vice President, First Division.....	CHARLES E. COON.
Vice President, Second Division.....	Col. REDFIELD PROCTOR.
Vice President, Third Division.....	CHARLES J. CHATFIELD.
Vice President, Artillery Corps.....	C. S. WAINRIGHT.
Corresponding Secretary.....	Capt. J. M. ANDREWS, JR.
Recording Secretary.....	Capt. H. O. CLARK.
Treasurer.....	FLORENCE DONOHUE.
Historian.....	J. H. STINE.

PORTLAND, 1890.

President.....	Col. REDFIELD PROCTOR.
Vice President, First Division.....	Capt. C. E. STUBBS.
Vice President, Second Division.....	Maj. D. B. RICKER.
Vice President, Third Division.....	Capt. H. O. CLARK.
Vice President, Artillery Corps.....	Capt. J. H. CHASE.
Recording Secretary.....	Capt. J. M. ANDREWS, JR.
Corresponding Secretary.....	H. O. CLARK.
Treasurer.....	A. H. VAN DUSEN.
Historian.....	J. H. STINE.

BUFFALO, 1891.

President.....	IRA M. HEDGES.
Vice President, First Division.....	E. B. WRIGHT.
Vice President, Second Division.....	W. F. ROGERS.
Vice President, Third Division.....	H. O. CLARK.
Vice President, Artillery Corps.....	Lieut. BENJ. W. WILBER.
Recording Secretary.....	Capt. J. M. ANDREWS, JR.
Corresponding Secretary.....	C. F. PIERCE.
Treasurer.....	Capt. A. H. VAN DUSEN.
Historian.....	J. H. STINE.

SOCIETY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

OFFICERS, 1869 TO 1892.

PRESIDENTS.

Lieutenant General PHILIP H. SHERIDAN, U. S. A.....	1869
Major General GEORGE G. MEADE, U. S. A.....	1870
Major General JOSEPH HOOKER, U. S. A.....	1871
Major General AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE, U. S. V.....	1872
Major General IRWIN McDOWELL, U. S. A.....	1873
Major General WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, U. S. A.....	1874
Major General JOHN F. HARTRANFT, U. S. V.....	* 1876
Major General HENRY W. SLOCUM, U. S. A.....	1877
Major General WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN, U. S. V.....	1878
Major General DANIEL E. SICKLES, U. S. V.....	1879
Major General HORATIO G. WRIGHT, U. S. A.....	1880
Brevet Major General CHARLES DEVENS, JR.....	1881
Major General A. A. HUMPHREYS, U. S. A.....	1882
Brevet Major General JOHN NEWTON, U. S. A.....	1883
General ULYSSES S. GRANT, U. S. A.....	1884-1885
Brevet Major General MARTIN T. MCMAHON, U. S. V.....	1886
Major General JOHN C. ROBINSON, U. S. V.....	1887
Major General JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN, U. S. V.....	1888
Major General JOHN G. PARKE, U. S. V., (Colonel U. S. A.).....	1889
Brigadier General SELDEN CONNOR, U. S. V.....	1890
Major General DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, U. S. V.....	1891

RECORDING SECRETARIES.

Brevet Major General GEO. H. SHARPE, U. S. V.....	1869-1876
Brevet Colonel HORATIO C. KING, U. S. V.....	1877-1891

CORRESPONDING SECRETARIES.

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM C. CHURCH, U. S. V.....	1869-1876
Brevet Brigadier General T. F. RODENBOUGH, U. S. A.....	1877-1878
Brevet Major General GEO. H. SHARPE, U. S. V.....	1879-1891

* No meeting was held in 1875.



HON. O. P. MORTON.

BIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER PERRY MORTON.

[War Governor of Indiana].

BY COLONEL HOLLOWAY, his Private Secretary.

In the little village of Saulsbury, Wayne County, Indiana, on the 4th day of August, 1823, Oliver Perry Morton was born. He was of English descent, his grandfather having emigrated from England about the beginning of the Revolutionary war, and settled in New Jersey. His mother died when he was quite young. After the death of his mother the most of his boyhood days were spent with his grandparents in Ohio and with his widowed aunts in Centreville, Ind. His opportunities for education were rather limited, and at the age of 15 he was put to learn the hatter's trade with his half-brother, William T. Morton. At this occupation he worked for years, employing all his spare time in study. Early in 1843 he entered Miami University, at Oxford, Ohio. He remained there two years in hard study. While there he was counted the best debater in the university, and displayed the powers of presenting an argument that afterwards made him famous.

On leaving college he entered the office of Hon. John S. Newman, at Centreville, and began the study of law. He was then nearly 22 years of age. On the 15th of May, 1845, he married Miss Lucinda M. Burbank, daughter of Isaac Burbank of that place. This marriage proved a most happy one, his chosen companion holding and exercising over him, from their marriage until his death, an influence that did much to advance his fame.

Mr. Morton was a Democrat in politics in his earlier years, and always took a deep interest in political affairs. In 1854, when the Missouri Compromise was repealed, Mr. Morton was one of the vast army who left the Democratic party and united to stem the tide of slavery aggression, and he became the leader of the new party in his section of the

State. He attended the Pittsburg Convention in 1856, and actively participated in its discussions. On the 1st of May of that year the new party met at Indianapolis to nominate a State ticket. Mr. Morton was elected unanimously to the head of the ticket. His opponent was Hon. A. P. Willard, the idol of his party, and who was regarded as the ablest stump speaker in the State. A joint canvass was arranged, and the champion of the new party soon proved himself more than a match for his opponent in debate. His strong logical arguments utterly drove his antagonist from all his defenses. The election resulted in favor of the Democrats, and Mr. Morton thought his political career was ended. The Republican party grew very rapidly between 1856 and 1860. In the latter year he accepted the second place on the ticket with Hon. Henry S. Lane at its head. He threw himself, heart and soul, into the canvass, and was everywhere recognized as the most powerful debater in either party. This time his party was successful.

The anticipated election of Mr. Lincoln as President had brought about threats of secession, and his success was no sooner heralded than South Carolina made haste to take herself, as she thought, out of the Union. It was a critical time. All hearts feared the Union was gone. The prevailing sentiment seemed to be that there was no remedy for secession. The Democrats held that there was no power to coerce a State, and the leading Republicans were advocating that the "wayward sister" should be permitted to depart in peace. There were stormy forebodings on all sides. The idea of civil war was abhorrent, yet the loyal people did not like the idea of having the Union dismembered. In the midst of this general gloom, there came a lightning flash which electrified the North and startled the South. On the 22d of November a monster meeting was held in Indianapolis to ratify the election. The newly-elected Governor Lane and others spoke. Their speeches were of a conciliatory nature. At length Lieutenant Governor Morton arose, and in his very first words the vast

audience saw that the man had come with the hour. There was no uncertainty with him. He announced at the very outset that if the issue was to be disunion and war, he was for war. It was a momentous occasion, and he felt that he was speaking for the Republican party, and not alone for it, but for the whole loyal element of the country, and his measured words fell upon the air like the notes of a bugle calling men to action. He discussed the right of secession, and the right to coerce, and gave to the acts of South Carolina an interpretation none before had been clear-sighted enough to see. In concluding, he struck the keynote of the whole situation in declaring and emphasizing that we are a nation and not a combination of States. Upon this point he said :

We must then cling to the idea that we are a nation, one and indivisible, and that, although subdivided by State lines for local and domestic purposes, we are but one people, the citizens of a common country, having like institutions and manners, and possessing a common interest in that inheritance of glory so richly provided by our fathers. We must, therefore, do no act, we must tolerate no act, we must concede no idea or theory that looks to or involves the dismemberment of the nation. * * * Seven years is but a day in the life of a nation, and I would rather come out of a struggle at the end of that time, defeated in arms, and conceding independence to successful revolution, than to purchase present peace by the concession of a principle that must inevitably explode this nation into small and dishonored fragments. * * * The whole question is summed up in this proposition : "Are we one nation, one people, or thirty-three nations, or thirty-three independent and petty States?" The statement of the proposition furnishes the answer. If we are one nation, then no State has a right to secede. Secession can only be the result of successful revolution. I answer the question for you, and I know that my answer will find a true response in every true American heart, that we are one people, one nation, undivided and indivisible.

This was the first time that resistance on the part of the North had been advocated. It touched the popular chord everywhere. From that time on there was no hesitancy upon the part of the loyal masses. Mr. Lincoln, when he read it, said "it covers the whole ground, and declares the

policy of the Government." That speech made Mr. Morton a leader in national politics.

On the 14th day of January, 1861, he took the oath of office as president of the Senate. Two days afterwards Governor Lane resigned to take his seat in the United States Senate, and Mr. Morton became Governor of the State. The history of his administration of the affairs of the State for six years has become the foundation stone of his fame. He everywhere became known as the great War Governor. When the war came in April, as he had been the first to predict that it would come, and the first to crystallize the loyal sentiment of the North, so he was the first to respond to the call of the President for troops. At his word Indiana sprang to arms, and thousands of her loyal sons answered the call of the President for six regiments. Here was a chance for his wonderful executive ability. Indiana, like the other Northern States, was unprepared for war. She had but few men in her borders who were possessed of any military training. Volunteers were plenty, but how to arm and equip them was the trouble. Governor Morton was equal to the emergency. He grasped the situation at a glance, and seemed to be everywhere present, stirring and animating the citizens, bringing order out of chaos, and reducing all to system, so that in comparatively few days Indiana was a vast military camp, and troops were ready for the field.

An agent was sent to the leading manufacturers of the East and Canada to purchase arms. He gave but few hours to sleep in those days, but wore out his secretaries in continuous labors. During the four years of the war this intense strain was continued. A large number of people of his State were opposed to war, and thousands of them actively sympathized with the rebellion. These things added to his labors. He was the youngest of all the loyal governors, but so manifest was his ability, so lofty his patriotism, so hopeful was he in the darkest hours, that all turned to him for counsel. President Lincoln and his great

War Secretary trusted him and leaned upon him as they did upon no one else. He was often consulted by the generals in the field, especially those in the West, in regard to the movements of the army, and he was always the first one appealed to for help and reënforcements. No such appeal was ever made in vain. Of the high opinion entertained of him and his labors by the members of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, the following extract from a letter written by Hon. S. P. Chase to Governor Morton in 1865 will evidence. Mr. Chase wrote him a letter stating that, in a conversation with Secretary Stanton the night before,

We naturally, turning our minds to the past, fell to talking of you. We agreed that no Governor rendered such services, or displayed such courage or more ability in administration; and we agreed that your recent services were most meritorious of all, because rendered under circumstances of greatest personal risk of health and life, and which would have been by almost any man regarded, and by all accepted, as good reasons for total inaction. I have seldom heard Stanton express himself so warmly.

As we said before, the war found the North unprepared. In the autumn of 1861 he found that the General Government would be unable to supply the men with overcoats in time to prevent suffering from the cold. He went to New York and purchased twenty-nine thousand overcoats for the use of the Indiana troops. The soldiers were his first care. To relieve the sick and wounded he organized a sanitary commission, which afterwards was adopted by the other States. To show his deep interest in the soldiers, and the care he took of their interests, it may be mentioned that during the siege of Vicksburg, when the army hospitals were full of sick and wounded, he applied to the Secretary of War for permission to remove the Indiana sick and wounded to the North. The Secretary declined to grant the permission. Governor Morton declared his intention to take the matter before the President. He did so, and the result was a general order permitting not only Indiana, but any other State to remove the sick and wounded and care

for them. Under the system of relief inaugurated by him, Indiana collected and disbursed over \$600,000 in money and supplies.

In this short sketch we can do no more than glance at his work as Governor. In 1862 the Democrats elected a Legislature hostile to the war, and efforts were made to cripple the Governor in discharge of his duties. They refused to make appropriations to carry on the State government and to meet the interest on the public debt. Governor Morton was undismayed. He went to New York, and through the banking firm of Winslow, Lanier & Co., and some of the counties of the State, and a few of the patriotic citizens, arranged for money for the use of the State. He established a financial bureau without authority of the law, and in one year and nine months he raised and paid out over a million dollars. Every dollar of this was paid out upon his own check, and not a dollar was lost or misappropriated.

His extraordinary activity was well demonstrated in 1862, during the invasion of Kentucky by Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith. These two active Confederate generals had slipped around General Buell and invaded Kentucky, threatening both Louisville and Cincinnati. On the 17th of August, late at night, he received a telegram that Kentucky had been invaded at several points. Before night of the 18th one regiment was mustered in, armed, and started for the scene of action. During the night of the 18th four more regiments were forwarded. On the morning of the 19th some of the patriotic banks and citizens advanced half a million dollars, and during the day and night four more regiments were paid and sent forward. By the 31st of August more than 30,000 troops had been armed and sent to the relief of Kentucky. All this time the arsenal of the State was employed day and night in the manufacture of ammunition, making 300,000 rounds daily, and all the river towns of the State were occupied by the State militia. Ohio as well as Kentucky wanted help. Cincinnati was threatened. Governor Morton was called upon, and Indi-

ana troops rushed to the defense of her sister State. Ammunition was wanted for the heavy guns placed in position. The Mayor of Cincinnati and Committee of Defense telegraphed to Columbus for a supply. They were instructed to make out a requisition in due form and have it approved by the commanding officer and forward it, and the ammunition would be supplied. They then applied to Governor Morton. No requisition was asked for, but the telegraph flashed back the answer that in an hour a train would start, and the train did so, bearing about 4000 rounds of artillery and 720,000 rounds for small arms. In eight days Indiana supplied 33,000 rounds for artillery and 3,365,000 for small arms, the entire amount having been made at the State arsenal. For his services the Cincinnati Common Council ordered his portrait painted and placed in the City Hall, which was done with imposing ceremonies.

In 1864, in the midst of a heated presidential canvass, the exposure came of the organization known as the Knights of the Golden Circle, or Sons of Liberty. This organization numbered fifty thousand members in the State, and an uprising was planned. The Governor had possessed himself of all their secrets, and before they knew that they were even suspected, he dealt them a terrible blow and crushed them. He ordered the arrest of the prominent leaders of the movement, and so alarmed were the members to find that their plots were known, and that they were in the power of a man whose hatred of treason was so intense, and who was so unrelenting in his efforts to crush all disloyalty, that dismay seized upon them and they stood bewildered, not knowing what to expect. The trial and conviction of the leaders is a part of the general history of the country.

Governor Morton was triumphantly elected to the office of Governor in 1864, and the people placed a loyal Legislature to help him. It was the grandest political triumph ever achieved in this State.

Oliver P. Morton was twice elected a member of the United States Senate by the Republicans, his first term

commencing on the 4th day of March, 1867, and his second on the 4th day of March, 1873. The limits of this sketch forbid anything like an attempt at a history of his senatorial labors. During his ten years of service, he was foremost in all things—in debates, in party counsels, in labors. It is not invidious to say of him that in labors he was more abundant than any other, notwithstanding his physical disability. He entered the Senate at a stirring time. The war was ended, but the South was in a state of chaos. What was to be done, and how to do it, were the two questions uppermost in the minds of all. There was an irreconcilable quarrel between Congress and the President. At the very outset of his senatorial career, although it was his first legislative experience, he was given three important places. He was made chairman of the Committee on Manufactures, and a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and that of Military Affairs. The first great question in which he took part was that of reconstruction. He went into the Senate with well-settled views upon this question. He had held tenaciously to the idea that the United States was a nation, and he insisted upon that on all occasions. He looked upon treason as a crime deserving punishment. He could not be led to believe that those who had laid down their arms after a four years' struggle to overthrow the Government could safely be intrusted with power until, at least, they had given evidence of having renewed their allegiance. He was inspired by no hatred of the people of the South; it was their treason he hated.

To Senator Morton more than any other man is due the credit of the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. He was bold and aggressive in his advocacy of this important measure, designed as it was to secure to the colored man the right of suffrage. It was opposed by Senator Sumner and some other Republican members, but Mr. Morton led in the debate and carried the measure triumphantly through. He met all arguments, repelled all assaults, and held the friends of the amendment together until the final vote was taken.

Nor did his labors end with its adoption by Congress. It had to be ratified by the States. The Democratic members of the Indiana Legislature resigned to defeat its ratification. Senator Morton reached Indianapolis the morning the resignations were handed in. He sent word to the Republican members not to adjourn, but take a recess and meet him. He then showed them the resignations did not break a quorum, and demonstrated that they had the power to ratify the amendment.

They acted in accordance with his wishes, and the work was done, to the amazement of the Democrats. Still States were wanted. Senator Morton was equal to the emergency. A bill was introduced providing for the reconstruction of Mississippi, Texas and Virginia. He seized the opportunity, and offered an amendment providing that before these States should be admitted to representation in Congress they should ratify the proposed Fifteenth Amendment. The amendment was referred to the Committee on Judiciary. An adverse report was made by Senator Trumbull, chairman of the committee. Senator Morton still adhered to his amendment, and, after a debate lasting three days, was successful. This was one of the most remarkable debates of the Senate. Still another State was wanted, and Senator Morton led in the work of securing it. He introduced a bill authorizing the military commander of Georgia to call the Legislature of that State together, including the colored members, who had been expelled the year before, and empowering the Legislature to reconstruct that State, by electing two United States Senators after ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment. Again the Judiciary Committee antagonized him, but again he triumphed, and the Fifteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution, and stands to-day as a monument of his love of justice and his powers as a leader, more enduring than brass or marble.

Space will not permit the dwelling upon his labors in the great Kuklux debates and other similar measures, but in all he took a leading part, and upon all he left the im-

press of his lofty and unyielding patriotism. As chairman of the Committee on Elections and Privileges he rendered signal service. All questions that came before him were treated with the utmost fairness, and stern justice ruled in the decisions of his committee. One notable instance of this kind was his action in regard to the election of Caldwell as Senator from Kansas. It was evident that his election had been procured by corrupt means. Senator Morton held that he should be expelled from the Senate as unworthy a seat in that body. The friends of Caldwell plead to have the election simply declared void. Mr. Morton would not listen. His sense of justice had been outraged, and he felt that American politics needed purifying, and insisted upon expulsion, and to save himself from that the Kansas Senator resigned. With fraud, force, or corruption, he had no patience, and he would neither listen to the pleading of friends of the accused, nor pay heed to their threats. He believed in the right, and had the courage at all times and under all circumstances to maintain his beliefs.

In 1873 he delivered a speech in the Senate, which in the light of later events looks almost like prophecy. The question under discussion was a resolution instructing the Committee on Privileges and Elections to report upon the best and most practicable mode of electing a President and Vice-President, and providing a tribunal to adjust and decide all contested elections therewith. Senator Morton took strong grounds in favor of doing away with the Electoral College, and electing a President by the direct vote of the people.

It was Mr. Morton that gave to us the civil rights bill, which was intended to make good the promises of the nation to the colored men that they should have equal and exact justice with all races. That they have since failed is no fault of his.

In the Senate he left the stamp of his individuality upon all legislation. He was the moving spirit, the leader,

upon whom all relied. There was no question of public moment too small for his attention ; but his mind grasped all, his wisdom foresaw all, and as far as possible he attempted to warn and guide the country, that it might avoid the danger he foresaw before it. He spoke often in the Senate, but always with effect, and was listened to with the utmost attention, for it soon became recognized that when he summed up the arguments there was little or nothing left to be said. When defeated, as he sometimes was, he at once accepted the situation, but never despaired. His fertility of resource was wonderful, his industry was prodigious.

The last stroke which ended eventually his life, came while in the discharge of his senatorial duties, and though not in his place at the Capitol, yet like John Quincy Adams, he died in the harness.

In 1877 the Senate ordered an investigation into the case of Senator Grover, of Oregon, who was charged with having secured his election to the Senate with corrupt means. This duty devolved upon the Committee on Privileges and Elections, of which Senator Morton was chairman. It was necessary to go across the continent to Oregon. Senator Morton, though physically feeble and worn out by his incessant labors, did not hesitate to take the long and tiresome journey, in company with Senators Saulsbury of Delaware, and McMillan of Minnesota.

During the entire trip to San Francisco he was much prostrated, but the sea voyage to Portland, Oregon, seemed to do him good. This investigation lasted eighteen days, during which he labored incessantly, and the sessions of the committee were sometimes prolonged late into the night. This labor nearly broke down the other members of the committee, but it seemed the iron will of Senator Morton rose above every trial, for, in addition to his work on the committee, he prepared an elaborate political speech to be used in the approaching Ohio campaign. At the conclusion of the investigation he addressed the people at Salem in a

speech of considerable length, which was pronounced the ablest speech ever heard in the State.

He arrived in San Francisco upon his return home early in August, and on the sixth day received his second stroke of paralysis.

It would not be proper or just to close this short sketch without referring, at least in a brief way, to the political services of Morton other than those directly connected with his labors in the Senate and as Governor of Indiana, and to touch upon the general characteristics.

Great as was his work in both of the high offices to which the people elevated him, his labors in the general field of politics were no less prodigious. From 1856, when he first entered politics, until death claimed him, his voice and pen were never idle. In every political contest he was foremost in the fight, and the downtrodden and oppressed were always his care. Not only did he engage in the political battles of his own State, but in almost every State of the North he sent forth the bugle-call which rallied the forces of Republicanism. Few men made more stump speeches than he, and none ever carried such weight. In Indiana, during each campaign, he spoke incessantly, and he always knew how to touch the popular chord of patriotism.

He not only spoke, but hundreds of editorials from his pen found their way into the columns of the leading papers. His political speeches, if collected and published, would make a political history of the country in its great struggle, unequalled. He was always ready to answer the calls of his party. His devotion to his party was witnessed by his declining the English mission. President Grant was desirous of concluding a treaty with Great Britain on the subject of the depredations of the rebel cruisers, and urged Senator Morton to undertake the mission. He was inclined to accept it, but the Legislature of Indiana was controlled by the Democrats, and he declined. President Grant wrote to him as follows :

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D. C., October 21.

DEAR SIR :—Your letter of the 19th inst., declining the English mission, with reasons therefor, is received. I fully concur with you in all the reasons which you give for the course you find it your duty to pursue in the matter, but regret that the country is not to have your valuable services at the English Court at this important juncture. Your course, however, I deem wise, and it will be highly appreciated by your constituents in Indiana and throughout the country.

With assurances of my highest regard, I remain, very truly,
your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT.

Hon. O. P. MORTON, United States Senate.

It is difficult to justly sum up the character of such a man. He was a born leader, and no sooner did he enter political life than he took the leadership of his party and maintained it until his death. He was a man of strong will, indomitable energy, and untiring industry, and was possessed of moral and physical courage which approached the sublime. As a party leader and organizer he has had no equal. The universal testimony of those who were with him in the Senate is to the effect that America has never produced a party leader who could even lay claim to rival him. He was strong because he was always in earnest; because he never forgot a friend; because he was ever ready to meet a foe. He always mastered his subject, and never undertook to discuss it until he had thoroughly mastered every phase of it. It was this that gave him such great power with an audience. His mind was of an analytical turn, and when he spoke his sentences were terse, logical, and oftentimes eloquent. There was little or no fancy about him, and he rather despised those fancy flights of oratory by which some men endeavor to capture their audiences. He dealt with facts, and dealt with them as living things. While he was often severe, and even terrible, in his denunciation or arraignment of his opponents, he never was personal, but always calm, dignified, urbane.

Mr. Morton was simple in his tastes; honest in the

strictest sense of the word. No taint of corruption ever lingered near him. He loved his home, his family, his friends, and they clung to him with a devotion equal to his love. His nature was kind and sympathetic. The cry of the suffering or sorrowing always found an echo in his heart. The State often absorbed him to such a degree that he forgot himself, his own physical weakness, his own wants, but never so that he forgot his home or family, and he always turned to them for rest. When in the bosom of his family he was as simple as a child.

There was no love of pomp in his nature, and he was always accessible to the people, the poor equally with the rich. He gave to the country seventeen years of his life, and wore himself out and died a poor man, as he had lived. His last audible words expressed it all, "I am worn out." Yes, he had worn himself out.

The people of Indiana have raised in the Circle Park of Indianapolis a bronze statue of the great War Governor and Senator, but his greatest monument lives in the pages of the Constitution and laws of his country, and in the doctrines of patriotism he inculcated and enforced.

AUG 26 1920